| 作成者 |
|
|
|
| 本文言語 |
|
| 出版者 |
|
|
|
| 発行日 |
|
| 出版タイプ |
|
| アクセス権 |
|
| 関連DOI |
|
| 関連DOI |
|
|
|
| 関連URI |
|
|
|
| 関連情報 |
|
|
|
|
|
| 概要 |
In this paper, we consider a non-cooperative n-person game in the strategic form. As is well known, the game has a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. While, it does not always have a pure-strategy Nash ...equilibrium. Wherein, Iimura (2003), and Sato and Kawasaki (to appear in Taiwanese J Math) provided a sufficient condition for the game to have a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. This paper has two aims. The first is to extend the authors’ sufficient condition. The second is to give a necessary condition for the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the case of two persons. In both sections, monotonicity of the best response correspondences plays the central role.続きを見る
|
Mendeley出力
