Reimagining the Republic's Frontiers: The Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission and Identity Discourseon Taiwan, 1949-2017

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Reimagining the Republic's Frontiers: The Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission and Identity Discourse on Taiwan, 1949-2017

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Abstract

In 2017, the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission (MTAC) was disbanded after 68 years of operation on Taiwan, raising the question of how an anachronistic institution evolved as the Republic of China's (ROC) underwent democratization. Certainly, for many who look at the rhetoric of "Multicultural Taiwan" beginning in the 2000s, the existence of the MTAC may have been bewildering outside its historical context. However, the history of the MTAC on Taiwan can illuminate the transition of national identity in the ROC. The issue of national identity in the ROC on Taiwan is not one facing academic neglect or scholarly disinterest. Rather, particularly since the process of democratization began in the 1980s, extensive scholarship has investigated questions related to Taiwaneseness, Chineseness, the development and impact of Taiwanese nationalism, the political movement for Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples, and much more. However, limited scholarship has investigated the trajectory of official portrayals of the ROC's "frontiers," a term which referred to Mongolian, Tibetan and other non-Han minorities for decades after retreat in 1949. Research into the MTAC offers an opportunity to center ROC narratives of the so-called "the frontier," thereby allowing investigation into the shifting official approach to the (internal) "other" in national identity building. This perspective has the potential to shed a transformative light on the transition of national identity on Taiwan, as it showcases often neglected narratives on the ideological and geographical periphery.

Thus, investigation into to the evolving discourse of the MTAC from 1949 to 2017 can be understood as a case study to explore the formation of official ideology before, during and after democratization. More pointedly, the project specifically focuses on the shifting role of official portrayals of its former "frontier" peoples in the state's consolidation of ideology. This dissertation aims to improve our understanding of how the MTAC, as part of the ROC's larger state apparatus, imagined its national territory and understood the state's relationship to its so-called "frontier." Furthermore, the project focuses on debates on imperialist legacies in Chinese nationalism, and aims to uncover the legacies of imperialism and their possible lingering impact on Taiwan today.

Following a discourse-historical approach, my analysis finds that until the end of martial law (1987), the MTAC retained a mission to civilize its "frontier" through development policy and reform. Taiwan was seen as a peripheral island on the edge of a much greater Chinese nation. MTAC discourse on national identity in the first period was heavily influenced by a Han-centric notion of the Five Nation Republic, with an overt civilizing mission embedded into the Commission's images of a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, and multi-cultural nation.

Visions of the frontier's victimization at the hands of foreign and communist forces demonstrated the need for ROC protectionism. These images were further strengthened by romanticized portrayals of Tibetan and especially Tibetan Buddhist martyrdom at the hands of the CCP and other menaces. All these discursive themes contributed to the overarching message that the ROC was the rightful ruler of Greater China, an indivisible entity whose whole depended on all of its parts.

The overt civilizing mission in MTAC portrayals of the nation's "frontier" served to justify ROC legitimacy over Mainland China through demonstrations of the frontier peoples' inferiority. Under the correct ROC, or Han, leadership, the logic of the Five Nation Republic's approach to pluralism argued that these peoples could be further developed. The ROC officially recognized five race-nations or *minzu* (民族) within China: Manchu, Hui, Mongolia, Tibet, and Han. Although this recognition was also accompanied with a localized or *yinsu'erzhi* (因俗而治) approach to governance, and strict assimilation was seldom a described objective of the state, MTAC discourse during this era suggested a rigid cultural or civilizational hierarchy at play, with the Han implicitly supreme.

By the 21st century, rhetoric emphasizing bilateral and international exchange had emerged within MTAC publications. However, within this discourse, the Commission continued to highlight the relative status of Taiwanese development to that of Mongolia and Tibet, even as espousal of political "Chineseness" faded. Furthermore, MTAC portrayed twenty-first century Taiwan as developed, democratic, and vaguely multicultural, and made efforts to tie the national narrative to the existence of Taiwan Indigenous Peoples, tracing back over centuries. Despite this, Indigenous Peoples' voices within the MTAC were scarce, and only began to appear during Ma Ying-jeou's KMT presidency. At the same time, other elements of Taiwan's multiculturalism, championed elsewhere within the young democracy were entirely neglected in MTAC literature. Consequently, as the Commission largely omitted Indigenous, Hakka, and other recognized local communities' contributions to Taiwan's history and national development, Taiwan's regional superiority depicted in MTAC publications was implicitly portrayed as a Han-Taiwanese achievement. This image of Han-Taiwanese advancement enabled differentiation of Taiwan from the PRC, but avoided making divisions within the greater Han civilizational/cultural identity. Thus, despite official re-centering on Taiwan and focus on a different core set of ethnic or national identities, the basic logic for ROC legitimacy remained in essence rooted in a Han-centric claim to benevolent and well-managed pluralism.

In sum, the doctoral project finds that instead of employing Chinese imperialist strategies as means to demonstrate sovereignty over Greater China, 21st century MTAC rhetoric relied on certain imperialist attitudes to showcase Taiwan's relative cultural superiority, diversity, modernity, and democracy as key to survival in the PRC's growing shadow.

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This dissertation is dedicated to Barbara Hook Montgomery and Guy Ferrer.

Chapter One: Introduction

1.1 Introduction

At first glance, the existence of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission (MTAC) on Taiwan in the 2000s was a curiosity. Described by Tibetan scholar and journalist Tsering Namgyal (2003) as a "hold-over" from the era of Republican rule on Mainland China, the Commission was formed in 1928, during the ROC's Nanjing years, with headquarters in Beiping. The MTAC's purported mission was to assist in governance and reform in Mongolia and Tibet (Executive Yuan 1929), although in reality, the Commission's purview extended to all frontier peoples (Lan 2017). In 1949, as the Republican government retreated to Taiwan and the Chinese Communist Party took hold of the Mainland, the MTAC headquarters also relocated to Taipei. On Taiwan, the Commission continued to publish extensive writings on Tibet, Mongolia and other "frontier" (邊疆) regions claimed by the Republic of China (ROC).

On 14 August 2017, Taiwan's Tsai Ingwen administration officially announced that the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission would no longer receive funding from 2018 onward.[1] For many years preceding this announcement, DPP-leaning press had run a highly negative campaign against the MTAC. The most read print newspaper in 2016, the *Liberty Times* rarely discussed the publications or events organized by the MTAC. Instead, *Liberty Times* coverage presented an overall negative image of the Commission, including reference to the organization as a "fat cat" (肥貓)[2] (Press Release, 2017 Aug 14a; Li and Qiu, 2013 Oct 28). Furthermore, reports highlighted the Commission's ineptitude, misconduct, and oversized budget throughout its final years. In 2012, multiple headlines covered an incident where the Commission confused Mongolia, the country, with Inner Mongolia, the PRC autonomous region (Li, 2012 May 22). "The Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission Stupidly Cannot Distinguish Between Outer and Inner Mongolia, Netizens Cry Shame," read one headline (Press Release, 2012 May 21). Later the same year, the paper published another critical headline on the failure of the MTAC: "Already 57 Tibetans have self-immolated, Legislative Yuan Criticizes the MTAC: 'doesn't dare rebuke China'" (Xie and Li, 2012 Oct 05).

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[1] "蒙藏委員會年底裁撤？" (Mengzang weiyuanhui niandi caiche?, MTAC Disbands at the end of the Year?). *Taiwan People News* 15-August-2017, https://www.peoplenews.tw/news/298fb822-067c-4b2c-9ed2-e0096b94cad2 (accessed 2-February-2021).

[2] In Taiwan, "fat cat" (肥貓) is a term used to refer to those people or organizations who take public funds but do nothing of consequence.

Specific MTAC officials were also featured in critical pieces. In 2013, a story running under the sensational headline "Skipping Work to Take Large-Breasted Woman to Motel, MTAC Official Receives Demerit" criticizes MTAC member Jue'an Ciren (覺安慈仁) for carrying on an alleged romantic affair during work hours (Press Release, 2013 Aug 15). Later, in 2016, the newspaper reported on the Legislative Yuan's interview of MTAC Chairwoman Lin Mei-chu (林美珠). During questioning, when asked if she supported Tibetan Independence (*zangdu*, 藏獨) Chairwoman Lin responded in the affirmative. After some commotion in the chamber, and consultation from another present MTAC member, the Chairwoman apologized and clarified that she misheard the question as: do you support Tibetan people (*zangzu*, 藏族). The article ran with the headline: "MTAC Lin Mei-chu Makes a 'Tibetan Independence' Misunderstanding" (Wu, 2016 Jun 20). The paper's exclusive focus on MTAC officials' misdeeds and mistakes offered a vision of inept and corrupt government officials. When considered in conjunction with criticisms of the entire organization, *Liberty Times* coverage of the MTAC is strikingly negative, with pointed focus highlighting the Commission's incompetence and tendency toward scandal.

These criticisms were further compounded by coverage of the MTAC budget, frequently framed as oversized or wasteful. In 2013, the headline "Service Costs Only 8 Million NTD, Human Resources Cost 80 Million NTD/ MTAC 'Criticized as Fat Cat Ministry'" (Liu and Qiu, 2013 Oct 28). Occasionally, critique of the budget involved reference to other scandals, such as in the case of the headline in 2017, published during the legislative deliberation and announcement of the Commission's dismissal: "Every Year Human Resources Costs 70,000 NTD, MTAC High Official Once Caught Skipping Work to Take Woman to Motel" (Press Release, 2017 Aug 14a). On the same day, when it was announced that the MTAC would be disbanded, the paper ran the headline: "MTAC at End of Year to Be Extinguished, Lin Junxian: Fat Cat Dismissal Long Overdue" (Press Release, 2017 Aug 14b). Altogether, *Liberty Times*' messaging on the MTAC was clear: incompetent, scandal-ridden government body is a waste of national resources.

Furthermore, while generally more acknowledging of MTAC events and other work, pro-Blue camp press was not particularly active in rallying a defense of the Commission, or indeed in engaging in a politicized discussion of the body. With ample coverage of the Commission's failures, perceived budget bloat, and direct calls for the MTAC to disband, DPP associated media made a strong argument for the dismissal of the Commission. Blue camp, in contrast,

was largely inactive in the debates leading up to the decision to disband, and made little or no effort ot positively politicize or champion the existence of the MTAC beyond basic reports of the Commission's regular activities. One of the few exceptions came after-the-fact, when a KMT associated paper framed the Commission's closure to a limited extent as an example of DPP "de-sinification" efforts (Zhou, 2017 Aug 17). Consequently, while disbandment of the Commission may not have been a full bi-partisan effort, there was little to no resistance present in popular KMT supporting news media. Finally, after the brief flurry of media attention in the days following the announcement, the MTAC was disbanded with little fanfare by the end of 2017 after nearly 90 years of operation. Despite its quiet end, the Commission's prolonged existence on Taiwan raises questions regarding how and why such a seemingly anachronistic institution survived so long, and how its mission and functions evolved as the nature of the ROC regime itself changed.

1.2 Approaching the Issue

Originally, the Commission was assigned two main tasks: (1) to "assist in governing" and (2) to "implement reform" in Tibet and Mongolia (Article 2). In 1947, the MTAC was placed in the same rank as other national government ministries and affairs commissions, directly under the administration of the Executive Yuan (Executive Yuan, Article 3.16). After 1949, despite relocating to Taiwan along with the rest of the ROC state apparatus, the MTAC continued nominally to pursue its original mission. For the following 68 years, it produced literature on a range of subjects related to the Mongolian and Tibetan peoples and territories.

However, over the same period, the political landscape both within Taiwan and in the wider Asia-Pacific region underwent significant change. Kuomintang (國民黨, KMT) military rule ended in 1987, while the region saw a shift away from Cold War politics after reform in the People's Republic of China (PRC), the fall of the Soviet Union, and revolution in Mongolia. In 2011, on its now-defunct website, the MTAC portrayed its continuing mission as to:

"defend the aim of the ROC constitution, ensure the equal status of various ethnic groups, promote the regional autonomy of Mongolia and Tibet, enhance the economic and educational reforms in Mongolia and Tibet, foster Mongolian and Tibetan cultures, and respect their religious beliefs and social customs, in the hope of achieving harmonious ethnic relationships and protecting the ROC's sovereignty." (cited in Pan 2015)

Thus, for many decades there has been a clear divergence between the ROC's effective sovereignty, limited to Taiwan and surrounding islands, and its national imaginary as reflected in MTAC documents. However, despite the MTAC's curious extended life on Taiwan, there is limited English-language scholarship that explores the great volume of resources and output from the Commission. Some research has alluded to changes in the MTAC's work in response to shifts in the ROC's political context (HE 2018; Pan 2015; Namgyal 2003), but questions remain regarding the extent and nature of such changes. Moreover, little scholarship has focused on the trajectory of official ROC portrayals of the mainland's non-Han peoples after 1949. Consequently, analysis of MTAC publications provides an opportunity to showcase the role of "frontier" peoples outside of China Proper in official constructions of national identity, and opens a hitherto neglected window onto ROC history. Evolving official portrayals of non-Han or "frontier" peoples raise questions regarding the legacy of Qing imperialism in the trajectory of ROC national identity and conceptions of statehood. Part of this history has already been examined by Leibold (2007). Discussed in greater length in this dissertation's historical background (Chapter Four), Leibold's research of the ROC extends through ROC governance of the Chinese mainland, thus ending before ROC retreat to Taiwan in 1949. However, official ROC conceptions of the state's fantasy frontier in Central Asia post-1949 continued to play a role in shaping 20th and 21st centuries' discourse on Taiwanese identity. This project thus seeks to shed light on how the MTAC understood the state's relationship to its imagined "frontier," and how this understanding contributed to conceptualizations of ROC statehood and national identity after the regime's 1949 retreat to Taiwan. Furthermore, the 2010s' heavily partisan public debate about the Commission's continued existence, followed by the (tacitly) bi-partisan support of its budget reduction, and then its ultimate closure, raises questions about the nature of the institution and its path toward dissolution in 2017.

Certainly, for many who look at the rhetoric of Multicultural Taiwan beginning in the 2000s, the existence of the MTAC may have been a bewildering thought without consideration of the historical context of the ROC. The history of the MTAC on Taiwan offers a window onto the transition of national identity in the ROC from its Mainland-centric visions of nationhood and citizenship during the era of military rule through the islands' democratization and official embrace of a multicultural and Taiwan-centered approach to nationalism. Thus, investigation into to the evolving discourse of the MTAC from 1949 to 2017 can be understood as a case study to explore the formation and manipulation of official ideology before, during and after democratization. More pointedly, the project specifically focuses on the shifting role of official portrayals of its former "frontier" peoples in the state's consolidation of ideology.

To enable this analytical perspective, extensive review of Chinese imperialism is necessary to recognize its possible legacy in 20th and 21st century ROC rhetoric. The center-periphery ideological framework of the MTAC as an institution itself further demands a focus on Han-chauvinism, Chinese imperialism, and the development of national identity in the early Republic within the historical review.

This dissertation aims to improve our understanding of how the MTAC, as part of the ROC's larger state apparatus, imagined its national territory and understood the state's relationship to its so-called "frontier." Furthermore, the project focuses on debates on imperialist legacies in Chinese nationalism, and aims to uncover the legacies of imperialism and their possible lingering impact on Taiwan today. Much scholarship has examined the transition from empire to nation in China. Although Wang Hui (2014) is primarily concerned with the division within narratives of history into categories of empire and nation-state and the stages of modernity, many of his questions are directly applicable to this dissertation's examination of the MTAC's evolving discourses on identity and the fluctuations of ideology contained therein. Wang Hui asks:

> …it is difficult to overcome the problem of how to explain the very prominent and direct historical relationships between the Qing dynasty and modern China. If one simply treats the Qing dynasty as the antithesis of modernity, then how can we explain the relationships between modern China and the Qing in such areas as demographic composition, territorial borders, cultural identity, and political structure? Can one really argue that the 'modern' can override these types of specific and far-reaching historical relationships and structure and establish itself independently? (14-15)

This dissertation argues, in a word, no. As the archives of the MTAC demonstrate in the findings chapters, ideologies that arose or were fortified under the Qing remained present to varying degrees at various times in the Republic of China on Taiwan. Unlike Wang Hui, this dissertation is not particularly concerned with the political delineations of empire and nation-state. Nevertheless, Wang's work provides a basis for forgoing narratives which exaggerate the "rupture" of history following the emergence of Chinese nationalism and the subsequent nation-state. Instead, this project approaches the history of the Chinese nation from a perspective of "entangled modernity," wherein any emergence of a Han or Chinese national identity and subsequent formation of a nation-state must interact with its (Qing) imperial origins.

Central to the question of how to understand the emergence of the Chinese nation are the concepts of imperial China's culturalist notion of *Tianxia* and Chinese nationalism. Duara's (1996) work links together the two ideologies, which previous historians' (namely Levenson) had theorized as disparate entities. Duara argues that the notion of *Tianxia* is not an unlimited, universalist ideal, but in fact a "hidden form of relativism" that extends only to a changing boundary of a *Chinese* universe (41). Relativism, Duara explains, is not fundamentally different from nationalism. By understanding principle of culturalism in *Tianxia* as not universalist but as a "Chinese culturalism," it becomes apparent that culture, and specifically the "culture of the imperial state and Confucian orthodoxy," served as a standard by which to delineate a particular community (42). Following "Chinese culturalism," assimilated "barbarians" could join the cultural community and further differentiate from other "barbarians" who had not done so. Duara emphasizes the idea that relativist culturalism and nationalism both manage "distinguishing marks and boundaries of a politicized community" (44). In other words, "what is novel about modern nationalism is not political self-consciousness, but the world system of nation-states" (44).

This introduction to the dissertation has so far offered a book-ends approach to understanding the MTAC, providing both stories of the Commission's establishment in 1928 and its dissolution in 2017. While it is clear that what began as an attempt to extend control over Greater China, a vast territory defined by the boundaries of the late Qing Empire, ended as a much-diminished government body facing derision in the public sphere, the larger story of the Commission's vicissitudes over the near-seven decades of its existence on Taiwan remains to be explored. The following section outlines in greater details the aims of this project and the questions set to guide the dissertation's exploration of the MTAC and its publishing record.

1.3 Research Questions

The following section presents a detailed discussion of the project's aims and research questions to guide research into the trajectory of portrayals of national identity and peripheral peoples in MTAC documents from 1949 to 2017. These aims discussed here were crafted after establishing a strong foundational historical background, and then surveying an overview of MTAC publications from Taiwan. Following this work, the aims of the research were specified as the following:

to improve our understanding of how the MTAC, as part of the ROC's larger state apparatus, imagined its national territory and statehood; understood the state's relationship to its so-called "frontier;" approached the management of diversity and its conception of multiculturalism; and advocated for its representation – and indeed continued existence – overseas.

After several rounds of initial surveying of the Commission's publications, it became clear that a critical approach to discourse analysis was necessary to uncover linkages between text and history, between text and text, and between contemporaneous socio-political movements and text. A discourse-historical approach (Wodak 2001) situates the text in both history and contemporaneous politics, allowing for a critical reading with a view onto shifting ideology. Using a discourse-historical approach has allowed for stronger findings that prioritize interpretation situated in socio-political and historical contexts and focus on tracing shifting ideology, fulfilling both the original umbrella questions and later specified aims of the research. It was clear that a modification of methods to incorporate both modes of analysis in a two-stage procedure was necessary.

From the above research aims, it was evident that a strong research plan must include a sturdy foundation of background research, with particular emphasis on building a historical narrative. I began my exploration of history related to the MTAC with a series of broad questions:

- How has the official concept of identity and "national identity" shifted over time within China, from the late Qing to Republican Era? Furthermore, how has the role of the "other", and "internal other" in particular helped shaped these ideologies?
- Within these ideologies how have different categorizations of social grouping: lineage, race, ethnicity, language, etc, shifted over time?
- Separately, what was the process of national identity formation for Han people, Republican China, Tibet, and Mongolia? How do these ideological formations intersect?
- How have "metaphors of sex" and gendered portrayal of "the other" played a role in official construction of national identity?

The above set of questions aimed to lead up to a larger, big-picture question: Who is "Chinese?" However, to accommodate the complex and shifting nature of late Qing imperial identities, Republican nation-building discourses and late 20th century identity in the ROC on

Taiwan, this question soon widened to: Who belongs to the nation? Under this guiding question, focus ultimately narrowed in on investigating the hierarchies imbedded within the greater politics of belonging.

This stage of research continued through October 2019, with several subsequent returns to the background research when certain questions arose or gaps in my knowledge were noticed. This stage established several significant historical narratives that were highly relevant to later analysis. After a year of work largely dedicated to establishing a strong knowledge of history and a few initial glimpses of the Mongolian and Tibetan Cultural Centre and its online resources in early 2019, data collection began in earnest in October 2019, when I relocated to Taipei for archival fieldwork.

In Taipei, during initial readings several trends emerged, among them persistent reference to what amounts to a civilizing mission in the state's relationship with the Mongolian people. While a significant portion of the body of research is dedicated to investigations of early ROC history and its "frontier", rising discourses of popular nationalism in Taiwan, and the ROC on Taiwan's response to that discourse, there is very little literature on the continued trajectory of the ROC's mainland legacies, particularly those legacies related to its "frontier" and the problematic of the ROC's Han-chauvinist civilizational hierarchy with regard to peoples on the Mainland. Discussion of the ROC's civilizing mission is an essential part of the narrative of its transition from "Greater China" to "Taiwan" and thus forms a major focus of this paper. After reading through the volumes relevant to the "frontier," including Mongolia and Tibet, specific quotations from these works were selected to provide examples of a civilizing mission discourse, with effort to include document rhetoric from each decade from the 1950s to 2010s.

Next, I observed that the nearly seven decades of MTAC publications and activity on Taiwan before its dissolution offer a view onto the process of integrating official interpretations of national identity and pluralism into ROC institutions. Established in a by-gone era, headquartered in Beiping, the MTAC presented a window onto the ROC's transition from its "Five Nation Republic" past to its "Multicultural Taiwan" present. The MTAC was itself based on the Qing's *Lifanyuan* (理藩院), an imperial agency created to facilitate Qing governance over its outer empire. Today, the ROC capitalizes on its democratic transition and localization, both to mediate contending local nationalisms and group interests and to appeal the international community's approval of multicultural citizenship. But to what extent does this the ROC's "Multicultural Taiwan" paradigm differ from early and mid-20th century conceptualizations of pluralism in the ROC? This inquiry becomes particularly salient when

viewed from the perspective of the ROC's Qing imperialist inheritance, which greatly contributed to informing ROC conceptions of pluralism, identity, and governance. While considerable scholarship has come to the consensus that "Multicultural Taiwan" is an official response and indeed negotiation of competing nationalism to legitimate the ROC's continued existence both at home and abroad (Chang 2004; Rubinstein 2007; Dupre 2018), the issue of what remains of the "Five Nation Republic" has been largely neglected by contemporary scholarship.

Finally, since the Commission's relocation to Taiwan in 1949, its purpose became primarily propagandistic, serving at times a public-facing educational role through exhibits, conferences, and other events, until its closure in 2017. Across all eras of the MTAC's operation on Taiwan, Tibetan Buddhism was prominently featured in the Commission's work, although its role and image were inconsistent. While under military rule, Tibetan Buddhism was largely portrayed as an exotic religion facing oppression at the hands of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). By the 21st century, the Commission distanced itself from its previous criticism of the CCP, and began to champion itself as a supporter of Tibetan Buddhism within Taiwan, including hosting events for Taiwan-based Tibetan Buddhist practitioners. As part of a greater project on the institutional history of the MTAC, this dissertation further proposes an investigation specifically into the historical trajectory of Tibetan Buddhism's role and image in official conceptions of national identity on Taiwan.

Based on the initial observations outlined above, this doctoral dissertation hence aims to illuminate the trajectory of the Republic of China's official discourse of national identity. To accomplish this, I propose to investigate the history of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Council in the Republic of China and the Commission's shifting propagandistic message. In particular, I aim to analyze how the MTAC's status, official mission and range of its activities changed as the ROC on Taiwan made the transition from Martial Law to democratic governance. I present three main lines of inquiry:

1. How have political agendas within the ROC shaped the role and status of the MTAC and its propaganda messages?

2. How does the history of the MTAC as an institution illuminate the shifting official conceptualization of national identity in the ROC and its relationship with the PRC and the outside world?

3. How has MTAC helped shape and responded to the emerging discourse of "multiculturalism" in Taiwan, particularly since the advent of democratization in the late 1980s?

Following initial survey of MTAC documents, several subsidiary lines of inquiry developed according to three key discursive themes. The first, with discussion of findings presented in Chapter Six, examines the trajectory of the civilizing mission discourse found especially in martial law era MTAC publications. Spanning nearly seven decades, publications from the MTAC cover an expansive range of subjects and genres. The first sub-set of research questions focuses on themes related to the "frontier," national identity, and the imagining of a national territory. It addresses one principal question: How does the frontier imaginary of the MTAC illuminate the trajectory of official ROC discourse on national identity? More specifically, how has the MTAC portrayed the relationship between China and the Mongolian people and associated territories? Finally, how does the MTAC's portrayal of Mongolia shed light on official conceptions of ROC statehood?

The second sub-set of research questions examines the evolving dimensions of pluralism in MTAC rhetoric. This line of inquiry aims to illuminate the complex dynamics of MTAC appeals to "Multicultural Taiwan" over the course of its greater mission to liaise with Mongolia and Tibet, parts of the ROC's past pluralist republic. Chapter Seven sets out to critically examine these questions, discussing the evolving discourse of pluralism, diversity, and multiculturalism, from 1949 to 2017. The primary question addresses the Commission's navigation of the shifting official conceptualization of national identity with its institutional and ideological history. How does the early Republican notion of a "Five Nation Republic" influence MTAC representations of the nation? Furthermore, to what extent does the MTAC acknowledge Taiwanese multiculturalism in its 21st century activity? More broadly, how can historical comparison of the case of Taiwan inform us about the transition of imperialism – an inherently pluralist exercise -- into multiculturalism?

The last sub-set of research questions, discussed in Chapter Eight, reviews the evolution of discourse on Tibetan Buddhism and its followers. Finding a continuing presence of orientalist and exotifying approach to portrayals of the religion and its practitioners, the chapter is primarily concerned with tracing the additions and subtractions to the official vision of Tibet, according to the shifting contemporaneous political contexts. The principal question asks: as the ROC government has localized its official conceptions of national identity and promoted multicultural and religious tolerance, how have the MTAC's portrayals of Tibetan Buddhism and its practitioners shifted? As the ROC increasingly champions itself as the Asian bastion of tolerance, diversity, and democracy to preserve its legitimacy at home and to gain traction in the international community, questions arise onto the unfolding of this narrative and the degree

of its authenticity. To what degree have MTAC portrayals of Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism in particular employed an "internal orientalist" approach? How has the "internal orientalist" approach shifted over time? Lastly, how have these shifts corresponded to official notions of statehood and national identity?

Both the project's overarching research questions and the specific and theme oriented subsidiary lines of inquiry serve to direct the dissertation's exploration of the vast material left by the MTAC. In other words, these questions target the most relevant and otherwise neglected themes within the MTAC's archives to uncover an important part of the ROC on Taiwan's history. The following section pinpoints the significance of the project before outlining the research's limitations.

1.4 Significance and Limitations

The process of democratization since the late 1980s and shifting discourses of national identity in the ROC over the past 70 years have inspired many researchers to investigate the causes, mechanisms, and effects of these changes. Recent work on late 20th and 21st century ROC identity building in Taiwan focuses on the impact on those living on Taiwan (Chang 2015; Heylen 2011; Hughes 2016; Song 2009), and many have investigated Taiwanese nationalism and its influence on the ROC (Hsiau 2003, Song 2009). However, limited scholarship has investigated the trajectory of official portrayals of the Mainland after 1949, especially of non-Han peoples, such as the Mongolian people. Indeed, more generally there is limited scholarship on the ROC's positioning of its imagined frontiers, especially in later decades after its retreat to Taiwan. This research thus aims to improve our understanding of how the MTAC, as part of the ROC's larger state apparatus, imagined its national territory and understood the state's relationship to its so-called "frontier".

Spanning nearly seven decades, publications from the MTAC cover an expansive range of themes, topics, and several genres. The Commission's representations of the ROC, its frontier, and Taiwan provide a look into the changing relationship not only between the ROC state and Mainland China in general – a topic which has already received considerably scholarly attention – but more significantly between the ROC and the minority or marginalized communities within Greater China. The MTAC's description of the center-periphery relationship within the Republic offers the opportunity to explore the evolving role of Han-chauvinism, Chinese imperialism, and related notions of cultural or ethnic hierarchy in official conceptions of national identity. The finding chapters' discussions of the shifting forms of

imperialism embedded in ROC national identity aim to shed light on the development of contemporary official ideology in Taiwan, particularly vis-à-vis the ROC's claims to legitimacy as an important bastion of multicultural democracy and a regional leader for human rights and modern development.

However, this project has certain limitations. First, as the project looks exclusively into discourse as expressed in the publications of a state organ, any conceptions of identity or nationalism described can only be attributed to official state efforts to *ascribe* identity. The discussion of identity within the project's findings does not consider popular or *inhabited* notions of identity, national or otherwise (Bloomaert 2006). Second, the project does not touch on Mongolian, Tibetan, Indigenous, or other marginalized voices from "frontier" communities, except where included in MTAC documents themselves. This project is at least in its primary objective of revealing the trajectory of official conceptions of national identity uninterested in any notion of a historical truth or correcting the official national history of the ROC. Instead, the very concept of an official national history is regarded as inherently political, in line with a constructionist approach to national identity (Gellner 1983; Anderson 1983). While future research may consider the ROC's impact in shaping Mongolia or Tibet, or indeed Mongolia and Tibet's influences in shaping the ROC, this project is focused only on the internal official dialogue within the ROC.

Lastly, this project is not an exhaustive look into all aspects of MTAC history. Without interviews of surviving MTAC officials and members, or an exhaustive review of all MTAC documents – many of which were unavailable due to library access restrictions and limitations within the MTCC – there may be other questions to ask to direct additional research into the MTAC's institutional history. Future research may choose to include oral histories, focus on other themes, or gain access to the MTCC's archive. Additionally, there are some limitations owing to the situation external to the project. Fieldwork in place was abruptly ended several months in advance due to the advent of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2022. Although many materials were able to be photocopied in time or later purchased on-line, some texts were not available for photocopy in the rush to leave Taiwan before the Japanese border closed.

1.5 Structure of the Thesis

The thesis consists of nine chapters. Following this introduction chapter, the subsequent two chapters expand on the significance, originality, sources of data, and methods. The second chapter serves as a literature review and explores the body of research on Chinese imperialism,

Chinese nationalism, and national identity on Taiwan. This chapter aims to lay out the foundational political theory and key approaches to understanding Chinese history, focusing particularly on identity formation and consolidation efforts under the imperial Qing, by Han nationalists, and during the early Republican period. The chapter shifts to review scholarship on the emergence and consolidation of other nationalisms and identities on Taiwan, particularly after the island's retrocession to the ROC in 1945. The final section of the chapter discusses the limited body of work on the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission itself to reveal the gap in literature this dissertation aims to fill. Next, the third chapter presents an overview of the sources and methods used in the project. I describe the process to access and the general availability of the sources, as well as provide an overview of the materials. I then consider my theoretical approach to the study's reading and analysis of the documents, including a brief discussion of critical discourse analysis. I further introduce and justify my integration of an analytical approach that seeks to both foreground Qing and early Republican history, as well as incorporate domestic and international political contexts contemporaneous to the source materials' publication (Wodak 2011).

The fourth and fifth chapters both provide historical background information to further ground the project in its historical (pre-1949) and contemporaneous (1949-2017) contexts. The fourth chapter focuses on Qing management of the frontier and early Republican governance (or attempted governance) of its inherited frontier until retreat to Taiwan in 1949. Subsequent sections focus on identity formation and briefly reviews the succession of governing bodies on Taiwan from the 1600s through 1945. The chapter aims to provide a historical narrative of official identity formation and governance on the Mainland, as well as the simultaneous shifts in official approaches to identity and governance on Taiwan until ROC relocation to the island. Finally, the fifth chapter serves as a brief overview of the MTAC's institutional history on Taiwan, providing justification for the periodization.

The sixth, seventh, and eighth chapters form the findings chapters. Each chapter focuses on a specific theme and traces its shifts over time. The sixth chapter aims to investigate the continuation of a civilizing mission discourse in MTAC publications. The chapter discusses notions of ethnic or civilizational hierarchy and identifies key ideologies of Han-chauvinism under Qing imperialism and their legacies impacting national ideology through 2017. The seventh chapter turns to the concept of pluralism or multiculturalism. This chapter focuses on identifying the dimensions of the early Republican and martial law-era construction of the "Five Nation Republic" in the official approach to conceptualizing pluralism in the ROC. It then traces the emergence of "Multicultural Taiwan" and provides comparison between the

two conceptualizations of pluralism. The chapter also examines a possible ideological link between the two approaches. Finally, chapter eight explores official use of an "internal orientalist" lens in MTAC works envisioning and imagining Tibetan Buddhism, Tibetan Buddhists, and Tibet. This chapter finds a persistent narrative of righteous martyrdom in depictions of Tibetan Buddhists, employed in various ways in different eras to demonstrate specific qualities in the ROC.

The ninth chapter reviews the project's findings according to the research questions raised in Chapter One. While the previous three chapters organized the discussion of the results following a discourse-historical approach according to overarching theme, in the conclusion chapter, I aim to narrate the shifts in discourse in roughly chronological order, according to the periodization established in Chapter Five. After providing this narrative, I further discuss the ways in which the various themes interact with each other and their historical contexts over time in a discussion sub-section. Additionally, as I complete this project in 2022, the time of writing is fast approaching the five-year mark of the Commission's closure. After reviewing the dissertation's findings, this chapter thus addresses the time elapsed, the ongoings in Taiwan since 2017, and any implications of this study on contemporary identity politics, diplomacy, and statehood in Taiwan. This reflection of Taiwanese identity politics five years after the close of the MTAC serves as a segue into a final conclusion section to complete the dissertation as a whole.

Chapter Two: Imperialism, Pluralism, and National Identity

2.1 Introduction

This chapter is predominantly concerned with outlining an approach to understand the doctoral dissertation, both in terms of political theory and within the context of current scholarship on the case of the ROC on Taiwan. While a literature review is an essential chapter for all scholarly work aiming to demonstrate its relevance, originality, and significance, this chapter is of paramount importance for this project, as investigation into the now-defunct Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission and discussion of its relationship to both past and present conceptions of national identity and statehood in China and/or Taiwan is not readily understood as significant. Afterall, as one journal editor pointed out, during the time period under examination, neither Tibet nor Mongolia was in any way under the jurisdiction of the Republic of China. In other words, at first glance, there are no apparent real-life consequences for Mongolians or Tibetans stemming from any of the MTAC publications analyzed in this project.

Indeed, this project does not attempt to evaluate the impact of MTAC publications on Mongolia, Inner Mongolia, Tibet, or overseas Tibetans, and thus cannot dispute (nor confirm) the claim that the MTAC's work on Taiwan was inconsequential for these communities – although perhaps an initial line of inquiry for a future project. Instead, this endeavor examines exclusively the nature, causes, and significance of shifts in discourses of national identity and statehood within the MTAC on Taiwan from 1949 to 2017. In doing so, research narrows in on three main themes, all of which are connected to the nebulous space between or intersecting imperialism and nationalism: the mission to civilize, management of pluralism, and the orientalist imagery of Tibetan Buddhism. The research problematics of this project do not raise queries into the efficacy of the MTAC, but are concerned with the ideological implications for identity in Multicultural Taiwan, including where and how early Republican imperialism transformed or mutated into Taiwan's diversity-championing democracy. While the dissertation says little on Tibet or Mongolia, it aims to speak volumes on the nature and character of official national identity and conceptions of statehood for all people within the ROC. Furthermore, through the case of Taiwan, I hope to reflect on the conceptual foundation of imperialism within multicultural, civic notions of nationalism and identity today. As Said phrased it, "More important than the past itself, therefore, is its bearing upon cultural attitudes in the present." (1993, 49)

The following chapter thus turns to contextualize this project within the greater body of research. The literature review is divided into three sections. The first section reviews theories of imperialism and imperial approaches to consolidate identity and manage pluralism, before reviewing literature on Chinese imperialism specifically. In the second section, I discuss various relevant approaches to understanding nationalism and the nation, and then review literature on the trajectory of national identity on Taiwan, focusing on the years between 1949 and 2017. Then, the third section of the chapter reviews current English and Chinese language literature on the MTAC. Ultimately, this literature review aims to demonstrate not only the dearth of scholarship on the MTAC on Taiwan as an institution, but more importantly the gap in literature investigating the impact of imperialism's legacy on contemporary Taiwan, as well as the encompassing lack of historically anchored examinations of ROC portrayals of Greater China outside of the Han dominated central plains, or so-called "inner China" [內地].

2.2 Imperialism and its Legacy

2.2.1 Imperialism and Ideology

Although this project is predominantly concerned with the evolution of official conceptions of national identity and statehood, the concept of imperialism underpins the central arguments throughout the dissertation. Thus, before reviewing the theory and body of scholarship of nationalism and identity formation in the Republic of China, particularly on Taiwan, it is first vital to introduce an approach to imperialism. The following section reviews briefly scholarship on imperialism globally, before focusing on the study of imperialism in the Qing court and Republic of China specifically.

Writing in the early 20th century, J.A. Hobson's treatise *Imperialism* (1902, ed: 2018) laid bare some of the mythologies embedded in the logic of imperialism. Relying on Social Darwinist notions of racial hierarchies from his contemporary ethnologists, Hobson played apologist for the general phenomenon of colonization, arguing that state regulation of a natural conquest of more primitive peoples was a moral necessity. However, in addition to his apologism and an extended orientalist evaluation of China's civilizational integrity, Hobson's work made several key contributions to the unveiling of European falsehoods used to justify the forcible spread of control and subjugation. First, Hobson identifies the possibility for a simultaneous occurrence of both nationalism and imperialism, and was in clear support of the

former over the latter, believing nationhood to be a primordial truth. He explained that it is a "debasement" of "genuine nationalism" to work "to overflow its natural banks and absorb the near or distant territory of reluctant and unassimilable peoples, that marks the passage from nationalism to a spurious colonialism on the one hand, imperialism on the other." (8) Although this project does not accept Hobson's claim that the nation is a naturally occurring, primordial phenomenon, discussed further below, Hobson's argument that imperialism and nationalism can coexist is convincing. Furthermore, his definition of imperialism provides an initial base for further exploration. He describes imperialism as the management of territory outside of a mutually recognized national boundary, with the subjugated peoples often held "in complete political bondage so far as all major processes of government are concerned" (9).

While Hobson presented a world view steeped in the racial and ethnic hierarchies embedded in European scholarship of his time, his work remains valuable in highlighting the mythmaking inherent in imperialism and the institutional tools employed by state actors to perpetuate these ideologies both within the core nation and periphery territories. Hobson was particularly concerned with the lies of convenience woven into the fabric of especially British imperialism. He demonstrated through several examples the false claim of the civilizing mission, arguing that any imperialist promise of enriching the lives of the subjugated peoples, whom Hobson refers to as "lower races," is based on an ingenuine objective to indoctrinate a targeted community, ultimately so as to control the territory and enforce labor practices within a community. Hobson cites many possible channels for this indoctrination for the "management of nations," including: "controlling the press, the schools, and where necessary the churches, [to] impose Imperialism upon the masses under the attractive guise of sensational patriotism." (344-345) He concludes that only through the "establishment of a genuine democracy, the direction of public policy by the people for the people through representatives over whom they exercise a real control" can these imperialist forces be brought to an end (344).

Writing at the end of the 20th century, Said (1993) emphasizes the importance of hierarchy as an ideological tool of imperialism, thereby adding a much-needed dimension to Hobson's work. Said offers the following and oft-referenced definition of imperialism: "'Imperialism' means the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan center ruling a distant territory." (41). Said notes that while "direct colonialism" has for the most part ended at his time of writing, imperialism remains influential and significant within the cultural, political, ideological, economic and social spheres. Said's *Culture and Imperialism* demonstrates several key components to both active and latent imperialism. First, in the logic

of hierarchies inherent to imperialism, Said notes a tautology in European representations of empire:

> …representations of what lay beyond… came, almost from the start, to *confirm* European power. There is an impressive circularity here: we are dominant because we have the power (industrial, technological, military, moral) and they don't, because of which they are *not* dominant; they are inferior, we are superior… and so on and on. (137-8)

Images of empire thus served both to describe and legitimate the hierarchical relationship between ruler and ruled: those who rule do so because of their relative advancement.

Extending Hobson's efforts to demonstrate the faulty logic of imperialism, Said continues his discussion of imperialist hierarchy into a review of the ideological practices necessary to demonstrate superiority. Said (1993) outlines a number of key ideological elements of imperialism, several of which are directly pertinent to this project. As Said is primarily examining "Western" or European and U.S. imperialism throughout the rest of the world, he examines the "Western" imperialist ontological demarcation between east and west, a practice he describes in his book *Orientalism* (1979). However, here, Said (1993: 140) breaks this concept down further, to explore the imperial "codification of difference" and the practice of imperial powers "to codify and disseminate knowledge, to characterize, transport, install, and display instances of other cultures … and above all to rule them". It is through this practice of consolidating and classifying knowledge that a narrative of "duty" to the subjugated peoples can emerge. This narrative can also be understood as a civilizing mission. Said terms the ability to write, manage and disseminate such narratives within imperial institutions the "great creative power" of imperial attitudes.

Hobson and Said both fall into the trap of focusing exclusively on European or American examples of imperialism, and consider other empires exclusively as receivers of "Western" aggression, where they might be considered at all. Scholars of Japanese imperialism in particular have responded to the exclusion of non-Western empires in discussions of colonialism, imperialism, and (imperial) nationalism. Naoki Sakai (2009) criticizes the strict delineation between what he terms "the West" and "the Rest" in much of academic discussion on imperialism, nationalism, and racism. He argues that by accepting the "West-Rest binary," scholars deny themselves the opportunity to examine more fully the nature of imperialism or to "question certain theoretical premises" of Japanese imperialism specifically (198). He cites several examples of these premises, including issues relevant to the discussion of Chinese

imperialism (explored below), such as universalism, hierarchy, and lineage, ultimately asking: "is it still plausible to appeal to the discourse of the West and the Rest so as to put forth the basic assumption … that Japanese nationalism and imperialism are qualitatively different from those of the West?" (199).

While providing an answer to Sakai's provocations is outside the purview of this dissertation, Ching (2001, 19), writing a few years prior to Sakai's article, asks—and answers—a similar set of queries:

…are all Western imperialisms and colonialisms… the same? What are the intellectual and political stakes in comparing empires in this way? What are the enunciative modalities that insist on the difference of Japanese colonial empire from other – that is, white and Western – empires? In short, what difference does difference make?

Ching thus explains that, while locality and specificity are "undoubtedly important," an "overemphasis" on difference between regimes "masks the homogenizing force and the collaborative alliance among the various colonizers at different historical moments under shifting geopolitical configurations" (19). Emphatic in his appreciation of the specific mechanisms and strategies of Japanese imperialism, Ching still asserts convincingly the need to contextualize the Japanese empire within the global phenomenon of colonialism, citing the "fundamental structure" in the relationship between the colonized and the colonizer (19).

To further support his argument, Ching challenges the common assumption (or in Sakai's terms, premise) that Japanese imperialism is unique due to the empire's racial homogeneity. First, Ching emphasizes that notions of race were complex and at times contradicting in imperial Japan. He draws on writings by Sakai to illustrate Japan's simultaneous acceptance and rejection of "Western" imperialism's notions of racial hierarchy. He demonstrates that Japanese cultural or racial affiliation with its subjugated colonies was employed in discourses arguing against Anglo/Western imperialism in Asia, so as to facilitate an imperial logic of protectionism and unification in the face of racial competition. The project of assimilation or *douka* (同化) emphasized an "ideology of equality and fraternity" and was often entangled with Japan's modernization and, later, war mobilization efforts in its colonies (4). At the same time, imperial Japan's dominion over its colonies served as an important symbol of Japan's superiority within a strict civilizational hierarchy. For example, according to Fang-ming Chen (2005), Japanese control of Taiwan was depicted as evidence of Japan's colonial capability and

rightful association among the world's colonizing powers. Chen further identifies the symbolic value of Taiwan and the territory's modernization projects as a vital element of Japan's imperial logic. Imperial Japan's portrayals of Taiwan drew on a clear notion of cultural hierarchy within the empire, in which the residents of Taiwan were presented as belonging to a second-class race: "uncivilized and still waiting for civilization to be brought to them" (11). In short, Ching (2001) argues, in various instances, discourses of racial differentiation or racial affinity were used either to justify Japan's colonial projects and greater imperial expansion or to discourage European or Western development.

Across the studies of imperialisms discussed here, several key ideologies relevant to this study are highlighted, namely cultural or civilizational hierarchy, codification of difference, and the mission to civilize. However, before attempting to draw on these concepts in later analysis, it is first necessary to contextualize the discussion of imperialism and its development within the context of China. Fortunately, a number of scholars have made great progress in investigating the bounds and characteristics of a Chinese imperialism, particularly during both Qing and early Republican eras. The following sub-section reviews several of these key scholars and their work, aiming to discuss their contributions not simply within the confines of an area studies deliberation of what is "Chineseness," but connected to the above larger discussion of imperialism more globally.

2.2.2 The Case of China

Teng (2004) confronts the neglect of imperialist China in scholarly work on colonization and imperialism directly. She argues that many modern, post-colonial scholars of China "have tended to focus on China's historical experiences with Western imperialism while ignoring China's own history as an imperialist power," citing in particular contemporary PRC narratives of history (7). Teng defines the imperialism of the Qing empire as the "Qing conquest of vast tracts of non-Chinese lands through military force, their rule of these distant lands from an imperial center, and their incorporation of significant numbers of ethnically distinct, non-Chinese peoples as subjects of the empire." (9) She continues to explain that her use of the term "imperialism" should refer to the "set of practices, politics and ideologies," and references the same definition of imperialism from Said (1993) included above. Teng then makes an extended comparison of Chinese and European imperial cultures, and draws a series of equivalencies, including similar employment of discourses on the barbarian "other." Teng's work proceeds to examine Qing travel writing in Taiwan during the era of Qing expansionism, finding clear evidence of a discourse of a mission to civilize in their writings.

Teng also considers the complexity of official identity politics under the Qing Empire. As the historical background in Chapter Four discusses in greater detail, the Qing Empire was formally an ethnic Manchu enterprise, with an enforced exclusion of non-Manchus within the elite ruling class. However, Teng notes that the Qing empire's conquest of its extended territory relied considerably first on its "multi-ethnic troops," which included Manchu, Han and Mongol Banners, and second on the "nearly exclusively Han Chinese" settlers of the conquered "frontier" regions (11). Thus, Teng draws the conclusion that the imperialism of the Manchu Qing state can be characterized as "Chinese" and not simply as "Manchu". An important precedent, Crossley (1999) laid the groundwork for Teng's argument in her study of Manchu governance and the Qing's purposeful manipulation and consolidation of identity as means to manage diversity within its empire. Crossley finds that many identities, including the category of Manchu itself, were created or codified during Qing imperial rule to extend and maintain sovereignty during the process of expansion. Discussed further in Chapter Four, it should be noted here that the five primary racial categories solidified under the Qing would eventually become the five recognized nations that comprised the Republic of China in 1912.

The discussion of identity and imperialism in Qing and early Republican China was also explored in the works of both Duara (1996) and Wang (2014). With somewhat diverging backgrounds and conclusions, both scholars examine the relationship between the Qing empire and associated imperialism and the birth of Chinese nationalism, with regard to the concept of culturalism. Duara defines "culturalism," or what he re-terms "Chinese culturalism," as "a statement of Chinese values as superior but, significantly, not exclusive" (43). Duara explains that through education, so-called "barbarians" were allowed partial entry into this community – and thereby could further "distinguish themselves from yet other barbarians who did not share these values." (44) Duara connects the relativism of Chinese culturalism to the emergence of the Chinese nation, arguing that previous scholarship's view of culturalism as "radically different" from nationalism is incorrect. He posits that the "Chinese culturalism" employed by the Qing court saw culture "as a criterion defining a community" (42) and community membership as "participation in a ritual order that embodied allegiance to Chinese ideas and ethics, which revolved around the Chinese emperor," in this case an ethnic Manchu emperor successfully employing the mandate of heaven rhetoric for legitimacy (42). Duara explains that these "ritual practices" allowed the Republic of China to claim inheritance to the vast territory of the Qing empire by maintaining certain imperial ideologies. From Duara's history of Chinese nationalism, it is clear that imperialist attitudes and strategies, developed or

strengthened under Qing expansion, were adopted by early Republican leaders to lay claim to a multi-ethnic, multi-nation state.

Wang (2014) also sees the "very prominent and direct" relationship between Qing and Republican China, and seeks to reject the strict delineation between imperialism and modernity. He asks a series of edifying questions:

Is China an empire or a nation state, or an empire merely passing itself off as a nation-state? Is China a political concept or a civilizational or cultural concept? How are we to understand Chinese nationalism and Chinese national identity? (25)

Wang provides a solution to understanding the complex and intertwined relationship of imperialism and nationalism in China through the concept of entangled modernity. Entangled modernity allows the "denaturalization of the category of 'China,'" and thus a reflexivity or hybridity of nationalism and imperialism can be considered (24). However, Wang's work takes much of the early Republic of China's rhetoric of equality at face value, and does not examine more deeply the ideological forces at play within the young Republic.

Leibold (2007, 3) offers such a critical review of early Republican nationalism. He examines official navigation of the "frontier" and "national" questions during the Republican era up to 1949. The frontier was key to forging a Republican Chinese national identity: the frontier regions were imagined as home to a barbarian "inferior familiar other" dependent on culturally superior modern (Han) "liberators" (6). Leibold's description of a hierarchy of civilizations embedded in Republican era nationalism is congruent with Osterhammel's (2006: 8) definition of a civilizing mission: "the self-proclaimed right and duty to propagate and actively introduce one's own norms and institutions to other peoples and societies, based upon a firm conviction of the inherent superiority and higher legitimacy of one's own collective way of life." Osterhammel further identifies the mission to civilize as a key component of modern imperialism.

Vickers (2015) further discusses the civilizing mission in modern China. He cites Osterhammel and others in his essay tracing the history of the Chinese civilizing mission, reviewing scholarship illuminating the ideology's impact on the policies and ideology of various Chinese regimes. Vickers stresses that many of the ideas informing older manifestations of the colonial civilizing mission are to be found embedded in discourses of contemporary nationalism. In this respect, he finds extensive continuity between Republican

frontier development and education programs, and minorities policy under the People's Republic of China.

Finally, Bulag (2006) argues for a compelling framework through which to view the role of imperialism within the Republic of China (1912-1949). Much like Vickers and Leibold, Bulag (2006, 261) refutes the notion that the establishment of the ROC signaled a "definitive triumph of Chinese nationalism," but instead describes the drive to control Greater China as a "combination of both nationalism and imperialism." To investigate this amalgamation, Bulag zeroes in on the Republican central government's policy toward Mongolia, including both Inner Mongolia and the independent nation of Mongolia. He insists that the term "empire" does not accurately define the ROC, and instead offers the phrase "going imperial" to explain the Republican government's borrowed imperial tactics while attempting maintain a "unified nationalist China." Bulag's work provides concrete and focused examples of the deep imperial roots informing the ROC's approach to the peoples and territories outside of the Han's ancestral center plains and extended land.

Before transitioning to the next section, it is necessary to briefly review certain key terms and outline how the imperialist attitudes, strategies of governance, ethno-cultural tropes discussed above can be applied in a discussion of nation and nationalism. Imperialism, defined by Hobson (2018) and Said (1973), covers a vast array of ideologies and practices, only some of which are relevant to the case of the MTAC on Taiwan. As the Commission was not in a position to assist in governing any region of Tibet or Mongolia during the period of examination (1949-2017), most of the elements of imperialism considered in this dissertation are ideological in nature, and may or may not have held any real impact on the lives of Tibetan and Mongolian peoples on Mainland China. In other words, the ROC on Taiwan was not an empire, but this dissertation argues that certain imperialist ideas significantly influenced MTAC discourses of national identity and statehood. This dissertation thereby employs the term *imperialism* as an umbrella phrase to reference the overarching ideology that connects the relevant imperialist discourses, tropes, and linguistic mechanisms, e.g., cultural hierarchy and Han-chauvinism, assimilation, the mission to civilize, exotification, and codification of pluralism (discussed at length in Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight). Wherever possible, the specific discourse or trope is named to avoid confusion.

The scholarship presented here thus proposes a view of ROC nationalism (through 1949) as the inheritor of key Qing ideologies. The works of Teng (2004), Crossley (1999) provide a critical review of the Qing approach to imperialism, specifically targeting the political process of identity consolidation, power, and governance on the frontiers of the empire. Both Leibold

(2007) and Vickers (2015), highlighting early Republican frontier policy, thus extend Teng's position that the Qing engaged in a deliberate civilizing mission project, positing that such an imperialist project continued into the 20th century. Bulag (2006) further identifies imperialist strategies of governance and claims to sovereignty in his "going imperial" framework. Duara (1996) argues for an understanding of Chinese nationalism that includes key elements of imperialist ideology as central to the notion of a Chinese people, territory, and/or nation. However, these scholars' histories of Chinese nationalism end before 1949 or fail to follow the evolution of the ROC's approach nationalism on Taiwan. Consequently, a key question arises about the recent history of the ROC, after retreat to Taiwan. To what degree have the legacies of Qing imperialism evident in early Republican era strategies of governance and official approaches to nationalism, identity, and hierarchy remained entrenched in official ideology on Taiwan? Before attempting to answer this question through examination of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission on Taiwan in later chapters (see Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight), first the literature on the development of nationalism on Taiwan must be reviewed. The following section offers an overview of the vast subject of the development of both official and popular nationalisms on Taiwan, underlining the scholarly neglect of precisely this dissertation's grounding consideration of lingering imperialist ideologies in the ROC.

2.3 Nationalism on Taiwan

This section reviews current literature on the shifting conceptualization of national identity on Taiwan. Like much of the scholarship included below, it begins by establishing an understanding of nationalism, drawing primarily on Gellner (1983) and Anderson (1983). Gellner (1983) investigates the development of the nation and its relationship to nationalism and statehood. He posits that "[i]t is nationalism which engenders nations, and not the other way round" (56). Anderson's (1983) examination of how nations, once in existence, develop into "imagined communities" so as to adjust to their evolving social, economic, or political contexts greatly illuminates the dynamism of nationalism's political production. To ensure its continuation, the state must remember, forget, and mythologize its past, present, and future in a never-ending effort to maintain a coherent national narrative. Work published by the MTAC, a state organ ostensibly responsible for liaison with and governance of the Mongolian and Tibetan peoples and their territories, is the kind of official body that Anderson and Gellner point to as working to consolidate national identity. This section next reviews scholarship of popular and official nationalisms, with the emergence of popular notions of identity primarily

framed in the context of how these movements shaped or contributed to official ideology. In the remaining paragraphs, Han identity and chauvinism on Taiwan is reviewed, followed by a discussion of scholarship on the localization and/or de-Sinicization movement(s). The section finally examines current research on Taiwan's adoption of a multicultural approach to citizenship.

Particularly since the process of democratization began in the 1980s, extensive scholarship has investigated questions related to Taiwaneseness, Chineseness and the development and impact of Taiwanese nationalism. Research has also explored the extent and nature of the shift in the ROC's official conceptions of citizenship, recognition of language, portrayal of national culture, and much more. Brown (2004) asks her question forthrightly in her title *Is Taiwan Chinese*?. In her book, Brown examines the historical trajectory of Taiwanese identity, arguing that for extended periods immigrants from China residing in what is today called Taiwan did not identify as "Han," and in fact did not form a collective ethnic identity until Japanese colonization (1895-1945).

Song's doctoral dissertation (2009) also examines modern Taiwanese nationalist ideologies, their civic and ethnic components, and the degree of integration into the ROC state. Citing "territoriality" as a featured aspect of civic conceptions of nationalism and a particularly salient issue in the context of the ROC on Taiwan, Song includes consideration of how activists, politicians, and scholars have understood Taiwanese nationalism, including activist Huang Shaotang and politician and former president Lee Tenghui. Huang argues for an independent Taiwan, based on the concept of "non-differentiating [national] identity," in which "territory became the primary object of national identification" (161). Former president Lee Tenghui, taking a more middle-of-the-road approach, constructed a concept of ROC citizenship based on the sovereignty of those living on Taiwan. Both approaches to Taiwanese national identity, however, emphasized territoriality, localization, and the link among the people, the land, and the state. Writing several years prior to Song, Schubert (2004), argues that both political parties have been greatly influenced by Taiwanese nationalism, despite the partisan "schism:" "Taiwan's political parties are both reflectors and amplifiers of a national identity that is predominantly rooted in the peoples' identification with their sovereign state." (535) In other words, Schubert argues, with regard to potential reunification, no political party would be able to significantly move in this direction without the objection of the people in Taiwan.

Writing in the same year, Bi-yu Chang (2004), also notes the great overlap between political parties in terms of favored national ideologies. She finds that while both KMT and DPP rely on Taiwanese cultural exchange in diplomacy, the DPP has pushed this program

much further, even, as Chang claims, presenting Taiwan "as a cultural product, placed on the international market by the creation of brand names, logos, positioning, brand associations, and brand personality." (44) Chang concludes that the primary difference between the two parties is the prioritization of localization. While the KMT had found it necessary to localize to maintain political legitimacy, the DPP pushed localization as part of their agenda for de-sinicization.

Place and national geography are also important components in national identity formation. While certain other aspects of the ROC's official conception of national identity also reflected ideological tensions, the contradiction between the official imaginary and political reality of national territory has only increased over time. Despite this, as Chang (2015) notes, scholarship investigating place, geography, and boundary prevalent in the ROC on Taiwan is rather limited. Chang (2015, 2) examines the "spatial dimension of identity formation" through her analysis of yearbooks, cartography, elementary school textbooks, and the phenomenon of the Chunghsing New Village through the 20th century, finding a shifting conception of national geography that re-orients itself away from Mainland China towards a Taiwan-centric understanding of self by the late 20th century. This shift towards Taiwan, however, is "dominated" by "a long shadow" of postwar education—into the 1980s—that had an "overwhelming China-centric, Han-oriented and male chauvinist tendency' and 'shaped students' geographical imagination and worldview" (197). Chang's workplaces "Taiwan"—both place and people—at the center, and thus focuses predominantly on the impact and interaction of these official, ascribed notions of place and national identity on the inhabited identities of Taiwan's residents.

Finally, in Chang's most recent publication (2021), she reviews social studies textbooks' images of the "national self" from 1949 until 2000, finding that the shift from China to Taiwan in "official national self-image" is not simply a matter of geography. Instead, Chang argues that the meaning of "we" in official nationality discourse fundamentally changes. She claims that a historical discourse of "what we came from" shifts to "what we have achieved" in the late 1960s and 1970s and then again to "what we have become" by the late 1990s. Textbooks' driving message at the end of the 20th century worked to highlight what Chang terms "a 'contemporary we'" that features the nation's development and democracy (37).

Since the early 2000s, Taiwan has increasingly embraced pluralism and recognized a growing number of diverse identities, particularly after the 2005 constitutional amendment to affirm multiculturalism (Executive Yuan 2005). Hughes (2016) examines first the process of "nativization" of national identity, the KMT's response to democratization and the need to

review what he terms the incongruous "China myth" (153). He then goes on to explore the Democratic Progressive Party's term in office after 2000 and efforts towards "de-sinification," followed by the return of the KMT in 2008. He concludes that over the course of the past three to four decades, "democratization has thus allowed the steady growth of a pluralistic, civic sense of Taiwanese identity."

Official recognition and revitalization of certain languages in Taiwan is one arena that has been particularly impacted by the expansion of state multiculturalism. With strict Mandarin-only policies under military rule, during the beginning stages of democratization and localization in the late 1980s and 1990s, Taiwan began to turn away from its draconian language policies. Taiwan has since implemented various multicultural and multilingual language policies within the education system, for broadcasting regulations, and to extend official status to all native "Taiwanese" languages (Tiun 2020). Lu (2005, 12) highlights the geo-political context for the shifts in language policy in Taiwan, pointing to the "battlefield" of language choice in the context of conflict with the PRC. In the 21st century, localization was means for differentiation from the PRC by stressing local identities and democracy in a multicultural Taiwan. Indeed, after over half a century of pushing for Mandarin as the common language with Mandarin Only policy, under DPP President Chen Shui-bian (2000-2008), "native language" classes were established in primary and lower secondary schools, generally referred to as "mother tongue education" (Scott and Tiun 2007, 60). This program taught Hakka, Taiwanese, and Indigenous languages weekly to students, although the medium of instruction remained Mandarin (Schubert and Briag 2011).

It is notable, however, that the DPP during Chen Shui-bian's administration declined to adopt the movement to co-officialize Taiwanese as a national language alongside Mandarin, in tepid favor of legislation that also recognized Taiwan's minority languages, such as the National Language Development Law (NLDL) (Dupre 2016). However, the NLDL was not initially successful, having drowned in legislative debate on terminology and concerns over "Hoklo chauvinism" (Dupre 2016, 28). A decade after Chen Shui-bian's presidency, the NLDL passed legislation (Ministry of Culture 2019). The NLDL extends official status of national languages to Hakka, Taiwanese, recognized Indigenous languages, and Taiwan Sign Language.

In addition to Taiwan's local and regional contexts, international politics has influenced Taiwan's evolving language policies. In step with a general shift away from a "Cold War-like" international relations model towards "one oriented around public and especially cultural diplomacy" that works to highlight Taiwanese democracy, culture, education, and economic

development (Rawnsley 2017, 990), Taiwan's language policies have made appeals to democracy and multiculturalism. Dupre (2019) emphasizes the entwinement of international and national concerns in the process of democratization and policy for multiculturalism, tying concerns for the portrayal of Taiwan's democratic legitimacy, sovereignty, and national identity for audiences both at home and abroad to key language legislation, namely in the Indigenous Languages Development Act (ILDA). The ILDA recognizes Indigenous languages as national languages (a few months before the NLDL reaffirmed this designation) and provides some measures for the protection and revitalization of recognized Indigenous languages. However, Dupre (2019, 662) cautions that the ILDA "is only the first, the most symbolic, and arguably the easiest step in the revitalization of Indigenous languages, and its implementation will be a far better indicator of the direction Taiwan's democratic state tradition is headed toward."

Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples' advocacy groups have also made headway for greater recognition and autonomy beyond language rights and revitalization programs. Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples since 1998 have won the right to semi-autonomous education systems (Law 2002). Policy relating to semi-autonomous Indigenous education has moved towards increased recognition of Indigenous Peoples and their cultures, languages, and history (Chen 2011; Kuan 2016). However, Chi (2016) contends that Taiwan's official narrative of Indigenous Peoples in its history remains stinted and immature. Referencing Kymlicka (2001) and Gellner (1995), Chi argues the common culture shared in Taiwan reflect little of genuine Indigenous cultures. Chi posits that Indigenous Peoples' movements have been essential in "pushing the Taiwanese government to embrace multiculturalism by re-examining its ethnocentric legacy" (277), and ultimately had a great share of the responsibility for the adoption of the vision of Multicultural Taiwan employed by the ROC both at home and abroad to great reception. However, Chi states directly that there remains a "limit to multiculturalism in Taiwan" in that the "'shared culture,' as it manifests in different aspects of social life and institutions, is still heavily leaning towards the settler society." (275)

Finally, although only beginning to be featured in Taiwan's multicultural discourse before 2017, the year of the MTAC's closure, the category of "new immigrants," referring officially to migrants from seven recognized Southeast Asian countries, Mainland China, Hong Kong or Macau, was increasingly included in discussions of pluralism on Taiwan. The category of new immigrants is predominantly made up of "marriage migrants," typically women from China, Hong Kong, Macau, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, Myanmar, and Malaysia (MOI 2015). Isabelle Chang and Dafydd Fell (2014) examine the role of "marriage migrants"

in DPP and KMT election materials leading up to the 2012 election. They find that while marriage migrants' stories and images are clearly used to depict Taiwan as multicultural and "strengthen the citizens' Taiwanese identity," ultimately, the actual voices and experiences of marriage migrants were largely neglected and ignored within the larger ideological structure of national identity in Taiwan. Writing several years later, Kasai (2022) finds that despite the inclusion of "new immigrant" languages, in reference to selected languages spoken in the seven Southeast Asian countries, in the mother tongue language program, the complex identities of "new immigrants," including both the predominantly female immigrants and their children, continue to be ignored by official discourses in favor of simplified identities that emphasize their foreignness so as to highlight Taiwanese tolerance and diversity.

Based on the above scholarship, it is evident that Taiwan has undergone several great transformations since the arrival of the ROC in 1945 and the government retreat in 1949. Since even before the end of military rule in 1987, Taiwan has seen localization movements pivot towards the islands and away from Mainland China, ultimately fundamentally changing not only the geography and territoriality of the nation, but the very nature of what it means to be a citizen on Taiwan. As a result of the extension of democracy and localization efforts, multiculturalism has become a principal pillar of ROC national identity on Taiwan, embracing not only the distinct identity of the Taiwanese, but also Hakka and Indigenous Peoples. Most recently, new immigrants have also been included into this conversation. Still, there are many critics of multiculturalism in Taiwan who argue that the state's championing rhetoric far outpaces actual official efforts to support its stated ideals, resulting in stunted language revitalization programs and the politicization and reduction of certain identities.

While the above literature provides a robust look into how Taiwan has shifted towards Taiwan and away from the notion of Han China, it fails to consider the potential for a lingering impact of Chinese imperialism in Taiwan, or how any transformation of Taiwanese society and government may have been influenced by the ROC's (former) relationship with Greater China, including Tibet and Mongolia. Indeed, more generally there is limited scholarship on the ROC's positioning of its imagined frontiers, especially in later decades after its retreat to Taiwan. This research thus aims to improve our understanding of how the MTAC, as part of the ROC's larger state apparatus, imagined its national territory and understood the state's relationship to its so-called "frontier". What happened to this historical legacy of the ROC during its shift to a democratic, multicultural Taiwan remains unclear. Although no work has yet compiled a critical, comprehensive review of MTAC discourse on national identity during its years on Taiwan, the following section reviews scholarship that mentions the Commission.

2.4 Current Research on the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission

English language scholarship on the MTAC is limited, with only a handful of works discussing the Commission. The bulk of this scholarship focuses on the early Republican era and follows the attempts of the MTAC to extend sovereignty throughout the regions of Mongolia and Tibet. Beyond this, only a tiny number of mostly Tibetan scholars and journalists consider the MTAC after its relocation to Taiwan with the rest of the ROC central government. In addition to English language scholarship, there are some Chinese language projects that examine the MTAC, although they are typically short reports from PRC scholars, often with overt political messaging on the existence of one China and the need or possibility of reunification.

In a rare instance of extended English language investigation into the MTAC, Mei-hua Lan (2017) traces the evolution of the Qing Lifanyuan into the MTAC, and provides a bulleted comparison of the two bodies in lieu of a conclusion. The eleven-page chapter primarily focuses on the development of the Lifanyuan from 1638 and the debates over the Commission's creation in the 1920s in Nanjing. The chapter's main contribution lies in Lan's historical narrative linking Qing and Republican management of their territory's periphery, identifying key differences between the two institutions, and the early Republican debates over the scope of the MTAC's jurisdiction. However, Lan's study does not incorporate a theoretical framework, and only briefly mentions the MTAC's symbolic value. While valuable for its descriptive historical narrative through 1937, Lan's chapter does not touch on issues of national identity, imperialism, or statehood. Furthermore, as is typical for English language material, the chapter does not consider at length the MTAC's evolutions on Taiwan.

Apart from Mei-hua Lan's chapter, the bulk of English language research referencing the MTAC does so only briefly, and is focused on examining the narratives of Tibetan or Mongolian independence movements. Some of these works merely mention the MTAC in a sentence or two to describe a KMT policy directive or negotiation tactic, including Goldstein (2007), Mackerras (1995) and Kapstein (2006), to highlight a particular response by the Tibetan authorities. Others, including Namgyal (2003a; 2003b) and Shakya (1999) trace somewhat more extensively a series of MTAC actions or attitudes to explain key events or phenomena in Tibet (Shakya 1999) or within the Tibetan government-in-exile (Namgyal 2003a; 2003b). Apart from Namgyal's information-rich albeit brief articles describing the developing relationship between the ROC and Tibetan government-in-exile, all of these works

end their consideration of the MTAC by the 1950s. After this, like the most work on Greater China, their research focuses on PRC governance.

Research into the Mongolian independence movement also accounts for several projects that incorporate the history of the MTAC in its analysis. Uradyn Bulag's work in this arena provides several valuable investigations into the MTAC's role in influencing the Mongolian independence movement. Bulag (2002; 2006; 2010) across several studies includes MTAC efforts to coerce, negotiate, and/or entice Mongolian and Tibetan leaders to pledge loyalty to the ROC and agree to Republican governance, including the book chapter previously discussed (Bulag 2006, see section 2.2.2). While Bulag's collected work is an essential piece of the body of literature on modern Mongolian identity formation, nation-building, and early 20th century Asian history, his research interest does not spill over to the ROC on Taiwan, nor to the shifting nature of the MTAC as an institution.

Chinese language scholarship has written somewhat more extensively on the development of the Commission on Taiwan. Generally, Chinese language research on the MTAC heavily reflects the researchers' affiliated institution's locations, with the Taiwan Strait once again serving as a partition between camps. On Taiwan during the period of martial law, the MTAC played a significant role in both in shaping academic institutions and collaborating on specific research. Consequently, the MTAC was occasionally referenced in scholarly work from the time, although never from a critical perspective. A review of this literature, termed as frontier studies or "China Border studies" scholarship, during the period of martial law is included Chapter Five to explore discourses of the frontier, statehood, and approaches nationalism within academia.

Since the end of martial law, the MTAC has not received much scholarly attention on Taiwan. Only a handful of projects investigate the Commission's change over time, including those works written by (former) MTAC officials themselves for commercial publication. One masters' thesis by Hui-Chen Chi 紀慧貞 in 2017 examines the impact of party politics on the MTAC with particular view towards the MTAC's medical and health exchange programs with Mongolian-majority states, incorporating not only Mongolia but also the Republic of Kalmykia, Republic of Buryat, and Republic of Tuva, as well as, under Ma Ying-jeou's administration, the PRC's Inner Mongolia. Chi's thesis covers only the last two to three decades of the MTAC, after democratization and the establishment of free elections. The thesis paints the MTAC's public health and medical training and exchange programs as a bi-partisan attempt to de-politicize the Commission and enable dialogue and exchange with varying targets

(Mongolia, the PRC). While the thesis does touch on KMT versus DPP approaches to de-sinizization [去中國化] and the official response to the question of Taiwan independence [台獨], beyond these issues, there is no discussion of ideology. Moreover, despite introducing the MTAC as a government body with roots in the Qing Empire, mention of imperialism or imperialist ideologies is limited to a reference to the actions taken by the Soviet Union[3]. While Chi's thesis is an interesting look into one untold story of party politics on Taiwan, the project does not extend far beyond this analytical frame or consider in depth the issue of statehood and identity.

圖 5-1　蒙藏委員會蒙事處業務擺盪特性圖
資料來源：研究者自繪

Image: Ji demonstrates the change in rhetoric and targeted region across administration from the 1990s to 2010s (148).

Other Chinese language research into the MTAC on Taiwan includes Liu Xueyao's recent (2018) book, titled *Seventy Years of Frontier Administration Research on Taiwan* [台灣的邊政研究七十年]. The book was published by a commercial publishing house (致知學術出版社, a subsidiary of 思行文化傳播有限公司). The *Seventy Years of Frontier Administration*

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[3] Troublingly, Chi (2017) appears to cite MTAC publication as scholarly sources in the thesis' historical background section to explain the pre-Commission relationship between the ROC and Mongolia. Chi's reference to Soviet "imperialist policy" [帝國主義之政策] is part of a quote pulled from a book published by Liu Xueyao (discussed later in this section) in 1996 and published by the MTAC: 《蒙藏委員會簡史 續編—附歷任委員長簡歷》.

Research on Taiwan is divided into two sections: the first an overview of academic research into frontier administration and the second a review of MTAC efforts on Taiwan until 2017. Rather than a "tell-all" account of the government body or of the inner workings within frontier studies circle, the book instead heaps praise on the work and graduates of his alma mater, the Frontier Administration Studies department in National Taiwan Chengchi University, and former employer, the MTAC. As a former MTAC member and chief secretary (主任秘書), Liu contributed to many Commission publications, particularly during the years under martial law, through 1987. A Mainlander from Zhucheng, Shandong Province, Liu strictly maintains a one-China approach to the Mainland, and in the later chapters of each book section, Liu laments the demise of both the MTAC and the greater public's interest in the "frontier." Consequently, while an interesting and at times informative history of the MTAC, the book is limited in its perspective, and much of his recounting of the final 30 years of MTAC history is limited to criticism of the MTAC's dwindled resources and demotion in status. Further discussion of the book, particularly of its earlier chapters focusing on 20th century MTAC and frontier studies' history, is included in Chapter Five, on the development of the MTAC on Taiwan.

Across the Taiwan Strait, the past few decades have seen some interest in the history of the MTAC from PRC scholars. Research referencing the Commission has been published in university periodicals, primarily from *minzu* universities or Tibet-affiliated schools. Most of these works make the claim that the MTAC's existence demonstrates (or demonstrated, depending on the time of writing) the inalienability of Tibet and/or Taiwan from the Mainland. While still much of these articles focus on the Nanjing years of the early Republican era, some comment on the Commission's continuation on Taiwan. Cited throughout the dissertation, He (2018) offers an overview of the MTAC on Taiwan a year after its closure. He notes that the MTAC's agenda after its move to Taiwan largely serves as symbolic purpose to justify both the existence of the institution itself and ROC as a legitimate state. He also provides a periodization for the Commission on Taiwan, arguing for two main eras: military rule and after. Although this dissertation finds another significant rupture in MTAC discourse after the election of the first DPP administration in 2000, He instead casts the 21st century as not another separate period but simply the beginning of the end. He frames the DPP's electoral victory in 2000 in a negative light, with the Party's embrace of de-sinicization (去中国化) to blame for the Commission's ultimate demise.

Typically, most recent PRC-based articles that focus on the MTAC's establishment and early work from 1928 to the 1940s paint the MTAC in a very positive light. Zhang Zixin and

Xirao Nima (2010) argue that the MTAC helped not only extend Chinese sovereignty in Tibet, but also stability in the region, with long-lasting positive implications for contemporary Chinese nationalism. Zuo, writing a year earlier, (2009) examines the role of the MTAC in its management of Tibetan Buddhism, arguing that the Commission effectively managed and developed Tibetan Buddhism as part of its mission to extend sovereignty in the region. Zuo argues that this was necessary as it allowed for better protection of a frontier region that was held as an object of "aggressive ambition" [侵略野心] for "Western powers" [西方列强] (4).

Several other articles highlight the contributions of the early Republican MTAC to Tibet and Mongolia through development of education (Zhu 2008; Liu 2013), stability and rule of law (Liu 2008; Liu 2013), and development (Li and Li 2014; Liu 2013). Despite focusing on the failure in MTAC negotiation and eventual expulsion from Lhasa in 1949, Chen (2009) still finds a positive spin for the ROC as a whole, stating that:

"However, as a short-lived regime, the KMT Government on the Mainland was unlucky [命运多舛] with limited strength [实力不逮]. In spite of this, there is still no denying the achievements of the Nationalist government. It is precisely due to their great efforts [努力] that later work could be carried on." (22)

In PRC scholarship of the MTAC over the past two decades, while the ROC can be understood as ultimately unsuccessful, the MTAC itself and early Republican efforts to extend sovereignty over Tibet, Mongolia and other outer regions, is uniformly portrayed as positive and just.

It is thus apparent that both English and Chinese language scholarship lacks a historically grounded, critical examination of the MTAC and its full history on Taiwan. While the MTAC and its work on Taiwan appears very seldom in English language scholarship, this history is occasionally featured as the object of research in both PRC- and Taiwan-based research. However, on both coasts across the Taiwan Strait, such investigations are either narrow in scope or are used to provide political justification for the unification of China. This dissertation, rather than engage in such questions about the integral unity of China, instead aims to examine the shifts in official national ideology presented in MTAC documents throughout its tenure on Taiwan (1949-2017).

2.5 Conclusion

While there is ample scholarship investigating the nature of imperialism in Mainland China, including in early Republican era and later PRC governance, the majority of research examining Chinese notions of imperialism does not follow the Nationalist government across the Taiwan Strait in 1949. Instead, research focusing on the politics of identity, official ideology, and conceptions of statehood turns to study the shifts of national identity/ies on Taiwan. This is especially the case since the end of military rule in 1987, with a great body of scholarship discussing both official and popular efforts to expand multiculturalism, localize public policy, and recognize the specific Taiwanese dimensions of identity on the islands. Consequently, little of this work considers the ROC's link to Greater China beyond the KMT's Han-chauvinist and Mainlander-centric origins. The MTAC's work on Taiwan is largely ignored, with both Chinese and English language scholarship typically focusing on the MTAC policy and propaganda during the Republican Era of rule on Mainland China. Historical investigation into the MTAC's archives and publications is an opportunity to open a window onto the trajectory of official notions of identity and statehood on Taiwan. The MTAC, as a government body with ideological roots in the Qing's *Lifanyuan* and a history of operation during Republican rule of the Mainland, is a valuable source to investigate a neglected aspect of history. The MTAC provides a golden opportunity to highlight any lingering influence of both Qing and early Republican ideologies in the trajectory of official notions of nationalism and statehood. Accordingly, several key, overarching questions arise to guide the investigate. First, how have political agendas within the ROC shaped the role and status of the MTAC and its propaganda messages since 1949? Furthermore, how does the history of the MTAC as an institution illuminate the shifting official conceptualization of national identity in the ROC and its relationship with the PRC and the outside world? Finally, how has the MTAC helped shape and respond to the merging discourse of "multiculturalism" in Taiwan?

Certainly, extensive scholarship has focused on the influence of localization, popular nationalism(s), and democratization in the trajectory of official notions of identity on Taiwan. Still, these powerful political forces cannot be disregarded in this project. Therefore, this dissertation aims to feature both historical and contemporaneous contexts in its analysis. After an initial survey of materials (discussed at length in Chapter Three), three subsets of questions were drafted to explore certain emergent themes across the MTAC's publications. The first subset of questions aims to extend current scholarship of imperialism with regards to notions of identity, hierarchy, and the frontier. This set of questions centers around the MTAC's

conceptualization of a national "frontier." Namely, how does the frontier imaginary of the MTAC illuminate the trajectory of official ROC discourse on national identity? More specifically, how has the MTAC portrayed the relationship between China and the "frontier" peoples and associated territories? Finally, how does the MTAC's portrayal of the "frontier" shed light on official conceptions of ROC statehood?

The second subset of questions aims to explore the Commission's shifting approaches to pluralism. These questions focus on understanding the ideological changes and consistencies from 1949 to 2017. It focuses on the MTAC move from embracing the early Republican notion of a "Five Nation Republic," a concept of pluralism largely based on the Qing's "Five Nation Family" approach to identity politics, to promoting "Taiwanese multiculturalism". This subset of questions asks: How does the early Republican notion of a "Five Nation Republic" influence MTAC representations of the nation? Furthermore, to what extent does the MTAC acknowledge Taiwanese multiculturalism in its 21st century activity? More broadly, how can historical comparison of the case of Taiwan inform us about the transition of imperialism – an inherently pluralist exercise -- into multiculturalism?

Finally, the third subset of questions focuses on the legacy of exotification and "internal orientalism" within the ROC. This investigation studies the MTAC's portrayals of Tibetan Buddhism and Tibetan Buddhists over time. Once again attempting to feature both the Commission's informative historical legacies and the shifting contemporaneous contexts, this section raises several questions on the trajectory of official ideology from 1949 to 2017. First, as the ROC government has localized its official conceptions of national identity and promoted multicultural and religious tolerance, how have the MTAC's portrayals of Tibetan Buddhism and its practitioners shifted? Second, as the ROC increasingly champions itself as the Asian bastion of tolerance, diversity, and democracy, to what degree have MTAC portrayals of Tibetan maintained an "internal orientalist" approach? How has the "internal orientalist" approach shifted over time? Lastly, how have these shifts corresponded to official notions of statehood and national identity?

In sum, this chapter's review of the current literature on imperialism, official notions of identity, and the MTAC demonstrates need for further investigation into the ROC's shifting relationship to its former, so-called frontier territories and peoples after retreat to Taiwan. This dissertation thus aims to simultaneously situate the analysis in its contemporaneous political contexts, as well as its historical context via the MTAC's own historical link to imperial Qing and the *Lifanyuan*. However, before reviewing the relevant historical background and proceeding to the project's findings, it is necessary to discuss the available sources and provide

explanation of methods considered and adopted. The following Chapter Three thus turns to the subject of MTAC materials, other official sources, and their accessibility, with further aims to justify the selection of the approach to reading and analysis.

Chapter Three: Methodology and Sources

3.1 Introduction

The literature review in the previous chapter ended with a discussion of the research questions and their role in addressing the gap in scholarship on Chinese imperialism on Taiwan and shifting ROC notions of the "frontier" (邊疆) after 1949. Based on this discussion, it is clear that the dissertation's analytical approach to understanding the MTAC's publishing history must foreground history while simultaneously considering the contemporaneous political development on Taiwan. Furthermore, provided the wide range of materials left by the MTAC's publishing arm, it is necessary to adopt a suitable analytical approach so as to facilitate organized management of the reading process, and, more critically, to serve as a principled guide for analysis and interpretation. In the chapter that follows, I first set out to provide a brief theoretical discussion of the central issue of this project: national identity and ideology. After defending a constructivist understanding of nationalism and official notions of identity, I review the source materials and my process both to access and survey them. I then provide a justification for the choice of adopting discourse-historical approach (Wodak 2011) as a framework for analysis and interpretation. Finally, the chapter issues some concluding comments, including addressing the omission of interviews and providing a brief reflection on the chapter.

By adopting a constructivist approach to nationalism, this project aims to contribute to the body of research that builds on the work of scholars such as Gellner and Anderson to interpret official conceptions of national identity. In essence, the dissertation serves as a case study to investigate the development, transformations, and continuities of national identity in the instance of The Republic of China on Taiwan from 1949 to 2017. In Blommaert's terms (2006), the scope of research thus is limited to official *ascriptive*, rather than inhabited, national identity/ies. This dissertation is certainly not the first project to investigate the history and development of national identity in Taiwan from a constructivist perspective. Indeed, much of the work in justifying applying a Gellnerian constructivist approach to national identity has been successfully accomplished in previous decades. Writing in the years leading up to the first DPP presidency, A-chin Hsiau (2003) in his book *Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism* issues the claim that Taiwan's "cultural nationalism is basically a politically induced phenomenon" and that "as the 'political competition' approach to Taiwanese nationalism shows[,] politics is of key importance to the developments of nationalism in

Taiwan's case." (20) To defend his constructivist lens, Hsiau draws on Gellner in several instances, and relies in particular on Gellner's assertion, as paraphrased by Hsiau, that "a nationalist believes that political boundaries should be coterminous with national boundaries…" (14) Furthermore, Hsiau adeptly positions Gellner's theory of nationalism within the context of Taiwan:

A nationalist project calls for a major discursive jump – from the insistence on equal citizenship based on ethnic distinctiveness to the insistence on establishing a new country based on a unique national culture. In Taiwan – where native Taiwanese have long been defined as racially and culturally "Chinese" not only by outsiders but also by most of themselves – the articulation of the distinctiveness of Taiwanese national culture is essential for Taiwanese nationalism. (14)

Writing over a decade later, Rwei-ren Wu (2016) also draws on Gellner (1983) to examine the various "engendering" (2) of nationalisms in Taiwan, situating Taiwan within its histories of empire—from European settlements to Republican control. Wu claims that by "inheriting and transforming the colonial state (the emigre Republic of China on Taiwan), Taiwan has largely achieved internal decolonization and *de facto* independence." (7) Both Wu and Hsiau adopt Gellner's understanding of nation and nationalism to examine state appropriation of local nationalisms. Similarly, this dissertation aims to investigate the shifts in official identity as a political to maintain or exert control.

However, unlike Hsiau, Wu, and the other scholars reviewed in Chapter Two, this dissertation focuses on the ROC's representations of Tibet, Mongolia, and other minority nationalities within Greater China. The body of work published by the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission (MTAC) presents an opportunity to illuminate a neglected dimension of official ROC notions of national identity. The Commission's nearly seventy years of publications covering "frontier" policy, anthologies on "frontier peoples," speculations into international affairs, reports on cultural exchange, and myriad other issues offer a nuanced look into the state's evolving notions of cultural and ethnic identities, national territory, diversity and multiculturalism. Furthermore, research into the MTAC offers an opportunity to center ROC narratives of Mongolia, Tibet, and other minority groups in Mainland China, referred to for decades as "the frontier." This perspective has the potential to shed a transformative light on the transition of national identity on Taiwan, as it showcases the often-neglected narratives on the ideological and geographical periphery. Thus, to effectively investigate the history of

the MTAC, contextualization in both history and contemporaneous politics are key to exploring official ideologies. During the initial stages of research, it became evident that a critical approach to discourse analysis is necessary to interpret the bounds of meaning, greater ideology, and further implications for the evolutions of official national identity in the ROC.

Adopting a Foucauldian understanding of discourse provides a method to contextualize the body of text in its enveloping power relations (Foucault 1974). Critical discourse analysis (CDA) works to illuminate "the strategies of discriminatory inclusion and exclusion in language use" (Wodak, et al. 2009, 8). In the case of the MTAC, history – spanning from the late Qing through the 21st century – is of particular importance to interpreting language according to both the Commission's foundational ideologies and the evolving politics over the course of democratization. A suitable approach to discourse analysis in the case of the MTAC must foreground history. Wodak's (2011) discourse-historical approach (DHA) to analysis does just this by placing the body of text in its historical and contemporaneous political contexts. DHA is particularly useful for research which aims to focus on identifying shifting ideology. DHA is also common approach for researchers examining Chinese discourse, in part due to the importance many of these scholars place on historical context (Cao 2014).

3.2 Source Material and Access

MTAC publications on Taiwan from 1949 through 2017 form the empirical foundation of this study. After retreat to Taiwan in 1949, the MTAC continued to publish, producing primarily articles and books on Mongolia, Tibet, and/or other ethnic groups within greater China and diaspora communities. These publications fell into the genres of history, geography, politics, and, increasingly in later decades, culture. Narratives of history embedded in documents across subject or topic, particularly in the years under military rule were composed of accounts of official records of history. There were two main categories of contributing authors within the MTAC. The first was made up of MTAC officials and members; the second consisted of academics. These categories often overlapped. Of those credited authors with a career in academia, most were associated with history, politics and multi-disciplinary studies university departments. In addition, many documents were not attached to any specific author and instead cited either the Commission itself or one of the Tibetan or Mongolian Affairs Offices.

Data collection was conducted mainly in Taipei, at archival libraries National Taiwan Library and National Library from fall 2019 to spring 2020. The Mongolian and Tibetan

Cultural Center (MTCC), founded in 1993 (2020) under the MTAC, and since transferred to the Ministry of Culture, maintains an online archive of additional MTAC periodicals published after 2009. Due to travel restrictions owing to the novel coronavirus, data collection on-site was terminated early unexpectedly. However, I found a number of MTAC publications from the 2000s and 2010s for sale at the National Book Store (國家書店), and acquired those available for purchase using private funds. Of the 70 documents selected for review, excerpts from 48 documents were quoted in the dissertation to provide an illustration of the relevant thematic trends in the three findings chapters (Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight).

During the initial stages of the research planning process, I originally planned to make extensive use of the Mongolian and Tibetan Cultural Center (MTCC). The Center was established in 1993 under the jurisdiction of the MTAC, and although management has shifted to the Ministry of Culture, the Center continues to offer a small exhibition space close to National Taiwan Normal University in Da'an District, Taipei (MTCC 2020). The MTCC also housed a large collection of MTAC documents and artifacts. However, during visits to both the Center's headquarter office within the Ministry of Culture and its exhibition space in March 2019, it became clear that these archives would be difficult to access in practice. Through discussion with several staff members at the MTCC exhibition space, I learned that while the archives were technically open to the public, individual applications must be completed to request specific materials or documents by title, rather than by keyword. The MTCC did not offer a complete catalog, database or other record of its archives. Consequently, as I could not learn which documents were held in the MTCC's collection, I could not file an application request for any specific title. Furthermore, while the MTCC maintained an online archive of *The Tibetan and Mongolian Quarterly*, the earliest of this online collection was published in 2009. Apart from the eight volumes of the journal, 91digitized copies of the MTAC's 120-volume *Mongolian and Tibetan Special Research Series* (蒙藏專題研究叢書). However, this collection began in 1984, already 25 years after the MTAC moved to Taipei. It was clear that neither the MTCC's online or physical archives would provide access materials from the first two and a half decades of MTAC publication on Taiwan.

After learning this, during the same preliminary visit to Taiwan in March 2019, I visited the National Library (in Taipei), finding several hundred publications listed as available with a library card. As a result, I updated my research plan so as to instead conduct the bulk of data collection at the National Library. In October 2019, after relocating to Taipei, I included a second public archival library: National Taiwan Library in the adjacent New Taipei City.

MTAC publications from these two archival libraries included both long-form (100-300+ pages) and short-form publications (as few as 16 pages) on a range of subjects, including primarily history, ethnographies, and policy analysis and recommendations. Although only a small percentage of the total number of library's holdings, other MTAC publications such as conference proceedings, exhibition collections, dictionaries, and annotated sheet music were available on-site. While incomplete, archival libraries often had at least one or several volumes of a series. For example, in the *Frontier Collection* (邊疆叢書), together, the archival libraries held two of the twelve volumes in the series. Some of the other volumes in this collection were available in other libraries around Taiwan, outside of the Taipei area, while other volumes could not be located.

Consequently, through March 2020, data collection was primarily conducted on-site at the two archival libraries in Taipei/New Taipei City. While the many texts in the library systems were available for viewing, it was a daily occurrence to find volumes noted as lost or removed from circulation at both the National Taiwan Library and the National Library. Although difficult to confirm, based on the age of many of these texts (dating back to the 1950s and 1960s) and the typical printing format of the documents, I assumed most of these out-of-circulation materials were in poor condition and not prioritized for repair. Indeed, even many of the older books available for reading were falling apart, with broken bindings, loose pages, and, most troublesome, faded text. Most of the books were required to read in-library, thus limiting reading hours to the library's desk operation. I also relied on the MTCC's on-line archival collection, especially the *Mongolian and Tibetan Quarterly* journal published after 2009.

In March 2020, it became evident that the novel coronavirus would disrupt travel between Japan and Taiwan. Expecting that the Japanese borders would soon close, I began to photocopy as many of the available relevant documents as possible in National Taiwan Library. However, this library soon closed due to an outbreak in the district, and so I returned to the National Library to continue photocopying. I returned to Fukuoka, Japan on April 1, 2020. In Fukuoka, I continued reading from my personal collection of scanned or photocopied MTAC publications and from the MTCC's online collection. Additionally, I found and purchased 13 volumes of MTAC publications from private sellers online.

It must be noted that without a complete record of all MTAC publications, it is impossible to determine the extent to which the texts I was able to access might represent a full picture of the scope or nature of the MTAC's work during its time on Taiwan. A catalogue of holdings

in the MTAC library published in 1975 is available and indicates a much greater list of publications on a much wider range of topics than is publicly available, particularly from the 1960s and 1970s. Based on their titles alone, most of these volumes are related to the Cold War and are explicitly anti-communist, though it is difficult to speculate further. Although I was not able to locate many of these titles, there are still a great number of articles, reports, and research books covering a plethora of issues related to the Chinese Communist Party, the USSR, and criticism of communism. Without reading all MTAC publications, it may be impossible to capture a complete picture of all official discourses employed by the Commission. However, this project's aim is not to provide a comprehensive description of all aspects of MTAC discourses, as capturing all approaches to meaning might well be impossible. Instead, this project's scope is limited to examining the shifting official discourse of national identity, particularly as it related to imperialism, multiculturalism, and supremacist notions of hierarchy. For this end, the texts surveyed across the 1960s and 1970s are able to offer enough material or data to generate a clear narrative of change over time to answer the research questions.

3.3 Methods

After establishing a strong foundation of historical background, I first surveyed the considerable body of MTAC publications from 1949 to 2017. Following the historical background reading and preliminary survey, the aims of the research were narrowed down to shed light on how the MTAC, as part of the ROC's larger state apparatus, imagined its national territory and statehood; conceptualized the state's relationship to its so-called "frontier;" approached the management of diversity and its conception of multiculturalism; and advocated for its representation – and indeed continued existence – overseas.

After several rounds of analysis as my data set grew, I found that a second critical stage was necessary to uncover linkages between text and history, between text and text, and between contemporaneous socio-political movements and text. A discourse-historical approach (Wodak 2001) situates the text in both history and contemporaneous politics, allowing for a critical reading with a view onto shifting ideology. Using a discourse-historical approach has allowed for stronger findings that prioritize interpretation situated in socio-political and historical contexts and focus on tracing shifting ideology, fulfilling both the original umbrella questions (see Chapter One for research questions) and later specified aims of the research.

3.3.1 Surveying the Data

Reading through the documents involved several stages. First, I surveyed the titles available to me through the library systems. In selecting which books to read, I prioritized insuring equal distribution of titles across each decade from the 1950s to the 2010s. However, this soon became a challenge, as the earlier decades, from 1950 to 1979, had relatively few documents, especially once those listed titles marked as lost or unavailable were removed from consideration. Although the libraries' collection of 2010s titles was not quite as plentiful as those published in the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s, the MTCC's online collection, as well as those in my private acquisitions, provide dozens of documents from 2010 to 2017.

During this initial stage, I read with the aim to observe and possibly identify patterns of meaning and their change over time. While surveying, I took notes, including categorizing the text according to its genre, pulling passages that seemed relevant both to the narrative within the document and across texts, and recording to the document's form, function, and scope. After reading several documents, I began the process of reviewing my notes, to compare and link volumes. My goal during this time was to observe consistencies or discrepancies of terms, ideas, and narratives, across time or subject material. As I continued to read, I continued to review notes and return to previous publications, shifting my focus and awareness of keywords, narratives, images, and representations, as certain patterns became evident. In total, I surveyed over 150 documents, ranging from children's literature to journal articles, to full-length books. To gain further insight into the MTAC's institutional history, in March 2021, I also conducted a small-scale investigation of the ROC's and MTAC's budgetary history, performing a separate document analysis on the MTAC's available budget reports from 1994 to 2017.

Preliminary findings during the survey stage centered around identifying reoccurring or idiosyncratic terms, topics, and genres, as well as narratives. This step also considered the emergence, disappearance, and transitions of rhetoric over time. Observation of these patterns generated a long list of textual themes to further investigate. These themes included: the importance of dynastic history in showcasing the connection between Mongolian and Chinese peoples, as well as Tibetan and Chinese peoples; official delineation between Inner China and its frontier; the narratives of Chinese, Tibetan, and Mongolian victimhood at the hands of both Chinese Communist and foreign imperialist invaders; the cruelty and ineptitude of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP); tales of anti-Communist resistance in Tibet; praise of ROC pluralism and the concept of the Five Nation Republic; emphasis of exchange and cooperation; and recognition or celebration of Taiwanese multiculturalism.

Together with the auxiliary document analysis of budgetary records, my findings from this stage enabled me to construct the outline of an institutional history of the MTAC from 1949 to 2017. This overview of the Commission became critical for providing an explanation of the organization, as no English- or Chinese-language literature exists to reference for a general or comprehensive introduction to the MTAC on Taiwan, and consequently many readers, even those with scholarly interest in Taiwanese and Chinese nationalism and identity politics, are unfamiliar with the MTAC. Most significantly, this overview was also key for laying the groundwork for periodization. Beyond yielding findings suitable for drafting an institutional history, many general textual themes and patterns emerged. At this point, when reflecting on my previous background reading, it became clear that a greater degree of contextualization was vital to explore the deeper meanings and implications of these themes. While I had not previously considered highlighting the influence of Chinese imperialism on MTAC rhetoric, many of my observations during the initial survey rounds led me to revisit familiar key concepts in my historical background reading, including Qing imperial policy and various ideologies belonging to Chinese imperialism. Consequently, my subsequent approach to analysis aimed to feature the Commission's historical and contemporaneous contexts to draw out interpretations of these discursive patterns.

3.3.2 Analysis and Interpretation

A Foucauldian understanding of discourse situates text within its surrounding power relations, and can provide an approach to investigate the ideologies and meaning propagated in official discourse. Foucault (1974) describes discourse as "practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak," stating that discourses are "not about objects; they do not identify objects, they constitute them and in the practice of doing so conceal their own invention" (49). According to Wodak, et al. (2009; 8) "the aim of Critical Discourse Analysis is to unmask ideologically permeated and often obscured structures of power, political control, and dominance, as well as strategies of discriminatory inclusion and exclusion in language use." The conceptualization of language and meaning as socially constructed requires the researcher to have a robust understanding of the utterances' context(s). In the case of the MTAC, not only itself now a historical institution but also an institution greatly informed by its historical precedent, the body of language in question has an important historical context that cannot be ignored. Finding a suitable approach to discourse analysis thus cannot only be critical, but must center history.

Wodak (2001, 65) explains that a discourse-historical approach follows "at least" three aspects, paraphrased below:

1. Critique aimed at exploring "inconsistencies, (self-)contradictions, paradoxes and dilemmas" within the body of data.

2. Critique aimed at illuminating the hidden, neglected or "latent" character of the greater discourse. This critique requires the researcher to "exceed the purely textual … sphere," by grounding analysis in "his or her background and contextual knowledge" and integrating additional theory into the research.

3. Critique aimed at the "improvement of communication."

The first critique is limited to the texts themselves and provides necessary groundwork for the latter two aspects. The first critique in this project is conducted during the survey stage. The second critique forms the bulk of the discourse analysis conducted, and, as noted by Wodak, depends on the researcher's knowledge background and exposure to the contexts in which the discourse is situated. The final critique forms only a small part of the project: the goal of improved communication is realized primarily through analysis's illumination of neglected aspects of the greater discourse. In other words, despite refraining from specific policy recommendations, I hope that uncovering certain historical legacies and revealing their impact on contemporary language use and ideology will help to clarify official statements, policies and positions both within Taiwan and in the greater Asia-Pacific region.

Wodak's (2011, 44) discourse-historical approach is specifically "designed to enable the analysis of implicit, coded prejudiced utterances, as well as to identify and expose the allusions contained in prejudiced discourse." Indeed, shedding light on implicit ideology are the project's stated aims, re-iterated here: to improve our understanding of how the MTAC, as part of the ROC's larger state apparatus, imagined its national territory and statehood; understood the state's relationship to its so-called "frontier;" approached the management of diversity and its conception of multiculturalism; and advocated for its representation – and indeed continued existence – overseas.

Although Ruth Wodak herself is based in Europe and primarily examines European contexts, her discourse-historical approach and CDA more generally is common in research on Greater China. Indeed, I am far from a pioneer in the field of CDA, or indeed in application of CDA in studies of Greater China. There is a significant body of research both into the application of discourse analysis in a Chinese social and/or linguistic environment, and of studies which themselves adopt both Foucauldian and discourse-historical approaches to their analysis. Some who investigate the application of Chinese discourse analysis trace the

scholarly investigation of meaning and language to Confucius. This includes discourse analysis scholar Cao (2014, 1), who pins the following excerpts at the top of her chapter:

> 'Without legitimacy, words are invalid; invalid words lead man to nowhere'. (名不正则
>
> 言不顺，言不顺则事不成。Mingbuzheng ze yanbushun; yanbushun ze shibucheng)
>
> Confucius (The Analects)

> 'Truth' is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statement. 'Truth' is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces, and which extend it. A 'regime' of truth. Foucault (in Rabinow 1984: 74)

The implication here is that Foucauldian understanding of discourse is not a foreign concept in China, as his work does not present original ideas, at least in China: one of China's greatest and most well-known scholars spoke of a similar notion millennia before Foucault.

Cao also notes that Wodak's discourse-historical approach is particularly common in Chinese language discourse analysis, as many scholars are especially interested in situating their research in history. Chilton, Tian and Wodak (2010, 1) posit that the fundamentals of critical discourse analysis of Chinese language changes little, except by way of context and linguistics:

> To research discourses in China is then to examine how discourses change in context-dependent ways, and to relate the changes to the social factors that lead to these changes or are the effects of them. Discourse research will also examine how social identities are constructed through language use and how discourse facilitates change in society. Further, this kind of research may include the investigation of the ways in which agents or agencies manipulate meanings. In the context of Chinese society, a discourse approach has its focus on the role of the Chinese language, or more precisely its use, in the socio-political transformation that is currently unfolding.

Wei (2019; 49) notes that while "it is often not possible or desirable to home in on a person or institution and be critical about their discourse in the Chinese context, we can still use the

CDA toolkit to uncover the underlying power structures and value systems embedded in the texts." Here, Wei is primarily referring to the People's Republic of China, whereas my research is not principally concerned with the PRC. If this project were conducted a few decades before during the ROC's period of military rule or in the early days of democratization, Wei's comment may have needed to be heeded, but it does not especially apply within the context of contemporary Taiwan. Certainly, discourse analysis is a common scholarly tool, for Taiwanese academics writing in either Chinese and English (Teng 2004; Chiang and Lin 2020; Ferrer and Lin 2021)

As became evident in the preliminary surveying stage, without being situated in history and the contemporaneous political contexts, the deeper meanings of the identified themes or patterns were often lost. For example, document analysis made clear that MTAC documents through the 1980s and to a lesser extent the 1990s placed strong emphasis on the historical relationship between "China" and "Mongolia," or "China" and its "frontier," including Mongolia, Tibet, and other minority groups in China. This form of analysis also revealed a persistent focus on ROC, and later Taiwanese, contributions of aid and development to its frontier, and Mongolia in particular. However, only after returning to these documents following a discourse-historical approach did it become clear that these two themes were related to one another, both revealing different aspects of the continuing influence of Qing imperialism and a Chinese mission to civilize on the ROC on Taiwan.

Drawing on the foundation of historical background conducted October 2018 to October 2019, my research focused primarily on themes of belonging, shifting concepts of the "other" and hierarchy. Consequently, discourse analysis presented thematic trends primarily concerned with connecting 21st century Taiwan to its legacies formed while under military rule and to its historical inheritances from the KMT during the Republican era (1912-1949), and late Qing imperialism. Analysis conducted during this stage was productive. The three large overarching themes contributed to accomplishing the revised aims of exploring the trajectory of official national identity and notions of statehood, the state's relationship to its "frontier," evolving conceptualizations of diversity and multiculturalism, and shifting approaches to maintaining or establishing legitimacy both at home and abroad. With the first objective encompassing the following three, the tentative findings from the second stage of discourse analysis fall into three groupings, divided by theme. The first grouping covers the conceptualization of a Mongolian and Tibetan "frontier" and the associated Chinese civilizing mission directed at it. The second grouping examines the overlapping discourses of pluralism and multiculturalism, from the notion of the *Five-Nation Republic* to emergence of "Multicultural Taiwan." The third

grouping examines another dimension of the shift from centering Mainland China to Taiwan, focusing on the role of anti-Communist resentment in identity formation.

In sum, this dissertation's approach to analyzing the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission's publication history can thus be summarized according to two stages. The initial survey of the Commission's published articles, reports, and books succeeded in observing broad patterns and themes across documents, and ultimately served to pinpoint periodization. The second stage then relied on these textual and rhetorical patterns to draw in key historical legacies and contemporaneous politics through a discourse-historical approach. Embracing critical discourse analysis allowed for an enhanced lens through which to trace underlying consistencies in ideology despite surface-level shifts in language.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter has reflected upon the processes involved in planning and conducting research through discussion of the investigation into the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission during its years on Taiwan (1949-2017). While the overarching line of inquiry remained constant throughout the project, over the course of reading for the literature review and historical background, the aims and focus narrowed considerably. The heavy influence of ideology and strategies of governance from the Qing and Republican eras made it necessary to center history. Additionally, attempts to conduct a literature review revealed a dearth of scholarship on ROC's representations of its "frontier:" essentially, the people and territories, including Mongolia and Tibet, on the periphery of the ROC's (former) imagined republic. Keeping in mind both the influence of Qing and Republican legacies and the limited body of scholarly work on similar topics, focus narrowed in on exploring this dimension of ROC official national identity and conceptualization of statehood. The influence of these inherited ideologies ultimately necessitated the incorporation of a discourse-historical approach as a second stage of analysis to better reveal their presence.

Briefly, I would like to address my choice not to include interviews. Although my research proposal did not originally include concrete plans to conduct interviews, I had considered the potential benefits of incorporating a limited number of expert interviews, primarily for the purpose of triangulating any findings or to fill in any gaps in the institutional history overview. However, COVID-19 made the option of organizing one or several interviews with former MTAC affiliates considerably more difficult to realize. While living in Taipei, I was unable to tap into a potential network of former MTAC officials or staff members. I was also unable to

locate records of former employees, and for many of the named contributing authors, I found it challenging to find contact information. Indeed, the majority of contributing authors do not appear to have an on-line presence or have been confirmed as no longer living. Furthermore, the MTCC, the final online remnant of the MTAC, does not offer any online or web-based method of contact, issuing only a Taiwanese telephone number and physical address. Thus, after my hurried relocation to Japan, my ability to identify, contact, and secure an interview with a former official, member, employee or other associate of the MTAC became greatly reduced.

In any case, discourse analysis, does not generally require the inclusion of interviews, although they may be of interest in certain studies. It is my aim that the justification of methods provided in this chapter is satisfactory for the arguments laid out in the subsequent chapters. In the following Chapter Four, as necessary for any analytical approach that foregrounds history, I present a historical narrative of relevant ideologies of identity and governance. The chapter begins with a discussion of official identity formation and approaches to policy during the Qing Empire and continues to retell the story of national identity consolidation across China through the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912 and the MTAC itself in 1928. In line with the discourse-historical approach outlined in this chapter, the historical background highlights Qing influence on ROC policy and conceptualization of the nation and its "frontier."

Chapter Four: Qing Imperialism, Republican Statehood, and History on Taiwan

4.1 Introduction

Some analysis of historical context is essential to understanding the evolution of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission. This dissertation's focus is MTAC discourse on official notions of national identity in the latter 20th and early 21st centuries. Exploring the origins of the ideas and narratives that have featured in MTAC publications provides a point of departure for the examination of shifting official discourses from 1949 onward. Studying the historical development of key ideologies can help to identify how various intertwining notions, logics, and narratives of the national self have changed over time. This chapter thus sets out to provide an analytical overview of the history of identity, statehood, and strategics of governance within Greater China, including Mainland China, Tibet, Mongolia and Taiwan through 1949.

Moreover, the MTAC itself has now passed into history, following its closure in 2017, and its nearly nine-decade existence witnessed many major historical transformations within the ROC: from its establishment in Mainland China through the retreat to Taiwan and introduction of Martial Law to Taiwan's transition to democracy. However, the complex institutional history of the MTAC on Taiwan deserves its own chapter (see Chapter Five). Here, I trace the institutional and ideological roots of the Commission back to the Qing Empire. As discussed below, the MTAC was modelled largely on the Manchu Qing's *Lifanyuan*, with Leibold (2007) noting that even MTAC policy language imitated that of the imperial institution. Before continuing on to review the institutional history of the MTAC, it is therefore first necessary to explore Qing attitudes toward governance and management of the empire's periphery nations – including Mongolia and Tibet. Furthermore, basic knowledge of the Qing institution, the *Lifanyuan,* enables further insights into the ideologies and strategies at play within the ROC Commission.

However, the MTAC's institutional links to Qing imperial governance are not the only aspect of the commission that requires historical contextualization. As this project primarily considers the neglected issue of ROC portrayals of its former frontier nations, the following historical narrative narrows in on official navigations of Chineseness, ethnic and cultural Han identity, and these identities' relationship to Tibetan, Mongolian and Taiwanese communities and identities. The historical background aims to establish an account of the unfolding of

official identity in the ROC, with efforts to highlight the role of nationalities and identities outside of the Han in these conceptual formations. Thus, the chapter serves as a foundation to establish relevant influential ideologies. These ideologies' emergence and shifts over time are presented in a narrative format to facilitate the application of a discourse-historical approach in analysis. As discussed in Chapter Three, a historical background is necessary for such a history centered approach to analysis. The dissertation's findings are presented in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.

In consideration of the presented findings, this chapter's historical narrative follows the origins and evolution of several key ideologies. First is the notion of belonging and inclusion: who belongs to the empire or nation-state? Second, civilizational, cultural, and/or ethnic hierarchies are traced over time and territory, beginning with the Qing. Additionally, the background provides an explanation of different categorizations of social groupings and their significance over time and place, including lineage, race, ethnicity, language, and religion. These narratives play a vital role in examining how the MTAC on Taiwan, as part of the ROC's larger state apparatus, imagined its national territory and statehood; understood the state's relationship to its so-called "frontier;" approached the management of diversity and its conception of multiculturalism; and advocated for its representation – and indeed continued existence – overseas.

The focus of the chapter's historical narrative primarily targets the emergence and management of official identities. To facilitate the exploration of history across a wide range of time, space, and competing empires, the chapter is divided into sections first according to territory and then by political era. The next section covers the unfolding of national identities on the Mainland and considers in chronological order the periods of imperial Qing rule, late Qing reform and revolution, and early Republican rule. The following major sub-section is focused on Taiwan, and falls into three parts: pre-Qing history, Qing colonial rule, and a brief overview of Japanese rule and subsequent retrocession.

4.2 From Empire to Nation State: Chinese History on the Mainland

4.2.1 Imperial China – Manchu Qing Rule

The question of who belongs to the Chinese nation has long been a hotly-debated subject. While today most scholarship examining the boundaries of and diversity within "Chineseness" focuses on Mainland China, the historical development of the many identities under the umbrella of Greater China is a critical issue for this dissertation. Official notions of identity in the 20th and 21st century did not spontaneously generate, but rather are ideas rooted in history, unfolding over time. Many of the ethnic, racial, and national identities recognized today within Greater China were bound together or otherwise consolidated during Qing conquest and rule. Consequently, this section aims to introduce the Manchu Qing Empire and its approach to ethnic or national identity policy.

The last dynasty of imperial China, the Qing Empire (1644-1911) was officially rule by Manchus. Officially designated "Manchu" under Qing codification in 1635, the Manchu ethnic group was composed of nomadic peoples from what is today northeast China (Rigger 1994). Although the Qing empire accounts for one of two major dynastic periods considered to be conquest and subsequent rule of China by outsiders, both many popular and scholarly histories suggest that the Manchu government underwent considerable sinicization. Tsung (2009) claims the Qing government was in effect a coalition of the ruling Manchu and Han ethnic group. The Han ethnic class, although remaining culturally and socially powerful within the regime, were not politically dominant, and Qing government policy favored ethnic Manchus. Zhou (2003) also underlines the different processes of assimilation during and under the Qing. While many Manchus voluntarily assimilated to Han culture, the Qing government oversaw the forced assimilation of minority peoples within their territory to Han norms. Furthermore, the Qing word for China (*Zhongguo*), increasingly used in Qing foreign policy documents, encompassed the entire empire, thereby incorporating non-Han peoples such as Tibet and Mongolia (Leibold 2007).

However, there are a number of scholars who contest the degree to which the Manchus underwent sinicization, aiming to distinguish between the political utility of Han culture versus actual Manchu assimilation. Most notably, Crossley (1999) argues powerfully that the racial, ethnic, nationalist or other such categorization of Han, Mongol, and Manchu identities were bound and consolidated over the 17th century period of conquest. These identities were purposefully managed as means for Qing imperial occupation and governance. Crossley's

argument highlights the connection between recognized pluralism and imperialism, with nationalist or racial divisions fostered for the sake of management and control. She highlights the imperial need for territorial boundaries where boundaries may not have had previously existed, and ethnic identities where such consciousness may have been varied or limited before. Crossley's critique of the sinicization [4] narrative strikes at the account's threading of contemporary national or ethnic identities backwards through time. In doing so, the sinicization narrative fails to observe the aims and effects of Qing efforts to consolidate racial or national identities. She further emphasizes that the Qing court's adoption of Chinese values and appeals to the concept of *Tianxia*, or "all under Heaven," served as a political measure to establish legitimacy after conquest.

Other scholars have echoed Crossley's arguments. Harrison (2001) builds a narrative of Manchu rule that highlights Manchu efforts to retain Manchu language and culture to argue that acculturation of the Qing court was a largely practical effort, rather than ideological. Leibold (2007) offers a nuanced perspective on the Manchu-Han relationship, chronicling the changes in Qing policy towards identity and ethnic classification. Under Qing rule, official categorization and conceptualization of identity was largely a question of lineage. In the early years of the Qing, lineage was a relatively flexible process: those who surrendered could join forces with the Manchu banner or military unit, and become "indistinguishable" from their Manchu compatriots (Rigger 1994, 189). During the 18th century, however, the Manchu government began strictly regulating ethnic classifications. From 1727, genealogical descent was required as proof of Manchu identity. In 1742, Han banners were expelled from military service. These actions were aimed in reinforcing the hard boundaries of entry into the ruling Manchu class to exclude Han and other non-Manchu peoples. The following section focuses on the process of codifying identity under the Qing.

4.2.1.1 Qing Recognized Pluralism and Imperialism

Qing codification of racial identities was a key element in facilitating both the expansion and management of the empire. Under the Qing state, the Han were one of 5 recognized races that comprised the empire, conceptualized as one family (五種之家, *wu zhong zhi jia*) (Harrison 2001). In addition to the Manchu and Han, the Qing identified three other branches

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[4] Crossley (1999, 13) also has this to say on the term "sinicization" itself: "'Assimilation' and 'acculturation' are not as words or concepts denied to historians of China. This being the case, 'sinicization' has no purpose other than as a vessel for a set of ideological impositions describing assimilation and acculturation as having causes and meanings with relation to China that are somehow special."

of the imperial 'family': Muslim Turks, Tibetans and Mongols. The Tibetans, Mongols and Turks were classified as separate from "China" or the "interior empire", and instead organized as parts of the "exterior empire" from "Inner Asia", and thus enjoyed greater independence from the Manchu government (Smith 1996:145). The Qing court approached the governance of these regions with a fundamentally different approach, with the Qing attempting to preserve and promote the different recognized cultures as a means to maintain control over the vast territory (Leibold 2007). This approach to governance was termed *yinsu'erzhi* (因俗而治), meaning to govern according to local customs. Leibold (2007) argues that this arrangement in effect placed the emperor at the center – rather than the Han or Inner China.

The Qing court institutionalized the *yinsu'erzhi* approach to governance through state organs whose primary objectives were to oversee management of the empire's pluralist frontiers. These offices employed local-specific cultural touchpoints, most prominently religion and key local leaders, to extend increasing control. Evolving out of the Mongol Department (蒙古衙門, *menggu* yamen), the *Lifanyuan* (理藩院) served as the institutional embodiment of the *yinsu'erzhi* approach to governance. The *Lifanyuan* oversaw administration of Mongolia and Tibet (and again later Xinjiang), connecting the local leaders of these regions to each other and to the Qing emperor. The *Lifanyuan* became "the bureaucratic arm" to assist the Dalai Lama's administration outside of Tibet in Qinghai and Mongolia (Crossley 2006). Over time, Qing control and surveillance over the Dalai Lama's rule increased, with the *Lifanyuan* presiding over the Dalai Lama selection process by the mid-17th century. Consequently, Crossley highlights the power of Tibetan Buddhism to demonstrate Qing legitimacy of rule, not only in Tibet but also Mongolia.

Similar to strategies deployed in Mongolia and Tibet, the *Lifanyuan* also extended a differentiated approach to governance in Xinjiang[5]. Millward and Newby (2006, 120) describe Qing rule of Xinjiang as "tolerant" of Islam, providing some "imperial patronage for" the religion. Thus, while Tibetan Buddhism politically bound Mongolia and Tibet to each other and the Qing court, Xinjiang was always held separate from this linkage. Furthermore, the Qing conquest of Mongolia and Tibet had been comparatively peaceful compared to that of Xinjiang.

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[5] Although Xinjiang was included under the general purview of the MTAC as part of the greater "frontier" (Lan 2017), it was not a prioritized region, and as such never had a dedicated office within the Commission, unlike Mongolia's Mongolian Affairs Office and Tibet's Tibetan Affairs Office. Consequently, the dissertation does not prominently feature Xinjiang in its analysis. However, a brief look into Qing management of Xinjiang region can help to further understand the role of the *Lifanyuan* and the limitations of portraying the MTAC as an exact replica.

Qing incorporation of Mongolia had relied on integrating Mongolian military forces into the Manchu Banner System. In the case of Tibet, the Qing court was providing sought after protection to the region. Xinjiang, in comparison, was taken by military force, with the Qing military left in place for continued dominion (Perdue 2005). Thus, while all three territories could loosely be categorized as governed under the same *yinsu'erzhi* principle, the political reality in Xinjiang was quite distinct as compared to Mongolia and Tibet in several aspects. Finally, discussed in greater detail below (see Section 4.2.3), in the fall of the Qing and the resultant power vacuum during ROC's early years, Xinjiang's trajectory did not overlap with Mongolia and Tibet. While Mongolian and Tibetan independence movements offered bilateral support, stemming in part from the regions' shared religion, Xinjiang was not included in these treaties and statements of recognition.

4.2.1.2 Consequences of Codified Pluralism

The codification of identity as a tool for governance had major repercussions for the populations it regulated, including the nationalities of this dissertation's focus: Mongolia, Tibet, and Han. Mongol ethnic identity underwent considerable consolidation under Qing rule, particularly beginning in the mid-eighteenth century. Khan (1996) traces this process of identity consolidation to the results of Qing policy in the 18th and 19th centuries. During this time, Qing policy evolved from protectionist to isolationist and then again to colonial. Khan pinpoints several key causes for these shifts in policy. First, the increasing degree of assimilation to Han culture and adoption of a "Chinese" political identity by the Manchu pushed the Mongols further from the ideological center of the empire. Second, the growing threat and impact of Western and Japanese encroachments relocated the zone of greatest border insecurity from the northern periphery to the eastern seaboard—thereby lowering the Northern territories' political prioritization. Third, Khan argues that Russian encroachment in the North prompted greater support for Han colonization of Mongolia. This last cause in particular meant that Mongols "found their cultural traditions threatened and their identity stigmatized by Han ethnocentrism and ethnic chauvinism" (260). As a result, Mongol consciousness developed into an increasingly unified national identity, and manifested in uprisings protesting the sale of lands to agricultural Han colonists, modern printing in Mongolian language and subsequent publications, and Mongolian cultural organizations. Ultimately, Mongol national identity led to the establishment of the Mongolian People's Republic after the Qing Empire's collapse.

Unlike Mongolia, Tibet, after the 9th century, relied primarily on outside military aid and patronage for protection. By the 18th and through the early 20th century, the role of protector

fell to the Qing (Perdue 2005). Playing an important role in extending Qing control throughout Mongolia as a religious-political leader (see above discussion in 4.2.1.1), Tibet under the Dalai Lama was left "largely autonomous," with Qing control increasing and then decreasing over the 18th and 19th centuries, respectively (Smith 1996, 146). Over time, Tibet faced increased encroachments from Chinese colonists in the 19th century. Following increased Chinese settlement and the decreasing status of Mongolia as a buffer zone, Tibet's original "nominal submission" hardened into an assertion of Qing suzerainty by the end of the same century (148). When the Qing Empire fell in 1911, Tibetan loyalty did not simply roll over to the proclaimed inheritors to the fallen empire. Indeed, as is explained in greater detail below, despite their efforts, the subsequent Republican Chinese government was largely unsuccessful in its attempts to extend the exercise of sovereignty or even suzerainty throughout Tibet.

The fall of the Qing empire was largely an affair of emergent nationalism. In accordance with a consolidated ethnic identity, beginning in the mid-eighteenth century, Han scholars began to protest their unfair treatment as second class. However, the Qing ruling class denied any accusations of discrimination. Following the Qing logic of the five-nation empire, discrimination against another branch of the "family" was not possible. To further aid claims of legitimacy, the Qing state used a culturalist approach to defining Han identity, and therefore Manchu identity, arguing that it was *because* the Manchu had so assimilated to Han culture, that they could no longer be considered as true outsiders, nor as oppressors. Accordingly, there existed a tension between the self-proclaimed assimilation or sinification of the Manchu Qing and the government's exclusionary hard boundaries of social group classification, which prevented Han access to political power. Following this, Chow (1997, 52) argues that it was under the strain of European imperialism in the 19th and early 20th centuries that forced some Han reformers to embark on a revolutionary search for "an ideological weapon that was powerful enough to overcome the strong tradition of culturalism."

Finally, it should be acknowledged that it was under Qing rule that the first endeavors for consolidating a nationalistic identity occurred. During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the Qing government established modern schools for the purpose of molding citizens—as well as to continue education's previous project of training for government officials (Harrison 2001). Harrison argues that a key goal of the modern school project was to use curriculum based on a Western model "to transform the people…into loyal patriots" (90) The next section will examine the response to anti-Han discrimination and the greater global trend for republicanism in the 19th century. Two camps advocating for change emerged—those pushing

for reform and those for revolution. These bodies of scholarship examined Han identity from different perspectives, primarily those of race and culture.

4.2.2 Reform and Revolution

Many of the Han or Chinese nationalist activists and scholars writing at the end of the Qing asked these same questions explored by Duara (1996) and Wang (2014) (see Chapter One): What is "China"? Who is "Chinese"? Their answers to these questions depended on their time of writing, and heavily informed their goals. The reform movement preceded the push for revolution. Resting on the same culturalist understanding of Chinese identity as the Qing government, the reform movement did not call into question the legitimacy of the Manchus as a people to rule over the Han (for a larger discussion of culturalism, see Chapter Two). Harrison (2001) points to reformer Kang Youwei, who argued that provided a Manchu conversion to Han naming tradition, the Manchus might successfully fully integrate, and could therefore be accepted as rulers. Han Chinese scholars in the reform camp were primarily concerned with foreign imperial influence and encroachment. Reformers introduced the discussion of race into social classification, joining with much of the world in deliberations of human biology and development. Although certainly greatly influenced by and aware of its Western contemporaries, the resulting Chinese racial discourse at the end of the 19th and early 20th centuries was not a pure, unadulterated import. Dikötter (1997) characterized Chinese racial identity discourse as "cherry-picked," with scholars selecting overseas ideology in accordance with established folk conceptions of identity and social grouping. For example, the concept and specific term *minzu* (民族) was a notion originally conceived by Japanese theorists of race and nation (Harrison 2001). Imported theories merged with local mythological or historical figures and symbols, pre-existing lineage-based conceptions of identity, and associated fears. Moreover, Dikötter argues for an understanding of racial discourse as both top down and bottom up, formed by a "degree of circularity or reciprocal action" between official and popular race ideologies (33).

In the last decades of the Qing empire, reformers such as Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao wrote on Chinese identity by taking from select Western, including Japanese, scientific knowledge and applying it to folk symbols and lineage to argue for a "pure origin" of the "Yellow race" ((Dikötter 1997, 2). To encourage solidarity and promote a concept of a unified Chinese or Yellow lineage-race, pre-existing folk symbols and mythological figures were incorporated into racial discourse. The Yellow Emperor was thus presented as the "common

ancestor" for all of China (Dikötter 1992). Dikötter (1997, 15) saw these "reconfigured folk notions of patrilineal descent" contribute to the foundation of racial discourse "represented all inhabitants of China as the descendants of the Yellow Emperor."

According to Harrison (2001), for Liang Qichao at the turn of the century, it was vital to forge an identity based on country (*guojia*), rather than a heavenly empire with no permanent insider-outsider boundaries. Liang Qichao hoped to eliminate the concept of empire—particularly its *tianxia* or "all under heaven" aspect. Understanding history and human development to unfold as a direct product of competition—survival of the fittest—Liang advocated for a rebirth of identity and solidarity for the people in a Chinese republic. Harrison highlight's Liang's direct appeal to race, and his concern that without improving the strength of the "Yellow race," the entire race would be extinguished. Leibold (2007) cites a Hegelian understanding of historical and ahistorical peoples as a significant influence in shaping Liang's thought. Ahistorical races, previously understood as *foreign races* (*yizu,* 夷族), depend on and would eventually be absorbed into the historical races, in this case the Han people. Thus, Liang believed that the differences between Han and Manchu were not as stark as those between general Chinese and Westerner. After all, under the Qing, both Han and Manchu were branches of the same family tree. Dikötter (1992, 1997) presents this conceptualization of race and fears of racial destruction as informed by the legacy of Qing-era lineage-based formations of identity. He argues that Liang and other early theorists of race relied on the human development theory of competition for resources to appeal for unity in the fight for racial dominance. Dikötter (1992) points specifically to ethnic clashes (*fenlei xiedou,* 分類械鬥) as a source of inspiration in forming Liang's approach to conceptualizing race and competition. At the time of Liang's writing around the turn of the 20th century, violent ethnic and lineage feuds were not uncommon. These clashes made continuity of lineage a serious concern for involved families, with a real threat of lineage extinction a possibility. Liang Qichao's theorizing contributed significantly to developing the notion of Han identity and status within the greater umbrella of Chinese identity.

Subsequently, revolutionaries in the early 20th century continued and greatly expanded racial identity discourse in the late Qing. Zhang Binglin's early writing centered his consideration of identity and social groupings around race, pitting the foreign imperial "White" race against the "Yellow" race. However, the Manchu Qing government's failure to reform after the Boxer Rebellion pushed Zhang away from his softer reformist roots to revolutionist thinking. In the turn of the century, Zhang emerged as a revolutionist, publishing *Qiu Shu* (*Book*

of Persecution) in 1900. Subsequently, Zhang began to present the Han as a distinct racial category (漢族, *hanzu or* 漢種*, hanzhong*) (Leibold 2007). Chow (1997) cites this publication in his recounting of Zhang's shift from an anti-European to anti-Manchu stance, and his switch from advocacy for the "Yellow" race to a specific focus on the Han people. According to Chow, Zhang used origins and lineage to separate Han and Manchu. In an effort to consolidate Han ethnic identity, Zhang also incorporated the mythical figure of the Yellow Emperor as the first descendant of the Chinese people. Chow (1997) identifies Zhang as the scholar behind the conception of the "Chinese People-State" (中華民國, *Zhonghua Minguo*).

Sun Yat-sen was another prominent revolutionary writing on race. Sun pushed for consolidation of a Han national identity, using explicitly anti-Manchu and anti-Mongol rhetoric as justification (Tsung 2009). According to Dikötter (1992), Sun's racial nationalism, similar to both his reformist and revolutionist contemporaries, builds on the fears of racial extinction to advocate for racial unity, claiming that "only nationalism could forestall racial destruction," and sees Han as a "pure biological entity" (124). Unlike some other revolutionaries (perhaps most notably the young martyr Zou Rong), Leibold (2007) cites Sun as more tempered in his approach to racial extermination in the name of racial competition and struggle: extermination, according to Sun, should only be used in the case of nationalist (民族主義, *minzu zhuyi*) self-defense.

Dikötter's work presents the emergent Chinese nationalism in the late Qing as both fundamentally racialist and, with the associated hierarchy of racial categories, racist. Dikötter (1997) explains that "privilege, political power, social and economic exploitation have all been legitimized by the invention of racial boundaries, in particular in China and Japan" (8). Especially in conjunction with harmful modernization and development ideologies, racialized identities are operationalized to create and preserve hard boundaries between groups of people, organized into clear hierarchical rankings. In turn of the century and early 20th century Chinese identity discourse, clear racial and ethnic hierarchies served as a foundational concept across theory, with evolution and development understood as "an inevitable ascent through a preordained hierarchy of stages" (Dikötter 1997, 7).

Following the anti-Manchu military mutiny in Wuchang in late 1911, revolution erupted, and in a "relatively quick and painless" process, the Republic of China was established in early 1912 (Esherick 2006, 234). Esherick, contends, however, that in the former empire's periphery, the transition to ROC governance was not quite so straightforward. Indeed, elites in both

Mongolia and Tibet sought independence, and expressed opposition to Republican claims of sovereignty over the regions. The following section aims to further explore Tibetan and Mongolian responses to the founding of the ROC, Republican attempts to enforce territorial claims, as well as official efforts to consolidate a national identity during the Republican Era on Mainland China, 1912-1949.

4.2.3 The Republic of China: 1912-1949

Following the dissolution of the Qing government and the establishment of the Republic, Founding Father Sun Yat-sen's thought on Chinese identity and its "foreign" races underwent considerable change. Instead of pursuing an exclusively Han-Chinese state, ROC leadership pivoted to rely heavily on the previous Qing approach towards pluralism and governance. The new government extended official recognition of the five nations of the Republic: Han, Manchu, Mongolian, Tibetan, and Hui (Turkic Muslim). Harrison (2001) notes the colors of then Republican flag represented each nation: Hui as white, Mongol as blue, Manchu as yellow, Tibetan as black, and Han as red. Despite official narratives insisting otherwise, following the Han government's "position of paternalism and assumed superiority," the Manchu, Mongolian, Tibetan, and Hui races were not considered on equal standing with the Han (Tsung 2009:53).

Leibold (2007) offers an extended critique of the popular notion that Sun argued for and supported the unity of all five nations as equal members of the ROC. Leibold argues that Sun's championing of self-determination was limited, and could be characterized as mostly political rhetoric extended in the hopes of garnering acceptance of Republican sovereignty in these frontier lands. Indeed, the "frontier question" of how to manage effectively the diverse and significantly different frontier played a prominent role in policy making in the early republic. The Republican government was struggling to establish sovereignty over vast tracts of territory on all sides of the Republic, with concurrent power struggles with warlords in the south and north, frontier minority nations, political factions within the party, opposition parties, and continued foreign encroachment. Leibold (2007, 13) quotes Sun in 1921 speaking on the need to assimilate the Tibetans, Mongols, Hui and Manchus in order to provide a buffer between China and the Japanese, Russian and British empires, all of which waited on the other side of these disputed lands. Claiming these nations could not defend themselves, the Chinese state argued a need to solidify control over these lands as an issue of national security for the Republic (Esherick 2006). Bulag (2006) adds that the Mongolia also played a key economic role as both a market for Han-Chinese goods and as a new home for waves of late 19th and early 20th century Han migration. Meanwhile, Tibet remained a key piece of territorial puzzle

in the region's role as a religious-political authority over both Mongolia and Manchuria. Bulag reveals that once the founding revolutionaries deemed the peoples on China Proper's periphery as necessary, but subsidiary, components of the nation, the central government worked to instrumentalize Tibetan Buddhism as a tool for unification. All considered, even with the formal inclusion and recognition of the pluralistic "Five Nation Republic," it is evident that the Early Republican approach to statehood placed the Han nation very clearly at center of both ROC territory and ideology.

Furthermore, despite Sun's eloquent aspirations of a unified Five-Nation Republic and official appeals to equality, Leibold (2007) demonstrates that Republican sovereignty in these border lands was limited to non-existent. In both the cases of Tibet and Mongolia, independence movements, foreign intervention, and conflict with regional warlords or other regional stakeholders greatly complicated ROC claims of rightful control. With the collapse of the Qing Empire, support for establishment of the ROC arrived from the Russian Empire, but this support also came with the Empire's support for the separation of Outer Mongolia from China. Mixed messages continued after the fall of the Russian Empire and the establishment of the USSR. In 1924—the same year the People's Republic of Mongolia was founded—the Soviet Union signed an agreement with the ROC to recognize outer Mongolia as belonging to China. However, the USSR remained otherwise supportive of an independent People's Republic for Outer Mongolia. This foreign support for an independent Mongolia was a heavy blow for ROC nationalism. The Republican national government faced considerable pressure from wealthy citizens both at home and abroad and from powerful regional leaders to retake Mongolia.

Under these conditions, Sun Yat-sen saw the political necessity in establishing sovereignty and control across the five nations and their territories. Sun in fact worked to limit the extent to which the Republican government promised to extend rights of self-determination. For example, Sun's *Jianguo Dagang (Outline for National Reconstruction)* featured a "vaguely worded" framework for self-determination, and merely promised a government role in "'cultivating' (*fuzhi*) the ability of all of China's 'domestic, small, and weak minzus' (*guonei zhi ruoxiao minzu*) to 'self-determination and self-rule' (*zijue zizhi*)." (Sun, translated by Leibold 2007: 56).

An independent Outer Mongolia also complicated the ideological argument for the inclusion of inner Mongolia into the ROC. Harrison (2001) cites several instances of inner Mongolian banners attempting to join the new People's Republic shortly after its establishment. The banners' leadership often cited the problem of Han chauvinism and

oppression under the ROC as reasons to separate from China. Leibold (2007) further explains the complexity of the political situation in the decades after the fall of the Qing, citing Han settlement of inner Mongolia, powerful Han warlords, Mongolian banners, and the increasing threat of Japanese invasion. As a result, ROC President Yuan Shikai agreed to grant greater authority to the local government, with both Mongolian and Han leadership.

The question of sovereignty was not any clearer in Tibet. In 1912, the 13th Dalai Lama expelled all Manchu and Chinese officials. Shortly thereafter, Mongolia and Tibet mutually recognized the other's independence in Urga, Mongolia. The winter 1912 treaty recognized Mongolia and Tibet as independent from the Qing and ROC governments, and as sharing Tibetan Buddhism as a religion (Smith 1996, 185). Then, at the Simla Conference in 1913 came the first official claim of an independent Tibet, although the Tripartite Accord signed at the conference by British, Tibetan and Chinese representatives granted the Republic suzerainty over Tibet alongside a Republican commitment to extensive Tibetan autonomy (Leibold 2007). As with the case of Mongolia, Yuan Shikai attempted to entice Tibet into the Republican fold through courting favor with the Dalai Lama: issuing a formal apology and re-recognizing the Dalai Lama's status. The Mongolian and Tibetan Office within the larger Ministry of Internal Affairs was subsequently tasked with writing new policy to win over Tibet, ultimately issuing "Outline of Regulations for the Treatment of Tibet" (Leibold 2007). Policy under the Yuan administration for Tibet and Outer Mongolia continued to run along parallel tracks. Despite deploying troops to be ready to enter Tibet, and responding swiftly and mercilessly to uprisings in Inner Mongolia, Yuan Shikai's response to the continued insistence of independence in Outer Mongolia and Tibet was tempered by the ROC's need for foreign recognition and support, and thus military intervention in these areas was limited and restrained.

Until 1928, a number of increasingly large and important government bodies were created to attempt to lure Outer Mongolia back to the Republic, dissuade Mongols in Inner Mongolia from joining any struggle for independence, and persuade the Tibetan leadership to submit to ROC sovereignty (Lan 2017). Within months of the ROC's founding, the Office of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs was established to target the linked independence movements of Mongolia and Tibet. Lan (2017) chronicles the evolution of this Office, as it was upgraded into a Bureau (1912), then the Board of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs 蒙藏事務院 (1914), which fell directly under the jurisdiction of ROC President. Lan concludes, however, that even with the increasing prestige and size of each body reorganization, the various Mongolian and Tibetan affairs agencies could not make progress in extending ROC sovereignty.

After another decade of continued independence and increasing foreign influence and encroachments, Leibold (2007) explains the establishment of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission. The Commission was first proposed in the late 1920s by Mongolian KMT party member Bai Yunti. Bai's proposal aimed both "to formulate central government policy toward Mongolia and Tibet" and "to help promote domestic and international awareness of the imperialist plot to break apart the *Zhonghua minzu* under the bogus banner of national self-determination" (58). Thus, in addition to its function as a governing body, with the power to directly draft legislation and oversee its implementation, the Commission further served as a propaganda or educational tool in its objective to spread *awareness*. The Commission borrowed heavily from *Lifanyuan* precedent, adopting a similar *yinsu'erzhi* approach, collaborating with local leaders and working with pre-existing structures and institutions. This included approaching the Dalai Lama for negotiations and attempting to assert oversight of the Tibetan Lama system so as to extend control over both Tibet and Mongolia.

Warfare blighted the 1930s and 40s, further frustrating Nationalist efforts to extend sovereignty throughout its frontier regions. Fighting both the Chinese Communist Party insurrection and against the Japanese in the Second Sino-Japanese War, Nationalist Party troops were spread thin. Although the Japanese ultimately accepted defeat at the end of World War II in 1945, fighting continued for Nationalist soldiers, with efforts redoubled against the Communist Party. During this time, the MTAC aimed to fulfill its policy outlined in two key policy documents issued in 1929: a policy outline procedure [施政綱領及進行程序] and a timetable [訓政工作分配年表]. According to Lan (2017), these policy directives included issuing awards to abdicating princes and nobles, demanding free tuition for Mongolian and Tibetan students in China, supporting Mongolian and Tibetan students' study in Central and Beiping universities, managing military acceptance of Mongolian and Tibetan men, and prompting intermarriages among Mongolian, Tibetan, and Chinese families.

Following the founding of the Republic of China in 1912, a new era of official discourse of Chinese ethnicity, race, and nation had begun. By the end of the Republican Era in 1949, a multinational Chinese state with its own notion of national identity, statehood, and territory had emerged. Indeed, Republican era official images of China as depicted in history and geography textbooks used in state schools in lower Yangzi region directly touched on many of these aspects of nationalism. The Chinese nation was described as "unified, sovereign territory that had grown continuously over millennia," that was also "under threat from outside attack," and "marked by ethno-cultural pluralism as well as … 'backwardness'" (Culp 2007, 9). As

Culp (2007) highlights, territory, as much as race or culture, was a crucial element of Republican nationalism. As demonstrated by Leibold (2007), Lan (2017), Bulag (2006) and Tsung (2009), Qing imperial policy, Han-chauvinism, and civilizational hierarchy all played a role in maintaining claims to territory. In other words, in inheriting the population and territory of the Qing, the new Republic was also heavily influenced by the imperial approach to managing diversity within its territory. As the chapter's story of the ROC on Mainland China drew to a close, a key question remains on the continuation of the ROC's ideological approach to identity, diversity, and civilizational hierarchy. To what extent did these key concepts persist as the ROC's understanding of national identity, statehood, and national territory evolved over the second half of the 20th century and into the early 21st century?

The findings and conclusion chapters aim to answer this question. However, before beginning discussion of the MTAC's evolution on Taiwan, it is first necessary to review the unfolding of identity management and governance in Taiwan prior to its incorporation into the Chinese Republic. In 1949, the Nationalist government relocated to Taipei in retreat, still adamant on retaking the Mainland. It is the MTAC's activity in the decades that followed Nationalist retreat that are the primary interest of this dissertation. However, before turning to examine the Commission's institutional history on Taiwan, it is first essential to explore the context in which the KMT found itself in the 1950s, subsequent motivations for democratization, and the greater ideological change leading up and into the 21st century. To provide this context, the history of Taiwan and its peoples must be told.

4.3 On the Periphery: History of Taiwan

4.3.1 Pre-Qing History on Taiwan

Following the founding of the People's Republic of China on 1 October 1949, the government of the Republic of China retained control of the island Taiwan, as well as the nearby Penghu islands, Tungsha Island, and the Jinmen and Matsu islands (Roy 2003). However, Taiwan and its closest neighboring islands had not been under the ROC's jurisdiction for long. Indeed, the language(s), popular histories, and culture(s) carried to Taiwan by the *Waishengren* or Mainlanders diverged considerably from that of those peoples local to Taiwan. Taiwan and its surrounding islands were not simply another part of a greater China under the administration of the ROC. The islands had only come under its administration 4 years before, at the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War and after 50 years of Japanese colonial rule. Previously, Taiwan had been subject to a series of distant rulers, which Shih (2015, 175) terms

"the condition of 'serial colonialism.'" The following section reviews the history of Taiwan until 1949. The section aims to provide a brief account of the origins of key political tensions influencing official identity in the ROC and the development of the MTAC on Taiwan through 2017. Namely, this includes the development of popular identities, including the emergence of Taiwanese nationalism, and the movement for greater recognition of multiculturalism.

The population of Taiwan today is organized into an evolving set of categories. Until the early 2000s, Taiwan's population consisted of Indigenous Peoples, Hakka, Hokkien, and Mainlanders. In the past two decades, New Immigrants, a category of majority female migrants from certain Asian countries, have received increasing official recognition and inclusion in social programs (Cheng and Fell 2014). Shih (2015, 175) comments that Taiwan's "multicultural, multiethnic, and multilingual constitution" of today is "overdetermined" by the numerous and significant "historical upheavals" of regime change. According to Shih, for the early settlers of Taiwan, most of these regimes were colonial. However, from the perspective of Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples, all regimes "including the apparent democratic ones since the late 1980s" were colonial (176). In another volume, Shih (2021, ix) puts forth in plain terms the history of Taiwan from the Indigenous perspective: "Taiwan is a settler colony where indigenous Austronesian people have been colonized for several hundred years and yet endured. This a priori fact precedes all ways of understanding Taiwan's history..." Indeed, scholarship places Taiwan's Indigenous Peoples on the islands up to 8,000 years back (Chen 2010). As of 2022, the ROC has officially recognized 16 different tribes, although this number is subject to change pending acceptance of additional petitions for official recognition. According to Chen (2011), Taiwanese indigenous groups are Austronesian, with linguistic links to other Austronesian peoples. Since the arrival of Chinese migrants and colonial powers, recognition and classification of these tribes have evolved over time. Significant changes in recognition have even occurred within the ROC's relatively short period of rule on the island, discussed at greater length in Chapters Six and Seven.

Migrants from Fujian province began arriving in Taiwan beginning in the 14th century. Speaking *Minnanyu*, also called Taiwanese or Hoklo, Hokkien migrants from nearby Fujian Province came in search of economic opportunities related to fishing, farming and trading (Roy 2003). Hakka people, or *Kejiaren* (客家人) as called by other Han sub-ethnicities, began arriving on the island around the same time, in waves from the 13th century on. Speaking their own dialect, Hakka people arrived as a displaced people, fleeing harassment on the mainland (Roy 2003). Both Hakka and Hokkien peoples had a difficult relationship with the different

indigenous tribes. Intermarriage was not unusual, but forced displacement of indigenous farmers and violent clashes were also common (Brown 2004).

In the 17th century, European colonizing forces arrived on Taiwan. From 1624 to 1661, a Dutch colony, under the Dutch East India Company, operated a trading and military base. Brown (2004) chronicles the Dutch manipulation of ethnic tensions. The Dutch colonial administration encouraged immigration from the Chinese mainland while using a militia of Indigenous peoples to control this growing body. The Dutch colonial administration devised a tax system based on ethnicity. Han Chinese—including both Hokkien and Hakka—were taxed on the proceeds of farming, while taxes were collected from Indigenous peoples through a levy on the deer trade. Additionally, the Dutch pursued an evangelical mission limited to the Indigenous tribes (Heylen 2012). At this time, the island served as a trading space for Chinese traders and merchants, Japanese traders, as well as other European traders. However, Taiwanese indigenous peoples remained the ethnic majority.

1661 saw the ending of Dutch colonial rule by Zheng Chenggong. One of the last Ming loyalists, Zheng was pushed to Taiwan by the expanding Manchu Qing state. Wen-Hsiung Hsu (1980a) marks these two decades as a pivotal period in the islands' history, seeing a transformation "from a foreign trading colony into a Chinese frontier" (28). Before the Qing military seized control from the Zheng clan in 1683, Zheng forces established a military state, with heavy taxes on both Indigenous and Han (including both Hokkien and Hakka) peoples, based in part on the Dutch system. The Zheng administration also extended a system of forced labor service for Indigenous tribes. Brown (2004) also argues that during this time, there was no evidence of a unifying Han identity, with identity formation largely resting on shared sub-ethnicity, lineage, and place of origin, and struggles between clans were often violent. Ultimately, the Zheng clan's rule of the islands was short lived, ending after several losses on the battlefield and surrender to Qing forces. It should be noted here that it was through Qing expansion that brought Taiwan, Mongolia, and Tibet all into the Chinese polity. It would not be until the 21st century that the ROC would formally cease to lay claim to this territory in its entirety – by finally officially recognizing the independent republic Mongolia in 2002.

4.3.2 Qing Colonial Rule

The Manchu Qing established at first a rather lax rule over the territory in 1683, extending until the loss of the islands to the Japanese in the First Sino-Japanese war in 1895. Roy (2003) emphasizes the "distinct" nature of development in Taiwan throughout this period. He cites the Qing administration's unwillingness to invest in the island beyond the minimum necessary to

hold the island—both from outside threat of attack and local Han and Indigenous uprisings. The nature of the Manchu-controlled state ruling from the mainland led to a political dynamic on the island in some ways reminiscent of the Dutch colonial order. Brown (2004) examines the evolution of Qing administration, and in particular the system of taxation, to understand its approach to governance and classification. Brown finds that Qing treatment of its subjects on Taiwan was largely dependent on what they could offer in military service, tax revenue, or labor. Indigenous peoples in particular, according to Roy, were at different times regarded as valuable "taxpayers, conscripted soldiers… and corvee laborers" (25), while particularly during these early years Han Chinese were regarded with greater suspicion and possible enmity. Brown argues that these assessments, in conjunction with the administration's wish to prevent costly anti-Qing or anti-Han uprisings, greatly influenced classification, taxation and other policy targeting Indigenous peoples.

In Chinese writings during this period, Taiwanese Indigenous peoples were frequently categorized according to level of "civilization." In Taiwan, this tended to take the form of a labeling of populations as *shengfan* ("raw") or *shufan* ("cooked"). Teng (2004) reviews these terms and traces the classification of tribes under Zheng and then Qing rule, pinpointing several factors in each category's definition. One loose parameter was the question of who paid taxes— those who paid taxes were considered "cooked," and those who did not "raw." Other complicating factors included who submitted to Qing rule and who did not, which tribes were friendly, and which were not. During Zheng's two decades of administration, these definitions were also associated with the degree of sinification (漢化). Teng also points out that these classifications of cooked and raw could be applied to the land as well, and indeed in time came to correspond to the division between "Plains" and "Mountain" tribes, respectively. However, it is important to note that Taiwanese Indigenous peoples—across the Chinese "raw" to "cooked" spectrum—were not recognized under the Qing "Five Nations, Under Heaven" or "Five Nation Family" imperial framework. It thus follows that the Qing administration saw no ideological need to establish or reinforce a clear demarcation between or among Han and Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples. Nonetheless, in the early and middle Qing periods, separation of "Mountain" and "Plains" Indigenous Peoples was encouraged to prevent inter-tribe and Indigenous-Han clashes. In the early Qing period—which Brown defines as extending up to the 1730s—Plains tribes were viewed favorably, as a result of their provision of military service in aiding with the management of anti-Qing Han uprisings and collection of taxes on deer hunting and trade.

However, in the middle Qing period (until the 1870s), the extinction of deer led to the end of this valuable source of tax revenue. The increasing Han population also saw rising tensions and violence between Indigenous tribes and Han peoples, as Qing protection of Indigenous lands from the expanding agricultural Hokkien and Hakka peoples largely failed. However, Plains Indigenous Peoples remained valuable soldiers. Finally, during the late period (until the advent of Japanese colonial rule in 1895), Brown identifies the large-scale conversion to Christianity of many Plains Indigenous Peoples as leading to a loss of the Qing government's trust in the new converts. Consequently, Qing administration began to favor Hokkien and Hakka peoples. Thus, during the final years of Qing rule, Plains tribes were encouraged to integrate with and assimilate to their Han neighbors. Mountain tribes, however, remained largely segregated with strict prevention of Han relocation to the mountain areas. This was maintained until the last 20 years of Qing rule. From 1875, the ban on Han expansion into mountain regions was lifted, resulting in over a dozen uprisings by Mountain tribes, deadly attacks on incoming Han Chinese, and Qing government response to suppress resistance and violence (Hsu 1980b). Roy (2003) cites economic and security pressures as primary reasons for this change, pointing to the accompanying development of social, transport, and trade infrastructure into the mountains.

Teng (2004) argues that Qing rule in Taiwan should be viewed as an instance of colonialism, comparable with contemporary Western colonial projects in regions such as North America. (Discussion of Teng's research in relation to other works on imperialism is presented in Chapter Two.) Teng cites Qing and Chinese travel writing in Taiwan to present her claim that Qing expansionism, including that in Taiwan and surrounding islands, is part of a greater "Chinese imperialism." Her research reveals that the Qing not only perceived their expansionism as in some respects similar to that of contemporary European imperial powers, but also believed themselves to be performing a civilizing mission. In the case of the Qing, the situation is complicated by the fact that this was a conquest regime controlled by a non-Han people, the Manchu. As discussed in the previous section, the Manchu ruling class operated by subjugating the Han and other races or nationalities (民族) while simultaneously adopting a position of culturalism, claiming to some degree to have Sinicized culturally and politically. Teng highlights the duality of exchange between Han Chinese and Manchu, arguing that the Han also "Manchuized." This interweaving of Manchu and Han played out to a greater degree in the Empire's frontier regions, including Taiwan, where Qing troops, recruited from across the empire, fought for expansion, but where only Han Chinese settled in large numbers.

Teng thus makes the case for including Qing and Chinese imperialism in broader discourses on imperialism and colonialism, particularly those that consider "cross-cultural modes of constructing foreign 'others'." (12-13) Gender is one such element involved in Qing discourses on the "internal other" in the case of the Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples. Teng comments that gendered and sexualized portrayals of imperial subjects worked not only to mark the people in question as "other" but also as less than human. Qing travel writing associated the categories of masculine and civilized, feminine and barbaric; such travel writing often focused on the matrilineal social organization of many of the Indigenous tribes and the higher status of women in these Indigenous societies as markers of their "barbarity."

Han Chinese on Taiwan did not adopt such matrilineal practices, at least not *en masse*. But neither did they organize themselves in the same fashion as on the mainland. Hsu (1980b) contends that unlike on the mainland, Qing dynasty Hokkien Chinese communities in particular did not follow a social order according to lineage, largely resulting from the nature of economic migration and Qing policy which greatly constrained Hokkien women from migrating until 1790. Although many men did marry Indigenous women, as Brown (2004) notes, many men did not marry at all. Consequently, Hsu argues, identity and social grouping formed around shared ancestral homes, names, and dialects. Outside of these bonds of commonality, clashes and competition over resources led to violent struggles between communities (械鬥, *xiedou*).

In addition, clubs and organizations based on common interests emerged, and these organizations often became sites for rebellion. Brown (2004) maintains that a "pan-Taiwanese identity" did not develop until the Japanese occupation in the late 19th century, and when it did develop, was "an identity limited to Han" (8). Landlords fought bitterly with each other, and, in the power vacuum left by the Qing's lackadaisical approach to the island's administration, acted like warlords in the *xiedou* clashes.

In the last decade of Qing administration of Taiwan, the island was upgraded to provincial status after the 1884 Franco-Chinese War and French threat to take Taiwan. Following this, economic development was pushed under the heavy hand of Governor Liu Mingchuan, in addition to the drive to assimilate and subdue both so-called Plains and Mountain Indigenous peoples. Schools in particular were established for Indigenous students to push Qing imperial initiatives. In addition, Liu Mingchuan lead several brutal punitive campaigns against Indigenous rebellions. Threatened by the mounting pressures of foreign encroachment and war, these development campaigns signified a shift in Qing policy to abandon the previous protocol of neglect and to take up efforts to strengthen the island (Roy 2003). Ultimately, this status as

independent province under the Qing was short-lived, as in 1895, the Japanese government began its occupation of the islands.

4.3.3 Japanese Rule and Retrocession

Under Japanese colonial rule, lasting from 1895 to 1945, Brown (2004) sees the development of ethnic identity and classification into something more similar to our contemporary categories: "peoples in Taiwan were classified by a notion of race, which in practice, in the early Japanese house-hold registers, looks a lot like today's ethnic classifications." (8) These distinctions became less important over the course of the Japanese colonial period, ultimately being dropped from the family registers by the early 20th century. Race and class distinction, and in particular the division of Japanese and non-Japanese, became far more relevant. Intermarriage with Japanese was illegal. During this time, "Plains" tribes ceased to hold their own classification, and were merged with the Han into one social group, although "Mountain" tribes retained their separate status. This group in particular faced forced relocation, breaking apart of families, and strict social regulation. "Plains" Indigenous peoples saw the end of whatever land rights they had retained from Qing Governor Liu Mingchuan's pro-assimilation policy. Roy (2003, 51) explains succinctly: "In sum, the Japanese administration carried on with its predecessors' twin tactics of assimilation and selective warfare."

Under the household registration system, termed *hoko* in Japanese and *baojia* in Chinese, system, the Japanese reined in local Taiwanese resistance and, according to Roy (2003), largely succeeded in breaking down clan-based identities. Throughout this period, there was continuous debate on the question of pro-assimilation policy for Japan's colonial subjects. Brown (2004) cites Japanese language and schooling as two important factors in changing the cultural landscape of Taiwan, the latter bringing together for the first time, feuding clans in addition to its project of instilling Japanese culture and values in its pupils. Limitations on local languages in favor of Japanese language gradually tightened over time, with the eventual banning of local languages and exclusive promotion of Japanese. Roy notes that industry and infrastructure was heavily built up during this time as well. And while certainly rebellion and resistance toward the Japanese continued throughout the fifty years of occupation, there was also a high participation rate and enthusiasm for the opportunity to enlist in the Japanese wartime military.

Partly as a result of that record of Taiwanese collaboration with the Japanese, the return of Taiwan and its nearby islands to mainland China at the end of the Second Sino-Japanese

War in 1945 was accompanied by many difficulties and tensions. Mainland China had undergone many changes during Japan's occupation of Taiwan, as discussed above. Brown (2004) explains that after the island's retrocession to the Republican administration, Chen Yi was placed at the head of the special military government to preside over the island, now without official provincial status. Following the return of Taiwan, many Mainlanders, also called *waishengren* or literally "people from outside the province," moved to the island as soldiers, officials, or those interested in business. Many of the Plains Indigenous Peoples had by this time been subsumed into the greater-in-number Taiwanese Han ethnicities. Furthermore, Governor Chen imposed a hard switch to a Mandarin-only policy, forbidding use of the Japanese language. It is important to note that Mandarin or *Guoyu* is not mutually intelligible with Hakka, *Minnanyu*, let alone any of Taiwan's Indigenous languages, and this move therefore precluded the involvement of many Taiwanese in their own government. Tensions between Mainlanders and Taiwanese ran high, with local Taiwanese characterized as traitorous and Mainlanders characterized as opportunistic and exploitative. While Roy (2003) makes the case that many Mainlander officials came with good intentions, certainly, the Republican administration as a general body was plagued by corruption. Consequently, the harsh combination of new policies for language planning, influx of Mainlanders, and government misconduct was met with local Taiwanese uprisings.

The Chen administration took violent measures to suppress these uprisings and other forms of dissent, impacting both local Taiwanese and Mainlanders. Most infamous of these transgressions was the 2:28 incident. On 28 February 1947, a Taiwanese protest march reacting to the mistreatment of a cigarette vendor turned into a murderous riot. After news of this spread across Taiwan, Taiwanese took to the streets, and nine major cities scummed to violence and widespread social unrest. With the breakdown of negotiations, Governor Chen under authorization of President Jiang sent in Nationalist troops to take back control and declared military rule once again. According to Roy (2003), whether through direct instruction or lack of discipline, soldiers led a campaign of terror to execute all traitors, a campaign that at times included indiscriminate killings, rapes, and theft. The subsequent years of suppression and violence mark the period of White Terror. It is thus clear that the retrocession of Taiwan was not a smooth transition, nor was there any concerted attempt to incorporate Taiwanese local identities and politics. Instead, Heylen (2011) argues that the return of Taiwan to mainland China placed Taiwan on the periphery of the official national identity that centered around a "Chinese master identity" with the Mainland Han at its core. After the retrocession, only four years passed before the Communist Party seized control over the mainland and established the

People's Republic of China, forcing the Nationalists to retreat to Taiwan—still hoping to one day regain control over greater China.

History on Taiwan, while not isolated from the Mainland, was certainly distinct in many ways. Governance of Taiwan involved both colonial and settler-colonial "modes of domination," from occupation by European forces, most significantly the Dutch, the Qing Court, formal Japanese colonization, and ROC control (Hirano, Veracini and Roy 2021, 225). Until the arrival of the Japanese, clan based feuding and violent ethnic clashes made life on the island gruesome and bloody. Uprisings were common, in the form both of inter-ethnic conflict and of rebellions against the various administrations. Official delineations between social groups—of what might be considered ethnicity, race, class, etc—were largely decided based on taxation systems and ease of governance. This is especially apparent when considering the three administrations with the longest rule and largest hold of territory: the Dutch, the Qing, and the Japanese in chronological order. All three administrations were foreign colonial powers who had taken the island by force. Taxation policies were passed down. Qing and Japanese treatment of Taiwanese indigenous peoples had considerable overlap but differed from the Dutch. Above all, the three administrations were imperial regimes, with Taiwan falling at the periphery of each empire.

4.4 Conclusion

With the arrival of the Mainlanders and the Republican administration in 1945, much of the islands' subsequent troubles seemed evocative of the uprisings, violent suppression, and inter-ethnic conflict of past administrations. Despite no longer belonging to an empire or placed under colonial rule as such, Taiwan and its peoples were still relegated to the Republic's periphery. Government leadership was largely monopolized (at least at senior levels) by Mainlanders, in a top-down effort to control and manage Taiwanese people(s) and resources, thus perpetuating the pattern of rule by outsiders. In addition, the Nationalist administration continued previous Qing and Japanese efforts to incorporate and erase histories of "Plains" Indigenous Peoples. The legacies of resistance, violence, and suppression between the people of Taiwan (including Taiwanese Hakka, Hokkien and Indigenous peoples) and their government thus continued into Republican Chinese administration.

Many key ideologies forged during the Qing and early Republican periods have not been addressed by the ROC in the years since relocating to Taiwan. While not subjecting the island to a formal colonial regime as previously, the ROC brought to Taiwan its imperialist ideologies.

These ideologies included the Five-Nation Republic approach to managing pluralism, the notion of cultural hierarchy with Mainland Han placed at the top, and a strict adherence to a vision of China still rooted in the former Qing Empire's territorial boundaries. Understanding these complex and intertwining historical narratives from both Mainland China and Taiwan is crucial to the subsequent discussion of the MTAC on Taiwan, from 1949 to 2017. To what extent did Qing approaches to identity and governance continue to influence MTAC discourses of the so-called (former) frontier? Furthermore, to what degree have these inherited notions of Han-chauvinism and civilizational hierarchy influenced the continued development of national identity and statehood following the retreat to Taiwan in 1949?

The following chapter begins where this chapter ends: in 1949 with the arrival of the Republican central government in retreat on Taiwan. Chapter Five narrows in on the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission to provide an institutional history of the state organ in its contemporaneous political context. The chapter further offers justification for the periodization employed throughout the findings chapters and conclusion, noting key political and social junctures in the ROC's history on Taiwan, 1949-2017.

Chapter Five: Development of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission on Taiwan

5.1 Introduction

Since retreating to Taiwan, the ROC has transformed itself through a dual process of localization and democratization. As a state organ, the MTAC itself had thus also significantly shifted the nature and tone of its activities and publications. Rather than attempt to provide a complete narrative of political, social, and cultural shifts alongside the presentation of results in the findings chapters (Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight), this chapter serves as a further background chapter. Thus, the following chapter aims to provide insight into how the prevailing political attitudes and relevant current events informed the MTAC's mission and scope. In doing so, the chapter introduces the periodization of the Commission's publication history that will be referenced throughout the findings chapters.

This chapter aims to provide both the ideological and practical political contexts for changes in MTAC policy and orientation across three eras: Martial Law (1949-1987), Transition to Democracy (1988-1999), and the 21st Century (2000-2017). The emergence, adoption, and disavowal of certain key ideologies, including the Three People's Principles and the concept of "Multicultural Taiwan". With regard to politics, the chapter includes consideration of the changing socio-political landscapes on Taiwan, within the Asia-Pacific region, and globally. The unfolding of these narratives is limited to which historical events are relevant to the MTAC's own institutional history.

5.2 Martial Law (1949-1987)

The first period roughly coincides with the era of the ROC's authoritarian regime, beginning with the MTAC's relocation to Taipei in 1949 and ending with the end of KMT military rule in 1987. This period was shaped by Chiang Kai-shek and subsequent authoritarian leaders' insistence on maintaining ROC claims to Mainland China, with Taiwan positioned on the nation's periphery as a frontier bastion. Chiang Kai-shek's administration strictly adhered to the Three People's Principles (*sanminzhuyi* 三民主義), a set of ideals established by Sun Yat-sen and other revolutionaries at the end of the Qing rule, and included the principles of

nationalism[6] (民族主義), democracy (民權主義), and livelihood (民生主義) (Leibold 2007, 34). After relocation, Chiang Kai-shek declared Taiwan to be a Three People's Principles "model province," and emphasized the national duty to retake Mainland China (Chang 2015, 112). Furthermore, the White Terror campaign, begun in the late 1940s in response to local Taiwanese uprisings, continued throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Strict regulation of society and promotion of economic growth were portrayed as necessary to prevent the development of communism on Taiwan (Heylen 2011).

Other government and academic publications from this era can provide an additional glimpse into official notions of national identity and conceptualization of the "frontier" under military rule. Looking through a lens of "territoriality" and focusing on Mainland China as a whole rather than the frontier specifically (see Chapter Two for more), Chang (2015) explores the contradiction between the official imaginary and political reality of the national territory after 1949 as presented in Government Information Office publications and ROC Yearbooks (1951-2010). Chang argues that the state's decision to publish yearbooks starting in 1950 reflected the ROC's "territorial insistence" and a deliberate effort to demonstrate continuity in its legitimating ideology. Chang and Holt (2015) similarly argue for a continuity across the period of military rule with regard to official terminology for Mainland China, with terminology, including pejoratives such as "Communist Bandit" [共匪], chosen to demonstrate the ROC's rightful claim to sovereignty and condemn the "usurpation" of the CCP.

In these early decades after the ROC retreat to the island, history and politics were written largely within such a Cold War framework, with some in the international community, most significantly the United States, supporting the ROC as a means of containing the PRC (Wang 2007). In the first three decades on Taiwan, the ROC and PRC competed over international recognition as the rightful representative of China. Particularly since the ROC lost its seat in the United Nations in 1971, the PRC has largely prevailed in this regard, with the ROC losing its place in nearly all political international organizations (Hughes 2016). PRC scholar Yang Zhong (2016, 347) theorizes that the "lack of international recognition and the disappearance of the very name 'Republic of China' from the international stage must have had an impact on how people in Taiwan perceive themselves." Certainly, in the official arena, early nativization efforts in the 1970s yielded some results for limited political engagement in the *dangwai* (non-

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[6] Leibold translates this as "the doctrine of the people's lineage" to highlight the specific meaning of *minzu* as relating to family line and ethnic heritage (34).

KMT) movement, although still great change did not arrive until the 1990s. In 1977, the first *dangwai* politician (Hsu Hsin-liang) was elected, to the position of Taoyuan County Magistrate, albeit only after local riots forced the KMT to honor the results (Hughes 2016). It would be another 10 years still before military rule ended, and 20 years before the first direct presidential election.

The university system during this era was significantly influenced by official policy and rhetoric. National Chengchi University (國立政治大學) served as the primary site in Taiwan for scholarship on the "frontier". The university itself was re-established in Taipei 1954, and, reportedly under the direction of the MTAC, concurrently founded the Department for Frontier Studies [邊政學系] intended for the training and development of future leaders and policy-makers for the frontier-region after reunification (Liu 2018). Through the 1960s, a school journal was published entitled *Bulletin of the Department of Ethnology and Sociology*「邊政學報」. In 1969, the Graduate School of China Border Area Studies (邊政研究所) was established, and shortly afterwards, the name of the school bulletin was changed to the *Journal of Ethnology and Sociology* [民族社會學報], and then again in 1981 to 「社會學系」[7]. All three publications featured articles from National Chengchi University students, researchers, and professors, many of whom had ties with the MTAC, either before, during or after their studies and/or time on the faculty. According to Liu (2018), this list included Hu Nai-an 胡耐安, MTAC member and frequent contributor, who served as the Department's first chair. Chou Kun-tien 周昆田, previous MTAC chairman, served as the first Director of the Graduate School of China Border Area Studies. Under their leadership, the first generation of Taiwan-educated ROC frontier or "China Border" scholars were raised. In addition to MTAC Chairman and National Chengchi University Professor Zhang Junyi 張駿逸, scholars including Liu Xueyao 劉學銚, He Ke 何可, Hsiao Chin-sung 蕭金松, Chen Youxin 陳又新, and Zhao Zhucheng 趙竹成 all graduated from one of the border studies programs and worked or wrote for the

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[7] National Chengchi University Historical and Cultural Relics Management System [國立政治大學校史文物登錄管理系統] "邊政研究所年報（民族學報）"[online] [Accessed 15 may 2022]. https://contentdm.lib.nccu.edu.tw/digital/collection/nccuhistory/id/1340/

MTAC. Despite the departments' name changes, Liu (2018) asserts that little changed in the programs' content or structure. Indeed, corroborating Liu's claim, over 25 years after the retreat from Mainland China, the Graduate School's program objectives remained as: "studying the nation's border area policy through academic research and teaching, encouraging research on China's border regions, and fostering border policy specialists who will be able to assist in the reconstruction of border areas after recovery of the mainland [以該政府光復大陸重建邊疆]" (Lin (ed) 1985, 160)[8].

The Department for Frontier Studies and Graduate School of China Border Area Studies' bulletins and journals provide a wealth of resources on ROC scholarship from throughout the period of martial law. These publications also serve as testament to the cooperation between academy and government beyond the overlap in official personnel and university faculty registers. Namely, the rhetoric and conceptual approach to the "frontier," the China Border, and China itself employed throughout scholarly writings from Taiwan-based academics suggest the general alignment with official ideology of the era. Publications in both the *Bulletin* and subsequent *Journal of Ethnology and Sociology* demonstrate an ardent Han- and Mainland-centric approach to their study of the ROC. Primary focus in much of the contributions lay on cataloguing and categorizing ethnic groups, with considerations of social customs, location, and proximity to Han civilization (see: 「清朝新疆漢回經濟隔離政策研究」Lin 1976; "Peoples and Societies in Yunnan" Yang 1978, 1979). Exactly where, when, and to what degree certain groups separated, became one, or were entirely subsumed by larger ethnic groups was a major question across many papers and issues (see:「匈奴之分化」劉義棠 1967; 「中國邊疆民族中最大的一個族支：僰族羣」Hu 1966; 「說夷」李學智 1976). Just as the MTAC's definition of the "frontier" or "border" area included Taiwan, Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples were included within the purview of the *Bulletin* and *Journal*, with detailed ethnographic studies of Taiwanese Indigenous peoples (See: 「綠島的民間宗教之研究」Yuan 1978; "Some Kinship Aspects of Bunun Myth" Chiu 1975) published semi-regularly.

For a more immediate view onto the alignment between official and academic approaches to conceptualizing the frontier and the ROC, the *International Conference on China Border*

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[8] This quote is drawn from an appendix document titled "Introduction of the Graduate School of China Border Area Studies National Chengchi University" included the *Report on the International Conference on China Border Area*, originally held in 1984. The "Introduction" was printed in both English and Chinese languages.

Area Studies, held during the final years under martial law, in 1984[9], provides an excellent case study. Formally hosted by the National Chengchi University, and co-sponsored by the Pacific Cultural Foundation (太平洋文化基金會), then Vice Premier of the ROC, Chiu Chuang-Huan (邱創煥) provided the one of the key opening addresses. Within the conference organizing committee, standing MTAC chairman Hsueh Ren-yang (薛人仰) was named as an Honorary President (榮譽主席). Among the general organizing committee members was Liu Xueyao, then MTAC councilor (參事). Several MTAC-affiliated members or officers were further selected to present in the conference, including Liu Xueyao, Chou Kun-tien (周昆田), and Hsiao Chin-sung (蕭金松). Jagchid Sechin (札奇斯欽) also gave a brief public address. Sechin, an ethnic Mongolian government official-turned-scholar, previously served as an editor for the MTAC (see: *Frontier Education*, 1961), and was also by 1984 an established professor and frequent contributor to various National Chengchi University publications. His first role in the conference ceremonies was to provide a brief address in Mongolian, alongside four other "Border Area Compatriot Representative Speakers" (邊疆同胞代表致詞) also speaking in other border area languages. Each speech was but a few paragraphs. Sechin later presented a paper titled "The Sinicization of the Mongolian Ruling Class in the Late Manch Ch'ing Period" in the conference, under his US Brigham Young University[10] affiliation. Sechin, Liu, Chou, Hsiao, and then MTAC chairman Hsueh, all demonstrate the revolving door between academia and the MTAC. Furthermore, the inclusion of both political and academic titles at an international conference also suggests a general acceptance of such a dual role as academic-official.

Perhaps even more indicative of the overlap of state and scholarship is the uniformity of discourse employed across all ROC-nationals in the international conference. Specifically, both academic and official rhetoric on the greater ROC nation and the frontier was largely in agreement, with both key narratives and terminologies similarly employed across the already

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[9] The *Report of the International Conference on China Border Area Studies*, from which this quote is drawn, was published in the following year 1985.

[10] Brigham Young University is a Latter-Day Saints (Mormon) affiliated and sponsored university in Utah, US.

blurred divide. In his Chinese remarks[11] in the opening ceremony, President of National Chengchi University and conference chairman Dr. Ou-yang Hsun, states:

Our Chinese Nation [中華民族] since ancient times has been achieved through the never ending merging of multiple ethnicities … Especially since the founding of the Republic of China, the implementation of the Five Nation Republic [五族共和], our frontier compatriots and Han ethnic people are all equal [一律平等], with every nation a master of its country. The ROC constitution specifically stipulates that every frontier nation enjoys the right to autonomy [自治權] and the necessary aid [協助] for construction and development. (59)

President Hsun employs several concepts frequently used by the MTAC itself, and discussed in greater detail in the findings chapters. This includes reference, if not directly by name, to ideals espoused by the Three People's Principles, including equality and autonomy (Chapter Six), ethnic pluralism and the Five Nation Republic approach to national identity (Chapter Seven), and the emphasis of the central government's aid and support for frontier development (Chapter Six and Eight).

Meanwhile, Vice Premier Chuang-huan Chiu, as the conference's esteemed guest speaker, gave a largely overlapping introductory speech, touching on many of the same key points. The following are excerpts of the Vice Premier's English language speech, with key words from the Chinese language version provided where necessary for clarity:

Dr. Sun Yat-sent's Three Principles of the People, on which our country is founded, incorporate traditional Chinese principles and modern ideas. Their aim is to break down racial, political and social inequality and advocate equality among the five nationalities (Sinitic, Manchu, Mongol, Uighur, and Tibetan.) [五族（漢滿蒙回藏）共和的平

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[11] For all Chinese language speeches in the conference proceedings, an English language version was provided as well. (Note: this did not include English translations for the five speeches in Manchu, Mongolian, Uighur, and Tibetan languages, for which only a Chinese language translation was provided.) However, President Hsun's English language translation omitted several key utterances. Interestingly, Vice Premier Chiu's English translation, by contrast, included many direct translations President Hsun's version chose to rephrase.

等]¹².The government of the ROC has always respected and protected the traditional cultures, languages, religions and customs of its border peoples. In a spirit of mutual assistance, it has enabled the border areas to develop at the same pace as the interior … The Border policy of the ROC is correct, and it is welcomed by the border peoples themselves. (67-8)

Finally, Vice Premier Chiu also offers this note on the MTAC specifically:

For example, the government has directed such frontier administrative bodies as the MTAC and the SPGO to carry out liaison with Uighurs, Khazaks, Manchus, Mongols, Tibetans and others in exile and to help people of border nationalities in Taiwan obtain higher education and find employment. All these measures are designed to protect the traditional cultures and languages of the various nationalities in accordance with the stipulations of the Constitution of the ROC and the principles of special treatment and respect. … We are thus reiterating the principle of equality and cooperation among the nationalities of our country and working hard to unite them. (70)

The Vice Premier echoes the University President's border rhetoric with reference to the Three Peoples' Principles, equality, aid, multi-ethnic pluralism and the Five Nation Republic. The so-called "border peoples", including those in exile, are described as grateful recipients of the ROC's benevolence. The call for national reunification is clearly articulated several times over. These are the same ideas expressed in University President Yang's speech, and again echoed in conference presenter and border compatriot representative Sechin's opening speech, translated into Mandarin.

Returning to the MTAC, the Commission continued to perform as a functioning government organ. Throughout the era of martial law, the MTAC, despite able to access Tibet, Mongolia, and the rest of the greater "frontier", continued to operate with a variety of MTAC programs. In this dissertation, the focus lies on the Commission's diverse range of publications.

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¹² Only two phrases in this excerpt are omitted in the conference's provided English translation, and neither are especially suited for translation. I've copied these phrases here underlined in context: "其目的即在打破種族上 政治上及社會上的不平等 提倡五族（漢 滿 蒙 回 藏）共和的民族平等的政治主張，合五族為一體，集全國為一家" (64). I offer the following English: "…integrating five nations into one whole, gathering the whole country into one family." These phrases are notable in their emphasis on one Chinese nation, as well as again reiterating the concept of the Five Nation Family.

The MTAC also reportedly engaged in other activities outside the purview of this dissertation, such as the training of Tibetan exile guerrillas in Tamsui, Taiwan (Namgyal 2003a) and expanding educational opportunities for Tibetan and Mongolian students (Liu Xueyao 2018). MTAC publications covered a range of topics, and were generally couched in a scholarly or scientific style or register. Most works adopted an anti-Communist Cold War perspective, with emphasis on the righteousness of ROC governance of its diverse frontier lands in accordance with the Three People's Principles. History, anthropology, international relations, national security, and policy review were all common subjects for both shorter reports and book-length treatises. This included the *Frontier Collection*, a series of edited volumes on several subjects including education, national defense, economics, and anthropology, published during this era.

Chiang Ching-kuo's pronouncement in July 1987 officially lifted martial law. A plan towards establishing a representative democracy with free and fair elections was drafted, and protections for free speech were gradually introduced. In the following years, civil society blossomed, with activists promoting a diverse range of public interests, including expanding rights and recognition for native languages and ethnic identities and limiting gender-based discrimination. The next section examines the social and political changes experienced by the ROC from 1988 to 1999.

5.3 Transition to Democracy (1988-1999)

The second period ran from 1988 until 1999 – the year preceding the first DPP administration – and saw the early stages of democratization and localization across Taiwan, as well as the demise of a viable Cold War approach to politics as the Soviet Union fell. The 1990s saw a swell of Taiwanese and pro-democracy activists advocating for localization and integrating Taiwanese identity into official ideology. As part of a larger campaign, in 1991 Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples' rights groups pushed for the localization of the MTAC, calling for its replacement by an Indigenous Peoples' affairs commission. Then Chairman Wu Huapeng 吳化鵬 reportedly fought hard against this movement, invoking the ROC Constitution and legal arguments to assert the special status of the Commission, as well the body's "multifaceted significance for history, the present and the future" (Liu 2018, 230). Ultimately, the demand for restructuring the MTAC was dodged with the establishment of a separate body, the Council of Aboriginal Peoples in 1996 (later renamed Council of Indigenous Peoples) (Ku 2005). There is no mention of these events in MTAC publications, and the

MTAC's budget saw little change throughout the 1990s, growing from 203,742,000 NTD in 1994[13] to 229,223,000 NTD in 1999[14].

Furthermore, following the passage of the "Additional Articles" in 1991 and 1992, elections for the Legislative Yuan, National Assembly and President of the ROC were initiated in stages. By implementing a multi-party electoral system specific to Taiwan, the KMT could no longer claim to be the singular party and rightful government for all of China. However, Hughes (2016, 155-56) argues that President Lee Teng-hui remained dependent on the "China Myth" for a few key reasons: first, "the continuing domination of the highest ranks of the KMT and the armed forces by mainlanders loyal to the Chinese nationalist mission" and second, "the need to develop a stable relationship with a PRC that was growing in strategic and economic importance for both Taiwan and its security guarantor, the US." Lee thus responded to these pressures by focusing on the ethnic, rather than political, aspect of Chinese identity, pushing for a flexible understanding of *China* as a term imbued with "multifaceted geographical, political, historical and cultural meanings" (158). Lee further incorporated the discourse of globalism into his presentations of Taiwan to his international audiences, highlighting Taiwan's democracy, established human rights, and economy.

Although the MTAC's work did not incorporate or reflect much of the localization or democratization movements in Taiwan, goings-on within the international community and the evolving cross-strait relationship certainly made an impact. First, the Commission's approach to writing about Mongolia changed considerably following the shifting regional politics with liberal regime change in Russia and Mongolia (see Chapter Six). The USSR fell in 1991, with a nominal democracy established in Russia in its stead. Furthermore, a democratic revolution swept Mongolia in 1990 (Bulag 2017). With the end of a viable Cold War framework following the fall of the USSR and anti-authoritarian revolution in Mongolia, the pejorative and caustic language of previous MTAC texts largely fell out of use. However, the Commission continued to publish reports, articles, and monographs covering history, ethnographies, policy reviews, and criticism.

Second, an increasingly complex matrix of relations among the United States, Tibet, PRC and Taiwan emerged in the 1990s (Namgyal 2003a). While throughout the decade, economic and cultural ties grew across the Strait, the political relationship was less sure. In the early

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[13] Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS), 1994, "Summary Table of Budget Comparison by Agency's Annual Expenditure" https://win.dgbas.gov.tw/dgbas01/83ctab/83c14F.HTM
[14] DGBAS, 1999, "Summary Table of Budget Comparison by Agency's Annual Expenditure" https://win.dgbas.gov.tw/dgbas01/88btab/88b140.htm

1990s, the ROC and PRC experienced a period of détente, with Su (2009) referring to the years from 1991 through mid-1995 as a period of conciliation. However, following Lee Teng-hui's trip to the United States and the ensuing 1995-1996 missile crisis, relations between the PRC and ROC soured again (Su 2009). Furthermore, Tibetan Buddhism and the Dalai Lama in particular were also caught up in the ROC's new challenge of navigating both its relationship with Beijing and its place in a world which increasingly denied recognition to the Republican state. Accepting Lee Teng-hui's invitation, extended in 1993, the Dalai Lama visited Taiwan for the first time in 1997, with "tremendous success" in its popular reception (Namgyal 2003b, 72). However, in the following year, a second trip to Taiwan was cancelled by the Dalai Lama in his pursuit of a "possible thaw" in the relationship between the Tibetan government-in-exile and Beijing (73).

The "possible thaw" was further complicated in 1998 when PRC President Jiang Zemin, in discussion with US President Bill Clinton, stated that a relationship with the Dalai Lama could be developed if the government-in-exile recognized Taiwan as an inalienable part of China. Jiang's statement thereby tied together the issues of sovereignty in both Taiwan and Tibet. Support of linking together the issues of Tibet and Taiwan and developing the relationship between the government-in-exile and the ROC had a mixed reception in Taiwan, with Namgyal noting that support of the government-in-exile was somewhat partisan. Although KMT president Lee Teng-hui was open to developing a relationship with the Dalai Lama, hard-line conservatives within the KMT were in "dismay" at the level of support for the Dalai Lama and his administration shown in Taiwan (73). Indeed, in 1994, members of the MTAC signed an agreement with Tibetan guerrilla group Chushi Gangdruk stating that after the ROC's return to Mainland China, it would extend recognition to Tibet as an autonomous region with the Dalai Lama at its helm. This declaration did not signify a policy change on the part of the ROC, but the renewed suggestion that ROC government officials would participate in planning for the governance of Tibet angered many Tibetans. Indeed, the continued existence of the MTAC itself was a point of aggravation within the overseas Tibetan community, and at multiple points, both in response to 1994 scandal and during the Dalai Lama's visit in 1997, Tibetan officials expressed directly to the ROC and specific DPP officials that the MTAC should be abolished, with Tibetan official Kelsang Gyaltsen stating that he believed the DPP would resolve the issue once in power (Namgyal 2003b).

Liu Xueyao (2018) notes that general interest in the so-called frontier at this time greatly dimmed, and university intake dwindled, with few students enrolling and limited career opportunities available post-graduation. For this trend, Liu blamed the general social shift

toward Taiwan and away from Greater China. Furthermore, after NCU graduate Chairman Zhang Junyi's (張駿逸) scandal prone[15] administration from 1993-1994, ROC leadership began recruiting party officials, legal scholars, and politicians to serve as MTAC chairman. According to Liu, subsequent chairmen Li Hougao (李厚高) and Gao Konglian (高孔廉) both had held myriad Provincial and Central government positions, although the latter lacked a background related to Mongolia, Tibet, or the frontier regions and neither were expects in the field. This trend towards selecting non-experts in the frontier area studies continued onto the following era, after the election of the first Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration in 2000.

5.4 21st Century (2000-2017)

This transitional period gave way to the MTAC's third and final phase: from 2000 to its closure in 2017. Following the election of the first DPP administration in 2000, issues of identity and nationhood could no longer be ignored by the Commission. MTAC publications changed considerably with numerous appeals to democracy, multiculturalism, and exchange. *Taiwan* replaced *the Republic of China* across MTAC documents. In 2005, in the first year of Chen's second term, the constitution was amended to include a note affirming the multicultural nature of the nation. Although the DPP championed Taiwan's local diversity with greater enthusiasm, the ROC's embrace of Taiwan's multiculturalism was largely a bipartisan effort, though with significant differences in emphasis on the part of the KMT and DPP. Chang (2004, 44) argues that the new "branding" of Taiwan as "a place of rich natural beauty and cultural heritage," with strong technical industry to boot became a pillar of DPP outreach to the international community. This national narrative was adopted by the DPP as means to cut ties with China and demonstrate Taiwan's distinctive identity. In contrast, the KMT pursued localization as means to legitimize the party as a viable option to represent Taiwan in electoral politics. In practice, both parties advocated for multicultural development and heritage preservation.

DPP president Chen Shui-bian spoke of his desire to dissolve the MTAC during his first term, but did not manage to accomplish this task. This was due to early 2000s' partisan split on the issue, making such a legislative move impossible. Furthermore, the Chen

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[15] In the most publicized incident, newspapers, informed by a blackmailer (黑函), reported that Chairman Zhang had been arrested for pickpocketing while he was a student in the US (Liu 2018, 237).

administration's agenda prioritized localizing over de-Sinification. In 2003, Chen himself presided over the foundation of the Tibet-Taiwan Exchange Foundation and signaled the establishment of the NGO as a pathway towards dissolution of the Commission[16]. Moreover, the DPP's selection of MTAC chair reflected the administration's general disregard for the specialization of the MTAC, and prioritization elsewhere: Hakka scholar Hsu Cheng-kuan was the first pick for chairperson, followed by constitutional scholar and politician Hsu Chi-Hsiung (許志雄).

Across administrations, the budget reflected the bipartisan prioritization of a localized Taiwanese pluralism, as well as DPP intent to close the Commission. From 2000 onward, the Commission's budget was gradually reduced to approximately half of its 1999 total by early 2017 (115,105,000 NTD), with sizeable portions frozen following the inauguration of the Tsai administration in 2016.[17] Notably, this trend in downscaling the budget continued throughout Ma Yingjeou's KMT administration, as well as the DPP administrations on either end of his two terms. Ma's KMT administration was also responsible for the downscaling and demoting of the Commission. The MTAC was reorganized as part of the Mainland Affairs Commission in 2012, and thereby lost its status among national ministries and commissions (Executive Yuan 2010). That this shift took place during Ma Ying-jeou's KMT administration signaled bipartisan acknowledgement of the MTAC's awkward incongruency. Liu Xueyao (2018, 230) offers another interpretation, however. As discussed in Chapter Two, Liu is a former martial-law era trained academic and former MTAC official. He lambasts KMT President Ma Ying-jeou as "lacking knowledge of history" (缺歷史的知識) and "lacking the notion to defend the structural integrity of the nation" (又乏維護國家完整形貌意念). Liu further criticizes the silence of three chairpeople sitting during the Ma administration: "this is like wanting to eat eggs, but not allowing the chicken to survive" (231).

The ROC's relationships with Tibet and Mongolia also continued to develop from 2000 onward. The ROC formally recognized Mongolia's independence in 2002 and established informal relations, as Mongolia is officially prohibited from extending recognition to the ROC

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[16] Tshering Chonzom Bhutia (2015) "Tibet, Taiwan and China – A Complex Nexus" *The Diplomat*. (November 24, 2015) [online] [Accessed November 11, 2021] https://thediplomat.com/2015/11/tibet-taiwan-and-china-a-complex-nexus/

[17] DGBAS, 2017, "Summary Table of Budget Comparison by Agency's Annual Expenditure" https://www.dgbas.gov.tw/public/data/dgbas01/106/106Ctab/106C%E6%AD%B2%E5%87%BA%E6%A9%9F%E9%97%9C%E5%88%A5%E9%A0%90%E7%AE%97%E8%A1%A8.PDF

while recognizing the PRC.[18] The previous year in 2001, the Dalai Lama returned to Taiwan to meet with DPP President Chen Shui-bian to "promote ties between the two sides" (Namgyal 2003a, 73). Alongside appeals to Taiwanese democracy and multiculturalism, a call to bilateral exchange also appeared during these years, particularly after the constitutional amendment to recognize multiculturalism in 2005. During the third era, MTAC documents consisted of largely scholarly histories and political analyses, professional and economic development programs, and cultural exchanges with Inner Mongolia, Tibet, Overseas Tibetans, and Mongolia.

5.5 Conclusion

Finally, after its original establishment law was revoked in 2017 (Executive Yuan 2017), the MTAC's resources and remaining tasks were reassigned to the Mainland Affairs Commission (MAC), Ministry of Culture (MOC) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) (HE 2018). Although the MTAC itself has disappeared, its archive of publications and policy documents provides a window onto the turning away of the ROC from its aspirations to control Greater China and towards its reinvention as a Taiwanese democratic regime. The nearly six decades of modern history discussed in this brief chapter offer a look into the contemporaneous political dynamics influencing the ROC's ideological transformation. Following Chapter Four's discussion of the historical background into the emergence of key ideologies informing official notions of national identity and governance, this chapter details the context in which the ROC became Taiwan. The central question of this dissertation thus follows: how did national identity discourse shift from 1949 to 2017? Furthermore, to what extent did the legacy of imperialist strategies of governance and approaches to inter-ethnic relations embedded in early Republican nationalism influence the formation of Taiwan's 21st century multicultural democracy?

The following three chapters review my findings. Chapter Six examines the shifting images of the so-called frontier in MTAC documents. The chapter highlights evolving messages of Han-chauvinist cultural hierarchy and considers the presence of a civilizing mission in the ROC agenda. Next, drawing on the previous chapter's connection of imperialism and ROC nationalism, Chapter Seven narrows in on the shifting conceptualization of pluralism in ROC national identity. The chapter specifically explores the transition from the image of the ROC

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[18] "Onward to Mongolia" (2003) *Taiwan Today* [online] [Accessed on May 5, 2021]
https://taiwantoday.tw/news.php?post=4126&unit=4,29,31,45

as a "Five Nation Republic" to "Multicultural Taiwan," and the extent to which both identities borrow from imperial Qing ideology. Finally, Chapter Eight aims to shed light on the changing portrayal of Tibetan Buddhism within the MTAC's discourse of national ideology. Chapter Eight focuses on the shifting role of the religion, its practitioners, and its leader the Dalai Lama in particular within the national narrative of the ROC. All three chapters discuss themes directly linked to ideologies of identity, statehood, and governance developed during the Qing. The periodization and changes in political context discussed in this chapter are drawn upon throughout the findings chapters to highlight contributing factors to the shifts in ideology and rhetoric.

Chapter Six: A Civilizing Mission for the ROC's Fantasy Frontier

6.1 Introduction

The following three chapters (Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight) present an interrogation of the research questions. Each chapter focuses on a different discourse, taking care to note how each discourse interacts with the others. The present chapter narrows in on the notion of a civilizing mission and its evolution from 1949 through 2017 as presented in MTAC documents. The chapter is divided into four main sections, which aim in turn to introduce the research questions, present the trajectory of the civilizing mission discourse, interpret the significance of the shifts in trajectory, and provide initial concluding remarks. The bulk of the analysis is contained in the second section, which examines the MTAC's views on the direction and spread of civilization; emphasis on national integrity and defense; images of aid and development; attention to health and hygiene; and finally, portrayals of international exchange.

While the MTAC was officially established in 1928, its conceptual foundations were forged much earlier, as discussed in Chapter Four. Qing political strategy and "frontier" policy had great influence on early Republican approaches to nationalism and statehood. Teng (2004, 9) demonstrates the imperialist and colonial character of Qing rule, evidenced by the large-scale "conquest" of territory and its subsequent governance from a distant "imperial center". Teng further finds evidence of a colonial civilizing mission embedded in Qing frontier policy. Following the fall of the Qing, the new Chinese Republic borrowed heavily from Qing conceptualization of the composition and governance of its empire: drawing a clear distinction between Inner China and the corresponding "frontier." While several works have found evidence of a similar civilizational hierarchy in early Republican (Leibold 2007, Vickers 2015) and Communist periods (Harrell 1994), there has yet to be a large-scale scholarly investigation into the Qing imperial legacy of a civilizing mission in the ROC on Taiwan. Consequently, this chapter investigates its lengthy afterlife following the ROC's move to Taiwan (1949). After the end of military rule in 1987, under Lee Tenghui's administration, beginning in 1988, the KMT was increasingly pressured to engage in the movement for localization by the rise of popular Taiwanese nationalism. Lee's administration oversaw the publication of the Knowing Taiwan (認識台灣, *Renshi Taiwan*) textbook, which restructured curriculum to center Taiwan and present a "more neutral" account of Taiwanese and Chinese culture(s) and sensitive issues, such as the 28 February Incident and aftermath (Corcuff 2005: 160). Hughes (2016, 167), writing over a decade later, concludes that over the course of the past three to four decades,

"democratization has therefore allowed the steady growth of a pluralistic, civic sense of Taiwan."

This chapter extends scholarly investigation into the neglected official portrayals of "Outer China," the "frontier," or non-Han ethnic groups. These peoples and territories played a significant role in the unfolding of ROC history, reflected by the MTAC's high ranking within the ROC's government apparatus. Indeed, the MTAC's continued existence on Taiwan for decades symbolized the state's official conception of its statehood as Chinese and not Taiwanese. Consequently, the MTAC's body of publications remains an important source for a more nuanced understanding of the ROC's political history and development. Thus, this chapter focuses on themes related to the "frontier," national identity, and the imagining of a national territory. It addresses one principal question: How does the frontier imaginary of the MTAC illuminate the trajectory of official ROC discourse on national identity? More specifically, how has the MTAC portrayed the relationship of China to Mongolian and Tibetan peoples and associated territories? Finally, how does the MTAC's portrayal of Mongolia and Tibet shed light on official conceptions of ROC statehood?

As the MTAC was charged with administration of both Mongolia and Tibet, this chapter examines both territories. However, in the final section covering rhetoric from 2000-2017, focus narrows in on portrayals of Mongolia and Inner Mongolia. Much of MTAC coverage of exchange or cooperation with Tibet converges with images of Tibetan Buddhism and the Dalai Lama, and thus further discussion of this theme is reserved for Chapter Eight, which specifically covers the portrayal of religion by the MTAC. Furthermore, the division between Inner Mongolia and Mongolia further complicates investigation of shifting MTAC claims of sovereignty and portrayals of the region(s). Special attention is thus paid to highlighting when and where the MTAC makes distinctions between these two regions.

6.2 The ROC's civilizing mission

Over the three eras of MTAC history (see Chapter Five), my analysis identified several themes embedded in the MTAC's shifting conceptualization of its "frontier". Together, these themes suggest that, following the move to Taiwan, the mission to civilize the frontier continued to play a role in the Commission's conceptualization of Mongolia, Tibet and other Mainland regions as well as of Taiwan itself. The following five sub-sections review my findings of the MTAC's portrayal of the ROC's mission in Mongolia: establishment of a hierarchical relationship, national defense, social development and aid, health and hygiene, and

international exchange. The first section examines in more depth the official categorization of Mongolia as part of the "frontier" and the MTAC's imagining of the state's relationship with Tibet as well as Inner and Outer Mongolia. The second section investigates MTAC rhetoric concerning national defense, with particular focus on the threat of foreign encroachment. The third section focuses on MTAC illustration of official social and economic development projects targeting Tibet and Mongolia. The fourth section examines the ROC's evolving concern of health and hygiene practices on the frontier. The fifth and final section examines the impact of democratization and localization on the 21st century imagining of Mongolia and the ROC-Mongolian relationship in particular.

6.2.1 Spreading civilization: China Proper and its frontier

For most of the 20th century, the MTAC on Taiwan portrayed Inner China as center, Outer China as frontier, with civilization flowing from center to periphery. A depiction of this relationship can be found in *Frontier Education*, a lengthy review of ROC education policy in its "frontier" regions, published by the MTAC. Defining the "frontier" as "Mongolia, Xinjiang, Qinghai, Tibet, Xikang, and the southwest where Miao, Yi and other groups live," *Frontier Education* commented on the ROC's "frontier question" (MTAC 1961: 1). The text argued that China's frontier is fundamentally different from most other countries' border regions:

> Our frontier problem is not only an issue of protecting our borders and solidifying national security, but especially an issue of how to foster our various frontier brother-tribes [*xiongdi buzu*, 兄弟部族], how to develop their economy, education, culture, and regional autonomy. (2)

Frontier Education imagined the "frontier" and the "tribes" who live there as younger brothers in dire need of aid and development support from China Proper. In other words, the document portrayed a relationship rooted in an official Republican mission to civilize China's frontier, with particular emphasis on the issues of national security, aid and development.

When discussing minority ethnic groups outside of the five recognized nationalities, the Frontier series was even more condescending. In *Frontier Education*, the chapter covering the Southwestern Peoples' Territory stated plainly that while there were too many small nations or tribes to go into too much detail, some broad characterizations could be made. First, the text explained that despite their early and continued contact with the Han, "the amount of cultural

exchange appears to be pitifully little," as many of these cultures have not been thoroughly assimilated into Han culture. Second, the text argues that based on historical observations, most Southwestern tribes are "passive" (被動) or "conquered," (被征服). Furthermore, due to excessive force used by all but the most skilled conquerors, many of these tribes had been pushed into the mountains "step by step," and therefore their "conservative nature is further strengthened". However, in their "long term passive position," the text argues that "at the end of the day, those who were pushed into the mountain regions gradually accepted Sinicization and thus were called 'cooked Miao' [熟苗] or 'White Yi'[白夷] and 'flattened mountain tribes' [平地山胞]" (62). Overall, *Frontier Education* had very little regard for the Southwestern Tribes, the historical value of whose cultures was largely determined by their degree of perceived Sinicization. Notably, the text accomplished the objectives in defining the intended target(s) of a civilizing project, as described by Harrell (1994): (1) demonstrate civilizational inferiority and (2) provide evidence that further civilization is possible. In sum, while Southwestern Tribes were described as "pitifully" behind in cultural exchange with the Han, some have made advances in assimilation. There is an inevitability at the core of this narrative logic: As a defining feature of the Southwestern tribes, their "passivity" both differentiates them from the Han, yet also decides their eventual Sinicization. Even those who retreat into the mountains are portrayed as so destined.

Such narratives of history were instrumental in establishing the ROC's civilizational hierarchy, in which China Proper dominates its frontier. In both the first and second periods of the MTAC's operation on Taiwan, chronology was kept according to Chinese dynasties. In 1955, the book *Chronicle of Events in Tibet* (西藏大事記, 1955) list the major incidents within Tibet beginning from the Tang Dynasty and followed Chinese dynastic time keeping and western time keeping. Tibetan chronology or perspectives were not included. In the case of writings on Mongolia, a Chinese perspective on race and ethnicity was also adopted in discussion of pre-Yuan Chinese-Mongolian relationships. Chinese terms for nomadic peoples (defined as peoples who eventually coalesced to form the Mongolian *minzu*) were listed in succession according to Chinese dynasty (S. Jin, 1999; Guo 1971). By exclusively using Mandarin terminology for these nomadic herders—Mongolians' alleged ancestors—and Chinese dynastic dating conventions, the historical narrative reinforced a Han-, or in the words of the MTAC, "Inner China"-centric perspective. In effect, the Chinese-Mongolian relationship

thus presented "Inner China" (內地) itself as a permanent, cohesive unit. The MTAC's historical narratives consistently centered a Han-chauvinist perspective on history, failing to acknowledge or incorporate perspectives or terminology from Tibet or Mongolia.

During the first and second phases (through the 20th century), frontier discourse placed emphasis on ROC policies to spread civilization, development, and education. MTAC works featured excerpts of the ROC constitution and policy documents, with tables of schools built in the frontier regions, and other such documentation of policy for Mongolia and Tibet from 1911 to 1949. The text introducing these policies was not critical or reflective, but triumphant in celebrating government efforts to promote political, educational, economic, and cultural development (Guo 1971; Yao 1954; H. Jin 1988; Liu 1996). ROC policies were framed as testimony to the regime's noble and dedicated pursuit of a civilizing mission in Mongolia, Tibet, and other frontier regions.

6.2.2 Banditry and National Defense

The narrative of victimization at the hands of foreign imperialists and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) played a large role in MTAC documents. Strongly colored by an ideology of mingled anti-imperialism and Cold War anti-communism, this narrative portrayed China as a victim of western, Japanese, and Soviet imperialisms, emphasizing the USSR's corrupting influence on the CCP. This theme was largely restricted to the first phase leading up to the end of military rule in 1987. Until the end of the 1980s, no text on Mongolia failed to mention either Russia / the USSR or Japan. The series of secret pacts made by Russia and Japan in the early 20th century were cited repeatedly as evidence of foreign imperial encroachment. Often, flowery language, including *chengyu*, figurative language, and other idiomatic expressions, were used in these passages, such as the claim that the UK, Japan, and Russia "became co-conspirators" (*pengbi-weijian*, 朋比為奸) (Yao 1954: 45).

During the first (Martial Law-era) and early second (transitional) phases of MTAC operation on Taiwan, publications passionately condemned communist policies and imperialist aggression. The book *Chinese Communist "National Minority" Policy* (Chen 1983) harshly critiques the policy of the Soviet-influenced communist "bandits" (*gongfei*, 共匪) as assimilationist. The term "bandit" was used by the MTAC and other official bodies on Taiwan following the retreat there in the late 1940s until at least 1987 (Chang and Holt 2015). The volume ends with the dire conclusion that the PRC's "national minority" policy is attempting

to "finally eliminate the existence of their nations" by means of "class division and class struggle" (84). The text emphasized the oppressive and unnatural divisions resulting from Soviet-imported "Marxist-Leninist indoctrination" (84), and sought to paint a portrait of Mongolian and other nationalities' victimization. The text's insistence on continuing Soviet influence over the CCP despite the rift between the two states since the 1960s was typical of ROC discourse during this time. Chang and Holt (2015: 63) explain that the Chinese Communist Party was seen as "but a special brand of Chinese [communism] bred by Russian [communism]," and therefore a foreign "evil" import from its outset, independent of contemporaneous Soviet-Sino relations.

Through the end of military rule, and for some years afterwards, harsh criticism of communism's impact on minority or former Republican frontier nations continued. In the final year before the end of martial law, *The Three Way Relationship of Outer Mongolia surrounded by Chinese and Soviet Opposition* (Li 1986) targeted Soviet influence in Mongolia. Inflammatory language positioned Russia as a hostile, predatory power and referred to the Russian Empire and the USSR alike as *e'kou* (俄寇) or "Russian bandits". The document framed Russian and Soviet aggression towards Chinese Mongolia, and later support of an independent Mongolian state, as an attack on China's frontiers. In another instance, the text accused the Russian Empire of "kicking [China] while she's down" (*xiajing toushi*, 下井投石) and "committing innumerable crimes" (1).

To further expose the expansion and wanton violence of the Russian Empire and the USSR, *The Three Way Relationship of Outer Mongolia surrounded by Chinese and Soviet Opposition* (Li 1986) pontificated: "having studied under the Tsar, the [Soviet] student thus surpasses the master, and goes one step further, using [rhetoric of] liberation as sugar coating to carry out their invasion." Following an introduction to this record of iniquity, the subsequent 41 pages comprise a table documenting major Russian (or proto-Russian) and Soviet depredations from the Song Dynasty to the Republican period. Accusations of Soviet imperialism also feature in *A Brief Discussion of Outer Mongolia from a Geographical Standpoint on National Defense* (H. Jin), published in 1988. Here the philippic is given an explicitly Cold War framing: "repeatedly expanding, [Soviet] force can be used to resist American invasion, to carry out its communist world revolution, to be democratic nations' shared enemy." (37) While the MTAC depicted Soviet interest in Mongolia as fundamentally an attempt to extend its frontier for security purposes, the main point was not to object to the use of Mongolia as a buffer zone *per se*, but rather to insist that Mongolia was not the USSR's buffer zone to occupy. In fact,

Mongolia's function as a Chinese buffer zone was seen as especially necessary because of Soviet expansionism. Furthermore, since Outer Mongolia could not be expected to defend itself against Soviet influence, responsibility fell on the ROC to protect its vulnerable frontier.

During the second phase (1988-1999), the narrative of victimization was toned down in writings on Mongolia. While discussion of the Soviet Union's influence in Outer Mongolia, for example, still featured in a *Survey of Outer Mongolia and Introduction to Tourism* (S. Jin) in 1999, inflammatory language was absent: the pejorative Russian "bandit" label dropped, and terms like "influence" replaced references to "aggression". By the third (post-2000) phase, apart from scholarly texts with an explicit focus on history, MTAC documents generally omitted any discussion of Russia or the USSR. No longer a Cold War enemy, and with informal relations established in 2002, the ROC's priority shifted to making alliances with Mongolia. By the 21st century, MTAC documents no longer involved condemnations of imperial encroachment.

MTAC literature on Tibet also followed a similar trend, with a focus on imperial and/or foreign encroachments persisting into the 1980s. In the forward to the MTAC translation of the book *Three Years of Change in Tibet* (藏變三年 1952, forward written in 1951), MTAC official Tian Jiongjin (田炯錦) described the bloodlust of Chairman Mao and the "bandits' urgent westward attempt [to take Tibet]," with the resulting "tragic situation in today's Tibet." Tian explained that the reason why "Bandit Mao" was initially "able to fight without blood" [能兵不血刃] was purely "pragmatic" [務實] and owed to the fact that "Tibetan authorities [had] forced [KMT] personnel to evacuate Lhasa in 1949." Tian continued, referring to the 1949 expulsion as an "unfortunate dispute" that "exposed the fear and shaken heart of the Tibetan authorities." Tian's description of the 1949 expulsion of KMT officials and early 1950s conflict with the CCP cast the Communists as the main villain – responsible not only for the suffering of Tibetans in the 1950s, but also for the KMT's previous eviction. Furthermore, the Tibetan regime's insistence on independence was entirely edited out of the MTAC's narrative of events, with Tian instead suggesting that the Tibetan authorities were merely acting out of their great fear of the wicked CCP.

Chronicle of Events in Tibet (西藏大事記, 1955), which lists the major incidents within Tibet since the Tang Dynasty, highlighted the repeated border disputes during the "Manchu Qing" and "Republican" (民國) eras. These disputes included conflict with both the British

Empire and later the independent Indian government over the McMahon Line. The PRC's military actions and treaties were also discussed, with the CCP and PRC referred to with the pejorative term "communist bandits" (共匪). A similar document, written a year before, looks specifically at all incidents of interference in Tibet, beginning during the Qing Dynasty: *Summary of Tibetan Negotiations* (西藏交涉紀要, 1954) focuses on British "nibbling" away (蠶食) of Tibetan territory and "aggression" (侵略) toward the region. Later chapters highlight Great Britain's involvement in the ROC's struggles to control Tibet.

Additional documents appeared in the 1980s detailing the China-India border disputes, including *in Frontier Border Disputes between Communist China and India* (中共與印度邊界糾紛) (Yu 1983) and *Chinese-Indian Frontier Borders and Communist Bandit-Indian Border Dispute* (中印邊界與匪印邊境糾紛) (Lü 1984). The earlier text lists the border disputes beginning from 1890, and the resulting border agreements where applicable. Furthermore, the text provided arguments on the basis of history, geography, race, bloodline, culture, religious belief, and division of governance over area to prove that the disputed territory belonged to China (我國). The accusation of inheriting a legacy of imperial aggression, deployed in the case of the USSR, was also used with respect to the border dispute between India and the Beijing government. Here, the claim was made that the Indian government had never forgotten their British Colonial inheritance: the rewards of occupying Tibet (18). In the document *The Situation in Tibet* (西藏情勢, 1983), similar language appeared, stating that "after the British left India, India wanted to take over, having always kept an ambition for Tibet, even to the extent of wanting to encourage Tibetan independence to act as a buffer between India and China. In the end came no success." (6)

Just as in the case of MTAC writing on Mongolia, literature focusing on foreign or imperial encroachments and interference in Tibet fades away after the end of Martial Law. Under the Three People's Principles framework, the nationalist duty to fight for the sovereignty of the Chinese people in their rightful land is paramount. Indeed, Sun Yat-sen in his Sanmin Chu I lecture series (republished in 2003) focuses on the need for the Chinese nation to overcome imperialist aggression. However, once the KMT began the project of democratization, the Three People's Principles rapidly fell out of favor. Furthermore, following the democratization of Mongolia and the USSR, as well as the increasing need for the ROC to cast a wider net in

its international relations policy, Cold War-style attacks on communism and unfriendly accusations of imperialism were no longer deemed necessary.

During the first period, narratives of the aftermath of ROC retreat portray the regions of Mongolia and Tibet as defenseless victims, bullied and violated by the likes of India, the Soviet Union, and above all the CCP. The MTAC specifically names communism or the PRC's general ideologies as the primary drivers in their destruction of Tibet and Mongolia. Both texts The *Situation in Tibet* (西藏情勢, 1983) and *Chinese Communist Policy on "Minority Nationalities"* (中共對「少數民族」之政策, 1983) have long passages devoted to exploring the PRC's devastation of Tibetan or "民族" peoples, including attacks on religion, culture and ways of life in the name of communism or class struggle. Chinese Communist Policy for "Minority Nationalities" is concerned with the movement and redistribution of people so as to mix peoples together (昆合雜居) to reduce the power of any specific group as an individual entity. The report also claims the PRC is attempting to "eliminate" (消除) minority *minzu* by "destroying *minzu* traditional culture, religion and local customs". The text continues: "Indoctrination of Marxist poisoned thinking and class struggle will finally wipe out the existence of '*minzu*'. This is the CCP's policy for minority '*minzu*'" (84). In similar language, the document *Current State of Research on Mongolia First Volume* (蒙古現況研究第一輯, 1985) also accuses the PRC of "carrying out countless crimes, sparking the anger of man and gods alike" and spreading poverty to Mongolia and Tibet in the false name of communism. In *Frontier Border Disputes between Communist China and India* 中共與印度邊界糾紛 (Yu 1983), the authors claim that "today's world's state of turbulence is thus communism and communist parties' harm to world peace, and only by destroying the communist party and fully overthrowing the communist system will world peace have a future" (55).

Furthermore, although early descriptions of the CCP in the 1950s and 1960s were unswervingly damning, by the mid-1980s, a more understanding portrayal of PRC actions and policies towards (inner and outer) Mongolia emerged alongside the more inflammatory rhetoric. Although the term Communist bandit (共匪) does not disappear from texts in the 1980s, some documents begin to favor the more neutral "Chinese Communists" (中共) instead, such as in the texts *A Brief Discussion of Outer Mongolia from a Geographical Standpoint on*

National Defense [就國防地理觀點略論外蒙古] (1988), *Mongolian United Banner System* [蒙古盟旗制度] (Liu 1996) and *Brief Manuscript on the Tibetan Religious System of Government* [西藏政教制度略述稿] (1996). In addition, beginning in the 1980s, portrayals of the CCP as inept or ineffective rather than as especially cruel begin to appear. In some instances, the heart of the CCP was portrayed as well-intentioned, despite the Party's clumsy attempts at policy implementation. This is suggested when the PRC is charged with moving Han people into Inner Mongolia so as to prevent annexation to the People's Republic of Mongolia (*Current State of Research on Mongolia First Volume*, 蒙古現況研究第一輯 1985).

This portrayal of ineptitude appears alongside accusations of brutality, since this is the same text cited above condemning Communism's evil mission to spread poverty. Language in the text *The Three Way Relationship of Outer Mongolia Surrounded by Chinese and Soviet Opposition* (中俄共對立下環繞外蒙的三角關係, Li 1986) appears almost sympathetic to the PRC, suggesting that while the PRC wishes to develop its relationship with the People's Republic of Mongolia (PRM), both the PRM and PRC's hands were tied by the Soviet Union. Any natural desire of both heads of state to develop their relationship was restricted by Soviet-Chinese enmity. However much the PRC wished for a diplomatic relationship with Mongolia, Soviet influence and power prevented or imperiled such a development.

As the ROC began to reorient its national ideology during the 1990s to center on Taiwan (Chang 2015), portrayal of Mongolia and Tibet as necessary frontier buffer zones disappeared. The patriotic obligation to protect China's national integrity as derived from *The Three People's Principles* was no longer relevant for a localizing state that was distancing itself from the preceding military regime. Still, while MTAC documents by the mid and late 1980s demonstrated a dimmed hostility towards the CCP, the overarching narrative of Chinese victimhood that framed discussion of Mongolia persisted through the second era (ending in 1999). While the identity of the specific bully or aggressor might change over time, Mongolia's statehood was framed as a tragedy for China until the ROC recognized Mongolia in 2002. Meanwhile, in the case of Tibet, demonization of the CCP did not fade. As is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Eight, with DPP and later growing bipartisan support for human rights issues associated with Tibet, Tibetan refugees, the and the Tibetan government-in-exile, accusations of CCP abuse and violence remained prominent, as did the narrative of Tibetan victimhood.

6.2.3 Social Development and Aid

In works published during the Martial Law period discussing ROC policy for "frontier" regions, emphasis on the central government's leadership and generosity buttressed a vision of the ROC as pursuing a civilizing mission. Until the early 21st century, references to "support" (*fuzhi*, 扶植), "advancement" (*cujin*, 促進), and "development" (*fazhan*, 發展) were common tropes in discussion of the ROC's relations with its frontier regions. *Central Government Administration of Mongolia and Tibet Since the Founding of the Republic* (Guo 1971) pointed to the fact that it was the ROC that eliminated derogatory radicals, such as those associated with animals and insects (犬、羊、虫、豸) from the Chinese characters for "frontier peoples," including Mongolians, Tibetans and Hui, in the process of character standardization. This note concluded by emphasizing how the law "showed the government's respect for Mongolian and Tibetan social customs." (9) In a similar vein, the document *Mongolian and Tibetan Student Guidebook* (蒙藏學生輔導手冊 1955) chronicled the efforts by the ROC and MTAC to deliver education in Tibet and Mongolia. The text reviewed pre-1949 education policy, including the development of schools and available places of higher education suitable for Tibetan and Mongolian students, including overseas universities.

Other policy notes applauded ROC efforts to rule according to local customs, including references to the diversity of language and culture in the frontier regions. In *The Mongolian Banner System* (Liu 1996: 32), this sentiment was reiterated with an eye to the future – stating instead that after reunification, it would be necessary to govern with sensitivity and respect for local customs. These texts, ranging in publication date from the 1950s to the 1990s, all emphasized the KMT's right to retake Mainland China, and demonstrated dedication to the "China Myth" (Hughes 2016). Moreover, these documents presented a narrative of a natural and rightful relationship between the ruled—Tibet and Mongolia—and ruler—the KMT. The implicit logic of this narrative is that the frontier regions of the ROC, Tibet and Mongolia, needed a legitimate Chinese ruler to govern them, and to lead them to civilization.

Meanwhile, official ROC policy towards Tibet after 1959 promised to extend greater autonomy after reunification as a reward for Tibetan efforts to resist CCP rule. This was announced in Chiang Kai-shek's 1959 "Letter to Tibetan Compatriots" [告西藏同胞書].

Writing a few years after the announcement, Tibetan ROC official Luosang Yixi (羅桑益西) contributed a forward to the MTAC translated work *New Tibetan Cultural Research* (西藏文

化的新研究 1963, forward written in 1960). Luosang wrote that Chiang Kai-shek's "Letter" made Tibetans everywhere "weep in gratitude" (3). Luosang further referred to Chiang's letter as an "epoch-making announcement of leniency" and "a great declaration" (3). Here, although only a local representative of Xikang Province's Enda Prefecture, Luosang's Tibetan identity[19] served as justification for his role as spokesperson for all of Tibet.

Later, in 1983, similar language and the same reference point reappeared in a speech on Tibet by MTAC official Hsueh Renyang's (薛人仰) (a Fujianese native). He stated:

> ... the decision made by the Government of the Republic of China on the Tibet issue is very simple. On March 26th, 16 days after the anti-violence in Tibet, our former President Chiang Kai-shek (蔣公) issued a statement called the "Letter to Tibetan Compatriots" [告西藏同胞書]... At the beginning, the "Letter" expresses concern for our Tibetan compatriots and praises their spirit of resisting violence... This is the basic strategy of our policy towards Tibet, which has not changed so far and will not change in the future. (25-26)

Nearly 25 years after the fact, the MTAC continued to praise Chiang's announcement, and trumpet the ROC's generosity in recognizing Tibet's sacrifices for justice. Although the Commission was discussing its diminished claim to control over Tibet, it was continuing to rely on an implicit assumption that the Republican government was not only in a strategic position to make such a policy promise, but also in a position of authority to make decisions about the future of governance in Tibet. Essentially, the MTAC's portrayal of ROC's "leniency" in Tibet positioned the Republican central government as a legitimate evaluator of Tibetan readiness to self-govern. In other words, this portrayal presented the ROC as a benevolent ruler with the right to make decisions regarding Tibet's autonomy and governance.

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[19] National Museum of Taiwan History "Commander Peng awards medal for National Congress Representative Luosang Yixi" [彭指揮官為國大代表羅桑益西配戴紀念章] [online] [accessed on November 11, 2021] https://collections.nmth.gov.tw/CollectionContent.aspx?a=132&rno=2002.007.2633.0052

6.2.4 Health and Hygiene

In a similar vein of solicitude mingled with condescension, the issue of health was occasionally discussed in research on Mongolian society. Published in 1954, *A Survey of Mongolia* (Yao) included a particularly vivid section on hygiene. While admitting that the MTAC's efforts to promote better hygiene had not been successful, the text suggested these failures were primarily attributable to the rigid and superstitious nature of Mongolian society, which had "barely any hygiene to speak of." (181) This claim was supported by various examples, ranging from "corpse abandonment in the wild" to accounts of Mongolians "going a whole month without washing their faces". The high death rate was attributed to the lack of hygiene amongst the local population: "Mongolians do not treat their illnesses, and instead go to pray, and thus as a result each disease is passed around. Then, at a loss as to what to do, they let things take their course: death is everywhere…" (181). This portrayal of hygiene characterized Mongolian people and customs as backward in the extreme: superstitious and irrational to the point of being unteachable. Failings of the MTAC's advocacy efforts were blamed on the Mongolians themselves, portrayed as willfully unreceptive to instruction in cleanliness. The amount of detail devoted to this topic was unmatched in other sections of the Survey, indicating the special significance attached to hygiene as a marker of Mongolian backwardness and need for the civilizational uplift that the ROC state could offer.

Tibet was not exempt from the MTAC's hygiene focused gaze. Published in the same year, *Summary of Tibetan Negotiations* (西藏交涉紀要, 1954) offered similar commentary on the state of hygiene, medicine, and health practices in Tibet.

The number of families also grows smaller every day… Additionally, the customs are not good. For each household with a second son, one son must become a Lama, and Lamas do not take a wife…. Fertility is decreasing due to lack of hygiene. There is not much emphasis on the study of medicine, and with the lack of knowledge, when residents are met with illness, they value prayer to avert disaster. So, the death rate increases daily. One less one more, so it is calculated. (1-2)

Similar to *A Survey of Mongolia* (1954), the rhetoric in the case of Tibet was concerned with not only the hygiene habits and preference for spiritual healing over medical treatment, but also the perceived implications of these "customs" on the death rate. Summary of Tibetan Negotiations continued in this manner to examine the issue of population decline,

ultimately pointing to the monastic traditions of the Lama system alongside the "lack of hygiene" as the primary causes. In sum, Tibetans were portrayed as ignorant, uncivilized, and un-scientific.

Although the discussion of hygiene largely disappears from discussions related to Tibet after the 1950s, variations of this theme continue in MTAC documents on Mongolia. After the onset of democratization in Taiwan from the late 1980s, references to the specific ROC contributions to the "civilizing" of Mongolia diminished, but some texts manifested a continuing emphasis on the relative cleanliness, health and safety of the ROC in comparison to Mongolia. For example, the 1999 *Survey of Outer Mongolia and Introduction to Tourism* included a fearful subsection on disease. While not explicitly condemning Mongolia for its superstition, this document drew attention to the difference in knowledge between its presumed Chinese-speaking readership and the Mongolian public. A section subtitled: "Diseases Currently Necessary to Take Precautions Against" begins with the statement that:

> Everyone knows that when traveling, the scariest thing is for a disease to arrive and plague the body. Especially when going to Outer Mongolia, this piece of wide-open land, if you get sick in a place where there are few people, it becomes even more difficult to cure. (124)

There follow statistics related to the number of medical care facilities, types of common diseases, and health threats pertinent to visitors. While not touching on the issue of hygienic practices in Mongolia, the text warns of the lack of medical resources and development in the area. This warning echoed the rhetoric of earlier decades linking hygiene and civilization, although now in the context of the MTAC's promotion of tourism in Mongolia.

With a shift in tone, discussion of health in Mongolia continued into the 21st century. In 2014, the MTAC's journal *Mongolian and Tibetan Quarterly* published a report titled "Mainland Inner Mongolia Medicine and Health Professionals Visit and Exchange to Taiwan" (MTAC MAO). Language in this report differed considerably from the previous era's detailed depiction of disease and death, instead placing emphasis on exchange, bilateral harmonious development, and cooperation. The health objectives were also distinct from those which concerned the MTAC in 1954 (Yao), focusing on women's health, hospital management, among other issues.

Still, the subject of health, hygiene and medicine retained its salience, spanning all three phases of the MTAC's existence, from the 1950s to the 2010s. Although the tone and focus

changed over time, there remained an essential assertion of the ROC's superior health and hygiene practices. Both 20th-century portrayals of Mongolia as dirty and diseased and 21st-century images of ROC programs to foster the development of Mongolian healthcare serve to signal the ROC's virtues: good health and hygiene. The persistent appearance of this topic and relational superiority of the ROC also suggests that health and hygiene, and the related possession of a first-class, modern medical infrastructure, had become important aspects of ROC (or Taiwanese) identity.

To conclude, it appears that throughout the 20th century the MTAC continued to produce material reflecting a Han-centric approach to nation and concept of territory, reflective of the assumptions underpinning its earlier active civilizing mission. The ROC's China-centrism did not simply mean that it focused on the mainland—although it did do this—but more importantly, that it looked at the Mainland with a Han-chauvinist gaze. Through the 20th century, although the nature of the MTAC's rhetoric in its description of "frontier" peoples changed in its degree of condescension, assumptions of Mongolians' subordinate position in a civilizational hierarchy, and associated assumptions of an ROC mission to civilize, persisted. In the 21st century, MTAC discourse shifted towards a focus on mutual exchange between Mongolia and Taiwan. This in turn indicated a repositioning towards "Taiwan," a term used for self-reference in the 2013 reports, and away from a strictly Chinese orientation in national identity discourse. However, certain legacies have remained. Most notably, the subject of health (*weisheng*, 衛生) in Mongolia has prevailed through all three phases of the MTAC on Taiwan.

6.2.5 Towards international exchange: Taiwan, Mongolia and Tibet

The third phase began with the start of the 21st century, after a decade of increasing people-to-people exchanges with Mainland China, official recognition of Mongolian independence in 2002, and two visits to Taiwan by the Dalai Lama (in 1997 and 2001). The third phase was overwhelmingly dominated by rhetoric covering international cultural, academic, and economic exchange. Both *From the Pastures with Love* (MTAC MAO 2012) and *Taiwanese Heart, Mongolian Passion* (MTAC, National History Museum (Taiwan), and Mongolian National History Museum 2007) featured only introductions to Mongolia and Mongolian people, primarily limiting content to that on climate, geography, and collaborations between Mongolian and Taiwanese cultural institutions. "Taiwan" effectively became equivalent to the ROC in official discourse, with the DPP administration of Chen Shui-bian abandoning

pretensions to sovereignty over the Chinese mainland. Indeed, a very different discourse was presented in *Taiwanese Heart, Mongolian Passion*, with appeals to multiculturalism, international exchange, and cultural collaboration. The text's introduction from the MTAC began with a comparison of Taiwan and Mongolia to highlight differences in climate, people, and culture, further noting: "due to the two countries' distance, Taiwanese people have had few opportunities to see Mongolia's unique culture." The artists' visits and subsequent exhibition collaboration were then explained as part of the MTAC's attempts to "enrich Taiwan's philosophy of multicultural values," (2) an important allusion to Taiwanese multiculturalism. The introduction provided a sense of distance and exotification between the grass prairies of Mongolia and the island of Taiwan. Furthermore, published in 2007, the introduction marks the MTAC's introduction of the term 'country' to refer both to Mongolia and Taiwan.

Both the "2013 Academic Seminar on Trade and Culture in Taiwan and Inner Mongolia" (MTAC MAO) and "Inner Mongolian Medical and Health Professionals Visit Taiwan for Exchange" (MTAC MAO) articles focused on subject-specific exchange. Both articles championed the exchange of knowledge, and situate such exchange in the contemporary world, with little or no reference to past history. Again, terms related to the ROC were replaced with Taiwan, and the term China was used only in reference to the Mainland. The PRC was hinted at with references to cross-strait cooperation of different sorts. The benefits of cooperation and exchange were stressed throughout the two reports. Both articles looked toward the future, and not the past.

In other documents, vestiges of past civilizing discourse remained, though expressed in less derogatory terminology, and emphasizing what Taiwan specifically - rather than China - has provided and could further offer for Mongolia. The *Mongolian and Tibetan Quarterly*'s "2011 Judicial Seminar for Mongolian Judges" detailed a list of Taiwan's efforts to assist in establishing Mongolia's judicial system. Certain keywords framed Taiwan's assistance, including mention of Taiwan and Mongolia's closeness and the "good interaction and exchange" for the "establishment of the two countries' justice departments", noticeably continuing to use the term country (*guojia*, 國家) in reference to Taiwan and Mongolia (MTAC MAO: 16). However, although appeals to mutual, country-to-country exchange were frequently inserted throughout texts in the third phase, documents' content tended to focus on "Taiwan's" contributions to Mongolian development. These narratives of official benevolence communicated a relative developmental superiority, clearly an important facet of official

national identity across the different eras of the MTAC's existence.

The theme of international exchange extends far beyond the introductory section within this chapter. Most discussion of international exchange is framed within a greater discourse of multiculturalism or cultural pluralism. Chapter Seven narrows in on the discourse of pluralism within the ROC on Taiwan, and thus offers a more nuanced look into this phenomenon there. Furthermore, particularly for Tibet, much of the contents of MTAC work within the international exchange theme focus on Tibetan Buddhism, its practitioners, and the Dalai Lama. This is the subject of investigation in Chapter Eight. As a result, the discussion of twenty-first century discourse concerning exchange with Tibet is primarily explored in the following two chapters.

6.3 Discussion

It is clear from the analysis above that the MTAC's orientation towards the Mainland underwent a great transformation after the end of military rule (1987). Throughout the 20th century, the ROC upheld assumptions of a civilizational hierarchy in depictions of its imagined relationship with Tibet and Mongolia, both "Inner" and "Outer". The ROC's portrayal of its civilizing mission was multifaceted and was characterized by several themes. The MTAC until the late 1990s continued to rely on historical narratives depicting the Sino-Mongolian and Sino-Tibetan relationships as a strong and ancient bond of centuries (even millennia) of contact. However, these historical narratives were told from the perspective of China Proper, with Chinese dynastic dates and, in the case of Mongolia, Chinese language labelling of the proto-Mongolian "other". The Mongolian and Tibetan peoples were included in the greater Republican Chinese concept of national identity, but only in a subordinary capacity. As seen most clearly in relation to the theme of foreign encroachment, Tibet and Mongolia's contribution to this unequal "family" of nations was portrayed as providing a buffer for the protection of inner China.

The distinct and subordinate status accorded to Mongolia and Tibet and the peoples who lived throughout the frontier territories was further reflected in the MTAC's policy rhetoric. Policy reviews portrayed a one-sided relationship, with the state extending paternalistic care to weaker, backward peoples on the frontier. Inner China, which remained the imagined locus of the ROC regime until the 1990s, was portrayed as more civilized in every way: more developed, less religious (or "superstitious"), cleaner. Both Tibet and Mongolia, by contrast, needed the state's paternalistic support to develop their economy, education, infrastructure, as

well as to raise standards of hygiene and transform values for the better. In Mongolia, in areas where the state (the MTAC or other bodies) failed in its mission to "develop" or "support" the Mongolian people, blame was placed on the lower quality of the Mongolian people themselves, as superstitious and lacking basic scientific knowledge. While this language lost some of its harshness following the onset of Taiwan's democratization, some underlying assumptions have persisted, as the ROC continues to center its own munificence and relatively "advanced" status in its aid programs and regard for human rights in Mongolia and Tibet, respectively.

Intimations of a shift in frontier discourse towards the end of the 20th century came to fruition after 2000. A substantial re-imagining of the former "frontier" territory and peoples, and their relationship with the ROC on Taiwan, reflected the push for localization and a new centering of Taiwan in official conceptions of statehood. From the turn of the 21st century, "China" and the "ROC" as terms for self-reference dropped out of use in MTAC literature, in favor of Taiwan. Furthermore, the ROC on Taiwan now recognized Mongolia and Inner Mongolia as separate entities from itself, with the former depicted as a sovereign country and the latter as an autonomous region under PRC governance. The ROC simultaneously pursued a tentative relationship with the Tibetan government-in-exile and Mainland Tibetan artistic and cultural organizations, signaling a shift from a paradigm of domestic or internal relations to one of loose diplomatic or international ties. Relationships with these regions were portrayed by the MTAC as involving distant but friendly neighbors. The ROC's conception of statehood meanwhile gravitated steadily towards a multicultural and democratic Taiwan. As the imagining of national territory shifted from that of a "greater China" to "Taiwan," from the ROC's new national perspective, Taiwan, Tibet, and Mongolia were all located on (or outside) China's periphery. The closure of the Commission in 2017 implicitly set the seal on this new vision.

As regards Taiwan's own national identity, however, 21st century MTAC depictions of Mongolia reflected a new Taiwanese consciousness that in some respects echoed the old ROC conceptions of a civilizational hierarchy and civilizing mission vis-a-vis its so-called frontier. The change in self-appellation to Taiwan corresponded with a greater shift in ideological positioning. The ROC moved away from imagining Inner China as its national center and toward a (civic) conceptualization of the ROC as based in Taiwan. While the ROC has ceased to assert sovereignty over Greater China, and appears to be content with the status quo on Taiwan (Huang and James 2014), its portrayal of Inner and Outer Mongolia maintains notions of a civilizational hierarchy. Rather than rooted in a grand five-nation Republic, this relates to an implicit vision of a regional Asian hierarchy, with Taiwan's relatively developed and

multicultural democracy conferring civilizational superiority. Certainly, both Outer Mongolia and Inner Mongolia were accorded elevated status under the new, post-2000 paradigm, with rhetoric stressing exchange, mutual development, and cooperation. However, discourse of exchange related mainly to a narrative of ROC assistance to Mongolia and Inner Mongolia, as well as cultural and spiritual imports from Tibet (see Chapters 7 and 8 for more information). While explicit denigration of Tibetans, Mongolians, and other minority nationalities as backward and under-developed had gone, this was superseded by a more subtle emphasis on the ROC's civilizing benevolence, advocacy, and development through its foreign policy. In sum, 21st century images of Mongolia worked to highlight Taiwan's selfless contributions to the region as a democratic, multicultural and economically developed friendly neighbor.

One manifestation of this discourse concerning Taiwan's relatively "advanced" or civilized status involved allusions to its superior attainments in medical development and healthcare. ROC advancement of medical science and healthcare have been key domestic policies for decades (Lu and Chiang 2011), attracting even more domestic attention following the ROC's expulsion from the United Nations (UN) and UN subsidiary body, the World Health Assembly (WHA) (Alexander 2020). Particularly since the 1990s, foreign aid aiming to improve healthcare infrastructure has become a mainstay in ROC diplomacy, in part as an attempt to strengthen the case for Taiwanese access to the WHA. Alexander highlights the aspect of virtue signaling in foreign diplomacy, and pinpoints the ROC's foreign aid and domestic health industry as key markers in the ROC's drive for international recognition. While it is evident that health and hygiene are key aspects of ROC identity (and have become even more prominent in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic), the history of the MTAC complicates Taiwan's contemporary foreign aid and diplomacy. The issues of health and hygiene were primarily raised by the MTAC to showcase ROC or Han civilizational superiority vis-à-vis the ostensibly inferior hygiene and healthcare in Mongolia and, to lesser extent, Tibet. However, the current body of scholarly research on ROC healthcare and foreign aid does not consider the ROC's historical civilizing mission, its evolving relationship with Mongolia, nor their implications for contemporary healthcare development initiatives.

With the MTAC's disbandment in 2017, programs for exchange, research, and development in Tibet, Mongolia and Inner Mongolia have been turned over to MOFA, MAC and MOC (HE 2018). While some sense of an ROC civilizing mission persisted throughout the period of the MTAC's existence, further research may consider investigating possible similar approaches in official state portrayals of Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples within the MOC. Finally, in light of the ROC's response to COVID-19 and its "mask diplomacy", future research

may look directly at the legacy of this aspect of the ROC's civilizing mission on its "frontier" and its enduring influence on contemporary diplomatic virtue signaling.

6.4 Conclusion

Over the course of its 68 years of operation on Taiwan, the MTAC evolved from a symbolic link to "Greater China" into an advocate of intercultural and international exchange after the start of the 21st century. Throughout the era of military rule, the MTAC presented the ROC state as the rightful government of the Mainland, including its vulnerable but vital frontier. By 2000, the MTAC had lost most of its bark, taking on a friendlier tone in its portrayal of Tibet, Mongolia, and Inner Mongolia, while maintaining an implicitly Han-chauvinist, Mainland-oriented approach. Following the trend towards localization in Taiwan, steps toward rapprochement with the Tibetan government-in-exile, and official recognition of Mongolia as an independent nation in 2002, the MTAC began a process of reinventing itself and the ROC as embodiments of Taiwan as a multicultural, Asian island nation. Accompanying this shift in conception of statehood, was a move away from highlighting the ROC state's relative civilizational superiority over its imagined frontier of Tibet and Mongolia to a more subdued and tactful, but still unmistakable emphasis on Taiwan's relative economic or developmental advancement. Review of documents published by the MTAC on Taiwan has revealed the utility of Mongolia as a vehicle for showcasing the superiority of the ROC (however defined) as a civilized, developed, and magnanimous nation. It is clear that certain characteristics of the ROC's formerly overt civilizing mission targeting its peripheral territories and the peoples who live there have persisted into the 21st century.

The following chapter turns to examine the discourse of multiculturalism in MTAC publications. Overlapping in parts with this chapter, particularly with regards to the emergence of a rhetoric of international mutual exchange, the next chapter focuses on the shifting politics of cultural and ethnic identities as defined and understood by the ROC state. The mechanics of the ethnic or civilizational hierarchy first explored in this chapter are revisited to interrogate the evolving dimensions of first "pluralism" then "multiculturalism" as the parameters of the ROC's imagined statehood shrank from Greater China to Taiwan.

Chapter Seven: Official Pluralism from the Five Nation Republic to Multicultural Taiwan

7.1 Introduction

The previous chapter revealed the persistent discourse of a civilizing mission and cultural hierarchy embedded in much of the MTAC's literature through 2017. This chapter homes in on a related dimension of imperialism within Greater China: the management of pluralism by a distant state. Since the end of military rule in 1987, the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC/Taiwan) has increasingly portrayed itself as an exemplar of multiculturalism within Asia. In the process of democratization, minority groups have advocated for increased recognition, resulting in the establishment of the Council of Indigenous Peoples (1996) and the Hakka Affairs Council (2001). In 2005, the constitution was amended, promising that "the country affirms multiculturalism and actively maintains and develops Indigenous languages and cultures." (Executive Yuan). Since then, a broad range of government institutions have implemented policy with direct appeals to multiculturalism, including the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Culture. While these government bureaus and commissions have received considerable scholarly attention, the MTAC has largely been neglected in critical discussions of the evolution of multiculturalism in Taiwan. In the 21st century, The MTAC was among those agencies widely adopting the term "Multicultural Taiwan" to reference a localized notion of Taiwanese pluralism. Indeed, as discussed at length in Chapter Five, in the 2000s, the Commission's primary activities included arranging cultural exchanges, promoting economic development, and in its own words, "contributing to peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region" (MTAC, 2003). Despite the Commission's integration of a localized multiculturalism into its organizational rhetoric, its disbandment in 2017 signaled a significant shift in the official stance on Taiwan's constitutional relationship with Mainland China, and with its non-Han regions in particular.

However, the nearly seven decades of MTAC publications and activity on Taiwan before its dissolution offer a glimpse into the process of integrating official interpretations of multiculturalism into ROC institutions. As a hold-over from the early days of Republican rule on the Chinese mainland, the MTAC in particular offers a window onto the ROC's transition from its "Five Nation Republic" past to the institutional embodiment of "Multicultural Taiwan" in the present. As discussed in Chapter Four, the MTAC was itself partially modeled on the Qing's *lifan yuan* (理藩院), an imperial agency created to facilitate Qing governance

over its outer empire. Today, the ROC capitalizes on its democratic transition and localization to mediate contending local identities and to appeal to the international community's approval of multicultural citizenship. But to what extent does the more recent "Multicultural Taiwan" paradigm differ from early and mid-20th century conceptualizations of ROC pluralism? This inquiry becomes particularly salient when viewed from the perspective of the ROC's Qing imperialist inheritance, which greatly contributed to informing early ROC conceptions of pluralism, identity, and governance (Duara 1996; Rigger 2011). Currently, scholarship has come to the consensus that "Multicultural Taiwan" is an official negotiation of competing nationalisms, working to legitimate ROC existence at home and abroad (Dupre 2019; Rawnsley 2017). However, the legacy of the "Five Nation Republic" in Taiwanese discourse on multiculturalism has been largely neglected.

This chapter therefore investigates MTAC appeals to "Multicultural Taiwan" and critically examines the evolving discourse of pluralism from 1949 to 2017. The central line of inquiry asks how the Commission navigated the shifting official conceptualization of national identity with its institutional and ideological history. I seek to uncover what remains and what has fundamentally changed in the transition from the Han-chauvinist, Mainlander-centric "Five Nation Family" to the "Multicultural Taiwan" approach to national identity. How did the early Republican notion of a "Five Nation Republic" influence MTAC representations of the nation? In particular, what do these findings suggest about the legacies of Qing imperialism on Taiwan today? Finally, to what extent did the MTAC adapt itself to the discourse of Taiwanese multiculturalism in its twenty-first century activities? The next section tackles these questions across eight sub-sections focusing on particular aspects of the MTAC's conceptual approach to "pluralism" or "multiculturalism" and their change over time.

The chapter consists of four sections. Following this introduction section, the second section presents the findings of my analysis. In similar fashion to the preceding chapter, the analysis section comprises the majority of the chapter, and is divided into thematic sub-sections to explore the many and oft-changing facets of the MTAC's conceptualization of pluralism and later specifically multiculturalism. The third section reviews and synthesizes the thematic shifts and consistencies in pluralism discourse over time. Finally, the fourth section provides commentary on the findings presented in this chapter in the context of the thesis project as a whole.

7.2 Pluralism, Past and Present

As is clear from the greater institutional history of the Commission, the language, style, and content of the MTAC's work underwent great changes from its 1949 relocation to Taipei until its closure in 2017. MTAC discourses of pluralism largely followed along the same institutional shifts of the Commission. The following discussion of findings aims to trace the trajectory of change, situate the discursive shifts in their socio-political context and historical background, and draw out the themes across martial law, democratization, and the 21st century. Analysis is organized thematically. To highlight the discursive shifts over time, the periodization outlined in Chapter Five is employed throughout. In broad strokes, after a brief period in the 1950s when the MTAC focused on identifying and attacking imperial and communist aggression, the first period (1949-1987) was consistent in its mainland- and Han-centric approach to pluralism. From the 1960s until the end of military rule, references to pluralism or diversity were largely limited to discussions of race and ethnic categorization. Where pluralism appeared in Commission documents, it was discussed through the lens of the Three People's Principles (三民主義), and was directly linked the idea of the Five Nation Republic. After the end of military rule, the second period (1988-1999) saw fewer direct references to the "Five Nation Republic" concept, although the five nations continued to be invoked in discussions of pluralism. Pluralism itself was less frequently invoked during this period, with some notable exceptions, discussed below. Instead, the MTAC employed rhetoric of exchange to promote a stronger Cross-Strait relationship through its ties to Mongolia and Tibet. Finally, after the election of the first DPP administration in 2000 and change of the constitution in 2005, the Commission became aligned with the ideals of multiculturalism and the vision of a Multicultural Taiwan. The Commission pivoted to focus on exchange programs aimed at fostering multiculturalism, an expression frequently used yet never clearly defined. Incoming exchanges typically showcased Tibetan and Mongolian cultural elements through artistic exhibitions and performances, while documents presented Taiwan as offering professional expertise or economic aid and investment to Mongolia and Tibet. The following subsections trace and analyze these shifts in MTAC portrayals of cultural diversity.

7.2.1 Relocation and the Persistence of the Five Nation Republic

In the first decade after the retreat to Taiwan, the MTAC, like the ROC regime as a whole, maintained its wartime stance on retaking Mainland China. Internationally, the Cold War loomed large, with active conflict on the Korean Peninsula and increasing tension building

in Vietnam (Roy 2003). Pluralism, multi-ethnic diversity, or even concepts of *yinsu'erzhi* (因俗而治) did not feature in MTAC writings. Messages concerning multi-national brotherhood within the Five Nation Republic were put aside in favor of strongly worded attacks on imperial or communist aggression. Throughout the 1950s, the MTAC primarily focused on the issue of national defense and the integrity of the Chinese frontier – specifically in relation to Mongolia and Tibet - with these regions generally treated as distinct entities. This trend included books such as *Summary of Tibetan Negotiations* [西藏交涉紀要] 1954, which detailed the efforts of Great Britain (英國) to expand its territory into Tibet, beginning in the early Qing period. Another text, focusing on Mongolian territory, cataloguing imperial Russian and later Soviet incursions, was entitled *Record of Major Events between China and Russia Relating to Mongolia* [中俄間有關蒙古的大事記] 1954). In addition to documents discussing national security, the Commission also published several books outside its typical genre range. These included reprints of older works, such as *An Account of Mongolian Nomads* (蒙古游牧記) by Mu Chang (張幕) in 1959, a work originally published in 1826. Additionally, a volume of Mongolian sheet music and lyrics was published in 1954 (*Mongolian Collection of Lyrics* [蒙古歌詞集]).

However, by the 1960s, pluralism became a regular theme in writings on the ROC's notional frontier. As it would do throughout the Martial Law period, the ROC fervently insisted on its mission to retake the mainland. A key ideological element of the ROC's assertion of rightful sovereignty on the mainland was the conceptualization of China as a Five Nation Republic. As discussed in Chapter Four, the Five Nation Republic was a notion borrowed from the Qing's Family of Five Races (五種之家), and referred to the Han, Mongolian, Tibetan, Manchu and Hui nations (previously races). Pluralism was thus deeply embedded in official conceptualization of the ROC as a Five Nation Republic, and the subject appeared frequently in ethnologies and catalogues of race/ethnicity in the ROC. Drawing primarily on data collected before the retreat to Taiwan, MTAC documents through the 1960s and 1970s sought to demonstrate official knowledge of and paternalism towards the vast inner Asian territories claimed by the ROC and the peoples who inhabited them. *A Brief Look into the System of*

Chinese Nationalities [中國民族系支簡篇] (1968) is one volume of the *Frontier Series* (邊疆叢書). In its introduction, *A Brief Look* establishes its intention to set straight the history of the ROC's many ethnicities, as there is 'considerable misunderstanding' (錯覺與誤解) and "prejudice" (歧視) shared about "the categorization of China's ethnic branches" (中國之民族系支的區分) (1). Chapters then focus on issues such as industry, geography, population grouping, customs, religion, and language of ethnic groups including and beyond the five nations. Special attention is paid to ethnic subdivisions, including the residences, the particularities and distinctions of each. Above all, the text reads as an exercise in naming, counting, and classifying peoples primarily in order to underline the state's authority to categorize its subjects or citizens. Through its detailed and vivid portrait of the Republic, the MTAC generated a portrayal of the ROC as a diverse but cohesive unit under the leadership of the KMT.

7.2.2 Dimensions of the Five Nation Republic on Taiwan

In constructing the Five Nation Republic, the MTAC at various times throughout the first period of its operations on Taiwan (1949-1987) made efforts to delineate both the dimensions and logic of pluralism. In delineating the dimensions of the Republic, the MTAC also acknowledged the existence of other peoples outside the formal categories of the five recognized nations (Han, Manchu, Mongolian, Tibetan, and Hui). Several texts included consideration and categorization of these peoples according to their cultures, languages and customs, often providing reasons for their exclusion from China's five official nations. Two key texts discussed in detail below explored the ethnic breakdown of the greater Chinese nation, and explained the relationship between various ahistorical or "passive tribes" and the five Chinese nations, though primarily the Han. This concept of "passive" or ahistorical peoples originates from an adopted Darwinian theory of evolution as applied to race and civilization. Explained in greater depth in Chapter Four, this idea was adopted in Liang Qichao's writings on race and revolution in the late Qing period (Leibold 2007) (see also Chapter Six for more discussion of assimilation and passivity in military rule era MTAC writings on "tribal" peoples). The text *Frontier Ethnography* [邊疆民族志] (1970) expatiated at length on the importance of unity of the Five Nation Republic, collectively referring to the

peoples of all five nations as Chinese (中國人). The book also emphasized that there are a great number of Chinese who are not included in one of these five nations, in reference to minority *minzu* or nationalities, particularly in Southwest and Southeast China.

Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples were among the minority *minzu* denied the status of "nation" within the "Five Nation Republic." Along with other minority *minzu* on the Mainland, Taiwan Indigenous Peoples were included in the Commission's purview under the general category of "frontier" peoples since the MTAC's establishment on the Mainland (Lan 2017). Consequently, both *Frontier Ethnography* (MTAC 1970) and *A Brief Look* (MTAC 1968), introduced above, included lengthy chapters documenting the characteristics of Taiwan Indigenous Peoples, whom throughout military rule were referred to as "Taiwan aborigines" (*Taiwan tuzhe*, 臺灣土著) or *gaoshan zu* (高山族). The MTAC framed Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples as part of the "Southeast branch" of China's "frontier ethnicities" (*bianjiang minzu*, 邊疆民族) (1968, 101), and in doing so incorporated not only Taiwan but Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples into the greater Chinese nationality. However, this inclusion was limited to the margins on the frontier. *A Brief Look into the System of Chinese Nationalities* argues that Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples, while "not worth noting due to their total population number" (in China as a whole), are nonetheless worthy of scholarly and national interest due to their widespread residence in Taiwan, especially in the island's eastern half (103). Later discussed in greater detail, it is worth noting here that during the era of martial law Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples received comparatively greater attention as a recognized ethnic minority in MTAC publications. Indeed, Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples faded from view in the work of the Commission once the MTAC began to change its function post-1987 to focus on a more international relations-oriented approach to its work.

Official recognition of distinct identities, like the Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples (previously referred to as Taiwan aborigines), other minority *minzu*, and the multiple historical "nations," complicated the rationale for a united Republic of China. Pluralism was thus an essential aspect in official conceptualization of the "Five Nation Republic". Indeed, pluralism throughout the first period of MTAC publications (1949-1987) was characterized as inherent to the Chinese nation (中華民族). The embedded Han-chauvinist civilizational hierarchy, as outlined in Chapter Six, gave further structure to official approaches to pluralism. In its breakdown of race and ethnic categorization, *Frontier Ethnography* presented the logic of pluralism in the ROC. The book argued for the natural coexistence of unity and ethnic diversity

through its discussion of a Chinese *chao zhongzu*, or "super" race. The text argued that it is characteristic of "old nations," such as China, to be multi-ethnic (多民族) and such nations may even merge to become "above" race or to form a "super" race (超重族). The text's introduction further made a case for the importance of national unity, stating that "staying together to form a modern strong nation requires every *minzu* to hold a spirit of public security, shared honor, with harmony of the greater self like happiness of the smaller self…" (1). In likening 'harmony' of the diverse Chinese nation to the 'happiness' of local ethnic or cultural identities, the text both acknowledged ethnic difference and simultaneously prioritized the importance of unity, harmony, and the greater public. In the context of Frontier Nation and similar documents' hierarchical understanding of the Han nation, the peripheral frontier nations, and additional "passive" frontier tribes, it is evident that the text's advocacy for the "modern strong nation" placed Han culture, language and society at the center. In other words, to forge a "super race" for a "modern strong" Chinese nation was to accommodate and accept Han superiority and governance. Consequently, the recognition of difference offers little in exchange for acceptance of the imperative of national unity under the dominance of the superior Han.

The championing of unity over a recognized plurality was a common theme where discussion of cultural or ethnic pluralism featured in MTAC documents during the martial law period. For example, in 1971, the volume *Central Government Administration of Mongolia and Tibet Since the Founding of the Republic* (Guo, J.) [民國以來中央對蒙藏的施政] (henceforth *Central Government Administration*) declared:

> From the start of building the Republic, the founding fathers advocated for the Five Nation Republic; Han, Manchu, Mongolian, Hui, and Tibetan one by one became designated within our country's ethnic branches, uniting to be called the Chinese Nation [中華民族]. (1)

The introduction continued to explain how each nationality developed its identity and integrated into the greater Chinese Nation, beginning with the Han people. After additionally reviewing the origins of the Manchu, Mongol, Hui, and Tibetan peoples, the text also noted the existence of other ethnicities. "As for the Miao-Yao ethnic branch, Luo-Mian [羅緬] ethnic

branch, and Boshan ethnic branch, for some time they were easily called 'wild' [蠻], and came

from far-away places such as Liangcuan [兩爨], Nanzhao, Dian Kingdom, Ailaoyi, Yelang,

and elsewhere." (2) Here, although the text directly discussed pluralism and recognized minority cultures as distinct, there is a clear civilizational hierarchy, with Han culture placed at the center of the Chinese nation and the remaining four nations forming the periphery. A particular note of condescension was reserved for "wild" minority ethnic groups such as Taiwanese Aborigines[20] who fell outside the officially recognized five nations.

Equality among the peoples of the Republic was a key refrain. *Central Government Administration* (Guo 1971) reiterated conceptualizations of a pluralist Five Nation Republic centered around Inner China's Han culture. In a section entitled "Mongolian and Tibetan Policy Establishing the Three People Principles," the document explained that ROC policy aimed to "promote ethnic status equality," as "the five nations have already become a family…" (5). The text listed various related components of the MTAC's policy while based on the Mainland and its accomplishments, such as extending "the right to speech in politics," "establishment of equal status," and giving hope for "the people of five nations, all as brothers, coming together in heart and spirit, working together for the future of the Republic of China." (6) The text presented a recognition of ethnic and cultural pluralism with the emphasis on unity centered around a Han identity. Under this Han-chauvinist approach to national unity, texts during this era occasionally extended recognition of national pluralism beyond the five nation "family" to encompass minority ethnic groups, including some references to "Taiwan Aborigines" (Taiwan tuzhe, 台灣土著). However, these minority ethnic groups were presented with overt

condescension and dismissal of their importance or contribution to the national (Chinese) culture. The imperialist, Han-chauvinist logic at the core of the Five Nation Republic concept viewed Greater China in concentric circles: at the center the civilized Han, then its brother nations on the periphery, and finally the nearly "wild" "tribal" peoples seen as of little historical significance.

In the last decade of martial law, pressure on the KMT to localize and democratize grew. The KMT responded by shifting national ideology away from a Three People's Principles framework and worked to recenter somewhat national policy, particularly education policy, toward Taiwan. Thus, within the MOE, increased representations of Taiwan marked social

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[20] Taiwanese Aboriginals are now referred to as Indigenous Taiwanese Peoples.

studies curricula beginning in 1975 and gradually increased in the 1980s, although it should be noted that the overall emphasis remained on the Mainland (Chang 2021; see Chapter Five for more detail on the transition to democracy). Similarly, while the MTAC also maintained its focus on the Mainland, the Commission increasingly distanced itself from Republican Era rhetoric. Subsequently, as discussed in Chapter Five, by the end of military rule, official state ideology moved away from the Three People's Principles, and direct references to the Five Nation Republic in MTAC literature too began to disappear. More generally, open discussion of pluralism and unity across the Republic dropped out of MTAC publications. Instead, an increasingly Taiwan-centered rhetoric highlighted the theme of cross-straits exchange. While Taiwanization of the Commission resulted in an increased focus on the island, diversity or multiculturalism within Taiwan itself was as yet largely unacknowledged in the Commission's work. Indeed, the MTAC prioritized the mission to develop cross-strait relations with the PRC as a whole, rather than Tibet, Mongolia, or other frontier *minzu* specifically. As a result, the MTAC approach to cultural exchange was in essence an exchange between two Han societies in discussion of Greater China's peripheral nations. The following section traces the rise of the rhetoric on cross-strait cultural exchange in place of the Five Nation Republic discourse.

7.2.3 Remnants of the Five Nation Republic in the March Toward Democracy

During the second era from 1988 to 1999, predominantly characterized by the democratization and localization movements, there was a general shift in MTAC writings towards vague or unclear language. Facing internal divisions on the optimal extent of localization or Taiwanization, the KMT remained in office through the end of the 20th century. The late 1980s through the 1990s saw the end to a viable approach to diplomacy under a Cold War framework and increasing pressure within Taiwan to recognize the political and cultural identities of Taiwanese, Hakka, and Indigenous peoples. Under the changing political context, both at home and internationally, the extent to which Han-chauvinist and imperial approaches to pluralism remained in official discourse comes into question. After the end of military rule, there was increased official recognition of Taiwanese history, local languages, and Indigenous rights, but the degree to which this acknowledgement of diversity on Taiwan permeated state ideology beyond a surface level rhetoric is still an issue of scholarly concern. As an institution established to manage diversity within the Republic, the evolution of the MTAC during this era can provide such a window onto the shifting state ideology. Simply the MTAC throughout the ROC's transition to democracy did not acknowledge the state's contemporaneous efforts to extend recognition to local groups in Taiwan. As stated above, the Three People's Principles

became largely absent in these texts, and with it faded direct reference to the "Five Nation Republic." However, the imagined boundary of the "Five Nation Republic" remained entrenched. Moreover, the general notion of pluralism did not entirely disappear from view: while there were limited direct references to ethnic pluralism, MTAC rhetoric increasingly focused on intercultural exchange with Mainland China.

Change towards Taiwan-focused localization was slow to permeate the MTAC. The "Five Nations Republic" approach to pluralism lingered in MTAC literature for some years after the specific term the "Five Nations Republic" dropped out of use. Shortly after the end of military rule, the text *Damu Mongol Defense of the Qing Era Tibetan Frontier* [達木蒙古於清代西藏邊防] (1989) reviewed pre-Republican history in Tibet, linking together Qing and Republican statehood in discussion of the connection between Republican pluralism and the development of the Qing empire. The document tied narratives of the Qing incorporation of Tibet to the development of the Chinese nation, stating that: "traditionally, our nation [我國] is a nation made of many *minzu*" (24). The text drew indirectly on the concept of the Five Nation Republic, and the prior conceptualization of the Qing realm as a family of five races, although without explicitly referencing it by name. The Han, Manchu, Mongolian and Tibetan peoples were portrayed uniting as "brothers to protect [China] against foreign enemies in Tibet" (24). The fifth nation, the Hui, were not mentioned in the text, as the Mongol defense of Tibet did not include mobilization of the Hui. Notably, beyond the text's introductory link between Qing conquest and the ROC multi-ethnic nation-state, there was no mention of a contemporary equivalent of the Qing bond of brother *minzu*. In other words, although references to Qing imperial ideology served to contextualize the historical analysis, specific links to the ROC's contemporary statehood and national circumstances were omitted.

While occasional reference to a greater Chinese pluralism and the notion of the Five Nation Republic still featured in MTAC documents during the late 1980s, they were quietly superseded by emphasis on cross-strait cultural exchange by the 1990s. The KMT's efforts to reorient towards Taiwan through localization made the insistence on the Five Nation Republic approach to the mainland nonviable. Furthermore, with cross-strait rapprochement taking off in the 1990s, the previous regime's aggressive stance on taking the mainland back from the communists was not compatible with the ROC's aim of developing an economic relationship with Beijing. Without the imperative of demonstrating the ROC's rightful claim to Greater China, the notion of the Five Nation Republic was no longer necessary. Still, developing a

relationship outside of the Five Nation framework with Inner Mongolia and Tibet was key both in strengthening cross-cultural ties and in maintaining some essence of the "China Myth" (Hughes 2016) to maintain legitimacy at home (see Chapter Five for more discussion of the role of the "China Myth").

7.2.4 Cross-Strait Conciliation and Cultural Exchange

Throughout the 1990s, direct appeals to pluralism, diversity, and/or multiculturalism nearly dropped from view within the MTAC. However, many of the Han-centric ideals embedded in the former regime's conceptualization of pluralism remained at play. These Han-centric ideals were apparent especially in MTAC rhetoric on cross-cultural? exchange. Following reforms and accelerating economic growth on Mainland China, the ROC was keen to court a relationship with the people of China through professional, academic, and cultural exchange. The *Recent Decade's Research on Mongolia and Tibet from Taiwan* [近十年來台灣地區的蒙藏研究] (1995), by Wang Weifang (王維芳) and Yang Jiaming (楊嘉銘) provides an excellent example of the careful use of language championing exchange, culture, and a special cross-strait connection between Taiwan and Mainland China, encompassing Mongolia, and Tibet. Couched in an academic register, the text showcased the efforts made on Taiwan (*not* referred to here as the ROC) and by the MTAC to facilitate academic exchange:

At the same time as both coasts have spent many decades apart, this distance has been shortened by exchange particularly of culture and scholarship. Previously, the Mongolian and Tibetan academic conferences hosted within the region of Taiwan were only limited to research exchange at home and abroad. Today, due to cross-strait [兩岸] exchange and improving relations, both the widening of scholars' horizons and the depth of writing have facilitated appropriate contact and improvement. (31-32)

Although Mongolia and Tibet were the ostensible subjects of research, the text was primarily concerned with uniting Taiwan and Mainland China, rather than Taiwan and Mongolia and Tibet. The special connection described was between the two coasts [兩岸] and more specifically the scholarly unity of Chinese (primarily Han) involved in researching the frontier communities of Mongolia and Tibet.

The emphasis in MTAC research on Mongolia and Tibet on bringing together Taiwan and Mainland China was further underlined in the following page, in a passage stressing the need for bilateral cooperation:

> Until now, conferences have mainly involved one party. To promote the normalization of cross-strait academic exchange, long term planning should organize alternating hosting between Taiwan and the Mainland to allow bilateral scholarly visitations and encourage understanding of both regions' politics, economy, society, and culture. (32-33)

The scholarly community from Mainland China was framed as the expert party with whom to partner for research into Mongolian and Tibetan communities, thereby sidestepping direct collaboration with Mongolia and Tibet. The centering of the cross-strait and Han-Chinese relationship between Taiwan and Mainland China in research on Mongolia and Tibet revealed the lack of interest in Tibetan and Mongolian agency. It further suggests a Han-oriented, subjective gaze in research discussing Tibetan and Mongolian communities. MTAC disregard for Tibetan, Mongolian, or other "frontier" nationalities' voices suggested that Han-chauvinist approaches to national unity remained embedded in the MTAC conception of Chinese statehood. Furthermore, the realpolitik of the early 1990s' cross-strait rapprochement is another factor. The book was published in the year following what Su Chi (2009) frames as the years of conciliation from 1991 to 1994, and a central idea of the text is to showcase how research on Mongolia and Tibet can foster broader cross-strait exchange, not just academic but political, economic, social and cultural.

Due to Lee Teng-hui' 1995 controversial trip to the United States and the ensuing 1995-1996 missile crisis, relations between the PRC and ROC soured (Su 2009). Consequently, the relations matrix among the United States, Tibet, PRC and Taiwan became increasingly complex (Namgyal 2003). Political association with the PRC and emphasis on cross-strait rapprochement faded, but Han-centrism remained a powerful force within the MTAC in shaping the field of Mongolian and Tibetan Studies. The *Tibetan Studies Academic Conference Proceedings* [西藏學術會議論文集] (2000), includes a transcript of the opening ceremony, which, notably, took place in 1999, the year before DPP party candidate Chen Shui-bian won the presidency. The comments examined below were delivered at the time of the conferences in 1999 by Commission chairman Gao Konglian (高孔廉).

Chairman Gao Konglian again focused on Mongolia and Tibet's relational position to China and Han people specifically:

As a result of both Mongolian and Tibetan peoples' long and close relationship with Han people, and due to their position in the border region of Mainland China, Mongolian and Tibetan peoples hold a very important historical significance and strategic position within the formation of the Chinese people [zhonghua *minzu*, 中華民族]. (p. III)

In Gao Konglian's remarks, the importance and relevance of Mongolian and Tibetan Studies was derived from the territories' proximity to Han China. Chairman Gao Konglian directly appealed to the notion of a greater Chinese identity by invoking the term *zhonghua minzu*. However, where precisely Taiwan fits into the Commission's conception of Chinese statehood and national identity was not made clear in his remarks. As discussed in Chapter Five, although Lee Teng-hui led the KMT charge on Taiwanization, many serving KMT party members and officials disagreed with this and resisted where possible (Su 2009). In this context, the failure to specify Taiwan's placement within the MTAC's vision of a greater Chinese identity appears purposefully vague and suggests sympathy with the more conservative factions of the KMT.

Rather than define Taiwan's relationship to China, the Commission instead highlighted its own internal transformations since leaving the Mainland:

In fact, the MTAC since it was established in 1928 to today has continuously made great efforts to bring reform to Mongolia and Tibet. Today, striding towards the upcoming 21st century, the MTAC has drafted more important policies, including: carrying forward Mongolian and Tibetan traditional culture, promoting economic and cultural exchange with Outer Mongolia, linking overseas and domestic Mongolian and Tibetan compatriots [*tongbao*, 同胞], guiding Mongolian and Tibetan youth to receive modern education, and conducting works for Mongolians and Tibetans in the Mainland. (p. III)

Instead of distancing the Commission from its Mainland Chinese past, Chairman Gao Konglian chose to draw attention to the congruency between the MTAC's past and present work: bringing reform and development to Tibet and Mongolia. The MTAC was still striving to assert its central role in connecting Han, Mongol, and Tibetan peoples. Unlike texts earlier in the decade, these comments contained limited calls for cross-strait collaboration, while urging the

cooperation of "allied countries" (p. III). As with other texts of the time, the term "Outer Mongolia" was still in use, in line with the enduring official claim to Outer Mongolia.

Finally, Chairman Gao Konglian's remarks made a direct appeal to pluralism, stating that the conference aimed to "examine the relations of Mongolian people and neighboring peoples, and thereby demonstrate[s] the multi-ethnic special quality of the formation of the Chinese people [zhonghua *minzu*, 中華民族]" (p. III). While avoiding mention of the Three People's Principles or any claim of ROC sovereignty over Mainland China, Chairman Gao Konglian's comments in the conference's opening ceremony relied on an ideological framework that overlapped in several key areas with martial law era notions of ROC statehood and national identity.

The notion of pluralism was generally given little prominence during the Commission's transitional era from 1988 to 1999. When it was invoked, it was largely as a tool for asserting a Han-centric vision of Greater China, binding a diverse but backward periphery to a civilized Han core. For a period in the early 1990s, this was intertwined with a Han-centric vision of conciliation and rapprochement with the PRC. Within this framework, pursuing a direct relationship with Tibet and Inner Mongolia was largely overlooked in favor of exchange with the PRC, primarily involving the Han-dominated community there. However, following the post-1994 cooling of cross-strait relations, MTAC constructions of pluralism defaulted to formulaic reiterations of the principles of the Five Nation Republic. It is evident that the imperialist foundations of the ROC's conceptualization of national identity, statehood and, above all, pluralism remained entrenched through the second era. In other words, although muted, the Five Nation Republic approach to pluralism persisted within the MTAC until the end of the millennium. The following subsection discusses the post-2000 emergence of the Multicultural Taiwan approach to national identity and statehood.

7.2.5 An Embrace of What Kind of Multiculturalism?

In the third and final era, the MTAC was re-envisioned as an official body to represent and serve the Republic of China on Taiwan, rather than China as a whole. In essence, the MTAC became a representative of the people of Taiwan in their dealings with Mongolia, Tibet, and other regions, instead of acting as a governing body of the frontier. Four primary themes are evident in this era, ushered in by the election of the first DPP administration at the start of the 21st century. First, there was a flood of direct appeals to multiculturalism and related ideals. Following this, the much-championed bilateral exchange, discussed above and in Chapter Six,

was billed as part of the state's effort to foster multiculturalism. The MTAC presented its promotion of bilateral exchange according to two distinct discursive trends, which constitute the second and third theme of this subsection: the incoming flow of cultural material from Mongolia and Tibet and outgoing professional, technical and economic content from Taiwan. Finally, this section reviews what is absent or neglected in MTAC portrayals of the nation, now centered on Taiwan in its international exchange with Tibet and Mongolia. Particularly notable is the limited acknowledgement of Indigenous, Hakka, and Minnanese voices, cultures, and historical contributions to the building of Multicultural Taiwan, a term now frequently invoked in MTAC publications.

As discussed in Chapter Five, DPP president Chen Shui-bian spoke on his aim to dissolve the MTAC during his first term, but did not manage to accomplish this task, due in part to a partisan split on the issue and his administration's prioritization of localization over de-Sinification. In 2003, Chen himself presided over the foundation of the Tibet-Taiwan Exchange Foundation and signaled the establishment of the NGO as a step towards dissolution of the Commission.[21] Furthermore, the DPP's selection of MTAC chair reflected the administration's general disregard for the organization's specific mission: Hakka scholar Hsu Cheng-kuan was the first pick for chairperson, followed by constitutional scholar and politician Hsu Chi-Hsiung (許志雄); neither nominee had any significant claim to knowledge of or interest in Mongolia or Tibet. Finally, the torrent of direct appeals to multiculturalism began in the final years of the DPP's Chen Shui-bian administration, after the ROC constitution was amended to include an affirmation of multiculturalism in 2005. *Taiwanese Heart, Mongolian Passion* [臺灣心·蒙古情] (2007) was an exhibition catalog produced by predominantly ethnic Han Taiwanese visual artists who had travelled to Mongolia for artistic inspiration, with the resulting collection of pastoral landscapes and a few abstract pieces selected for publication in the volume. In describing the relationship between Taiwan and Mongolia, the text stated the following: "The two countries nature and cultural landscape are utterly different" (2), and consequently, international collaboration would "enrich Taiwan's philosophy of multicultural values" (2). Appeals to multiculturalism subsequently became a permanent feature of MTAC discourse, continuing and even expanding through the following KMT administration under Ma

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[21] Tshering Chonzom Bhutia (2015) "Tibet, Taiwan and China – A Complex Nexus" *The Diplomat*. (November 24, 2015) [online] [Accessed November 11, 2021] https://thediplomat.com/2015/11/tibet-taiwan-and-china-a-complex-nexus/

Yingjeou. However, questions remain as to multiculturalism's meaning and the extent to which the idea was integrated into the work of the Commission.

Mention of multiculturalism extended to discussion of religion as well. The book *Language for Inheritance* [語旨傳承] (G. Liu 2017), which used language to examine the transformations of Buddhism across time and space, included reference to the development of cultural pluralism in Taiwan. Liu tied the spread of Buddhism in Taiwan to democracy and the growth of pluralism. "Since lifting of military rule in 1987, the spread and development of Buddhism has gradually shaken off the state's management. Within religious organizations, charity work, and cultural activities, the development of pluralism and freedom has emerged" (129). Although discussion religion is covered in Chapter Eight, it should be noted briefly here that the free and open practice of religion and Buddhism specifically was an important part of MTAC portrayal of Multicultural Taiwan in the 2000s. This message was especially powerful as it helped tie together Taiwan and Tibet's image, both in their struggle for independence and as victims of Beijing. Furthermore, highlighting the freedom that Taiwan's citizens enjoy compared to the struggle of Tibetans as PRC citizens helped to solidify an image of Taiwan as both distinct from and superior to the PRC.

While frequent invocations of multiculturalism and associated terms, including diversity, pluralism, and multi-ethnic, marked a departure from the previous era, the MTAC refrained from providing a clear definition of multiculturalism. However, it was clear that neither Mongolia nor Tibet were included within the national parameters of the MTAC's institutional location in what was now referred to nearly exclusively as "Taiwan." Through exchange, these regions could contribute to Taiwan's cultural enrichment, but they did not constitute parts of the same political entity. In other words, Mongolia, Inner Mongolia and Tibet were henceforth treated as external to a national self that no longer encompassed Greater China, but was restricted to Taiwan. Furthermore, in documentation relating to these cultural exchanges, the shared histories of the ROC and the Tibetan and Mongolian regions were generally downplayed. In many instances, the differences and distances of each location were stressed instead. In the case of "Rivers and Pastures—The Fine Arts of Inner Mongolia Exhibit" [「父親的草原母親的河」蒙古族文物精品展] (2010), a MAQ report on a visiting art exhibit, a lengthy paragraph was dedicated to describing these differences:

In addition to being covered in diverse landscapes such as hills, basins, plains and high mountains, the ocean island of Taiwan is home to tropical, subtropical, temperate, and frigid, climates. These ecosystems have bred and produced a rich and colorful natural ecology of plant and animal life forms too numerous to count. Moreover, under the torrent of time, Taiwan's various ethnic groups have developed diverse and splendid cultures. When a southern agrarian island [Taiwan] and a northern nomadic frontier [Mongolia] come together to meet each other, not only does this meeting broaden cultural horizons, but it also brings the hope to know and help each other. (8-9?)

After a lengthy introduction of Taiwan's great diversity in both vegetation and human civilization, the passage portrays Taiwan and Mongolia as strangers, with little in common and few shared ties. Interactions with Mongolia may help to increase multicultural awareness, but Mongolia, the place and its people, were not included in the pluralism inherent to Taiwan.

7.2.6 Imports from Mongolia and Tibet

Appeals to cultural exchange were a common feature in passages referencing multiculturalism, for example in MTAC descriptions of imported cultural content from Tibet and Mongolia. MTAC-organized cultural events and exhibits featuring primarily Tibetan and Mongolian fine arts and performances were commonly framed as important contributors to multiculturalism in Taiwan. *Taiwanese Heart, Mongolian Passion* (2007) is one of several exhibition catalogues dedicated to fine arts. The book Deities*, Landscapes, Tibetans, Charm: Tibet of the Past and Present A Photographic Exhibition* 「天、地、人、美、西藏的今與昔攝影展」 (2008) described the MTAC as an organization that "aims to enrich Taiwan's multiculturalism, raise social tolerance of different cultures, and deepen multi-ethnic harmony…" (3). Another volume of collected art works, the publication is a selection of photographs, taken primarily by Han photographers, of Tibet across several decades. The collection's themes, as its title suggests, focused on religious imagery, landscape, and Tibetan people. Similarly, the exhibition catalogue *King Gesar Thangka and Artifacts* 唐卡精品 《台灣巡迴展》圖錄 (2010) also made an appeal to enriching "multi-ethnic cultural content" (p.i).

The text further argued that the collection provided an opportunity to "allow the audience to know Tibetan culture from a different perspective" and "effectively promote cross-strait cultural exchange" (p.i).

Cultural exchange based primarily on visiting performance arts troupes and exhibitions of cultural artifacts remained a key feature of MTAC literature into the 2010s. *The Mongolian and Tibetan Quarterly* (MAQ) journal, an MTAC publication, frequently ran articles publicizing upcoming exchange activities or reporting on the success of recent cultural events hosted by the MTAC. In the article "Rivers and Pastures—The Fine Arts of Inner Mongolia Exhibit" [父親的草原母親的河, 蒙古族文物精品展] (2010, 8), the MTAC posited that the visit of Mongolian art and artifacts offer opportunity to "broaden cultural horizons." Another MAQ article titled "From the Pastures with Love – Tour Performance Given by the Ulanmuchi Troupe from Dalad Banner of Ordos City in Inner Mongolia"「我從草原來—內蒙古鄂爾多斯市達拉特旗烏蘭牧騎歌舞團」巡迴表演 (2012), served as a write-up of the event with the same name. The article stated that the event provides an arena for "the promotion of cross-strait cultural and educational exchange to enrich the multicultural knowledge and understanding of the people of Taiwan" (21).

It is evident from the above examples that in rhetoric featuring the Tibetan and Mongolian contributions to cultural exchange, emphasis fell overwhelmingly on the arts: fine arts (*Taiwanese Heart, Mongolian Passion* 2007; *King Gesar Thangka and Artifacts* 2010; "Rivers and Pastures" 2010); photography (*Dieties, Landscapes, Tibetans, Charm* 2008); and singing and dancing performances ("'Cross-Strait Tibetan and Mongolian Dance Exchange Series" 2010; "From the Pastures with Love" 2012) – with emphasis on traditional dress and religion. Documents prominently featured images, many of which were photographed or drawn by Han documentarians and artists from Taiwan, while touring exhibitions and performances were written about by the MTAC itself. Effectively, exchange imported from Tibet and Mongolia – the former "frontier" regions of the "Five Nation Republic"– were largely concerned with cultural content and often presented through a Han Chinese lens. From this perspective, it is clear that exoticism remained an important aspect of representing cultural imports from Tibet and Mongolia through the MTAC's 21st century publications. For more additional discussion of exoticism, Chapter Eight further investigates the internal orientalism deployed in MTAC visions of Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism.

7.2.7 Taiwan's Exports to Mongolia and Tibet

Representations of Mongolia and Tibet in the context of cultural exchange contrast with the MTAC's representation Taiwan. Taiwan's efforts are primarily presented as related to

dissemination of technical support and 'advanced' knowledge in the spheres of economics, education, medicine, in a word: aid. It is evident that Taiwan has continued to adhere to a developmentalist understanding of modernity in its international aid, identifying some communities or nations as developed and others as less developed. In 2003, the bilingual English-Mandarin text *Introduction to the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission* [蒙藏委員會簡介] outlined the Commission's programs for Mongolia, Inner Mongolia, Overseas Tibetans, and/or Tibet, stating:

> The MTAC "arranges for Mongolian government officials to participate in seminars and workshops or conduct research in Taiwan; providing opportunities for Mongolian youth to learn Chinese in Taiwan; and coordinating the donation of necessities and the decencies required by the Mongolian people with organizations, agencies, and schools." (11)

Notably, the text was written in both English and Chinese, and so the above excerpt is not my own translation. The inclusion of English language also suggests the target of reaching an international audience to display Taiwan's generosity. An example of such a program included *The Judicial Seminar for Mongolian Judges*, held in 2011 and reported in the *MAQ* with the Chinese title 2011 年蒙古法官司法研習班. In the article, the MTAC claimed the program would help provide mutual exchange and development, although only Mongolian judges were selected as program participants. The following year, the MTAC also reported the success of *The Third Police Research Seminar for Mongolian Police* [第三期蒙古警察警政研習班] (MTAC MAO 2012), with twenty participating Mongolian police officers given training at the Central Police University in Taiwan. Through such activities, the MTAC positioned the ROC as an East Asian beacon for dispensing knowledge and best practice in relation to key values held by the international community: the rule of law, human rights, and science-based knowledge. By disseminating related information in English, the MTAC apparently sought to reach an audience in the Anglosphere, particularly the U.S.

Another example of multicultural exchange from Taiwan was the 2004 tour for outstanding overseas Tibetan youths. A collection of the Tibetan and Taiwanese students' essays about their experiences was published in 2005, titled *Zhaxidelei*, 札西德勒, a Chinese translation of

a common Tibetan greeting tashi delek, བོད་ཟམ་ཟ་ཁང་. The text was subtitled *Taiwan's Liberty, Democracy, and Culture Tour for the Outstanding Overseas Tibetan Youths* [海外優秀藏籍青年台灣自由、民主及人化之旅實錄]. While essays from the young Taiwanese participants were also included, the text offered a rare opportunity to read about the MTAC's activities and exchange through Tibetan voices. The program hosted ten overseas Tibetan youths, including several in their mid-30s, toured Taiwan joined by twelve pre-selected Taiwanese youths. Part of the selection process, as reported by the Taiwanese youths, involved being able to articulate in English a solid understanding of Taiwanese multiculturalism, liberty and democracy. Differing significantly from most other outgoing exchanges, Hakka and Indigenous cultures were given some attention, as Tibetan youths were taken to museums and cultural sites that highlighted Indigenous and Hakka contributions to Taiwanese identity and history. Most of the Tibetan youths who contributed essays to the publication explicitly mentioned the long history of the island and the multi-ethnic and/or Indigenous roots of the "local" people.

7.2.8 Indigenous Inclusion?

By the 21ˢᵗ century, the MTAC often made references to Taiwan, and frequently offered descriptions of the island and its peoples, especially when covering issues related to foreign affairs or "mutual exchange" with Mainland China, Inner Mongolia, Tibet, and Mongolia. Aside from a Mandarin-speaking Taiwanese identity, few other cultural or ethnic communities' contributions were showcased in MTAC portrayals of Taiwan. Indeed, despite the introduction of Taiwan-born and without party-affiliation officials as commission chairs throughout in the early 2000s, Indigenous and Hakka cultures rarely made an appearance in MTAC literature. Outside of the tour for overseas elite Tibetan youths, only a handful of other programs documented in MTAC materials mention Indigenous communities, histories, or cultures, while Hakka people and their contributions did not appear at all. This is especially striking considering that Hakka Studies scholar Hsu Cheng-kuan (徐正光) led the Commission from 2000 to 2002[22]. Overlapping with Hsu's tenure, the activities (from 2000-2003) listed in an *Introduction to the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission* (2003) made no mention of

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[22]Academia Sinica Institute of Ethnology (Web Archive) "徐正光 (Hsu, Cheng-kuang)" [online] [accessed November 11, 2021]:
https://web.archive.org/web/20120930012752/http://www.ioe.sinica.edu.tw/chinese/staff/Hsu-cheg-kuang.html

either Indigenous or Hakka cultures. In the nearly 500 programs listed in in the document "Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission Chronicle of Events" [蒙藏委員會大事記], ranging from 2008 to 2017, only 14 events included Indigenous communities or made reference to Indigenous cultures. No inclusion of Hakka or Taiwanese (Southern Min) language, Hakka history, or Hakka culture was mentioned.

Exactly how Indigenous peoples' presentations or participation contributed to the MTAC's message was often unstated. Furthermore, Indigenous voices were often omitted in MTAC records and publications. The resulting rhetorical effect suggests that the value of Indigenous groups lay in their mere existence: in offering living proof of Taiwan's diversity. Of the 14 events which involved Indigenous communities, a handful involved group art performances, wherein both a visiting Mongolian or Tibetan troupe sang and/or danced and a local Indigenous group, unnamed, also performed or showcased a particular fine art. This included an event in April 2011, when the MTAC hosted the National Dance Troupe of the Republic of Kalmykia (an ethnic Mongol majority region) of the Republic of the Russian Federation to perform at the MTAC Centennial Performance Tour Activity. For certain performances, an unspecified Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples performance group joined in. A few years later, in November 2014, the MTAC organized the Mainland Chinese Qinghai Yushu Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Folk Dance Troup Tour Activity: "43 people came to Taiwan to tour, held among five locations, Taoyuan, Jiayi, Taidong, Hualian, and Taipei, while at the same time a Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples' art performance group jointly performed." No explanation about a common theme or justification for the shared stage was given. In essence, the MTAC denied the artistry and agency of these Indigenous performance groups by neglecting to include their names, their group names; to discuss the dance meaning or significance; or offer any word on the thematic relationship between the Taiwanese Indigenous performance and that of the visiting performers. The MTAC's sparse information highlights the only relevant point for the Commission: Taiwan has Indigenous peoples.

However, several other of the limited events specifically mentioning Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples between 2008 and 2017 described events for which Taiwanese Indigenous organizations were among the primary hosts of training seminars as well as professional, civil, and governmental development meetings. This included a November 2011 event titled Members of the National Ethnic Affairs Commission of Mainland China Visit to Taiwan Exchange Activity. MTAC documentation of the event stated only that two members from the National Ethnic Affairs Commission's Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan office met with the

MTAC, the Council of Indigenous Peoples, and the Taiwan Indigenous Peoples Cultural Park Administration. No subject of discussion was given. Similarly, in another event in May 2013, four guests from Sichuan Province's Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures were invited to "discuss [座談] with the MTAC, the Executive Yuan Council of Indigenous Peoples and Taitung's Indigenous Peoples." No further information was provided. However, the May 2014 event *Chinese Mainland Minzu Academy Visit Taiwan for Youth Volunteer Service Exchange Activity* [中國大陸民族院校青年來臺參訪暨志願服務交流活動] offered a few more details, which suggested significant and empowered representation of Indigenous voices. The event hosted 18 visiting youths to 'attend our foreign aid training camp' and then travel to Taichung Heping District and meet with the Taiwan Indigenous Dinavun Development Association [原住民深耕德瑪汶協會] to "observe in the field the promotion of Taiwan's non-government services."

With only 14 of 499 documented activities from 2008 to 2017 involving Indigenous Peoples, it is clear that showcasing Taiwanese Indigenous cultures and history was not a priority for the MTAC during these years. Still, the inclusion of 14 activities marks a dramatic shift from the early 2000s when Indigenous peoples did not feature at all in promotional materials. Moreover, it is notable that in these few post-2009 instances, Indigenous communities, organizations, and governmental bodies are portrayed as among the primary representatives of Taiwan. Several Indigenous bodies, including the Council of Indigenous Peoples, non-governmental organizations, and the Taiwan Indigenous Peoples Cultural Park Administration, were recorded as active participants in the MTAC's bilateral exchange. In other words, these institutions are recognized in the export knowledge and skills on behalf of Taiwan. Remarkably, despite its protected and recognized status with its own Hakka Affairs Council, the MTAC itself made no record of any activities featuring exchange with Hakka people or Hakka representation of Taiwan. It is only through the essays of visiting Tibetan youths that mention of Hakka and Taiwanese (Minnan) culture, history and language appeared in MTAC literature. The MTAC's interpretation of multiculturalism at the time of its closure reflects Chi's (2016, 275) assessment of Multicultural Taiwan more broadly: multiculturalism's boundaries still predominantly reflect and center the culture of the "settler society" or Han Taiwan (for more on Chi 2016 see Chapter Two).

7.3 Discussion

It is clear from MTAC documents that official national ideology made several distinct shifts as part of the ROC's transition away from promoting the Five Nation Republic identity toward a new vision of Multicultural Taiwan. Most obviously, the center of national consciousness as expressed in official discourse moved from Mainland China to Taiwan. This recentering has been well-documented in the broader Taiwan Studies literature (see Chapter One), but MTAC publications reveal what this meant for the ROC's relationship with its former "frontier" regions: Mongolia, Tibet, and other minority nations, including Indigenous Peoples on Taiwan itself. After careful review and periodization of MTAC discourses from 1949 to 2017, a principal question remains: to what extent has the imperialist nationalism of the Five Nation Republic continued into the 21st century and informed the development of Multicultural Taiwan?

The notion of pluralism presented in the Five Nation Republic discourse was ardently paternalistic and Han-chauvinist, with the "frontier" civilizations positioned as the recipients of Han Chinese benefaction (see Chapter Six for more on MTAC discourse of civilizational hierarchy). Conceptual constructions of the Five Nation Republic relied heavily on the Three People's Principles. As part of a greater effort to demonstrate the ROC's right to sovereignty across Mainland China, MTAC texts aimed to showcase the state's knowledge of and care for the frontier communities. Publications frequently referred to the country as "multi-ethnic". A united, harmonious Five Nation Republic was depicted in publications that relied on decades-old records and defunct policies. Inherent in such images of the Five Nation Republic was the presentation of Mongolia, Tibet and other minority nationalities as intertwined with the Han nationality as a super-race, with the frontier nationalities advancing through the care and guidance of the central state's policies (*Frontier Ethnography* 1970; *A Brief Look into the System of Chinese Nationalities* 1968; *Central Government Administration of Mongolia and Tibet Since the Founding of the Republic* 1971).

While far from the focus of most MTAC texts during the period of military rule, Taiwan Indigenous Peoples, referred to as Taiwan aborigines or *gaoshan zu*, made a few extended appearances in the MTAC's cataloguing of the ROC's frontier peoples (A Brief Look 1968; Frontier Ethnography 1970). The rhetorical treatment of the various nations within this group to a large extent mirrored chapters on Mongolians and Tibetans. Emphasis was placed on first proving their place within the ROC's vision of the greater Chinese nation, and then categorizing by ethnicity and detailing ethnic or cultural markings. However, special

condescension was reserved for "Taiwan aborigines", as revealed, for example, in references to their small population. Reference to Taiwan Indigenous Peoples by any name fell by the wayside during the period of democratic transition (1988-1999), as eventually did allusions to the Five Nation Republic and pluralism more generally.

Direct appeals to multiculturalism began to pepper the bulk of MTAC materials after the start of Chen Shui-Bian's second term, but what kind of multiculturalism? While distinct from the Five Nation Republic in name and geographical focus, the ideological conception of Multicultural Taiwan similarly connected sovereignty and legitimacy to claims of a state embrace of diversity and a natural, long-established multi-ethnic co-existence. Although the terms "China" and "the Republic of China" rarely make an appearance in twenty-first century MTAC documents, the Han-chauvinist hierarchical relationship appeared to linger in MTAC positioning of Mongolia and Tibet in relation to multicultural Taiwan.

Cultural exchange between Taiwan and Mongolia and Tibet adopted the pattern of importing rich, colorful, exotic culture and entertainment in exchange for exporting aid, knowledge and skills. Furthermore, Mongolian and Tibetan contributions were nearly exclusively presented through an ROC lens. Mongolia and Tibet were featured in Taiwan artists' largely pastoral paintings and photography. Mongolian and Tibetan exchange visits and performance tours were catalogued and detailed in MTAC publications, most prominently in the journal Mongolian and Tibetan Quarterly. In these documents, both Mongolian and Tibetan contributions to the oft-emphasized bilateral exchange were composed of dance and music performances, as well as historical or cultural artefacts and religious art exhibits. *Zhaxidelei* served as one exception to this general rule, one of the few documents inclusive of Tibetan voices, with a collection of overseas Tibetan youths' essays after their visit to Taiwan.

Meanwhile, the MTAC's portrayal of Taiwan primarily focused on the island's relative development, across economy, governance, democracy, and education. Now re-centered on Taiwan, Tibetan and Mongolian peoples were no longer included within the boundaries of citizenship. Taiwan Indigenous Peoples, who had previously been included as small minority groups on the periphery of the Chinese nation, were portrayed as part of the nation's multicultural tapestry. However, while playing an important role in Taiwan's definition of multiculturalism, lengthy discussion of Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples or other minority cultures were rarely developed in MTAC depictions of Taiwan as a nation. Allusions to Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples, Hakka and Taiwanese ethnic groups mostly did not extend beyond reference to a multi-ethnic history or multicultural present. Importantly, the economic, professional, and political development of Taiwan was implicitly labeled Han Chinese, without

distinction among Hakka, Taiwanese or Mainlander contributions, and with very little incorporation or acknowledgement of Indigenous voices. There were references to a general notion of Taiwan's multi-ethnic society, but often these discussions were accompanied with a larger description of Taiwan's geological landscape, rather than a closer look into culture. To this point, MTAC publications saw only limited incorporation of Indigenous, Hakka, or Minnan cultures and languages. A small portion of live events were described as involving to varying capacities Indigenous voices, but collaborations with Hakka or Taiwanese organizations remained outside the scope of MTAC efforts to represent the ROC in its exchange programs.

7.4 Conclusion

In sum, the MTAC painted twenty-first century Taiwan as developed, democratic, and vaguely multicultural, with its cultural diversity tied to Taiwan's Indigenous Peoples and traced back over centuries. However, Indigenous Peoples' voices within the MTAC, primarily as participants in exchange events, were scarcely heard until Ma Ying-jeou's presidency. Other elements of Taiwan's multiculturalism, championed elsewhere within the young democracy (such as Hakka culture) (Ku 2005; Chang 2015; Dupre 2016), were entirely neglected in MTAC literature. Meanwhile, portrayals of generosity played a key role in official images of Taiwan, with the MTAC showcasing the island's contributions to its underdeveloped and/or oppressed neighbors. These demonstrations of generosity served to further highlight the island's relative political, social and economic development. By omitting specific mention of contributions to Taiwan's development by any Indigenous, Hakka, or other identity, Taiwan's regional superiority was implicitly portrayed as a Han-Taiwanese achievement: eager to distinguish Taiwan from the PRC but not create divisions within a greater Han identity. Thus, despite official re-centering on Taiwan and focus on a different core set of ethnic or national identities, the basic logic for ROC legitimacy remained in essence rooted in a Han-centric claim to benevolent and well-managed pluralism. During the first period under military rule (1949-1987), this logic was embedded in the concept of the Five Nation Republic and served to legitimate the ROC claim to Mainland China. By the twenty-first century, the same core ideal transitioned to offer evidence of the ROC as a leading democratic country within Asia and to legitimate the ROC's statehood on Taiwan.

As discussed in Chapter Six, a clear Han-chauvinist cultural hierarchy and Qing-informed civilizing mission continued to inform ROC conceptions of statehood and identity through the

21st century. This chapter reveals the persistence and transformations of imperialist approaches to pluralism in Taiwan's official approach to multiculturalism through 2017. Although multiculturalism continues to shift and grow to incorporate a greater list of recognized identities such as "new immigrants" (see Kasai 2022), this chapter offers a view onto how conceptions of pluralism and ultimately multiculturalism were contorted over time in the face of changing political contexts and evolved into their shape today. Furthermore, this chapter reveals the lasting influence of Qing imperialism and Han-chauvinism in Taiwan's multicultural national identity today. The following chapter, Chapter Eight, investigates the Commission's shifting portrayal of Tibetan Buddhism, a key political and ideological element in the Qing imperial and early Republican approaches to governance. Chapter Eight traces MTAC writings on the religion, its practitioners and its leader the Dalai Lama.

Chapter Eight: (Internal) Orientalist Visions of Tibetan Buddhism and Its Practitioners

8.1 Introduction

Following examinations of the latent civilizing mission in Chapter Six and Qing informed notions of pluralism in Chapter Seven, I now turn to official portrayals of Tibetan Buddhism. Official recognition and regulation of religion has undergone considerable change in the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC/Taiwan) since 1949. During military rule (until 1987), freedom of expression, including participation in cultural and religious groups and education, was strictly regulated. As part of the transition to democracy, official constructions of national identity have localized, and, with the expansion of official multiculturalism, Taiwan has seen greater religious tolerance (Clart and Jones 2003, Travagnin 2016). With its complex geopolitical history, Tibetan Buddhism has been doubly impacted by the intersecting and shifting official national ideologies in Taiwan. While proselytizing, constructions of temples, and community building within Tibetan Buddhist circles on Taiwan was effectively banned during the period of military rule, with restrictions only gradually softened thereafter, Tibetan Buddhism today enjoys considerable media attention, state support and a growing community of believers across Taiwan (Zablocki 2016, 156).

Despite the restrictions on practice of the religion within Taiwan through the 1980s, Tibetan Buddhism featured to varying extents in the Commission's work throughout its long Taipei-based era. During the Martial Law years, Tibetan Buddhism was mostly portrayed as an exotic religion facing oppression at the hands of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). By the 21st century, however, the Commission was increasingly positioning itself as a champion of Tibetan Buddhism both within Taiwan and abroad, hosting events for Taiwan-based Tibetan Buddhist practitioners. The evolving political context and official framing of the religion therefore raise this question: as the ROC government has promoted more localized conceptions of national identity, along with multiculturalism and religious tolerance, how have the MTAC's portrayals of Tibetan Buddhism and its practitioners shifted?

Historical context is crucial to understanding the narratives informing MTAC discourse on Tibetan Buddhism. Both Manchu Qing and early Republican strategies of governance incorporated Tibetan Buddhism in their management, or attempted management, of Tibet and Mongolia. Tibetan Buddhism was approached through a highly politicized and instrumentalist framework (see Chapter Four for more on Qing perspectives on Tibetan Buddhism). In the

early Republican Era, shortly after the founding of the MTAC, former MTAC chair Shi Qingyang made the following statement on the role of Tibetan Buddhism:

> There is almost no single Mongol or Tibetan who does not believe in Buddhism; their thought and culture all center around Buddhism…. After thousands of years, these bellicose warriors suddenly transformed themselves into benign lamas… with the frontier trouble in the northwest and southwest not only diminishing daily, but the Mongols and Tibetans having all attained gentle and amiable signs… Such a history of Tibetan Buddhism in totally transforming Mongolia, Tibet, and China's frontiers deserves great respect and research. (text and translation from Bulag 2006, 274)

Clearly, Tibetan Buddhism has long been seen by officials as a key ideological tool for preserving the integrity of the Chinese realm. However, much has changed since the KMT's Nanjing years and Taiwan's Martial Law era. Hence, to what degree has a political and instrumentalist approach to Tibetan Buddhism been preserved in MTAC images of the religion, its practitioners, and the region of Tibet?

In addition to analyses of civilizing missions during the Qing, early Republican, and Communist eras (Harrell 1994; Teng 2004; Vickers 2015; see Chapter Two), scholarship has further examined official representations of the internal other in Mainland China. Borrowing from Said's (1978) theory of orientalism, Gladney (1994) framed Communist Chinese representations of "minority nationalities" (少數民族) as a kind of "oriental orientalism," wherein official representations of the nation commodified the minority others to suggest Han modernity and superiority against the primitive minority nationalities. Schein (1997) coined the term "internal orientalism". She highlights internal orientalism's power differential in giving voice to the image producers to generate meaning, while rendering the depicted other "mute" (72). Writing several decades later, Sun and Xie (2020) apply Schein's concept of "internal orientalism" to the domestic tourism industry targeting primarily Han tourists in Tibet today. They find that Tibetan identity has been commodified for the explicit purpose of tourism in Mainland China. Similar to Gladney (1994) and Schein (1997), they highlight the gendered (female), child-like dimensions of these representations, but focus instead on these images' commercial, rather than official, use. Finally, as Wilcox (2016) reminds us, it is necessary to recognize the possibility for change and nuance throughout history. While Wilcox is also focused on the PRC, and thus her concerns about context are specific to the vast territory of

Mainland China, she critiques scholars who she argues have disregarded discrepancies for a simplified conclusion. In essence, ideology may fluctuate in history. While this claim may seem obvious, Wilcox provides ample evidence that her warning is warranted, as the growing body of work on PRC representations of national minorities is overly reductive, with research tending to extend a blanket interpretation across all eras and corners of PRC governance.

However, the PRC is not the only inheritor of ROC "minorities" policy from the Nanjing years; the ROC itself continues to exist on Taiwan. While other chapters in this thesis have examined the extent to which imperialist notions of hierarchical pluralism have informed Taiwan's approach to multiculturalism and the extent to which a civilizing mission persists in the ROC today, this chapter focuses on the exotification of the ROC's former "internal other," and the ramifications of a lingering "internal orientalism" in ROC portrayals of Tibet, Tibetan people and Tibetan Buddhism in particular. Furthermore, heeding Wilcox's call for more rigorous and nuanced scholarship, this chapter seeks to draw attention especially to the fluctuations, terminations, or other alternations to a possible official discourse of "internal orientalism." Questions addressed therefore include: To what degree have the MTAC portrayals of Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism employed an "internal orientalist" approach? How has the "internal orientalist" approach shifted over time? And how have these shifts corresponded to official notions of statehood and national identity? As the ROC increasingly champions itself as the Asian bastion of tolerance, diversity, and democracy to preserve its legitimacy at home and to gain traction in the international community, it is important to investigate the origins and evolution of this narrative and the agendas that have informed it. The following section thus aims to discuss exploration of these questions.

8.2 Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism as Exotica

The core of this chapter consists of four thematic sections covering the primary discursive trends of MTAC representation of Tibetan Buddhism from 1949 to 2017. As with the previous two findings chapters, the following analysis draws on the periodization of MTAC publications established in Chapter Five to trace shifts in the treatment of each theme. The first trend concerns the mystification and exotification of Tibetan Buddhism in MTAC writings. I find that the Commission used descriptions of the religion to bind together the people, place, and (mystical) "spirit" of Tibet. Through an exotifying lens, the Tibetan plateau, Tibetan culture, and Tibetan religion were presented as all indisputably ancient, esoteric, and mystical – even mythical – and ultimately key to the political integrity of China as a whole. Tibetan Buddhism,

its birthplace, and its practitioners were placed on a distant pedestal: as a semi-sacred object to be appropriated and controlled. The second section demonstrates that in the Commission's vision, Tibetan Buddhism was what made Tibet valuable, both politically and culturally, to China, yet simultaneously precisely what rendered Tibet especially vulnerable to Communist oppression and violence. And yet, in the Commission's narrative, the purity and goodness of Tibetan Buddhism was what empowered and inspired Tibetans to fight back against the Communists. This drive for self-determination and the fight to protect the right to faith were consistent themes of Commission discourse from the 1960s to its closure in 2017, intertwined with portrayals of Tibet's democratic martyrdom. The third trend highlights the linkage of Tibet and Taiwan. I show that by the end of the 20th century, images of the Tibetan pursuit of democracy and the fight against CCP oppression were linked increasingly directly and explicitly to Taiwan's own democratization and localization movements. Finally, the fourth section discusses a few instances of MTAC depiction of Tibetan Buddhism and its spiritual leader the Dalai Lama that deviated from or jarred with the other themes discussed here.

8.2.1 Mystical Country [神秘之鄉]

Throughout the first (1949 to 1987) and last (2000-2017) eras of MTAC publications, the MTAC persistently employed an exotifying gaze in its writings on Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism. Few elements of Tibetan life escaped association with Tibetan Buddhism. MTAC impressions of the religion shaped nearly all their writings on Tibetan people and territory. The Commission also emphasized repeatedly the ubiquity of the faith throughout the region, focusing on the unity or uniformity among the Tibetan people bestowed by their shared faith. Extended descriptions of Tibetan Buddhism commonly reflected a reductionist glorification of the religion's goodness and purity. Although this theme was particularly evident during the first period under military rule, the same exotifying discourse was employed with slightly more subdued rhetoric in the 21st century. Notably, during the late 1990s, the idealization and exotification of Tibetan Buddhism briefly dimmed. This short-term phenomenon is discussed in greater detail in the final sub-section of the analysis.

References to Tibetan Buddhism featured in a large variety of publications related to Tibet throughout the MTAC's history. The *Tibetan Mandarin Small Dictionary* [藏漢小辭典] (1959) includes a forward by Li Yongxin [李永新] to its handwritten catalogue of Tibetan words. Li first explained Tibetan language in the context of the ROC: "Our Republic of China

is one country made up of many nationalities, united with one national language [國語國文], which is thus used and cherished by each nationality." Li's effort to situate the Tibetan language as both a minority language and as secondary to the primary universal language, Mandarin, was congruent with early 1960s MTAC writings on pluralism within the ROC (see Chapter Seven). Li then homed in on the uniqueness of the Tibetan language and its cultural contributions to Greater China as evidence of the language's continued merit. "The Tibetan People constitute a part of our Republic of China, and have their own excellent language. Arriving over a thousand years ago, the Tibetan language has made contributions to Buddhism, whose development is well known." In other words, although secondary to Mandarin, Tibetan remained an important cultural product due to its special role in the evolution of religious tradition.

While the *Small Dictionary*'s only focus was language, *Frontier Education* [邊疆教育] (1961) covered a far wider range of topics related to Tibet. *Frontier Education* drew a number of cultural links to Tibetan Buddhism:

The Tibetan people are a people who prioritize religion. The people's life, and all activity, all should correspond with the objectives of religion. If religion is removed from the Tibetan people, then all would become hollow. Thus, here we say that: both the history of cultural education and its [current] system need to center around religion. (53-54)

Here, the text directly stated that "all activity," a Tibetan's entire life, was devoted to religion – without religion, nothing would remain. A few pages later, the text went into greater detail on these "activities". All cultural and artistic productions were religious creations, with religious functions:

The Tibetan people are a people with a great love for dance and theatre. Each locality often has an original version of a religious story that they perform for theatre. Thus, the arts are all very developed, and further deepen the people's belief in religion. The arts ' contribution to education in everyday society cannot be denied. (60)

In the MTAC's view, the arts in Tibet thus not only served as forms of creative religious expression, but also as tools to strengthen the people's faith in Tibetan Buddhism. The arts and

religion permeated "everyday society". Tibetan religion, language, history, culture, customs, and artistic expression were presented as entangled and indistinguishable in the MTAC vision.

Geography as well as traditional notions of place also played a role in the MTAC's portrayals of Tibetan people and religion. In his lecture, published in 1983, MTAC official Hsueh Renyang [薛人仰] introduced Tibet by reviving an old nickname and comparing the region to heaven in the minds of the Han:

In the past, Tibet had a nickname, "mystical country" [神秘之鄉]. Because people [人們] absolutely do not know what heaven is like! So high, so far. Similarly, people also don't know what Tibet is like, just like a wonderland [仙境] on Earth. This is a specialty of Tibet's topography (3).

Addressing an audience he clearly assumed to be Han, Hsueh Renyang stressed Tibet's past unknowability, the plateau's distant heights, and associations of mysticism. Hsueh elaborated the theme of religion, again deploying Han nicknames and associations, while at the same time admonishing his fellow Han for inappropriate use of terminology.

In Tibet, almost 99 percent of residents are all Buddhists. They call Buddhist monks lamas, and thus there are people who call Tibetan Buddhism the lama religion [喇嘛教], but Tibetans are not happy about this. [Tibetans] say that in Inner China [內地], there are believers who leave home to become monks and nuns, so why not call Buddhism the monk religion [和尚教] or the nun religion [尼姑教]? (3-4)

Outside of the lecture's context, educating a Han audience on terminology may be considered innocuous. However, in conjunction with Hsueh's earlier reference to Tibet's relational location (high and far), its mystical nature, and comparisons to heaven and "wonderland" [仙境], the ultimate effect of prioritizing Han (mis)conceptions of Tibetan identity and religion delivers a clear message of exoticism.

In the period of transition, from 1988 to 1999, the focus on Tibetan Buddhism began to fade from MTAC texts. Instead, as I discuss further below, an alternative view of Tibet as an area of historical and political interest emerged. This portrayal was notable for its largely secular focus on contemporary politics, historical power struggles, and the region's relationship with the formation of China. However, by the early 2000s, MTAC representations of Tibet were once again promoting Tibetan Buddhism and particularly its associated visual and performative culture. Accompanied by language reminiscent of the first period of MTAC publishing (1949-1987), the exotification of Tibetan culture and religion was resumed and intensified. Performance, art exhibits and photography collections were key in MTAC demonstrations of its patronage of cultural exchange with Tibet. (For more on the growing role of cultural exchange in the era of multiculturalism, see Chapter Seven.)

The prevalence of a Han gaze remained strongly evident in depictions of Tibet, often with the effect of distancing the (Han) author from her subject (Tibet). In the book *Over by the Foothills is Tibet* [山麓那邊是西藏](2007, 14), Chinese author and activist Mo Li began her collection of writings on Tibet with the following statement: "To think of it is a little impossible [不可思議]. Me, I am a born and raised as a Hunanese who had never had the opportunity to visit such a plateau of mysticism [神秘] and beauty [美麗]" (14). Mo Li explained further, stating that it was not until she met with Chinese exiles in Europe that she began to think about the "Tibet Problem." According to Mo Li, her Tibetan friends had a saying: "it is a kind of special fate [緣分]." She described "fate" as "a kind of Buddhist thought" that communicates the Buddhist's belief that (and here she used quotations) "'everything that exists is fated to exist.'" She concludes," Although I am not Buddhist, I can truly feel it. My affectionate relationship with that piece of land could not have happened for no reason [無緣無故]." Mo's rhetoric was greatly reminiscent of Martial Law-era visions of Tibet as a distant mystical land. Mo's Han Chinese identity was at the forefront of her writing on Tibet, and an essential aspect of how she approaches the so-called "Tibet Problem."

The exotic beauty and mysticism of Tibet were common refrains in a variety of MTAC documents from the mid-2000s on. Write-ups of cultural exchange events included colorful, dynamic photographic documentation of dance and music performances, such as the "Cross-Strait Mongolian and Tibetan Dance Exchange Series – Building a Cross-Strait Platform for the Exchange of the Art of Dance" (2010) published in the *Mongolian and Tibetan Quarterly*

(see image 1 and 2). The article featured several bright and colorful images of the highly stylized folk dance. Dwarfed by the images dominating its pages, the article's text stressed the dance and music performances 'origins as creative productions of Tibetan Buddhism.

Image 1 Second Place in the Tibetan Group Category – "Snow Mountain Drums" [藏族團體組第 2 名 –雪山鼓韻]

Image 2 First Place in the Tibetan Group Category – "Snow Mountain Passion" (藏族團體組第 1 名 – 雪山情)

Similarly, the photo collection *Deities, Landscape, Tibetans, and Charm: Tibet of the Past and Present* [天地人美：西藏的今與昔攝影展] (2008, 3) primarily featured images, with just a few text passages to introduce various sections. The collection's introduction, written by MTAC chair Kao Su-po (高思博) again features reductive portrayals of the Tibetan Plateau's simple and pure culture and landscape, touching on Tibetan Buddhism, Tibetan geography, as well as the larger culture and specific customs of the Tibetan people. The book began with a description of the Tibetan plateau as "of an average height of over 4,000 meters." It continued,

The imposing [雄奇] and glorious [壯麗] mountains and waters and unique ecological environment gave birth to a simple and primitive [古樸] mystical culture. Whether it is the natural scenery or the folk customs, the snow-capped regions of Tibet on display have incomparable charm, gaining the common people's wholehearted exclamations of approval. (3)

In one paragraph, the text included all the major exotifying points commonly used by the MTAC: a charming people in a beautiful and primitive land live a life of simple folk customs. Moreover, while the first paragraph did not touch on religion, the text quickly turned to this theme. Chairman Kao explained that the images in the book demonstrate "the roof of the world's [世界屋脊] landscapes' scenic beauty, the Tibetan people's ancient, enduring history and traditional religion and folk customs." The book's chapters on Deities (天), Landscape (地), Tibetans (人), and Charm (美) were then attached to these ideas. As the title further demonstrates, photographs were pulled from across the 20th century. In language that strikingly echoes a previous era of Han-centric and Mainland-focused nationalism, the photography collection presented an exotic image of Tibet, Tibetan Buddhism, and Tibetan people, all bound together through the MTAC's glorification of the simple charm and mystique of the region, the people and their culture.

Finally, the MTAC's exotifying portrayals of Tibet often played a role in the Commission's greater envisioning of Taiwan's embrace of pluralism. As did both "Cross-Strait Mongolian and Tibetan Dance Exchange Series – Building a Cross-Strait Platform for the Exchange of the Art of Dance" (Vol 29.1) and *Deities, Landscape, Tibetans, and Charm: Tibet of the Past and Present* (2008), the exhibition collection *King Gesar Thangka and Artifacts Exhibition* [康卡精品《台灣巡迴展》] (2010) frames connection with mystical Tibet as a component of Multicultural Taiwan. The introduction to the *King Gesar Thangka and Artifacts* exhibition catalogue followed the common MTAC approach to describing the Tibetan Plateau ("4,500 meters high, with an area of 2.5 million square kilometers, named 'the roof of the world,'" unnumbered page), its climate, before turning to deliver a familiar romanticized account of the religion, customs and lifestyle of Tibetan people. Subsequently, the introduction by MTAC Chairman Kao Su-po (高思博) concluded that the exhibit's distinct spiritual content would "offer the Taiwanese public correct knowledge and understanding of a different ethnic group's [族群] folk culture." Furthermore, Kao wrote, "through promotion of cross-strait exchange and events, Taiwan's multicultural qualities can be enriched, and mutual respect, appreciation, and tolerance furthered" (unnumbered page). Thus, the images of an exotified and conceptually indistinct Tibet, Tibetan people, and Tibetan Buddhism were framed as evidence of the official embrace of Multicultural Taiwan. In other words, exotification of the other – in this case a

previously internal now external other – was a celebrated aspect of Taiwanese multiculturalism in MTAC documents through the 2010s. As such, the exotification of Tibet, Tibetan Buddhism and Tibetan people(s) was a widely employed ideological tool that often overlapped with other discourses.

8.2.2 The Tibetan Buddhist as Martyr

Beginning early in the era of military rule, the MTAC consistently portrayed Tibetan Buddhism as both the key product of value in Tibet and the primary cause of Communist oppression and violence in the region. Furthermore, Tibetan Buddhism was depicted as providing the spiritual means and motivation for the Tibetan people to resist the CCP. The purity and goodness of Tibetan Buddhism in essence made Tibet and its people both more vulnerable and more determined in the face of a shared Communist enemy. Tibetans were summarily cast as martyrs, determined to resist in a hopeless fight against evil. The text *Frontier Education* (1961) described the change in Tibet since the Communists 'arrival:

What had been a peaceful, joyful, and pious Tibet, has become a place of pain, moaning and hatred. All temples have been demolished, and the [traditional] education system of course has disappeared. At the same time, [Tibetan] cultural education policy in the Tibetan region has totally been replaced by conversion to communism as the main goal, and as a result, the educational goals naturally have thrown out religion as a priority. (60)

Communist policy was portrayed as uniformly oppressive, with a primary objective of eradicating Tibetan Buddhism from the hearts of the Tibetans. As a result, Tibetans suffered greatly, and their natural disposition for joy, peace and piety was replaced with nothing but pain.

A vivid depiction of Tibetan martyrdom in the fight to defend their religious practice was presented in the forward of *New Tibetan Cultural Research* [西藏文化的新研究] (Luosong 1963), a translation of Japanese language scholarship from several decades earlier. The introduction was written by Tibetan ROC official Luosang Yixi in 1960, in the months following the violent CCP take-over of Tibet. The text demonstrated that from the 1960s on, Tibetan resistance to the CCP was associated with Tibetan Buddhism. MTAC notions of justice were thus linked to religion, and to be anti-CCP was to be pro-Tibet, which was to be in support

of Tibetan Buddhism. Luosang's penned an impassioned condemnation of CCP actions and heroic Tibetan resistance:

> Thinking about the past three months -- the great resistance put up in Lhasa and the tragedy of the death of the just army [義軍] -- it was truly a case of one soldier falling after the other [前仆後繼], each dashing ahead regardless of the peril. [The Tibetan armies] carried primitive, useless weapons to fight to the death [作殊死戰] against the modernized bandit army [匪軍]; all this for the aim of justice, to defend their religious faith. They would rather die to defend their faith than live under the violent government of the Communist Bandits, and in the end, they did frighten the Bandits into a bad situation, stunning the world. (3)

Luosang painted the Tibetan troops as brave yet primitive, righteous yet doomed, unsuccessful yet inspiring. The Tibetan soldier's piety justified his resistance, and his devotion salvaged his reputation despite his failure. Luosang portrayed Tibetan soldiers as ill-fated heroes, martyrs willing to die for their faith.

Focusing more on the iniquities of CCP oppression, Hsueh's lecture "The Situation in Tibet" (1983) similarly cast Tibetans as righteous victims of Communist violence. Hsueh was primarily concerned with demonstrating the detrimental nature of CCP policies in Tibet, much of which Hsueh linked to the destruction of Tibetan Buddhism. Hsueh's account of failed CCP policy included the PRC's lack of progress in talks with the Dalai Lama, the wrongful installation of the "puppet" local government that replaced him, and the "poisoned thought" taught in Communist curricula (17). The logic of MTAC depictions of Tibetans affected by CCP repression was that Tibetan Buddhists 'great piety accentuated the pain inflicted through destruction of their mystic and holy way of life. This logic was especially demonstrated in Hsueh's lengthy paragraph on the PRC's constitutional [偽憲法] clause to protect the right to nonbelief. Using the pejorative "Communist Bandit" [共匪], Hsueh explained:

> This [clause] is directly pointed at the region of Tibet, where everyone believes in Buddhism. If you call them non-believers, their hearts will knot, and they will think to

themselves: I originally had faith, today suddenly I do not, this is a betrayal of god [神].

Therefore, the Chinese Communists especially emphasize "the freedom to not have faith" as a way to liberate the non-believer's guilty heart, and to teach people to think that their faith in the past was correct, and today's non-belief is also correct. (10)

Hsueh's argument cast the CCP "liberation" of Tibetan Buddhists 'hearts in a negative light, as ultimately destructive of their faith and intended to lure them toward non-belief. His lecture pointed to the corruptive and poisonous influence of the CCP, which targeted Tibetans especially due to their religious piety.

As in the case of the exotifying Han gaze towards Tibet, MTAC literature showcasing Tibetan martyrdom faded away during the island's transition to democracy, giving way to a more secular, political framework for envisioning the region. However, by the mid-2000s, emphasis on Tibetan martyrdom had returned, now associated more explicitly with a righteous struggle for democracy. In line with the previous documents, Mo Li (2007, *Over by the Foothills is Tibet)* argued with passion for the case to understand Tibet and Tibetans as innocent victims of a cruel Communist Party. She describes much of her work as devoted to not allowing "Tibet to die out [死掉]" (44), and identifies the Dalai Lama as a key figure in protecting Tibetan culture from forced Sinicization and subsequent "disappearance without a trace" (47) and in pushing forward for a "peaceful solution to the Tibet Problem" (44).

However, Mo Li's work focused as much on demonizing the Han as on emphasizing the righteousness of the Tibetans, even asking "As Chinese people, can we do something?" (47). She claims:

. . . Only when we [Chinese] and the [CCP] work together to promote respect for Tibetan civilization and give Tibet the opportunity to choose freely, would our Han people not continue to be regarded by the world as destroyers of other civilizations. (39)

Still, her harsh words for her Han compatriots do not alter the fact that her book continues to center Han experience, with its frequent appeals to her concern for the international reputation of Han Chinese. She engages in a form of "Han-saviorism," and thereby retains a Han-centric view of the "Tibet Problem" despite rejecting Chinese claims of sovereignty over Tibet. In one passage, she elaborates at length on the concept of "Tibetan traitors" [藏奸], which she

attributes to her "Tibetan friends". She explains that "once starting discussion on the 'Tibetan traitors' who support the CCP [助紂為虐], who stop at no evil [無惡不作], my Tibetan friends either ridicule and fling abuse [嘲笑謾罵] or gnash their teeth." (287) This hatred for their fellow Tibetans is then juxtaposed with Tibetan feelings for a "good Han": "In contrast, for all supportive, honest and good Han, their hearts are all full of gratitude [心懷感激]." (287)

Mo Li connects Communist, or "Han," oppression of Tibetans to the destruction of the earth and again to the rest of the world's assessment of Han people, while presenting herself as a devoted advocate of Tibetan independence and democracy. Indeed, democracy is an important aspect of Mo Li's book. While she presents the Chinese as, at best, eager to forget their bloody failed attempt at democracy after June 4th 1989, and at worst guilty in their tacit approval of Communist despotism, she argues that the Tibetan resistance movement is democratic:

> If we say that Tibet is a part of China, then it should be counted as China's very first part to implement a democratic system. Now, not only do hundreds of thousands of Tibetans have the right to democratic elections, but also Tibetans within Tibet also have crossed several channels to express their opinions about various policies of the government-in-exile. (283)

Mo Li continues to describe at length the democratic nature of Tibetans and the current Tibetan government-in-exile, highlighting the Dalai Lama's establishment of a representative Tibetan People's Congress [西藏人民代表大會] "only a few months after reaching Dharamshala" (284). Mo praises the Dalai Lama's tolerance for opposition, citing the vocal Youth Party and establishment of the exiles 'Tibetan Communist Party in 1968.

The MTAC relied on portraying Tibetans as martyrs consistently throughout both the 20th and 21st centuries, although towards different ends. Until the last few years before the 20th century (1950-1997), the MTAC showcased Tibetan death and suffering in the name of their religion. Subsequently, in the 21st century, the Commission pivoted to demonstrate Tibetans ' martyrdom in the cause of both religion and democracy. In both cases, these images work to juxtapose the evil of the Communist oppressor against the relative benevolence of the ROC. The next sub-section further explores a third dimension of the MTAC's imagining of Tibet's martyrdom from the 2000s, when visions of Tibet were more directly linked to Taiwan's own struggle for democracy and its perceived oppression by the PRC.

8.2.3 A United Tibet and Taiwan

The linking of Tibet and Taiwan in MTAC discourse emerged more strongly from the mid-2000s, after a decade or so of DPP support for such a linkage. Tibet and Taiwan's shared oppression and mutual goal of democracy was highlighted in many ways the MTAC. In fact, DPP President Chen Shui-bian himself contributed to the MTAC's *International Symposium on Human Rights in Tibet* [西藏人權問題國際研究討會] (2007), and his words were transcribed in the published conference proceedings the following year (2008). MTAC Chair Hsu Chi-Hsiung (許志雄) opened the conference by stating forthrightly that one of its two primary goals was to investigate the "emergence of Chinese cultural hegemony" and "the development of Tibetan Buddhism under Chinese policy controlling religious freedom." (1). Furthermore, Hsu justifies the MTAC and others' involvement by arguing that Taiwan is uniquely suited to host the conference: "Taiwan is particularly prominent in its special role in this Tibetan and Chinese discussion. On one hand, culturally, Taiwan and China have familiar origins [熟悉淵源], but on the other, Taiwan's experience of democratization enables us to understand Tibet's yearning for freedom and human rights." (1) The MTAC thus presented Taiwan as a democratic cousin to China – related but distinct, and united with Tibet.

Chen Shui-Bian spoke more openly about the relationship between the MTAC, Taiwan, and Tibet. Speaking in English, he argued that although Taiwan and Tibet's previous relationship had been limited, this was changing. "As more and more Taiwanese people now recognize that the territory of this country covers only such islands as Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, they are also increasingly aware that Tibet has never been a part of their country." (V-VI) Chen pressed on, emphasizing this point:

I would like to reiterate that, based on the friendship and common interests shared by the Taiwan government and the Tibetan government-in-exile, Taiwan will continue to support the Tibetan people in safeguarding their fundamental human rights and fighting for their right to self-determination. Taiwan will resolutely respect any solution proposed by the Dalai Lama to resolve the Tibet problem. I also hope that the Dalai Lama will accept our invitation to visit Taiwan again, so that we can further strengthen exchange and cooperation between Taiwan and Tibet, and pray and fight together for the peace, freedom, and human rights of the peoples of Tibet and Taiwan. (VII-VIII)

In Chen's speech, Taiwan, Tibet, the Dalai Lama, independence, and democracy all converge to be considered under the same ideological umbrella: independent nations at China's edge striving for righteous democracy and self-determination. Taiwan's government and the Tibetan government-in-exile were placed alongside each other, and portrayed as reaching for the same goal.

Delivered after Chen's oration, Hsu's 2007 speech, also in English, further stressed Tibetan Buddhism's value and its vulnerability at the hands of the CCP. "Simultaneously, China's direct meddling in Tibet's most valuable asset – Tibetan Buddhism—is an attempt to control Tibet." (XIV) Hsu also addressed directly the MTAC's relationship with Tibet and the government-in-exile: "The state under the influence of the KMT's Great China policy has caused a lot of obstructions, misunderstandings, and differences between the MTAC and the Tibetan government-in-Exile." Hsu noted that it was President Chen's leadership that allowed the Commission "to make a new start" (XIV). Chairman Hsu further emphasized the partisan divide over both the MTAC's orientation and general approaches to national identity in Taiwan, and declared a fresh start in front of an international audience. (Hsu had been chair of the MTAC for five years already, since 2002.) Certainly, Hsu's, and indeed Chen's, emphatic support for the Tibetan movement for democracy and linkage of Tibet not to the ROC but Taiwan was distinct from the discourse of KMT literature on Tibet during the Martial Law era. However, much of the supporting discourse around Tibet and the human rights abuses in the region remained steeped in the notion of Tibetan Buddhist martyrdom that arose in the 1960s. Above all, the persistent focus on Tibetan Buddhism as indicator of Tibet's value and vulnerability demonstrated the lasting legacy of imperial Qing and early Republican era notions of a familiar other.

Over by the Foothills is Tibet (Mo 2007) also emphasized the connection between Tibet and Taiwan. As was typical in her work, Mo foregrounds her Han/Mainland Chinese identity, arguing that Taiwan and Tibet, while they "originally had distinct historical, cultural, and ethnic origins," were linked together because "the CCP connected these two dissimilar issues together" as part of a propaganda campaign to malign both separatist movements (19). Mo Li thus requested her "Taiwanese readers" to accept this as evidence of the "the authoritarian nature of the CCP" (19). Mo Li provided an alternative perspective to suggest the connection of Taiwan and Tibet, that places the responsibility on the shoulders of the CCP, rather than on the ROC's DPP or Tibetan government-in-exile.

Finally, texts in the 2010s began to invoke Taiwanese popular interest in Tibetan Buddhism to demonstrate the mutual affinity of the two communities. Liu Guowei (劉國威) (2015) in the book *Inheriting the Old and Introducing the New: The Nyingma Sect of Tibetan Buddhism and its Current Development on Taiwan* [承舊鼎新：藏傳佛教寧瑪派及其在臺發展現況] charted the emergence and growth of Tibetan Buddhism before and after its arrival in Taiwan. In the book's forward, MTAC chair Jaclyn Tsai (蔡玉玲) continued the 21st century pattern of acknowledging past KMT authoritarian rule and the subsequent democratization and embrace of multiculturalism. She explained:

> As Taiwan has become more open and diversified, the society is quite compatible with and contains various religions from different cultural backgrounds. Tibetan Buddhism has been prospering in Taiwan since the 1970s. Buddhist groups of various sects have successively followed by the Dharma Propaganda Center. There are many Tibetan Buddhist monasteries established and even larger. Every year, more than 1,000 people from overseas and mainland Tibetan monks come to Taiwan to promote the Dharma or engage in professional activities such as education and culture, fully demonstrating the vitality of Tibetan Buddhism in Taiwan. (6)

By the 2010s, not democracy but Tibetan Buddhism was featured as the primary shared value bringing Tibet and Tibetan people closer to Taiwan, strengthening Taiwan's newly recognized diversity. Furthermore, Tsai's forward specifically encouraged the proselytization movement and spread of Tibetan Buddhism in Taiwan, writing that the book,

> …combines the joint efforts of our association and domestic Tibetan Buddhism scholars. It is hoped that it can enlighten people in a deeper understanding of the historical and cultural characteristics of Tibetan Buddhism, so as to promote the positive development of Tibetan Buddhism. (7)

The Taiwan/ROC state's interest in and sponsorship of Tibetan Buddhism was reminiscent of early Republican era state sponsorship of traveling Tibetan Buddhist monks and scholars to proselytize within Han communities, a phenomenon discussed by Liu in the book's chapters.

Tsai's introduction thus indirectly established a connection between Republican Era ROC and 2010s Taiwan policy on Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism.

Liu's historical review tells the story of the spread of Buddhism, especially after the establishment of the ROC. His review primarily centers on Han interactions with Tibetan Buddhism, rather than official ROC interactions with Tibet, although he notes the effect of specific ROC and government policies. Liu explains that "after the founding of the Republic of China, the exchanges between Han and Tibetan Buddhism entered a new stage instead, and mutual exchanges and exchanges can be said to have reached another peak" (22). Liu's three main points concern MTAC efforts to promote exchange between Tibetan and Han monks and scholars during the Republican Era, including organization of frontier studies and Tibetan studies, support for Tibetan high monks to proselytize in "Han Communities," as well as implementation of policy for Han monks to visit Tibet. Liu concludes the book with a return to the situation in Taiwan, offering another review of the growth of Tibetan Buddhism since the end of authoritarian rule in 1987. The "spread of Taiwanese Buddhism began to gradually throw off the control of the government, and organized social charity undertakings in the religious groups." Liu further cited the benefits for "local and traditional religions … including folk beliefs and Matsu Buddhism" (113).

While it is clear that Liu and Tsai both condemned KMT military rule on Taiwan as oppressive, the book roots contemporary Taiwanese interest in Tibetan Buddhism in Republican era policy and lauds the work of the MTAC as an organization supporting the growth of Tibetan Buddhism – both in the 1930s and 2010s. Liu's argument effectively suggests a natural and historical modern Han affinity for Tibetan Buddhism, supported by a benevolent government. Accordingly, despite the various transformations of society after the KMT's relocation and re-orientation towards Taiwan, this affinity for Tibetan Buddhism is portrayed as persisting in the hearts of the culturally Chinese people. Once permitted following democratization, the growing following of Tibetan Buddhism on Taiwan was well-received by the state. No longer with the objective of fostering religious-political links between Tibet and Inner China, the ROC thus renewed its patronage of Tibetan Buddhism.

Writing two years later, after another administration change and inauguration of DPP president Tsai Ingwen, *Language for Inheritance* [語旨傳承] (2017), also written by Liu Guowei, examines the various sects within Tibetan Buddhism and their influence in Taiwan. DPP administration nominated MTAC Chair Xu Zhangyao (許璋瑤) wrote the introduction for the book, largely repeating what previous KMT nominated chair Tsai had written two years

prior. She cited the growth of Tibetan Buddhism in Taiwan, the erection of Tibetan style temples, and the steady growth in the number of believers. For his part, Liu also repeats his previous book's assessment of Tibetan Buddhism in Taiwan, connecting its rise to the general "development of diversity and freedom" in Taiwan's "religious groups, charity industry, and cultural activities" (129). Liu pointed to the fact that most Tibetan monks "from the Mainland's Tibetan region" speak Mandarin as a primary reason that "these monks have greater than ever impact on Taiwan's believers." Many of these monks have thus established themselves in Tibet for a decade, or two, or more (148).

Across the DPP and KMT administrations from the mid-2000s until the year of the MTAC's closure in 2017, the Commission's rhetoric showcased the connection between Taiwan and Tibet. During Chen Shui-bian's presidency, this connection was primarily related to democratic struggles on the part of the Taiwanese and Tibet's government-in-exile. Chen promised to follow the Dalai Lama's lead on the Tibet Problem, and pledged Taiwan's support for the justice-seeking leader of Tibetan Buddhism and his followers. Although MTAC chairs nominated by the subsequent KMT administration shifted the focus away from official collaboration, emphasis on the ties between Tibet and Taiwan was nonetheless maintained through a depoliticized portrayal of the relationship. This was constructed through a spotlight on the rise of Tibetan Buddhism on Taiwan and state support for this development. In the final years of the MTAC (2016-2017), the DPP retook the presidency with Tsai Ingwen, but the Tibet-Taiwan connection did not change, with documents continuing to highlight the development of Tibetan Buddhism and exchange with Tibet in Taiwan.

The above three sub-sections have chiefly focused on connecting the first and last periods of MTAC publishing (under military rule and after the election of DPP president Chen Shui-bian, respectively). However, for a brief period falling largely during the transitional second era of the MTAC, from 1988 to 1999, an alternative discourse of Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism dominated the MTAC. The subsequent sub-section reviews official conceptualizations of Tibet during this period that avoided the mystification associated with Tibetan Buddhism, owing in large part to a complex political maneuvering among stakeholders in Mainland China, the Tibetan government-in-exile, and Taiwan. The ROC's complex bipartisan courtship of the Dalai Lama overlapped with both the navigation of an increasingly troubled political relationship with Beijing and the growing economic reliance on the Mainland. These three key factors converged, contributing to the MTAC'S reshaping its portrayals of Tibetan Buddhism as primarily a political force.

8.2.4 Alternative Visions of Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism

For around a decade and a half, Tibetan Buddhism seemingly lost its mystical hold over MTAC portrayals of the Tibetan region and its culture. Tibetan language, history, and folk customs were discussed without great emphasis on the religion or its mystique. In the book *Damu Mongolia and Qing Era Tibet* (1989) [達木蒙古與清代西藏], Yang Jiaming (楊嘉銘) examined the history of the Damu region of Tibet, where many ethnic Mongolians settled. His work focused on the political maneuverings of various Tibetan Buddhist sects, considering only the "secular forces" that competed for political power (3). Yang also avoided mention of the Qing and early Republican narrative relating how Tibetan Buddhism had soothed the savage warriors of Mongolia. Instead, the book focused on military strategy, and concluded with a note on the multi-ethnic Republic's various nations coming together to defend Greater China (see Chapter Seven for more on the theme of pluralism in Yang's work). Here, Tibet and Mongolia's military might is championed over any religious spirituality or goodness.

Tibetan Buddhism's mysticism was also missing from the collection of short stories for children entitled *Agu Dengba's Story* [阿古登巴的故事] by Chen Qingying (陳慶英), published in 1997. In the stories, Agu Dengba was described as an ordinary man of extraordinary cleverness and gifted at trickery. While Tibetan Buddhist beliefs, prayer, monks, and the associated system of government featured throughout the stories, these concepts were not reduced to stereotyped symbols of purity or martyrdom. Instead, some were presented merely as realities for the stories 'characters, and in some cases even as negative influences or obstacles. Tibetan monks were called fat, lazy, and implicitly portrayed as stupid. In one instance, Agu Dengba succeeds in tricking a greedy monk by employing magic beyond the ability of the monk himself. Agu Dengba breaks the rules of Tibetan society, looking out for others or sometimes simply himself, and is repeatedly rewarded for his cleverness. While the stories are old, and some effort was made to highlight the ancient quality of these folk tales, the book went to great efforts to explain some nuances and complicated social expectations of traditional Tibetan culture and society. The beloved "simplicity" of Tibetan landscape and culture embedded in earlier and later MTAC writings was disavowed in favor of portraying the complex and massively unequal Tibetan society of Agu Dengba's time.

Furthermore, in the year before the election of Chen, the Dalai Lama and the religion briefly fell from their holy pedestal. While the discourse of demystification of Tibet within the MTAC persisted from about 1989 to 2004, the presentation of Tibetan Buddhism and the Dalai Lama

as primarily political in nature reached its peak in 1999. The 1990s were characterized by a period of détente with Beijing, and although a relationship with the Dalai Lama was simultaneously pursued from 1994 onward, signals from Washington D.C., Beijing, and Dharamshala were carefully weighed on all sides (Namgyal 2003). After cancelling a second trip to Taiwan in 1998, and publicly pursuing a possible opening for talks with Jiang Zemin (Namgyal 2003), the Dalai Lama drew the MTAC's ire, as evidenced by several documents published in 1999.

The Political Analysis of the Internationalization of the Dalai Lama "Tibet Problem" [達賴喇嘛「西藏問題」國際化之政略分析] (1999) by Yang Kaihuang (楊開煌) confronted the Dalai Lama head on. K. Yang found that the Dalai Lama, described as the "Tibetan people's spiritual leader," had failed in resolving the "Tibet Issue," despite his efforts for internationalization. Furthermore, the document attacks the Dalai Lama and exile groups for making "the tactic of internationalization an end in and of itself." Finally, the document issued a warning, claiming that the Dalai Lama has "overly demonized the CCP's methods," and forgotten the independence movement's "anti-communist nature, to become anti-Han, anti-Chinese." It thus follows that "this is not only inappropriate, [the movement] is dangerous." (unnumbered page) K. Yang's warning represented a 180-degree pivot away from the MTAC's position of fifteen years earlier. Instead of poetically describing the violence and oppression of an evil CCP, Yang instead defends the PRC against the unfair and racist attacks of the Dalai Lama.

Although not as forthright as K. Yang's work, *Tibet's Political Status* [西藏之政治地位], also published in 1999, similarly advanced a political critique of Tibet's history and the influence of Tibetan Buddhism. Discussing the period from the 13th century onward, political scholar Lü Qiuwen (呂秋文) posited the following question: "Traditional Tibetan society and government was in the service of religion … is religion as it was before, in control of the state's operations [in contemporary Tibet]?" He summarized his findings at the end of the book, finding that as "the CCP has ceaselessly continued education reform in Tibet," there has been a decline in "the religion's influence over governance," ultimately "resulting in the greater implementation of various policies." (179) While Lü did not condone the entire record of CCP governance of Tibet, he was adamant in stating that Tibet is "an indisputable part of China," condemned the separatist movement, and consequently argued that Tibetan Buddhism's diminishing role in politics was perhaps ultimately a boon to Tibetan society under CCP

leadership. This is again a remarkable change from previous and later MTAC writings that fiercely condemned CCP policy towards Tibet, and especially the party's violent antagonism towards religion.

By the mid-2000s, however, this alternative discourse of Tibetan Buddhism and the greater Tibetan community had once again been replaced by a Taiwan-oriented but resolutely exotifying view of a mystical and holy Tibet. After the DPP administration of Chen Shui-bian, MTAC discourse witnessed a return to the previous era's Orientalizing discourse of Tibetan Buddhism, only now with a new Taiwan-centered approach. With greater political rapprochement with Mainland China no longer a priority within the independence-leaning administration, an appeal to the already internationalized, exotic and mystical struggle for liberation in Tibet was re-inserted into MTAC depictions of the region. Furthermore, the DPP's push for direct contact with Tibet's government-in-exile and later KMT patronage of Tibetan Buddhism on Taiwan connected the two regions politically and spiritually. The following section discusses in greater depth the transitions and shifting visions of Tibetan Buddhism and its practitioners.

8.3 Discussion

Despite what many scholars consider to be a transformation of Taiwanese society after the democratization and localization movements, 21st-century MTAC discourse on Tibetan Buddhism displayed remarkable similarities to discourse before democratization. Both during the Martial Law era (1949 to 1987) and in 21st century Multicultural Taiwan (2000-2017), MTAC documents employed an exotic vision of Tibetan Buddhism to characterize Tibet and Tibetan people more generally. The territory of Tibet – its topography and geography – was glorified as a scenic landscape of ancient and simple beauty. The Tibetan plateau, in both eras, was presented as distant: distant relative to the subjective gaze of the MTAC, whether notionally positioned as Chinese or Taiwanese. Most importantly, the "roof of the world" was celebrated as the birthplace of Tibetan Buddhism, and the people who lived atop the plateau were portrayed as uniformly devout practitioners. In the words of Chairman Hsu in 2007, Tibet's "most valuable asset," Tibetan Buddhism, was placed on a pedestal, reduced to a singular dimension of mystic wonder, and conflated with people, place, and custom throughout Tibetan communities both inside China and out.

The mystic beauty of Tibetan Buddhism, according to early and late era MTAC logic, was what made Tibet both so valuable to China and so vulnerable to the oppression of the violent

Communists, set on destroying religion. Furthermore, as a righteous people full of joy and peace, Tibetans were doomed to fail against the modern Communist forces. While in the earlier period, MTAC rhetoric predominantly framed Tibetans as religious martyrs, in the 21st century, MTAC publications extended their martyrdom to include the fight for democracy. Ultimately, Buddhist Tibet's fight for self-determination and the Dalai Lama was framed as comparable to Taiwan's own fight for independence under DPP president Chen Shui-bian. While in subsequent years, the MTAC opted to focus on Taiwan and Tibet's spiritual connection, the linkage of Tibet and Taiwan did not disappear. The Commission's sponsorship of Tibetan Buddhism and its championing of the religion's spread and capacity to facilitate exchange with Tibetans (both overseas and Chinese) remained through the third administration change until the closure of the organization. Naturally, the element of Taiwan-Tibet exchange and development of religion on Taiwan was presented as evidence of Multicultural Taiwan's diversity and tolerance – and used by both parties to demonstrate the transformation of Taiwanese society since the end of military rule in 1987.

MTAC publications during both the early (Martial Law era) and later (21st century) periods portrayed Tibet in terms strongly reminiscent of discourse during the early Republican and even the Qing imperial period. Tibetan Buddhism was viewed by both Republican and imperial states as a prized political tool, which without proper management and control could cost the state not only Tibet but Mongolia too. The very existence of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission was in part informed by the role of Tibetan Buddhism in connecting the Tibetan and Mongolian peoples and their independence movements. While it is evident that Martial Law-era images of Tibetans were largely employed to make the case for a rightful return to power on the Mainland, utilization of a narrative of martyrdom and glorified spirituality remained potent in later decades on Taiwan. Just as the Qing, early Republican, and early ROC on Taiwan policies all sought to control Greater China through manipulation of Tibetan Buddhism – with varying degrees of success – 21st century Multicultural Taiwan also manipulated a notion of Tibetan Buddhism to reflect and magnify messages concerning its own national identity.

Through a connection to the internationalized "Tibet Problem," Taiwan could announce its own democratic achievements and highlight its oppression at the hands of the PRC. Taiwan could also signal its generosity (discussed at greater length in Chapter Six) and its respect for multiculturalism (Chapter Seven) and human rights. Although the KMT and DPP administrations in the 2010s backed away slightly from these talking points, the connection to Tibet remained fruitful, as the growth of Tibetan Buddhism in Taiwan suggested in a more

subdued manner the linkage of the Tibetan and Taiwanese people spiritually. Furthermore, the proliferation of Tibetan Buddhism in Taiwan was successful in providing means to distinguish Taiwan from the Mainland: where the PRC repressed Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism, Taiwan embraced them. Still, however much Multicultural Taiwan presented a local embrace of Tibetan Buddhism, the exotifying tradition of rhetoric continued to entangle people, place, culture, and religion, and to highlight narratives of victimization and martyrdom.

However, the Commission's second period, from 1988 to 1999, represents a significant break in the tradition of exotification and romanticization of Tibet. During this time, particularly towards the end of the 20th century, the glorifying lens through which the bulk of MTAC writings had portrayed Tibetan Buddhism was set aside. Following the simultaneous localization on Taiwan and acceleration of cross-Strait economic exchange, Taipei and Beijing began a tricky dance of diplomacy and detente. Tibet was no longer useful for the ROC in its articulation of Chinese nationalism, as the boundaries of the nation itself became increasingly contested within Taiwan. Furthermore, CCP policy in Tibet had entered a short-lived phase of relative tolerance and openness, lasting until at least the end of the 20th century (Baranovitch 2010). Most importantly, while the KMT administration and DPP opposition party both, to varying degrees, courted the Tibetan government-in-exile, all sides, including the Dalai Lama, Jiang Zemin, and Lee Teng-hui, were carefully sending and interpreting signals for future negotiations. While the Dalai Lama visited Taiwan in 1997 (and again in 2001) (Namgyal 2003), he and his government's relationship with the ROC soured briefly after both prioritized their relationship with Beijing over their mutual relationship. After the prospect of talks with Jiang fell through for the Dalai Lama, and the pro-independence DPP gained office unexpectedly in 2000, this alternative discourse was replaced within a few years by a revival of portrayals of mystical Tibet, albeit now modified and centered on Taiwan.

8.4 Conclusion

Tibetan Buddhism throughout Qing and early Republican eras was identified as a key force to maintain the integrity of the bounded territory of Greater China, and both regimes went to great lengths to exert control over the Lamastic system (Crossley 2006; Leibold 2007). Despite being ejected from Lhasa by Tibetan authorities in the same year as relocating to Taiwan, the political leader of Tibet, the Dalai Lama, and Tibetan Buddhism remained a powerful tool in the eyes of ROC leadership, who still dreamed of retaking the Mainland. As the Dalai Lama fled Tibet and the Communist Party seized complete control of the region by the end of the

1950s, the struggle of the Tibetan people against the CCP became, for the KMT, an important symbol of resistance against Communist 'banditry'. Tibet, Tibetan people, and their source of inspiration – Tibetan Buddhism – were seen as useful to the legitimation of Republican claims to rightful sovereignty over Greater China. Images of the plight of the Tibetan people and the destruction of Tibetan Buddhist temples and worship practices were employed by the MTAC to illustrate the injustice of CCP rule and stress the urgency of a KMT return to power on the mainland. This appropriation and commodification of Tibetan people, their religion, and their region as a removed, exotified "other" was employed to deliver messages of to the relative strength, superiority, and modernity of the ROC. Internal orientalism was a fundamental element of official portrayals of Tibetan Buddhism and its practitioners throughout the era of martial law (ending in 1987).

After the end of Martial Law, images of Tibet's martyrdom no longer fit into MTAC narratives, as the KMT pivoted toward a more Taiwan-centric ideology alongside enhanced economic ties with China. In other words, the KMT no longer prioritized proving its right to govern the whole of Greater China as a means of legitimating its rule at home. Although the opposition party and more independence-leaning factions of the KMT, including President Lee Teng-hui himself, courted a relationship with the Tibetan government-in-exile and Tibetan spiritual leader the Dalai Lama, this relationship was, on both sides, carefully balanced against the developing relationship with Beijing. After a well-received visit by the Dalai Lama to Taiwan in 1997 (Namgyal 2003), the relationship was broken off briefly in 1999, resulting in a few documents praising the CCP's handling of Tibet in recent years and criticizing the Dalai Lama for his handling of relations with Beijing. Under this alternative framework in portraying Tibetan Buddhism, the previous era's internal orientalist discourse mutated: while the mystical, exoticism disappeared, deeply embedded notions of hierarchy and ultimately the ROC's right to preside over Tibetan Affairs remained entrenched.

This alternative discourse was quickly dropped, however, and a courtship of the Dalai Lama and embrace of Tibetan Buddhism resumed. In the mid-2000s, under independence-leaning DPP President Chen, the Tibetan struggle was no longer used to emphasize the relative benevolence of ROC rule, but instead served to reinforce condemnation of CCP governance and portray the common purpose of two democratic nations facing PRC aggression. Although the following KMT administration reduced emphasis on the shared struggle for democracy as something linking Tibet and Taiwan, the KMT-nominated MTAC chairs in the 2010s continued celebrating Tibet-Taiwan ties by showcasing state patronization of the development of Tibetan Buddhism on Taiwan and exchange between the two regions. Although the content

of the MTAC's messaging on national ideology, including national boundaries and identity had shifted considerably from the early Republican and military rule eras, the MTAC still employed portrayals of Tibetan Buddhism to articulate these messages. Until its closure in 2017, the MTAC continued to employ visions of the mystical Tibetan Buddhist believer and their plight to highlight the tolerance and multiculturalism of Taiwanese society.

Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight interrogate the MTAC's shifting images and narratives of its former frontier. The separate discussions examine the Qing and early Republican legacies of governance and ideology in MTAC discourses of statehood and national identity, covering questions of a lingering civilizing mission, evolution of pluralism, and deployment of an orientalist gaze. The three chapters converge on the issue of a Han-centric hierarchy and its reformulations to adapt to follow the seismic shifts in the local and regional political landscapes. The following Chapter Nine concludes the investigation by weaving together these disparate analysis chapters to provide a final interpretation of the trajectory of national identity and statehood discourse expressed in the MTAC from 1949 to 2017.

Chapter Nine: Conclusion

9.1 Introduction

Since the end of martial law, civil society on Taiwan has pushed the Republican state to navigate the islands' (difficult) heritage through monuments, historical sites, museums, natural landscapes, and much more (Chiang, Huang, Huang and Xiao 2017). Long-enforced injustices and practices of state violence against Taiwan's residents have started to be addressed with state efforts to embrace pluralism and to extend protection for local identities, many of which faced oppression during the past century's harsh rule under the Japanese colonial government and subsequent KMT authoritarian regime. While scholars may be critical of the extent or exact nature of these policies, research has documented the power of civil society to pressure and guide the newly democratic state towards change across multiple arenas: Indigenous civil rights and autonomy, the women's movement, environmental protectionism, among others (Fell 2018). It is clear that, owing to the blossoming of civil society in Taiwan, the ROC has made great strides towards realizing its constitutionally enshrined goal of affirming multiculturalism.

Within the realm of academia, since the rise of the 21st century, a growing body of research on Taiwan in certain fields has centered the islands' history as colonial subject, to varying degrees highlighting the experience and memory of colonial and/or settler-colonial rule (Chi 2016; Hirano, Veracini, and Roy 2021; Kuan 2016; Shih 2015; Shih 2021). However, while the issue of decolonization after successive colonizing regimes remains a pertinent theme for many researchers, the history of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission and its dismissal, have not been a subject of much study either within academic circles based in Taiwan or elsewhere (apart from the PRC). With aim to contribute to scholarship on the ROC's transition from a Chinese authoritarian regime to the democratic "Multicultural Taiwan," this dissertation explores the neglected history of the MTAC, and the legacies inherited from Qing and early Republican attitudes and practices towards the Chinese "frontier."

Thus, this final chapter discusses the dissertation's overall findings, explaining how each chapter's conclusions relate to each other. To achieve this, I structure the chapter according to the three overarching research questions, attempting to respond to each question with a synthesized discussion of findings identified in Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight. After this initial introduction, the second section explores the first research question: How have political agendas within the ROC shaped the role and status of the MTAC and its propaganda messages? While the previous three chapters discussed findings in relation to overarching themes, in this

final chapter I narrate the shifts in discourse in roughly chronological order, according to the periodization established in Chapter Five.

After providing this narrative overview, I proceed to discuss the other two original research questions, again synthesizing the conclusions of each individual findings chapter. The second question asks: How does the history of the MTAC as an institution illuminate the shifting official conceptualization of national identity in the ROC and its relationship with the PRC and the outside world? To respond to this question, I focus on the MTAC's rhetoric on international relations, public diplomacy, and the Cross-Strait relationship. A fourth section then explores the last of the original questions guiding this inquiry: How has the MTAC helped shape and responded to the emerging discourse of "multiculturalism" in Taiwan, particularly since the advent of democratization in the late 1980s? Here I explore the various ideologies informing official approaches to pluralism as presented in MTAC publications through 2017.

Finally, as I complete this dissertation in mid-2022, the five-year mark of the Commission's closure is fast approaching. After reviewing the dissertation's findings, this chapter thus considers developments in Taiwan since 2017, reflecting on the implications of this study for our understanding of contemporary identity politics, diplomacy, and statehood in Taiwan. This reflection on Taiwanese identity politics five years after the closure of the MTAC serves as a segue into a concluding section that completes the dissertation.

9.2 Shifts in Discourse

This section arranges the findings of the previous three chapters into a narrative of the MTAC's institutional history. The aim here is to provide an in-depth discussion of the findings related to the first research question: how have political agendas within the ROC shaped the role and status of the MTAC and its propagandistic messages? Broken into three subsections, according to the periodization laid out in Chapter Five, the section offers a breakdown of the evolution of MTAC against the background of major political developments on Taiwan. The three primary discursive themes of the dissertation are treated chronologically precisely in order to highlight their complex entanglement with each other and the broader political and ideological context. These themes will then be pulled apart in the subsequent discussions of research questions two and three.

9.2.1 Under Martial Law

The first period of the MTAC largely overlaps with the era of KMT military rule, beginning with the installation of the MTAC on Taiwan in 1949 and concluding with the official end to

martial law in 1987. This era was characterized by the KMT leadership's steadfast claim to rightful sovereignty over Greater China, with little of the KMT's official conceptualization of national identity changing during or after its move to Taiwan. Taiwan was seen as a peripheral island on the edge of a much greater Chinese nation. Chiang Kai-Shek and subsequent leaders maintained ideological adherence to the Three People's Principles, which portrayed the Chinese republic as a multi-national or multi-ethnic family based on the expansive territory inherited from the Qing Empire (Chang 2015). To maintain authoritarian power despite local uprisings and resistance movements in Taiwan, the KMT engaged in the White Terror campaign from the 1940s through the 1960s (Heylen 2011). The KMT's claims to China were largely supported by the international community, with many countries recognizing the ROC as "Free China" until the 1970s, when both individual countries and international organizations alike began increasingly to establish diplomatic relations with PRC. Still, the United States among other countries maintained its support for Taiwan even after switching formal recognition to the PRC.

During the period of martial law, MTAC discourse on national identity was heavily influenced by the notion of the "Five Nation Republic," a construction from the early Republican era modeled on the imperial Qing's "Family of Five Races." Under the Five Nation Republic paradigm, an overt civilizing mission was embedded in the Commission's imagery of a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, and multi-cultural nation. Visions of the frontier's vulnerability to foreign and communist forces demonstrated the need for ROC protection. These images were further strengthened by romanticized portrayals of Tibetan and especially Tibetan Buddhist martyrdom at the hands of the CCP and other menaces. All of these discursive themes reinforced the primary message that the ROC was the rightful ruler of Greater China, an indivisible entity whose whole depended on all of its parts.

The overt civilizing mission in MTAC portrayals of the "frontier" served to justify ROC legitimacy over Mainland China through demonstrating the inferiority of frontier peoples. Under implicitly Han ROC leadership, it was argued that these peoples could be guided towards enhanced development and prosperity. The ROC officially recognized five race-nations or *minzu* within China: Manchu, Hui, Mongolia, Tibet, and Han. Although this recognition was also accompanied with a *yinsu'erzhi* governance doctrine, and strict assimilation was never an explicit objective of the state, MTAC discourse during this era suggested a rigid cultural or civilizational hierarchy at play, with the Han implicitly supreme. Works published during the period of military rule thus emphasized the central government's role in supporting "frontier peoples" to "advance" or develop. Demonstrations of the ROC's

developmental support were supplied through reviews of past programs and policies for social aid, infrastructure development, and expanding access to education. Issues relating to hygiene and health were stressed to underline the extreme shortcomings and cultural backwardness of Tibet and Mongolia, and their corresponding need for the civilizing influence of the (Han-dominated) ROC regime. In contrast to the scientific advancement of comparatively secular Inner China, religious superstition was implicated in the spread of disease and death in these frontier regions, despite the state's best efforts.

The Five Nation Republic approach to pluralism also saw the continuation of projects to extensively codify and categorize the nations and tribes of the ROC. Ethnologies, catalogues of races and regions, and histories of the origins of peoples were important MTAC projects during the martial law era. Mongolian, Tibetan, and other frontier peoples were defined and described in great detail, often relying on data collected before the retreat to Taiwan. These efforts to codify the peoples of the ROC's claimed territory were part of the larger effort to demonstrate the power to name and categorize subject peoples, asserting a legitimate claim to rulership, in a manner typical of imperial states in general (Hobson 1902, ed 2018, Said 1993) and Chinese empires in particular (Teng 2004; Crossley 1999; Leibold 2007). It should be noted that Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples, then referred to as aborigines or *gaoshan zu* [高山族], featured in some MTAC documents during this time. However, Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples, along with other "frontier peoples" or "tribes" outside the recognized historical "nations," were treated with exceptional condescension. These peoples were overtly subject to an expectation that they assimilate or Sinicize, and discussion of specific cultural or linguistic customs was typically prefaced by notes on their small population size or general irrelevancy.

Discussions of the plight of Tibetan Buddhism and the martyrdom of its followers played a key role in illustrating the victimization of frontier peoples by the barbaric and illegitimate Communist regime installed in Beijing, and demonstrating the urgency of a resumption of ROC governance on the Mainland. Portrayals of the religion featured in the majority of texts on the region to showcase the exotic and pure nature of Tibet and its people. Extended descriptions of Tibetan Buddhism commonly highlighted the universal piety of its Tibetan followers, depicted as living literally closer to the heavens on their Plateau. Their love for the Dalai Lama and "joyful," "pious" hearts were portrayed as spurring Tibetans to fight a doomed war against the modern and cruel-hearted CCP. This "internal orientalism" or vision of the frontier as an exoticized other again reinforced assumptions of Han superiority and the need for a restoration of ROC authority. Destined to fail, the tragedy not only of Tibetan deaths but also the

destruction of religious artifacts, educational institutions, and daily customs further emphasized the evil of the Communists and the urgency of an ROC return.

Desperate to retake the Mainland, the ROC leadership on Taiwan clung to early Republican notions of pluralism within an ordered hierarchy, while deploying them in fierce attacks on CCP ineptitude and cruelty. Discourses of national identity during the authoritarian period of KMT rule focused on narratives of a civilizing mission vis-à-vis non-Han peoples on China's periphery. Although the frontier regions were no longer accessible to the ROC state, maintaining a claim to legitimate rule over these regions was considered of paramount importance, and so old data and policies were reviewed and reinterpreted in the Commission's exercises to demonstrate the power to codify and classify all the peoples of the Republic. In these descriptions of the various frontier nations and "passive" tribes, Inner China and Han culture, epitomized by the ROC state, remained central and supreme.

9.2.2 Democratization

The second period ran more or less from 1988 until 1999. The following year, in 2000, the DPP won their first presidential election, marking the start of a new era in Taiwan's politics. However, in the years between the end of military rule and the first administration of the anti-KMT opposition, Taiwan underwent a considerable transformation: embracing democracy and multiculturalism, while extending official recognition to certain local identities so as to legitimate continued ROC governance of Taiwan. Despite moves to reorient towards Taiwan, what Hughes (2016) termed the "China Myth" was sustained through the 1990s, as attachment to a Chinese cultural identity was still considered vital to KMT legitimacy. As the Cold War approach to diplomacy began to fade in the late 1980s and was increasingly replaced by a globalist and liberal approach toward trade in the 1990s, it became necessary for the ROC to give greater precedence to economic considerations in its political maneuverings with the PRC (Hughes 2016). This was reflected in MTAC documents, and by the 1990s, the pejorative "Communist Bandit" label had faded out of use in the Commission's publications.

Although the advent of democracy had opened several channels for dissenting and critical voices to champion inclusion and recognition of diverse identities, including those of Hakka, Taiwanese, and Indigenous Peoples, the MTAC remained dedicated to Han-centric representations of the Mainland's periphery. Images of Tibet and Mongolia during the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s were increasingly employed to signal growing exchange and connection with PRC society, encompassing the academic, cultural, and economic arenas. In the final decades of the 20th century, MTAC documents positioned both PRC and ROC scholars

as key experts in the fields of Mongolian and Tibetan Studies, in the process neglecting Mongolian and Tibetan scholars themselves, particularly those who lived outside of the PRC. The mutual interest of ROC- and PRC-based scholars in Greater China's peripheral regions was framed as an area of commonality that could help bridge the cross-Strait divide, not just academically but politically, economically, socially and culturally.

Furthermore, although pluralism, understood through an imperial lens or otherwise, was set aside in MTAC rhetoric from 1988 to 1999, several elements of the civilizing mission and Han-chauvinist cultural hierarchy remained intact in the MTAC's representations of Mongolia and Tibet. For example, the topic of health, medicine, and hygiene remained relevant to MTAC authors. Although less overtly dismissive of Mongolian or Tibetan medical practices and hygiene habits, late 20th century documents delivered more tepid warnings to Chinese-speaking readers on the limited development of the Mongolian healthcare system and dangers of disease confronting visitors. Meanwhile, texts reviewing former ROC policy in Tibet and Mongolia continued to emphasize Republican benevolence and generosity in fostering development in these frontier regions.

Finally, although maintaining its refusal to recognize the independence of the Mongolian Republic until the 21st century, the ROC embarked on a vacillating courtship of the Tibetan government-in-exile and the Dalai Lama specifically. With both the ROC and the Dalai Lama anxious to avoid angering Beijing, an unstable triangular relationship evolved, marked by a notable falling-out between the Tibetan and Taiwanese sides in 1998 and 1999. This volatile triangular relationship with the Dalai Lama and Beijing was reflected in the MTAC's shift in tone in its depictions of Tibet. The glorification of Tibetan Buddhist exoticism was dropped, as images of Tibet's martyrdom could not serve to further a relationship with Beijing or to bolster KMT efforts reinforce the party's local appeal within Taiwan. When pursuit of a relationship with the Dalai Lama was briefly abandoned in 1998-9, neglect of Tibetan Buddhism and the Dalai Lama in MTAC publications was succeeded by direct criticism, featuring condemnation of the "unreasonable" stance of the Dalai Lama and Tibetan independence supporters in the face of an increasingly accommodating Beijing. But the adoption of such rhetoric was short-lived, and from 2000 there was a reversion to the previous exotification and romanticization of Tibet and its government-in-exile.

The late 1980s and 1990s in Taiwan were a period of rapid transition. Still an important part of the ROC state apparatus, the MTAC weathered an attempt by Indigenous activists to transform the Commission into a commission for all minority peoples in the Republic – particularly those based in Taiwan (Ku 2005). This request was ultimately dodged by

establishing separate councils for Indigenous Peoples in 1996, and later for the Hakka community in Taiwan in 2001. While the Commission's publications addressed a narrower range of subjects, and evinced a friendlier approach to the CCP, key elements of the civilizing mission discourse and notions of a strict cultural hierarchy remained embedded in the organization's work. In a testament to the strong residual significance of the Commission within the ROC's ideological framework, even while the KMT was striving to reorient itself toward a Taiwanese electorate, the MTAC, symbolizing the connection to Greater China, was maintained through to the end of the century. But this line was becoming increasingly hard to sustain, and in the early 21st century began to crumble, first through steps to reorient the MTAC itself toward Taiwan, and ultimately by moves to close the Commission altogether in 2017, marking the end of the third period discussed below.

9.2.3 The 21st Century

Following the election of the first DPP administration in 2000, the MTAC slowly began to change its messaging, beginning with a change in the terminology of nationhood: Taiwan replaced Republic of China in most works published after 2000. This move signaled the Chen administration's abandonment of any claim to the Mainland. Subsequently, after the constitutional amendment to affirm multiculturalism in 2005, appeals to cultural diversity began to heavily season all MTAC documents. By this time, the multicultural approach to national identity in the ROC was no longer a project specific to the DPP, but a bi-partisan effort. While KMT officials tended to employ multicultural images of Taiwan to reinforce the notion of a localized identity centered on Taiwan, Chang (2004) argues that the DPP adopted a "branding" approach to multiculturalism in Taiwan to highlight the distinction between Taiwan and China, as part of their de-Sinicization effort. Moreover, through the 2000s and 2010s, the MTAC pursued relationships both with Mongolia and Tibetan exiles. In 2001, The Dalai Lama was invited back to Taiwan by the sitting DPP president Chen Shui-bian (Namgyal 2003), and the ROC recognized Outer Mongolia as an independent nation in 2002.[23] Appeals to democracy, multiculturalism and bilateral exchange with both these groups outside of the PRC featured prominently in MTAC documents, as well as accounts of exchanges with Inner Mongolia and Tibetan groups within the PRC. This final phase of the Commission's existence was dominated by rhetoric covering international cultural, academic, and economic exchange.

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[23] "Onward to Mongolia" (2003) *Taiwan Today* [online] [Accessed on May 5, 2021] https://taiwantoday.tw/news.php?post=4126&unit=4,29,31,45

Allusions to multicultural identity permeated MTAC publications in the early 21st century, and Mongolian and Tibetan cultures were presented as contributing an international dimension to Taiwanese multiculturalism through mutual exchange. While distinct from the martial law era's Five Nation Republic approach to pluralism, Multicultural Taiwan's ideological construction involved linking state legitimacy to an embrace of diversity and a national narrative of natural, long-lasting, multi-ethnic co-existence on the island. However, assumptions of cultural hierarchy continued to color the Commission's work during its final years. Cultural exchange between Taiwan and Mongolia and Tibet continued to follow the established ROC template: delivering civilization, modernization, and knowledge to peripheralized peoples, who in return provided colorful and exotic cultural entertainment. Mongolian or Tibetan voices were seldom presented in a direct or unmediated fashion, and MTAC publications typically depicted individuals from these ethnic groups engaged in cultural performances. In the much-touted bilateral exchanges, Mongolia and Tibet offered dance and music entertainment, as well as traveling museum exhibits. Meanwhile the ROC, now rebranded as "Taiwan", exported professional training and aid programs. But like Republican "China", Taiwan was assumed to be superior: comparatively modern, developed, democratic, and multicultural.

Moreover, while the MTAC made frequent reference to Taiwan's constitutionally affirmed multiculturalism, minority groups on the island itself made infrequent and insubstantial appearances in MTAC representations of Taiwan. With Indigenous voices featuring in only a tiny fraction of MTAC events by the 2010s, Hakka representation was even less apparent. MTAC documentation indicates only the use of Mandarin, occasionally English, and less frequently Tibetan or Mongolian at events organized under the Commission's auspices. Thus, while the Commission increasingly took care to distinguish Taiwan from China, there was no accompanying move to distance official ideology from established assumptions of Han-centrism in representations of the nation (whether Taiwanese or Chinese). Within the MTAC, Han-chauvinism was still at work in the 21st century official ideation of national identity.

Accordingly, the orientalist approach to Tibetan Buddhism returned to dominate MTAC visions of Tibet and overseas Tibetans, following the return of more cordial relations with Tibet's government-in-exile. Consistent with its embrace of de-Sinicization, the Chen administration resumed the courtship of the Dalai Lama and Tibetan government-in-exile that had been briefly abandoned by the KMT in the late 1990s. During the Chen administration (2000-2008), Taiwan's struggle for existence was conjoined ideologically with Tibet's fight for independence. Both regions were framed as fighting against the yoke of the PRC.

Resurrecting tropes from the era of military rule, in the early 2000s this narrative of pious struggle was further associated with a shared fight for democracy. Through building a connection to the internationalized "Tibet Problem," the ROC on Taiwan also aspired to spread awareness - especially in Europe and America - of its own democratic achievements, its generosity for less developed regions in Asia, and its respect for multiculturalism and human rights. While the subsequent KMT and DPP administrations' picks for MTAC chair opted to champion the spiritual connection between Taiwan and Tibet over any political connection, the exoticizing, orientalist approach to Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism remained. Highly reminiscent of Qing and early Republican approaches to Tibetan Buddhism, 21st century MTAC rhetoric manipulated portrayals of the religion and its followers to articulate ideas of ROC national identity to both a domestic and foreign audience.

Thus, it is evident that the MTAC underwent considerable changes during its long afterlife on Taiwan. However, the lasting influence of imperialist ideologies in the construction of Multicultural Taiwan as expressed by the MTAC suggests limits to the extent to which certain key ideologies were abandoned during the reorientation towards Taiwan and away from Mainland China. Despite championing Taiwan's transition to democracy and embrace of multiculturalism, implicitly imperialist approaches to hierarchy and identity persisted in MTAC discourse. The following section therefore examines the key conclusions that emerge from this narrative summary, in the light of theories of imperialism in general and Chinese imperialism in particular discussed in the literature review chapter (Chapter Two).

9.3 National Identity and Imperialism in the ROC on Taiwan

This section discusses the findings in relation to the second overarching research question: How does the history of the MTAC as an institution illuminate the shifting official conceptualization of national identity in the ROC and its relationship with the PRC and the outside world? The historical background and theoretical framework are brought back into focus here to guide discussion. Specifically, discourses of civilizational hierarchy, pluralism, and orientalism are framed within the history of Qing and subsequent early Republican policies for official identity consolidation and management.

According to Said (1993), imperialism refers to "the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan center ruling a distant territory," and its cultural influence can far outlast direct rule over a particular territory. While the ROC at no time during the period of investigation (1949 – 2017) exercised direct control over any part of Mainland China, let alone

the regions of Tibet and Mongolia, certain ideological legacies of imperialism maintained a powerful grip on official constructions of national identity. This is especially obvious in the MTAC's representations of its so-called frontier during the 20th century. Said notes that depictions of the empire in the metropolis worked to "confirm" authority through a circular logic of demonstrating the right to dominate due to a natural dominance: "we are dominant because we have the power… and they don't, because of which they are *not* dominant; they are inferior, we are superior…" (137-8). Through various political and ideological shifts during its seven decades on Taiwan, the MTAC's published output continued to assert the ROC's superiority and dominance. Documents both showcased the various frontier peoples' backwardness, exoticism, and victimhood (at the hands of *foreign* imperialists), while simultaneously underlining the nature of the ROC as modern, developed, and generous in its earlier social policies, and in later decades, in its sponsorship of international development and protection of human rights.

The ROC civilizing mission, overt through the period of military rule before becoming more subtle at the end of the 20th century and in the early 2000s, informed this discourse of ROC superiority. Osterhammel (2006, 8) defines the civilizing mission as "the self-proclaimed right and duty to propagate and actively introduce one's own norms and institutions to other peoples and societies, based upon a firm conviction of the inherent superiority … of one's own collective way of life." Official national identity in the ROC depends heavily on messages of superiority within its own constructions of cultural or civilizational hierarchy, whether within Greater China or Asia more broadly. This message was critical during the years of military rule to legitimate the ROC's claims of sovereignty over Mainland China, but after the end of martial law and the movement for localization, the civilizing mission discourse did not simply disappear. Instead, it morphed into a narrative of Taiwan's emergence as a leader and exemplar of democracy and modern civilization within Greater China and Asia. Although the MTAC no longer trumpeted policies for provision of infrastructure, education, or medical care in the Republic's backward and culturally distinct frontier regions, an abiding sense of civilizing mission was expressed in celebrations of Taiwanese aid for suffering Tibetan martyrs and the citizens of a newly democratic but still impoverished and backward Mongolia. Mongolians and Tibetans were invited to display their exotic cultures, customs, and traditional arts and crafts in Taiwan in exchange for professional development, economic aid, and government training programs. These exchanges, now billed as instances of multicultural, bilateral exchange, further strengthened the ideal of Taiwan as a tolerant, pluralist, and democratic nation, not only distinct from the PRC, but also a demonstrable leader within the wider East Asian region.

The arena in which the legacy of Chinese imperialism is most evident is in the MTAC's portrayal of Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism. In both the era of authoritarian rule and in the 21st century, an overtly orientalist mysticism characterized most MTAC discourse on Tibet. Tibetan Buddhism throughout Qing and early Republican era rule was framed as an essential tool for binding both Tibet and Mongolia to China, as is evidenced both by policy documents and the official efforts of both states to extend control over the Dalai Lama and the larger Tibetan system of religious governance. After the retreat to Taiwan, the ROC continued to view Tibetan Buddhism as a potent instrument in its struggle to retake the Mainland. Tibet's land, people and culture were all bound together with Buddhism in MTAC writings, with poetic and romanticized images of the tragedy of Tibetan martyrdom in the cause of protecting their religion from the barbaric Communist hordes. Visions of the Tibetan struggle against the CCP, rather than the struggle for independence more generally, and the ruination of religious artifacts and structures were employed both to illustrate the malignity of CCP rule and the inability of the Tibetans to protect themselves. The ROC was thus framed as both a champion of Tibetan freedom and the rightful sovereign of a China encompassing Tibet.

While demonstrating a need to restore ROC authority over Mainland China was no longer necessary by the 2000s, powerful images of Tibetan mysticism were still deemed relevant and useful to the MTAC. In the 21st century, the Tibetan plight was attached to a larger shared struggle for democracy in both Tibet and Taiwan, with Tibetan martyrdom acting as a symbol of the consequence of PRC governance and oppression. While the specific content of MTAC rhetoric on the national boundaries had undergone great change, the MTAC continued to employ portrayals of Tibetan Buddhism, its followers, and their relationship with the ROC to express key ideas about the ROC itself. Indeed, through its last year of operation in 2017, the MTAC continued to exoticize Tibet, highlighting the pious martyrdom of the Tibetan people in order to underline the iniquity of CCP governance, the potential danger this posed to Taiwan itself, and hence the justice and urgency of international calls to protect democratic Taiwan.

9.4 The MTAC's Role in Forming Multicultural Taiwan

The final overarching question investigates the much-championed development of multiculturalism in Taiwan. How has the MTAC helped shape and responded to the emerging discourse of "multiculturalism" in Taiwan, particularly since the advent of democratization in the late 1980s? The notion of a "Five Nation Family," comprised of Han, Manchu, Mongolian, Tibetan, and Hui peoples, had faded by the mid-1980s. Certainly, as Chang's work

demonstrates (2004, 2015, 2021), there was a transformative shift in the ROC's approach to national identity in terms of the portrayal of national territory and of associated peoples and cultures. While Chang also argues that this shift in the ideological borders of the nation encompassed a shift in the fundamental character of national identity, to what extent did the ROC's embrace of Taiwanese (Hoklo) and to varying degrees also of Hakka and Indigenous identities reflect an abandonment of Chinese imperialist attitudes, including Han-chauvinist approaches to pluralism and cultural hierarchy? The previous section has already underscored the persistence of a sense of cultural hierarchy, and indeed, the Han-chauvinism of the "Five Nation Family" paradigm continued to inform official conceptualizations of "Multicultural Taiwan." While previous work has not drawn connections to early Republican and Qing notions of identity, other scholars have noted the persistence of Han-chauvinism through the 2010s on Taiwan. Chi (2016) argues that the common culture in Taiwan reflects little of genuine Indigenous cultures, despite the disproportionate participation of Indigenous Peoples in the movement advocating for official embrace of multiculturalism. With the shared culture, including at the official level, still largely reflecting the culture of the "settler society," Chi's argument thus suggests that Han-chauvinism remains a key aspect of ROC identity on Taiwan.

Furthermore, multiculturalism for decades has continued to play a key role in Taiwan's public diplomacy strategy. Since losing its seat in the United Nations to the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1971, the ROC on Taiwan has struggled to maintain its visibility on the international stage. From the beginning of democratization in the 1980s and the contemporaneous blossoming of the localization movement, Taiwan's foreign policy and public diplomacy has shifted away from insisting upon the island's status as "Free China." Instead, international relations efforts have reflected a domestic emphasis on Taiwan as a democratic and multicultural island nation (Rawnsley 2017). Many scholars have been critical of some of the ROC's representations, particularly in the case of multiculturalism, pointing out inconsistencies or elements of hypocrisy. Hak-Khiam Tiun (2020), for example, sounds the alarm for Taiwan's native languages' revitalization efforts, claiming that the current compulsory mother tongue education course is failing in its objective of language preservation. Moreover, certain research focusing on domestic language and/or education policy has raised questions regarding the nature of the state's commitment to policies scholars argue were motivated at least in part by their international appeal. Jean-Francois Dupré (2019) argues that intersecting international and domestic concerns helped to inform the development of certain language policies, including most notably the Indigenous Languages Development Act

(ILDA), the first piece of legislation in Taiwan to recognize Taiwanese Indigenous languages as national languages.

In essence, these scholars' work suggests that official representations of "Multicultural Taiwan" retained a fundamentally similar utility to that of the "Five Nation Republic" framework: to serve as a propagandistic tool to unify and legitimate the nation at home and abroad. Both approaches to pluralism have prioritized a propagandistic message aimed at legitimating the Republic's existence. The MTAC's own representation of multiculturalism in the era of Multicultural Taiwan (2005 onward) was recentered on Taiwan. However, Han-centrism remained full entrenched in Commission discourse, framing culture on Taiwan as a cohesive unit, with little recognition of specific Indigenous or Hakka cultural contributions to the nation's history. Instead, by omitting the various contributions of specific groups within Taiwan, the MTAC's national narrative presents a unified history dominated by culturally Chinese Taiwanese peoples nonetheless portrayed as politically distinct from China. Rather than working to position the ROC regime as rightful sovereign of Greater China, pluralist discourse in the 21st century aimed to bolster Taiwan's right to exist as multicultural democracy in Asia. In other words, instead of employing a politicized discourse of Chinese imperialism to claim sovereignty over Greater China, the MTAC repurposed some of the old imperialist tropes to showcase Taiwan's relative cultural superiority, diversity, modernity, and democracy as key elements of a legitimating narrative designed to ensure survival under the PRC's growing shadow.

9.5 Five Years On – A View from 2022

Today, in 2022, while walking through Da'an District, Taipei, it is still possible to stumble across the Mongolian and Tibetan Cultural Center (蒙藏文化中心) (MTCC), the public facing museum, archive, and event space originally established by the MTAC in 1993. Currently under the jurisdiction of the ROC Ministry of Culture, the MTCC maintains a limited number of exhibition halls presenting Mongolian and Tibetan cultures. The Center additionally provides many services, most reflecting its original mission, including the dissemination of information on Mongolian and Tibetan culture, care for Mongolian and Tibetan vulnerabilities (關懷蒙藏弱勢),[24] promotion of exchange between Taiwan and Tibet and Mongolia, and

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[24] As part of the MTCC's four "core services" (核心業務), care for Mongolian and Tibetan vulnerabilities is defined as "care and guidance of Mongolian and Tibetan compatriots on Taiwan (在臺蒙藏胞), improve

management of humanitarian aid for Tibetans and Mongolians wherever they reside (MOC 2021). Indeed, despite the on-going COVID-19 pandemic restrictions, the MTCC has once again begun to advertise events for the public on its website. Recent events have included a visiting exhibition from part of the National Taiwan Museum of Fine Arts "Life in-betweeen: Mongolia and Central Asia, a Contemporary Art perspective (複景生活：當代藝術視角中的蒙古及中亞)."[25]

Due to the dedicated building and physical space arranged for the Center, the MTCC is perhaps the most obvious, visible legacy of the MTAC. However, other vestiges of the now defunct Commission persist. After its dissolution in 2017, the primary functions of the MTAC were not entirely disbanded. Instead, the MAC, MOC and MOFA absorbed key responsibilities and resources of the Commission. In addition to the MOC's operation of the MTCC and associated website, the MAC subsumed and continued relations and programs with Tibet and Inner Mongolia. Meanwhile the MTAC's work with Mongolia was reassigned to MOFA (HE 2018). In other words, the former responsibilities of the MTAC are now carried out by prominent government bodies presiding over Taiwan's own cultural affairs, relations with Mainland China, and international diplomacy.

While it is questionable how much influence Taiwan has over the domestic politics of Mongolia, Inner Mongolia, Tibet, or with overseas Tibetans, legacies of Qing and early Republican ideologies have continued to shape official conceptions of national identity on contemporary Taiwan. In 2017, President Tsai Ingwen's closure of the MTAC signified a clear disavowal of the organization as an organ of Taiwan's state apparatus. However, the Tsai administration's repackaging of key MTAC operations under different government ministries suggests that the primary issue at hand was the Commission's role as a symbol of Taiwan's Chinese past and most especially of the ROC state's residual claim to the entirety of the Chinese polity.

Since the dispersal of the Commission's services to the MOC, MAC and MOFA, other studies have suggested a continuation of imperialist attitudes towards official identity on Taiwan, particularly within the field of international diplomacy and foreign aid. As presented in Chapter Six, health and hygiene through 2017 played a significant role in demonstrating

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adaptation to life, as well as provide timely assistance with the social welfare resource network." (MOC 2021) At the time of writing, the website does not make it clear how these services are being provided.

[25] Ministry of Culture. "'Life in-betweens' exhibition showcases modernization challenges of nomadic culture in Inner Asia" [online] [accessed May 25, 2022] https://www.moc.gov.tw/en/information_197_145769.html

Taiwan's relative status as both developed and healthy, by contrast with a putatively diseased and impoverished Mongolia (and to a lesser extent, Tibet). In 2022, in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, images of Taiwan's advanced health care system and coronavirus regulations have become especially prominent in the island's public diplomacy. In their reflections on the 2020 forum "COVID and Governance: Global and Social Solidarity," Po-Han Lee, Ya-Wen Yang, Harry Ji-Jiu Wu, and Wen Liu (2020) discuss the online hashtag #TaiwanCanHelp used by Taiwan officials and government ministries (such as MOFA) in the context of pandemic relief, in part as a bid for entry into the World Health Organization and World Health Assembly. The forum further discussed official efforts to showcase Taiwan's advanced medical care, foreign aid, and superior pandemic policy to argue for inclusion in the WHO and deflect from accusations of racism from Taiwanese officials. That such health- and hygiene-focused discourses continue to be employed to highlight Taiwan's relatively "advanced" development suggests that perhaps some of the ideologies embedded in MTAC rhetoric have survived its demise.

The neglected history of the MTAC and other institutional vestiges of Chinese imperialist notions may thus have real implications for understanding some of the attitudes and beliefs that continue to inform Taiwan's overseas development projects, its foreign policy, and construction of a Taiwanese identity today. The dispersal rather than abolition of the MTAC's tasks and responsibilities prompts a number of questions. To what extent has the civilizing mission discussed in Chapter Six remained entrenched in Taiwan's MAC and MOFA policies directed at China's "minority nationalities" and at Mongolia? In a similar vein, how have the latent, official notions of cultural hierarchy within discourses of Taiwanese multiculturalism, discussed in Chapter Seven, informed the newest wave of Southbound policies and extension of policies for the newly recognized category of New Immigrants? How does the official employment of an orientalist gaze toward Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism explored in Chapter Eight impact the expanding community of worshippers within Taiwan?

Finally, this dissertation engenders one last series of questions on the nature of imperialism and the potential for comparison of imperialist legacies in other former empires or imperial nations. Returning to Ching's (2001) review of Japanese colonization of Taiwan (see Chapter Two), the case for comparison becomes sharper. Ching (2001, 5), speaking about nationhood and identity formation in Japan, underlines the need to examine the "traces of colonial practices, in both their sedimentation and permutation that continue to disrupt the symbolic order of a putatively 'post'-colonial, 'post'-war Japan." (5) Writing about the trajectory of national identity and statehood in the Republic of China, this dissertation has attempted to

investigate much of the same: the traces of imperialist ideology and practice over the decades since the ROC's retreat to Taiwan. Further studies' comparison of Japanese and Chinese imperialisms and their contemporary legacies may contribute to imperialism studies more broadly, to better our understanding of "post"-colonial, "post"-imperial societies' approach to foreign affairs, diplomacy, development, and national identity.

While these questions are ultimately for future research, the dissertation reveals the necessity to consider the implications of official deployment of imperialist attitudes towards peripheralized peoples. This investigation into the neglected history of the MTAC indicates that official identity discourse on Taiwan employed key legacies of imperialist attitudes to demonstrate the islands' right to exist internationally, its superiority in the region for a leadership role, and legitimacy at home.

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