Mendeley出力
＜学術雑誌論文＞
Whoever Said Money Won't Solve All Your Problems?: Weighted Envy-free Allocation with Subsidy
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| 概要 | We explore solutions for fairly allocating indivisible items among agents assigned weights representing their entitlements. Our fairness goal is weighted-envy-freeness (WEF), where each agent deems th...eir allocated portion relative to their entitlement at least as favorable as any other’s relative to their own. Often, achieving WEF necessi- tates monetary transfers, which can be modeled as third-party subsidies. The goal is to attain WEF with bounded subsidies. Previous work relied on characterizations of unweighted envy-freeness (EF), that fail in the weighted setting. This makes our new setting challenging. We present polynomial-time algorithms that compute WEF allocations with a guaranteed upper bound on total subsidy for monotone valuations and various subclasses thereof. We also present an efficient algorithm to compute a fair allocation of items and money, when the budget is not enough to make the allocation WEF. This algorithm is new even for the unweighted setting続きを見る |
詳細
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| 登録日 | 2025.09.08 |
| 更新日 | 2025.10.08 |