Hacker on Self-Consciousnes

Kan, Toyohiko
College of General Education, Kyushu University

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Toyohiko Kan

[I]

I The First and the Revised Edition of Insight and Illusion [1]

In the preface to the revised edition of Insight and Illusion, Hacker wrote as follows, " Where, however, the first edition was sorely wrong was the discussion of first-person psychological utterances.──────── I misconstrued Wittgenstein's argument. Having done so, I then tried to demolish the argument thus distorted. I have now attempted to rectify this in Chapter X, which is completely rewritten, and have replied to those of my earlier counter-arguments to Wittgenstein's case that seemed worthy of rebuttal."(p. ix)

Hacker's " earlier counter-arguments to Wittgenstein's case " are to be in the Rejection of the Truth-Valueless Thesis(The first edition, pp. 265-272) and in the Rejection of the Non-Cognitive Thesis(pp. 272-277). He thinks these arguments were "in the grip of a neo-Kantian picture of the relation between experience and the objects of experience and obsessed with forms of propositions to the point of being blind to the diversity of their uses." (revised edition, p. ix) We can find his criticism of a neo-Kantian picture in the revised edition, pp. 206-214 and his new thought of avowals in pp. 291-302.

But there is a point which he emphasized in the first edition, which is, to my mind, important. Let me quote some passages.

"The fundamental features around which the counter-argument must revolve concern the fact that 'I am in pain' has, after all, a structure. As such it is complex or articulated. My use of this sentence is only intelligible in so far as I know what 'pain' means, i.e. know how to apply the predicate on the basis of those criteria which constitute its meaning. For this, as we have seen, is a precondition for my ascribing it to myself without criteria. Equally I must know how to use the personal pronoun 'I'. And this involves possession of the

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(1)P.M.S.Hacker, Insight and Illusion, 1st ed.(Oxford, 1972), 2nd ed.(1986)

concept of a person and a grasp of the relations between 'I' and 'You' and 'He'." (p.266, cf.p.207,1.25-31, p.269,1.9-21, p.271,1.17-26)

Of course, it is dangerous to discuss the statements which have been taken out of their contexts. Hacker may assert that these passages imply the Strawsonian transcendental argument which he has rejected. Let's look at his passages.

"The Strawsonian transcendental argument presupposes that these uses of language(such propositions as 'I am in pain')involve an identifying reference to a dependent particular, viz. an experiece, the ascription of the experience thus identified to a subject, viz. oneself, which in turn is referred to by the first-person pronoun. This self-ascription, though not resting upon the behavioural criteria which characterize other-ascription, nevertheless has 'an entirely adeqate basis'."(p.212)

I accept Hacker's statements. Strawson certainly thinks that self-ascription has 'an entirely adeqate basis'. But is this thought the core of his argument of concept of person? I don't think so. In fact, Strawson suggests to move a certain class of P-predicates('going for a walk', 'coiling a rope',etc.)to a central position in the picture. According to Strawson,these P-predicates release us from the idea that the only things we can know about without observation or inference, or both, are private experiences; we can know, without telling by either of these means, about the present and future movements of a body. Yet bodily movements are certainly also things we can know about by observation and inference. [2]

The question 'How is the concept of a person possible?' becomes the question 'How are P-predicates possible?'. If the predicates of actions are put in a central position in Strawson's P-predicates, we can separate the central argument of Strawson's concept of a person from the thought that we know our own experiences. And if we use the term 'self-ascription' in the form

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(2) P.F.Strawson, Individuals (London,1959),p.111.

compatible with the Truth-Valueless Thesis and the Non-Cognitive Thesis, the above quotation from the first edition of Insight and Illusion, I think, signifies an important thought. But does Hacker accept it? I am unclear.

Hacker concentrates his attention on the criticism of his 'earlier counter-arguments to Wittgenstein's case'. " The idea of behaviour plus pain is derived from games in which there is a genuine inner and outer. The expression of pain gets its importance not from an experience to which it corresponds or which lies behind it, but from the fact that it is a natural, primitive, pre-cultural reaction to circumstances. ------It is on such foundations that our concepts of sensation, feeling, expecting, hoping, etc. are erected."(p.296)

We can learn much about the role of avowals from his revised edition, however two questions remain. One concerns the relation between avowals i.e.,first person psychological utterances and self-consciousness. The other concerns the relation between the expression of pain and the expressions of other 'experiences'.

II The Self-Consciousness and The Use of 'I'

"What philosophers call 'self-consciousness' is not consciousness of a self, an immaterial subject of experience which has its seat in the body. It is rather consciousness that such-and-such holds of oneself (where 'oneself' is the indirect reflexive). Or, more cautiously, it is the capacity to give expression in language to one's thoughts and feelings, one's beliefs and purposes." (pp.282-283) By this last statement, Hacker asserts that self-consciousness does not involve consciousness of experiences. He thinks that 'avowals'='the first person psychological utterances'='self-consciousness'.

But when Anscombe(whose passage Hacker quotes) writes that the expression 'self-consciousness' can be respectably explained as 'consciousness that such-and-such holds of oneself', she connects it to one's own actions, postures, movement, not to avowals as 'I have a pain'. I think Hacker and Anscombe are agree in their criticism of Cartesian dualism. But Hacker's concept of self-

consciousness is totally different from Anscombe's. Here I prefer Anscombe's thoughts. I would like to briefly mention the reasons for it.

(1) "It is a cardinal error of the Cartesian picture to take avowals of experience as descriptions of experience and to construe descriptions of experience on the model of descriptions of objects of experience."(p.280)

"I do not perceive my pain, and I do not identify my sensations, either by an inner criterion or by employing a 'private' sample. I use a given expression, e.g. 'It hurts', 'I have toothache', without grounds and without an object of comparison. 'But this is not the end of the language-game; it is the beginning'(PI, §290). This beginning is not a description of pain, but an expression of pain which provides a criterion for descriptions given by others." (p.293)

These statements costitute a serious criticism of the Cartesian picture. But these do not explain how we use the term 'I' as a subject.

(2) On the other hand, for Anscombe, the concept of self-consciousness is related to the peculiarities of the use of 'I', not to the use of 'I have a pain'. Compared with 'A' users who identify A(him) by the observation, or the use of the criterion, 'I' users(we) have I-thoughts non-observationally(without the use of criterion). These I-thoughts are 'I am sitting', 'I jumped' etc.. Anscombe writes, "The reason why I take only thoughts of actions, postures, movements, and intended actions is that only those thoughts both are unmediated, non-observational, and also are descriptions(e.g. 'standing') which are directly verifiable or falsifiable about the person of E.A. Anyone, including myself, can look and see whether that person is standing."(The First Person, p.63)[3] But this identity of description is entirely missing in the thoughts 'I have a headache', 'I see a variety of colours'. So Anscombe thinks the Cartesianly preferred thoughts (i.e. 'I have a headache') are not the ones to investigate if one wants to understand 'I' philosophically.(We can see

(3) G.E.M.Anscombe, The First Person (Mind and Language, ed. S.Guttenplan, 1975)

rather the same thought in Strawson's Individuals. pp.111-112)

(3) What is the central difference between Hacker's concept of 'self-consciousness' and Anscombe's?

(a) Hacker's concept is restricted to first person psychological utterances, i.e. avowals. He concentrates upon the case of pain, and says that Wittgenstein's account of 'pain' is a guideline for the description of the roots of psychological concepts. He refers to 'want', 'dream', 'see red'.(pp.296-297) But what is the relation between 'I have a pain' and 'I want----'? What is the role of 'I' in these utterances? It seems to me that Hacker explains only the role of avowals(mainly, 'I have a pain'), not the role of 'I' in avowals.

(b) Hacker says that one can learn to say 'I see red' only after one has mastered 'That is red' and one learns the special use of 'It seems to me that I see ----' only later.(pp.296-297, 305-306) I agree with him. Similarly we learn first person psychological utterances only after we learn 'I am sitting' 'I am eating' etc.. These first person psychological utterances (except 'I have a pain', of which I'll discuss later) have a complicated structure("The phenomena of hope are modes of this complicated form of life"(P.I. p.174)) But cannot we apply the term 'self-consciousness' to a child who does not use 'I expect so-and-so', 'I remember so-and-so'? It may be said that it is simply a matter of defining 'self-consciousness'. I agree with it in a sense. But when Hacker writes as follows,

"Its use(of the first-person pronoun) is systematically interwoven with the use, by oneself and others, of person-referring expressions. And these depend upon a variety of public criteria that are involved in our concept of a person."(p.236),
doesn't he think that his use of 'self-consciousness' is too narrow? How does his use of the term relate to the use of 'I' and the concept of a person? Here I prefer Anscombe's thought. When we use the sentences 'I am sitting' 'I am eating', I think, we can say that we have self-consciousness.

(c) 'The use as object' of the word 'I' (in Wittgenstein's Blue Book and

Brown Books, pp.66-67) involves the recognition of a particular person and the use of criteria(observation)which includes the possibility of error. On the other hand, there is no use of criteria, no use of observation, and so no possibility of mistakening in 'the use as subject' of 'I'.

But there is another domain in which <u>there is no use of criteria, but the possibility of being mistaken, and as result the possibility of knowledge</u>. That is <u>the domain of Anscombe's 'I-thought', which is related to self-consciousness</u>. Now, I want to suggest that we can recognize this idea in Wittgenstein's <u>Philosophical Investigations.</u>

(4) Knowledge of one's own body

(a) The basis for the use of 'I' for Anscombe is 'I am sitting', 'I jumped', 'I am eating',etc., which are only thoughts of actions, postures, movements. She thinks that only those thoughts both are <u>unmediated, non-observational</u>, and also are descriptions(e.g. 'standing')which are directly verifiable or falsifiable about the person of E.A.(The First Person, p.63) Anscombe explains this 'unmediated, non-observational' thought in detail as 'knowledge without observation' in her <u>Intention</u>(sect.8)[4] . I think she borrows her ideas from Wittgenstein.

(b) "If a man tries to obey the order 'Point to your eye', he may do many different things, and there are many different criteria which he will accept for having pointed to his eye. If these criteria, as they usually do, coincide, I may use them alternately and in different combinations to show me that I have touched my eye ·····<u>If, e.g., my eyes are shut, I can still have the characteristic kinaesthetic experience in my arm which I should call the kinaesthetic experience of raising my hand to my eye</u>."(B§ B p.63, underline is mine)

(c) But,Wittgestein denies this thought positively in <u>Philosophical Investigations</u>.

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(4) G.E.M.Anscombe, Intention, (Oxford,1957)

"'How do you know that you have raised your arm?' — 'I feel it.' So what you recognize is the feeling? And are you certain that you recognize it right? —— You are certain that you have raised your arm; isn't this the criterion, the measure, of the recognition?"(P.I. §625, cf. §624, §626)

" 'But after all, you must feel it, otherwise you wouldn't know(without looking)how your finger was moving.' But 'knowing' it only means; being able to describe it. —— I may be able to tell the direction from which a sound comes only because it affects one ear more strongly than the other, but I don't feel this in my ears; yet it has its effect: I <u>know</u> the direction from which the sound comes; for instance, I look in that direction."(P.I. p.185)

I think Anscombe develops her concept 'knowledge without observation' from Wittgenstein's insight, although the explanation of the relation between 'under a description' and 'knowledge without observation' is her original contribution.

Let me repeat Hacker's passages.

"Its('I am in pain')use, one might say, is <u>rooted </u>in natural pain-behaiviour, but what grows from this differs as the foliage of a tree from its roots."(the revised edition,(p.294) "'I am in pain' has a structure." In order to use this utterance, "I must know how to use the personal pronoun 'I'. And this involves possession of the concept of a person and a grasp of the relations between 'I' and 'You' and 'He'".(the first edition, p.266)

The <u>description of the use of an utterance</u>('I am in pain') and the <u>explanation of the possibility of that use</u> are different. Wittgenstein's and Anscombe's thought about one's own body indicates the origin of the use of 'I'.

Ⅲ Pain and Intentionality

Hacker has concentrated upon the case of pain and refers to 'want', 'dream', 'see red'. Then he writes,"In short, Wittgenstein's account of 'pain' is a guideline, not a mechanical paradigm, for the description of the roots of psycholgical concepts."(the revised edition,p.297) In what sense is the account of 'pain' a guideline? I want to briefly mention pain and intentionality.

(a) In the Blue Book, Wittgenstein distinguishes the transitive and intransitive use of verbs such as 'fearing', 'longing', 'wish',,.etc. "If in characterizing such sensations (not referring to objects) we use verbs like 'fearing', 'longing', etc., these verbs will be intransitive; 'I fear' will be analogous to 'I cry'. We may cry about something, but what we cry about is not a constituent of the process of crying;"(B& B p.22)

On the other hand when what I fear, or wish is a constituent of fearing or wishing, 'I feel fear', 'I wish ---' is a transitive one. In Philosophical Grammar, Wittgenstein asserts the 'autonomy of language' by his unique interpretation of 'intentionality'. When someone expects Mr N's visit, he often looks at the clock, arranges the ashtray, somtimes opens the door and looks outside. A bystander cannot recognize his behaviour as an expectation of N's visit. What makes his behaiviour an expectation of N's visit? We want to say that it is a mental process or a mental act in his mind. But if we think that, many difficulties arise.

"The paradox disappears only if we make a radical break with the idea that language always functions one way, alway serves the same purpose: to convey thought ——which may be about houses, pains, good and evil, or anything else you please."(P.I. § 304)

If we think of the expression of expectation as the act of expectation, the problem appears solved. When he says "I expect N's visit", his behaviour is defined as behaviour of expectation of N's visit. "This verbal reaction is the movement of the pointer, which shows the object of expectation"(Zettel. § 53) "It is in language that expectation and its fulfilment make contact." (Philosophical Grammar § 103)

Before Wittgenstein grappled with the concept of pain, he had established the thought that the verbal expressions of wish and an expectation are not descriptions of inner processes, but manifestations. The grammar of intentionality('expect', 'intend',etc.) has been solved in Philosophical Grammer. But compared with these intentionalities, the concept 'pain' is

thought to be the strongest weapon for Cartesian dualism.

(b) I have emphasized the difference between intentionality and unintentionality(sensation). I have asserted that the grammar of intentionality was solved in Philosophical Grammar. But If we compare the use of 'cause' in the Blue Book(p. 15) and in Philosophical Investigations(e.g. § 325), we can recognize that Wittgenstein uses this word rather differently. Let me quote some passages from Philosohical Investigation.

"'The certainty that I shall be able to go on after I have had this experience — seen the formula, for instance, —is simply based on induction.' What does this mean? ------Whether the earlier experience is the cause of the certainty depends on the system of hypotheses, of natural laws, in which we are considering the phenomenon of certainty.

Is our confidence justified? — What people accept as a justification — is shewn by how they think and live."(P. I. § 325)

'How am I able to obey a rule? —if this is not a question about causes, then it is about the justification for my following the rule in the way I do. If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my space is turned. Then I am inclined to say: "This is simply what I do."(P. I. § 217)

"I shall get burnt if I put my hand in the fire: that is certainty. That is to say: here we see the meaning of certainty."(P. I. § 474)

"We should distinguish between the object of fear and the cause of fear. Thus a face which inspires or delight(the object of fear or delight), is not on that account its cause, but — one might say —its target."(P. I. § 476)

"Why do you believe that you will burn yourself on the hot-plate? —— Have you reasons for this belief; and do you need reasons?"(P. I. § 477)

Wittgenstein wrote " It is in language that expectation and its fulfilment make contact."(P. G. § 103)and emphasized the autonomy of language in Philosophical Grammar. But in Philosophical Investigations it seems to me that he investigates how it is possible. It is an investigation of the grammar of 'pain' and of the following rule. This may be said to change the investigation

of the grammar of other psychological concepts. In that sense, the case of 'pain' may be said to be a guideline.

[Ⅱ]

Let me summarize my arguments in [Ⅰ].

① If I cannot know how to apply the predicate 'sitting' on the basis of criteria, I cannot ascribe it to myself without criteria (or I cannot use "I am sitting")

② If I cannot know how to apply the predicate 'pain' on the basis of criteria, I cannot ascribe it to myself without criteria(or I cannot use an avowal "I am pain").

③ Equally I must know how to use the personal pronoun 'I'.

④ ③ involves possession of the concept of a person and a grasp of the relations between 'I' and 'You' and 'He'.

I tried to support these points. ②, ③, ④ are included in Hacker's early thought (Insight and Illusion, the first edition, p.266). My arguments were as follows;

(a) Although the explanation of the role of avowals in the revised edition certainly constitutes a serious criticism of the Cartesian picture, but it does not explain the role of 'I' in avowals.

(b) And in order to explain the role of 'I', we must take action-verbs, posture-verbs, and movement-verbs as models, not first person psychological utterances(=avowals). Hacker accepts that one can learn to say "I see red" only after one has mastered "That is red" and that one learns the special use of "It seems to me that I see⋯" only later(the revised edition, pp.296-297, 305-306). Similarly I think, we learn first person psychological utterances only after we have learnt 'I am sitting', 'I am eating', etc.. Anscombe claims that the notions "I am sitting", "I am eating", etc., are both non-observational, and also descriptions (e.g. 'standing'), which are directly verifiable or falsifiable about the person of E.A. (The First Person, p.63) I think she has borrowed

these ideas from Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigation(P.I. § 624-6,
p.185) I take action-verbs, postures-verbs as criteria for understanding the
role of 'I' and 'self-consciousness'.

Hacker does not admit these (a)-(b) and①- ④ which imply the hierarchical
structure of our language-games. From the point of view of the revised edition
of Insight and Illusion, these points are only empirical hypotheses. But I
think these are conceptual ones. Of course it is difficult to explain what this
'conceptual relation' means. I am not going to support these (a)-(b), ①- ④
directly. Hacker has changed his early view of 'criteria'. Perhaps it is
closely connected with the main reasons why he does not admit his early point ②
, let alone ③ and④. So, I should like to examine his view of 'criteria' in
section I. In section II I shall to investigate some passages of On Certainty
in order to support (a)-(b) and ①- ④.

I. Criteria and the Ostensive Definition
"The solutions which Wittgenstein offers to the central problems in the
metaphysics of experience can only stand firm if they are supported by a
comprehensive and systematic account of a criterial semantics which he
delineated unsystematically and obscurely."(first edition,p.309)

"He(Wittgenstein) thought that the very idea of a theory of meaning is an
absurdity, and adamantly denied that he was propounding one. Futhermore, he
thought that metaphysics was at best disguised grammatical trivialities, and
more commonly simply nonsense. Any suggestion that Wittgenstein's philosophical
clarifications have metaphysical consequences is a sure sign that they have been
misconstrued."(revised edition, p.335)

These two quotations from the last page of both editions are radically
different interpretations of Wittgenstein's thoughts on the criteria and
metaphysics of experience.

Let me quote some passages from the revised edition to show Hacker's idea
of criteria.

"Although Wittgenstein employed the expression 'criterion' fairly frequently in his later writings, ⸺it is not a pivotal notion in a novel theory of meaning."(p.318)

"In some cases expressions are explained by citing criteria for their application, in others by giving a Merkmal-definition, in some cases an ostensive explanation may be given, in others a series of examples; for certain purposes a paraphrase will fulfil the role of an explanation, for others a contrastive paraphrase; in some instances an exemplification will be in order, in others a gesture."(p.329)

"Many of the things which philosophers have said about Wittgenstein's conception of a criterion depend upon selecting a narrow range of his remarks and disregarding others."(p.310)

Although I am not going to defend the assertion-condition theory and the anti-realism which Hacker attacked, I want to discuss some of the reasons why he has rejected 'a comprehensive and systematic account of a criterial semantics', so that I may say that the problem of criteria is still a central problem of philosophy.

(1) It seems to me that there is not much difference between the first edition and the revised edition in the definition (characterization) of 'criteria' itsef .

(ⅰ) criteria for P are a grammatically (logically) determined ground or reason for the truth of P.(the revised edition, p.315)

(ⅱ) criteria for P partly determines the meaning of 'P'.(ibid.,310)

(ⅲ) criteria are circumstance-dependent, so criteria are defeasible.(ibid., p.316)

(ⅳ) there are multiple criteria for a given state of affairs (for the application of a given concept).(ibid., p.312)

Then what does the big difference between two editions depend on?

(2) I have been strongly impressed by Hacker's differentiation of the case

of criteria and the case of ostensive definitions. "The range of expressions that can legitimately be explained by ostensive definition and by explanations akin to ostensive definition (e.g. explanations of verbs by exemplification) is very wide"(ibid., p.319). So if we cannot admit the case of ostensive definitions as the analogue case of criteria, we cannot hope for 'a comprehensive and systematic account of a criterial semantics'.

Certainly, the origins of 'ostensive explanation'(and sample) and of 'criteria' are different. Let me sum up my interpretation of them. As Hacker points out (ibid.,ch. v, p.307), the origins of the ideas of 'criteria' is in Philosophical Remarks. Wittgenstein distingushed between 'genuine propositions' and 'hypotheses'. "A phenomenon isn't a symptom of something else: it is reality.⸺ it itself is what verifies the proposition."(Philosophical Remarks, §225) The 'phenomenon'(immediate experience)is what verifies the proposition and give it its meaning. On the other hand, the 'symptom' does not relate to the meaning of proposition. But Wittgenstein could not help abandoning the princple of verification. So, the source of meaning had dried up.

Wittgenstein wrote "If you exclude the element of intention from language, its whole function then collapses."(P.R. §20) This is the starting point of his investigation into meaning during his transition period. His central problem was to examine this element of intention. We can see how he eliminated the element of intention in his Philosophical Grammar.

(a)The first is the investigation of 'ostensive definitions'(P.G., §45 ff.) "The ostensive definition may be regarded as a rule for translating from a gesture language into a word language."(ibid., §45) It is a rule of grammar. He takes the expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the tone of voice as having a similar semiotic function as the word. Accordingly, teaching a word by an ostensive definition(explanation) is to show a rule of translation. We need not refer to Gegenstand (in Tractatus) or to intention(mental act).

"The connection between 'language and reality' is made by definitions of words, and these belong to grammar, so that language remains self-contained and

autonomous."(P.G. §55) "It is grammatical rules that determine meaning (constitute it) and so they themselves are not answerable to any meaning and to that extent are arbitrary."(P.G. §133)

Of course, this is the <u>fundamental change</u> from the explanation of language by 'phenomenon'(phenomenology, P.R. §1).

(b)The second is the investigation into '<u>Intentionality</u>'. After his investigation into ostensive definition, Wittgenstein examined 'expectation', 'will', 'wish', 'intention', 'hope' etc...(P.G. §90 ff.) He asserts the 'autonomy of language' with his unique interpretation of 'intentionality'. When someone expects Mr N's visit, he often looks at the clock, arranges the ashtray, and sometimes looks outside. What makes his behaviour indicate that he is expecting N's visit? We want to say that it is a mental process or a mental act in his mind. In that case, many difficulties arise. On the other hand, if we think of <u>the expression of expectation </u>as the<u> act</u> of expectation, then the difficulties are resolved. When he says "I expect N's visit", his behaviour is defined as the behaviour of expecting N's visit. "It is in language that expectation and its fulfilment make contact."(P.G. §92)

I want to give attention to the word 'the<u> expression (Ausdruck)</u> of expectation' or 'The<u> manifestation (Ausserung)</u> of wish'.(P.G. §103) I am convinced that these words have developed from the above mentioned word '<u>phenomenon</u>' and have developed to the word '<u>criterion</u>' in <u>The Blue Book.</u>(B & B . pp.24-25) His early<u> Phanomenologie </u>became <u>Kriteriologie</u> through 'the expression'.

The term 'expression' in<u> Philosophical Grammar</u> was applied only to first person intentional states. But when that word came to be applied to unintentional states such as sensations and feelings in <u>The Blue and Brown Books</u>, the word 'expression' may have become too narrow to include the conventional language and bodily behaviour expressive of pain or anger. Thus Wittgenstein uses the word 'criterion', a term which, it is thought, conveys, the grammatical description not only of psychological words, but also of <u>all</u>

<u>words.</u> Thence the 'criterion' has been incorporated into the ostensive definition (the ostensive explanation).

In the revised edition of <u>Insight and Illusion</u> Hacker wrote as follows;
(i) It is evident ----that he denied that first-person psychological sentences are used on the basis of criteria. I can tell you where my pain is and what sort of pain it is (sharp and intermittent), but in so doing I employ no criteria."(ibid., p.318)

(ii) "The meaning of an expression, on Wittgenstein's view, is not given by specification of something called its 'truth-conditions' ----. Nor is the meaning of an expression given by specification of something called its 'assertion conditions'. It is given by explanations of meaning, and these do not belong to any theory. Rather are they grammatical rules, rules for the correct use of expressions. <u>They are not rules of a meaning calculus tacitly known or yet to be discovered,</u> but humdrum explanations by the use of which we teach and explain, justify and criticize, correct mistakes and clarify ambiguities in our uses of words. They are very varied: in some cases expressions are explained by citing criteria for their application, in others by giving a Merkmal-definition, in some cases an ostensive explanation may be given, in others a series of examples; for certain purposes a paraphrase will fulfil the role of an explanation, for others a contrastive paraphrase; in some instances an exemplification will be in order, in others a gesture."(p.329)

If I accept all these statements (but I think that <u>there are rules of meaning, conceptual relations, not ⟨a meaning calculus⟩, tacitly known or yet to be discovered.</u> I shall discuss this point in the next section). What, then, can I say?

"There is no division of the branches of philosophy into the central and the peripheral ----The absence of hierarchical structure is lack of one kind of system" [5] I cannot accept these statements. After the failure of explanation

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(5) G.P.Baker and P.M.S.Hacker, Wittgenstein-Meaning and Understanding, p.368

of the meaning by the 'phenomenon' (the immediate experience), Wittgenstein attained the insight that "the connection between 'language and reality' is made by definitions of words (ostensive definition). This is the fundamental change, so the problem of criteria and the ostensive definition becomes the central problem of philosophy for Wittgenstein. I think these problems have not been solved yet, although his thought of 'autonomy of language' has not shaken. Let me explain briefly.

(i) In a passage of Augustine's Confessions which Wittgenstein quotes at the beginning of Philosophical Investigations, "Their intention was shewn by their bodily movements, as it were the natural language of all peoples". I think the ostensive definition which makes "the connection between 'language and reality'" does not stands up without the 'idea of the natural language' ; If the ostensive definition is the rule of grammar, the rule of translation between the wort-language and gesture language(P.G. § 45), the autonomy of grammar(language) is closely connected with the idea of natural language. In Philosophical Grammar Wittgenstein introduces a concept 'familiality' in understanding a picture.(P.G. § 34, 115 -121) . This concept has developed into the difficult term 'see as (Sehen als)' in Philosophical Investigations part 2. I am not sure whether Wittgenstein have solved this most difficult problem or not.

(ii) In the first edition of Insight and Illusion, Hacker accepts the Principle of Natural Epistemic Justice.(p.303) Whether or not he accept it in the revised edition, I consider the difficult problem about defeasibility as to criteria to be an important problem. However, I am not satisfied with Hacker's explanation in the revised edition.(pp.315-318) But, I think, On Certainty has relevance to it and we should locate the problem of defeasibilty in the hierarchical structure. Although I cannot deal with this problem here, I would like to discuss that there are rules of meaning, conceptual relations, tacitly known or yet to be discovered.

Ⅱ 'The Entire System of Our Language-Games' (<u>On Certainty</u>)

As I said at the beginning, in [Ⅰ] I tried to support some elements of Hacker's early thoughts about the self-consciousness and the use of 'I' ; that is, the above points ①- ④, (a)-(b). These points imply the hierarchical structure or the system of our language games. Hacker finished his <u>first edition</u> by quoting three sections from <u>On Certainty</u>. By discussing these sections, I should like to assert that there are rules of meaning, conceptual relations, tacitly known or yet to be discovered, and through these discussions to support the above points.

"Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; —— but the end is not certain propositions striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of <u>seeing</u> on our part; it is our <u>acting</u> which lies at the bottom of the language-game." (O.C, §204)

What is <u>'our acting which lies at the bottom of the language-game'</u>? Wittgenstein wrote in <u>Zettel</u> as follows: "Being sure that someone is in pain, doubting whether he is, and so on, are so many natural, instinctive, kinds of behaviour towards other human beings, and our language is merely an auxiliary to, and further extension of, this relation. our language-game is an extension of primitive behaviour. (For our language-game is behaviour)." <u>(Zettel,</u> §545, cf. P.I. §241-242)

But I think the above 'our acting' in <u>On Certainty</u> is not same as 'primitive behaviour' in <u>Zettel</u> and P.I. This 'our acting' is connected with Moore's propositions or world-picture(Weltbild). Wittgenstein discussed Moore's propositions by using the term 'judgment' after §124.

"We do not learn the practice of making empirical judgments by learning rules: we are taught <u>judgments</u> and their connection with other judgments. A <u>totality</u> of judgments is made plausible to us." (O.C. §140)

"When we first beginn to <u>believe</u> anything, what we believe is not a single proposition, it is a whole system of propositions. (Light dawns gradually over the whole)." (O.C. §141)

We learn a totality of judgments by <u>the practice of making empirical judgments</u>. Wittgenstein here is thinking of judgment being involved often in cases where no linguistic expression is being used. 'The practice of making empirical judgments' is different from 'judgments' in <u>Zettel</u> and P.I. And behind the language-game there are beliefs which we have never learnt explicitly.

"Think of chemical investigations. Lavoisier makes experiments with substances in his laboratory and now he concludes that this and that takes place when there is burning. He does not say that it might happen otherwise another time. He has got hold of a definite world-picture — not of course one that he invented: he learned it as a child. I say world-picture and not hypothesis, because it is the matter-of-course foundation for his research and as such also goes unmentioned."(O.C. § 167, cf. § 95-105)

Lavoisier is not conscious of these judgments in his acting. Why do we need the world-picture? But we need to use them in order to explicate the sense of what he does. Wittgenstein wrote as follows:

"I want to say: propositions of the form of empirical propositions, and not only propositions of logic, form the foundation of all operating with thoughts (with language) ----."(O.C. § 401)

"Our knowledge forms an enormous system. And only within this system has a paticular bit the value we give it."(O.C. § 410)

"If I say 'we assume that the earth has existed for many years past' (or something similar), then of course it sounds strange that we should assume such a thing. But in the entire system of our language-games it belongs to the foundations. The assumption, one might say, forms the basis of action, and therefore, naturally, of thought."(O.C. § 411)

I don't intend to explain these sections. They are difficult and Wittgenstein himself cannot help using many metaphors to explain <u>the entire system of our language-games.</u> The metaphor of the following section explains his thought of <u>On Certainty</u> well.

"I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can dicover them subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the sense that anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility."(O.C. § 152)

This section implies clearly that there are rules of meaning, conceptual relations, tacitly known or yet to be dicovered. It seems to me that the problem about the defeasibility of criteria should be investigated in this context. And the notion of 'self-consciousness' or the use of 'I' should be investigated, too.

Wittgenstein's works and abbreviations

Tractatus   Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, tr. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness, 1961.

P. R.   Philosophical Remarks, ed. R. Rhees, tr. R. Fargreaves and R. White, 1975.

P. G.   Philosophical Grammar, ed. R. Rhees, tr. A. J. P. Kenny, 1974.

B. B.   The Blue and Brown Books, 1958.

P. I.   Philosophical Investigations, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and R . Rhees, tr. G. E. M. Anscombe, 1953.

On Certainty, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H von Wright, tr. G. E. M. Anscombe and D. Paul, 1969.

Zettel, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H von Wright, tr. G. E. M. Anscombe, 1967.