

Resolution Analysis & Debate Briefs of the 21st HEnDA High School Debate Tournament in 2026

“Resolved: That the Japanese government should
eliminate all tariffs on imported rice”

Inoue, Narahiko
Kyushu University : Professor Emeritus

<https://hdl.handle.net/2324/7441641>

出版情報 : 2026-09-14
バージョン :
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Resolution Analysis & Debate Briefs of the 21st HEnDA High School Debate Tournament in 2026 “Resolved: That the Japanese government should eliminate all tariffs on imported rice”

第 21 回全国高校生英語ディベート大会 2026 年度
論題 「日本政府は輸入米の関税を撤廃すべきである。是か非か。」
論題分析と資料集

Generated by Claude.ai

Edited and expanded by Narahiko INOUE¹

September 2026

Preface

This document assumes that the readers are familiar with the HEnDA-style debate and general principles of so-called “Policy Debate” popular in the US and in Japan. Those who are not familiar with the type of debate are advised to read a textbook such as *DEBATE FOR JAPAN: A Policy Debate Textbook for HEnDA Nationals* (an AI-generated textbook available from <https://sites.google.com/view/2026henda-debate/>) or traditional debate textbooks (e.g., Inoue, 2006; Aleles & Inoue, 2020). They should also learn particular rules of the HEnDA nationals. The official HEnDA information (the resolution and the tournament rules) is available in Japanese and English at <https://henda.global/>

For the readers’ reference, the conversation with AI (Claude) is publicly available (<https://claude.ai/share/daa0cab4-8852-42ed-881b-d57c6c983490>) so that they can review how the initial prompt to produce the first version of this document was written and subsequent revisions were made by Claude. After a modified version was generated, it has been extensively revised by two humans (Inoue and a graduate student)². Any remaining errors may be corrected later to make a new version. But either the Claude AI or the human editors are NOT responsible for remaining errors. DO NOT simply use the texts from this document. Verify the original sources in the References, all of which have URLs.

¹ Professor Emeritus, Kyushu University. Contact [debate\[at\]flc.kyushu-u.ac.jp](mailto:debate[at]flc.kyushu-u.ac.jp)

² I am indebted to Mami Matsuse for her help in validating sources in an earlier version of this document.

この文書は、HEnDA 形式のディベートや一般的なポリシーディベート（「アカデミックディベート」）についての知識や経験を有する読者を想定して生成、修正されています。そうでない読者は先に教科書（e.g., 井上, 2011; Aleles & Inoue, 2020）などでポリシーディベートについて学び、HEnDA 公式サイトで公開されている大会ルールの関連箇所と論題の定義を読むことを推奨します。

このファイルの内容は、まず Claude AI によって生成され、いくつかの修正を経て、再度生成したファイルを基に、2 名の人間による大幅な修正を行いました。ただし、引用や分析における正確さを保証するものではありません。ディベートのスピーチなどで使うときは必ず元の出典を確認してください。Claude の生成過程はこちらで公開しています。

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For more information, as well as for constructive comments, contact the editor (Narahiko INOUE) via Google form (<https://forms.gle/D3gPeEt57gDcT1LW9>)

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I. Introduction

The 21st Annual HEnDA National High School English Debate Tournament (2026) centers on the following resolution: Resolved: That the Japanese government should eliminate all tariffs on imported rice (日本政府は輸入米の関税を撤廃すべきである). This resolution arrives at a critical juncture in Japan's rice policy history, as the country has been grappling with a severe rice shortage since the summer of 2024, soaring consumer prices, and mounting international pressure to liberalize its agricultural markets. This analysis provides (1) an overview of Japan's current rice supply-and-demand situation and government policies, (2) possible affirmative cases (advantages of the affirmative plan), (3) possible negative cases (disadvantages), and (4) additional attack-and-defense briefs for both sides.

II. Background: Japan's Rice Supply, Demand, and Policy Framework

A. The Tariff-Rate Quota System and the 341-Yen/kg Out-of-Quota Tariff

Japan's current rice trade regime is among the most protectionist in the developed world. Following the GATT Uruguay Round in 1993, Japan agreed to allow minimum access (MA) imports beginning in 1995, and converted to a tariff-rate quota (TRQ) system in 1999. Under this arrangement, 770,000 metric tons of rice may enter Japan tariff-free each year under the WTO's minimum access framework. (Sakuyama, 2025; Kaneko, 2025; The Yomiuri Shimbun, 2024)³ Rice imported outside this quota, however, faces a punitive specific tariff. As the USA Rice Federation (2025) explains:

"U.S. rice that enters Japan outside the TRQ system faces a tariff of 341 yen per kilogram, which in U.S. dollars is roughly \$2.33 per kg or \$2,330 per MT." (para. 5)

Crucially, the 341 yen/kg levy is a specific duty — a fixed charge per unit of weight — not an *ad valorem* tariff expressed as a percentage of the import price. Its *ad valorem* equivalent (AVE) therefore changes as world rice prices fluctuate. The figure of 778% that appears frequently in media and policy commentary derives from a MAFF calculation published in 2005, based on world rice prices prevailing at that time. Yamashita at the Canon Institute for Global Studies (2013) cautioned that "while a tariff of 778% does not actually exist, the real tariff is ¥341 per kilogram. We have seen some analyses based on a tariff rate of 778% but these are incorrect" (para. 11). Agriculture professor Sakuyama at Meiji

³ Some historical highlights of the GATT negotiation is narrated in the Yomiuri Shimbun article (2024):

"In December 1993, Germain Denis, chairman of the market-access negotiating group of the Uruguay Round, presented a compromise proposal that called for the implementation of minimum access, meaning that a specific import volume would be allowed, and would increase every year, in exchange for a six-year postponement of tariffication on rice as a special exception. Then Foreign Minister Tsutomu Hata met with Denis in Geneva on Dec. 12, and requested that non-trade factors be taken into consideration when discussing whether to extend the special exception after six years."

"The government subsequently decided to impose tariffs on rice in April 1999 to curb the expansion of rice imports through the minimum access framework."

University (2025) similarly explains that "[a]ccording to the estimate published by MAFF in 2005, the tariff rate in percentages amounts to 778%," while noting that President Trump's "700%" remark drew on the same dated calculation (para. 8).

At current (2024–2025) world rice prices, which have risen substantially since 2005, the AVE is considerably lower. Yanagida, Research Fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs (Yanagida, 2025) estimates the tariff as "equivalent to roughly 400% ad valorem" based on prevailing prices (para. 7). A separate 2025 analysis using U.S. California medium-grain rice export prices puts the AVE at approximately 227% (Northwood, 2025, para. 1). Tae Yeon Eom, Research Scholar at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada (2025) references the dated figure in noting that "high import tariffs on rice — reaching as high as 778 per cent — were implemented in the late 1990s to shield domestic farmers from foreign competition" (para. 7); debaters should be aware that this figure reflects the rate's historical calibration, not its current ad valorem impact. Regardless of the specific percentage used, the duty of \$2,330 per metric ton remains highly protective relative to world prices. The Reuters report by Kaneko (2025) states that "beyond the minimum access framework, Japan imposes a levy of 341 yen (\$2.36) per kg of rice, which has, for the most part, effectively priced imports out of the market" (para. 8).

In parallel, the OECD (2025) notes that "rice imports are managed by a state trading enterprise⁴, fulfilling Japan's minimum-access commitment under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture," and that "a TRQ of 682,200 tonnes (milled) applies" — with the government able to apply additional mark-ups when selling imported rice on the domestic market (OECD, 2025, *Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation 2025, Japan chapter*):

"The maximum mark-up (collected by the government when importing and selling on domestic markets) for rice imports is set at JPY 292 (USD 2.1) per kg, and the out-of-quota tariff-rate is JPY 341 (USD 2.4) per kg." (p. 448)

MA (Minimum Access) and SBS (Simultaneous Buy and Sell)

The government purchase imported rice within the Minimum Access quota and stockpile it or sell it to the market with a markup. But the small part of it is more or less directly bought and sold by private companies. USDA explains (Fujibayashi, 2026):

"The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) administers the WTO TRQ and imports MA rice tariff-free. MAFF limits MA rice destined for table rice to a maximum of 100,000 MT, and it channels the remainder into processed foods (such as miso, shochu, and rice crackers), livestock feed, and overseas food aid. That 100,000 MT maximum of table rice is imported via Simultaneous Buy and Sell (SBS) tenders, where MAFF collects a markup capped at 292 yen per kilogram, which is below the out-of-quota tariff of 341 yen per kilogram. Consequently, this leads private importers to fully utilize the SBS quota before

⁴ MAFF acts strictly as an STE (the international regulator) at the border, and manages a stockpile (the physical emergency reserve warehouses) inside the country. The details is found in this discussion paper (MacLaren, 2011). The legal framework has not changed although economic and market situations have changed.

turning to out-of-quota imports, which, prior to 2024, remained very low at around 600-800 MT annually."

B. The 2024–2026 Rice Crisis ("Reiwa Kome Sodo")

The structural fragility of Japan's rice policy became dramatically apparent in the summer of 2024. Masayoshi Honma, distinguished professor at Asian Growth Research Institute (2024) describes the situation:

"Japan faced a rice shortage during the summer of 2024, sparking confusion among consumers as supermarket shelves emptied". (para. 1)

Several converging factors triggered the crisis: an unusually hot summer in 2023 reduced the proportion of high-quality rice; post-COVID tourism increased domestic demand; and a major earthquake warning prompted panic-buying by households. Eom (2025) argues, however, that "the root cause of the shortage and the crisis that ensued lies in the rigidity of Japan's conservative rice policies, which prioritize protecting domestic farmers over ensuring supply chains flexibility" (para. 5).

The price consequences were severe and prolonged. van Blokland (2025) reports that "Japan's Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries reported that rice prices had risen by 48% in September 2024 compared to the previous year, marking the highest level in more than 30 years" (para. 2). Prices continued escalating into 2025. The USDA GAIN Report (Fujibayashi, 2025) states:

"In January 2025, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIAC) reported the retail price for a 5-kilogram bag of rice rose to 4,051 yen (USD 27.41), up 77 percent from a year ago, and the highest price since at least 2000." (p. 1)

By March 2025, conditions had not eased. Park, a postdoctoral research fellow at Tohoku University (2025) notes that "rice prices have surged an alarming 94 per cent year-on-year as of March 2025, with occasional supply shortages in some supermarkets creating economic pressure and anxiety unseen since the post-war years" (para. 2). The government stockpile, which stood at 910,000 tonnes in 2024, fell to only 100,000 tonnes by June 2025 (van Blokland, 2025).

Despite the crisis, the Ishiba government resisted structural reform. When announcing a July 2025 trade deal with the United States involving rice, Prime Minister Ishiba told reporters:

"We made absolutely no sacrifice in the agricultural sector," Ishiba told reporters.

"Import volumes will remain within the minimum access framework and we retain the discretion over how much and what type (of rice) to import from each country," he said."

(Kaneko, 2025, para. 4-5).

A realtime price of rice is available at this site (<https://price-transition.mdingon.com/>) based on RDS-POS data of more than 2,000 retail stores in Japan (Merchandising-ON, 2026).

The private sector moved to meet the market demand by importing rice beyond the Minimum Access quota. USDA reports (Fujibayashi, 2026):

"The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) administers the WTO TRQ and imports MA rice tariff-free. MAFF limits MA rice destined for table rice to a maximum of 100,000 MT, and it channels the remainder into processed foods (such as miso, shochu, and rice crackers), livestock feed, and overseas food aid. That 100,000 MT maximum of table rice is imported via Simultaneous Buy and Sell (SBS) tenders, where MAFF collects a markup capped at 292 yen per kilogram, which is below the out-of-quota tariff of 341 yen per kilogram. Consequently, this leads private importers to fully utilize the SBS quota before turning to out-of-quota imports, which, prior to 2024, remained very low at around 600-800 MT annually."

"Once the government SBS import quota is fully realized, companies must pay a tariff of 341 yen/kg (USD 2.30/kg) for imports. Historically, imports outside of the state-trade system are negligible due to the prohibitively high tariff. Yet, after the SBS quota was filled in December 2024, companies began to import rice outside the state trading system through private importers. According to importers, imported rice is still price competitive against domestic rice even with the 341 yen/kg tariff. According to MAFF, rice imports outside of the state-traded system are up by almost 170 percent when comparing the first ten months of JFY2023 to the same time period in JFY2024. In JFY2023, 368 MT of rice was imported outside the state trading system for the first 10 months of the Japanese Fiscal Year, compared to 991 MT in JFY2024, including 523 MT imports in January 2025, alone."

Debaters must update themselves about the rice prices. Although the HEnDA stipulates that the negative must defend the government policy as of March 1st, 2026, it does not prohibit the use of newer information outside the government policy. The rice prices are decreasing as of summer (Merchandising-ON, 2026). Newspapers report updated situations (e.g., The Yomiuri Shimbun, 2026, September 11):

On Wednesday, at the Tobu Store chain's Maenochō branch in Itabashi Ward, Tokyo, newly harvested Hazuki Minori-brand rice was being sold for ¥2,786, including tax, per 5 kilograms. Next to it was Koshihikari-brand rice harvested in 2025, priced at ¥3,866.

C. Acreage Reduction (Gentan) Policy and Production Constraints

A key structural cause of the crisis is Japan's gentan (production adjustment/acreage reduction) policy. Park (2025) explains:

"At the centre of Japan's food security problem lies the gentan program, a government-mandated reduction in rice acreage designed to maintain artificially high prices. This policy was originally implemented to protect small-scale farmers' income during Japan's rapid industrialisation in the 1970s, while also preventing rural-to-urban migration that might destabilise social harmony and agriculture. While [officially abandoned in 2018](#), the practice continues, with [Japan Agricultural Cooperatives](#) (JA) and the Ministry of Agriculture working in [concert to suppress production](#)." (para. 4)

Although the formal gentan policy was officially abolished in 2018, the government has continued to incentivize production restriction through other means. Jeyaretnam, a reporter at *TIME*, (2026) reports:

"The government continues to indirectly influence the price of rice through a policy called gentan seisaku. The policy was first introduced in the 1970s as a means to essentially pay farmers to produce less rice. While the policy was officially lifted in 2018, the government continues to provide subsidies to farmers who reduce the amount of acreage used for rice production" (para. 4).

As a result, Yamashita, a research director at the Canon Institute, (2024) reports that "currently, 40% of paddy fields are not in use, meaning that production is limited to around 6.5 million tons" (para. 12). This structural supply constraint explains why even an average harvest fails to buffer against demand shocks.

D. Demographic Crisis in Japanese Agriculture

Japan's agricultural sector faces a severe and accelerating demographic crisis. Okada of Asian News Network (2025) reports:

"The number of people whose primary occupation is in the agriculture industry has halved over the past 25 years, dropping to about 1.1 million. Their average age is 69. The number is projected to plummet to 300,000 in 20 years." (para. 8–9)

The IRM India (2025) similarly notes that "the average age of farmers is now over 67, and there is a significant labour shortage as younger generations migrate to urban centers for non-agricultural work" (para. 5). Meanwhile, per capita rice consumption has been falling for decades — from 118 kg in 1962 to approximately 51 kg in 2022. Looking ahead, Masayoshi Honma at Asian Growth Research Institute (2024) projects that "rice consumption is projected to decline to 3.75 million tonnes by 2040" (para. 8), meaning that the market the current tariff regime is designed to protect is itself shrinking.

E. Food Self-Sufficiency Rate and Geopolitical Context

Japan's calorie-based food self-sufficiency rate has been a chronic concern for policymakers. Tridge, agri-food trade consultant agency, (2025) places the issue in a global context:

"Japan's food self-sufficiency rate for the 2024/25 fiscal year ending March 31 remained at 38%, unchanged from the previous year and below the government's 2030 target of 45%, Reuters reported [Obayashi, 2025], citing a report from the country's agriculture ministry. This figure is one of the lowest among developed economies and highlights Japan's vulnerability to food security risks at a time of heightened geopolitical tensions, global fragmentation, and increasingly unstable weather." (para. 1)

Following the 2024–2025 rice crisis, van Blokland (2025) notes in *Borgen Magazine* that "in 2025, the nation's food self-sufficiency rate fell to a stark 38%" (para. 3). The government has set a target of raising this rate to 45% by fiscal 2030, but as Grokipedia (2026) reports, "progress has stalled for four consecutive years" (para. 4). This background of low self-sufficiency already heavy on imports intensifies the debate about whether eliminating rice tariffs would compound or ameliorate Japan's food security challenges.

Notes on Affirmative and Negative Cases

Given below were cases originally generated by Claude.ai (2026), extensively modified by Inoue, which were based on traditional “Stock Issues” of policy debate, such as Significance, Inherency, and Solvency. They roughly correspond to Importance, Present Situation, and Effect in the HEnDA-style affirmative/negative constructive speech structure.

III. Affirmative Cases

Plan

The affirmative team advocates that the Japanese government should immediately and unconditionally eliminate all tariffs on imported rice — both the 341 yen/kg out-of-quota tariff and any government mark-ups applied to in-quota (TRQ) imports.

The affirmative may simply state that their plan follow the HEnDA definitions (2026) or specifically present some of the features relevant to their advantages or effective to attack potential disadvantages, such as agricultural subsidies that may relieve farmers' damages.

Some AI outputs may include plan planks which are not allowed under the HEnDA definitions and rules. For example, the initial output from Claude.ai for this document included:

(1) "while maintaining existing WTO minimum access quantity commitments."

HEnDA (2026) states: "It should be assumed that the "minimum access rice" purchase by the Japanese government (approximately 770,000 tons annually, imported tariff-free) would be terminated." The Affirmative Constructive may want to include this plank to make it explicit:

"The "minimum access rice" purchase by the Japanese government (approximately 770,000 tons annually, imported tariff-free) shall be terminated."

(2) "All related Japanese laws and agricultural policy frameworks are amended accordingly."

This is often included in "policy debate" plans to avoid potential disadvantages and solvency attacks. The HEnDA rules and definitions do not allow such a plank in the affirmative plan but the HEnDA Rules (HEnDA Judging Committee, 2025) seem to assume that the affirmative plan would include a coherent package of changes necessary to carry out the resolitional plan:

2.1.1.1 Affirmative Plan

"If in any case, the Affirmative side did not propose any plans in the Affirmative Constructive speech, the judges will assume that the Affirmative side is supporting a vague standpoint with a minimum Plan action related to the tournament topic."

This in turn implies that the Negative cannot run Topicality attacks and government-internal circumvention and cooptation attacks. For example, the Negative cannot attack the effect of the Advantage of cheaper imported rice by showing that the MAFF would introduce a ministerial ordinance to impose a new surcharge on imported rice after it goes into domestic markets. The negative could argue that the JA (Japan Agricultural Cooperatives) would boycott the imported rice or buy up the imported rice so that it would not be sold in Japan, if it can show that the JA has both means and motive to do so.

Advantage 1: Consumer Welfare and Price Reduction

Significance (Importance)

The current tariff system imposes a massive and regressive financial burden on Japanese consumers, particularly lower-income households for whom rice represents a significant share of food expenditure. A 5 kg bag of rice cost 4,051 yen in January 2025 — approximately 77% higher than a year earlier (Fujibayashi, 2025). A family of four was estimated to spend ¥84,000 more per year on rice than in previous years (Etonomics, 2025). The 2024 crisis also generated a black market for rice, as "illegal trade routes hidden from the eye of the Japanese Food Agency sold rice below market price" (Etonomics, 2025, para. 4), indicating how severely the official market was failing consumers.⁵

Inherency (Present Situation)

The Yeon Eom (2025) identifies the root cause of consumer harm in the policy itself: Japan's protectionist approach "has contributed to higher consumer costs and limited the sector's capacity to

⁵ The above AI-generated paragraph has some problems. The *Etonomics* article refers to the 1993 "Heisei Rice Crisis" not the 2024 "Reiwa" crisis. *Etonomics* is a student newspaper contributed by students at Eton College. Although many of them are probably much smarter than college professors, this particular quote above requires a caution. The mention of black market is in this context:

"The economic consequences of rice insecurity are also not to be overlooked in this story. The crisis led to the rise of a black market for rice (which already existed due to tight governmental control on rice), as illegal trade routes hidden from the eye of the Japanese Food Agency sold rice below market price, which led to businesses exploiting these routes to attract customers. (See figure 2) The increased market share of the black market undermined the Japanese policies on rice, resulting in the government abandoning the state-controlled rice sector. Previously, farmers were legally obligated to sell rice to the Japanese government, so that the government could resell them through government-approved vendors at a controlled price. However, the advent of non-native rice and its inefficient use led to the overall sentiment that the government caused more inefficiencies in the market rather than good, thus leading to the abandonment of this law. Furthermore, the abolishment of the Food Control Law in 1995 led to the rise of governmental rice stores, allowing the government to stabilize the market with its release or purchases of rice, easing any sudden dips in prices or demand without monopolized control."

Figure 2 (people lining up for rice offered at a 50% discount) [<https://etonomics.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/image.png>]

Although the general historical description is correct, there are several problems. (1) The "illegal trade routes" and "black market" may refer to those immediately after the WWII, called "black market rice" (闇米), which was sold above the government prices. The subsequent legal "voluntarily marketed rice" (自主流通米), or rice not subject to government controls, is not black-market rice. (2) The article does not cite any reliable sources but only gives one picture of a discount store, which is probably from around mid 1990s when "Heisei rice crisis" not "Reiwa" happened. (3) The term "governmental rice stores" is incorrect because the government did not and does not operate retail stores but it manages rice stockpiles or reserves (政府備蓄米).

respond to supply crises like the 2024 shortage" (para. 7). Even with an average harvest, tariff barriers prevent affordable imported rice from reaching consumers, and the State Trading Enterprise, i.e., the MAFF, can apply additional mark-ups on in-quota rice. Without structural tariff elimination, consumers will remain at the mercy of opaque, politically managed supply chains. In the affirmative plan, as the HEnDA (2026) definition states: "It should be assumed that rice imports would be conducted by the private sector. "

Solvency (Effect)

Eliminating all tariffs would allow competitive market forces to bring Japanese domestic rice prices in line with global prices. Economist Tatsuo Hatta of the Asia Growth Research Institute argues directly for liberalization:

"It's rational to liberalize more on rice imports. The LDP might resist, but on the other hand, they can now have an excuse — that is, pressure by the United States." (as cited in Jeyaretnam, 2026, para. 7)

Hatta further explains that "the fact that the productivity is lower than the United States on both fronts is really the result of political intervention in the market" (as cited in Jeyaretnam, 2026, para. 8), reinforcing that the price premium is artificially imposed, not a reflection of Japanese rice's inherent value. The elimination of the tariff barrier would produce immediate price competition, lowering food costs for all Japanese households.

Overall, consumer welfare effects are predicted to be positive over the long run as Vellinga and Tanaka (2025, p. 703) concludes:

"If rice trade liberalization is implemented for several decades, the benefit from the measure needs to be assessed over the long term by extending the simulation period, since the welfare effects increase over time and converge at approximately \$5,237 million, which enhances the mean welfare level higher than that shown in Tanaka and Hosoe (2011). Therefore, the most important finding from previous research, which is that the import tariff on rice should be abolished, is confirmed by our analysis."

Advantage 2: Supply Chain Resilience and Long-Term Food Security

Significance

Japan's near-total reliance on domestic rice production, sustained by tariff walls, creates a fragile supply chain with no redundancy. When domestic production falters — due to weather, distribution failures, or demographic decline — there is no efficient import mechanism to compensate.

Seohee Park is Postdoctoral Research Fellow at Tohoku University (2025):

"The dramatic rise in rice prices across Japan since August 2024 reveals a troubling paradox. A staple so central to Japanese identity that the word 'gohan' means both 'meal' and 'rice' — a grain that sustained its population reliably for generations — has become increasingly expensive for ordinary citizens."

“Rice prices have surged an alarming 94 per cent year-on-year as of March 2025, with occasional supply shortages in some supermarkets creating economic pressure and anxiety unseen since the post-war years. This rice crisis was not inevitable but rather self-inflicted through decades of misguided agricultural policies. Unlike natural disasters or external shocks, Japan deliberately dismantled its rice production capacity while global food systems grew increasingly unstable.”

The 2024 crisis demonstrated that the TRQ system's rigid caps and government mark-ups prevented timely import relief, while the 341 yen/kg tariff made private imports prohibitively expensive until prices rose dramatically.

Nippon.com (2025, July 23):

“When private companies import rice, they are subject to a high tariff of ¥341 per kilogram. In recent years, these private imports have generally stayed in the range of 600 to 800 tons per year. The graph below shows rice import volumes, with yellow representing minimum access rice and red private imports, which, as can be seen, were such a small amount up to 2024 that they were practically invisible.”

“A graph of just the private imports shows a sharp increase since the start of 2025. The 1,280 tons in March exceeded the total of 1,015 tons for the whole of 2024, and this rose to 6,838 tons in April, and then 10,607 tons in May. The soaring price of domestically produced rice makes it seem that foreign rice is cheaper, even when tariffs and other import costs are taken into account. In the past, the majority of foreign rice was imported from Thailand, Vietnam, India, and other Asian countries. However, since the beginning of 2025, the ratio of rice being imported from the United States has been increasing, surpassing 70% in May.”

Meiji Gakuin Professor Godo and International Food Policy Research Institute's Yamauchi emphasize the current policy's “structural rigidities”:

“Japan believed that the government could handle emergency situations such as natural disasters that create acute rice shortages in the domestic market. But the price hikes observed since summer 2024 were a consequence of unreliable news regarding the impact of extreme heat and large earthquakes, economic decisions — speculative motives and panic behaviour — and structural rigidities and missing markets in the Japanese rice system.”

“The real problem in Japan's rice market is not a shortage of rice production relative to consumer demand, but the rigidities built in rice production and missing trades that exacerbated rice price hikes. A market-friendly approach should offer a more sustainable long-term solution than delayed ad-hoc government actions.”

Inherency

Eom (2025) locates the problem in policy design: “the root cause of the shortage and the crisis that ensued lies in the rigidity of Japan's conservative rice policies, which prioritize protecting domestic

farmers over ensuring supply chains flexibility" (para. 4). The rigid system cannot scale up quickly in response to sudden demand increases or unexpected supply disruptions (Eom, 2025). MAFF's own request that farmers not expand rice cultivation beyond 2023–2024 levels illustrates this inflexibility:

"In fact, with a declining per capita rice consumption, driven by aging demographics and changing dietary habits, income-support subsidies are [provided](#) to encourage farmers to transition paddies to other crops. The recent rice shortage and rising prices have increased farmers' interest in cultivating rice, but MAFF has [explicitly requested](#) farmers not to expand rice cultivation beyond 2023-24 levels, maintaining the policy of controlling production volumes. While this approach aimed to ensure rice farmers' incomes by maintaining price levels through controlled production, it has also contributed to the shortage by limiting overall production volumes. This rigid system leaves the sector unable to scale up quickly in response to sudden increases in demand or unexpected disruptions." (Eom, 2025, para. 9)

Solvency

Eliminating all tariffs creates a market-based import mechanism that can respond instantaneously to supply disruptions. Rather than waiting for government tender processes under the TRQ system, private importers would be free to source rice from the United States, Australia, Thailand, Vietnam, South Korea, or any other supplier at competitive world prices. This supply diversification reduces vulnerability to any single production shock. The scientific literature supports this conclusion: Tanaka and Hosoe (2011) shows in a spatial equilibrium model that rice trade liberalization would lead to imports constituting up to 20–50% of domestic consumption, establishing a robust import buffer against domestic production failures.

"When we assume abolition of all the tariff and nontariff barriers on paddy and processed rice imports by Japan (scenario T1), imports of paddy and processed rice surge to reduce Japan's paddy rice production by 30% compared with scenario T0.11 Rice consumption is increased by 8% because of consumers exploiting the falls in rice prices. As a result, the overall welfare gains measured by equivalent variations (EV) are US\$4453 million." (Tanaka & Hosoe, 2011, p. 373)

"Abolition of trade barriers on rice imports increases the penetration of foreign rice, which is subject to productivity shocks. The results of scenario R1 show that trade liberalization increases both the mean and the standard deviation of welfare compared with those of scenario R0. This increase in volatility is, however, not so large that it brings a case for Japan to suffer negative welfare impact among the 1000 cases. Furthermore, the worst welfare level (US\$4202 million) achieved under free rice trade (scenario R1) is far better than the best welfare level (US\$94 million) without free rice trade (scenario R0)." (Tanaka & Hosoe, 2011, p. 374)

"The impact of productivity shocks in foreign countries can be confirmed by examining import prices for Japan. While rice trade liberalization lowers the import price of processed rice by about 70% on average, its price fluctuations seem to be almost nil. Therefore, the

productivity shocks abroad do not cause any price hikes or adversely affect household rice consumption." (Tanaka & Hosoe, 2011, p. 374)

"When we simulate productivity shocks in Japan, the value of trade liberalization during productivity shocks can be assessed from a different viewpoint. The simulation results of scenario J0 show that domestic productivity shocks without trade liberalization would bring about significantly large volatilities in welfare. This is because the domestic market is isolated from alternative supply sources abroad because of high trade barriers. With productivity shocks in Japan, trade liberalization brings the country a double dividend (scenario J1)—a higher welfare mean and a lower welfare volatility. By integrating the domestic market with foreign rice markets, Japan can pool the risk of productivity shocks internationally." (Tanaka & Hosoe, 2011, p. 374)

Advantage 3: Agricultural Reform and Modernization

Significance

The current tariff regime sustains structurally inefficient, small-scale rice farming that has been declining for decades regardless of protection. The gentan-era policy of paying farmers to produce less rice has produced a sector where 40% of paddy fields lie fallow (Yamashita, 2024)⁶ and the average farmer is nearly 70 years old (Okada, 2025). Yoshikawa (2022) explains:

"On the other hand, the gentan policy led to criticisms of the government's generous subsidies to farmers. **Subsidies of up to 1.05 million yen (US\$7,250) per hectare in fiscal year 2016 disincentivised rice farmers from properly managing their fields, increasing productivity, and developing crop strategies.**"

The sector is not being preserved by tariffs — it is being placed on life support.

Inherency

The Honma (2024) identifies the political economy driving this stasis: "Japan's agricultural policy has prioritised protecting producers and significantly undervalued the perspective of consumers" (para. 9). The rural lobby's disproportionate electoral influence under Japan's malapportioned electoral system perpetuates policies that serve aging farmer constituencies at the expense of urban consumers and long-term agricultural competitiveness.

Solvency

Eliminating tariffs would create the competitive pressure necessary to consolidate Japan's fragmented rice sector into larger, more efficient operations — a structural reform that decades of incremental subsidy policy have failed to produce. Freed from artificial price support, surviving farms

⁶ "Currently, 40% of paddy fields are not in use, meaning that production is limited to around 6.5 million tons. If Japan stopped this policy of reduced production, and instead exported 4 million tons, it could handle the kind of situation seen this year through a small decrease in the amount exported and no domestic shortages." (Yamashita, 2024)

would be incentivized to invest in technology, mechanization, and niche premium products (high-quality Japanese varieties) for which global demand is growing. Yoshikawa (2022) argues that revitalizing Japanese rice farming "means targeting export markets," which requires cost-competitiveness achievable only through structural reform, not tariff protection. Elimination of tariffs would trigger this reform while consumer welfare is protected through affordable imports.

Advantage 4: Improved International Trade Relations

Significance

Japan's sky-high rice tariffs have been a persistent irritant in international trade negotiations, particularly with the United States. In April 2025, President Donald Trump publicly criticized Japan for imposing a "700% tariff on rice," making rice market access a central demand in bilateral tariff negotiations (Sakuyama, 2025). Japan's automobile and electronics industries — facing U.S. reciprocal tariffs of up to 24% plus 25% on vehicles — have enormous stakes in securing favorable trade relations.

Solvency

Economist Hatta directly connects rice liberalization to Japan's broader trade interests:

"If Japan is able to use rice imports as a bargaining chip to lower American tariffs on its much bigger automobile industry, both countries will benefit: the U.S. can purchase a cheap Japanese car, and Japan can purchase cheap rice from the United States" (as cited in Jeyaretnam, 2026, para. 5).

Eliminating rice tariffs would remove the single most contentious agricultural trade barrier in Japan's portfolio, unlocking reciprocal benefits across sectors and demonstrating Japan's commitment to rules-based multilateral trade.

IV. Negative Cases

Overview

The negative does not necessarily want to dispute that Japan's rice policy requires reform. Rather, it argues that the blunt instrument of eliminating all tariffs simultaneously would cause irreversible harm to domestic farmers, national food security, and rural communities — harms that far outweigh the asserted benefits of the affirmative plan.

Some disadvantages may happen regardless of the actual amount to imports of rice. The very plan actions of eliminating the tariffs would cause new problems even if the actual import would not significantly increase. Other disadvantages would happen only if the imports would increase and the consumption of domestic rice would decrease.

Disadvantage 1: Collapse of Domestic Agriculture and Rural Communities

Link

Eliminating all tariffs on imported rice would expose Japan's small-scale, high-cost rice farmers to direct competition with industrial-scale producers in the United States, Australia, Thailand, and Vietnam, who produce rice at a fraction of Japan's cost. Japan's own Ministry of Agriculture has quantified this link. Sam Eaton reports in PBS NewsHour (2012):

"The Ministry of Agriculture estimates that Japanese rice production would drop 90 percent if the trade deal goes through."⁷

Internal Link

The destruction of domestic rice farming would devastate the rural communities that depend on it. These communities are already severely stressed. Yomiuri editorial board vice chairman, Akihiro Okada (2025) documents:

"The number of people whose primary occupation is in the agriculture industry has halved over the past 25 years, dropping to about 1.1 million. Their average age is 69. The number is projected to plummet to 300,000 in 20 years."

⁷ This estimate is probably attributed to MAFF (2010), which is found in its website without details (translation added):

品目名 Commodity name	生産量減少率 (%) Production Volume Decline Rate	生産減少額 (百億円) Reduction in Production Value (10 billion yen)	今回の試算の考え方 Basis for Current Estimate
米 rice	90	197	新潟産コシヒカリ、有機米等のこだわり米等を除いて置き換わる。 Replaced, excluding specialty rice such as Niigata Koshihikari and organic rice.

Apparently the the MAFF overestimated the damages in order to maintain the import restrictions of rice in the TPP negotiations. The later estimate by the Japanese government (Cabinet Secretariat of Japan, 2013) was more realistic to estimate that 32% of the domestic rice would be replaced by imported rice.

Galvan (2024), a blog post by a student researcher in the Michigan State University describes conditions in Japan's rice-growing heartland:

“Shonai, Japan, a coastal plain near the Japanese Sea known for its fertile granaries and rice paddies, is facing a severe rural [crisis](#). **The aging population, decreasing number of farmers, and dropping rice prices describe a lonely scenario. This rural crisis, depopulation, trade liberalization, and depleted government resources are deemed the most severe since World War II.** The farmland prices in Shonai have plummeted by [70%](#) in the last 15 years, with the number of farmers reducing by half since the beginning of the 1990s. During the past decade, rice production has declined by [20%](#) in Japan, raising concerns in a country that imports 61% of its food. A cause of Japan’s rural economic system lies in the small, family farms that hinder necessary [reforms](#). In regions like Yamagata, sentiments are mixed, reflecting dissatisfaction with the political party’s ruling of [rural issues](#). As farmers handle challenges such as inflated land prices and high mechanization costs, the future of Japan’s agriculture hangs in the [balance](#). Reforms are considered crucial to avoid further decline in agriculture and potentially revive Japan’s local [economies](#).”

Full tariff elimination would accelerate and magnify this crisis across all rice-producing prefectures.

Impact

The abandonment of rice paddies would cause irreversible environmental harm (loss of wetland ecosystems, flooding protection, biodiversity), social harm (breakdown of rural communities and local governance structures), and economic harm (unemployment, regional depopulation, collapse of agricultural support industries). Furthermore, the political destabilization of rural Japan — which provides the LDP with its core electoral base — would create significant governance risks in a country already facing demographic and fiscal challenges. For example, rice fields abandonment lead to an irreversible loss of biodiversity as a 2018 meta-analysis article in the journal *Conservation Biology* shows:

Species richness and abundance in rice fields decreased to 56–72% after abandonment (Fig. 2). **This reduced species richness was unlikely to recover**, at least for plants, even after 10–15 years (Fig. 6). These results suggest the assumption behind rewilding and passive landscape restoration that land abandonment leads to increased biodiversity (Navarro & Pereira 2015) does not always hold true for rice-field ecosystems. This is not surprising given that rice fields have served as alternatives to natural wetlands and provided important refuges for many organisms dependent on aquatic and wetland environments (Elphick 2000; Usio & Miyashita 2014). Abandonment of rice fields may thus lead to local extinction of these wetland specialists (Miyashita et al. 2014) and terrestrial species that depend on the seminatural grasslands maintained around rice fields (Uchida & Ushimaru 2014).” (Koshida & Katayama, 2018, p. 1398)

Disadvantage 2: Import Dependency and Strategic Food Security Risk

Link

Eliminating all rice tariffs would irreversibly shift Japan from near-complete rice self-sufficiency to heavy import dependence for its primary dietary staple. Japan's food self-sufficiency rate is already only 38% (van Blokland, 2025), and the government's own stated policy is to increase this rate, not reduce it further. Tridge (2025) flags that this figure "is one of the lowest among developed economies and highlights Japan's vulnerability to food security risks at a time of heightened geopolitical tensions, global fragmentation, and increasingly unstable weather" (para. 1). These quotes are found in various sources originating probably from this Reuter's article (Obayashi, 2015):

"Japan's food self-sufficiency rate for the 2024/25 fiscal year ending March 31 remained at 38%, unchanged from the previous year and below the government's 2030 target of 45%, Reuters reported, citing a report from the country's agriculture ministry."

"This figure is one of the lowest among developed economies and highlights Japan's vulnerability to food security risks at a time of heightened geopolitical tensions, global fragmentation, and increasingly unstable weather."

Internal Link

Once domestic rice production collapses (as the government's own projection of a 90% drop suggests (MAFF, 2010) or a 30% (MAFF, 2013), it cannot be quickly restored. Reconstructing a rice farming sector — rebuilding irrigation infrastructure, training farmers, reactivating fallow paddy fields — takes years or decades. In the interim, Japan would be entirely dependent on global supply chains for its most culturally and nutritionally central food. Park (2025) warns that "[f]ood has emerged as a critical tool in modern conflicts and strategic competition that security experts call 'hybrid warfare', where nations use non-military means to project power and pressure competitors", and that "Japan's low food sufficiency rate has left it in a vulnerable position".

"Food has emerged as a critical tool in modern conflicts and strategic competition that security experts call 'hybrid warfare', where nations use non-military means to project power and pressure competitors. While Japan has voluntarily compromised its strategic position, its food exports hit a record high in 2024. But its self-sufficiency rate has remained low since the early 2000s, reaching 38 per cent in 2023 — the worst among developed economies." (Park, 2025, para. 10)

"Japan's rice crisis, marked by soaring prices and supply shortages, is a direct result of agricultural policies that have intentionally restricted production. Despite rice's cultural importance, Japan's efforts to artificially limit output have compromised its food security. With global food systems increasingly manipulated for political leverage, **Japan's low food sufficiency rate has left it in a vulnerable position.** To ensure its future stability, Japan must urgently reassess its approach to food security." (Park, 2025, para. 1)

Impact

Export restriction risk is real and documented: India banned white rice exports in July 2023, causing a 15–20% spike in global rice prices and threatening food security in import-dependent nations (Galvan, 2024). A Japan that imports the majority of its rice from a handful of exporting nations would be acutely vulnerable to similar unilateral export restrictions, natural disasters in supplier countries, maritime supply disruptions, or political leverage exercised by exporting nations in diplomatic disputes.

“Overall, the global rice market is experiencing a shortage, the most severe in two decades, as India’s export ban on rice imposes challenges throughout the industry. **India’s ban on plain, white, long-grain rice is causing disruptions and threatening food security in developing nations. Over half the world’s population relies on rice as a crucial staple. India’s ban on certain rice exports began with broken rice in September 2022. It then expanded to include certain rice varieties in July 2023, which has led to a 15% to 20% spike in global rice prices.** Despite rising input costs for energy and fertilizer, rice prices have remained relatively stable compared to other commodities in the agricultural world. This situation challenges rice farmers globally, leading to concerns about profits and government intervention to prevent potential crises.” (Galvan, 2024)

Food security is more important than military weapons.

Reynolds and Huang (2022) of Bloomberg explain:

“The Japanese government’s abandonment of rice paddies and other agricultural land is leaving the country more vulnerable than ever, Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force retired vice admiral Toshiyuki Ito said.”

““They don’t do anything for national security,” said Ito, now a professor at Kanazawa Institute of Technology, about Japan’s ministries responsible for food production. “They think only about economic efficiency.””

“The impact of higher global grain prices, fertilizer shortages and fuel inflation, exacerbated by a weaker yen, have been filtering through to Japanese consumers in the past few months, with supermarkets marking up everything from instant ramen noodles to ice cream.”

“However, any major blockade or disruption to sea lanes around China and the Taiwan Strait could have bigger implications than just price inflation. Unlike the US and the EU, Japan would have little to fall back on if food imports were to dry up.”

“To ensure the country’s national security, it is crucial for Japan to increase the amount of rice and wheat grown domestically, **University of Tokyo professor of agricultural economics Nobuhiro Suzuki said.**”

““In terms of national security, food should come before weapons,” he said. “If you don’t have food, you can’t fight.””

Disadvantage 3: Cultural and Socio-Political Harm

Inherency

Rice farming in Japan is not merely an economic activity — it is the material foundation of Japanese culture, landscape, and identity. Okada (2025) observes: "rice paddies are a distinctive feature of Japan's landscape throughout the country. Rice is a food in which the nation is nearly 100% self-sufficient. In trade liberalization negotiations, the Japanese government has consistently designated rice as a "sacred domain""

"Rice is not merely a food."

"During the Edo period, people used rice as a form of currency, and they paid taxes with rice."

"Even today, rice farming cooperatives and rural communities remain deeply rooted throughout Japan, forming the foundation of Japanese society. Rice paddies are a distinctive feature of Japan's landscape throughout the country."

"Rice is a food in which the nation is nearly 100% self-sufficient."

"In trade liberalization negotiations, the Japanese government has consistently designated rice as a "sacred domain." . " (Okada, 2025)

Anthropologist Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney at University of Wisconsin (2004, p. 8) explains:

"Our memory of the Japanese resistance toward the rice importation in 1993 is still vivid. What surfaced during the rice importation issue reinforces the symbolic power of rice for the self identity even today. The Liberal Democratic Party government under successive prime ministers had been paving the way to import rice—a practice done since the medieval period (1185–1603)—while engaging in double talk and telling the Japanese and the world that it will prevent the importation of foreign rice "until death."⁷ Unlike Chinese long-grain rice, California rice is virtually identical with Japanese domestic rice, both in appearance and taste. Nonetheless, not just the government and farmers but also some consumers came to the defense of domestic rice and Japanese rice agriculture, arguing that rice paddies are essential for Japanese land, functioning as flood control by serving as dams, soil conservation, preservation of underground water, purification of air and water, and beautification of the land. We see the recurrence here of the spatial metaphor of rice paddies as our land. California rice, in contrast, is grown in American paddies, thus serving their land and water, and not ours. The equation of self-sufficiency (jikyujisoku) with the exclusive reliance on domestic rice was a frequently used discursive trope. Other metaphors of rice used include: the lifeblood crop, the lifeline (seimeisen); the last sacred realm (saigo no seiiki); the last citadel; national life; and the prototype of Japanese culture."

Link

Eliminating tariffs would remove the economic foundation of rice farming communities and, with them, centuries of agricultural heritage, festivals, local ecosystems, and landscape that constitute a distinctively Japanese way of life.

Impact

"The revised May 2024 *Basic Law on Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas* explicitly places the highest priority on food security and calls for the improvement of domestic production" (Honma, 2024, para. 10), reflecting the legislature's judgment that protecting domestic production is a fundamental national interest.

"Getting caught up in short-term phenomena and ignoring long-term trends is a mistake. Japan's agricultural policy has prioritised protecting producers and significantly undervalued the perspective of consumers."

"The government missed an opportunity to reassure the public by fine-tuning the release of rice stockpiles. **The revised May 2024 Basic Law on Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas places the highest priority on food security and calls for the improvement of domestic production** and the establishment of a food supply system in the event of an emergency."

"Food security is an important role for governments. It is not just about physically securing food, it is also about providing people with peace of mind. For example, in the event of an emergency, it is necessary to promise to provide food and present concrete production and distribution plans." (Honma, 2024)

V. Attack and Defense Briefs

A. Negative Attacks on Affirmative Advantages

Attack on Advantage 1 (Consumer Welfare): Turn⁸ — Risk of Greater Price Volatility

[Turn] If Japan eliminates all tariffs and domestic rice production collapses, Japan's consumers become entirely dependent on world market prices for their staple food. World rice markets are notoriously thin and prone to price spikes when major exporting countries restrict exports. India's 2023 rice export ban caused a 15–20% global price surge (Galvan, 2024). Under a fully import-dependent scenario, Japanese consumers would be exposed to such external shocks with no domestic production buffer — potentially suffering price volatility far worse than the 2024–2025 crisis.

Galvan, 2024:

“India’s ban on certain rice exports began with broken rice in September 2022. It then expanded to include certain rice varieties in July 2023, which has led to a 15% to 20% spike in global rice prices.”

[Non-Unique] Rice prices are already falling without tariff elimination. As TIFE (2026) notes⁹:

“The Japan Times reported on April 3, 2026 that the average retail price of a 5kg bag of rice has fallen below ¥4,000 for the first time since late 2025, landing at approximately ¥3,920 — the seventh consecutive week of price declines.” (Cf. Japan Times, 2026, April 3)

If the market is already stabilizing under the current regime through increased TRQ imports and stockpile releases, the radical step of eliminating all tariffs is disproportionate to the problem.

Japan Times, April 3, 2026 (Jiji, 2026):

“Prices of rice sold from March 23 through Sunday in Japan averaged ¥3,935 per 5 kilograms, down ¥43 from the previous week, marking a seventh straight weekly decline, the agriculture ministry said Friday.”

Attack on Advantage 1: Defense — Structural vs. Cyclical Prices

[Defense] The negative's non-unique argument conflates the current cyclical price correction with the structural price premium that tariffs impose. Even at the ¥3,920 per 5 kg bag reported by *The Japan Times* (as cited in TIFE, 2026), Japanese rice remains far more expensive than comparable

⁸ “Turn” or “Turnaround” is a refutation technique to use the opposition’s argument for your own side. It may show an advantage is actually a disadvantage or vice versa. It may also show that a certain effect of the plan would go the opposite direction of the original argument.

⁹ TIFE (Tokyo International Friends & Events) is a website for sharing information and events for both visitors and local people. The particular article (TIFE, 2026) was anonymous and its accuracy should be checked against citing sources.

international prices.¹⁰ The structural price differential — maintained by the 341 yen/kg tariff — represents a permanent, not cyclical, consumer welfare loss. Only tariff elimination addresses the structural cause.

Attack on Advantage 2 (Food Security): Link Turn — Tariff Elimination Increases Vulnerability

[Link Turn] Rather than improving food security, eliminating all tariffs removes the domestic production base that serves as Japan's last buffer against import disruptions. Once domestic production falls 90% (See Footnote 7 and Appendix I on MAFF (2010)'s estimate), Japan would have no meaningful fallback in a supply crisis. A retired Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force vice admiral warns that Japan's abandonment of agricultural land leaves the country "more vulnerable than ever," and that policymakers "think only about economic efficiency" at the cost of national security (as cited in Reynolds and Huang, 2022, para. 5–6). (See also **Disadvantage 2: Import Dependency and Strategic Food Security Risk, Impact section above.**)

Attack on Advantage 2: Defense — Diversification Argument

[Defense] The negative's supply-disruption risk ignores that under tariff elimination, Japan would import from multiple supplier nations simultaneously, not from a single source. Diversified supply from the United States, Australia, Thailand, Vietnam, and others is inherently more resilient than monoculture domestic production vulnerable to Japan's own weather shocks. Moreover, stockpiling policies can be maintained regardless of import tariffs — Japan can hold strategic reserves while simultaneously importing competitively priced rice.

Attack on Advantage 3 (Agricultural Reform): Counterplan — Gradual Reform Over Shock Liberalization¹¹

[Counterplan] The negative does not oppose agricultural modernization; it opposes the abruptness and irreversibility of full tariff elimination. A counterplan of gradual tariff reduction over 10–15 years, paired with farm consolidation subsidies, direct income support for transitioning farmers, and agri-tech investment, achieves the same long-term reform goals without catastrophically destroying domestic agriculture overnight. Japan's own experience abolishing direct gentan subsidies in 2018 demonstrates that incremental policy change can stimulate structural adjustment without wholesale sector collapse.

Attack on Advantage 3: Defense — Structural Reform Requires Market Discipline

[Defense] Decades of gradual reform have failed. Yamashita, a research fellow at the Tokyo Foundation, (2009) describes Japan's acreage-reduction system as "a supply-restriction cartel

¹⁰ See Merchandising-ON (2026) for real-time retail prices of rice in Japan.

¹¹ The HEnDA rules do not allow the Negative side to present a counterplan. It could only argue that the affirmative plan's adoption would exclude the possibility of a different plan that the present system will likely adopt in future, i.e., the counterplan, which is a kind of a disadvantage of missed opportunity cost. Or, the negative may simply argue that the affirmative's plan is too sudden to work effectively, thus it opposes the adoption of the resolution.

arrangement that aims to keep surplus rice off the market to prevent prices from falling" (para. 2).¹² Half a century of incremental adjustment has produced a sector where 40% of paddies are fallow, the average farmer is nearly 70, and subsidies remain politically entrenched. Only the market discipline created by tariff elimination can break this political-economic deadlock and force the structural transformation the sector needs.

Attack on Advantage 4 (Trade Relations): Negative Block — Concessions Without Compensation

[Block] Eliminating rice tariffs unilaterally removes Japan's key bargaining chip before securing reciprocal concessions. Prime Minister Ishiba's statement that Japan made "absolutely no sacrifice in the agricultural sector" (Kaneko, 2025, para. 2)¹³ in the July 2025 trade deal with the US illustrates the government's rational strategy of using rice access as leverage while protecting domestic farmers. The affirmative plan gives away this leverage for nothing, removing Japan's strongest card in negotiations over automobile tariffs, electronics, and digital trade.

B. Affirmative Attacks on Negative Arguments

Attack on Disadvantage 1 (Collapse of Domestic Agriculture): Internalize (Non-unique) — Agriculture Is Already Collapsing

[Internalize (Non-unique with the Neg. evidence)] The disadvantage concedes that Japan's domestic rice farming sector is already in structural decline under the current tariff regime. With 40% of paddy fields already fallow (Yamashita, 2024)¹⁴, the farming workforce "projected to plummet to 300,000 in 20 years" (Okada, 2025), and per capita rice consumption declining to 51 kg per year (Honma, 2024), the sector is shrinking with or without tariff elimination. The question is whether consumers should subsidize a declining industry through artificially high prices indefinitely,

¹² The full quote is:

"The policy of trimming rice production by reducing rice acreage, which began in 1970 and continued even after the abolition of the staple food control system in 1995, is a supply-restriction cartel arrangement that aims to keep surplus rice off the market to prevent prices from falling. Some 40% of the nation's 2.55 million hectares of rice paddies are currently subject to acreage reduction." (Yamashita, 2009)

¹³ "After months of negotiations, the two countries [struck a deal](#) to lower the so-called "reciprocal tariffs" to 15% from a proposed 25%, and said increased rice shipments from the U.S. to Japan was part of that deal. Under a World Trade Organization (WTO) "minimum access" framework introduced in 1995, Japan imports about 770,000 metric tons of rice tariff-free every year. Last fiscal year, the U.S. accounted for 45% of the total. "We made absolutely no sacrifice in the agricultural sector," Ishiba told reporters. "Import volumes will remain within the minimum access framework and we retain the discretion over how much and what type (of rice) to import from each country," he said. Announcing the trade deal on Tuesday in Washington, President Donald Trump said Japan would increase market access to American producers of cars, trucks, rice and certain agricultural products, among other items. Neither country disclosed what other farm products were included, but Ishiba said the deal did not include a lowering of tariffs."

¹⁴ "Currently, 40% of paddy fields are not in use, meaning that production is limited to around 6.5 million tons. If Japan stopped this policy of reduced production, and instead exported 4 million tons, it could handle the kind of situation seen this year through a small decrease in the amount exported and no domestic shortages."

or whether those resources should be redirected to support farmer transitions and rural community development.

[Mitigate] The transition harm can be mitigated through direct income support, retraining, and regional development programs for affected farmers — policies that Japan already funds through its current agricultural subsidy system. Redirecting existing subsidy expenditures toward genuine income support (rather than production restriction) would soften the adjustment while creating more economically productive outcomes.

Attack on Disadvantage 1: Negative Defense — 90% Drop Is Not Mitigation

[Defense] The 90% production drop estimate from MAFF (2010)¹⁵ cannot be mitigated by subsidy redirects. The scale of displacement — hundreds of thousands of farming households across all rice-producing regions simultaneously — would overwhelm any retraining or income-support system. Japan's government currently lacks the fiscal capacity and administrative infrastructure to manage such a rapid, nationwide agricultural transition without devastating rural communities.

Attack on Disadvantage 2 (Food Security): Empirically Denied and Turn

[Empirically Denied] Japan already imports almost all of its wheat, soybeans, corn, and animal feed grains without treating this as a fatal national security risk. Japan's overall food self-sufficiency rate is only 38%, meaning that 62% of calories are already imported. If import dependency were truly catastrophic for food security, Japan would already be food-insecure. A diversified global supply network — which tariff elimination would enable for rice — provides more robust resilience than a domestic production base that can be wiped out by a single bad summer.

[Turn] The gentan policy itself is the greatest threat to Japan's food security. Yamashita (2024) demonstrates that "[i]f Japan stopped this policy of reduced production, and instead exported 4 million tons, it could handle the kind of situation seen this year through a small decrease in the amount exported and no domestic shortages" (para. 10). The true lesson of 2024 is that production-restricting policies — not import dependency — create food insecurity.

Attack on Disadvantage 2: Negative Defense — Rice Is Strategically Unique

[Defense] Wheat, soybeans, and corn are not strategic equivalents of rice in Japan. Rice is Japan's sole self-sufficient caloric staple, culturally embedded as the foundation of the Japanese diet, and the one crop that Japan produces in sufficient quantities to feed itself in an emergency. Losing rice self-sufficiency is categorically different from dependence on imported wheat or soybeans. The 2024 *Basic Act on Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas* reflects the legislative judgment that domestic rice production is a national security imperative that cannot be reduced to economic efficiency calculations.¹⁶

¹⁵ The negative should consider whether they want to defend this exaggerated estimate or a more moderate 30% decline (Cabinet Secretariat of Japan, 2013).

¹⁶ The Basic Act on Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas (2024) does not specifically mention "rice" production as a security imperative but the law together with the New Basic Plan for Food, Agriculture,

Attack on Disadvantage 3 (Cultural Harm): Minimization and Alternative Mechanism

[Minimization] Cultural preservation of rice farming does not require a tariff of the current magnitude. Countries with strong agricultural heritage — France, Switzerland, South Korea — protect culturally significant farming traditions through direct payment schemes, geographical indication protections, and agri-tourism development programs while simultaneously participating in free trade agreements. Japan can protect culturally significant rice-growing communities through targeted cultural preservation subsidies without imposing a massive price burden on 125 million consumers.

[Uniqueness] Rice farming culture is already in terminal decline under the current regime. Protecting a “sacred domain” through tariffs has not preserved Japanese rice farming culture — the average farmer is 69 years old and the workforce is projected to plummet to 300,000 within 20 years (Okada, 2025)¹⁷. If the tariff has not prevented cultural erosion over 50 years, there is little reason to believe it will do so in the future.

and Rural Areas (MAFF, 2025) make the government policy stance apparent. Under Article 2 (Ensuring Food Security), the law (act) dictates that “In consideration of the fact that the world's food supply and demand, and trade is unstable, a stable supply of food to the people must be maintained based on increase of domestic agricultural production, and at the same time secure stable imports and stockpiles of food.” Because rice is Japan's sole major caloric staple crop where the nation maintains near 100% self-sufficiency, any broad statutory mandate to defend domestic production explicitly targets the rice-growing sector as its primary infrastructure.

¹⁷ “The number of people whose primary occupation is in the agriculture industry has halved over the past 25 years, dropping to about 1.1 million. Their average age is 69. The number is projected to plummet to 300,000 in 20 years.”

VI. Conclusion

The HEnDA 2026 resolution — whether Japan should eliminate all tariffs on imported rice — is one of the most substantively rich policy debates in contemporary Japanese politics. It sits at the intersection of agricultural economics, food security strategy, international trade law, demographic transition, and cultural identity.

The affirmative side presents strong structural arguments: the 2024–2025 rice crisis demonstrated that the current tariff regime creates price volatility, supply rigidity, and consumer harm; the domestic farming sector is declining regardless; and international trade dynamics provide a window for reform. The negative side raises equally substantive concerns: a 90% projected drop in domestic production, heightened import dependency in a geopolitically volatile world, and the irreversible destruction of rural communities.

For affirmative teams, the central strategic focus should be the empirical record of the 2024–2025 crisis as evidence that the current system fails consumers and that food security arguments are belied by the already low self-sufficiency rate. For negative teams, the central strategic focus should be the irreversibility of domestic production collapse and the distinction between eliminating tariffs (which the negative opposes) and pursuing gradual reform (which the negative can support through a counterplan).

Ultimately, this resolution tests debaters' ability to balance short-term economic efficiency arguments against long-term strategic and social welfare considerations — a skill of enduring importance in policymaking beyond the debate hall.

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Appendix I. MAFF Estimates. 農林水産省推計、コメ輸入自由化による国内生産減 90%や 30%について

Some negative teams shows a serious domestic rice production decline by the rice trade liberalization estimated by MAFF (2010) (See Footnote 7):

品目名	生産量減少率 (%)	生産減少額 (百億円)	今回の試算の考え方
米	90	197	新潟産コシヒカリ、有機米等のこだわり米等を除いて置き換わる。

この資料内では資産方法などが書かれていません。ただ、次の資料で言及されている平成 22 年 11 月公表の試算の表だろうと思います。農水省のサイトで削除漏れなどで残っていたファイルかもしれません。検索してもあまりヒットしません。

一方、こちらはよりヒットしますが、輸出国が限定された試算です。

Cabinet Secretariat of Japan. (2013). 内閣官房（2013 年 3 月 15 日）（別紙）農林水産物への影響試算の計算方法について

て. https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/tpp/tppinfo/2013/pdf/130315_nourinsuisan_2.pdf

に次の記述があります。以下の試算の考え方は 2010 年の資料と共通するものと推測します。

p. 3

平成 22 年 11 月に公表した全世界を対象に関税撤廃した試算では、農林水産物の生産減少額を 4.5 兆円程度と試算。これと同じ方法で、T P P 交渉参加 11 ヶ国に対して関税を撤廃した場合の農林水産物の生産減少額は、3.4 兆円程度となる。平成 22 年試算と今回の試算の前提の主な違いは以下のとおり。

p. 5

各品目の試算の考え方

品目名	生産量減少率	生産減少額	試算の考え方
米	32%	約 1 兆 100 億円	国内生産量の約 3 割が輸入に置き換わる。それ以外の国内生産は残るが、価格は下落。

p. 6

考え方（シナリオ）

○輸出国は、国際的に高い価格水準にある我が国のコメ市場に向けて、我が国のニーズに合った短粒種及び中粒種の生産を拡大。

○既に国産米と遜色のない米国及び豪州産米の輸入により、国内生産量の約 3 割が置き換わると想定。

なお、ベトナムでも一部で短粒種を生産しており、将来的には短粒種の増産が行

われることも想定されるが、その拡大ペースや規模は現時点では予測が困難。
 ○残る国産のコメの価格は、輸入米に置き換わる部分の価格低下率の半分の価格低下率で下落。

内閣官房（2013）については、その資産方法などに対する批判など、この資料を引用する論考がいくつかあります。

<https://www.google.com/search?q=>（別紙）農林水産物への影響試算の計算方法について"

のような検索でヒットします。

一方、2010 年の資料はあまりヒットしません。

<https://www.google.com/search?q=>“国境措置撤廃による農産物生産等への影響試算について”

他にも、関税撤廃による 30%程度の国内生産減を示す論文などがあります。例えば Kawasaki (2024, 2025), 川崎 (2025)。経済学者(Professor, GRIPS Alliance, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS))によるシミュレーションですが、日米 2 国間のみを対象としたり、独自計算 (“Source: Author's simulations.”)という説明だけで詳細が示されていない、等等の疑問が残ります。

If all remaining tariffs between the US and Japan were removed, US production is estimated to increase the most in rice, by 21.4%, amounting to 6.8 billion USD, followed by meat. US motor vehicle production would decrease, but by 0.1%, amounting to 0.5 billion USD, far smaller than increases in rice production. On the other hand, Japan's production would change, unlike that of the US. **Rice production is estimated to decrease substantially, by 30.8%, amounting to 9.7 billion USD.** Meanwhile, motor vehicle production would increase by 2.6%, amounting 10.5 billion USD, which would almost be offset by decreases in rice production. (Kawasaki, 2024)

If Japan removed all tariffs on agriculture imports from the US, it is estimated that US rice production would increase by 21.2% and US meat production would also increase by 1.0% as is shown in Table 1. On the other hand, **Japan's production is estimated to decrease by 30.9% in rice** and by 5.1% in meats. (Kawasaki, 2025)

日本と米国の間で残されている全ての関税が撤廃されると、日本のコメ生産 30.8% (97 億ドル) と大きく減少すると推計されている。（川崎, 2024, p. 3）

日本が米国からのコメの輸入関税を撤廃すると、日本のコメ生産が 30.9%減少することに加えて、コメ部門の雇用は 17.4%減少すると推計されている。ただし、実質 GDP は日本では 0.29%、米国では 0.02%増加する可能性がある。（川崎, 2024, p. 4, 注 7）

Appendix II. 778% or 341 yen per kilogram (MAFF, 2005)

浅川 芳裕（2025 年 5 月 16 日）コメ関税 700%をめぐる日米対立：江藤農水相の隠蔽工作と国益の危機. <https://note.com/yoshihiroasakawa/n/na88aa96bcfb0>

MA 米の無税輸入後、農水省は最大 292 円/kg のマークアップを購入事業者に課しており、この額は国際的に“一次関税”とみなされる。
一部スーパーで販売される外国産米が国産米と価格が近いのは、この 292 円/kg のマークアップが原因だ。ゼロ関税を装いながら、国民に実質的な税負担を強いているといえる。
そのゼロ関税のカラクリはこうだ。WTO ルールではミニマムアクセス輸入米にも関税が認められているが、その収入は財務省に渡り一般財源となるため、農水省が自由に使えない。
そこで、関税をゼロ化、代わりにマークアップを収入源とする戦術で省益を確保してきた。

農水省（2005）の試算による 778%という数字の元の出典を探しているのですが、なかなか辿りつきません。

上記（浅川, 2025）では次のような指摘がなされています。

WTO 貿易交渉を振り返れば、日本のコメ関税 700%の初出は、USITC（アメリカ国際貿易委員会）が WTO ウルグアイラウンド（UR）交渉時に算出し、当時の大統領に報告した数値だ。
日本産とアメリカ産のコメの内外価格差を関税相当額に換え、%化したもので、UR 農業協定付属書 5 に基づく正当な計算である。
当然、日本政府にも提示され、今もアメリカ政府のウェブサイト公開されている。
さらに、アメリカ側だけでなく、農水省も USITC 提示の 2 年後、仮にコメを関税化した場合に 700%になると試算した。

この付属書 5 は公開されています。

https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/ecm/it/page25_000403.html

付属書五の付録 この付属書の 6 及び 10 に規定する特定の目的のための関税相当量の算定の指針

1. 関税相当量(従価税率又は従量税率のいずれの税率により表示されるものであるかを問わない。)の算定は、国内価格と国際価格との実際の差を用いて透明性のある方法で行う。使用するデータは、千九百八十六年から千九百八十八年までのものとする。

https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ag_e.htm

Attachment to Annex 5

Guidelines for the Calculation of Tariff Equivalents for the Specific Purpose Specified in Paragraphs 6 and 10 of this Annex

1. The calculation of the tariff equivalents, whether expressed as ad valorem or specific rates, shall be made using the actual difference between internal and external prices in a transparent manner. Data used shall be for the years 1986 to 1988.

2015、2016 年でも農水省の資料で 778%と出しています。

農水省（2015）https://www.maff.go.jp/j/kanbo/tpp/pdf/151224_sankou.pdf

○ 米は、国民の主要食糧の一つであり、国内における米の安定的な生産とその継続を確保するため、WTO 協定で約束したミニマム・アクセスを超える数量について、高い二次税率によりその輸入（枠外輸入）を抑制するとともに、ミニマム・アクセス米（枠内輸入）については、国家貿易を通じて国が輸入差益を徴収しつつ、用途に応じた売渡し管理を行っている。

二次税率 341 円/kg（※）

※従価税換算値：778%（精米）

（注）WTO 農業交渉（'00～）において、非従価税の関税削減幅を決定するために、基準時（'99-'01）の輸入価格及び国際価格を基に算出された数値。

同じ資料が掲載されています。

農林水省政策統括官（2016）農政新時代～水田・畑作分野における T P P 対策～.

https://www.maff.go.jp/j/kanbo/tpp/pdf/h_inehata_2.pdf

さらにこのような説明も

■ 現行の国家貿易制度を維持するとともに、枠外税率（米の場合 341 円/kg）を維持した上で、米国、豪州に SBS 方式※の国別枠を設定。（国別枠は、米と米粉等の国貿品目を対象として一体的に運用。）

※注：SBS 方式とは、国家貿易の下で、輸入業者と国内の実需者との実質的な直接取引を可能とする売買方式。

国内への影響の書き方で少し異なるのは備蓄用買い入れがこの時期に始まったのか、文書の対象読者の違いによるのか。

農林水産省（2017 年 12 月）農林水産物の生産額への影響について（TPP11）

<https://www.maff.go.jp/j/kanbo/tpp/attach/pdf/index-42.pdf>

品目名――生産量減少率――生産減少額 ――試算の考え方

米 ――0% ――0 億円 ――現行の国家貿易制度や枠外税率を維持することから、国家貿易以外の輸入の増大は見込み難いことに加え、国別枠の輸入量に相当する国

産米を政府が備蓄米として買い入れることから、国産主食用米のこれまでの生産量や農家所得に影響は見込み難い。

農林水産省（2016 年 3 月）農政新時代～努力が報われる農林水産業の実現に向けて～＜農林水産分野における T P P 対策＞<https://www.maff.go.jp/j/kanbo/tpp/attach/pdf/index-11.pdf>

影響 一―品目 一―対応方向等

国家貿易以外の輸入の増大は見込み難い 一―米一―・ 国別枠により輸入米の数量が拡大することで、国内の米の流通量がその分増加することとなれば、国産米全体の価格水準が下落することも懸念されることから、備蓄運営による外国産米の主食用米生産に対する影響の食い止めの検討や、更なる競争力の強化が必要。

ところで、アメリカとの TPP 交渉で関税は残してアメリカからの輸入を保証した。他の国は不満です。これはベトナムのサイトから

Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI). (2014, April 18). U.S. Allows Japan to Exclude Rice in Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations. Center for WTO and International Trade.

<https://wtocenter.vn/tin-tuc/3713-us-allows-japan-to-exclude-rice-in-transpacific-partnership-negotiations>

“The U.S. initially wanted Japan to abolish import tariffs on rice and other agricultural items as a part of TPP, but now wants Japan to exclude rice and some other agricultural products. In return, Japan has agreed to the U.S. demand to increase rice imports the U.S. in a new private import quota. Local sources say that this would lower competition for U.S. rice and other agricultural items in the Japanese market.”

WTO 交渉の経緯

<https://www.mri.co.jp/knowledge/column/20250613.html>

1994 年時点で、日本はコメの特例措置を認めることに成功したが、その後、1999 年には関税化に移行している。結果的には、最初から、特例措置ではなく関税化を選択した方が有利であった（実質的なコメの輸入ゼロを維持しつつ、ミニマムアクセス米の量を少なくすることができた）と現在では考えられている。しかし、それは、いわゆる「後講釈」と言っていいたろう。当時の国内政治状況は「コメの関税化を断固回避した」という決着を必須としていた。

Appendix III. Notes on Research (Finding Evidence)----To be updated.

Types of Sources

The HEnDA (2026b) rule is slightly confusing about the types of evidence and types of sources:

3.1.1 Varieties of Evidence

As for quotation of evidence, quotations of (1) objective factual data, like statistics and legal statutes, should primarily be recommended. Besides that, (2) testimony or analysis by authorized experts, (3) newspaper articles or news from dependable press can be used.

*Using TV broadcasts or direct Interviews should be avoided basically, as they can not be verified on paper. If you want to quote from these sources, the recording dates and the exact transcription of the broadcast/recording should be made and be brought to the tournament.

The two basic types of evidence (information) is facts and opinions. Two sub-types of facts are statistics and legal statutes (e.g., laws, constitutions, and government ordinances). Not all opinions are valid evidence in debate; only opinions (including interpretations, analysis, arguments) from experts of the relevant subject area can be used as the basis of arguments.

Sources, or types of publication should also be considered. Traditionally major types are books, articles in periodicals (magazines and newspapers), and other publications such as government reports (e.g., whitepapers). They used to be published on printed papers, which can be accessed in libraries and bookstores. But now most of the books, articles, and government reports are available online over the public internet or less accessible databases. Still, traditional tests of evidence do apply to new types of publications (Alles & Inoue, 2020, p. 66):

- (1) Is the evidence consistent with other evidence?
- (2) Is the evidence consistent within itself?
- (3) Are the statistics sound?
- (4) Is the source of evidence competent?
- (5) Is the evidence neutral? Isn't the source or author biased?
- (6) Is the evidence timely?

But because of the nature of online publications, some additional notes of caution are required:

Notes on "external consistencies"

In print publications, some news articles originate from newswire services such as Associated Press (AP), Reuters, AFP, Jiji, and Kyodo. Even if you find the same information in different newspapers, it does not pass the evidence test of "external consistency" because they are from the same sources. Now in the digital publications, in addition to such syndicated articles, many other texts are republished, legally by Creative Commons rules, and illegally. Again such facts and opinions are not considered as those from independent multiple sources.

Notes on “publication date”

Many old journal articles are “published” online in recent years without changing the contents. Even if an article was published online in 2026, the contents may be dated 1999. Look for original (print) publication data.

Dubious sources

The credibility of sources is increasingly difficult to assess in online publications. In print media, publications from reputable publishers and government agencies functioned as a basic warranty, although they also include incorrect information and biases. Today almost anyone can “publish” any information on the web (their own homepages and social network accounts) without “editors” in traditional media.

Here are some questionable sources and notes about evidence sources that came to the editor’s attention while researching the rice tariff topic.

AI-generated

米関税論題で学生が見つけた文献が怪しい。

Kato, R. (2025). The research progress on the geographical analysis of rice price evolution in Japan: Environmental, human, and global interaction perspectives. *Geographical Research Bulletin*, 4, 398-401. https://doi.org/10.50908/grb.4.0_398

著者の所属 Iwami Laboratory は不明。

探してみると同じジャーナルにこんな論文もある

Yanagi, M. (2025). Geographical drivers of rising rice prices in Japan: Climate change, socioeconomic restructuring, and trade policy barriers. *Geographical Research Bulletin*, 4, 402-405. https://doi.org/10.50908/grb.4.0_402

著者の所属 Media Department, Sihan Publishing House 実態不明

別論文 (https://doi.org/10.50908/rdj.3.0_65) では所属は Research Department, Resources Economics Research Board

Miyuki Yanagi はこの学会のジャーナルに複数論文がある。同名の著者、芝浦工大修士、ヒューレットパッカード勤務の柳美由貴がきるがおそらく別人

https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/result/global/-char/ja?languageKind=ja&item1=8&word1=%22Miyuki+Yanagi%22¬Cond1=0&yearfrom=&cond1=&translate=0&yearto=&bglobalSearch=false&fromPage=/search/global/_search/-char/ja
<https://cir.nii.ac.jp/crid/1070001337906979201>

Media Department, Sihan Publishing House 所属になっている他の著者もあり

Lu, M. (2024). Impact of climate change on rice and adaptation strategies: A review. *Advances in Resources Research*, 4(2), 252-262. https://doi.org/10.50908/arr.4.2_252

Google Scholar で被引用 27、ただし論文の中身（書き方）は怪しい。

査読履歴情報の追加が行われている（このジャーナルの発行者はこういった情報のメンテナンスも行っている。もちろん、こういった作業自体 AI が行っている可能性もある）

Student works

Student works are often of low quality. Some problems are discussed in Footnote 5 about Economics (2025). They do not have conventional “authority” or “expert” credentials. But some of their works exhibit scholastic qualities and are even published in peer-reviewed academic journals.

Anonymous blogs and Wikipedia articles

Anonymous writings are not considered reliable sources in debate but they may be useful gateways to more reliable sources. Look at linked sources and try to quote from the original sources. You must also evaluate the credibility of such sources. Blog posts and Wikipedia articles may or may not used credible sources.

“New” types of quality sources

There are emerging new genres of publications differne from traditionally reliable sources such as books and articles from reputable publishers. One good example is *The Conversation* (e.g., Gao & Amos, 2025).

Biased sources

Government sources are not “neutral” especially about the topics related to their own policy agenda. If Japan’s Ministry of Agriculture wants to protect rice farmers from imported rice, they may exaggerate the potential damages from rice trade liberalization. The US Ministry of Agriculture may want to increase their rice export to Japan and thus they may overestimate the consumer benefits of Japan’s importing American rice.

Agricultural lobbies and industry-related organizations are apparently biased; some organizations and publications are more easily associated with certain interests and biases and others like think tanks may look more neutral.

Scholars are also biased. In the rice tariff debate, many of the economists argue for the abolition of rice tariff based on their purely economic model simulations, which may ignore non-economic factors.

Direct quotation vs. Paraphrase

In debates, the general rule is to use direct quotations (copying text verbatim from the source and enclosing it in quotation marks). While HEnDA rules permit paraphrasing—and paraphrasing is often encouraged in academic papers and general writing—you should first accurately record the original text in your manuscript. You may then choose to use a paraphrase if necessitated by speech time constraints.

In most American “Policy Debate” practices, most of the quotations are selectively highlighted and they are read without verbalizing quotation marks. But the manuscripts have the copy-and-pasted texts from the original sources.

ディベートでは直接引用（原文からのコピーを引用符で囲む）を原則としてください。HEnDAのルールではパラフレイズを認めていて、学術論文や一般的な文章作法でもパラフレイズを推奨することが多いですが、まずは原文を正確に記録して原稿には記載しておきましょう。そのうえで、スピーチ時間の都合により、パラフレイズを使ってもいいでしょう。

Translation from Japanese

英語以外の言語で書かれた出典からの引用は原文と翻訳した英文を併記しましょう。アカデミックライティングでは、直訳でもパラフレイズとして扱う場合もありますが（APAスタイル）、ディベートでは直訳した場合は直接引用として扱っていいでしょう。引用符で囲み、Quote Unquote と引用符を読み上げてください。