

Psychoanalytic Schools in Historical Perspective

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Psychoanalytic Schools in Historical Perspective

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Abstract

This paper summarizes the historical evolution of major psychoanalytic schools. Because Sigmund Freud founded psychoanalysis, we start with the description of the Freudian model. Freud proposed his libido theory as an answer to the fundamental question in psychology, i.e. "What drives the human mind?" Many of the psychoanalytic schools came into existence from criticism of Freud's libido theory. Although they all disagree with the libido theory in one way or another, each school formulated a different hypothesis to replace it. This is basically why so many variations exist in psychoanalysis today, although the difference between them is often very subtle.

Alfred Adler and Carl Jung expressed the earliest criticism of Freud's libido theory. We thus first review the Individual Psychology of Alfred Adler, then proceed to the Analytic Psychology of Carl Jung. With respect to Ego Psychology, we review Anna Freud, Erik Erikson, Heinz Hartmann, and Margaret Mahler. As for British Object Relations School, we review Melanie Klein, William Fairbairn, Harry Guntrip, and Donald Winnicott. As for Neo-Freudians, we cover Harry Sullivan, Karen Horney, and Erich Fromm. Finally we review Heinz Kohut and his Two-Factor Theory.

Key Words: psychoanalysis, libido, Freud

1. Introduction

Psychoanalysis has gone through considerable changes since it was originally founded by Sigmund Freud (1856-1939). This paper summarizes the history and evolution of major psychoanalytic schools.¹⁾ To put it very simply, the fundamental question in psychology is "What drives the human mind?" Freud proposed his libido theory as a unique answer to this question. He focused on the sexual instinct as the primary driving force in the unconscious. Many of the psychoanalytic schools came into existence from criticism of Freud's libido theory. Although they all disagree with the libido theory in one way or another, each school accepted a different hypothesis to replace it. This is basically why so many variations exist in psychoanalysis today, and the difference between them

is often very subtle.

In this paper, we focus on the following psychoanalytic schools and associated figures:

- Individual Psychology: Alfred Adler
- Analytic Psychology: Carl Jung
- Ego Psychology: Anna Freud, Erik Erikson, Heinz Hartmann, and Margaret Mahler
- British Object Relations School: Melanie Klein, William Fairbairn, Harry Guntrip, and Donald Winnicott
- Neo-Freudians: Harry Sullivan, Karen Horney, and Erich Fromm
- Two-Factor Theory: Heinz Kohut

The earliest criticism directed against Freud's libido theory was formulated by Alfred Adler in 1911, and subsequently by Carl G. Jung in 1912. They both rejected Freud's emphasis on sexuality, and established their own theories. Adler named his theory Individual Psychology. He maintained that feelings of inferiority are universal in human beings and that the struggle to overcome these feelings is the source of human behaviors. On the other hand, Jung named his theory Analytic Psychology, and combined psychoanalysis with philosophy and religious mysticism. He classified the unconscious into two layers, personal and collective. In his theory, the collective unconscious includes behavior patterns common to mankind as the result of hereditary inheritance.

The third group, Ego Psychology, actually represents an evolution of the Freudian scheme. Freud published *The Ego and The Id* in 1923 when he was 66 years old (*Standard Edition*, 19, 3-66). What is apparent in this book is his shift of emphasis from the id to the ego. Anna Freud, Freud's youngest daughter, followed his path in England and pursued the function of the ego in the field of defense mechanisms. Erik Erikson, a former pupil of Anna Freud, took social factors into consideration and expanded the psychosexual and psychosocial developmental phases beyond adolescence, and applied them to the whole span of life. Erikson's eight developmental stages are widely known today. In the United States, Heinz Hartmann took a different approach from Anna Freud. While Anna Freud focused on the conflict and the resultant ego's defense, Hartmann started with the hypothesis that certain ego functions are inherent in neonates and that these functions develop within a conflict-free environment. Following Hartmann's strategy, Margaret Mahler took the child's interactions with the mother as the critical process and concentrated on the pre-oedipal period.

The fourth group, British Object Relations School, shifted the focus from the instinctual drives to the relation with objects. "Objects" in this school primarily mean other people or their internalized images. In the Freudian scheme, objects are of secondary significance because they are just the means to discharge the libidinal energy and to satisfy the sexual instinct. Melanie Klein,

the founder of the British School, developed her object relations theory while retaining Freud's dual instinct scheme (life and death instincts). Her basic premise is that desires and objects are inseparable, i.e. desires do not exist by themselves in an isolated form, but they are necessarily desires for something. In her theory, a child recognizes "good objects" by projecting libido through satisfying experience and "bad objects" by projecting destructive impulse as a result of frustrating experience. William R. D. Fairbairn then proposed a drastic change in object relations theory by rejecting most of Freud's fundamental premises. According to Fairbairn, the id and death instinct do not exist. Furthermore, libido is object-seeking rather than pleasure-seeking. In other words, for the ego, object relation is more fundamental and significant than instinctual satisfaction. Therefore, the nature of the object relation determines the way libido is discharged rather than the other way around. Harry Guntrip then took an opposite position to Fairbairn's. While Fairbairn considered object-seeking as indispensable for the ego, Guntrip considered withdrawal from objects as the primary tendency of the ego, and interpreted object-seeking as a defense. Donald W. Winnicott took yet a different stance. He did not reject the instinctual drives, and he took object relation and drive gratification as independent. Like Mahler, he focused on the child's interactions with the mother, and defined the mother-infant unit as the fundamental element.

The fifth group, the Neo-Freudians, consists of American scholars who largely rejected biological aspects of the Freudian scheme. They placed more emphasis on interpersonal or cultural affect on individuals. Unfortunately, however, there is no universally accepted definition of "Neo-Freudians," and different people use this term in slightly different ways. Harry S. Sullivan is the founder of Interpersonal School in the United States. In his theory, a person is not a separate entity from the social context, and personality is meaningful only in the realm of relations to others. Karen Horney criticized Freud as being too biologically oriented and reductionistic. She claimed that human needs for satisfaction (food, rest, sex, and so on) cannot be reduced to a single element such as sexual instinct. She rejected Freud's life and death instincts, and also the psychic structure of the id, ego, and superego. She defined basic anxiety to be the consequence of lack of acceptance and affection, thus stressing the importance of environmental factors. Erich Fromm attempted a consolidation of Marxism and psychoanalysis. He used an economic framework to explain the sociological evolution to modern capitalistic society, which in turn provided each individual with freedom and aloneness. This condition of aloneness is the basic cause of anxiety in Fromm's theory.

Finally, Heinz Kohut proposed a so-called mixed-model strategy. He separated psychosexual and narcissistic development as independent, and applied each of them to a different developmental phase of child. The earlier developmental stage, i.e. before the oedipal period, is that of narcissistic development. The goal of this period is to establish a firm and cohesive self. Once this goal is achieved, the subsequent oedipal phase progresses as psychosexual development based on the

Freud's theory.

As we can see from the above brief descriptions, the difference between these psychoanalytic schools is both diverse and subtle. On the one hand, people like Melanie Klein formulated her object relations theory within the realm of Freud's instinctual drives. On the other hand, people like Fairbairn and Horney dropped Freud's concept of life and death instincts and also his psychic structure, and went to extremes. Still the systems of Fairbairn and Horney are quite different from one another. In the remainder of the paper, we describe each psychoanalytic school in more detail. Since many of the schools are rooted in criticism against Freud, we start with a brief review of the Freudian model.

2. Freudian Model

Freud's basic premise is that instinctual drives are the fundamental driving forces for the human mind. For this reason, his scheme is often called the drive model. In his late years, Freud proposed the dual instinct theory, i.e. the theory of life and death instincts. The former is represented by sexual desires, and the latter by aggressive impulses. Freud, however, placed much more emphasis on the sexual instinct than the death instinct. These two instinctual drives control the id which is totally unconscious, and is the only psychic element of a newborn infant. The other elements, the ego and superego, come into existence later through the conflicts between the id and the external reality. Thus, the id is the primary psychic element, and is the sole source of psychic energy.

There are three important aspects of the Freudian scheme. First, his scheme is based on biology and anatomy. For instance, the instinctual drives and the discharge of psychic energy to release the bodily tensions are both biological concepts. The idea of the unconscious itself seems quite opposite to traditional rationalism, but the framework Freud employed to explain the function of the unconscious is highly materialistic. This biological aspect is a source of dispute with most Neo-Freudians. Second, the individual is depicted as a more or less self-sufficient entity per se. This is because man is basically taken as a biological entity rather than a social entity. Although Freud did not ignore the role of society, society is considered as secondary for its affect on individual. In *Civilization and Its Discontents*, Freud claims that the role of society is to suppress the harmful impulses like incestuous and destructive desires, which are inherent in human beings, to keep order (*Standard Edition*, 21, 59-145). This aspect is another source of dispute with so-called culturalists and also with the School of Object Relations. Finally, the Freudian model is deterministic. The crucial event in the early childhood works as a cause, and determines the actions in the future. Thus, there is a clear cause-effect relationship in human behaviors, and the goal of

psychoanalytic therapy is to identify the cause of pathological behaviors which is often suppressed in the unconscious. This is another controversial subject. People like Adler and Horney explicitly disagreed with Freud about his determinism. Having reviewed the Freudian drive model and its characteristics, we will now proceed to early criticism against Freud by Adler and Jung.

3. Alfred Adler and his Individual Psychology

Alfred Adler (1870-1937) was born in Vienna, and obtained his medical degree in 1895. In 1902, he was one of the four original members of Freud's Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. In 1911, however, he became Freud's "hated enemy" because of his criticism against Freud. He was actually the first disciple who broke away from the Freudian school.

Adler's Individual Psychology has three major characteristics (Adler 1929, 1931; Ansbacher and Ansbacher 1956). First, Adler rejected the biological aspect and the libido theory of Freud, and placed feelings of inferiority as the basic driving force of human mind. Second, he rejected the tripartite psychic structure, and treated the human mind as an indivisible entity. Third, he rejected the determinism, and insisted that human behaviors are oriented toward future goals instead of being determined by the past event. All of these three characteristics are discussed in more detail below.

Adler featured feelings of inferiority as the main theme in his theory just as Freud focused on sexual instinct. It may be due to the fact that he suffered from rickets in his childhood and was only five feet tall. His basic hypothesis is that inferiority feelings are universal to human beings and that attempts to compensate for these feelings lead to a commensurate striving for power. To support this hypothesis, he classified causes of inferiority feelings into three categories: genetic, organic, and situational. Genetic factor is based on infant's being physically helpless in relationship to adults. This is a universal and unavoidable phenomenon, and Adler believed that it would necessarily lead to primary inferiority feelings. What is implicit in his argument is that these feelings are inevitable regardless of the parents' attitude toward the child. This view of Adler is not shared by some Neo-Freudians like Sullivan and Horney as we will later see. The genetic factor is the rationale for his inferiority feelings as the universal element. The other two factors, organic and situational, are not necessarily universal, but reinforce the primary feelings of inferiority if present. Organic factors include physical disabilities and organic inferiority, which can be either anatomical or functional defects. Situational factors include maltreatment and rejection of a child by the parents. In Adler's theory, the Oedipus complex is a situational factor. This is in sharp contrast to the Freudian theory. While Freud maintained that the Oedipus complex is a necessary consequence of psychosexual development and hence is a universal phenomenon, Adler claimed that it was caused only by the

improper parental attitude which provoked the incestuous fantasy of the child. Another interesting contrast is seen in the subject of female psychology. In the Freudian theory, inferiority feelings of woman are described based on the anatomical and biological difference from man, namely lack of male genital organ. Adler rejected the emphasis on sexuality, and attributed these feelings of woman to situational factors, i.e. the result of social and cultural limitations. This view of Adler is clearly reflected in Horney as we will see later in the Neo-Freudian section.

According to Adler, man tries to compensate for the inferiority feelings, and strives for superiority and perfection. Each individual sets his or her own goal, and struggles toward it. The only conflict in his theory is between the individual who struggles toward his goal and external environment which interferes with this effort. There is no intrapsychic conflict such as the one between the id, ego and superego. This is the second characteristic of Adler. He rejected the Freud's psychic structure, and treated the individual as a whole and as an indivisible unit, which is why his system is named Individual Psychology. Consequently his interpretation of anxiety and neurosis is radically different from Freud's. Since there is no intrapsychic conflict, anxiety is simply a representation of inferiority feelings, and neurotic activity is the result of setting a wrong goal. For instance, in the case of phobia, the fundamental problem lies not in the behaviors of these people, but in the nature of their goals which are either implicit or explicit. Phobic people set up problematic goals and are doing every effort to achieve these goals. Their behaviors are quite consistent with the goals. The only problem is that their goals are not socially acceptable or sustainable.

The above interpretation of neurosis is totally different from Freud's, and leads to the rejection of determinism, Adler's third characteristic. Like Freud, Adler recognized the importance of early childhood. He believed that the individual's life style in relation to inferiority feelings is usually determined by four or five years of age. However, what is crucial in Adler's theory is that human behaviors are oriented toward future goals instead of being determined by the past. Although basic inferiority feelings might be established in early childhood, individual has a choice to attach his or her own meaning to these feelings and to set up his or her own goal to compensate for these feelings. Although the past event affects individual's future behaviors to certain extent, there is no cause-effect relationship. The behaviors are essentially driven by the goals set by the individual himself. This goal-oriented viewpoint of Adler is also inherited by Horney.

The above difference also leads to a different objective of psychoanalytic therapy. For Adler, the objective is not to identify a past event as the cause of neurotic behaviors, but to identify the often implicit goal of the patient and to correct it. Neurotic behaviors will disappear if a right goal takes over. Although his Individual Psychology is extinct as a psychoanalytic school today and he did not have any real followers, his influence is still significant in the history of psychoanalysis and

is most notable in Horney's work.

4. Carl Gustav Jung and his Analytic Psychology

Carl G. Jung (1875-1961) was a Swiss psychiatrist and was the second disciple who left the Freudian school. Although Jung was selected by Freud as his successor and became the first president of the International Psychoanalytic Association, his split from Freud became apparent in 1912, immediately after Adler's departure.

Jung's Analytic Psychology has three major characteristics. First, he denied the sexual nature of libido, and redefined it as general psychic energy. Second, he proposed his own tripartite psychic structure: conscious, personal unconscious, and collective unconscious. Third, he combined psychoanalysis with religious mysticism to explain the function of the collective unconscious.²⁾

Like Adler, Jung deemphasized the sexuality of Freud's libido, but came up with a totally different theory. While Adler rejected the concepts of psychic energy and intrapsychic conflicts altogether and treated the individual as a whole, Jung basically accepted these concepts and modified their constituent parts. Thus, his theory is still based on energy principles like Freud, but he defined libido to be general life energy without necessarily a sexual orientation. As for psychic structure, he divided the unconscious into two levels, personal and collective. The collective unconscious is comprised of the behavior patterns common to mankind or a specific race as the result of heredity.

This formulation of Jung has two immediate implications: lack of the id and superego. In the Freudian theory, the id is the sole source of psychic energy and consequently the primary psychic element. In the Jungian theory, there is no such element. Psychic energy is believed to be generated by the perpetual conflict between the conscious and unconscious. If the conscious mind cannot handle the contents of the unconscious properly, the result will be psychosis. The second implication is the role of culture. Freud's superego is formed only by the child's interactions with parents and society. In other words, there is nothing culturally inherent in a newborn infant according to Freud. On the other hand, Jung's collective unconscious includes cultural traits passed down as genetic information, and is inherent even in a neonate.

Jung relied on mysticism to explain the function of the collective unconscious. Here his methodology is totally different from the biological drive theory of Freud. Jung believed that ancient systems of reactions are stored in the collective unconscious as "archetypes." Since these archetypes must have been formed through the repeated experiences of certain behavior patterns, he turned to ancient mythology to identify these patterns. For instance, the image of "sun-hero" appears as a common theme in mythologies of various cultures. Jung interpreted this fact as the

result of people's watching the sunrise and sunset repeatedly in ancient times regardless of geographical locations and cultures. Therefore, he concluded that the image of sun-hero was stored in our collective unconscious as an archetype. He also proposed other behavior patterns like anima (female tendency in man) and animus (male tendency in woman) as archetypes. Thus, what dominate the collective unconscious in Jung's theory are not biological drives, but the images and behavior patterns inherited from the ancestors.

Jung's devotion to religious mysticism is probably related to his attachment to Eastern civilization. He actually denounced Western civilization as underestimating the significance of the unconscious. Because of his heavy reliance on mysticism, however, his argument is often very difficult to follow from a logical viewpoint. Presumably for this reason, one critic even classified him "as a religious philosopher instead of as a psychoanalyst" (Fine 1979, 86). Adler and Jung were representatives of early criticism directed against the Freudian drive model. We will next see how the Freudian School evolved in the field of Ego Psychology.

5. Ego Psychology

Ego Psychology was an evolution of the Freudian scheme after Freud shifted his emphasis from the id to the ego in his late years. This shift was most notably represented by the concept of defense. The concept first appeared in *The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence* in 1894 (*Standard Edition*, 3, 43-61), and was then dropped from his theory for 30 years until it again reappeared in *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety* in 1926 (*Standard Edition*, 20, 77-172). For instance, repression was first recognized as the cause of anxiety, but later reinterpreted as the effect of anxiety. In the latter viewpoint, anxiety was caused by a different mechanism, and the ego was reacting to anxiety by a way of repression to maintain equilibrium. This view placed more emphasis on the functions of the ego, which were the main theme of Ego Psychology, in contrast to the emphasis on libido in the earlier Id Psychology.

There are two lines of development in Ego Psychology. One is represented by Anna Freud who focused on the defense mechanisms to study the functions of the ego. The other is represented by Heinz Hartmann who considered certain ego functions as autonomous of the id. We will start our discussion of Ego Psychology with Anna Freud.

5.1. Anna Freud

Anna Freud (1895-1982) was the youngest of Freud's six children. She came to London with Freud when they fled Vienna in 1938, and continued her study in England thereafter. Her major contribution consists of her study of defense mechanisms and the application of psychoanalytic

theory in the field of child psychology.

Anna Freud's position is quite similar to Freud's drive model. The basic premise is that the ego arises from the conflicts between the id and external reality and develops through the conflicts with the id, superego, and reality. Therefore, it is a logical consequence to concentrate on the reactions of the ego when faced with conflicts in order to study its functions. In 1936, she summarized various defense mechanisms in *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence* (Freud 1954). In this book, she discussed nine mechanisms which Freud had mentioned earlier (regression, repression, reaction formation, isolation, undoing, projection, introjection, turning against the self, and reversal), and also added five others (sublimation, denial, restriction of the ego, identification with the aggressor, and a form of altruism).

Anna Freud's second contribution was her application of psychoanalysis to the study and treatment of children. Except for the case of little Hans, then five years old, Freud did not treat young children. As a result, this task was taken up by his daughter. She published *Introduction to the Technique of Child Analysis*, her first book about the treatment of children, in 1928. This task was also taken up by Melanie Klein, the founder of the British School. There are deep disagreements between their theories, and the British psychoanalytic society is divided accordingly. While Klein used play as a therapeutic technique for children and insisted on the neutral position of analysts in relation to children, A. Freud rejected such a technique and insisted on the educational role of analysts instead. A. Freud's argument is that children cannot be treated in the same way as adults. In the Freudian scheme, the key concept in therapy is transference. A patient comes to a therapist with an inner world which is formed by past experiences. Interpretation of the patient's transference onto the therapist is essential for interpreting his or her past and eventually for liberating the person from bondage of the past. Children, however, are not capable of transference because they are still close to the parents. Therefore, it is meaningless to take a neutral position and treat children like adults. This is the primary argument of A. Freud. The therapist needs to establish an educational relationship with the child before the treatment, and the objective of treatment is to understand, respect, and helpfully modify the behavior of the child.

Anna Freud is considered to represent the most orthodox psychoanalytic school. Ironically she has received much greater recognition in the United States than in England, where M. Klein held the dominant position. Before we turn to Hartmann's model of Ego Psychology, we will briefly discuss Erik Erikson, a former pupil of Anna Freud.

5.2. Erik Homburger Erikson

Erik H. Erikson (1902-1994) graduated from the Vienna Institute of Psychoanalysis, where he was a pupil of Anna Freud, in 1933, and immediately emigrated to the United States. In Vienna,

he received training to be a child analyst. Erikson's background is unusual. Upon his first contact with the Viennese circle in 1927, he was a hitchhiking artist. He was one of rare figures in the psychoanalytic society who did not possess formal academic degrees, the only other major figure being Anna Freud.

Erikson's theory has two characteristics. First, he extended the psychosexual and psychosocial development stages to the whole span of life, and defined eight developmental stages. Second, he took up the issue of identity, and claimed its establishment as the responsibility of the ego. It is as a result of this second characteristic that Erikson's system is viewed primarily as Ego Psychology (Erikson 1963).

Erikson did not abandon Freud's drive model. Actually he repeatedly insisted that he was not opposed to the Freudian theory. Instead he added social factors to Freud's psychosexual development phases (oral, anal, and genital), and expanded the concept to the whole life. Freud's development phases are based on the biological development of erogenous body zones since the focus of libidinal energy necessarily shifts as the individual grows. Erikson included other biological aspects like muscular and locomotive development as well as social aspects. Hence actions like creating, competing, and overcoming are all important elements of development for Erikson. While Freud focused on the first five years of life as the critical period, Erikson viewed the whole life span as involving a series of developmental activities. He characterized each of eight phases by a corresponding conflict, and believed that the resolution of conflict at one phase enabled the individual to develop and advance to the next phase. Erikson's eight developmental stages are as follows:

- (1) basic trust vs. basic mistrust
- (2) autonomy vs. shame and doubt
- (3) initiative vs. guilt
- (4) industry vs. inferiority
- (5) identity vs. role confusion
- (6) intimacy vs. isolation
- (7) generativity vs. stagnation
- (8) ego integrity vs. despair

For instance, the fifth stage (identity vs. role confusion) corresponds to the adolescent period. In this period, the identity formed through the childhood experiences and libidinal changes come in direct conflict with the roles and opportunities provided by the society. The goal of this period is to reconcile these two opposing elements and to establish one's own identity.

This issue of identity is the central theme of Erikson and is a second fundamental characteristic of his theory. Identity is not a mere result of the identification by which Oedipus complex is

resolved, but what the ego needs to establish on its own in its conflict with both biological and social factors. Erikson assigns the ego a more active role in the establishment of self than Freud.

He called the defining moment in adolescence an “identity crisis,” and maintained that establishment of one’s own self is difficult, especially in a fluid society like the United States. While Freud’s model is trans-cultural and is not confined to a specific culture, Erikson’s major concern was the development of the individual in the American social context. We will now proceed to the second school of Ego Psychology, namely the model of Hartmann.

5.3. Heinz Hartmann

Heinz Hartmann (1894-1970) is often said to represent the New York School because he mainly worked in New York after he had emigrated from Europe. Although he did not reject the drive model, he took a different approach to Ego Psychology from Anna Freud. Briefly, he focused on the “autonomous ego” rather than “defensive ego.” He believed that certain ego functions develop autonomously under conflict-free conditions. Consequently it was not necessary for him to study the functions of the ego from the defense point of view, and his observation was more oriented toward adaptation (Hartmann 1939; Hartmann, Kris, and Lowenstein 1946).

Like Freud, Hartmann considered the human being as essentially a biological entity. However, his basic premise is that certain functions of the ego such as perception, memory, language, and motility develop independently and do not arise from the conflict between the id and reality. He called this the primary autonomy of the ego, and according to Hartmann, these functions can develop within a conflict-free environment. Although his model provided the ego with more autonomy than Freud, Hartmann did not consider the ego as a separate or independent element inherent in humans from the beginning of life. For a newborn infant, the ego is still a part of the id. In the Freudian theory, the separation of the ego from the id is the outcome of the infant’s frustration in his or her encounter with the external world. In Hartmann’s model, this separation is the result of perceptual and cognitive maturity. That is, the ego splits from the id when an infant is capable of differentiating himself from the outer world, assuming that functions of perception and cognition necessary for such differentiation develop spontaneously. In short, Hartmann gave more autonomy to the ego in the functional sense, but not in the existential sense.

As implied in the above discussion, Hartmann saw the ego’s development more as the spontaneous adaptation to the environment rather than as a defense against conflicts and frustrations. He was more interested in development as a normal non-pathological phenomenon. His belief was that human beings were born with capabilities to adapt to average life conditions. In addition to primary autonomy, he proposed a secondary autonomy of the ego because some functions originally derived from the conflict will become independent of such conflict after repeated

experience. The ego becomes capable of these functions even when the original conflicts between the id and reality are not present as a trigger. It is worth noting that Hartmann's concept of adaptation is meant primarily in the physical and biological sense. This is because he took the human being as a biological entity rather than as a social or economic entity.

Later Hartmann proposed a more autonomous ego model, and claimed that the ego has its own psychic energy, not borrowed from the id. This is a quite different assumption from the Freud's libido theory. In the Freudian scheme, even after the focus was shifted from the id to the ego, the id was still the sole source of psychic energy. Hartmann formulated a system such that the ego possesses its own psychic energy, called primary ego energy, which in turn drives the primary autonomous functions of the ego. For the secondary autonomous functions, he proposed that id energy is converted to ego energy by a process called neutralization. Both sexual and aggressive energies of the id are neutralized and subsequently used for the secondary autonomy of the ego. Hartmann's neutralization looks somewhat similar to Freud's sublimation which directs the libido to a socially acceptable goal, but there are three differences between these two concepts. First, neutralization is a continuous process supplying the secondary autonomous functions with the necessary energy, whereas sublimation is a defense mechanism used only when the original libidinal satisfaction is unavailable. Second, neutralization applies to both libido and aggressive energy, whereas sublimation only applies to the former. Third, neutralization changes the quality of the id energy, whereas sublimation simply deflects the aim of discharge. Thus, the primary and secondary autonomous functions of the ego are driven by the primary ego energy and the neutralized id energy, respectively. Since Hartmann started with the Freud's psychic structure and the concept of psychic energy, the formulation of primary ego energy and neutralization process was probably inevitable to lend theoretical support to the functional autonomy of the ego. Hartmann's model had significant impact on the psychoanalytic movement after World War II. Before we finish the section of Ego Psychology, we will briefly discuss one of Hartmann's followers, Margaret Mahler.

5.4. Margaret Mahler

Margaret Mahler was a pediatrician in Vienna, and came to the United States in the late 1930s. She followed Hartmann's approach, but paid particular attention to early ego development and infant-mother relationship based on her observation of normal and pathological behaviors of children (Mahler 1975).

While Hartmann described adaptation in physical and biological terms, Mahler viewed adaptation specifically in terms of an infant's interactions with the mother. According to Mahler, a newborn infant is totally narcissistic and its first stage of adaptation is symbiosis with the mother. Thereafter adaptation takes the form of a movement toward self-sufficiency and individuation.

Thus, Mahler defined her three developmental phases as follows:

- autistic phase: from birth till three or four weeks
- symbiotic phase: till four or five months
- separation individuation phase:
 - differentiation sub-phase: till 10 months
 - practicing sub-phase: till 15 to 18 months
 - rapprochement sub-phase: till the end of the second year
 - object constancy sub-phase: from the start of the third year

Mahler's theory has two important aspects. One is her emphasis on the pre-oedipal phase. In Freud's psychosexual development theory, the Oedipus complex occurs around the fifth year, and is considered crucial for the child's personality formation. In Mahler's developmental scheme, however, the crucial moment in a child's progress occurs in much earlier years. Therefore, the personality is formed in the pre-oedipal period through the interaction with the symbiotic partner, usually the mother. Consequently the Oedipus complex is not a critical phenomenon from the developmental point of view, nor does the father play an important role. The other notable aspect of Mahler's system is that individuation is not a spontaneous conflict-free process. She recognized two conflicting elements in this process. One is the spontaneous movement toward individuation driven by Hartmann's autonomous ego functions. The other is the child's awareness and resultant fear of separation from the mother. For Mahler, individuation is a process of overcoming this fear to become a separate individual, and it is not achievable without the emotional availability of the mother. While Hartmann was mainly interested in the ego's development as a normal phenomenon, Mahler saw a possibility of psychopathology without proper maternal care. This difference is probably due to Mahler's encounter with children's pathological behaviors as a pediatrician.

Mahler's focus on infant-mother relationship is similar to Winnicott as we will see later in the section on the British Object Relations School. Actually, Mahler was very much influenced by Winnicott. The mother in Mahler's system is indeed depicted as a symbiotic object, and the key is the child's relations with this object. Having discussed Ego Psychology, we will now proceed to object relations theory.

6. British Object Relations School

The British Object Relations School (also called British School or Object Relations School) emerged in England in 1920s and 1930s out of criticism directed against the Freudian drive theory. The basic position of this school involved a shift of emphasis from the instinctual drives to the relationship with object (Greenberg and Mitchell 1983).

In Freudian theory, the object is given a secondary place while instinctual drives are considered primary. Its basic framework is as follows: Biologically the fundamental tendency of an organism is to discharge excitation immediately because excessive accumulation is harmful. Thus discharge has survival value for organism, and the role of the object is restricted to satisfying the instinctual need, namely the discharge of excitation. In other words, the object is only a means and vehicle for the purpose of discharging aggressive and libidinal drives, but not an end in itself. Or we might say that the object is a practical necessity in Freudian theory, but not a logical necessity. That is, on a purely theoretical basis, if instinctual drives can be somehow discharged without an object, then the object is not necessary. In practice, however, drives usually cannot be discharged without object, so the object becomes a practical necessity. By the same token, the object does not have to be a person. It can be an animal or material substance. To further illustrate the point, loss of love object (say, the mother) is harmful for the organism (say, the infant) not because of the loss itself. The harm is not directly due to the loss of object or object relations. Such loss is harmful only because it will subsequently block the discharge and will cause excessive excitation.

The British School was opposed to this drive theory, and placed more emphasis on object relations. The object in this school is generally a person, either real or imaginary, and interpretation of human behaviors is based on an individual's specific relations with the object. However, among adherents of the school, there are wide variations. For instance, Melanie Klein retained the concept of drives as well as life and death instincts, but Fairbairn abandoned them altogether. We will start our discussion with Klein, the founder of the British School.

6.1. Melanie Klein

Melanie Klein (1882-1960) was born in Vienna and later moved to Budapest, Hungary. She was greatly influenced by Freud's three closest collaborators: Sandor Ferenczi (1873-1933), Karl Abraham (1877-1925), and Ernest Jones (1879-1958). Klein lived in Budapest between 1910 and 1919, and decided to apply psychoanalysis to children's treatment as a result of Ferenczi's encouragement. Later through Abraham's assistance, she worked at the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute until 1925. Finally, thanks to Jones, she emigrated to England in 1926 where she established the Object Relations School. Probably because of the influence of these figures, Klein formulated her object relations theory without rejecting the drive concept. While she held a dominant position in England, she found almost no supporters in the United States until the 1970s.

Klein's object relations theory has four important characteristics (Klein 1932, 1948, 1957, 1961). First, she did not abandon the drive concept, but redefined the nature of drives to highlight object relations. Second, she attributed much broader significance to fantasy, and placed more emphasis on the internal object than the external one. Third, she took the struggle between the life

and death instincts as the critical factor in infant's development, and established her own development theory. In her view, personality is determined in the first year of life, and the Oedipus complex happens in the middle of the first year. Fourth, for the purpose of child analysis, she devised a play technique, and proposed that a therapist take a neutral and purely interpretative stance.

Klein's first basic premise is that drives are inseparable from their objects. In other words, desires do not exist alone, but always accompany their targets. Thus desires are necessarily desires for something, and the object is taken as a logical necessity for drives. This redefinition of drives is in sharp contrast with the original Freudian concept, in which drives in the id are without direction or definite structure by themselves. Drives are directed to objects only when reduction of tension is required. In Klein's theory, drives are fundamentally directional psychological phenomena by definition. Aggressive and libidinal drives have specific relations with specific objects from the very beginning. Klein thus shifted the emphasis to object relations without abandoning the drive concept. For instance, an infant's turning to the mother is, in Freudian interpretation, the result of frustration because the accumulated libido inside the infant does not have proper channel of discharge toward outside world. Therefore, logically speaking, the libidinal object does not have to be the mother as long as it guarantees tension reduction. In Klein's interpretation, it must be the mother because libido in this case is inherently associated with the mother as its object. It is not possible that libido here is separated from the mother and taken as an abstract and isolated form of sexual desire.

Klein's second characteristic is her use of fantasy and internal object. She extended the meaning and function of fantasy, and claimed that it would become operative for an infant within a few weeks from birth. In the Freudian scheme, fantasy is a consequence of frustrated experience and is substitution of real gratification because fantasy is a function of the ego which in turn arises from the conflict. In Klein's view, fantasy is a more spontaneous, rather than defensive, function. Her second basic premise is that a neonate is originally endowed with the ego and its perceptive functions as well as with the id. Unlike Hartmann, she gave autonomy to the ego in both functional and existential sense. Therefore, her ego does not arise or evolve through the conflict between the id and reality. This also disagrees with Anna Freud who takes a more traditional Freudian view. Klein defined fantasy as interaction between the id's instinctual impulses and the ego's perceptive functions, both of which are inherent in an infant. Her concept of fantasy thus has much broader meaning, and is more spontaneous. It is customary to use "phantasy" to denote Klein's specific usage of fantasy.

Her phantasy consequently leads to the mechanism of introjection and projection. Phantasy is the interaction between the impulses and perceptive functions. The external object is first

perceived by these ego functions. The perceptive image is then affected by the id's impulses, and stored internally in the modified form. This is the mechanism of introjection, and the introjected image of the external object is the internal object. This internalized image can be further affected by the impulses and then projected toward the external object through perceptive functions. These processes are self-perpetuating, and the projected image can be re-introjected in turn. As the result of phantasy, the child's mind contains numerous internal objects. Object relations in her theory is thus oriented more toward the relationship of the ego with internal object than with external object. This heavy reliance on internal object is one distinction between her object relations theory and Sullivan's interpersonal theory. Another important point is that her usage of introjection and projection is not from the defensive point of view. Just like phantasy, she considered these mechanisms a natural and spontaneous consequence of human development. This is another source of dispute with A. Freud. First of all, A. Freud considers repression as the major mechanism of the infant's ego, and second she defines introjection and projection strictly as defenses against the conflict.

Using the concept of internal object, Klein also offered a different interpretation of narcissism. Freud draws a distinction between object libido and narcissistic libido. The former is libido directed toward external object, and the latter toward the ego. Thus narcissism is a phenomenon such that libido is directed toward the ego itself. Klein, on the other hand, focused on the contrast between external and internal object instead of external object and the ego. She proposed that narcissistic libido is not directed toward the ego itself, but toward the internal objects. Unlike Freud, there is no conversion from narcissistic libido to object libido because libido is in each case associated with a specific object, either internal or external, from the beginning.

Klein's third characteristic is that struggle between life and death instincts is critical in infant's early development. Infant's first object relation is with the mother's breast. This external object will then be split into good object and bad object as follows: Through the interaction with the breast, the infant will have both the satisfying experience of having the milk and the frustrating experience of not having the milk when desired. Satisfying experience is combined with libidinal impulse, and will lead to an image of the good breast. Likewise frustrating experience is combined with an aggressive impulse, and will lead to an image of the bad breast. These images are then introjected, and become good and bad internal objects. This is the process of splitting. Klein called this situation of the infant the "paranoid-schizoid position," and believed that it would happen within three months from birth. In this period, the major anxiety of the infant is the fear of destruction of self from outside, namely by the bad object. The destructive impulse leads to the fear of annihilation of self through the bad object. The next development phase is the "depressive position" which takes place in the following three months. In this period, the infant comes to recognize the mother

as a single entity thanks to the autonomous development of perceptive functions of the ego. It becomes apparent for the infant that the bad breast is indeed part of the mother with the good breast and that destroying the bad object will automatically destroy the good object. This discovery causes frustration and anxiety, which is why this situation is called depressive position. The child suffers from a phantasy that the good object is totally destroyed by one's aggression and will never be reconstituted. Here the destructive impulse leads to the fear of destroying the good object by one's own aggression. Klein thus depicted the child's early life as struggle between life and death instincts.

As evident from this discussion, Klein concentrated on the first year of life as the critical developmental period. She claimed that the superego starts to emerge as soon as the mother is recognized as a whole and that the Oedipus complex happens in the middle of the first year. In the Freudian model, both of these phenomena occur around the fifth year. Freud's psychosexual phases are based on the development of erogenous body zones (mouth, anus, and genitals) which in turn causes the shift of libidinal focus. Klein did not take this viewpoint. For her, the child's body is not a source of drives, but a vehicle to express feelings since the child does not have the expressive power of language at the beginning.

In her late years, envy became her central theme (Klein 1957). She distinguished envy from other kinds of hatred in that envy is directed toward good objects while all other forms of hatred are toward bad objects. Envy is unique because a child wants to destroy objects because they are good. An example is the mother's breast providing the child with a limited amount of milk. The child starts to feel that the mother is withholding the milk which gives the child such satisfaction. The very goodness and richness of the good breast drives the child to the destruction of good object, which in turn causes persecution anxiety and terror in the child.

Klein's fourth characteristic is her application of psychoanalysis to the treatment of children. She devised a method of play therapy since children cannot express their feelings fully with language. This is in line with her belief that body is a vehicle to express the feelings instead of a source of the feelings. She also took a purely analytic approach, focusing on the instinctual conflicts. As described in the section of Ego Psychology, Klein's attitude of treating children just like adults was severely criticized by Anna Freud who insisted on the educational role of a children's therapist. For a similar reason, Klein's usage of terms like paranoid and depression in the normal development stage of infancy drew much criticism from traditional Freudians. These terms are predominant in adult psychoses. In their opinion, adult psychosis, especially depression, is a conflict among well-developed personality elements, and is essentially different from the conflict experienced by children. Klein's theory is, in a sense, a compromise between Freud's drive model and object relations model. We will next see Fairbairn's model which is drastically different and highly non-

Freudian.

6.2. William Ronald Dodds Fairbairn

William R. D. Fairbairn was a Scottish psychoanalyst. He proposed a radically different theory from Klein's, and tried to replace Freud's drive model by the object relations theory (Fairbairn 1954, 1963). Fairbairn's theory has two major characteristics. First, he abandoned the drive concept, and characterized libido as object-seeking instead of pleasure-seeking. Second, he attached primary importance to the external object, and considered the internal object as compensatory form.

Fairbairn rejected most of Freud's fundamental premises. According to him, the id and death instinct do not exist. The ego has its own psychic energy, and libido is simply a function of the ego. Consequently instinctual drives do not exist. For the ego, object relation is indispensable and of primary importance. In other words, the ego has an inherent tendency to seek relationship with others as its basic function. Once a specific relation is established between the ego and object, the nature of this relationship determines the way libido is discharged. Hence object relations determine the libidinal attitude, not the other way around. Libido is thus characterized as object-seeking instead of pleasure-seeking. Clearly this is a drastically different object relations theory from Klein's which was formulated within the framework of the drive model.

Fairbairn's second characteristic is his contrast between internal and external object. He regarded the internal object as the result of a dissatisfying relationship with a natural external object. The individual tries to assimilate the image of the external object, which caused frustration, into one's own mind for the purpose of compensation. This is a process of internalization or introjection. Thus Fairbairn illustrated introjection as a form of defense while Klein depicted it as a more spontaneous function. Under the ideal scenario of Fairbairn, a perfectly healthy individual will have a completely satisfying relationship with real others and will have no need of an internal object. In his opinion, psychology deals with the individual's relationship with external object and psychopathology deals with the relationship with internal object. Internal object thus has negative connotation in Fairbairn.

Klein's first basic premise was that drives are inseparable from objects. Since Fairbairn abandoned the drive concept, this premise is naturally meaningless per se. However, he replaced "drives" in this premise by "the ego," and came up with his own premise. Thus Fairbairn's basic assumption is that the ego and object are inseparable. In other words, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the portions of the ego and objects. Therefore, each time an internal object is formed to compensate for dissatisfying experience, a portion of the ego is dedicated to it. This is a process of splitting, and it causes the fragmentation of the internal ego.

In terms of the infant's relation with the mother, Fairbairn classified objects into three

categories: ideal, exciting, and rejecting. The ideal object is the gratifying aspect of the mother, and both exciting and rejecting objects arise from an ungratifying relation with her. If ungratifying experience provides some hope for the future, an exciting object will be formed. In contrast, if ungratifying experience is totally depriving, a rejecting object will be formed. Since the portions of the ego and internal objects are inseparable, the aforementioned three object-categories have corresponding ego portions. Fairbairn named them central, libidinal, and anti-libidinal ego to match ideal, exciting, and rejecting object, respectively. While Klein's depressive anxiety is an inevitable consequence of the infant's own destructive impulses, Fairbairn's exciting and rejecting objects are reflections of insufficient maternal care. Thus he places more emphasis on the mother's emotional availability for the child.

While Freud's Oedipus complex is a triangular relationship, Fairbairn focuses more on the infant's early relation with the mother like Mahler. Actually it becomes somewhat difficult to apply the above scheme to Oedipus complex since it will involve six ego portions of the child. They are two sets of central, libidinal, and anti-libidinal egos, i.e. one for the mother and the other for the father.

Klein and Fairbairn provide a very interesting contrast within the Object Relations School. His belief is that human behaviors are fundamentally derived from the search for contacts with others. In this respect, his object relations theory has an overlap with Sullivan's interpersonal theory. Next we will briefly discuss Guntrip who took a different position from Fairbairn about the object-seeking tendency of the ego.

6.3. Harry Guntrip

Harry Guntrip turned to psychoanalysis after a career of ministry and pastoral counseling. Because of this background, his argument is often based on moral and aesthetic grounds. He criticized Freud as being excessively oriented to biology, and as handling human relationship on a sub-personal level. In a word, Freudian scheme looked simply too pessimistic and grim to Guntrip. This is a quite different position from Fairbairn whose criticism of Freud was formulated on highly conceptual grounds (Guntrip 1961).

Guntrip's position is that the ego's primary propensity is to withdraw itself from all object relations instead of seeking such relations. This is a totally opposite stance toward object relations in comparison with Fairbairn's. Fairbairn started with the hypothesis that objectless state is impossible for the ego. According to Guntrip, however, such a state is indeed possible, and, moreover, the object-seeking attitude of the ego is not its primary tendency, but a form of defense.

Guntrip initially followed Fairbairn's theory, and developed a concept of the regressive ego. Fairbairn's libidinal ego was associated with the exciting object and with ungratifying, but still

promising and enticing experiences. Guntrip thought that the libidinal ego would be further split into two parts. The first part would be attached to the exciting object, and would perpetually seek relatedness. The second part, which he called the regressive ego, would withdraw itself from the exciting object, and would renounce any object relations altogether. The regressive ego is caused by inadequate mothering, and represents a dread of being abandoned and the associated feelings of being helpless and hopeless. In short, he recognized the two conflicting aspects in the libidinal ego, a positive promising side and a negative dissatisfying side, as irreconcilable, and divided the libidinal ego into two separate domains accordingly.

Guntrip departed from Fairbairn's system by identifying the regressive ego as the core of the ego itself. He claimed that the fundamental dynamics of the ego is to retreat from others, either real or imaginary, in a longing for a return to the mother's womb. At the same time, this desire of a flight from life poses a fearful threat against the ego itself. Therefore, in Guntrip's theory, the basic human tendency is regressive, and necessarily raises an existential dilemma. All the psychodynamic processes, including object-seeking, are thus interpreted in terms of defense against this regression.

Definition of neurosis is consequently quite different for Fairbairn and Guntrip. For Fairbairn, neurosis is a representation of perpetual relations with bad internal objects for compensating purposes. The individual is inherently oriented toward relations with others any way, and neurotic people happen to be predominantly related with bad internal objects because of dissatisfying relations with natural external objects. For Guntrip, neurosis entails problematic object relations as the result of defense against the fearful flight from life. The individual possesses the inherent desire to seek the objectless state, and inadequate mothering merely reinforces this regressive tendency, which in turn will cause problematic object relations as a defense by the ego.

Guntrip's "desire to return to the mother's womb" is somewhat similar to the "birth trauma" of Otto Rank (1884-1939), a disciple of Freud who left the Freudian School in 1923. Rank's birth trauma is defined as a sudden exposure of a neonate to the excessively stimulating outside world from the previous internal peace in the mother's womb (Rank 1929). Rank believed that all neurotic anxiety is eventually based on this traumatic birth experience. From the comparative viewpoint, Guntrip's characteristic is his emphasis on emotional atmosphere provided by the mother while Rank placed his emphasis on the physical aspect. For Guntrip, proper parenting was the only solution for achieving internal harmony and equilibrium of an infant in the face of the inherent regressive tendency. He viewed a neurotic patient as an innocent victim of disastrous mothering, and a therapist as a heroic figure who sought to save such a patient. To end the section of British Object Relations School, we will discuss Winnicott who proposed still another object relations theory.

6.4. Donald Woods Winnicott

Donald W. Winnicott (1896-1971) was a British psychoanalyst who came to psychoanalysis through pediatrics. He initially followed, and then separated from Freud and Klein. His theory has three characteristics (Winnicott 1953, 1958, 1965). First, like Mahler, he specifically focused on the mother-infant relationship. Second, he did not reject the drive theory, but took drives and object relations as mutually independent. Third, he devised a concept called the transitional object.

Winnicott defined the mother-infant unit as the most fundamental element. For him, it is useless to describe a baby alone or outside its relation to the mother. In this respect, he is quite similar to Mahler. He did not reject the drive concept, either, and he actually criticized Fairbairn's abandonment of the classical drive theory. At the same time, he claimed that the mother-infant relationship is totally independent of instinctual drives.

This approach of Winnicott is different from that of either Freud, Klein, or Fairbairn. In Freud, the relationship with the mother is subordinate to the need of the drives. In Klein, the relationship is equivalent to the need of the drives, and in Fairbairn the drives do not exist. In Winnicott, drives do exist, and the mother does satisfy the infant's instinctual needs. Such gratification, however, does not determine or affect the infant's essential relationship with the mother. Such a relationship develops more from the mother's caretaking performance and her character.

This emphasis on maternal care seems to constitute the basic difference between Winnicott and Mahler. Although Mahler did stress the importance of the emotional availability of the mother for the infant's individuation, the fundamental idea was that the mother-infant relationship is the result of adaptation processes proposed by Hartmann, which put more emphasis on the infant's initiative. Winnicott, on the other hand, focuses more on the maternal care as the primary determinant of the mother-infant relationship. This is probably why he criticized Mahler's term "symbiosis" as still too biologically rooted since symbiosis with the mother in her theory was the first adaptation phenomenon of the infant. In a sense, this criticism of Winnicott is ironic because Mahler was emphasizing less of the biological and physical aspects in comparison with Hartmann.

For Winnicott, psychopathology is thus purely a result of parental deficiency. This conclusion itself apparently resembles that of Guntrip although their underlying theories are quite different. Winnicott realized that maternal failure consisted of two aspects. One is the failure to provide an infant with help when needed, and the other is the failure to leave it alone when it wishes to be left undisturbed. These failures will both lead to the infant's fear of annihilation of the self, and will further cause the fragmentation of true and false self. The former will be mainly hiding, and the latter will be simulating the infant's image presumed by the mother to avoid psychic annihilation.

Winnicott's third characteristic is his concept of the transitional object. He defined transitional space as an intermediate existence between the internal space of the mind and the external space

of the reality. Transitional object is the one in this transitional space. An example is a blanket or teddy bear for an infant. It is a completely separate object from the adult point of view, but is still an extension of the inner mental world from the infant viewpoint. For Winnicott, the infant's mind is full of hallucinations. They are caused by the mother's automatically fulfilling the infant's need, thus giving a sense of omnipotence and power to the infant. The transitional object lies between this hallucinatory omnipotence and the recognition of objective reality. Winnicott further maintained that transitional space is nothing unique to the infant and that it recedes and expands throughout individual's life. Having discussed British Object Relations School at length, we will next consider the variant theories of the Neo-Freudians.

7. Neo-Freudians

As described in the Introduction, Neo-Freudians are American psychoanalysts who rejected the biological aspect of the Freudian drive model. They placed more emphasis on interpersonal or cultural factors instead. Other than this fairly general point, however, there is little in common among their theories, and it is probably misleading to treat Neo-Freudians as members of an established psychoanalytic school. "Neo-Freudian" is a collective terminology, but only in a very general sense. Each Neo-Freudian should be discussed rather independently. We will start our discussion with Sullivan's interpersonal theory.

7.1. Harry Stack Sullivan

Harry Stack Sullivan (1892-1949) was an American psychiatrist, and is often mentioned as the founder of interpersonal theory. His basic premise is that personality is meaningful only in terms of relations to others and that the individual is not to be conceived outside the social context. For Sullivan, an observable human behavior is necessarily a reaction to other people under a specific situation. Thus the individual per se does not exist, or human behaviors do not arise from biological processes (Sullivan 1940).³⁾

The above approach is clearly opposed to the principal tenets of Freudian theory. One complication in Sullivan's theory is that he also emphasized the physiological and biological aspect of human actions. He claimed that two goals of human beings are pursuit of satisfaction and security. The former represents biological needs, and the latter represents interpersonal and cultural processes. Furthermore, satisfaction here is represented by muscular relaxation from the state of tension, and hence is quite similar to Freud's basic idea. This is probably one reason why some critics claim that Sullivan's theory is not much different from Freud's.

The major difference between Sullivan and Freud is, in a sense, a matter of emphasis. Both of

them recognized that the physiological processes are affected by the social influences, an example of which is toilet training for a child. However, each placed his own emphasis on a different element. Freud believed that such influences are only subordinate to instinctual drives in significance. This is true regardless of the developmental stage of the individual because the human being for Freud is basically a biological entity. On the other hand, Sullivan believed that such social influences will eventually outweigh the drives and become a dominant factor in forming an individual's behaviors. The role of instinctual drives is diminished as individuals follow the developmental path because the human being for Sullivan is fundamentally a social entity.

Sullivan also recognized the importance of parent-child interaction, and classified appraisals from parents into three categories. Acceptance and praise from the parents will be reflected in the child as "good me." Mild anxiety as "bad me," and horror or shocking experience as "not me," which will be fully suppressed into the unconscious as an undesired portion of the self. Thus the appraisals from the parents have an essential impact on the child's personality formation. This is an interesting contrast with Adler's concept of inferiority feelings, which he claims is inevitable for the child regardless of the parental attitude. In Sullivan's view, such feelings are not inevitable, but are only a product of inappropriate parenting.

The evaluation of Sullivan in the psychoanalytic society is controversial. Although Sullivan is often named as the most important figure in American interpersonal theory, some dispute his originality. Fine (1979, 541) argues that Sullivan's work is not much different from Freud's. He further claims that the need of a charismatic figure distorted the historical significance ascribed to Sullivan. In other words, he holds that Sullivan was promoted to the position he occupies not because of his originality and theoretical contribution, but because of the need for a symbolic figure in this academic field. Next we will discuss Horney who was much influenced by Adler.

7.2. Karen Horney

Karen Horney (1885-1952) was a student at the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute between 1920 and 1930, and subsequently emigrated to the United States. After being a faithful disciple of Freud for 15 years (although she did not have a personal relationship with Freud), she departed from the Freudian School. Her criticism was also directed against the biological aspect of Freudian theory. From her viewpoint, Freud treated the human mind as a derivative of biochemical processes, and consequently his theory was reductionistic. She believed that human needs for various satisfactions cannot be reduced to a single element like sexual instinct.

Horney's system has three major characteristics. First, she rejected most of Freud's basic principles such as the drive concept, psychic structure, and determinism. Second, she considered "the need to be accepted" as the basic driving force for human beings, and replaced the drives by

this concept. Third, she placed much emphasis on cultural aspect. In particular, she insisted that inferiority feelings on the part of women are strictly a cultural phenomenon, and totally rejected the biological explanation (Horney 1937, 1939, 1945, 1950).

Horney rejected Freud's life and death instincts together with his tripartite psychic structure. She also rejected his deterministic attitude as past-oriented, and took a future-oriented approach. Like Adler, her idea was that human behaviors are oriented toward future goals instead of determined by a past event. Consequently, the objective of therapy is not to analyze the patient's past to identify the cause, but to analyze the present situation to identify the false goal.

Second, Horney asserted "the need to be accepted" as the most fundamental element for understanding human behaviors. In her opinion, a child does not seek instinctual gratification, but warmth and protection from the parents. Fundamental here is her optimistic philosophy that human beings have a basic tendency to grow toward harmonious life, and she defined basic anxiety to result from the lack of genuine warmth and affection.

The above formulation has immediate implications with regard to Freud's Oedipus complex and Adler's inferiority feelings. Neither of these concepts is universal or significant in Horney's theory, and is only the result of poor parenting or particular cultural effect.

Horney believed that conflict first arises between the individual and environment. While the individual has the need to be accepted, society has different value requirements under different circumstances. Thus conflict is inherent in our society and culture. Apparently the nature of this conflict is broader and deeper than that of Adler. In Adler's theory, the conflict is between the individual striving toward one's own goal and the environment interfering with it. This is a one-dimensional view. In Horney, society disagrees about its own values, and consequently individual cannot escape from conflict even by following a goal accepted by the society. She maintained that four defensive patterns could result from such conflict. The individual can act either overly submissively by sacrificing himself/herself in order to be accepted by others, or act overly aggressively to force others to accept him/her, or can withdraw from personal relations with others to avoid any such conflict. The fourth pattern, different from the previous three, is one whereby the individual develops a fantasized image of an idealized and exaggerated self. This is a defensive attempt to maintain the personal unity and integrity against conflict. Horney called it the "idealized image." In her theory, neurosis is based on the subsequent conflict between this idealized image and the real self because the latter will be alienated as the consequence of this conflict. Horney's idealized image is somewhat similar to Freud's superego or ego ideal, but carries a more negative connotation. While Freud's superego is a product of natural progress, Horney's idealized image is that of a purely defensive movement and is the source of all neuroses.

Horney's third characteristic is her heavy emphasis on culture, which is most distinct in her

interpretation of female psychology. In Freudian theory, female penis envy during the oedipal phase is the basis of psychology of women, and it is explained as the necessary consequence of biological and psychosexual development. Psychoanalysts like Helene Deutsch (1884-1982) proposed an even more radical viewpoint. In 1944 and 1945, Deutsch claimed that penis envy and the anatomical inferiority of clitoris compared to penis lead to female masochism and that a woman has the unconscious need to be raped by man to be freed from her frigidity (Deutsch 1944, 1945). Horney argued against such a biological viewpoint, and insisted that penis envy was strictly a cultural phenomenon. Here again, her view is quite similar to Adler's. In 1939, she criticized the Freudian view (Horney 1939), which provoked a battle between the Freudians and so-called culturalists. Her basic position is that there is no inherent psychological difference between men and women. In her theory, penis envy is a representation of envy for masculine characteristics not given to females in our society, and thus has nothing to do with anatomical difference. We will next discuss Fromm who tried to combine psychoanalysis with sociology, Marxism in particular.

7.3. Erich Fromm

Erich Fromm (1900-1980) is a social psychologist who obtained his Ph.D. in sociology. He was trained at the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute in the 1920s, although he did not have any personal acquaintance with Freud. He was later invited to the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research by the sociologist Max Horkheimer as part of an attempt to combine psychoanalysis and Marxism. He later emigrated to the United States to escape from Nazi Germany.

Fromm's uniqueness is his dualistic use of sociology and psychoanalysis. He abandoned Freud's drive theory, and took the view of social changes in ways explained by the economic principles of Marxism, which in turn affect individuals psychologically. In other words, he used a sociological framework, Marxism in particular, to explain macro level social changes, and then used a psychoanalytic framework to explain the consequent micro level affect on each individual (Fromm 1941, 1947, 1949, 1955).

Historically an attempt to combine psychoanalysis and Marxism was not unique to Fromm, but most others failed in their attempts. At the early stage of development, these two ideologies actually developed together partly because of a belief that social and sexual revolution should go together. In a sense, each of them is a different version of materialism. Marx and Engels took economic life as a critical factor for humans, whereas Freud took instinctual satisfaction. By 1930, however, most such attempts failed, and there was virtually no hope for a synthesis once Joseph Stalin (1879-1953) came to power in Soviet Union soon after the death of Lenin in 1924.

According to Fromm, economic evolution from medieval feudalism to modern capitalism provided individuals with more freedom, but oftentimes more than they can handle. Such economic

changes exposed every individual to an unavoidable loneliness, which is precisely the basis of anxiety and neurosis in modern society. The behaviors of modern humans are the desperate struggle to overcome this aloneness, and are not biological derivatives. In this sense, Fromm's interpretation is very close to existentialism. The fundamental concept of this philosophy is the existential dilemma caused by man's existence in the world and the lack of a logical necessity for such existence. Man exists, but he does not find any rationale for his own existence. Human beings consequently have to face absolute loneliness. For Fromm, restrictions of medieval society in occupation, geographical mobility, and other factors limited individual freedom, but at the same time worked as a restraint against the existential dilemma. That is, people did not have to be exposed to it. Now thanks to economic evolution, people are forced to face the existential dilemma in modern capitalistic society. Many people cannot handle the situation, and resort to defensive mechanisms to escape from freedom. Fromm describes moral masochism, sadism, destructiveness, and automaton conformity as such defense patterns. These concepts are somewhat similar to Horney's first three defense movements against conflict (submissiveness, aggressiveness, and withdrawal). People try to either submit to external authority, make others dependent on them, or conform to others' behaviors without identity. In Fromm's view, such defense mechanisms are often exploited and abused by totalitarian and authoritarian regimes in the twentieth century, and thus are reflected in social phenomena as well. The best examples include the Italian Fascism of Benito Mussolini (1883-1945) and Nazism of Adolf Hitler (1889-1945).

Fromm's difference from traditional existentialists is that the latter explain even social changes as the effect of existential dilemma while Fromm uses the economic scheme of Marxism for this purpose. Thus his uniqueness is the dual use of sociology and existential psychoanalysis.

Accordingly, his interpretation of the Oedipus complex is very different from Freud's. Fromm presented his view in *Scientific American* in 1949 (Fromm 1949). He argued that sexual theme of incest is not a prime element in the Oedipus mythology because such a theme occupies only a small portion in the entire Oedipus trilogy of Sophocles. The coherent theme in the trilogy is, in his opinion, the protest against the patriarchal principle. The Oedipus complex thus signifies the rebellion of the son against the pressure of father's authority which in turn is rooted in the patriarchal structure. Therefore, the Oedipus complex will not appear in a society without strong patriarchal characteristics. It is strictly a cultural phenomenon, and is not universal by any means. For the last section of this paper, we will discuss Heinz Kohut and his two-factor theory.

8. Heinz Kohut and his Two-Factor Theory

Heinz Kohut was the president of the American Psychoanalytic Association between 1964 and

1965. He started with the orthodox version of the drive model, and later tried to complement it by an additional model. His system has two characteristics. First, he evaluated narcissism much more positively than other psychoanalysts. He believed that healthy narcissism was indeed possible. Second, he took narcissistic and psychosexual development as separate and independent. He then applied a different model to each development phase, which is why his approach is often called two-factor or mixed-model strategy (Kohut 1966, 1971, 1977).

Kohut's first characteristic is a positive emphasis on narcissism. In 1966, Kohut challenged the general trend of psychoanalysis toward interpersonal theory in a seminal article (Kohut 1966). He criticized the traditional view of narcissism as bad and object love as good as nothing but a stereotype. In his opinion, psychoanalysis overemphasized object relations and object libido, neglected the importance of self-love and self-esteem, and further denounced narcissism as primitive or pathological. He argued that a certain level of narcissistic libido is necessary and that this is apparent from the behaviors of artistic heroes and geniuses. He thus advocated the possibility of healthy narcissism.

This proposition of Kohut drew much criticism. Otto F. Kernberg (1928-) argued that narcissistic personalities are the consequence of pathological object relationship and that there is no healthy narcissism. Erich Fromm attacked narcissism as the essence of all severe pathology, and insisted that the only reality under narcissism would be one's own thought processes, feelings, and needs. Thus the narcissistic individual would be totally isolated from social context, which in Fromm's view is pathological by definition of human being as a social entity. In classical Freudian theory, too, the reciprocity principle (the law of conservation of energy applied to psychic energy) dictates that the individual will be less involved with external others and reality if one becomes more self-absorbed. The most extreme example is schizophrenia in which case the individual lives in one's own hallucinatory world without much interaction with the outer world.

Kohut's second characteristic is that he separated the narcissistic development phase as independent and preceding the psychosexual phase. He applied his own model, which he called the psychology of self, to the first phase, and the drive model to the second. As a part of narcissistic development, a child develops a grandiose self-image and constructs an idealized parental image. This is a necessary process in establishing a firm and cohesive self, and also the maintenance of narcissistic equilibrium. Once this goal is accomplished, the child is ready for the oedipal phase.

This so-called mixed-model strategy of Kohut also drew much criticism. There are three major criticisms against his approach. First, Kohut's assumption about the universality of the child's developing a grandiose self is challenged because of his lack of supportive evidence. Second, Kohut's approach is criticized as "adultomorphic." His basic position is that child and adult are essentially the same and that the need of self-object persists throughout lifetime. This attitude of

Kohut is criticized as interpreting child's behavior erroneously from the adult's viewpoint. Finally, his rationale for the combining of two models is challenged as insufficient. Kohut claimed that the drive theory and psychology of self are complementary in nature because most clinical materials can be interpreted in both ways. Critics argue that the mere fact that two models can simultaneously explain a certain range of events does not necessarily suggest a connection. It is very likely that the two models involved have incompatible and mutually exclusive dimensions.

In this paper, we depicted only the major psychoanalytic schools. What is striking in the comparative study of psychoanalysis is the diversity on the one hand and the subtlety on the other hand of the theoretical varieties. Psychoanalytical theorists start with radically different hypotheses, and can still reach very similar conclusions. Conversely, they start with a slight difference, and can still reach vastly different conclusions. At the same time, the identification of the driving force within the human mind ranges from biological drives to Marxist economic principles, depending on one's fundamental philosophy. Psychoanalysis is still evolving today, and the basic question remains much the same: What drives the human mind?

Notes

- 1) More detailed discussions of various psychoanalytic schools will be found in Fine (1979), Munroe (1955), Wolman (1984), and Wyss (1966).
- 2) Jung's literature has been consolidated into his *Collected Works* (Read, Fordham, and Adler 1966). His theory of unconscious is summarized in the following essays in *Collected Works*:
"On the Psychology of Unconscious," Two Essays, *CW* 7, pars. 106-109.
"Conscious, Unconscious, and Individuation," *CW* 9 i, pars. 489-524.
- 3) Sullivan (1940) is the only book he published during his lifetime. All other books were published after his death based on his lecture notes.

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