

The Autonomous Industrial Colony “Kuzbas” and S. J. Rutgers (8-Supplement) : Contents, Summaries, and Selected Bibliography

YAMANOUCHI, Akito
Kyushu University : Professor emeritus

<https://doi.org/10.15017/7385225>

出版情報 : pp.1-34, 2025-09-08. Kyushu University
バージョン :
権利関係 :



The Autonomous Industrial Colony “Kuzbas” and S. J. Rutgers
(8, Supplement) : Contents, Summaries, and Selected Bibliography

by

Akito YAMANOUCHI

(Professor Emeritus of Kyushu University)

- Part 1 A New Interpretation on Its Foundation
(<https://doi.org/10.15017/6781001>)
- Part 2 The Establishment of the American Organization Committee and
Its Operations
(<https://doi.org/10.15017/7151988>)
- Part 3 From the Preparation for the Start of Operations till the Restart
with the New Contract
(<https://doi.org/10.15017/7182144>)
- Part 4 From the Reorganization of the New York Bureau to Its Dissolution
(<https://doi.org/10.15017/7236532>)
- Part 5 From Regular Operations till the Expansion of Enterprise Scale
(<https://doi.org/10.15017/7331661>)
- Part 6 From Further Development of the Enterprise to Its Liquidation
(<https://doi.org/10.15017/7361467>)
- Part 7 The Aftermath of Its Liquidation and Toward the Conclusion
(<https://doi.org/10.15017/7376539>)

Table of Contents and Summaries

Part 1	A New Interpretation on Its Foundation	4
Introduction		
Chapter 1	The Idea of the Foundation	
Chapter 2	The First Draft of the Plan	
Chapter 3	The Resolution of the Industrial Immigrant	
Chapter 4	The Proposal for the Foundation based on a Field Survey	
Chapter 5	Deliberations on the Proposal	
	(1) Surfacing Differences of Opinion	
	(2) Toward Reaching an Agreement	
Chapter 6	The Approval of the Government	
Summary		
Part 2	The Establishment of the American Organization Committee and Its Operations	6
Introduction		
Chapter 1	Toward the Start of Activities	
Chapter 2	Toward the Establishment	
Chapter 3	Over the Management	
Chapter 4	A Survey of the Labor Dispatch Undertaking	
Summary		
Part 3	From the Preparation for the Start of Operations till the Restart with the New Contract	8
Introduction		
Chapter 1	The Preparation and the Start of Operations	
Chapter 2	Negotiations for a New Contract	
Chapter 3	The Provisions of the New Contract	
Chapter 4	The Restart with the New Contract	
Summary		
Part 4	From the Reorganization of the New York Bureau to Its Dissolution	12
Introduction		
Chapter 1	The Reorganization of the New York Bureau	

Chapter 2	The Criticism of Th. Reese by Rutgers and T. Barker	
Chapter 3	From Barker's Return to the Dissolution of the Bureau	
	Summary	
Part 5	From Regular Operations till the Expansion of Enterprise Scale	15
	Introduction	
Chapter 1	The Enterprise Development immediately after the Transition to the Sole Management	
Chapter 2	Negotiations with Governmental Organs over Competition and Mergers	
Chapter 3	Rutgers' Disease and His Deputy Problems, and Bronka's Death	
	Summary	
Part 6	From Further Development of the Enterprise to Its Liquidation	18
	Introduction	
Chapter 1	Further Development of the Enterprise	
Chapter 2	The System of Management and Communication during Rutgers' Medical Treatment	
Chapter 3	The K.N. Korobkin Problem and Its Liquidation	
	Summary	
Part 7	The Aftermath of Its Liquidation and Toward the Conclusion	21
	Introduction	
Chapter 1	The Final Attempt at the Time of Reorganization and Korobkin's Downfall	
Chapter 2	The Aftermath of the Foreign Colonists	
Final Chapter	Toward the Conclusion	
	(1) A New Interpretation on Its Foundation	
	(2) Problems with Periodization	
	(3) Problems with the Interpretation of the IWW Tendency	
	(4) "Autonomy" and the Retention of the "Special Features"	
	(5) Over the Evaluation of Rutgers	
	(6) A New Evaluation from the Perspective of Post-liquidation Development	
	(7) Was it a Failure of Idealism?	
	Selected Bibliography	30

Summaries

The Autonomous Industrial Colony “Kuzbas” and S. J. Rutgers (1): A New Interpretation on Its Foundation

- 1 The Idea of the Foundation
- 2 The First Draft of the Plan
- 3 The Resolution of the Industrial Immigrant
- 4 The Proposal for the Foundation based on a Field Survey
- 5 Deliberations on the Proposal
 - (1) Surfacing Differences of Opinion
 - (2) Toward Reaching an Agreement
- 6 The Approval of the Government

After the introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in March 1921, the acceptance of foreign capital, foreign labor, etc. came to be accelerated in Soviet Russia. At that time S.J. Rutgers, H.S. Calvert and others aimed at founding “the first industrial colony in the world, where engineers will find freedom to work out experiments they cannot attempt under the profit-system, and where workers will find that self-government, that sense of social creativeness, that solidarity and equality they have never found anywhere in the history of the world until the present hour,” to which the word “autonomous” was prefixed, as a unique practice of the international labor solidarity.

This Part 1 aims to describe anew in detail how the Colony was founded and to put a new interpretation on it, mainly on the basis of both documents of the Soviet Russian Government and the Russian Communist Party, which the researchers of the former Soviet Union and Russia have not made full use of, as well as personal documents of its initiators, i.e., Rutgers, Calvert, W.D. Haywood, and T. Barker. Above all, it demonstrates how very important was the issue of “autonomy” within the Colony that Rutgers persisted in advocating throughout the founding process.

The main reason why the deliberations for the foundation were prolonged for nearly half a year was not the merits or demerits of the enormous financial support from the Government, as researchers have emphasized so far, but the disagreement over who should have jurisdiction over the Colony and who should better guarantee its “autonomy.” One side was the Soviet of Labor and Defense (STO), an upper organ which was presided over by V.I. Lenin and legally authorized

as commission of the Soviet of People's Commissars, and the other was the Supreme Soviet of National Economy (VSNKh), a lower organ which promoted the provision of concessions to foreign capitalists and insisted the Colony should also be operated on a commercial basis. In the end, it was decided that the Colony would be founded under the jurisdiction of the STO. But the STO had entrusted preliminary consideration to the VSNKh, a specialized committee specifically involved in the foundation and management of the Colony, and for that very reason, attempts by the VSNKh to "intervene" in the Colony would be unavoidable even after its foundation. It has ultimately been foreseen that the disagreement between the two sides over its jurisdiction would continue.

Key words: Autonomous Industrial Colony "Kuzbas," S.J. Rutgers, V.I. Lenin, STO, VSNKh, Soviet Russia

First Edition 5.IV.2023

Revised and Retitled Edition 17.X.2023

Revised 3rd Edition 4.IX.2025

The Autonomous Industrial Colony “Kuzbas” and S. J. Rutgers (2): The Establishment of the American Organization Committee and Its Operations

- 1 Toward the Start of Activities
- 2 Toward the Establishment
- 3 Over the Management
- 4 A Survey of the Labor Dispatch Undertaking

Part 1 dealt in detail with the course of events leading up to making an agreement on the foundation of the Autonomous Industrial Colony “Kuzbas” (AIC-K)⁽¹⁾. As raised at the beginning of Part 1, Part 2 also focuses on internal issues, such as what the initiatory group undertook as the first step toward realizing the AIC-K and what kind of problems arose?

The initiatory group began activities without waiting for the final agreement. They aimed to divide their activities into four locations (Kuzbas, Moscow, the Netherlands, and the USA) and accomplish their respective tasks. Particularly I take note of the composition, with S.J. Rutgers in the Netherlands at the center and H.S. Calvert and T. Barker in the United States and W.D. Heywood in Moscow as the two wings. And Rutgers took on the role of giving instructions and coordinating between the two wings. Rushing to carry out long-distance activities in a short period of time posed the following problems: (1) There was a shortage of suitable persons because they set about their task with a small number of people; (2) They could not bring about good understanding one another in spite of their efforts to exchange close correspondence.

The American Organization Committee (AOC) was organized in New York to handle labor recruitment and dispatch by Calvert, Barker, and others. The AOC could gain organizational cooperation and sponsorship from neither Communist Party on the spot (CP) nor the IWW and, what was worse, “factional strife” arose between the AOC and the CP or the IWW. Specifically,

(1) The communist J. Heiman, “the personal representative of Rutgers in New York,” pushed through with factionally gaining a majority in the AOC, which seemed to exceed the bounds of his authority as a representative. Furthermore, the repeated negotiations between the AOC and the communist-leaning Society for Technical Aid to Soviet Russia (STASR) ultimately broke down,

(1) My article, “The Foundation of the Autonomous Industrial Colony ‘Kuzbas’ and S.J. Rutgers” which was made open access in the Kyushu University Repository on 5 April 1923, has been revised, expanded, and reopened on 17 October 1923 under the changed title, “The Autonomous Industrial Colony ‘Kuzbas’ and S.J. Rutgers (1): A New Interpretation on Its Foundation” (hereafter annotated as Part 1).

and both of them ended up competing separately for the labor dispatch undertaking. The fact is, the conflict of opinion between Rutgers and L.K. Martens discussed in Part 1 lingered here: In other words, Martens effectively led the Supreme Soviet of National Economy (VSNKh) on the matter of immigrant industrial workers. A.A. Heller, who shared the views of Martens, was appointed the VSNKh's American representative and was put in charge of overseeing the STASR. This resurfaced, though not publicly, as the conflict between the AOC, including Calvert and Barker, and Heller's STASR.

(2) The Executive of the IWW, which had begun to clash with the Executive of the Comintern over the foundation of the Profintern, found it difficult to support the Kuzbas project, which was backed by the Soviet Government. Moreover, due to the fact that Haywood and J.H. Beyer (both were Wobblies and founding members of the AIC-K) fled the country while out on bail, the Executive of the IWW reproached the CP for its organizing the escape and some Wobblies, who had provided the bail and lost a considerable sum of money, were also furious not only at the CP but at two fugitives, leaving no room for negotiation.

In the end, the AOC directly invited the members of the CP, those of the IWW, and individual class-conscious engineers and workers to apply and be dispatched. The policy in this case was prescribed in advance by Rutgers: The AOC itself should have "the advantage [over the STASR] of combining different elements (IWW, CP, and others) and offer a good chance of avoiding domination by political influence of one kind or another" ("a non-partisan attitude").

The AOC's conflict with the CP and the IWW also affected its operations, particularly its committee composition, and led to disagreements among committee members (roughly divided into three groups: namely, CP's, IWW's, and liberal). Furthermore, it was essential for the AOC to gain approval from the Soviet Government, which funded its activities, and the opinions of its members were divided over how to respond not only to the wishes of the Soviet of Labor and Defense (STO), but also to those of Rutgers who acted as an intermediary (The AOC was to undergo fundamental reorganization in early 1923, partly because of this internal conflict).

So then, what actually happened to the AOC's core program, the worker dispatch program? Finally, using quantitative data, I have provided in advance a preliminary overview of the dispatch program from the spring of 1922 until the end of 1926, when the decision was made to dissolve and reorganize AIC-K itself. In the end, despite the handicaps of the AOC receiving organizational cooperation from neither the Communist Party nor the IWW and having to start from scratch, its performance in the first year of dispatching workers was not inferior to that of the STASR, and it was able to contribute more than the STASR, especially in terms of dispatching expert engineers.

Key words: Autonomous Industrial Colony "Kuzbas," American Organization Committee, STASR, Communist Party, IWW, S.J. Rutgers

First Edition 18.X.2023; Revised Edition 20.VI.2024; Revised 3rd Edition 4.IX.2025

The Autonomous Industrial Colony “Kuzbas” and S. J. Rutgers (3): From the Preparation for the Start of Operations till the Restart with the New Contract

- 1 The Preparation and the Start of Operations
- 2 Negotiations for a New Contract
- 3 The Provisions of the New Contract
- 4 The Restart with the New Contract

The Autonomous Industrial Colony “Kuzbas” (AIC-K) encountered various problems at the start of operations. At first, J.H. Beyer, W.D. Haywood, and S.J. Rutgers were each sent to Kemerovo in turn as its director. But differences over management ideas and approaches arouse among them, so Beyer nearly broke away (and then suddenly passed away), Haywood left shortly after Rutgers’ arrival and turned around to the opposite side before the “New Contract” was signed, leaving Rutgers to continue undertaking as sole director. In addition, Soviet governing bodies, particularly the Gosplan, quickly proposed downsizing the AIC-K project and revising the terms of the original contract, forcing Rutgers and others members of the Organization Committee (the provisional Managing Board) to focus on negotiating these issues. Three members of the American Organization Committee (AOC) also left New York for Russia to assist in the negotiations. At this point over how to respond to the proposal, however, the opinions of members of both Committees were also divided and the internal conflict arose. The repercussions of this internal conflict spread, leading to the liquidation of both the Organization Committee and the AOC.

The AIC-K signed the New Contract with the STO on 25 December 1922, and achieved the transition from the joint management with the Russians to the sole one on 1 February 1923. 1 March 1923 marked the official start date for the AIC-K, marking the start of full-scale operations.

What changed with the New Contract, and how? What kind of problems arose? Below, I will discuss the key issues, presenting perspectives and new interpretations that have been overlooked in research history.

1. On the term “autonomous”

Social and individual efficiency was the principle which the AIC-K aimed to establish. The first step in achieving this efficiency was to adapt to the real NEP system. First, the AIC-K established its headquarters in Moscow as the distribution center for buying and selling. It was also found necessary to define more clearly what was meant by the term “autonomous” (which

was not specified in the original contract). Many colonists had interpreted “autonomy” as individual license and freedom of action in their actions in the industry rather than as organizational autonomy within the framework of Russian institutions. As a result of this interpretation, efforts were made to resolve the AIC-K’s operational and technical issues through mass meetings. Therefore, the Colony recognized that it had not yet reached a state of definite organization and postponed, for the time being, elections to the Managing Board, allowing the STO to select or nominate it.

From the beginning Rutgers had aimed for “organizational autonomy within Russian institutions,” and the following problems arose in maintaining “autonomy” within the organization: (1) Due to the differences of opinion within the Organization Committee, that Committee of 14 members was discharged and the Managing Board of 3 (Rutgers, V.C. Shatov, and Th. Reese) was formed. Moreover, the AIC-K temporarily relinquished its right to vote on Managing Board to the STO; (2) The provisions of its statute, guaranteeing all colonists the “advisory capacity,” that is, the freedom to offer “advice and suggestions,” were criticized as being meaningless; (3) The mass meeting which was regarded as an important form of securing “autonomy” was criticized particularly from the perspective of the “technical efficiency” of production.

I will discuss these three issues in turn.

(1) Restructuring the Managing Board and relinquishing the right to vote

The liquidation of the Organization Committee and the restructure of the Managing Board were proposed by Shatov at the joint meeting of the Organization Committee and AOC members, passed by a vote of 3 to 2, and submitted to the STO. What is concerning here is that the proposal was made by Shatov, a representative from the STO, and that the STO’s intentions were at work behind the scenes, which potentially undermined the independence of the AIC-K. Nevertheless, Rutgers agreed to it, but it was likely due to the following unique ideas: He (and Reese) sent the following letter to the STO dated 30 October 1922: “This proposal is important because in the current Managing Board there are differences of opinion which would put a brake on the work for the preparation of production.” In other words, the issue of production “efficiency” was his highest priority, so he would be very anxious about the internal conflict that might decrease the efficiency and, what was worse, hinder the AIC-K’s just cause of supporting the economic reconstruction of Soviet Russia.

Indeed, the selection of 3 members of the Managing Board was intended as a temporary measure until the Colony could be clearly organized and the colonists could elect their own members. But, in reality, the measure (which also gave the STO the right to dismiss the Board members) increased their dependence on the Soviet Government. The AIC-K never regained its right to vote, and remained at the mercy of the Soviet Government’s personnel power until the very end (to be continued).

(2) The security of freedom of opinion, criticism, etc. from “below”

On the changes in the New Contract R.E. Kennell argued, “Another clause practically takes the ‘autonomous’ out of ‘the AIC-K’ by specifying that the management board, responsible only

the STO, is absolute dictator and the colonists have no voice in the administration of Kuzbas affairs.” However, one could counter this as follows: Indeed, the above-mentioned provisions on the security of that freedom may have been overly idealistic and later became meaningless, but they were effective, at least initially. An example of this is the following: Following advice from chemical engineers, including N. Sparks, director Rutgers shifted his focus from coal production to coke production. Furthermore, “Rutgers had previously asked the workers at Kemerovo what they required to be done at Moscow and had asked for suggestions [when negotiating a new contract].” Kennell wrote the above-mentioned critical report only five and a half months after arriving in Kemerovo. To tell the truth, “She evolved in her political views during the troubles of 1922 from an initial identification with the IWW partisans to an acceptance of the Rutgers reforms and the pragmatic Colony regime resulting from the new Agreement” (J.P. Morray). Given the subsequent changes in Kennell’s political stance, it is doubtful whether she would have continued to adhere to her early criticism.

(3) Mass meeting vs. technical efficiency

Soon after Rutgers arrived in Kemerovo, he raised the issues of the mass meeting (e.g., inefficiency that even the technical details had been discussed and resolved at the mass meeting) and sought to improve them by establishing “a certain discipline.” Although this attempt provoked opposition from IWW supporters, Rutgers criticized the mass meeting from the perspective of the “technical efficiency” of production, in other words, inevitability of industrial management by professional engineers. His argument was supported by an article in a local organ of the IWW: “Workers’ Control,” *Industrial Worker*, 1 July 1922 (reprinted in *Kuzbas*, 20 September 1922), stating that “Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as ‘Democratic Control of Industry,’ at least not in the sense of ‘Democratic Management’”; “The IWW plan is to organize each industry not only to fight the capitalist,, but to also run it efficiently,, That means a certain amount of subordination of individual whim to the will of expert. It might, it is possible to imagine, result in some sort of dictatorship of the technician, rather than a dictatorship of the proletariat, as far as production is concerned.”

This policy of prioritizing “technical efficiency” also led Rutgers assert the following right: “We will not be able to comply with all paragraphs of law, particularly of the mining laws, if we are to introduce American methods. We take it for granted that our contract gives us the right to disregard certain formal provisions of minor laws if they conflict with good American methods and practice.”

2. On the AIC-K’s “adaptation” to the NEP system

(1) Rejection of the “commercial trust”

In negotiations with Soviet governing bodies, Rutgers strongly refused to accept the idea of converting the AIC-K into an ordinary Russian “commercial trust” (in other words, “a form of Co-operative with profit sharing”), because the principle of the “Autonomous Colony” founded by Rutgers and others was that the Soviet State should guarantee living conditions of colonists and

the development potential of state-owned enterprise. However, with the introduction of a wage system, the relinquishing of its right to vote, etc., the AIC-K itself was also beginning to change considerably from the year before.

(2) On the evaluation of “adaptation”

L.Iu. Galkina has summarized the AIC-K’s history that downsized its project, while simultaneously achieving centralized management, on the basis of the New Contract whose main purpose was to “adapt” to the NEP system as follows: “The AIC-K *lived through* a period of ‘excitement, romance, and adventure.’ The members of the AIC-K ‘*started* to work for reconstruction,’ while intending to build a ‘New Pennsylvania’ in Kuzbas” (my *italics*). As mentioned in Part 1, for Galkina the “Russification of the Colony” process is taken for granted. Therefore, Galkina has failed to properly appreciate the so-called “birth pains” of the “Autonomous Colony” and, instead, considered that the AIC-K “*started* to work” only after the conclusion of the New Contract. Galkina lacks the attention to detail required to investigate historical facts that do not follow this “Russification” trend.

However, since the original purpose of the Kuzbas project was to contribute to the reconstruction and development of the Russian economy, and since the AIC-K was unable to receive active support from Soviet governing bodies, Rutgers had no choice but to make some institutional changes in line with economic development under the NEP. In fact, that was probably the only option for the AIC-K’s economic development. Rutgers’ original dream of forming a new Labor State (in the words of a colonist, “a new Republic of Labor”) was gone and all that remained was how to aim at accelerating its economic development by increasing the technical “efficiency” of production as much as possible, on the basis of “autonomy” within the AIC-K organization.

Key words: Autonomous Industrial Colony “Kuzbas,” STO, Gosplan, NEP, American Organization Committee, IWW, W.D. Haywood, S.J. Rutgers

First Edition 14.VI.2024

Revised Edition 1.X.2024

Revised 3rd Edition 5.IX.2025

The Autonomous Industrial Colony “Kuzbas” and S. J. Rutgers (4): From the Reorganization of the New York Bureau to Its Dissolution

- 1 The Reorganization of the New York Bureau
- 2 The Criticism of Th. Reese by Rutgers and T. Barker
- 3 From Barker’s Return to the Dissolution of the Bureau

Based on the new contract between the Autonomous Industrial Colony “Kuzbas” (AIC-K) and the Soviet of Labor and Defense (STO) on 25 December 1922, the meeting of the American Organization Committee (AOC) on 1 April 1923 decided to dissolve itself and its chairman, H.S. Calvert, was to break away from it. Instead, the New York Bureau was reorganized with Th. Reese as representative. M. Mulari, P.P. Cosgrove, and T. Barker, who were no longer AOC members, were retained on a salary. Reese was dismissed so early, because his views deviated from the ideals and principles on which the AIC-K had been founded (“Kuzbas idea,” to use the phrase from Barker’s recollection) and, moreover, he was lacking in his competence for the management. Although a cooperative relationship between its successor, Barker, and S.J. Rutgers was established directly, the differences of opinion that had existed before continued, and their relationship ended with the AIC-K’s liquidation. Looking back on the process, the main issues are examined below.

Shortly after Reese took up his post as head of the New York Bureau, he exchanged letters with Rutgers (29 May to 15 August 1923). These letters revealed Rutgers’ strong criticism of Reese’s views and policy, the main points of which were as follows:

(1) Rutgers asserted definitely, “Personally I [Rutgers] am also convinced, that the policy you [Reese] are pursuing is not quite correct.” Particularly Reese’s proposal for incorporating the AIC-K was a serious problem. It was “largely to be considered in connection with the trial and the wish to make ‘Kuzbas’ appear as a business enterprise, rather than as a definite proletarian organization.” Originally the incorporation plan was advised to Reese by a “liberal” lawyer who had been appointed a member of the Advisory Committee, and then was going to be proposed by Reese to the Committee. Moreover, Rutgers opposed in principle the establishment itself of the Advisory Committee which had been proposed again by Reese. It is clear that Reese’s proposals were deviating too far from the “Kuzbas idea.”

(2) Reese continued to avoid joining the “Group,” that is, the Workers Party of America. The joining that had been decided on the Managing Board in Moscow, according to Rutgers, was “not a formality, but an administrative one” and “could give satisfactory guarantees for control.”

Rutgers regarded Reese's dealing with the matter as unqualified for his present position (Barker pointed out and criticized Reese's unqualifiedness more concretely in a letter of 15 August 1923, addressed to W. H[aywood], S. Berg and J. Masukevich). Furthermore, the demand for the representative's joining the Workers Party was made by the Managing Board, including Rutgers, not "to ruin Kuzbas as a proletarian organization." It might have been a controversial issue from the viewpoint of management to appoint the "liberal," or non-political Reese as representative. But that demand for joining was clearly contrary to "a non-partisan attitude" which had been a basis for the AOC's management.

After the change of representative, Rutgers would have no option but to entrust the management of the New York Bureau to Barker. Although there was a large gap in opinion between Rutgers and Barker, their close cooperation became essential to the operation of the Bureau. The reasons why they could cooperate with each other are supposed as follows:

(1) Rutgers had criticized Barker's IWW thinking from the start (although not as much as he did Calvert and not directly). Under the pressure of necessity, however, Rutgers felt obliged to acknowledge Barker's administrative ability and his criticism of Reese. It goes without saying that it would be out of the question for the Managing Board to demand again a hard-core Wobbly, Barker, of joining the Workers Party.

(2) Although Barker had also criticized Rutgers repeatedly and openly, it is thought that he accepted the position of successor as representative due to his motivation for renewing his contract with the AIC-K enterprise and wanting "to know what is going to be doing." As representative, however, Barker does not seem to have fully supported Rutgers' management policy (although the first half is difficult to confirm due to a lack of historical documents, based on the second half), and he appears to have still adhered to the "Kuzbas idea." In the above-mentioned letter of 15 August 1923 Barker's harsh criticism of his comrades stands out, but he nevertheless seems to have still believed that the former AOC members (including even Reese) would add some sort of contribution to the development of the AIC-K: "If you [Haywood, Berg and Masukevich] are able to make contacts with either the New [Managing] Board or with some of the live folks connected with Kuzbas, you should suggest that the Board recall Cosgrove, Reese and myself [Barker] to the Colony as members. Also Mulari.[M.] Schuyler should also be recalled and the recall should be framed in proper language."

In fact, a group (including Barker, Haywood, Berg, Masukevich) that wanted to stick to the "Kuzbas idea" was being formed. Indeed, this group's arguments were not persuasive in heated debate about whether the AIC-K should adapt itself to the NEP system and carry out some institutional changes, because Rutgers' goal was to contribute to the reconstruction and development of the Soviet Russian economy by increasing the technical "efficiency" of production based on the basis of "autonomy" within its organization (cf. Part 3). But the members of the group still had some hopes for this international social "experiments" that "could not be attempted under the profit-system" (to borrow the phrase from a prospectus, *Kuzbas* written by Barker with Calvert at the start of the AOC's activities). They and most of the former AOC members (with some overlap) never broke off relations with the AIC-K until its liquidation on 1 January 1927.

On 1 September 1926 during his stay in Moscow, Barker even independently submitted a petition to “Dear Comrade Stalin” and brought the following discontent to Stalin’s attention: “they [those concerned] are liquidating this organization without any coordination or direction, and without taking into account the specific characteristics of the colony.”

In response to Barker’s attitude, Rutgers, who had continued to engage in important negotiations with Soviet governing bodies despite his illness, suspected that there still remained “the still strong Syndicalist [i.e., IWW] tendency” in it and it can be said that Rutgers was unable to dispel this suspicion even when AIC-K was in danger of extinction.

In the end, the differences of opinion between the two parties remained unresolved, and the AIC-K was liquidated, leading to the dissolution of its New York Bureau. Of course, the conflict between two parties was not the principal cause of the liquidation and dissolution. A determining cause was the constant pressure on the AIC-K from the outside, that is, the central and local organs of the Soviet Government and the Russian Communist Party. The result of the constant pressure was expressed euphemistically in a notice of the dissolution of the New York Bureau written (on 31 January 1927) by S.S. Shipman who had been appointed by Rutgers to succeed Barker, just before Barker’s leaving for Russia: “The elimination of an independent American representation comes as a consequence of gradual changes in the character of the administration of the Kuzbas enterprises. These changes resulted in the placing of an increasing proportion of Russian technicians and administrators in responsible positions in the industries. This has done away with the necessity of retaining the special American contacts for which purpose a separate New York office has been maintained up to the present time.”

Key words: Autonomous Industrial Colony “Kuzbas,” American Organization Committee, New York Bureau, H.S. Calvert, Th. Reese, T. Barker, S.S. Shipman, S.J. Rutgers

First Edition 26.IX.2024

Revised Edition 31.I.2025

Revised 3rd Edition 5.IX.2025

The Autonomous Industrial Colony “Kuzbas” and S. J. Rutgers (5): From Regular Operations till the Expansion of Enterprise Scale

- 1 The Enterprise Development immediately after the Transition to the Sole Management
- 2 Negotiations with Governmental Organs over Competition and Mergers
- 3 Rutgers’ Disease and His Deputy Problems, and Bronka’s Death

On 1 February 1923, the Autonomous Industrial Colony “Kuzbas” (AIC-K) achieved the transition from the dual management with the Russians to the single one. Immediately after that, the AIC-K enterprise began to attain a remarkable development, as shown by various data. To take one example, since October 1922 the total number of workers has been decreased from 2,307 to 2,041 (88.5%), mostly by reducing the office forces, watchmen, etc. Coincident with this the production has increased, the production of coal per person during March and April 1923 being three times that produced during October 1922. The year 1923 brought the organizational consolidation of the AIC-K as a Soviet enterprise with special features.

In 1924, despite the fact that the AIC-K received substantial subsidies from the Soviet Government, the development tempo of its operations slowed down less than originally planned. According to G.Ia. Tarle, the AIC-K, which was effectively under the sole jurisdiction of the STO, operated entirely outside the framework (control) of the Soviet economical institutions. The coal in Kemerovo was taken over in principle by the Soviet Government, and its sales channels were limited, so the start of coke production from coal was eagerly awaited. The opening of a chemical plant on 2 March 1924 provided a major impetus for its enterprise development. Thus, an industrial core was emerging and was about to grow from this first combination of coal mining, coke making, and chemistry. This also represented “a new financial basis” for the AIC-K.

While the AIC-K was obliged to again postpone the transfer of Nadezhdinsk plants in the “New Contract” signed on 25 December 1922, it was already planning to integrate the operations of Kol’chugino and Prokop’evsk, south of Kemerovo. Kemerovo was only the starting point with the Kuzbas project. Taking advantage of an opportunity of coke production, the AIC-K aimed to work toward realizing the integration of coal mining and metallurgical industries throughout the Kuznetsk Coalfield.

In response to AIC-K’s demands for an expansion of its operations, the STO established a committee for investigating both the AIC-K’s enterprise and its opponent, Kuzbas Trust within the People’s Commissariat of Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection through March into June 1924. After a two-month on-site investigation beginning at the end of June, in early September it approved to transfer the management of coal mines of Leninsk (formerly Kol’chugino) and Prokop’evsk and

Gur'evsk plants from Kuzbas Trust to the AIC-K. As a result, the AIC-K integrated half of the Kuzbas Trust's territory and, at the same time, was to assume 50% of the latter's debts. But new considerable debts were discovered after the transfer was decided and S.J. Rutgers was unwilling to finally accept the decision. In the end, that problem was settled by the STO's promise of even more financial support. By early 1925 the AIC-K acquired an area equivalent to the entire Netherlands, operating seven mines and three plants with 6,100 workers (L.Iu. Galkina).

It was primarily the Russian "spetsy" (specialists) who were always hostile to the process from the start of AIC-K's operations to its expansion. Rutgers and colleagues were never free from worries about their bureaucracy, red tape, deliberate sabotage, etc. The delay in the completion of the chemical plant in Kemerovo was mainly caused by the fact that Engineer I.I. Lokhanskii, the former director of that plant, had concealed a lot of its original blueprints in his home and somewhere. The Russian technical staff was all nervous and extremely afraid that the Americans would take control, turn the mines into a political battlefield, and fight against the Kuzbas Trust. The AIC-K requested that the management of the Kuzbas Trust with poor performance be transferred. The "spetsy" of the competent authorities, who became members of the STO committee, openly opposed its [investigative] report and "revealed a tendency to obscure Kuzbas Trust's management and operation system, which did not actually justify itself, and to underestimate and conceal the achievements of the AIC-K enterprise." Russian researchers generally have not paid much attention to the hostile actions of "spetsy." Rutgers "regarded their slander or false allegations as political crimes" and addressed his detailed memorandum, including a supplement on a battle with "spetsy," to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. On 9 July 1924 the Politbureau of the Central Committee referred it for discussion and passed some resolutions, one of which was related to countermeasures against difficulties made by the "spetsy" and has not been taken up enough by researchers.

Since Rutgers was laid low by pneumonia just before the closing of the Founding Congress of the Comintern in March 1919, he kept working while constantly on the brink of illness. At the Kuzbas period he suffered from diabetes and further sciatica through overwork. Bronka Kornblitt, Rutgers' interpreter and secretary, who had been a tuberculosis survivor, was frequently sent to sanatoriums due to her demanding work schedule and died at the young age of 33 in June 1925.

The worsening of their health condition necessitated the need for representatives. Rutgers requested the Central Committee of the Party to recommend an assistant in place of Bronka. In the fall of 1923, Rutgers came back from Moscow to Kemerovo with Domberg, chosen as his assistant by the Central Committee. Around June 1924, however, Domberg proved to be ineffective and was dismissed at Rutgers' suggestion.

Finally, Rutgers showed the white feather in a letter of December 1924 to his wife, Bartha, saying "Continuing to work here would be like committing suicide for me." He considered taking a long break and asked the STO to recommend his own deputy, that is, acting chairman of the AIC-K Managing Board. A.E. Kalnin, chosen as deputy, newly arrived at Kemerovo this month. Before returning to the Netherlands temporarily for medical treatment, i.e., through January into

April 1925, Rutgers carried on negotiations in Moscow over raising funds for the expansion of the AIC-K and escaping from selling coke cheap to the Uralmet. In the meanwhile, Kalnin gave rise to confusion in Kemerovo by means of his rough-and-ready reorganization “in a Russian sense.” As a result, Rutgers and colleagues launched a campaign to dismiss Kalnin, in which they finally succeeded in the summer of 1925.

This case became a precedent of K.N. Korobkin, who was to be appointed again Rutgers’ deputy in April 1926. While the AIC-K had to spend considerable time and effort dismissing Kalnin alone, Korobkin, accompanied by 40 of his men in all, was to cause more serious troubles, which in a sense could prove fatal to it. The worsening of Rutgers’ health condition, which was caused by the constant pressure of his role as director, became the immediate cause of these two cases. In neither case was Rutgers able to find anyone comparable to Bronka who could support him consistently.

When the Colony cooperative voted to abolish the 60-per-cent contribution system of wage by the fall of 1924, Ruth E. Kennell said definitely, “Thus passed the last remnant of our experiment in pure communism.” Was it really true? Wage disparities among engineers remained almost nonexistent. What’s more important, Rutgers and colleagues remained committed to retaining “special features” that had been built on the founding idea of the AIC-K. In the midst of a campaign to remove his deputy, Kalnin, Rutgers unfolded the following thoughts to the Siberian Revolutionary Committee: “I [Rutgers] would like to once again emphasize that I am in favor of the transfer of the AIC to the Russian leadership. The AIC must, maybe very speedily, give up its independence and enter the normal system of the Soviet economy. But it is essential to retain *the special features of our organization*, that is, *high efficiency of the leadership by means of a minimum number of administrative personnel; combining clearly our statistics and the system of control with the introduction of the newest production method*. The latter is the most important achievement of our Colony. I am afraid that Comrade Kalnin, who is trying to turn the AIC into a Russian enterprise as rapidly as possible, would, in spite of sincerity of his intentions, throw away the baby with the bathwater, causing more loss than benefit” (my *italics*). To sum up, retaining the above-mentioned features (exhibited by the foreign forces) must be prerequisite for accomplishing the so-called “Russification” of the AIC-K.

Key words: Autonomous Industrial Colony “Kuzbas,” STO, Gosplan, H.P. Rastopchin, A.E. Kalnin, Bronka Kornblitt, S.J. Rutgers

First Edition 28.I.2025

Revised Edition 9.VI.2025

Revised 3rd Edition 8.IX.2025

The Autonomous Industrial Colony “Kuzbas” and S. J. Rutgers (6): From Further Development of the Enterprise to Its Liquidation

- 1 Further Development of the Enterprise
- 2 The System of Management and Communication during Rutgers’ Medical Treatment
- 3 The K.N. Korobkin Problem and Its Liquidation

The enterprise of the Autonomous Industrial Colony “Kuzbas” (AIC-K) continued to expand and develop further from 1925 to 1926. It is characteristic in it that the AIC-K quickly started taking action on making and realizing the next plan “Tel’bess,” though the AIC-K had only just set about integrating practically Leninsk and Prokp’evsk coal mines and Gur’evsk plants in early 1925. In other words, the AIC-K began to aim at the integration in the entire Kuznetsk Coalfield at its early stage and never gave it up until the very end. It is clear that for AIC-K the decision to liquidate itself at the end of 1926 came as a complete surprise.

What became clear in the process leading up to the liquidation decision was that the AIC-K which had been under the jurisdiction of the STO was going to be transferred to the jurisdiction of the VSNKh and, further, to be effectively incorporated into Gosplan’s plan (cf. the resolution of the Presidium of the Gosplan on 16 April 1926). The proposal of the VSNKh’s plan putting all enterprise operations together within the range of the Kuznetsk Coalfield may be conceivably in line with Rutgers’ aim of integrating the management of the entire Kuznetsk Coalfield. But, although the Gosplan’s “large-scale plan for constructing new metallurgical plants in the Urals and Siberia” was to be first realized in the First Five-Year Plan, originally Rutgers and his comrades had drawn up the Kuzbas project as the Industrial Workers Colony in Kuzbas and the Northern Urals (Nadezhdinsk plants). And then Rutgers enthusiastically advocated the so-called plan “Ural-Kuznetsk Industrial Complex” at the conference of the Presidium of the Gosplan on 31 October 1922, which was not taken seriously by the Gosplan due to the economic and financial condition at the time (Part 3). This preceding fact should be kept in mind.

Rutgers returned to the Netherlands for medical treatment and toward the end of 1925 he thought that he could no longer shoulder the heavy burden of running the AIC-K again and now that all were arranged and the Colony had a better perspective, it was high time to hand it over to someone else. Nevertheless, Rutgers received repeatedly from some colonists complaints and dissatisfaction with K.N. Korobkin’s management and desire for Rutgers’ return to work. As a result, Rutgers came to state as follows: He “could not take over full management,” but was of opinion that Engineer Begemann should take the leadership with a good Russian assistant; In this case, Rutgers was ready to collaborate further as “advisory engineer.”

A.G. Struik, S. Hahn and others in Kemerovo came to express a harsh criticism of Korobkin and regarded “a compromise with him as no longer possible.” Although Rutgers was “fully aware that the enterprise was in fact paralyzed,” he tried to persuade them to go on with their work with Korobkin on the assumption that Korobkin had to fulfill an obligation to keep foreign staff from leaving. It is supposed that the following are reasons for Rutgers’ behavior.

(1) Rutgers had too few allies to fight Korobkin’s management system. Struik and other colonists were also fully aware of that situation. Nevertheless, they believed that “the battle, perhaps a decisive one” was imminent and that the “Isolation” (in opposition to the “Russification”) of the AIC-K was unavoidable. As opposed to them, Rutgers brought their attention to such a background as Korobkin could have for his management: “Man should not underestimate that our operational bases in Russian life in general have also been weakened. [The local Party in] Novonikolaevsk also has no longer supported us and the central Party cannot have been involved in the details.” Moreover, there seems to be no end to organized attacks by the Russian “spetsy” (specialists).

(2) Under such circumstances, the AIC-K’s “Isolation” would be a dangerous experiment. Therefore the “Russification,” or integrating the AIC-K into the overall economic system in Soviet Russia was inevitable (meaning that the AIC-K would eventually come under the jurisdiction of the VSNKh). Rutgers’ ultimate fear was that by strongly insisting on opposing the “Russification,” it would “undermine the general interests of the USSR” (which also meant losing sight of AIC-K’s just cause [Part 3]: contributing to the reconstruction and development of the Soviet Russian economy). The Korobkin issue was of only secondary importance to Rutgers.

In this situation, in a talk with B. Foot, Rutgers passed final judgment as follows: “My work in the AIC-K is no longer as clear as it was before. It is time to adapt the Colony to the overall economic system of Soviet Russia.” Rutgers went so far as to say, “State organs can no longer be involved in individual enterprises. Russian industry, now standing firmly on its own two feet, does not need the autonomy of the Colony anymore.” The “autonomy” of the AIC-K gradually retreated and the retention of some “special features,” which had been built on the basis of its founding idea (Part 5), became the last stronghold of “autonomy.” To borrow expressions quoted in this Part 6, they are “the right to appeal to the STO,” “all the good in the organization, all the progressive and rational,” and “foreign staff and a small [but select] bureaucracy.” The “final” struggle of the AIC-K was no longer against the “Russification,” but was limited to a struggle for retaining those “special features.” It was employment stabilization of foreign staff that could guarantee this retention.

As a result, Rutgers, Korobkin, D.M. Kotliarenko and Foot agreed on forming a provisional Managing Board in order to stop foreign staff leaving and to facilitate collaboration. But Korobkin never convened its meeting, so that Rutgers, through Kotliarenko, requested the Party and its Central Control Committee to set up an Inspection Committee. Rutgers also directly requested the V.V. Kuibyshev Committee to deliberate on this matter. Although the extent in which these two Committees overlapped was not confirmed perhaps because Kuibyshev just changed his chairmanship from the People’s Commissariat of Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection to the

VSNKh at that time, the Kuibyshev Committee deliberated on Korobkin's recall, indeed. But that recall was not resolved at the subsequent STO conference on 19 November 1926. Finally, at a meeting chaired on 2 December 1926 by S.V. Kosior, secretary of the Central Committee of the Party, Rutgers came to declare: "I [Rutgers] am ready to keep taking on the leadership of the AIC-K, provided that Korobkin be replaced by a Russian manager."

On that declaration L.Iu. Galkina has explained as follows: "Rutgers' requirement was willing to be satisfied only on condition that he could undertake complete direction of, and responsibility for, integrating the AIC-K into the overall economic system. But Rutgers, tired of the constant struggle for what he had built with his own hands, demanded an experienced assistant. His condition was not accepted." G.Ia. Tarle has grasped the declaration like a final settlement: "In November 1926 S.V. Kosior, secretary of the Central Committee of the Party, took over him [Rutgers]. S.J. Rutgers agreed to return to the Colony only on condition that his deputy of the outstanding Soviet specialist be appointed." J.P. Morray has interpreted it broadly: "At the end of 1926 he [Rutgers] again returned to Moscow, where he offered to resume duties as Director in Kemerovo on condition that Korobkin be removed and a new Russian deputy named. His condition was not met, and Rutgers had to face the fact that his authority in Moscow was not sufficient to vanquish a Russian of Korobkin's standing."

All three explanations are vague and leave out the issue of keeping foreign staff back and, more importantly, retaining the "special features" exhibited by foreigners. This issue was exactly the point for Rutgers.

Despite the resolution at the conference on 19 November 1926 to take necessary measures to retain and utilize foreign workers and engineers, the STO (and the Party too) were either unwilling or unable to find a deputy of Rutgers and decided to keep Korobkin as deputy. As a result, there was no room for STO's accepting the condition proposed by Rutgers. But Rutgers never gave up: As Rutgers, struggling with a disease, could not take the responsibility on himself without a competent deputy, he got to withdraw his conditional agreement and to (temporarily) entrust his chairmanship to Korobkin on condition that Engineer Begemann be named not only as one of the two deputies for Korobkin, but also as representative of still remaining colonists." And Rutgers again urged Korobkin to "issue necessary instructions to do everything necessary to retain the foreigners." After the AIC-K was liquidated on 1 January 1927, Rutgers' efforts to bring in such a deputy as representative of colonists were to be made for some time, with a glimmer of hope (to be continued in Part 7).

Key words: Autonomous Industrial Colony "Kuzbas," STO, VSNKh, Gosplan, K.N. Korobkin, A.G. Struik, S.J. Rutgers

First Edition 6.VI.2025

Revised Edition 8.VIII.2025

Revised 3rd Edition 8.IX.2025

The Autonomous Industrial Colony “Kuzbas” and S. J. Rutgers (7): The Aftermath of Its Liquidation and Toward the Conclusion

- 1 The Final Attempt at the Time of Reorganization and Korobkin’s Downfall
 - 2 The Aftermath of the Foreign Colonists
- Final Chapter Toward the Conclusion
- (1) A New Interpretation on Its Foundation
 - (2) Problems with Periodization
 - (3) Problems with the Interpretation of the IWW Tendency
 - (4) “Autonomy” and the Retention of the “Special Features”
 - (5) Over the Evaluation of Rutgers
 - (6) A New Evaluation from the Perspective of Post-liquidation Development
 - (7) Was it a Failure of Idealism?

Previous researches have only touched on the reorganization of “Kuzbassugol” (State Coal, Chemical and Metallurgical Trust) and the downfall of K.N. Korobkin after the liquidation of the Autonomous Industrial Colony “Kuzbas” (AIC-K), but this Part 7 has newly revealed that even after its liquidation S.J. Rutgers, with the aid of Begemann, attempted to retain foreign engineers leaving and promote the next plan “Tel’bess,” hoping for a glimmer of hope. In the end, Rutgers’ efforts did not bear fruit. The possible reasons are as follows: (1) The successor manager, Kotin, did not oppose the plan “Tel’bess” from the outset, but he constantly interfered in technical issues and did not get along well with Begemann; (2) Top engineers had left Kemerovo, making it difficult to proceed with the plan; (3) It was difficult for Begemann to take over negotiations in Moscow in place of Rutgers.

Next, the aftermath of the leading staff who worked for the AIC-K until the end has been briefly described. Many of them continued to work in undertakings similar to the Kuzbas project in Soviet Russia, or returned to their home countries and found new jobs, but they still believed in and had high hopes for “a new Kuzbas.”

Here, a supplementary explanation was given about the Dutch engineers. N. Sparks, who participated in the first half of the AIC-K, recalled the role played by them as follows: “Besides the Americans, Rutgers had brought out half a dozen Dutch engineers [in the end, there were about two dozen]. The Americans were somewhat taken aback to find some of the Hollanders contemptuous not only of the Russians but of the Americans also, and convinced of their own superiority. But while all these attitudes muddies the waters slightly, they never seriously hindered the work. Then, too, certain individuals stood out in their efforts and ability at smoothing relations

between Russians and Americans, Americans and Dutch, Communists and non-Communists.” This role probably continued in the second half of the AIC-K. It should be noted that among the Dutch engineers, Rutgers, A. Baars, A.G. Struik, D. Schermerhorn and others were graduates of Polytechnic School of Delft (Technical College of Delft from 1905). At the turn of the century in the Netherlands, especially in Delft, it was not uncommon for graduates of the Technical School to be connected to the social reform movement and even socialism. The student movement there in the period of the so-called “Red Delft” became one of the origins of socialism in the Netherlands. This was the social background that led to Rutgers and his colleagues becoming engineers and socialist practitioners.

In the final chapter, a summary has been made toward the conclusion. However, I would like to point out that in this series, each Part is summarized briefly, and in summarizing it here (although it has been newly re-edited), those summaries are repeated to a certain extent.

1 A new interpretation on its foundation

The main reason why the deliberations for the foundation were prolonged for nearly half a year was not the merits or demerits of the enormous financial support from the Soviet Government, as researchers have emphasized so far, but the disagreement over who should have jurisdiction over the Colony and who should better guarantee its “autonomy” that Rutgers stressed the importance of sticking to during the deliberations. One side was the Soviet of Labor and Defense (STO), an upper organ which was presided over by V.I. Lenin and legally authorized as commission of the Soviet of People’s Commissars, and the other was the Supreme Soviet of National Economy (VSNKh), a lower organ which promoted the provision of concessions to foreign capitalists and insisted the Colony should also be operated on a commercial basis. In the end, it was decided that the Colony would be founded under the jurisdiction of the STO. But the STO had entrusted preliminary consideration to the VSNKh, a specialized committee specifically involved in the foundation and management of the Colony, and for that very reason, attempts by the VSNKh to “intervene” in the Colony would be unavoidable even after its foundation. It has ultimately been foreseen that the disagreement between the two sides over its jurisdiction would continue.

2 Problems with periodization

The division of the AIC-K into periods is presented by Galkina. I have listed it in the left column of the table below, and my own division in the right column (my division basically follows the subtitles of each Part in this series, so no further explanation would be necessary).

Galkina only adds short annotations for each period (characteristic excerpts are quoted in the table). Looking at these, Galkina’s main interest is not in the development of the AIC-K’s enterprise itself, but is rather partisan and focused too much on the conflict between the Wobblies

and the Communists. It is difficult to grasp how the AIC-K actually developed its enterprise from Galkina's division of periods and the annotations.

The Division of the AIC-K into Periods

The Division into Periods by L.Iu. Galkina	The Division into Periods by A. Yamanouchi
① Organizational period (20.X.1921 ~ VIII.1922) “.....characterized by the predominance of the syndicalistic mood in the colony”	① From Proposal to Approval of the Foundation (12.VI.1921 ~ 12.XI.1921) ○ Establishment of the AOC and Its Operations (2.I.1922 ~ III.1923)
② Preparatory period (VIII.1922 年 ~ III.1923) “.....characterized by the weakening of the influence of the Wobblies”	② Preparation for Operations till Restart with the New Contract (16.XI.1921 / I.1922 ~ II.1923) ○ From Reorganization of the New York Bureau to Its Dissolution (1.IV.1923 ~ 1.II.1927)
③ Managing period in the Kemerovo district (III.1923 ~ XII.1924) “.....distinguished by the strengthening of the position of communists and the most highest tempo of development”	③ From Regular Operations till Expansion of Enterprise Scale (1.III.1923 ~ XII.1924)
④ Active period of the expanded colony (1.I.1925 ~ XII.1926) “the strengthening of Russification; the removal of differences between AIC and ordinary Soviet enterprises”	④ From Further Development of the Enterprise to Its Liquidation (1.I.1925 ~ XII.1926) ⑤ Aftermath of Its Liquidation (1.I.1927 ~ II.1928)

3 Problems with the interpretation of the IWW tendency

(1) Mass meeting vs. technical “efficiency”

There were problems with the “mass meeting,” which was taken seriously by pro-IWW colonists as a system that guaranteed “freedom of criticism from below.” Soon after Rutgers arrived at Kemerovo, he posed the problem with the mass meeting (for example, inefficiency that even the technical details had been discussed and resolved there) and tried to improve the deficiencies of mass meeting by introducing “a certain discipline.” Although this attempt drew resistance from IWW supporters, what Rutgers was concerned with was the issue of technical “efficiency” in production, in other words, the inevitability of industrial management by specialized technicians. This was supported by the argument in the article “Workers’ Control,” which was published in a local organ of the IWW, *Industrial Worker* and reprinted in *Kuzbas*, saying that “Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as ‘Democratic Control of Industry,’ at least not in the sense of ‘Democratic Management’”; “It might, it is possible to imagine, result in some sort of dictatorship of the technician, rather than a dictatorship of the proletariat, as far as production is concerned.” Rutgers’ critical response to the mass meeting and emphasis on technological “efficiency” in production provided a valid criticism of IWW-style Colony

management.

(2) Dreams and reality of the Wobblies group

In the Colony a group of the leading Wobblies (W.D. Haywood, T. Barker, S. Berg, J. Masukevich and others) who kept on adhering to the original “Kuzbas idea” was being formed. The only time this group fought entirely with the Managing Board was over whether the AIC-K should adapt itself to the NEP system and make some institutional changes in the autumn of 1922. Indeed, their argument was not persuasive in heated discussions when faced with the real issue of how they could contribute to the economic reconstruction of Soviet Russia. As they were so attached to the “Kuzbas idea,” they could not propose anything other than maintaining the status quo. But they still left something like a hope for this international social “experiments they could not attempt under the profit-system.” They did not fight with the Managing Board on the level of being in conflict with the “Communists” that Galkina and others emphasized. Most members of the group never broke off relations with the AIC-K until its liquidation.

(3) The Wobblies as the “counterpart” of Communists

Why is it that not only American researchers W.Th. Smith and Morray, but also Russian researchers such as Galkina tend to be too fixated on the binary oppositional interpretation of “Communists vs. Wobblies”? The most important conflict at the time was between governmental organs (VSNKh, Gosplan, etc.) and the AIC-K. However, these were “opponents in argument” and disputes were inevitable under the difficult economic and financial situation at the time. In fact, there was another serious conflict, which was caused by hostile acts of Russian “spetsy” (specialists). N.P. Rastopchin, chairman of the STO [investigative] committee that investigated this conflict, wrote the following in his recollection, published years later: The “spetsy” of the competent authorities, who became members of the STO committee, openly opposed its [investigative] report and revealed a tendency to obscure Kuzbas Trust’s management and operation system, which did not actually justify itself, and to underestimate and conceal the achievements of the AIC-K enterprise. The “struggle with ‘spetsy’” was such a serious issue for Rutgers that “their slander or false allegations against the AIC-K were considered political crimes.” Russian researchers have sometimes made do with vague descriptions of the former conflict/controversy, and have not directly addressed the latter conflict/struggle, so no description comparable to the above-mentioned recollection by Rastopchin can be found among them. It is likely that Russian researchers have not placed importance on these two conflicts, and in order to divert attention from them, they have placed more importance on the Wobblies as the “counterpart/villain” than the historical fact dictates, and emphasized “Communists vs. Wobblies.”

4 “Autonomy” and the retention of the “special features”

Originally, in the first “plan for Industrial Labor Colonial of foreign Workers” addressed to Lenin in June 1921 the following was stated clearly: “It will be absolutely essential that the labor colony gets a free hand to manage its own affairs and to stimulate what energy can be put to further the development.” Rutgers also stated the following in the opening article of the inaugural issue of *Kuzbas*: “‘Autonomous’ colony means that the Soviet authorities have guaranteed a sufficiently free hand to manage their own interior affairs in order to make possible the highest degree of efficiency. No more.” In order to contribute to the reconstruction and development of the Soviet Russian economy, which was the just cause of the AIC-K, it was essential to improve “efficiency” both technically and socially. To achieve this, the AIC-K also needed to be guaranteed “a free hand,” in other words, “autonomy.”

Having started on such established principles, the AIC-K gradually developed despite encountering various difficulties due to it being an unprecedented project. In order to further develop to realize the just cause, the AIC-K needed to obtain any positive support from Soviet governing bodies. However, in reality, since it became difficult to obtain such support, the AIC-K had no choice but to make some institutional changes in line with the economic development under the NEP, and in fact, that would be the only option for the AIC-K. Rutgers’ original dream of forming a new workers’ republic (or, in the words of a certain colonist, a “new REPUBLIC OF LABOR”) was gone and all that remained was how to aim at accelerating its economic development by increasing the technical “efficiency” in production as much as possible, on the basis of “autonomy” within the AIC-K organization.

First of all, AIC-K’s headquarters was to be located in Moscow as the center of trade. This also required a clear definition of what was meant by the term “autonomy.” Many colonists, including the leading Wobblies, interpreted “autonomy” as “individual license and freedom of action in their conduct within the industry,” rather than as autonomy of an organization within the framework of Russian institutions. As a result of this interpretation, efforts were made to settle AIC-K’s operational and technical issues through mass meetings. Their interpretations and arguments, which sought to maintain the founding principles, were not persuasive in the heated debate that led to the AIC-K accepting institutional changes mentioned above. At the time, Rutgers (with Th. Reese) sent a letter to the STO, saying that “within the present Managing Board there are various differences of opinion which will put a brake on the preparatory work for actual production.” In other words, Rutgers was afraid that the internal conflict would affect the “efficiency” in production and ultimately hinder the just cause of contributing to the economic reconstruction of the Soviet Russia.

Galkin viewed this AIC-K’s trend, in other words, “Russification” as a natural and inevitable process and could see it as simply the start of full-scale operations, with the AIC-K being transformed into a normal Russian “commercial trust,” in other words, being incorporated into Russia’s overall economic system (which means that the AIC-K will be placed under the jurisdiction of the VSNKh rather than the STO). For Rutgers, the “Isolation” of the AIC-K was a

dangerous experiment that could potentially undermine the general interests of Soviet Russia, and the trend toward strengthening the “Russification” was unavoidable, but the prerequisite was that the “autonomy,” which had been gradually weakened, be retained in the form of the “special features.” To be specific, these conditions were “all the progressive and rational things that the colonists had been adhering to,” “high efficiency of instruction with a minimal amount of administrative personnel [foreign staff],” “combining our statistics and management system with the introduction of the latest production methods,” and the right of appeal to the STO. In the end, these conditions were not accepted either, and these issues were resolved with the liquidation and reorganization of the AIC-K, which was the worst possible outcome. The importance of Rutgers’ insistence to the end on preserving the “special features” that were the last bastion of “autonomy” and on retaining the foreign staff who guaranteed it, has never been recognized by any AIC-K researchers until now.

I would like to ask why they did not recognize the importance of this. This is because they did not thoroughly examine the documents left behind by Rutgers, who was the person most directly involved. The only documents they used in their research from Rutgers were the 1935 memoirs “Encounters with Lenin” and articles, reports, etc. printed in *Kuzbas*. The Rutgers documents were donated by Rutgers’ daughter, G.C. Trincher Rutgers, to the Institute of Marxism-Leninism (now RGASPI) on 31 January 1983. While G.Ia. Tarle and others may not have been able to view them, current researchers such as Galkina can view them, and in fact I have used them as the main sources for this series. Of course, the Rutgers documents I have used still need to be verified again by using meeting minutes of the STO and other organizations and reports submitted by Rutgers on each occasion, and I would like to leave this to future researchers.

5 Over the evaluation of Rutgers

The on-the-spot report that the colonists, secretary Hellen C. Wilson and doctor Elsie R. Mitchell, contributed shortly after returning to the United States after the liquidation of the AIC-K, was specific and detailed. However, it was based only on what they had seen and heard about, and they consistently criticized Rutgers as a “dictator,” stating, “It seemed a pity that the man on whom the dictatorship fell was a Hollander. His brief residence in the United States had resulted in a dislike and distrust of everything American — especially democracy.” Smith continued this evaluation of Rutgers as a “dictator.”

In response, Sparks, a chemical engineer who was a colonist in the first half of the AIC-K, evaluated Rutgers as follows: “He was the only one of the management board that commanded, if not agreement, at least a necessary modicum of respect from all sides at the enterprise.” It should be noted here that, although highly appreciated, there is a reservation “if not agreement.” This reservation is due to the “bureaucratic” or “centralized” management characteristics that have often been pointed out in evaluations of Rutgers, and is often treated critically. However, for Rutgers, “top-down” management and instruction were sometimes unavoidable, such as the

introduction of “a certain discipline” to make up for shortcomings in mass meetings and the unavoidable response of “some sort of dictatorship of the technician” to improve the technical “efficiency” in production. In this regard, Paula Garb expands on Sparks’ evaluation by summarizing it as follows, which was probably valid at least in 1923-24 before he fell ill: “[Rutgers] put a stop to the endless meetings and bickering over petty daily problems. To the displeasure of many of the workers, who believed every single matter should be decided by the collective, Rutgers began making decisions himself and insisted that they be followed without question. Fortunately for the Colony, he made the right decisions. He became so well respected that by the time he asked to leave in 1925 no one wanted to see him go. He was strict but fair and, most importantly, an excellent manager.”

Rutgers, who was known for his “strict” discipline, made the introduction of “discipline” a condition for accepting leadership roles in the midst of a serious situation. His resolute feelings were expressed in a long typed letter addressed to Heywood and A. Pearson, Jr. on 27 August 1922, after the Colony general meeting introducing Pearson as chief engineer, who had just arrived with the fourth group: “.....the Soviet Government would not turn over this property to a group of colonists, no matter how well they were organized, unless they had a man whom they considered qualified to administer it. It seems I am the Goat [=Scapegoat]. If we take over these mines, I am going to take them over. If they get on fire, I will be called to trial in Tomsk [by local governing bodies]. I am the man that is responsible. It is rather a serious situation for a man to get into. I cannot undertake this unless discipline is accepted in this colony.”

6 A new evaluation from the perspective of post-liquidation development

Regarding the evaluation from the perspective of economic development after the liquidation of the AIC-K, the evaluations of all researchers are almost unanimous. Here are two examples from shortly after its liquidation. Ruth Kennell says: “Taken as a colonization scheme or a social experiment, Kuzbas was a failure. But as an industrial undertaking it succeeded and its work lives on.” Wilson and Mitchell make this evaluation: “The specific task of completing the chemical plant and modernizing the Kemerovo mines had been accomplished; both were producing and profitable. Our coke was being used in the steel-mills in the Urals..... Some of our successes were not lasting, but the completed, producing plant remains as a substantial contribution to the industrial system of Russia.”

Its contributions increased further during World War II. “When the Germans overran Donbas, the Soviet Union lost over 60 per cent of her coal output. But in 1943 Kemerovo produced 25 million tons of coal. The chemical plant was the only coke plant still in the Soviet hands during the Nazi occupation. It supplied 2,000 enterprises with coke.”

Kuzbas was fortunate to be located in a geographical location that made it difficult for German troops to invade. It is important to recall here the rebuttal that Rutgers made to one of the arguments against the Kuzbas project, which argued that the Kuznetsk Coalfield should be given out as a capitalist concession: The region was close to the undeveloped interior of Russia, and

“.....chances for a bona fide concession in the Kuznetsk Basin on the basis of immediately putting up a large amount capital, are at present very small. Moreover it would be extremely important, if a region of so tremendous significance for the future development could be kept out of the hands of our class-enemies”; “Russia can utilize foreign experience and training in modern industries without the interference of capitalist concessionaires.”

Rutgers’ original idea for the project arose from a search for other ways to utilize “foreign *capital*” while avoiding the intervention of “foreign *capitalists*.” He sought cooperation with foreign *labor* without the help of foreign *capitalists*, and required concessionaires to “the supply of labor and technical and organizing abilities” as well as “the supply of *capital* in the form of machines, initial expenses, food funds, etc.” On the other hand, given the country’s severe financial situation and hardship at the time, Lenin was willing to offer concessions to foreign capitalists. Lenin, despite his views on concessions, supported Rutgers’ plan of “without the help of foreign capitalists” because he was keenly aware that this plan was part of the broader international labor solidarity movement. For Rutgers, granting concessions for the Kuzbas project to capitalists would have been absolutely unacceptable, but I believe he avoided directly opposing it by cleverly using its geographical location as a pretext. In fact, the AIC-K’s Kuznetsk Coalfield became “a region of so tremendous significance for the future development.”

The fact that the AIC-K had already achieved the economic development necessary to make such a contribution during World War II was likely due to the following proactive attitude toward expanding the scale of its operations: (1) The AIC-K had been merging enterprises in the surrounding areas from an early stage, and had consistently aimed to integrate the management of the entire Kuznetsk Basin coalfield until the Tel’bess plan. (2) The AIC-K was originally conceived as an industrial workers’ colony in both Kuzbas and the Northern Urals (Nadezhdinsk plants), but in the fall of 1922, when approval of the latter plan was in doubt, Rutgers pioneered the so-called “Ural-Kuznetsk Combinat” plan at the Presidium conference of the Gosplan (this was to be realized after the first Five-Year Plan).

If the AIC-K had not built the foundations for economic development in just five years (in extremely cold and other adverse conditions, although the country was finally emerging from the chaos of the Civil War), it is doubtful whether the Complex would have been able to support the country’s economy to the extent that it was during World War II. In the sense that it made this possible, AIC-K’s reputation as something that started as the “Little International in Siberia” and created a major industrial enterprise is unshakable.

7 Was it a failure of idealism?

As we conclude this series, let us answer the question posed at the beginning of the series: “Was this project based on international labor solidarity a failure of idealism? If so, what were the problems?”

The AIC-K was started with the aim of **(a) contributing to the economic reconstruction of Soviet Russia** and **(b) realizing social experiments and creation based on international labor**

solidarity and the principle of “autonomy.” However, since the pursuit of **(a)** was the just cause, if **(a)** was in jeopardy, the pursuit of **(b)** had to take a back seat, and the AIC-K was faced with a dilemma in which both goals were difficult to achieve. Although there were fundamental problems, i.e., difficulties, the two main elements that motivated the colonists to participate in the Kuzbas project at the time were: “The first is **the enthusiasm** among workers and technicians in capitalist countries **for the social experiment** to overthrow capitalism and to build socialism. The second may be found in an overestimating of the all-powerfulness of modern technique, when liberated from the restraints in the capitalist world. Together they explain as well the difficulties and the disappointments, as the successes and the final results” (Rutgers’ recollection in the 1950s). In short, it was especially the “enthusiasm for the social experiment” of **(b)** that enabled the proactive attitude toward expanding the scale of operations mentioned above to be maintained, and the contribution to **(a)** to be more solid.

On the other hand, the Soviet Government had some hope for the AIC-K and provided financial support for **(a)**, and as the NEP system was established, it came to believe that **(a)** could be achieved by the Government itself, that is, by “russifying” the AIC-K. Then another problem appeared. In the wake of Rutgers’ prolonged medical treatment and the issue of his deputy selection, the “Russification” progressed so rapidly that the pursuit of **(b)** was ultimately driven to failure.

The AIC-K was unable to achieve **(b)**, and in that sense it seems difficult to overturn the assessment that it was “a failure of idealism.” Although the AIC-K had internal problems such as a shortage of senior staff, internal conflicts due to differences in ideas and perceptions of the “autonomy” that was sought, and the death of Bronka Kornblitt and Rutgers’ medical treatment, it continued to demonstrate high productivity, as Galkina summarized: “It is evident that the colony was much more efficient when operated by its own management than it was under the command of the Soviet director.” In order for such AIC-K to achieve further economic development (for example, expanding the sales channels for coal, coke, and other chemical products), it had no choice but to enter the economic system of Russia as a whole, which was seen by the Soviet Government as a favorable condition for promoting the “Russification” of the AIC-K. Not a few colonists opposed the “Russification” and advocated the “Isolation” for the sake of **(b)**. But Rutgers recognized that refusing the “Russification” would make **(a)** more difficult and that the “Russification” was already unavoidable. However, he made the final condition that the foreign staff be retained, as they would maintain the “special features” essential to **(b)**. In the end, the fact that even this condition was overlooked by Soviet governing bodies suggests that there was **a fundamental problem on the Soviet Russian side**, in that they did not accept even the last condition, which had its roots in “autonomy.” Finally, it is recalled that not only among Russian “spetsy” but also among governmental organs, sentiments contrary to “international labor solidarity” were sometimes expressed, such as that they could manage on their own without help from foreigners.

As a conclusion it is argued that AIC-K’s “idealism” did not end with just failure, and that the cause of its failure was not solely its own fault, but also on the Soviet Russian side. How far

Rutgers and his colleagues have come since Lenin said at the turbulent conference of the STO on 30 September 1921: “Dear Comrade Rutgers, don’t get too excited, I promise you not only some freedom, but complete freedom [within the organization]”!

Key words: Autonomous Industrial Colony “Kuzbas,” STO, VSNKh, Gosplan, K.N. Korobkin, A.G. Struik, Begemann, S.J. Rutgers

First Edition 4.VIII.2025
Revised Edition 8.IX.2025

Selected Bibliography

1 Archival Sources

Российский государственный архив социально-политической истории (РГАСПИ) (Москва)

- ф. 5 (Секретариат Ленина (1917-1924))
 - оп. 1 (Документы государственной деятельности В.И. Ленина (1917-1923))
 - оп. 2 (Документы партийной и общественной деятельности В.И. Ленина (1917-1923))
 - оп. 3 (Документальные материалы Ленина по руководству международным коммунистическим и рабочим движением (1917-1923))
- ф. 17 (ЦК КПСС)
 - оп. 84 (Бюро Секретариата (1918-1926))
- ф. 495 (Исполнительный комитет Коминтерна (ИККИ) (1919-1943))
 - оп. 244 (Личные дела по станам)
 - д. 182 (A.G. Struik)
- ф. 515 (Коммунистическая партия США (1912-1944))
 - 515/1/4300/19-46: Report of Haywood's Trip to Kemerovo, Siberia
 - 515/1/4306/1-51: H.S. Calvert, "The Kuzbas Story"
- ф. 581 (Вайнкоп (Wijnkoop), Давид (1877-1941))
- ф. 626 (Рутгерс (Rutgers), С.Ю. (1879-1961))
 - 626/1/6/1-71: Kurzgefaßte Angaben über die Autonome Industrielle Kolonie Kuzbas (nach Dokumenten und Briefe)

Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis (IISG) (Amsterdam)

Archief A. Vaars

Archief S.J. Rutgers

Map 15: Nederlanders bouwen in Siberië (1921-1927)

National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) (Washington, D.C.)

RG 165: Correspondence of the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department General Staff, 1917-1941

Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University (Stanford)

American Subject Collection

2 Printed Documentary Sources

Владимир Ильич Ленин. Биографическая хроника, Т. 11 (Москва, 1980); Т. 12 (Москва, 1982).

“Деятельность «Автономной индустриальной колонии Кузбасс» и её оценка в документах СТО

- СССР (1922–1926 гг.),” *Исторический архив*, 1961, No. 3, 132-165.
- Документы внешней политики СССР*, Т. 4 (Москва, 1960).
- Кузбасс в период восстановления народного хозяйства 1920-1926 гг.* (Кемерово, 1966).
- Ленин, В.И., *Полное собрание сочинений*, Т. 53 (Москва, 1982).
- Ленинский сборник*, Т. 20 (Москва, 1932); Т. 39 (Москва, 1980).
- “О помощи трудящихся зарубежных стран Советскому сельскому хозяйству (1921–1925 гг.),”
Исторический архив, 1961, No. 4, 51-77.
- “Организация Автономной колонии американских рабочих «Кузбасс» (1921–1923 гг.),”
Исторический архив, 1961, No. 2, 69-98.
- Сибирский революционный комитет (Сибревком). Август 1919–декабрь 1925. Сборник документов и материалов* (Новосибирск, 1959).
- Een Nederlander in Siberië. Brieven van Anton Struik* (Nijmegen, 1979).
- The First Congress of the Red Trade Union International at Moscow, 1921. A Report of the Proceedings by Geo. Williams, Delegate from the I.W.W.* (Chicago, n.d.).
- Recognition of Russia. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate Sixty-Eight Congress First Session pursuant to S. Res. 50* (Washington, 1924).
- Die Tätigkeit der Exekutive und des Präsidiums des E.K. der Kommunistischen Internationale vom 13. Juli 1921 bis 1. Februar 1922* (Petrograd, 1922).
- 村田陽一編訳『コミンテルン資料集』第2巻 (大月書店, 1979).
- 『レーニン全集』第42巻 (大月書店, 1967); 第45巻 (大月書店, 1969).

3 Contemporary Newspapers and Periodicals

- Экономическая жизнь* (Москва), 1921.
- Правда* (Москва), 1927.
- Asia* (New York), 1928.
- Kuzbas. A Bulletin devoted to the Affairs of the Industrial Colony Kuzbas* (New York), 1922-1923.
- The Liberator* (New York), 1922.
- The Nation* (New York), 1923, 1924, 1929.
- Soviet Russia* (New York), 1922.
- De Tribune* (Amsterdam), 1928.

4 Contemporary Literature

- Мартенс, Л.К., “Иммиграция русских рабочих из зарубежных стран и наша промышленность,”
Экономическая жизнь (Москва), No. 157, 20.VII.1921, 1.

- Мартенс, Л.К., “Воспоминания о В.И. Ленине,” *Исторический Архив*, 1958, No. 5, 148.
- Рутгерс, С., “Встречи с Лениным,” *Историк-марксист*, 1935, No. 2-3 (42-43), 85-98.
- Baars, A., *Sowjet-Rusland in de practijk. Indië tot leering*. Overdruck uit De Nieuwe-Rotterdamsche Courant van 7, 8, 10, 11 en 12 januari 1928 [n.p., n.d.].
- Barker, T., “Lenin Inspired Us—A Veteran’s Reminiscences,” *Labour Monthly*, Vol. 52, No. 4, IV. 1970, 158-163.
- Brown, W.M., *Communism and Christianity analyzed and contrasted from the view-point Darwinism* (Galion, Ohio, n.d.[1920]).
- Gold, M., “Wanted, Pioneers for Siberia!” *The Liberator* (New York), Vol. 5, No. 3 [Serial No. 48], III.1922, 5-8.
- Heller, A.A., *The Industrial Revival in Soviet Russia* (New York, 1922).
- Kennell, R.E., “A Kuzbas Chronicle,” *The Nation*, Vol. 116, No. 3000, 3.I.1923, 7-10.
- Kennell, R.E., “Kuzbas: A New Pennsylvania,” *The Nation*, Vol. 116, No. 3017, 2.V.1923, 511-512.
- Kennell, R.E., “Kuzbas in 1924,” *The Nation*, Vol. 119, No. 3099, 26.XI.1924, 566-568.
- Kennell, R.E., “The End of Kuzbas,” *The Nation*, Vol. 128, No. 3318, 6.II.1929, 171-172.
- Kennell, R.E., “Lenin Called Us: A Kuzbas Chronicle,” *New World Review*, Vol. 39, No. 4, Fall 1971, 86-98.
- “Kuzbas.” *An Opportunity for Engineers and Workers. Prospectus* (New York, 1922), 32 p.
- Rutgers, S.J., “Industrial Labor Colonies,” *Moscow; Organ of the III Congress of the Communist International*, 1.VI.1921, 2, in: ПГАСПИ, 626/1/12/11-15.
- Rutgers, S.J., “Kuzbas. An Effort to strengthen Soviet Russia,” *Kuzbas*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 20.V.1922, 1.
- Schoorl Straub, Tini, *Een beetje vrijheid. Herinneringen van een Nederlandse vrouw in Siberië* (Laren, n.d.[1965]).
- Sparks, N., “Lenin and the Americans at Kuzbas,” R.S. Cohen/J.J. Stachel/M.W. Wartofsky (eds.), *For Dirk Struik. Scientific, Historical and Political Essays in Honor of Dirk J. Struik* (Dordrecht/Boston, 1974), 617-634.
- Wilson, H.C./E.R. Mitchell, “A Light-running Utopia. Kuzbas-American Colony in Siberia, ‘Liquidated’ because of Internal Friction,” *Asia* (New York), Vol. 28, No. 12, XII.1928, 955-962, 1034-1038.

5 Secondary Literature

- Галкина, Л.Ю., Создание и деятельность автономной индустриальной колонии иностранных рабочих и специалистов (АИК) в Кузбассе (1921-1926 гг.). Автореферат диссертации..... кандидата исторических наук (Кемерово, 1997).
- Галкина, Л.Ю., *Автономная индустриальная колония «Кузбасс»* (Кемерово, n.d. [2011]).
- Генкина, Э.Б., *Ленин—председатель Совнаркома и СТО. Из истории государственной деятельности В.И. Ленина в 1921-1922 годах* (Москва, 1960).
- Исторический Энциклопедия Кузбасса*, Том 1 (Познань, 1996).

- Кривошеева, Е.А., “Из истории образования «Автономной индустриальной колонии Кузбасс»,” *Из истории Западной Сибири*, Выпуск 1 (Кемерово, 1966), 210-236.
- Тарле, Г.Я., *Друзья страны Советов. Участие зарубежных трудящихся в восстановлении народного хозяйства СССР в 1920-1925 гг.* (Москва, 1968).
- Тринчер, Г./К. Тринчер, *Рутгерс* (Москва, 1967).
- Draper, Th., *Roots of American Communism* (New York, 1957).
- Draper, Th., *American Communism and Soviet Russia. The Formative Period* (New York, 1960).
- Dubofsky, M., *‘Big Bill’ Haywood* (Manchester, 1987) [邦訳: 久田俊夫訳 (批評社, 1989)].
- Dūma, L./D. Paeglīte, *Revolucionārie latviešu emigranti ārzemēs 1897–1919* (Rīga, 1976).
- Evans, D.J., “Society for Technical Aid to Soviet Russia (STASR),” J.L. Wieczynski (ed.), *The Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History*, Vol. 36 (Gulf Breeze, FL, 1984), 105-107.
- Felshinsky, Y., “The Legal Foundations of the Immigration and Emigration Policy of the USSR, 1917-27,” *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 3, 1982, 327-348.
- Garb, Paula, *They Came to Stay. North Americans in the U.S.S.R.* (Moscow, 1987).
- Gillette, Ph.S., “Armand Hammer, Lenin, and the First American Concession in Soviet Russia,” *Slavic Review*, Vol. 40, No. 3, Autumn 1981, 355-365.
- Goldberg, H.J., *The Anarchists View the Bolshevik Regime 1918-1922* (University of Wisconsin, Ph.D. diss., 1973).
- Graziosi, A., “«Building the First System of State Industry in History» Piatakov’s VSNKh and the crisis of the NEP 1923-1926,” *Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique*, Vol. 32, No. 4, X.-XII.1991, 539-580.
- Jacob, F., “Transatlantic Workers’ Solidarity: The Kuzbas Autonomous Industrial Colony (1920-1926),” F. Jacob/M. Keßler (eds.), *Transatlantic Radicalism: Socialist and Anarchist Exchanges in the 19th and 20th Centuries* (Liverpool University Press, 2021), 150-170.
- Landau, Julia, *Wir bauen den großen Kuzbass! Bergarbeiteralltag im Stalinismus 1921-1941* (Stuttgart, 2012).
- Landau, Julia, “Specialists, Spies, ‘Special Settlers,’ and Prisoners of War: Social Frictions in the Kuzbass (USSR), 1920-1950,” *International Review of Social History*, Vol. 60, Special Issue, 2015, 185-205.
- Mickenberg, Julia L., *American Girls in Red Russia. Chasing the Soviet Dream* (Chicago/London, 2017).
- Murray, J.P., *Project Kuzbas. American Workers in Siberia (1921-1926)* (New York, 1983).
- Olink, Hans, *De vermoorde droom [Drie Nederlandse idealisten in Sovjet-Rusland]* (Amsterdam, 1993).
- Palmer, B.D., “‘Big Bill’ Haywood’s Defection to Russia and the IWW: Two Letters,” *Labor History*, Vol. 17, No. 2, Spring 1976, 271-278.
- Palmer, B.D., *James P. Cannon and the Origins of the American Revolutionary Left, 1890-1928* (Urbana/Chicago/Springfield, [2007] 2010).
- Sawyer, B.W., “Shedding the White and Blue. American Migration and Soviet Dreams in the Era of

- the New Economic Policy,” *Ab Imperio*, 2013, No. 1, 65-84.
- Smith, W.Th., *The Kuzbas Colony Soviet Russia 1921-1926. An American Contribution to the Building of a Communist State* (Doctor of Arts in History diss., University of Miami, 1977).
- Spence, R.B., *Wall Street and the Russian Revolution 1905-1925* (Waterville, OR, 2017).
- Trincher Rutgers, G.C./K. Trincher, *Rutgers. Zijn leven en streven in Holland, Indonesië, Amerika en Rusland* (Moskou, 1974).
- カー, E.H. 『ボリシェヴィキ革命 1917-1923』 (ソヴェト・ロシア史 第3巻) 宇高基輔訳 (みすず書房, 1971).
- 門脇彰 「ネップ期西シベリアのクズバス・プロジェクト」 内田勝敏編著 『世界経済と南北問題』 (ミネルヴァ書房, 1990), 289-310.
- 山内昭人 『リュトヘルスとインタナショナル史研究 — 片山潜・ボリシェヴィキ・アメリカレフトウィング — 』 (ミネルヴァ書房, 1996).
- 山内昭人 『初期コミンテルンと在外日本人社会主義者 — 越境するネットワーク — 』 (ミネルヴァ書房, 2009).
- 山内昭人 『在米ロシア人移民労働運動史研究 — 在米ロシア人コロニー統一の試みを中心に — 』 2009 ~ 2011 年度科学研究費補助金 (基盤研究(C)) 研究成果報告書, 2012 年 5 月 [https://hdl.handle.net/2324/25910].
- 山内昭人 『戦争と平和, そして革命の時代のインタナショナル』 (九州大学出版会, 2016).
- 山内昭人 『第 3 インタナショナルへの道 — リュトヘルスとコミンテルン創設 — 』 (九州大学出版会, 2021).

First Edition 8.IX.2025
Revised Edition 6.X.2025