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| Abstract |
In a game each player holds a strategy based upon the actions that he can actually take. The quality and the quantity of the feasible actions are determined by his ability or power in the game. Genera...lly every player has no information on the others' powers, so it is one of the most important problems for them to know the powers. We treat such unknown games, played periodically, from the view point of information theory. We discuss both non-cooperative and cooperative games and prove some sufficient conditions under which a player can get the full information on the other players' powers from sequential observations on the states. In two person games we show also optimal strategies with respect to the information.show more
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