

Notes on Outbound Anaphora with respect to Do So and Do It

大津, 隆広
九州大学言語文化部

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Notes on Outbound Anaphora with respect to *Do So* and *Do It*

Takahiro Otsu

1. INTRODUCTION

The anaphoric relation of referring to an element within “anaphoric islands” may not be such a crucial one in terms of the entire linguistic phenomenon. It must, however, be crucial in terms of the economy or productivity of language, or the flexibility of referential accessibility. “Anaphoric islands”, coined by Postal (1969), refer to a particular aspect of reference; in essence, it is the region that prohibits the anaphoric relation between an antecedent and an anaphor. The anaphoric relation that the antecedent of a referential expression is included within is termed “outbound anaphora”. But little attention, I suspect, has been given to this subject.

From the syntactic point of view, Postal does not permit the anaphoric verb phrase *do so* to have an outbound anaphoric relation with the antecedent. According to Postal, (1)a and (1)b (below) are examples of a “mono-morphemic lexical item”, and (2)a and (2)b are examples of a “derivative”, for outbound anaphora. Whether an anaphoric island is a mono-morphemic lexical item or a derivative does not improve the accessibility of the referent. The italic forms shows a possible anaphoric relation (italics mine).¹

- (1) a *Max wanted to glue the boards together but Pete wanted to *do so* with tape.
(glue=“to *fasten* with glue”)
- b *Max wanted to radio the ship but Pete wanted to *do so* by pigeon. (radio=“to *send a message* by radio”)
- (2) a **Smokers* really shouldn’t *do so*.
- b *People who *handcarve statues* may want to *do so* by machine.

(1 and 2: Postal 1969)

¹ Cornish (1986: 8) refers to the antecedent as the “antecedent-trigger—a class of textually occurring expressions which subsumes those expressions that would be traditionally analysed as ‘antecedents.’” Aside from the advantage of covering all referential phenomena, it is a useful notion in dealing with outbound anaphora in which an antecedent does not, in any strict manner, syntactically co-refer to an anaphor. The anaphoric relations shown in this paper are the ones between the anaphor and the antecedent-trigger.

Before entering into a detailed discussion, it is important to distinguish between the following two ways of extraction: 1) the one as in (1) in which a part of meaning is the antecedent (Constraint E on Postal's classification); and 2) the one as in (2) in which the hearer inferentially reconstructs a referent with a morphological clue (Constraint E').² For the former to make an anaphoric relation acceptable, another pragmatic device such as a contrastive stress is necessary. A detailed discussion of this lies outside the scope of this paper.³ This paper dismisses seemingly artificial anaphoric relations such as (1), which are quite rarely seen in natural linguistic phenomena. Discussion is limited to the second type of outbound anaphora, as shown in (2).

Next, the crucial concept of outbound anaphora must be clarified. Postal simply defines it as the anaphoric relation prohibiting the correlation between an antecedent and an anaphor, and he assumes that typical anaphoric islands are mono-morphemic lexical items and derivatives, as mentioned earlier. But all things considered, anaphoric islands would better be defined as the lexical items which require a cognitive reconstruction from thing to event in the anaphoric process. This is well confirmed by the fact that it includes other data under a consistent explanation.

Contrary to Postal, as we shall see later in chapter 3, Ward, Sproat and Mckoon (1991, hereafter referred to as W, S & M) and Cornish (1986) cite several counter-examples.

- (3) a Mary is a *heavy smoker*—even though her doctor keeps telling her not to *do it* / **do so*.
 b In response to his wife's strenuous objections, Bill isn't much of a *sportscar racer* any more, but he still manages to *do it* / **do so* every once in a while.
 (W, S & M 1991: italics mine)

² The same classification applies to the extraction of a nominal designated as a thing from the antecedent. For further details of such nominal anaphoric islands, see Sproat and Ward (1987), Ward, Sproat and Mckoon (1991) and Otsu (1993).

³ Both (1)a and (1)b are practically unacceptable (italics and capitals mine).

- (1) a ??Whipsnade wants to nail the planks together, but Clamm wants to *do it* with twine. (nail = "to *fasten* with nails")
 b ??Termagant wants to truck her hand-made clothes-pins across country, but Shrew wants to *do so* by telekinesis. (truck = "to *convey* by truck")
 (2) a Whipsnade wants to NAIL the planks together, but Clamm wants to *do it* with TWINE.
 b Termagant wants to TRUCK her hand-made clothes-pins across country, but Shrew wants to *do so* by TELEKINESIS.

(1 and 2: Watt 1975)

In interpreting (1), [fasten] and [convey], which are a part of the meaning [fasten with nails] implied by the instrumental verb "nail" and [convey by truck] implied by "truck," cannot be the antecedents of *do it* or *do so*. When both "nail" and "twine", and both "truck" and "telekinesis" are given a contrastive stress respectively, however, the acceptability will be improved, as is shown in (2). This explanation is more fully developed in Watt (1975).

- (4) a *Picketing* will only be lawful if people are *doing so* outside their place of work.
 b *Users of this car park do so* at their own risk.
 c ... He [sc. Patrick Jenkin, the then Environment Secretary] went on to claim that the allegedly *high-spending* Labour authorities had, by *so doing*, damaged industry and lost jobs.

(Cornish 1986)

W, S & M claim that the proper anaphoric verb phrase for allowing outbound anaphora is *do it* as in (3), while Cornish's examples in (4) demonstrate that *do so* can also make such an anaphoric relation.

In the criticism of W, S & M, there must be considerable doubt as to why *do so* cannot be the anaphoric verb phrase as well as *do it*. What is suggested, one must ask, by Cornish's examples which allow *do so* to refer to an event by a word-internal element. The answer, which is the topic of this paper, will be developed in several stages. First, the discourse-semantic nature of these two anaphors is reviewed. I examine that, as with *do it*, *do so* can also extract an element from an anaphoric island and establish it as a predicate in certain situations. In short, both *do it* and *do so* are, in terms of their discourse property and aspectual value, possible anaphoric verb phrases for constituting outbound anaphora.

2. THE DISCOURSE-SEMANTIC PROPERTIES OF DO SO AND DO IT

The anaphors *do it* and *do so* are generally referred to as predicate anaphors, and accept predicates as antecedents. In this chapter, some discourse-semantic properties of *do it* and *do so* are reviewed.

To begin with, *it* in *do it* can refer to a discrete object or action, or a specific event, rather than a continuing process or state.

(5) A : Does Hiram eat roast wallaby?

B : *No, but Ed does it.

(6) A : Hiram just ate my cookie!

B : No, Ed did it.

(5 and 6: Murphy 1985)

The reason B in (5) can be seen as unacceptable is that the generic present tense in the question shows the indiscreteness of event (i.e. preference for food). The anaphor *did it* in (6), on the other hand, refers to a discrete action "just ate A's cookie," though the possessor is variable; hence, the acceptability of the dialogue (6).

Moreover, the lack of specificity characterizing *do so* as its property means that the anaphor refers to a generic predication.

- (7) ... they (sc. “Declarations”) are performed, normally speaking, by someone who is especially authorized to do so / *do it within some institutional framework. (Cornish 1986)
- (8) A : Why do human beings destroy so much?
B : They do so / *do it because they think only of themselves. (Declerck 1991)

What *do so* focuses on in (7) and (8) is the performing of declarations and destruction by human beings respectively.

In a similar vein, the more accurate interpretation of (9) is that the anaphor designates the generic action of playing the trumpet and not the speaker’s specific action. Hence the unacceptability of *do it* in (9).

- (9) Unfortunately, I can’t play the trumpet. If I had been able to do so/ *do it, I could have joined your hand. (Declerck 1991)

Another factor which helps determine the choice between two anaphors in (9) is the non-committal modality of conditional sentences and negation; in both modal situations any specific action cannot be implied.

Furthermore, because of such a semantic property, *do it* cannot, under normal circumstances, be used to refer to the same kind of action which occurred at a different time and place. This can affect the interpretation of the potential anaphoric relation of (10).

- (10) A : I’ve dropped some sauce on my suit.
B : Never mind, I’ve done it / done so too.

In B, the normal interpretation of *do it* would lead to the implication that he did the same action recently. As a result, since it reminds the participant B of his or her own past action, it can convey B’s own self-examination like “I’ve done such a foolish thing as well.” By contrast, *do so* merely suggests that the action at issue has occurred at a past time. The implication that *do it* refers to an action which occurred more recently than *do so* derives from the general contrast between specificity and generality. If an action can naturally be referred to as a generic one, it means that the speaker has already in the past formed an image of such an action in his or her mind, because a person actually performs an action himself or sees someone else do that action. Therefore, there are two different ways of referring to an action or an event again afterward; one is the reference as it remains specific, and the other is the one as it is generalized. The latter is the reference, one can assume, that presupposes the passage of time.

(11) and (12) further illustrate this same point. In these examples the judgment of *do so* is added to Declerck’s (1991) examples.

- (11) A : Have you spoken to your solicitor?
 B : Not yet. I will do it / ?do so tomorrow.
- (12) A : These people eat caterpillars and locusts.
 B : How disgusting! I would never do so / *do it.

Do it in (11)B suggests that the speaker is intending to speak to the solicitor he or she is acquainted with, or he or she has in mind at the time. In (12), on the other hand, the referent event cannot be the same as the preceding, as the modal auxiliary “would” is present. The action “eat caterpillars and locusts” is presented as a habitual action, rather than a one-time action. Hence the unacceptability of *do it*.

With respect to (13) and (14), it is widely accepted that *so* is more likely to allow so-called “sloppy-identity” reading than *it* is; in the case of *do so*, nominals included in antecedent-triggers can be interpreted as bound variables.

- (13) a John kisses his wife, and then Bill did so.
 b John kissed his wife, and then Bill did it. (Cornish 1992)
- (14) John hates to take his shower before eating breakfast, but his wife actually
 (a) prefers to do so.
 (b) ?prefers to do it.

In the process of interpreting *do so* in (13)a, the hearer reconstructs a new predicate—“kiss one’s own wife”—in the way it corresponds to Bill. The most appropriate interpretation of *do it* (i.e. Bill also kissed John’s wife.) comes from its property of specificity. In (14)a, if the event of taking one’s shower is also true of his wife, it can be understood mentally as “take her shower.” (14)b is somewhat nonsensical because the referent event for *do it* cannot easily be realized in the preceding discourse.

It is often suggested that predicates including different reflexives cannot be replaced with *do so*. However, *so did* in (15)b and *did so* in (15)c (below) refer to the same action, merely corresponding to Barbara. Therefore, in the end, these three sentences have the same meaning.

- (15) a Max criticized himself and Barbara criticized herself.
 b Max criticized himself and so did Barbara.
 c Max criticized himself and Barbara did so too.

The inappropriateness of *do so* is often said to apply to cases involving different time adverbials. However, (16)b and (16)c—where the two actions of the same person or the same actions of two different persons at a different time are described—are entirely acceptable. This is further evidence that *do so* can refer to the event type without being specific.

- (16) a The boy hit the dog yesterday and the girl did so too.
 b The boy hit the dog yesterday and he did so today too.
 c The boy hit the dog yesterday and the girl did so today too.

What has been discussed thus far proves that *do so* serves the function of repeating the type of event that is previously mentioned. Moreover, even tense or an “indexical” expression is not a rigid requirement of anaphoric relations with *do so* (cf. Tanenhaus and Carlson 1990). In general, the difference between the surface anaphor *do so* and the deep anaphor *do it* is the syntactic parallelism of their antecedents, but it is not merely superficial but more abstract one. (17)b serves as evidence of the argument.

- (17) John nearly caught a fish yesterday. Tomorrow he is sure that
 (a) he will (catch a fish).
 (b) he will do so.
 (c) he will do it.

If, for example, the event type of “catch a fish” can be actualized as John’s future action, it is mentally represented as “he will catch a fish”. When the event repeatedly mentioned is of the same person, substitution for *do so* can be allowed even when referring to a different time. The anaphor *do so* is, in certain respects, similar to verb phrase ellipsis. As long as one understands that the same type of action will be repeated by the same person, non-null anaphors will not convey any additional meaning. Therefore, (17)a and (17)b can be interpreted in similar ways. (17)c, on the other hand, implies that he will try hard to catch a fish. *Do so* or verb phrase ellipsis cannot fulfill such an implication.

Compared with *do so*, *do it* requires an agentive interpretation of the referent event in question. Consequently, in the following examples, substituting one anaphor for the other makes each interpretation somewhat absurd.

- (18) a That tree is going to fall some day. I hope it doesn’t *do it* while we’re here.
 b When the tree fell, it *did so* with a loud crash.
 (19) a The car is jerking and wheezing as it’s never done before. I wonder why it has to *do it* on this particular trip.
 b The car jerked and wheezed all through the trip, and it *did so* in spite of Jim’s careful attention to it. (18 and 19: Cornish 1986)

Do it can be more appropriate in (18)a and (19)a, because an animate subject “I”, which is really a non-actor in this situation, is perceiving the tree or the car, which are inanimate themselves, as actors. Such a personifying process does not occur in the speaker’s mind in (18)b and (19)b. Cornish (1986) insists that the progressive aspect in both (18)a and (19)a also helps strengthen an agentive interpretation on the referent event.

Last, Cornish (1992) uses the terminology “accomplishments” to characterize the “events that terminate at a definite end point.” This aspectual value is almost the same as telic, as Comrie (1976) calls it.⁴ Consider now the examples in (20). (The judgment in (20)a is mine.)

- (20) a ... It's very easy to smuggle a note out of prison. Reggie Kray has just managed to *do it* / ? *do so* from high security Parkhurst prison. All he did was pop it in the letter box... (Cornish 1986)
- b Shilton has made more saves this season than any other goalkeeper, and he's *doing it* / ? *doing so* again now.
- c [Michael] Keaton was nervous of playing his first villain. People were telling him he was a big star so he shouldn't *do it* / # *do so*.
- d The Americans have developed a new method of shooting down intercontinental ballistic missiles in space: they *did it* / # *did so* on Sunday.
- e ... So the care for each patient is very tailor-made. And the nurse continually evaluates the care given, updating the system as she *does so* / ?# *does it*.

(b-e: Cornish 1992)

In (20)a, *do it* conveys a telic aspectual value by extracting the referent event denoted by “smuggle a note out of prison.” Although the predication itself is a generic one, the action it refers to in the anaphoric clause is performed by a specific person at a specific time and place. The verb phrase “manage to” appears to serve as a specific reference. In (20)b, the statement referring to “saving a shot on the football goal” can focus on the action by using the progressive aspect and the present tense. The analysis of (20)c leads to the implication that the anaphoric clause refers to a space-and time-bound situation, similar to the one in (20)b. Similarly, in (20)d, the anaphoric predication introduces a specific event which occurs at a specific time in the past—“on Sunday.” The interpretation of *did it* requires that a number of intercontinental ballistic missiles, not just one, were shot. In (20)a–(20)d, *do it* is more appropriate than *do so*: *do so* implies that the same type of event is repeated, and in some cases, it is implied that it will be repeated in the future. (20)e, by contrast, is the example which prohibits the reference with *do it*. It is a generic description about the role of nurses in a hospital. The anaphoric clause is not aspectually telic because no specific time and place is suggested. Hence, the unacceptability of *do it*.⁵

⁴ Comrie (1976: 44) states that “if a sentence referring to this situation in a form with imperfective meaning (such as the English Progressive) implies the sentence referring to the same situation in a form with perfective meaning (such as the English Perfect), then the situation is atelic, otherwise it is telic.” For the telicity test, see Comrie (1976). For arguments that it is incomplete, see Cornish (1992:174).

⁵ Cornish (1986, 1992) uses Comrie's telicity test to see if the examples in (20) are aspectually telic. (20)c, for example, can be telic, because “Michael Keaton was playing his first villain” does not pragmatically entail “Michael Keaton had played his first villain.” As Cornish notices in (20)d, however, the choice between two anaphors depends not on whether the antecedent predicate is consistent with the telicity test, but whether it is assigned the interpretation “performance accomplished” or “performance accomplishable.”

To summarize the discussion above, the event mentioned by the anaphor *do it* is specific and aspectually telic. *Do it* conveys a telic aspectual value, with the interpretation that the referent event has been accomplished or will be accomplished in a specific space-and time-bound situation, which means that the speaker recognizes the event in question as a one-time action. It also illustrates that *do it* refers to a discrete event. The event implied by the anaphor *do so*, on the other hand, is the event type which holds for anyone at any point at any time. In (21), for instance, the speaker states that the same type of action Martin is doing now can hold for his neighbor. This example shows clearly that the expletive *so*, which serves merely as a marker for mentioning the same type of event, can be omitted.

(21) Martin is painting his house. I'm told this is merely because his neighbor did (so).

3. SO-CALLED ANAPHORIC ISLANDS WITH RESPECT TO DO SO AND DO IT

W, S & M (1991) suggest, with the help of some psychological experiments, that the antecedent-trigger for *do so* constitutes an anaphoric island, while the antecedent-trigger for *do it* does not. As a result of those experiments, concerning *do it*, they conclude that whether the antecedent is topical or not (as a pragmatic factor) in discourse has a close relation to the accessibility of the referent event; no morphosyntactic structure affects the accessibility. With *do so*, on the other hand, what affects the accessibility of the referent event is a morphosyntactic factor, as opposed to topicality: that is, the referent event is accessed more easily when it is the preceding verb phrase than when it is nominalized.⁶ This means that the felicity of *do so* requires a syntactic and categorical identity between an antecedent and an anaphor. These data may experimentally support the well-known dichotomy discussed by Hankamer and Sag (1976) that *do it* is classified as one of the deep anaphors, which are pragmatically controlled, while *do so* is considered to be one of the surface anaphors, which require the syntactic parallelism of their antecedents.⁷

Based on the dichotomy between surface anaphors and deep anaphors, W, S & M (1991) explain that reference to an event evoked by a verb that is contained within a nominal is felicitous with the deep anaphor *do it*, but not with the surface anaphor *do so*, as is shown again in (22) and (23):

(22) Mary is a *heavy smoker*—even though her doctor keeps telling her not to *do it* / **do so*.

⁶ The following is a brief explanation of the experimental procedures. They provide four versions of text for *do so* and *do it*, respectively. Each of the four versions can be classified according to whether the antecedent is within a noun phrase or a verb phrase, and whether it is topical or non-topical.

⁷ Mckoon, Ward, and Ratcliff (1993) and Tanenhaus and Carlson (1990) make virtually the same claim. It is worthy to note that the latter suggests that syntactic parallelism influences comprehension times for both types of anaphors, though the syntactic form of the antecedent does not affect the overall understanding of deep anaphors.

- (23) In response to his wife's strenuous objections, Bill isn't much of a *sportscar racer* any more, but he still manages to *do it* / **do so* every once in a while.

In (22), "heavy smoker" constitutes an anaphoric island that prevents *do so* from referring to "smoke (heavily)." In (23), on the other hand, "sportscar racer", as an antecedent-trigger, is an anaphoric island, and makes it impossible for *do so* to refer to "race a sportscar." Their argument which focuses on the morphological representation, however, cannot cover other linguistic data. Even *do so*, in fact, can be the anaphor for outbound anaphora in as many situations as *do it* can, as will be shown later in this chapter. Furthermore, pragmatic factors do not exclusively affect the acceptability of *do it*; the direction of their argument leads us to a wrong conclusion that no pragmatic factor works in the felicity of *do so*. But it does work in a particular situation. They tentatively conclude that *do it* reference to an event evoked by the word-internal element is felicitous on the grounds that it is a deep anaphor.

W, S & M (1991) do not account for the aspect of meaning involved in the felicity of outbound anaphora. In (22) and (23), the referent event that the word-internal element evokes is contained in predicate nominals. Predicate nominals typically have two functions: one is the identification of the referent in the subject position and the other is its characterization. (22) and (23) are examples of the second function. Characterizing someone and focusing on his or her action presupposes having recognized it. In order to say that someone is a heavy smoker, for instance, one must have perceived him or her to be smoking heavily or at least have assumed that he or she was doing such a thing.

Another factor which makes (22) acceptable is the implication of negation. Givón (1978: 109) says, "... negatives are uttered in a context where corresponding affirmatives have already been discussed, or else where the speaker assumes the hearer's belief in—and thus familiarity with—the corresponding affirmative." Negative statements are usually uttered on the assumption that the corresponding affirmatives have already been discussed or at least suggested in the previous discourse, or that the speaker at least assumes the hearer believes them to be true. In (22), it is reasonable to think that the affirmative event (i.e. "smoke heavily") referred to by the anaphoric verb phrase has been discussed in the previous discourse. Such a cognitive process helps facilitate the recognition of the referent event. *Do it* reference is possible in (23), because the verb phrase "manage to" would imply achievement in spite of difficulties rather than a mere activity, and the adverbial "every once in a while" would focus on the transitoriness of the event.

Despite the acceptability of outbound anaphora in (22) and (23), the most crucial problem is why *do it* is the only potential anaphoric verb phrase in those examples. Cornish's (1986) examples provide strong arguments against W, S & M's thesis. Cornish rules out the possibility that *do it* is the only predicate anaphor for outbound anaphora. In (24)–(26), using Cornish's examples, this paper attempted to prove the inappropriateness of the alternative predicate anaphor, and consequently, the use of *do it* turns out to be less acceptable than that

of *do so*. *Do so*, contrary to the examples in W, S & M, is the most appropriate choice of anaphors in the following examples.

- (24) *Picketing* will only be lawful if people are *doing so* / ? *doing it* outside their place of work.
- (25) *Users of this car park do so* / ? *do it* at their own risk.
- (26) ... He [sc. Patrick Jenkin, the then Environment Secretary] went on to claim that the allegedly *high-spending* Labour authorities had, by *so doing* / **doing it*, damaged industry and lost jobs.

Various kinds of syntactic categories constitute anaphoric islands: the gerund in (24), the noun phrase in (25), and the adjective in (26). The following anaphoric process involves placing various kinds of elements in anaphoric islands into an event. *Do it* is marginally acceptable in (24) and (25) when the specificity of each action is implied. But *do so* reference is clearly motivated by the preferable interpretation that the predication at issue is a generic statement: they simply repeat the event type “picket” or “use this car park” in a context in which it is not necessary to mention the doer. The reason *so doing* is exclusively appropriate to use in (26) may be more or less related to the constructive similarity: the arrangement of an adverbial and a verbal element.

What we must explain next is why *do it* is easier to refer to an event than *do so* in (22) and (23) and why *do so* is preferred in (24)–(26). The answer lies in the semantic and aspectual property of these two anaphors. In other words, the factors involved in determining the appropriateness of anaphora for outbound anaphoric islands are exactly the same as the factors involved in determining the accessibility of discourse referents in general. Consider the following examples.⁸

- (27) Most people think *smuggling a note out of prison is very difficult*. But Reggie Kray has just managed to *do it* / ? *do so* from high security Parkhurst prison. All he did was pop it in the letter box.
- (28) His [sc. Michael’s] attorney, Howard Weitzman, accused the father of *extortion*. He had thought that the father must have *done it* / ? *done so* because he was immersed in debt.

The anaphoric predications in both sentences are one-time, goal-directed activities, the accomplishment of which is of considerable importance to the referent of the activity of those two agents. The full interpretation of *do it* in this context depends on the completion of Reggie’s smuggling in (27) and the father’s extortion in (28). It is also facilitated by the use of

⁸ (28)–(34) are modified examples from *Time*.

the verb phrase “manage to” in (27) and the perfective aspect in (28).⁹

On the other hand, when constructed with *do so*, the interpretation of the anaphoric expression results in a homogeneous view of activity. Let us examine the environments where *do so* occurs.

- (29) One-third of right-whale deaths recorded since 1970 resulted from *collisions with ships or accidental entanglement in fishing nets*. The whales could not avoid *doing so* / **doing it*.
- (30) A similar campaign in Britain included *warnings against parental smoking or keeping the baby too hot*. We should continue to *do so* / **do it* each time we hold a seminar on sudden infant death syndrome.

One can easily see that each antecedent trigger is composed of two distinct events. The right-whale deaths described in (29) are understood to be the result of collisions with ships or due to accidental entanglement in fishing nets. *Do so* is exclusively appropriate here, since the framing predicational context of the anaphoric clause is that of a description of the usual cause of death in this particular accident: the mood is generic, the whales at issue being construed generically, not specifically. Similarly, in (30), it is implied that there were several kinds of warnings against at least two serious problems which parents of small children must be aware of. The plural events are comprised under the higher category and this is clearly a result of the fact that each referent event has no definite end point. *Do it*, as could be predicted, is clearly inappropriate in this context, because it would focus on both transitoriness and singleness. Note that *do so* can refer to two events which occurred at different times as if they were a continuous process, since it does not focus on the completion of each event.

Furthermore, (31)–(34) would be more informative because they suggest a typical environment where *do so* occurs.

- (31) *Whale watching* is very expensive. But to *do so* / ? *do it* brings pleasure to many people.

⁹ The situation concerning *do so* and *do it* is more complicated than it might at first appear. For instance, (1) is ambiguous about the choice of anaphors depending on the sequence of discourse given.

(1) *Smuggling a note out of prison* is very easy. Reggie Kray has just managed to *do it* / *do so* from high security Parkhurst prison. All he did was pop it in the letter box.

If we think the same event type applies to Reggie, *do so* is highly appropriate, while if we detect his intention of committing a crime in the second sentence, *do it* is preferred. The way of recognizing the event in question, on the other hand, is not clear enough to decide on the anaphor in (2), probably because the perception verb “see” does not necessarily suggest an intentional activity.

(2) Maybe Jackson is getting his wish of an intimate slumber party. His behavior onstage suggests as much: the infamous *crotch-grabbing* seems spontaneous. In Bangkok on his Pepsi-sponsored world tour, audiences often saw him *do it* / *do so*.

- (32) To watch belugas and killer whales go through their paces, people crowd millions into aquariums and theme parks; and to join *whale-watching* cruises, tens of thousands risk seasickness each year. But more and more people begin to *do so* / ? *do it* to demonstrate ecological awareness.
- (33) The idea that *whale hunting* is a cultural tradition worth preserving no matter what the cost is questionable. Because to *do so* / ? *do it* is also destroying a species.
- (34) Those angry about China's sad human-rights record had constituted *noisy opposition against Beijing's bid*. They *did so* / ? *did it* because they supported Sydney strongly.

In all the examples above, the event type designated by *do so* serves as a topic which will be expanded upon through further information in the following sentence. Moreover, in the process of interpreting the sentences, the event itself has remained generic. In terms of presenting information, reference with *do so* is not of much value, with the discourse referent designated by the anaphors: the anaphor *do so* has an inherent backgrounding role. Even though the referent event is specific in a particular context, reference with *do so* makes it rooted in discourse, because it can satisfy the primary role of anaphors. In that sense, it can be defined as an unmarked reference. By contrast, reference with *do it* in the same context would be more informative than is required. Unlike *do so*, the semantic value of *do it* is the salient event in the current context. Therefore, *do it* is less acceptable than *do so* in (31)-(34).

The predicate anaphors are, whether *do so* or *do it*, typically used to reiterate an idea concerning an event; it is the primary role of anaphors. The reason one intuitively feels that reference with *do it* is more marked than *do so* is that the specific event is referred to as it remains specific. For that reason, *do it* suggests the agent's intentional activity or the achieved activity.

4 . CONCLUDING REMARKS

Concerning Postal's (1969) prohibition of *do so* as an anaphor for outbound anaphora, W, S, & M (1991) investigate the acceptability of *do it*, not *do so*, whereas Cornish (1986) cites several examples that allow *do so* to penetrate into anaphoric islands. However, it is clear from the examples and explanations presented in this paper that both *do so* and *do it* can be the anaphoric verb phrases at issue in terms of the different discourse and aspectual property. These outlooks account for the competing theses of W, S & M (1991) and Cornish (1986).

The approach of this paper has been primarily to focus on the discourse and aspectual property of *do so* and *do it* in order to investigate the distribution of these two anaphors in outbound anaphora. In conclusion, a further remark concerning the difference in the accessibility of these two anaphors in outbound anaphora is offered: as they become distant in position from the discourse referents these anaphors become difficult to access. Considering the sentences discussed in chapter 3, the anaphor *do so* is present in the position relatively near the referent event. It is presumably because it usually serves as a topic before further

information follows. On the other hand, *do it* anaphor can be more easily accessed than *do so*, because the specific event referred to by the anaphor is the salient event established in the context. Even though the particular device to designate topicality is not provided, the difference in accessibility can inherently be present between these two anaphors. My research needs further investigation on this matter.

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照応形 *Do So*, *Do It* に関わる Outbound Anaphora の一考察

大津 隆 広

anaphoric island とは Postal (1969) が指摘した先行詞と照応表現のあいだの照応関係を不可能にする領域のことである。そして、照応表現の先行詞がそうした領域の中にある関係は outbound anaphora と呼ばれる。本来、Postal 自身は統語的観点から do so による語中の要素の照応は不可能であるとする。しかし、Ward, Sproat and Mckoon (1991) では心理言語学的実験をもとに do it による照応であれば語用論的に容認できると主張しており、さらに Cornish (1986) では do so による照応の例が見られる。本論文では、照応形 do so, do it の談話における意味的特質を考察することによって、do it による指示では anaphoric island からの要素の取り出しが可能であり、do so では不可能であるとは一概に言えないことを説明し、2つの照応形が現われる環境を探ることが目的である。

do so が指示する行為は行為のタイプであり、談話において背景としての位置に現われる。一方、do it は特定の行為を指示し、行為の達成までも指示の領域に入れる。