

The Structure of Hope : A Preliminary Study for the Reconsideration of False Pleasure

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The Structure of Hope

— A Preliminary Study for the Reconsideration of False Pleasure —

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Παρμενίδης ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ ποιήματι περὶ τῆς Ἐλπίδος αἰνισσόμενος τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγει·

λεῦσε δ' ὁμος ἀπεόντα νόῳ παρεόντα βεβαίως·
οὐ γὰρ ἀποτμήξει τὸ ἐὼν τοῦ ἐόντος ἔχεσθαι
οὔτε σκιδνάμενον πάντη πάντως κατὰ κόσμον
οὔτε συνιστάμενον·

ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ ἐλπίζων, καθάπερ ὁ πιστεύων, τῷ νῶ ὄρῳ τὰ νοητὰ καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα.
εἰ τοίνυν φαμέν τι εἶναι δίκαιον, φαμέν δὲ καὶ καλόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀλήθειάν τι
λέγομεν, οὐδὲν δὲ πάποτε τῶν τοιούτων τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶδομεν ἀλλ' ἢ μόνῳ τῷ νῶ

(Clemens of Alexandria, *Stromata*, 5, 2, 15, 5, 1)

ἐλπίς δὲ προσδοκία ἀγαθῶν ἢ ἀπόντος ἀγαθοῦ εὐελπίς.

(*op. cit.*, 2, 8, 41, 1, 2)

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The young Donald Davidson wrote in the late forties: “The *Philebus* is one of the best preserved skeletons in the cupboard of Platonic scholarship. As cupboards go, this is a well stocked one; and yet as skeletons in this cupboard go, the *Philebus* is peculiarly unnerving. For all the words that are heaped hopefully upon it, it won't quite stay dead; and for all the pops and machine that are insinuated into it, it won't talk either. The experts have contrived all manner of subtle rigs to hold the bones respectably together, and yet the results are somehow always so gruesome that it is hard to believe the monster could have lived. What is wrong with the *Philebus* that the doctors (of the philosophy) can neither cure nor decently retire it?”⁽¹⁾

This situation does not seem to have changed greatly in these more than forty years. D. Frede wrote in the Introductory Essay to her new translation of the dialogue: “The *Philebus* is a Platonic dialogue that is not commonly found on the undergraduate's mailing list. If it is studied at all, it is reserved for the arcane discussion of graduate seminars or for specialists in late Platonic philosophy. Given the dialogue's topic and form, however, it is at first rather surprising that it should lead such a shadow existence.”⁽²⁾

And yet there are a couple of topics related to the

dialogue which have been relatively well discussed: one of them is to do with Plato's late (last?) ontology; eg. whether Plato maintained his 'theory of ideas' expounded in his middle dialogues, in the dialogue written in his last period; if so, how?; if not, what does it mean? Another topic, which may be of wider interest, is false pleasures in that part of the dialogue which analyses pleasure, 31B-52C.

Plato's analysis of false pleasure consists of three parts⁽³⁾: the first two parts are concerned with the false pleasures of hope or expectation; the third one is with false pleasures such as pleasure mixed with pain. Now, before we start considering Plato's analysis of false pleasure in hope or expectation, it will be useful to make, as an introduction, a rough sketch of the features of Greek expressions for hope and expectation.⁽⁴⁾

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(i) One of the prominent features of hope seems to be its concern with the future. Certainly philosophers have defined it to be some type of our relation to the future. For instance, Plato himself wrote about expectation:

Δύο δὲ κεκτημένον ἐν αὐτῷ συμβούλω
ἐναντίω τε καὶ ἄφρονε, ὃ προσαγορεύομεν
ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην;

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. . .

Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἀμφοῖν αὐτὸ δόξας
μελλόντων, οἷον κοινὸν μὲν ὄνομα ἐλπίς,
ἴδιον δὲ, φόβος μὲν ἢ πρὸ λύπης ἐλπίς,
θάρος δὲ ἢ πρὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου·

(Leges I, 644C-D)

Aristotle also held the same kind of view:

τοῦ δὲ νῦν ἐν τῷ νῦν οὐκ ἔστι μνήμη,
καθάπερ εἴρηται [καὶ πρότερον], ἀλλὰ τοῦ
μὲν παρόντος αἰσθησις, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος
ἐλπίς, τοῦ δὲ γενομένου μνήμη·

(De memoria et reminiscencia, 449B25-27)

ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐλπίς τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐστίν
ἡ δὲ μνήμη τοῦ παροικομένου, τοῖς δὲ νέοις
τὸ μὲν μέλλον πολὺ τὸ δὲ παρεληλυθὸς
βραχύ·

(Rhetorica B12, 1389A20-23)⁽⁵⁾

Philo of Alexandria, a Hellenistic philosopher, also took a similar line of thought:

ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς τῶν τριῶν ἐφάπτεται
χρόνων, καὶ γὰρ τὰ παρόντα νοεῖ καὶ
τῶν παρεληλυθότων μέμνηται καὶ τὰ
μέλλοντα προσδοκᾷ·

(Legum Allegoriarum II, 42)⁽⁶⁾

This kind of view about the relation of expectation or hope with the future is not limited to philosophers. To say nothing of a lot of passages from classical writers in which the relevant Greek words are used with the structures that suggest the future (eg. with the future infinitive, with or without ἄν ; ὡς with the future indicative, or the optative with ἄν, etc.), there are several passages where a clear reference to the future are made with these terms. Let us look at several examples.

καὶ τὸν ἐπιόντα προσδοκᾶν χρῆσι τοιούτους
ὄντας βέλτιον ἢ νῦν πράξειν.

(Isocrates, Orationes VI:Archidamus, 22)

ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν περὶ Θήβας παραχθέντων
εἰ μνησθεῖμεν, ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς γεγεννημένοις
ἄν λυπηθεῖμεν, περὶ δὲ τῶν μελλόντων
βελτίους ἐλπίδας ἄν λάβοιμεν.

(op. cit., 47)

ἐγὼ γὰρ οὕτω, σφόδρα ἐμαυτῷ πιστεύω,
ὅσπ' ἐλπίζω καὶ εἴ τις πρὸς με τυγχάνει
ἀηδῶς [ἢ κακῶς] διακειόμενος, ἐπειδὴν ἐμοῦ
λέγοντος ἀκούσῃ περὶ τῶν πεπραγμένων,
μεταμελήσειν αὐτῷ καὶ πολλὰ βελτίω με εἰς
τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἡγήσασθαι.

(Lysias, Orationes XVI:Before the Council, 2)

ὅτι μέγιστος ἤδη διάπλους ἀπὸ τῆς

οἰκείας καὶ ἐπὶ μεγίστη ἐλπίδι τῶν
μελλόντων πρὸς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἐπεχειρήθη.

(Thucydides, Historiae, 6.31.6)

These are only some part of the passages in which future time is clearly mentioned with hope or expectation.⁽⁷⁾ So, the relation with the future would seem to be unmistakably one of its most prominent and perhaps essential features. However, this view is not correct, or at least too restrictive in the light of the actual usage of the relevant Greek expressions. It can be understood in two ways : (1) every hope or expectation bears some relation to the future ; (2) Our relation to the future is all hope or expectation, i.e., there is no way other than hoping or expecting in which we are connected to the future. Neither of these two seems to be correct. As for (2), we can relate to the future, when we intend to do something, predict that something will happen, order someone to do something, and so on. Aristotle once wrote: "οὔτε γὰρ τὸ μέλλον ἐνδέχεται μνημονεύειν, ἀλλ' ἔστι δοξαστὸν καὶ ἐλπιστόν." (De memoria et reminiscencia, 449B11) To see that (2) is wrong is not difficult, and yet we need to ask how hope is different from other modes of our relation with the future, when it is concerned to the future. We will see this to some extent in the next chapter. Then how about (1) ? Is there really any case of hope in which we are not related to the future ? Yes, there is, or rather there are. There seem to be cases in which we hope something in the present, and even something in the past ! Let us first look at several instances of the former case.

(ii)

οὐ γὰρ δὴ χρήματά γ' εἶναι μοι
προσδοκᾶτ' ἔξω τῶν φανερῶν, ὧν ἀφίσταμαι.

(Demosthenes, Epistulae, 3.41)

ἐλπίζων γὰρ ὁ Ἀλυάττης σιτοδείην
τε εἶναι ἰσχυρὴν ἐν τῇ Μιλήτῳ καὶ τὸν
λεῶν τετρῶσθαι εἰς τὸ ἔσχατον κακοῦ,
ἤκουε τοῦ κήρυκος νοστήσαντος ἐκ τῆς
Μιλήτου τοὺς ἐναντίους λόγους, ἢ ὡς
αὐτὸς κατεδόκει.

(Herodotus, Historiae, 1.22.3)

οἱ δὲ Βαβυλώνιοι ὀρῶντες ἄνδρα τὸν
ἐν Πέρσῃσι δοκιμώτατον ῥινός τε καὶ
ἄτων ἐστερημένον μάστιγι τε καὶ αἵματι
ἀναπεφυρμένον, πάγῃ ἐλπίσαντες λέγειν
μιν ἀληθεῖα καὶ σφί ἤκειν σύμμαχον
ἐπιτρέπεσθαι ἔτοιμοι ἦσαν τῶν ἐδέετο
σφέων

(op. cit., 3.157.1)

ὡς δὲ ἡμέρη ἐγίνετο, ὀρῶντες οἱ
Ἕλληες κατὰ χῶρον μένοντα τὸν στρατὸν

τὸν πεζὸν ἤλπιζον καὶ τὰς νέας εἶναι
περὶ Φάληρον

(*op. cit.*, 8.108.1)

τό μιν οὐ ποτε ἔλπετο θυμῷ τεθνάμεν
(Homer, *Iliad*, 17, 404f)

οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐξ οἴκειου τινὸς
ἀγαθοῦ τὸ εὐφυχον ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς
περὶ ἡμᾶς ὡς κάμνοντας ἤδη τοῖς κακοῖς
ἐλπίδος

(Josephus, *Antiquitates Judaicae*, 15.143)

ἐλπίδος γὰρ αὐτοῖς παραγενομένης
ἔμπνου κείσθαι τὸν Γάιον οὐκ ἔσθ' οὔτινος
κακῶν ἂν ἀπέσχοιτο

(*op. cit.* 19.149)

ὁ τοῖσιν Νικίου οἶκος προσεδοκᾶτο
εἶναι οὐκ ἔλαττον ἢ ἑκατὸν ταλάντων,
καὶ τούτων τὰ πολλὰ ἔνδον

(Lysias, *Orationes XIX: On the Property of
Aristophanes*, 47)

πρὸς ἐλπίδος χρηστῆς ὑπόμνησιν, ὡς
ἤδη τῆς φύσεως τὰς ἐτησίους εὐτρεπιζομένης
ἀνθρώπων γένει δωρεὰς ἐν τῇ τῶν
ἐπιτηδείων ἀφθονίᾳ

(Philo of Alexandria, *De specialibus legibus*, 158) ⁽⁸⁾

(iii)

There are also the passages which seem to suggest
that hope or expectation can be concerned with the past.

Τί δὲ προσδοκᾶτε; τὸν Αθῆνησιν ὑβριστὴν
οὐκ εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὸ
σῶμα τὸ ἑαυτοῦ, νόμων ὄντων, ἡμῶν ὁρώντων,
ἐχθρῶν ἐφεισθηκότων, τοῦτον <τὸν> αὐτὸν
λαβόντα ἄδειαν καὶ ἐξουσίαν καὶ ἀρχήν,
τίς ἂν ἐλπίσειεν ἀπολελοπέναι τι τῶν
ἀσελγεστάτων ἔργων;

(Aeschines, *Orationes I: In Timarchum*, 108)

ὁ μὲν δὴ Οἰόβαζος περιχαρῆς ἦν,
ἐλπίζων τοὺς υἱέας στρατηγίης ἀπολελύσθαι,
ὁ δὲ κελεύει τοὺς ἐπὶ τούτων ἐπεστεῶτας
ἀποκτεῖναι πάντας τοὺς Οἰοβάζου παῖδας

(Herodotus, *op. cit.*, 4.84.2)

ἐκίνηθεν δὲ φάλαγγες,
ἐλπόμενοι παρὰ ναυφί ποδώκεα Πηλεΐωνα
μηνιθμὸν μὲν ἀπορρίψαι, φιλότητα δ' ἐλέσθαι

(Homer, *op. cit.*, 16.281)

ἡ διὰ τοὺς Αἰγυπτίους τὴν αὐτοῦ
στρατιὰν ἐλπίζων ἰπ' ἐκεῖνων αὐτῶν
καταγωνίσασθαι;

(Josephus, *op. cit.*, 10.6)

καὶ οἱ μὲν στρατιῶται προσεδόκων
ἄγοντά τι σφίσις ἦκειν. ὁ δ' ἦγε μὲν
οὐδέν, ἀπήγγελλε δὲ ὅτι ἐπαινοῖη αὐτοὺς
καὶ Ἀναξίβιος ὁ ναύαρχος καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι,
καὶ ὅτι ὑπισχνεῖτο Ἀναξίβιος, εἰ ἀφίκοντο
ἔξω τοῦ Πόντου, μισθοφορὰν αὐτοῖς ἔσεσθαι.
καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ Ἀρμῆνῃ ἔμειναν οἱ
στρατιῶται ἡμέρας πέντε

(Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 6.1.16) ⁽⁹⁾

Now, in these passages we can see that hope or expectation can be concerned with the present and the past (as well as the future). We do not seem to have any particular difficulty in understanding these passages. And we can also make our own example without trouble. Suppose that an aeroplane is reported to be missing. The families of the passengers are naturally very anxious about them. Some of the families may express her feeling about her family in this way: "I hope he is safe." (A newspaper reporter would say that the families of the passengers are hoping that their relatives are safe and well.) She may also hope that he was not on board, or that he changed his time table and used some other method of transportation. These hopes seem to be fully understandable, and we seem to be able to conceive similar cases. So these instances in ancient Greek and English seem to me to be enough to show that we can hope/expect things in the present and in the past as well as things in the future.

(iv) However, we may well ask here if every kind of things, events, or state of affairs in the present or the past can be the objects of hope. Of course the answer is negative. The important cases in which we cannot hold hope for such things are those in which we know or believe that some thing, event, or state of affairs stands/ stood, or does/did not stand. Let us pick up our previous example of a missing aeroplane, and add some detail to it. The lady we mentioned above had talked on the new satellite-link telephone to her family on board fifteen minutes before the time when the accident is supposed to have occurred. When the plane crash is officially confirmed, she cannot hope that he was not on board, or that he changed his schedule and used some other transportation, although she can wish that he had. This imaginary case seems to indicate that we cannot hold hope about the things which we know or believe to be/have been the case, that they are/were not the case. Furthermore, we cannot hope about the things which we know/believe to be/have been the case, that they are/were the case. Let us revise our example a little in the following way: my relative who is thought to be on the aeroplane is a billionaire, and I am her only heir, and I am so greedy that I cannot exclude any methods of getting money. I used to looking forward to the crash of

every plane she boarded. But when I have come to know about the crash, I cannot hope for *the* crash any more, for some conceptual reason. We may say that hope and expectation are destroyed by the knowledge of, or belief in, the relevant facts.

Χο. ἡμῖν μὲν, ὦναξ, ταῦτ' ὀκνήρ'· ἕως δ' ἂν οὖν
πρὸς τοῦ παρόντος ἐκμάθῃς, ἔχ' ἐλπίδα.

Οι. καὶ μὴν τοσοῦτόν γ' ἐστὶ μοι τῆς ἐλπίδος,
τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν βοτῆρα προσμεῖναι μόνον.

(Sophocles, *Oedipus Tyrannus*, 835f.)

(v) This point, that things in the present and the past can only be the objects of hope or expectation, so long as we do not know, or are not convinced, what the actual case is, i.e., so long as the case is uncertain, indicates the connection between the two sorts (?) of hope, i.e., between the hopes for things in the present or the past, and those for things in the future: for one of the prominent features of future things is their uncertainty.

This concept of uncertainty excludes impossibility as well as certainty. We cannot hope for the things which (we know/believe) are impossible, as well as the things which (we know/believe) are certain, whether they are in the past, the present, or the future. It is not the case that we can hope for everything in the future. We can only do so, so long as we know/believe that the relevant things are possible in the relevant aspects, although we can hold wishes for things that are (we know/believe to be) impossible. There are unreal or counterfactual wishes, but there is no such hope. (This point of uncertainty will be more considered later.)

(vi) We have shown that we can hope for some range of things in the present and the past as well as things in the future. These things are thought to be events which (are supposed to) occur at some point of time. And yet the range of the objects of hope seems to be a little bit wider. Let us first look at several passages.

(1)

εἶρετο ὁ Κροῖσος τάδε· Ξεῖνε Ἀθηαίε, παρ' ἡμέας γὰρ περὶ σέο λόγος ἀπίκται πολλὸς καὶ σοφίης εἵνεκεν τῆς σῆς καὶ πλάνης, ὡς φιλοσοφῶν γῆν πολλὴν θεωρίας εἵνεκεν ἐπελήλυθας· νῦν ὦν ἡμερος ἐπειρέσθαι μοι ἐπήλθε σε εἰ τινα ἤδη πάντων εἶδες ὀλβιώτατον. ὁ μὲν ἐλπίζων εἶναι ἀνθρώπων ὀλβιώτατος ταῦτα ἐπειρώτα, Σόλων δὲ οὐδὲν ὑποθαπέυσας, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἔοντι χρησάμενος λέγει· ὦ βασιλεῦ, Τέλλον Ἀθηναίων.

(Herodotus, *op. cit.*, 1.30.3)

ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἐμὲ νῆϊδά γ' οὕτως
ἐλπομαι ἐν Σαλαμῖνι γενέσθαι τε τραφόμεν τε
(Homer, *op. cit.*, 7, 199)

πρῶτος γὰρ ἐξεληθὼν καὶ δόξας εἶναι κατὰ

πάντα ἀγαθὸς ἐλπίδα ἐγκατέλιπε βέβαιον ὡς καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν

(Thucydides, *op. cit.*, 4.81.3)

ἔν γε τοῖς μεγίστοις κινδύνοις, ὅταν ἐν στρατείας ἢ νόσοις ἢ ἐν θαλάττῃ χειμάζονται, ὥσπερ πρὸς θεοὺς ἔχειν τοὺς ἐν ἐκάστοις ἄρχοντας, σωτήρας σφῶν προσδοκῶντας, οὐκ ἄλλω τῷ διαφέροντας ἢ τῷ εἰδέναι

(Plato, *Theaetetus*, 170A9f.)⁽¹⁰⁾

(2)

Ἐννοήσωμεν δὲ καὶ τῆδε ὡς πολλὴ ἐλπίς ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι

(id., *Apologia Socratis*, 40C4)

ἐλπίζω γὰρ οὖν ἔλαττον ἀμάρτημα ἀκουσίως τινὸς φονεῖα γενέσθαι ἢ ἀπατεῶνα καλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ δικαίων νομίμων πέρι.

(id., *Respublica V*, 451A5)

ἐλπίς πολλὴ τὸ παραπάνω τὸ γένος ἡμῶν τοῦτο ἀναίσθητον πάσαις ταῖς τοῦ σώματος αἰσθήσεσι περιπεφυκέναι, νοητὸν δ' εἶναι

(id., *Leges X*, 898D11f.)⁽¹¹⁾

(3)

ταῦτόν δὴ τοῦτ', οἶμαι, καὶ ἐν ὄπλοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι χρῆ προσδοκᾶν ὀρθόν, ὅτι τὸν διττὰ δεῖ κεκτημένον, οἷς ἀμύνουτο τ' ἂν καὶ ἐπιτιθεῖτο ἄλλοις, μηδὲν ἀργὸν τούτων μηδὲ ἀνεπιστήμον ἐὰν εἶναι κατὰ δύναμιν

(*op. cit.* VII, 795C3)

(4)

Τί δὲ δῆ; περὶ τοὺς λόγους ἄρ' οὐ προσδοκῶμεν εἶναι τινα ἄλλην τέχνην, ἢ αὐτὴν δυνατὸν (δν) [αὐ] τυγχάνει τοὺς νέους καὶ ἔτι πόρρω τῶν πραγμάτων τῆς ἀληθείας ἀφιστάσθαι διὰ τῶν ὧτων τοῖς λόγοις γοητεύειν

(id., *Sophista*, 234C2)

(5)

ἐπεὶ, εἴπερ εἶη που αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν συνηθροισμένη καὶ ἀπηλλαγμένη τούτων τῶν κακῶν ὧν σὺ νυνδὴ διήλθες, πολλὴ ἂν εἶη ἐλπίς καὶ καλὴ, ὧ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἀληθῆ ἐστὶν ἃ σὺ λέγεις

(id., *Phaedo*, 70A8)

καθάπερ ὁδοὶ τέτμηται καθ' ὅς ἰτέον, προσδοκῶντα καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν εὖ λέγειν τὸ—

(id., *Leges VII*, 803E6)⁽¹²⁾

(6)

ΞΕ. Τί δῆτα προταξαίμεθ' ἂν εὐγνωστον μὲν

καὶ μικρόν, λόγον δὲ μηδενὸς ἐλάττονα ἔχον
τῶν μειζόνων; οἷον ἀσπαλιευτῆς ἄρ' οὐ πᾶσι τε
γνώριμον καὶ σπουδῆς οὐ πάνυ τι πολλῆς τινος
ἐπάξιον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΞΕ. Μέθοδον μὴν αὐτὸν ἐπίζω καὶ λόγον οὐκ
ἀνεπιτήδειον ἡμῖν ἔχειν πρὸς ὃ βουλόμεθα.

(id., *Sophista*, 218E2f.)

ΞΕ. Δεῖ τοίνυν τὸν τρόπον, ὡς ἔοικε, διορίσαντας
τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς πόλεως οὕτω τελέως τὸν πολιτικὸν
ἡμῖν εἰρήσθαι προσδοκᾶν.

(id., *Politicus*, 275A10)

These examples are concerned with several types of thing: (1) what kind of person someone is; (2) what kind of thing something is by its nature or in its essence; (3) a general prescription of behaviour; (4) existence of some kind of thing (eg. expertise); (5) what is the case, or the truth of a matter; (6) a method of theoretical enquiry. (This list is not intended to be exhaustive.)

(vii) Some comments will be useful on some of these cases. 1) The people about whose character we have hope certainly exist at/during some period of time, and yet when we hold the hope, we do not expect that they are some sort of person or people at some particular time. 2) When we expect that something is such and such by its nature, we are not concerned with when it is such and such. Dispositions and nature are different from events or state of affairs in that the former are, as it were, timeless. We may say the same thing about the existence of such things as expertise or knowledge. 3) General prescriptions of our behaviour are not limited to any particular time. When we give such prescriptions to other people or to ourselves, the range to which they are thought to apply is mainly the future, but it is not in the same sense in which the future is contrasted to the present and the past. 4) When we expect or hope that such and such is true or truth, our hope is not related with any particular aspect of time. We may well compare these two expressions;

a) I hope that she told me the truth.

b) I hope that what she told me is true.

While the interest of a) is rather in some fact about her past action, the point of b) is that the truth is such as she told me. My hope which is expressed in b) does not seem to be related to any particular aspect of time. We may well call this type of hope 'gnomic'. Typical cases of this kind of hope are those in which the content of hope is some general or 'universal' truth. Suppose that some scientist insists that the universe cannot expand infinitely. There is no evidence, positive or negative, yet, to prove or disprove her assertion. She may express her hope that the universe cannot expand infinitely, when she is dying. This hope can be interpreted in two ways. It may mean that she hoped that her theory would turn

out to be true. In this case, her hope is a 'temporal' one, concerning the future. But this is not the only possible way of taking her hope. It may mean that she simply hoped that the content of her assertion is true. In this case, her hope cannot be said to be concerned with the future, nor other phases of time. (Which interpretation is meant can depend on cases.)

But this 'gnomic' hope is not limited to the hope whose content is general truth. Let us suppose the following situation. A man is being prosecuted for murder. And a woman is to be summoned as a witness. She has testified in the preliminary enquiry that she had seen some man other than the suspect stabbing the victim — which is very important for proving the innocence of the suspect. The defence lawyer can hold two kinds of hope, or hold his hope in two ways, which are intimately related to each other: he hopes that the witness saw some other person killing the victim; he hopes that what she testified in the preliminary inquiry is true. In this case, the 'gnomic' hope is compatible with another 'temporal' hope which is concerned with the past event.

Another case may well be considered: a scientist has predicted that the eclipse of a star will occur at some particular time. This occurrence may prove the theory of another scientist. The second scientist can have hope in two ways: he hopes that the eclipse predicted by the first scientist will occur; he hopes that what he predicted is true. In this case, the 'gnomic' hope is intimately related to the 'temporal' hope which is concerned with something in the future. The consideration of these two cases seems to show us that the content of *the truth* in 'gnomic' hopes (not the content of the hopes) can be temporal facts as well as general or universal truths.

Now we must notice that the characteristic feature of 'temporal' hope which was pointed out above, i.e., uncertainty, applies to 'non-temporal' hope as well. We cannot hold the latter kind of hope for what we know/believe to be, or not to be, the case as such, either.

Let us summarize the points shown by the considerations in this chapter: i) we can hold hope for some of the things in the present and in the past as well as things in the future; ii) we can also hope for 'non-temporal' things, or hope for many things in some 'non-temporal' ways.

II

These points, however, are not incompatible with the fact that much more of our hopes are concerned with the future than with anything else. We may say that our life is full of hope for the future. What kind of features, then, does this kind of hope have? One of them is, as we suggested, uncertainty. We also pointed out that this feature excludes both certainty and impossibility. The future has typically both uncertainty and possibility.

Μνημονευτέον δὲ ὡς τὸ μέλλον οὔτε ἡμέτερον
οὔτε πάντως οὐκ ἡμέτερον, ἵνα μήτε πάντως
προσμένωμεν ὡς ἐσόμενον μήτε ἀπελπίζωμεν
ὡς πάντως οὐκ ἐσόμενον.

(Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae philosophorum*, 10.127.6)

(i) We can hope only so far as there is some kind and extent of uncertainty. And this uncertainty is concerned with the realization of the contents of hope. So there is always some room for the failure of realization in any hope. This is, as it were, a conceptual factor of hope. Needless to say, there are a lot of passages in Greek literature which talk about the uncertainty and unreliability of our hope; for instance,

οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν χωρὶς ἀνθρώποις θεῶν
σπουδάζομεν δὲ πόλλ' ὑπ' ἐλπίδων, μάτηρ
πόνους ἔχοντες, οὐδὲν εἰδότες σαφές.

(Euripides, *fragmenta*, 391.2)

ἐλπίδι τε ἦσσαν πιστεύει, ἧς ἐν τῷ ἀπόρῳ ἡ ἰσχύς
(Thucydides, *op. cit.*, 2.62.5) ⁽¹³⁾

(ii) The uncertainty implied in hope also excludes impossibility. We can only hope for things which we know/believe are possible, though we can be mistaken in these beliefs. This possibility is, of course, that of the realization of the contents of hope. This connection with the realization of things hoped for is another conceptual element of hope. ⁽¹⁴⁾ This point can be made clearer by contrasting it with a wish. We can wish anything (except that the current situation is as it is — this is not the same as wishing that the current situation continues to be as it is now), without any consideration of the realizability of things that we wish. A wish is related to the realization of what is wished, such that there is no real consideration of the possibility of the realization. (We may well say that a wish is a bare expression or manifestation of our desires.) It is due to this feature that we can wish even for counterfactual situations, whether in the present or in the past. The person who has a wish in this sense usually has no pleasure: what is usually felt in a wish is sorrow, sadness, disappointment, despair, regret and something like that. But there is one case where we can feel pleasure, even when we have no prospect of the realization of what we wish: that is daydreaming. In daydreaming, our glance at the future is cut off by this lack of (the consideration of) possibility in such a curious way that we lose our connection with the reality. Hope is different both from a wish and a daydream.

This point that hope can exist only when we entertain some possibility of the realization of the objects of hope, can be supported by several passages from ancient Greek writers.

(1) The connection with the realization of things ex-

pected is explicitly expressed by some Greek words which mean accomplishment, achievement, acquisition, attainment, execution, fulfilment, occurrence, realization, and something like that, and their opposites. The following are some of them.

i) πάσχω

κεῖ τὸ μηδὲν ἔξερω, φράσω δ' ὄμωσ.
τῆς ἐλπίδος γὰρ ἔρχομαι δεδραγμένος,
τὸ μὴ παθεῖν ἂν ἄλλο πλὴν τὸ μόρσιμον.

(Sophocles, *Antigone*, 236) ⁽¹⁵⁾

ii) τυγχάνω

εἰ φοβοῦντο καὶ ἀγανακτοῦεν, οὐ πολλῇ
ἂν ἀλογία εἴη, εἰ μὴ ἄσμενοι ἐκέισε Ἴοιεν, οἳ
ἀφικόμενοι ἐλπίς ἐστίν οὐ διὰ βίου ἥρων
τυχεῖν—ἥρων δὲ φρονήσεως—ᾗ τε διεβέβληντο,
τούτου ἀπηλλάχθαι συνόντος αὐτοῖς; ἢ
ἀνθρώπων μὲν παιδικῶν καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ
ὑέων ἀποθανόντων πολλοὶ δὴ ἐκόπτες ἠθέλησαν
εἰς Ἄιδου μετελθεῖν, ὑπὸ ταύτης ἀγόμενοι
τῆς ἐλπίδος, τῆς τοῦ ὄψεσθαι τε ἐκεῖ ὧν
ἐπεθύμουν καὶ συνέσεσθαι

(Plato, *Phaedo*, 68A1f.) ⁽¹⁶⁾

iii) λαμβάνω

καὶ σὸν πρόσωπον εἰσδεῖν; ἅπαντα γὰρ
συνθεῖς τάδ' εἰς ἐν νόστον ἐλπίζω λαβεῖν.

(Euripides, *Iphigenia in Tauria*, 1016)

Οἱ μὲν γὰρ προσδοκίαν ἐμποιοῦσιν ὡς καὶ
τὰς κτήσεις τὰς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν κομισόμεθα
καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ἀναληφόμεθα πάλιν ἢν
πρότερον ἐτυγχάνομεν ἔχοντες

(Isocrates, *Orations VIII:De pace*, 6) ⁽¹⁷⁾

iv) γίγνομαι

νῆπιον οὐ γὰρ σφιν δολιχόφρονές εἰσι μέριμναι,
οἳ δὴ γίγνεσθαι πάρος οὐκ ἔδον ἐλπίζουσι
ἢ τι καταθνήσκων τε καὶ ἐξόλλυσθαι ἀπάντη.

(Empedocles, D-K. B11.2) ⁽¹⁸⁾

v) ἀποβαίνω

Ἦν μὲν γὰρ ἠλπίζομεν, οὐδὲν ἀποβέβηκεν
(Isocrates, *op. cit.*, 29)

Ὡς δ' οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς ἀπέβαινε ὧν
ἠλπίζον, ἅπασιν ἦσαν καταφανεῖς ἀηδῶς
διακεῖμενοι καὶ χαλεπῶς φέροντες.

(id., *Epistulae*, VIII:Ad reges Mytilenaeans, 2)

vi) τέλος

εἴπερ ποτὲ καὶ νῦν ἐλπίς πάσα
ἀποτελεσθήσεται τοῦ τοῦς αὐτοῦς φιλοσόφους
τε καὶ πόλεων ἄρχοντας μεγάλων συμβῆναι
γενομένων.

(Plato, *Epistulae VII*, 328A6) ⁽¹⁹⁾

vii) εὐρίσκω

φωρᾶν δὲ ἂν ἐθέλη τις παρ' ὄταφον, γυμνὸς
ἢ χιτωνίσκον ἔχων ἄζωστος, προομώσας τοὺς
νομίμους θεοὺς ἢ μὴν ἐλπίζειν εὐρήσειν, οὕτω
φωρᾶν

(id., *Leges XII*, 954A6)

viii) αἰρέω

ἀφικόμενοι δὲ ἐς Ἐπίδαυρον τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἔτεμον τῆς γῆς τὴν πολλήν, καὶ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν προσβαλόντες ἐς ἐλπίδα μὲν ἦλθον τοῦ ἐλεῖν, οὐ μὲντοι προυχώρησέ γε.

(Thucydides, *op. cit.*, 2.56.4)

ix) εἰμί

ἤλπιζον γὰρ καὶ μάχην ἑκάτεροι ἔσεσθαι τῶν τε Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν προσβοθησάντων, καὶ οὕτω σφίσιν ἀσφαλεστέρας ἔχειν

(*op. cit.*, 4.71.2)⁽²⁰⁾

x) ἐργάζομαι

ἐλπίζειν γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τι ἔργον ἄξιον τοῦ κινδύνου ἐς τὸν πόλεμον κατεργάσεσθαι.

(*op. cit.*, 7.21.2)

xi) δίζημαι

τοῦνεκεν οὐ ποτ' ἐγὼ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι δυνατὸν δίζημενος κενεῖαν ἐς ἄπρακτον ἐλπίδα μοῖραν αἰῶνος βαλέω,

(Plato, *Protagoras*, 345C7)

(2) We may well here add several passages in which clear reference to the possibility, including capacity and ability, of realization is made.

ταῦτ' εἰδὼς ὅτι τοὺς παῖδας τοὺς αὐτῶν ἐθίζουσιν περὶ τοιαύτας πραγματείας διατρέβειν, ἐξ ὧν ἐλπίζουσιν αὐτοὺς οὐκ εὐεργέτας γενήσεσθαι τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλὰ κακῶς ποιεῖν μάλιστα δυνήσεσθαι τοὺς Ἑλληνας.

(Isocrates, *Orationes XII:Panathenaicus*, 210)

ἐξήμαρτον περὶ τίνας αὐτῶν ἐλπίζοντες, ἦν μιμήσονται τὰς Σπαρτιατῶν πράξεις, μᾶλλον αὐτὰς δυνήσεσθαι κατασχεῖν.

(*op. cit.*, 100)

βεβουλευμένον μὲν διὰ τοῦ μάντεως, ὃν ἤλπισεν ἀραῖς τισι δυνήσεσθαι καθελεῖν τὴν δύναμιν τῶν Ἑβραίων

(Philo, *De vita Moysis I*, 305)

Καὶ μὴν ὃ γε μαινόμενος καὶ ὑποκεκινηκὼς οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ καὶ θεῶν ἐπιχειρεῖ τε καὶ ἐλπίζει δυνατὸς εἶναι ἄρχειν.

(Plato, *Respublica IX*, 573C)⁽²¹⁾

(3) The essential character of realizability in hope can be seen also from the existence of the conditions under which, or the means by which, what is hoped for is thought to be realized (or to fail to be realized).

i)

εἰ δ' οὖν τις ἀκτὶς ἡλίου νιν ἱστορεῖ
καὶ ζῶντα καὶ βλέποντα, μηχαναῖς Διὸς

οὐπω θέλοντος ἐξαναλωῶσαι γένος,
ἐλπὶς τις αὐτὸν πρὸς δόμους ἤξειν πάλιν.

(Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* 679)

τοιούδε μόχθου τέρμα μὴ τι προσδόκα
πρὶν ἂν θεῶν τις διάδοχος τῶν κῶν πόνων
φανῆι, θελήσει τ' εἰς ἀναύγητον μολεῖν
Ἄιδην κνεφαῖά τ' ἀμφὶ Ταρτάρου βάθη.

(id., *Prometeus Vindictus* 1026)

εἰ δέ μοι πλοῦτον θεὸς ἀβρὸν ὀρέξαι,
ἐλπίδ' ἔχω κλέος εὐρέσθαι κεν ὑψηλὸν πρόσω.

(Pindarus, *Pythia III*, 111)

ii)

οὐ δὴ τὸν αἴτιον θεὸν ὑμνοῦντες δικαίως ἂν ὑμνοῖμεν Ἐρωτα, ὃς ἐν τε τῷ παρόντι ἡμᾶς πλεῖστα ὀνίνησιν εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἄγων, καὶ εἰς τὸ ἔπειτα ἐλπίδας μεγίστας παρέχεται, ἡμῶν παρεχομένων πρὸς θεοὺς εὐσέβειαν, καταστήσας ἡμᾶς εἰς τὴν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν καὶ ἰασάμενος μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαίμονας ποιῆσαι.

(Plato, *Symposium*, 193D3)

εἰς δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ ὠδέ πως εἶπεν· Ἐὰν δε ὑμεῖς καὶ ἡμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες, ὁμονοήσωμεν, νῦν ἐλπίς τὸ πάλαι λεγόμενον δεκατευθῆναι Θηβαίους.

(Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 6.5.35)⁽²²⁾

iii)

ὃν ἤλπιζον εὖ ποιήσας μεθ' ὑμῶν ἀποστροφῆν καὶ ἐμοὶ καλῆν καὶ παισίν, εἰ γένοιτο, καταθήσεσθαι.

(id., *Anabasis*, 7.6.34)

οὐκουν τάδ', ὦ παῖ, δεινά, τὸν Λαερτίου
ἐμ' ἐλπίζειαι ποτ' ἂν λόγοις μαλθακοῖς
δεῖξαι νεὸς ἄγοντ' ἐν Ἀργείοις μέσοις;

(Sophocles, *Philoctetes* 629)⁽²³⁾

Some of the conditions under which the objects of hope are supposed to be realized are thought to be beyond the power of the person who holds the hope. (See the cases contained under i.) Other conditions are thought to be within one's power. (See ii.) And in some of the latter cases, hopes are accompanied by more concrete means by which what is hoped is supposed to be realized. (See iii.) In each of these three cases, the point of conditions or means is the realization of hopes.

(4) The same point can be seen further from another aspect, i.e., the grounds for holding hope. Let us first look at several passages.

i) (experience, memory, knowledge of) past events, situations, or actions, either of one's own or of others

οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεγνώκασι τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ τὸν θάνατον τὸν τοιοῦτον δυσχεραίνουσιν, οἱ δὲ εὐέλπιδες εἰσι παρὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν.
(Aristoteles, *Ethica Nicomachea III*, 1115B3)

Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ μέχρι μὲν οὐδὲν περὶ Ἐλευσίνα καὶ τὸ Θριάσιον πεδῖον ὁ στρατὸς ἦν, καὶ τινα ἐλπίδα εἶχον ἐς τὸ ἐγγυτέρω αὐτοὺς μὴ προΐεναι, μεμνημένοι καὶ Πλειστοάνακτα τὸν Πανσανίου Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλέα, ὅτε ἐσβαλὼν τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἐς Ἐλευσίνα καὶ Θριῶζε στρατῷ Πελοποννησίων πρὸ τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου τέσσαρσι καὶ δέκα ἔτεσιν ἀνεχώρησε πάλιν ἐς τὸ πλεον οὐκέτι προελθῶν
(Thucydides, *op. cit.*, 2.21.1)

εἰ δὲ δεῖ τὰ μέλλοντα τοῖς γεγεννημένοις τεκμαίρεσθαι, πολὺ πλείων ἐλπίς ἐστίν ἕτερον ἀποστήναι πρὶν ἐκείνων ἐκπολιορκηθῆναι.
(Isocrates, *Orationes IV:Panegyricus*, 141)⁽²⁴⁾

ii) (past) good fortune

ὁ δὲ τούτοις τε πεισθεῖς καὶ τῇ τύχῃ ἐλπίσας, ὅτι οὐδὲν αὐτῷ ἠναντιοῦτο
(Thucydides, *op. cit.*, 3.97.2)⁽²⁵⁾

iii) character or disposition of one's own or others

οὐδενὶ γὰρ τούτων ἀμελές. ὥστε εἰ κακοὶ φανείησαν περὶ ὑμᾶς, τίς ἂν ποτε ἔτι πρόθυμος εἰς αὐτοὺς γένοιτο; ἐλπίζειν δὲ χρὴ ὡς ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς μᾶλλον ἢ κακοὺς αὐτοὺς γενήσεσθαι· εἰ γάρ τινες ἄλλοι, καὶ οὗτοι δοκοῦσι διατετελεκέναι ἐπαίνου μὲν ὀρεγόμενοι, αἰσχρῶν δὲ ἔργων ἀπεχόμενοι.
(Xenophon, *op. cit.*, 6.5.42)⁽²⁶⁾

iv) current situations

κυρία δ' ἦδ' ἡμέρα,
ἐν ἧ διοίσει φῆφον Ἀργείων πόλις,
εἰ χρὴ θανεῖν νῶ λευσίμφω πετρῶματι.
[ἦ φάσγανον θήξαντ' ἐπ' ἀυχένος βαλεῖν.]
ἐλπίδα δὲ δῆ τιν' ἔχομεν ὥστε μὴ θανεῖν.
(Euripides, *Orestes* 52)

Θουκυδίδης Ἀθηναῖος ξυνέγραφε τὸν πόλεμον τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων, ὡς ἐπολέμησαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἀρξάμενος εὐθύς καθισταμένου καὶ ἐλπίσας μέγαν τε ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἀξιολογώτατον τῶν προγεγεννημένων, τεκμαιρόμενος ὅτι ἀκμάζοντες τε ἦσαν ἐς αὐτὸν ἀμφοτέρω παρασκευῇ τῇ πάσῃ καὶ τὸ ἄλλο Ἑλληνικὸν ὄρων ξυνοστάμενον πρὸς ἑκατέρους, τὸ μὲν εὐθύς, τὸ δὲ καὶ διανοοῦμενον.
(Thucydides, *op. cit.*, 1.1)

Περικλεῖ δὲ ποτε τῷ τοῦ πάνυ Περικλέους υἱῷ διαλεγόμενος, Ἐγὼ τοι, ἔφη, ὦ Περικλεῖς, ἐλπίδα ἔχω σοῦ στρατηγήσαντος ἀμείνω τε καὶ ἐνδοξοτέραν τὴν πόλιν εἰς τὰ πολεμικὰ ἔσεσθαι καὶ τῶν πολεμίων κρατῆσειν.

(Xenophon, *Memorabilia Socratis*, 3.5.1)⁽²⁷⁾

v) upbringing and education

ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐν τοιοῦτοις ἤθεσι τέθραφθε νομοῖς σύ τε καὶ ὄδε, προσδοκῶ οὐκ ἂν ἀηδῶς περὶ τε πολιτείας τὰ νῦν καὶ νόμων τὴν διατριβῆν, λέγοντάς τε καὶ ἀκούοντας ἅμα κατὰ τὴν πορείαν, ποιήσασθαι.

(Plato, *Leges I*, 625A6)⁽²⁸⁾

vi) other people's words

Δεινὸν μὲν τοίνυν ἔτι προσδοκᾶν οὐδὲν δεῖ τὸν ἐμέ, ἐπειδὴ τοῦθ' οὕτως εἶπες

(id., *Philebus*, 20B1)

vii) truth

Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, ὦ ἐταῖρε, πολλῇ ἐλπίς ἀφικόμενῳ οἱ ἐγὼ πορεύομαι, ἐκεῖ ἱκανῶς, εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι, κτήσασθαι τοῦτο οὐδ' ἔνεκα ἢ πολλῇ πραγματεία ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ γέγονεν, ὥστε ἢ γε ἀποδημία ἢ νῦν μοι προστεταγμένη μετὰ ἀγαθῆς ἐλπίδος γίγνεται καὶ ἄλλῳ ἀνδρὶ ὃς ἠγεῖται οἱ παρεσκευάσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν ὥσπερ κεκαθαρμένην.

(id., *Phaedo*, 67B8)

ἐλπίς γὰρ μάλιστα αὐτοὺς οὕτω φοβηθῆναι τὸ γὰρ ἐπίον ὑστερον δεινότερον τοῖς πολεμίοις τοῦ παρόντος καὶ μαχομένου.

(Thucydides, *op. cit.*, 5.9.8)⁽²⁹⁾

viii) (lack of) intention of the relevant people

οὔτε γὰρ ναυτικὸν ἦν προφυλάσσειν ἐν αὐτῷ οὐδὲν οὔτε προσδοκία οὐδεμία μὴ ἂν ποτε οἱ πολέμιοι ἐξαπιναίως οὕτως ἐπιπλεύσειαν, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἀπὸ τοῦ προφανοῦς τολμήσαι ἂν καθ' ἡσυχίαν

(*op. cit.*, 2.93.3)⁽³⁰⁾

ix) (appearance of) someone's ability

οἱ δὲ καὶ ἐλπίδας ἔχοντες, διὰ τὸ ἄνδρα φαίνεσθαι ἀγαθὸν καὶ εὐτυχῆ, καὶ μέγαν ἔτι ἰσχυρῶς ἔσεσθαι αὐτόν

(Xenophon, *Cyropaedia*, 4.2.10)

x) impossibility of other alternatives

εἰ οὖν ἡμεῖς φίλοι γενοίμεθα, πόθεν ἂν
εἰκότως χαλεπὸν τι προσδοκῶσαιμεν; καὶ γὰρ
δὴ κατὰ γῆν μὲν τίς ἂν ὑμῶν φίλων ὄντων ἱκανὸς
γένοιτο ἡμᾶς λυπῆσαι;

(id., *Hellenica*, 6.3.14) ⁽³¹⁾

Various kinds of things can be grounds for our hope. Those which we have quoted above are only some part of such grounds. One prominent feature of these grounds is that most of them are related to the possibility of realization of things hoped for, which possibility can be measured by some past or present situation (in the widest sense). This is the reason we have looked at these passages. Some of the grounds for hope can be incorrect or false, and the hopes which are based on these grounds, i.e. groundless hopes, can be criticized.

(iii) Now, although these grounds for hope, i.e., those related to the realizability of things hoped for, contain a lot of things, they are not the only type of possible ground for hope. This point is important, because many cases of hope are concerned with the future, and yet hope is not the only way of our relation with the future. One of the other ways of this relation is a wish, from which hope can be distinguished by its connection with the possibility of the realization of the things hoped for.

(A wish can exist without any consideration of this possibility.) Another way in which we relate to the future is through prediction, or an estimate of the future, as Prof. Anscombe once called it. When we see hope from the point of the possibility of realization and the type of the grounds for hope which is connected with this possibility, hope looks similar to an estimate of the future. For we can criticize both of them for being sound or unsound, i.e., well-founded or ill-founded, rather than being fulfilled or not fulfilled. And yet hope has another aspect from which it can be justified or criticized, or even blamed. What is hoped for is thought of as the thing whose realization or fulfilment is good (in the widest sense). (What is feared is, of course, thought to be bad (in the widest sense).) So, hope can be justified or criticized from this point of view; whether what is hoped for as good is really good. "Grounds of hope are mixed of reasons for wanting, and reasons for believing, that the thing wanted may happen." ⁽³²⁾ An estimate of the future, especially a scientific one, does not have this aspect of value. Concerning this point, hope seems to be more similar to commands, in which also we are concerned with the future. Commands and orders are justified or criticized both for 'the reasons suggesting what it would be good to make happen with a view to an objective, or a sound objective' ⁽³³⁾, and for the reasons suggesting what it would be possible to make happen through the person(s) who is (are) given the order or command. (However good the thing is which is ordered

to happen, if the thing is beyond the power of the person(s) given an order, the order, or the person(s) who gave the order, can be criticized. In this point, i.e., that commands can be criticized both in value and possibility, Anscombe's view of commands is too simple.) However, there is some difference between commands and hope. The reasons or grounds for justifying hope are, in part, those suggesting what would be good to happen, not necessarily to make happen. We can hope for the things whose realization is (thought to be) beyond our own power as well as for the things whose realization is (thought to be) in our own power, *up to us*, and our own future intentional actions ('I shall be polite to him — I hope.' ⁽³⁴⁾). We can see this point by looking back at the cases of conditional hopes above-mentioned. Those conditions or means under which, or by which, things hoped for are supposed to be realized contain both the cases in which they *are up to the hoppers themselves* and the cases in which they are not. So, hope for future things is also different from an expression of intention, which is also concerned with the future, even though grounds of intention, which are reasons for acting, can, sometimes at least, relate to value. And we can hold both hope and intention without their expression, though this is not the case with commands.

(iv) The important point that hope is concerned with value, which distinguishes it from an (scientific) estimate of the future, lead us to put the ways of our evaluation into our consideration. "Further, it is not proper to neglect these considerations, especially with a view to that at which all inquiry should be directed, viz. the causes that enable us to share in the good and noble life . . . , and with a view to the hope we may have of attaining each good." (Aristoteles, *Ethica Eudemia I*, 1215A11) Not only a lot of things are hoped for, but also various things are hoped for by various people. And in some cases we hope for the things which we believe to be good for all the people concerned. But in other cases, we hope for the things the realization of which we believe to be good for us, but not necessarily for other people: eg. when we hope for our opponents' failure.

(1) We may well look at several passages in which clear references to value are made.

καὶ νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς εἰκός τι παθεῖν ἔμοιγε
δοκεῖτε τίς γὰρ ἂν ἠνέσχετο, τηλικαῦτα καὶ
τοσαῦτ' ἔσεσθαι προσδοκῶν ἀγαθὰ, ἢ ταῦθ' ὡς
οὐκ ἔσται λέγοντός τινος, ἢ κατηγοροῦντος τῶν
πεπραγμένων τούτοις;

(Demosthenes, *De Falsa Legatione*, 19.24)

χρὴ οὖν μηδὲν ἐλλείποντα κατὰ δύναμιν
τιμᾶν τοὺς θεοὺς θαρρεῖν τε καὶ ἐλπίζειν τὰ
μέγιστα ἀγαθὰ. οὐ γὰρ παρ' ἄλλων γ' ἂν τις
μείζω ἐλπίζων σωφρονοίῃ ἢ παρὰ τῶν τὰ
μέγιστα ὠφελεῖν δυναμένων, οὐδ' ἂν ἄλλως

μᾶλλον ἢ εἰ τούτοις ἀρέσκοι·

(Xenophon, *Memorabilia Socratis*, 4.3.17)

τί οὖν ἐστὶ τοῦτο; ὅτι οὐδέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῶν δεόντων ποιούντων ἡμῶν κακῶς τὰ πράγματα ἔχει ἐπεὶ τοι, εἰ πάνθ' ἅ προσήκε πραττόντων οὕτως εἶχεν, οὐδ' ἂν ἐλπὶς ἦν αὐτὰ βελτίω γενέσθαι.

(Demosthenes, *Philippica I*, 2)

Ἡδονῆς δ' αὖ καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν δεύτερον, ἐλπίδων δὲ καὶ δόξης τῆς ἀληθοῦς περὶ τὸ ἀριστον ἔφεσις τρίτον ἕτερον.

(Plato, *Leges IX*, 864B6)⁽³⁵⁾

ὁ δὲ βουλόμενός τιν' εὐπραγεῖν, ἐλπίδα ἔχων εὐπορίας δι' ἐκείνου, οὐκ ἔοικ' εὖνους ἐκείνῳ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἑαυτῷ, καθάπερ οὐδὲ φίλος, εἰ θεραπεύει αὐτὸν διὰ τινὰ χρῆσιν. (Aristoteles, *Ethica Nicomachea IX*, 1167A15)

εἶθ' οὕτως ἀγνωμόνως ἔχετε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὥστε δι' ὧν ἐκ χρηστών φαῦλα τὰ πράγματα τῆς πόλεως γέγονεν, διὰ τούτων ἐλπίζετε τῶν αὐτῶν πράξεων ἐκ φαύλων αὐτὰ χρηστὰ γενήσεσθαι;

(Demosthenes, *Olynthiaca II*, 26)

Ηρ. τί δ'; οὐ γαμῆς γάρ, ἀλλὰ χηρέυση λέχος;

Αδ. οὐκ ἔστιν ἤτις τῷδε συγκλιθήσεται.

Ηρ. μῶν τὴν θανούσαν ὠφελεῖν τι προσδοκᾷ;

(Euripides, *Alcestis* 1091)

Καὶ ὁ τοῦ Γλαύκωνος ἀδελφός, Πάννυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἔγωγε προσδοκῶ προὔργου εἶναι εἰς τοῦτο ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν.

(Plato, *Republica II*, 376D5)

ἐλπίζω δὲ σὺχ ἡμῖν μόνοις συμβουλευέσειν τὰ συμφέροντα, μάλιστα γὰρ μὴν ἡμῖν, καὶ δευτέροις πᾶσιν τοῖς ἐν Συρακούσαις, τρίτοις δὲ ἡμῶν καὶ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς καὶ πολεμίοις

(id., *Epistulae VIII*, 352B4)

ἐπεὶ δὲ ὄρθρος ἦν, ἔρχεται πρὸς τὸν Χειρίσοφον καὶ λέγει ὅτι ἐλπίδας ἔχει καλῶς ἔσεσθαι, καὶ διηγέεται αὐτῷ τὸ ὄναρ.

(Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 4.3.8)

ἐννοεῖ δὲ καὶ τάδε τίνι χαρισάμενος ἐλπίσαις ἂν μειζόνων τυχεῖν ἢ τούτῳ;

(id., *Cyropaedia*, 8.7.16)⁽³⁶⁾

(2) The concept of value, in the widest sense, including pleasure and pain, in hope, is closely connected with the people who hold hope.⁽³⁷⁾ (This connection is not limited to the hope for the future.) One and the same thing can

be hoped for by one type of people and feared by another type of people. What we hope depends on and manifests what kind of people we are, because the way of evaluation is the gist of our character. The more wholehearted and serious a hope is, the more clearly and deeply it manifests the character of the person who holds it. And we may well say that, as hope contains evaluation, an estimate of the possibility of realization, and pleasure, it can manifest one's character more than one's other attitudes can.

The connection of hope and value (including pleasure), and the role of hope in (discerning) character can be seen in the following more theoretical passages.

οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ δανείσαντι ἐνίστε ἀντιδανειστέον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ οἰόμενος κομιεῖσθαι ἐδάνεισεν ἐπιεικεῖ ὄντι, ὁ δ' οὐκ ἐλπίζει κομιεῖσθαι παρὰ πονηροῦ.

(Aristoteles, *op. cit. IX*, 1165A9)

συνδιάγειν τε ὁ τοιοῦτος ἑαυτῷ βούλεται ἡδέως γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ τῶν τε γὰρ πεπραγμένων ἐπιτερεῖς αἱ μνήμαι, καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐλπίδες ἀγαθαί, αἱ τοιαῦται δ' ἡδέαι.

(*op. cit. IX*, 1166A25)

ἔτι καὶ ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη ἐν ἀμφοτέροις ἔνεστι. καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐγκρατευόμενος λυπεῖται παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν πράττων ἤδη, καὶ χαίρει τὴν ἀπ' ἐλπίδος ἡδονὴν, ὅτι ὑστερον ὠφελήθησεται, ἢ καὶ ἡδη ὠφελεῖται ὑγιαίνων· καὶ ὁ ἀκρατῆς χαίρει μὲν τυγχάνων ἀκρατευόμενος οὐ ἐπιθυμῆ, λυπεῖται δὲ τὴν ἀπ' ἐλπίδος λύπην, οἶεται γὰρ κακῶς πράξειν.

(id., *Ethica Eudemia II*, 1224B17)

πονηρῶν δὲ ἀνθρώπων ἀτελεῖς ἐλπίδες· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἢ οὐχ ἦττον οἱ διαπεφευγένοι δόξαντες τῶν προκαταληφθέντων ἀλώσονται.

(Philo, *De Praemiis et Poenis*, 149)

ἐλπίσι γὰρ ἀγαθαῖς οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τῶν φαύλων ὑπέρεχουσι·

(Porphyrius, *Ad Marcellam*, 24.6)⁽³⁸⁾

(v) Now, let us go back to the point of the realization in hope. In considering an expression of intention, Anscombe subsumed it under the genus of 'prediction'. The account she gave of it is the following one; a man says something with one inflection of the verb in his sentence; later that same thing, only with a changed inflection of the verb, can be called true (or false), in face of what has happened later.⁽³⁹⁾ Other species of prediction she referred to are commands, an estimate of the future, and pure prophesies. We may well add some part of hope and wish to this list. If we can say that, as she

put it, execution-conditions for commands correspond to truth-conditions for propositions, there seems to be no substantial reason why we should not call hope true or false according as the things hoped for have occurred, although there is no particular inflection for hope, either in ancient Greek or in English, something like the 'sperative' mood.

Ἄλλὰ μὴν, ὁ Κῦρος ἔφη, εἷς γε τὸ προθυμίαν ἐμβαλεῖν στρατιώταις οὐδέν μοι δοκεῖ ἰκανώτερον εἶναι ἢ τὸ δύνασθαι ἐλπίδας ἐμποιεῖν ἀνθρώποις. Ἄλλ', ἔφη, ὦ παῖ, τοῦτό γε τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν οἷόν περ εἶ τις κύννας ἐν θήρᾳ ἀνακαλοῦτο ἀεὶ τῇ κλήσει ἥπερ ὅταν τὸ θηρίον ὀρᾷ. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον προθύμως εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι ἔχει ὑπακουούσας ἦν δὲ πολλαίς κίς φεύδεται αὐτάς, τελευτῶσαι οὐδ' ὅποταν ἀληθῶς ὀρῶν καλῆ πείθονται αὐτῶ. οὕτω καὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν ἐλπίδων ἔχει ἦν πολλαίς κίς προσδοκίας ἀγαθῶν ἐμβαλῶν φεύδεται τις, οὐδ' ὅποταν ἀληθεῖς ἐλπίδας λέγῃ ὁ τοιοῦτος πείθειν δύναται.

(Xenophon, *Cyropaedia*, 1.6.19)

We have considered the features of hope which characterize it, and distinguish it from some of other mental phenomena; the two main features we are interested in are its connections with the possibility of the realization of things hoped for, and with value (in the widest sense).⁽⁴⁰⁾ Now, the relation between these two features seems to give us some clue to the the riddle of false pleasure by drawing our attention to the situation in which hope and expectation are true or false. Our future task will be to try to solve this riddle by using the clue.

Notes

(The detail of the texts which are used is given at the end of this note.)

- (1) Davidson, D., *Plato's Philebus*, Ph.D Thesis (1949), Garland, 1990, p.1.
- (2) Frede, D., *Plato Philebus*, Hackett, 1993, p. xiii.
- (3) Frede dissects the analysis of false pleasure into four parts, but there seems to be little evidence to support her way of division.
- (4) The relevant Greek expressions are mainly ἐλπίς, ἐπιζῶ, ἔλπομαι; προσδοκία, προσδοκῶ, προσδοκῆμα.
- (5) See also *Rhetorica B12, 1390A6-9; De Partibus Animalium III, 669A21*; cf. Michael, *In ethica Nicomachea, ix-x commentaria, 481.34*, in *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graca 20*; Themistius, *In Aristotelis libros de anima paraphrasis, 107.10, CAG 5.3*; Olympiodorus, *In Aristotelis Categoriae Commentarium, 34.35-36, CAG 12.1*.
- (6) See also *De Migratione Abrahami, 16.154*; also cf. Proclus, *In Platonis Timaeum Commentaria 3.332.24*; id., *In Platonis Cratylum Commentaria, 123.9*; Damascius, *In Philebum, 82.4*.
- (7) See also Isocrates, *Orationes XII:Panathenaicus 6*;

Thucydides, *Historiae, 2.51.6; 7.77.3; 8.81.2*; Proclus, *In Platonis Rem Publicam Commentarii, 2.325.6*; Philo of Alexandria, *Quod Deterius Potiori insidiari soleat, 119-121; De Migratione Abrahami, 43; De Vita Moysis I, 199; De Vita Moysis II, 14; De Specialibus Legibus I, 284; De Vita Contemplativa, 46; De Somniis II, 207-210; De Virtutibus, 59; op. cit., 67; De Praemiis et Poenis, 71*; cf. *De Specialibus Legibus II, 12*.

- (8) See also Aeschines, *Orationes III:In Ctesiphon, 221*; Herodotus, *op. cit., 1.75.2; 3.62.2; 4.135.3; 7.212.1*; Josephus, *Antiquitates Judaicae, 2.48; 5.319*; Lysias, *Orationes XIX:On the Property of Aristophanes, 48*.
- (9) See also Aeschines, *Orationes I:In Timarchum, 3*; Homer, *Iliad, 15.110*; Josephus, *Antiquitates Judaicae, 18.112*.
- (10) See also Isocrates, *Orationes I:Ad Demonicum, 24*; Josephus, *De Bello Judaico, 1.391*; id., *Antiquitates Judaicae, 17.274*.
- (11) See also Plato, *Respublica VI, 486c3*; id., *Leges VII, 817C1f*.
- (12) See also id., *Respublica II, 383B5-6*.
- (13) See also Euripides, *fragmenta, 650*.
- (14) This point has already been pointed out clearly by Aristotle:

ἡ γὰρ μεμνημένοι ὡς ἔτυχον ἢ ἐλπίζοντες ὡς τεύξονται χαίρουσιν τινα ἡδονήν

(*Rhetorica A11, 1370B16-17*)

- (15) cf. Aristoteles, *Rhetorica B8, 1385B14*
- (16) See also Plato, *Phaedrus 231E1*; Aristoteles, *Ethica Nicomachea VIII, 1159A20*; Dio Chrysostomus, *Orationes XI, 142*; Josephus, *Antiquitates Judaicae, 8.8; 12.344*; Xenophon, *Cyropaedia, 1.6.4; 4.6.7; 8.7.16*; Thucydides, *op. cit., 6.87.4*.
- (17) See also Thucydides, *op. cit., 2.80.1*; Xenophon, *Symposium, 4.32*; id., *Memorabilia Socratis, 2.1.18*.
- (18) See also Isocrates, *Epistolae III:Ad Philippum 6*; Josephus, *De Bello Judaico, 4.85*; Plato, *Leges I, 646E7-8*.
- (19) See also Demosthenes, *Olynthiaca I, 1.14*; Philo, *De Specialibus Legibus, 34*; id., *De Virtutibus, 75*.
- (20) See also Xenophon, *Memorabilia Socratis, 1.2.2*.
- (21) See also Isocrates, *Orationes V: Philippus, 130*; Josephus, *De Bello Judaico, 7.27*; Philo, *Quod Deus sit immutabilis, 68; De Fuga et Inventione, 164; De Mutatione Nominum, 158; De Somniis II, 94; op. cit., 276; De Specialibus Legibus I, 49; Apologia pro Iudaeis, 111*; Damascius, *In Phaedonem, 44.3*; Plato, *Alcibiades I, 105D7f*; Proclus, *In Platonis Alcibiadem i, 157.14*.
- (22) see also Plato, *Epinomis, 973C6*; id., *Epistulae VII, 327D4*; id., *Respublica II, 369A9*; id., *Leges XII, 950D2*; Xenophon, *Agesilaus, 2.8*.
- (23) See also Plato, *Respublica IV, 427E6*; id., *Sophista, 219A1*; id., *Politicus, 275A10*; id., *Leges III, 688C2*; Thucydides, *op. cit., 1.70.7*; Euripides, *Ion 866*; id., *Hellena 432*; Josephus, *De Bello Judaico, 2.587*.
- (24) See also Aristoteles, *Ethica Nicomachea III, 1117A10*; Plato, *Leges III, 699B3*; Thucydides, *op. cit., 7.46.1; 7.77.1*; Xenophon, *Cyropaedia, 2.4.15*.
- (25) See also Aristoteles, *Ethica Eudemia III, 1229A18*.
- (26) See also Demosthenes, *In Aristogitonem I, 5*; Plato, *Phaedrus, 232E1f*.
- (27) See also Plato, *Sophista, 250E7*; id., *Politicus, 262D*; Euripides, *Alcestis 146*; Xenophon, *Hellenica, 4.8.38*.
- (28) See also Xenophon, *Memorabilia Socratis, 2.1.27*.
- (29) See also Plato, *Phaedrus, 231E1*.
- (30) See also Xenophon, *Anabasis, 4.6.18*.
- (31) See also Thucydides, *op. cit., 2.93.3*.
- (32) Anscombe, G. E. M., *Intention, §50*, Blackwell, 1957.
- (33) *op. cit., §4*.
- (34) *op. cit., §50*.
- (35) See also Aristoteles, *Ethica Nicomachea VIII, 1156A30*; id., *Magna Moralia I, 1191A15*; Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae philosophorum, 2.89.10*; Isocrates, *Orationes V:*

- Philippus*, 130; Philo, *Apologia pro Iudaeis*, 11.
- (36) Hope and expectation have very wide range of objects: for instance, deception of other people (Demosthenes, *Contra Nicortratum*, 53.29; id., *Contra Zenothemin*, 32.31); vengeance (id., *De Falsa Legatione*, 19.240; Josephus, *De Bello Judaico*, 5.404); death or lack of death (Euripides, *Orestes* 52); prosperity and happiness (id., *Heracidae* 521; Proclus, *In Platonis Alcibiadem* i, 106.9); mistake, unhappiness, or ruin of enemies (Herodotus, *op. cit.*, 7.212.1; Isocrates, *Orationes V: Philippus*, 130; Thucydides, *op. cit.*, 1.84.4; 7.48.2; Josephus, *Contra Apionem*, 100; id., *De Bello Judaico*, 4.335; *op. cit.*, 6.25); infliction of injury (Isocrates, *Orationes XV: Antidosis*, 143); concealment (id., *Orationes I: Ad Demonium*, 16); pain (Porphyrius, *Quaestionum Homericarum ad Iliad pertinentium reliquae*, 2.380.5); virtue (Xenophon, *Memorabilia Socratis*, 1.2.2); one's own superiority (*op. cit.*, 4.2.1); friendliness of others (id., *Cyropaedia*, 2.4.14); richness, office, praise, absence of disease, health and strength, knowledge (Philo, *Legum Allegoriarum III*, 87); gain, successful voyage, glory, prizes and crowns, happiness (id., *De Praemiis et Poenis*, 11-13); life after death (Plato, *Phaedo*, 67B8)
- (37) Our evaluation of things and the objects of our pleasure sometimes coincide, but not in all cases.
- (38) See also Aristoteles, *Ethica Nicomachea III*, 1110A32; *op. cit.*, 1116A2; id., *Ethica Eudemia III*, 1229B30f; Clemens of Alexandria, *Stromata*, 2.18.83.2.2; *op. cit.* 4.22.144.1.1; Philo, *In Flaccum*, 109; id., *Quod Deterius Potiori insidiari solet*, 140.
- (39) Anscombe, *op. cit.*, § 2.
- (40) Hope or expectation is contained in future-related emotions. The features of realization and its possibility, which we have suggested to be essential characters of hope, can also be seen in these emotions. This can be thought to be due to the element of expectation contained in them. cf. "Anger may be defined as a desire accompanied by pain, for a conspicuous slight at the hands of men who have no call to slight oneself or one's friends. . . . It must be attended by a certain pleasure — that which arises from the expectation of revenge. For it is pleasant to think that you will attain what you aim at, and nobody aims at what he thinks he cannot attain," (Aristoteles, *Rhetorica B1*, 1378A30f.); "... for no one grows angry with a person on whom there is no possibility of taking vengeance, and we feel comparatively little anger, or none at all, with those who are much our superiors in power." (*op. cit.* A11, 1370B13-15); "Revenge, too, is pleasant; it is pleasant to get anything that it is painful to fail to get, and angry people suffer extreme pain when they fail to get revenge; but they enjoy the prospect of getting it." (*op. cit.* A11, 1370B30-32); "If fear is associated with the expectation that something destructive will happen to us, plainly nobody will be afraid who believes nothing can happen to him." (*op. cit.* B5, 1382B29-32) (tr. by Rhy Roberts, W., in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, (ed.) J. Barns, Princeton, 1984)
- More exactly, the two features of realization and its possibility are thought to be more essential to hope than to these emotions: these emotions can be entertained before any estimate of realizability of the relevant aims; for instance, when we are slighted without reason, we can get angry without considering the possibility of vengeance. When we estimate it and find out that there is no possibility, the anger will die down. On the other hand, when we hold hope, we seem to have already some estimate of the realizability of the object of hope, though we sometimes make mistake in this estimation.
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