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Due to the fact that classical computers cannot efficiently obtain random numbers, it is common practice to design cryptosystems in terms of real random numbers and then replace them with (cryptograph...ically secure) pseudorandom ones for concrete implementations. However, as pointed out by [10], this technique may lead to compromise of security in secure multiparty computation (MPC) protocols. Although this work suggests using information-theoretically secure protocols and pseudorandom generators (PRGs) with high min-entropy to alleviate the problem, yet it is preferable to base the security on computational assumptions rather than the stronger information-theoretic ones. By observing that the contrived constructions in the aforementioned work use MPC protocols and PRGs that are closely related to each other, we notice that it may help to alleviate the problem by using protocols and PRGs that are ”unrelated” to each other. In this paper, we propose a notion called”computational irrelevancy” to formalise the term ”unrelated” and under this condition provide a security guarantee under computational assumptions.show more
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