

野村駐米大使日記

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野村駐米大使日記（パートⅢ 3/4） （昭和16年10月2日～11月15日）

三輪 宗弘
Munehiro MIWA

解題Ⅲ

『九州共立大学経済学部紀要』78号では昭和16年10月2日から11月15日までの「野村駐米大使日記」を掲載する。

8月17日に野村大使からローズベルト大統領に正式に手交された近衛—ローズベルト首脳会談は、10月2日に拒否の回答「オーラルステートメント」がハル國務長官から野村吉三郎に伝えられた。日米間の懸案事項（撤兵、自衛権問題、通商無差別主義）が事前の予備折衝会議で調整ができぬかぎり、実現した首脳会談が失敗に終われば、かえって日米の破局をもたらすというのが米国側の説明であった。米国は、その場しのぎの彌縫策では（patchwork agreement）では太平洋に平和・安定をもたらすことはない、と説明した。あわせて日本の国内の不安定性まで持ち出した。日本からすれば「政府部内の統制力」を問題にするのはおかしなことである。松岡外相であれば、これでこじれたであろう。

10月2日の野村日記はハルの言葉を簡略にしか記していない。ハルの主張は、米国外交文書“Foreign Relations of the United States 1941 Volume IV THE FAR EAST”の‘The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan’（494-497頁）から知ることができる。野村日記全般に言えることであるが、野村自身の発言はひかえられており、野村が何を語り、何を主張したのかをおさえるためには米国側文献・資料を突き合わす必要がある。かかる点でも米国外交文書は有益な情報に富んでいる。

日本・米国双方の外交文書に目を通すと、両国とも自国の主張が‘NARROW DOWN’（縮小制限され、争点が後退させられた）と考えている点で一致している。

9月6日の『『帝国国策遂行要領』ニ関スル御前会議』で10月上旬までに日米関係が打開されねば開戦するとの決定を踏まえ、首脳会談を成功させたいとする近衛文麿首相と、他面首脳会

談が不成功に終われば破局を迎えると考えるハル國務長官との間には埋められない溝があった。グルー（Joseph C. Grew）駐日米国大使は本国國務省に日本側（近衛首相、豊田外務大臣）の真摯な態度を打電しているが、首脳会談は頓挫に終わった。10月2日以降も東京とワシントンD.C.で約2週間首脳会談をめぐる話し合いがなされている。日米破局を避けたいとするグループが日米双方に存在したからである。ところで、グルー大使の日記は青木得三氏の名著『太平洋戦争前史第三卷』（学術文献普及会、昭和31年）に引用されているが、グルーと豊田外相とは相性がよかったことが読みとれる。「グルーとホーンベックの差異は一体何に起因し、米国の対日政策に如何に反映したのであろうか」という問、および「なぜ日米交渉の内容を中国、英国、蘭に通報し意見を聞いたのか」という問を歴史に投げかけたいのは、筆者だけではあるまい。

野村は10月14日に米国海軍作戦部長ターナー（Richmond K. Turner）少将の訪問を受けているし、10月16日には駐米英国大使ハリファックス（Lord Halifax）に面会し、日米交渉の大切さと防共駐兵に理解を求めている。Halifax大使と野村との会談は、豊田外相とクレギー駐日英国大使との会談を踏まえて開かれたのであろう。

10月18日の日記では、野村は近衛内閣の総退陣（10月16日）にいたった原因が日米関係の改善が不首尾におわったことであると読み、野村の本国への召喚を外務省に要請した経緯が記され、10月20日には海軍大臣にも辞意を伝えた。中国からの撤兵問題に目途が立たない限り、米国の姿勢は強硬であると書き添えられている。再び10月21日にも東郷茂徳新外相に辞意を表明した。近衛—ローズベルト会談の頓挫、近衛内閣総辞職が野村に辞意を繰り返し表明させるほど衝撃をあたえたことが窺える。実際日米関係は野村の目から見て打開の方途が見出せなかった。

10月27日にはプラット（William V. Pratt）大將が野村を訪問し、日本が北に出るのか、南方に向かうのか尋ね、戦争をせずに、兵力を温存した方が日本の国益であると野村に指摘したことが刻まれている。

11月4日に来栖特命大使が派遣されたが、11月には急速に日米関係が悪化していることがわかる。グルー大使が11月6日に米国に送った報告書 ‘an authentic report’ は、日本が戦争の準備に入ったという刺激的なものであった。対英米蘭開戦を決定した11月6日の第7回御前会議が筒抜けに抜けたことがわかる。親日家の郵政長官Walkerがこのころ頻繁に野村を訪問している。Walkerの訪問の目的は日米関係を憂慮したのと、日本の動向をさぐることの二点にあったのではなかろうか。

グルーの11月6日の報告書を受けて、米国側がますます態度を硬化させていったことは想像に難くない。そうであれば日米開戦を決めたのは11月26日に掲示されたハルノートではなく、11月6日の御前会議という解釈もできる。国家の存亡にかかわる決定が漏れ米国の強硬策を誘因したという、情報管理の杜撰さが問われなければならない。

日本は甲案乙案を提示して、日米関係はいよいよ最終段階を向かえていく。この点は紙幅が許せば次回に触れたい。

Ambassador NOMURA' Diary

October 2 ~ November 15

Thursday, October 2, 1941

No. 889

Visit to Secretary of State Hull

At 9 a.m. on October 2 (Thursday) I called on Secretary of State Hull at the other party' s request. Hull handed to me a document, as per telegram No. 890 and stated that the U.S. Government considered it dangerous to hold the meeting of the leaders of the two countries without reaching a preliminary understanding, that "a patched-up understanding" would be unsatisfactory, and that a "clear-cut agreement" would be necessary for maintaining peace in the whole Pacific. After replying that, though I knew very well Tokyo would be disappointed with this reply, I would transmit it anyway, I withdrew.

(Dispatched, 2 p.m., the 2nd.)

Friday, October 3

Called on the Secretary of State and made representations on matters relating to the docking of incoming vessels and the use of funds in South America for purchasing oil.

(Wired home today as per No. 898.)

Saturday, October 4, 1941

No. 911

Representation of Opinion

(Dispatched, October 4)

It is my greatest pleasure to tell you that I am excited with boundless joy supposing your efforts and cares day and night since you had an Imperial appointment and on the other hand, I regret to say that things have not gone on as I had expected.

Now, I must apologize for sending you my imperfect opinion yesterday in a hurry and beg you will be kind enough to excuse me and consider it as an act motivated by patriotism in view of the pressing emergencies.

Further, I think it quite necessary for Japan to effect a drastic reform in her economic life if she is to achieve self-sufficiency within the present co-prosperity sphere. I imagine that this is really a very difficult problem. I do not know to what extent we shall

be able to surmount the difficulties when we advance northward, but I am sure that when we advance southward, there is a great possibility of our obtaining a certain advantage several years after the advance. However, if we do so, we must be prepared to fight against Britain and America in the Pacific while further expanding our battle line during the China affair and we should expect nothing less than a protracted war. Such being the case, it is not a question that can be readily solved, I suppose.

Since this my observation is based on the limited information that I have obtained here, I cannot but hope that you will decide by degrees the questions of readjustment of international relations and of national development, after considering the advantages and disadvantages, without making a hasty conclusion in regard to war or peace. (In regard to the question of China, for example, you might try direct negotiations with Chungking if you want to obtain conditions to which America would agree.)

I hereby wire you my foregoing opinion again for your information.

(Dispatched, Saturday, October 4, 1:00 p.m.)

No. 915

Interview with Hull

Accompanied by OBATA, I called on Hull at 9:00 today (October 9). In accordance with your successive instructions, I referred to the conversations at the White House on September 3 and tried to confirm his opinion. He repeatedly said that the non-discrimination principle should be applied to the whole Pacific area and that geographical adjacence, etc., could be interpreted in various ways. Anyhow, he said that he would reply in detail through Valentine and others, after studying the document. (In the afternoon, Hamilton, Valentine, and Schmidt called on me.)

And again, I urged him to reconsider the matter, giving him a detailed description of China in respect to her administration, finance, and military affairs, and added that it was necessary for us to station our forces at certain points. Further, when I told him that the Premier had simply agreed to the four principles in principle, he seemed to have been already aware of it.

(Dispatched, 9th, 1 p.m.)

Friday, October 10, 1941

Your telegram No. 650 has been received. Regarding the maintenance of peace in the Pacific, the other side, though they wish it, maintains that it would be absolutely impossible for them to arrange for the preliminary conversation, because they consider our policy to be partly

peaceful and partly aggressive, and further that it seems to them that our proposal of September 6th had further “narrowed down” than the talks we have had so far. They seem to have some objections also to the points other than the three points indicated by you, but they won't give me an exact answer even though I questioned them closely. However, I can at least see that they are requiring us to make a concession along the “line” of the note handed to me on October 2nd. It is my observation that there is absolutely no prospect for holding a meeting of the leaders of the two countries so long as we do not make this concession. In short, sticking to their reply of October 2nd, they show no further conciliatory attitude. They seem to take the attitude that they are ready to take up Japan's proposal only when and if it agrees with that contained in their above reply.

(Dispatched, 10th)

Tuesday, October 14, 1941

No. 943

I met Rear-Admiral Turner and what he said maybe put together as follows:

What the U.S.A. wants is not a “show” but a reliable promise. Supposing that a conference of the two leaders is held before reliable preliminary conversations are completed and if it should so happen that the advance into Siberia is carried out during that time, the President would get into a predicament. In so far as Japan says she desires peace in the Pacific and in so far as she says that she will decide it from her own standpoint, her obligations under the Tripartite Alliance can be understood on the whole. As for the question of withdrawing or stationing troops, the former cannot be carried out at one time. So Japan had better do it gradually after laying down the details by agreement between Japan and China.

He seemed to imagine that there are various difficulties in the way from the viewpoint of domestic questions.

This opinion of his seems to have been communicated to the Secretary of State also. Further, according to him, even if the Soviet-German War comes to a close and Germany takes the initiative toward Britain for the restoration of peace, Britain would never respond to it because it would be a peace imposed by Germany.

Since Rear-Admiral Turner is an able man who holds an important post, we may regard this opinion as the Navy's opinion. However, according to Castle, Hoover, who seems to have obtained information of separate peace between the Soviet Union and Germany, is of the opinion that peace may come about unexpectedly early, if Germany should offer Britain lenient terms. He added that Hugh Gibson, also, views the matter in

that light, and hence it would be advisable for Japan to exercise a judicious caution. The foregoing opinion, however, is the opinion held by a few isolationists.

According to Moore's report, Secretary of State Hull stated in his reply to Senator Thomas that, though he would continue the Japanese-American negotiations with patience, he hoped that Japan would not mistake it for an American weak point and that the reply to the note of October 2nd had not yet arrived.

I add for your information that, according to Kiplinger, the rumor of the truce between Germany and the Soviet Union appears to be well-grounded and that the prospects for a Japanese-American War are fifty – fifty.

(Dispatched, October 14.)

Thursday, October 16, 1941

Interview with Lord Halifax

I called on Lord Halifax at 5 p.m. and had an hour's talk with him.

Starting the conversation, I stated to him to the following effect:

Japan and the United States hope for the stabilization of peace in the Pacific and, as he had once declared, Britain also entertained the same desire. The U.S. maintains that the settlement of the China Affair is a pre-requisite for the stabilization of peace in the Pacific.

Now, there are three difficult points in the Japanese-American Parley. Two of them have the chance of being settled somehow or other, but the question of stationing Japanese troops in China has always been a "stumbling block". Japan has proceeded on the principle of "no annexation and no indemnity" after four years' fighting. Now, in view of the present state of affairs in China, Japan feels it necessary to station troops at certain points for some time and makes this her minimum demand. If even this should be rejected as impossible, it would be tantamount to Japan's acknowledgement of "surrender" in spite of her victory in war. This, the Japanese people's sentiment will not permit.

Moreover, it is true that Japan concluded the Tripartite Alliance, but the Japanese people have been told that it was an inevitable measure under the international circumstances in which Japan was placed. The oppression by the Anglo-Saxon nations, indeed, was one of its causes. And recently economic oppression has been added. Under these circumstances, Japan is placed in the fate of being obliged to find a way out it, even against her will, for the protection of her own economic life.

Since Great Britain has great "interests" in East Asia, and since the question of stationing troops in China is not to be settled by force between Britain and America on the

one hand and Japan on the other I have been wondering if there isn't a capital idea of finding a "modus vivendi" for preventing war in the Pacific area.

Then, I told him that the Japanese Navy, in view of its tradition, could not be "pushed over" so easily as the Americans say and moreover, the Japanese people could stand a plain diet.

Lastly I added that, since such a war would be useless, there should be a "statesmanship" for preventing it.

He expressed his whole-hearted agreement to what I had said and even intimated his wish to talk with Secretary of State Hull. He was very courteous to me all throughout the conversations.

Saturday, October 18, 1941

Expression of Resignation to the Foreign Minister

Dispatched, October 18, 1941 (Saturday)

It is a matter for regret that I have been of no service though I have tried my utmost in compliance with the previous Cabinet's policies and I feel myself greatly responsible for it.

Indeed I am burning with shame because things have not gone according to my wishes since my assumption of the present post. As to the future, it can be easily foretold what I shall be able to do with my little ability. I fear that I should prove to be a harmful existence, to say nothing of being a useless person, but I have decided to think it over at the ex-Minister's earnest encouragement. Now, it is my desire to return to Japan at the first opportunity and report to you the state of affairs here, and also to ask for your proper instructions. I hope you would give your consent to this request as early as possible. As WAKASUGI and IGUCHI, who are capable men, will look after the affairs while I am away, there will be no inconvenience.

Monday, October 20, 1941

Expression of Resignation to the Navy Minister

Dispatched, Monday, October 20

Kindly communicate this to the Navy Minister, keeping it for Your Excellency's private information:

To the Navy Minister:

I congratulate you on your appointment.

I am burning with shame because things have gone contrary to my wishes since my arrival here, though I was honored with the enthusiastic support of the ex – Minister of the Navy on the occasion of my assumption of the present post. I don't think I should remain a sinecurist, when there are no prospects of any success for me.

America is confronted with the European War on the one hand, and the Pacific question on the other, but she has yet many strategically weak points. So I have expected that this would make her more or less cooperative, but, contrary to my expectations, she has stuck on to her own policy up to now, showing no conciliatory attitude. This may be because she has gone too deep into China.

Therefore, I had once thought of establishing a “modus vivendi” for the Far East, putting aside the question of China, and had hinted at it to the Secretary of State, but he rigidly maintained the indivisibility of the Chinese question and the stabilization of the Pacific.

A few days ago, I had an hour's talk with Lord Halifax. I told him that Great Britain had great concern over acute state of things and asked him whether there was a “modus vivendi” for avoiding the crisis and maintaining the present state of things. In reply he intimated his wish to have a talk with Hull, but he has not yet advised me anything about it.

Next, before my departure for the U.S.A., I had several talks with the then Cabinet Ministers and thoroughly understood the trend of the Government policy. But since then there have been two cabinet changes, with result that I am now in the dark, and know not what to do. In view of the fact that I have had already scores of talks with the Secretary of State, my continuance in the present post would doubtless be disadvantageous to Japan in case she reopened the negotiations from a new angle.

From this viewpoint, I wired home yesterday asking for permission to return temporarily. If the Foreign Minister asks for your opinion, I earnestly hope that you would kindly take the trouble of helping me in realizing my object.

(Dispatched, 20th)

Tuesday, October 21, 1941

A Second Telegraph to the Foreign Minister

Dispatched, Wednesday, October 22.

Some time ago I wired home about my personal affairs. I am firmly convinced that I should retire from office along with the resignation of the previous Cabinet.

From the first, the Secretary of State has recognized my sincerity, but it has been his judgement that I have no influence over Tokyo. So is the President' s opinion.

There are some Americans who put hopes on my existence, saying that I am a preventive medium against the rupture of the present situation, but this is a mere compliment to me, and not worth taking notice of. Among the Japanese residents in the United States also, there are some who hold the same idea, but really this is only a superstitious misunderstanding.

As to the instructions from you, WAKASUGI will be able to carry them out satisfactorily, and I don't think there are any objections to it in the Foreign Office. I am now, so to speak, a skeleton of a dead horse. It is too much for me to be a sham existence, cheating others as well as myself. I do not mean to run away from the battle-field, but I believe this is the course I should take as a public man.

I entreat you to appreciate my true feelings and speedily grant my request.

(Dispatched, October 22.)

Saturday, October 25, 1941

Conversed with Admiral Pratt. Stayed overnight at the Hotel Plaza.

Monday, October 27, 1941

No. 1004 (Dispatched, 6 p.m., October 27.)

I had a talk with Admiral Pratt on the 25th. He is one of those men who admit that economic blockade and armed war have the same end after all. He told me that there would be no war so long as the spheres of Japanese activities were limited to the China Affair, but that he feared the consequences in case Japan should advance northward or southward. However, he said that the last hope lay in His Majesty and the President. Moreover, expressing his regret over Knox's speech, he said that he made it a rule to be very careful not to hurt Japanese feelings in writing for journals or in broadcasting on the radio.

According to Pratt, Stark is no doubt the chief of Naval General Staff to the President and the two are of the same opinion, but Stark cannot be said to be the "strongest" man. Admiral Hart is a man of strong character, though he has some enemies in naval circles, according to Pratt.

I also heard from other sources that the President, though desirous of maintaining stability in the Pacific, is wavering because of various advices given to him.

Pratt said that Harriman, American envoy to the Soviet Union is an able man, who holds the view that Stalin is not in a position to effect a separate peace, nor is Hitler able to do the same.

And against the argument that Italy should be induced to conclude a separate peace,

Pratt stated that Italy would then get into the same scrape as France did and consequently there was no prospect of peace.

In short, he expressed the optimistic point of view, which is peculiar to Americans, that the war would be protracted, during which time one side would be more and more exhausted. Making the observation that the Atlantic War would be safe for Britain, he said that it was his opinion that, if Japan would preserve her naval power, she would be able to have a big voice in the peace conference, but that it would be very disadvantageous for Japan to diminish that power.

(Dispatched, October 27.)

Tuesday, October 28, 1941

Called on Lord Halifax (refreshments served).

Wednesday, October 29, 1941

No. 1010 (Dispatched, 7 p.m., 29th, Wednesday)

I submit to you the following report for you information:

1. Reserve Admiral Standley told Mr. KASAI, member of Diet, who called on him, that an influential senator from of the Middle West (many German-Americans are found there) had informed him that many persons in that part of the country were opposed to a German-American War, but favored a Japanese-American War. Admiral Standley, however, thought it to be a mere propaganda on the part of Germany. I heard a similar story before from O'Laughlin, who is closely connected with that part of the country.
2. Secretary of State Hull declared in Congress that, according to the American Government's view, the aims of the Tripartite Treaty were to "intimidate" America so that she would be unable to support Britain and also force her to retreat to her shores so as to make it impossible for her to exercise the right of self-defense till she had lost naval supremacy in the Atlantic.

Then he said that America naturally desired peace but that there would be a greater possibility of ensuring peace if she demonstrated power, and that the axis-powers would rapidly push forward according to their policies if America should concede too much or betray her weakness. Now relating mainly to the situation in Tokyo, he continued that there were signs of Japan's "temperature" rising or falling according to the progress of the Soviet-German War and that the whole situation was "very delicate and very changeable". (The New York Times, 28th.)

Secretary of State Hull once said to me that, since the Americans and the Japanese were both "proud peoples", they would not be moved by "bluff".

3. Assistant Secretary of State Breckenridge Long is said to have stated to a certain Japanese visitor that it would be impossible to arrive at a Japanese-American understanding by the 15th of October. This Japanese visitor had stressed the advantages of quick consummation of Japanese-American understanding, referring to press dispatches from Tokyo.

4. Recently I have had talks with Lord Halifax twice and tried to feel out the British attitude toward a Japanese-American understanding. Britain seems to follow the wake of America after all, as would be seen in Churchill's speech.

Lord Halifax hoped that Japan would bear patiently after mature consideration because both Britain and the U.S.A. did not want any complications in the Pacific. He avoided going deep into the "embargo" now being enforced by Britain and U.S.A.

(Dispatched, 29th)

Tuesday, November 4, 1941

No. 1034 (Dispatched, November 24th.)

General Situation in the U.S.A.

Observing the recent situation in this country, I find that there are no signs of indignation in the people's sentiment toward Germany in spite of the frequent damages to American destroyers and merchantmen. The people here think that America will never break off relations with Germany, nor will she declare war. They think that Germany knows too well the disadvantages of waging war against America. This country has yet made no preparations for participating in the European War. For the present, this country is helping the countries siding with this country to the extent of supplying goods, defending and patrolling the seas, and by giving technical support.

As the country proper is not in imminent danger, the people in general are easy-going and they are more interested in questions of livelihood, such as the rising of prices, the increase of taxes, and inflation, than in war. The Government authorities, too, seem to be trying to make a cat's paw of other countries as much as possible, and, if unavoidable, to appear on the final scene to win victory. Consequently they assume the attitude of not minding the continuation of war for five or ten years. Though they are supporting the Soviet Union at present, it is only to make a cat's paw of her, and not because they are friendly to

communist Russia.

The severance of economic relations with Japan is supported by the whole nation. As for the imminent danger of war, they seem to be of the opinion that they need not worry much, since the forces on the Pacific will be able to secure national defense and in the south – western Pacific Britain, America, and the Netherlands have gradually repleted their forces. They are not afraid at all of Japan's strong attitude toward America and are hinting that the A-B-C-D powers' conference has arrived at an agreement on the distribution of materials and goods needed for war. They show an attitude of proceeding along the pre – arranged policies to the end.

The Army and Naval authorities, however, are not so consistently optimistic: 1) some admit that the British "morale" is not as high as is reported by the newspapers and that there is a possibility of a British-German peace, if the Soviet Union should drop out of the ranks; 2) they think that the Mediterranean Sea will face danger before long and therefore, some make the observation that Churchill, in view of the American tendency to direct its attention to the Pacific, spoke directly to the President, and succeeded in making the latter assume a cautious attitude in the Pacific; and 3) I should judge that the American authorities are well aware of the fact that the Pacific War will be very burdensome and difficult. Commentaries and newspaper reports indicate that once war breaks out, they will concentrate their power and watch for the chance of a decisive battle on the basis of a thorough examination of the whole war situation.

I hereby submit the above report for your information.
(Dispatched, November 4th, 4 p.m.)

Thursday, November 6, 1941

Called on Post-Master General Walker in the afternoon.

Friday, November 7, 1941

Called on Secretary Hull at 9 a.m. (WAKASUGI accompanied me). Attended reception in commemoration of Soviet Union's Revolution at 5 p.m.

No. 1055 (Dispatched, 2 p.m., November 7th, Friday)

Interview with Hull on the 7th

At 9 a.m. on the 7th, I accompanied by WAKASUGI, met with Hull (Valentine sat in

company with him), and, after explaining to the President and the Secretary of State Japan's intentions and stand point in accordance with the instructions of the Japanese Government, told him that it was our desire to settle Japanese-American relations as soon as possible. Hull replied that there were in the world at present two influences fighting each other, that since neither side could win over the other swiftly, there would be a danger of steadily entering into a chaotic state of "anarchy", and that, if Japan and America should adopt peaceful policies in the Pacific at such a time this chaotic condition could be prevented. I explained to him as follows on the basis of your instructions:

- 1) Of the three pending problems, two are likely are to be solved somehow or other. In respect to the stationing and withdrawing of our troops, we are ready to make the maximum concession permissible under the state of our home affairs.
- 2) We earnestly desire that America would cooperate with us in settling our relations with her, by taking a long-range view of the present situation from the stand point of friendship between Japan and America.
- 3) Our Government instructed me to settle the question as soon as possible, after fully explaining Japan's resolution and stand point to the President and the Secretary of State.
- 4) We ardently desire the speedy consummation of our negotiations, because Japan's state of affairs has become so "impatient" after six months' negotiations that the situation is serious.
- 5) In view of the seriousness of the current situation, a parley will be started in Tokyo also parallely with that conducted here.

Thus explaining, I submitted the proposals instructed by you, saying that we purposed the above in the most friendly and conciliatory spirit, and asked him to agree to them from a long range view of the situation.

After reading them carefully, Hull, nodding assent to the principle of non-discriminatory treatment, said that this would be advantageous to Japan, too. Regarding the stationing and withdrawing of our troops, he simply inquired about the proportion of the troops to be stationed to those to be withdrawn. To this, I explained that the greater part would be withdrawn, stationing only a portion. I also gave explanation, based on your instructions on the right of self-defense. To this he replied that he would answer afterwards after studying the subject. I decided to give detailed explanation and obtain a reply in my next interview with the President.

Further, Hull revealed to me that, as he had told me before, it was necessary to

hold a conference among Britain, China, the Netherlands, and other countries in regard to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific, and that the United States was consulting with China in respect to the Chinese question. Then he asked me, as his own idea, what would be Japan's opinion if the supreme authorities of China should declare to the Japanese Government and people China's sincere friendship for and trust in Japan and express the desire to restore friendly relations between Japan and China. To this, WAKASUGI asked Hull in return whether this question was made after he had ascertained China's intention. Hull said that it was entirely his own personal idea, and that it would set a very good example and influence to the world. However, it seems to me that he probably put this question after he had obtained China's opinion beforehand.

Hull wished me to refer the aforesaid idea of his to the Japanese Government for its opinion. I simply replied that I would take it into consideration.
(7th, 2 p.m., No. 1055.)

Sunday, November 9, 1941

At night I called on Walker. Ordering the room cleared, he told me substantially as follows with an extremely earnest attitude:

"I tell this only to you, swearing to God. Both our 'boss' and the Secretary of State have received an authentic report that Japan has decided a policy of taking action. So the interview with the President tomorrow, the tenth, will be, in a word, a perfunctory one and almost no hope is placed on KURUSU's coming to Washington."

I told him that he was wrong and explained that, although Japan was becoming impatient on account of the economic oppression against her and was longing for a swift settlement, she was sincere in her wish to reach an understanding with America. His talk, in brief, seemed to disclose the substance of the Cabinet conference yesterday, the 8th. He informed me that, although the President and Hull placed unshakeable confidence in me, they possessed an authentic report on the situation in Tokyo.

Monday, November 10, 1941

No. 1066 (dispatched, 10th.)

1. We had More contact with Thomas (a member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations who is intimate with Hull).

The gist of his report is as follows:

America is not "bluffing" but will fight Japan, if Japan dares undertake further invasion.

The Americans are spiritually prepared for the worst and the Navy is "ready for action."

2. Yesterday (Sunday) night, a Cabinet Secretary, ordering the room cleared told me in earnest with an introductory remark that he was disclosing the matter only to me, swearing to God, in view of my intimacy with him, that the U.S. Government had obtained authentic information that Japan would start action very soon and hence considered that neither my visit to the President on Monday nor KURUSU's coming to America would have any important effect on the general situation. Therefore, I explained to the minutest detail that, although the Japanese people have become especially "impatient" since the "freezing" and had been longing for the swift consummation of a Japanese-American understanding, neither the Government or the people wanted a Japanese-American War but desired friendly relations to the last. To this he replied that their "boss" (the President) believed in the aforesaid information and so did the Secretary of State. As for the comments seen in the newspapers and magazines here, excepting the Daily News and the Hearst papers, a Japanese-American War seems to be far more popular than a German-American War and there are some among Englishmen who even try to avail themselves of this popularity. As to military and naval cooperation between Britain and the U.S.A., a preliminary understanding is reported to have been reached and some urge the necessity of dispatching part of the British fleet to Singapore. We cannot be sure that the President will not be influenced by domestic political considerations to move toward this direction. Anyhow, the above mentioned Cabinet Secretary stated that the U.S.A. would never take the initiative of starting action but once Japan starts action she would surely do the same to keep her honor by force of past circumstances.
3. In my interview with the President today, the 10th, I will do my utmost to carry out the purport of your instructions.

November 10, 1941

Interview with the President

(the Secretary of State and WAKASUGI being present also)

I had an hour's talk with the President from 11:30 a.m. I read our so-called "final proposal" from my prepared "statement." The President's answer to this may be summarized as follows:

- a) The whole world was in danger because of disturbances caused by the "forces of aggression." He earnestly desired that the world would return to the regular course of

peace. From the spirit of "fair play" , he would do his best to contribute to the establishment of peace and stability all over the Pacific. To this end, we should give practical efficacious results to the welfare of humanity. He wished the preliminary parley would produce such good results as to form the basis for our negotiations and promised to endeavor to expedite this parley.

He wished Japan would take "peaceful courses" and make clear that she would never resort to opposite measures. This, he believed, was the way to achieve our mutual desired end.

- b) The United States desired to prevent the war from extending farther and to establish everlasting peace.
- c) He hoped the principle of non-discrimination would be carried out throughout the world, which was just the contrary of what Germany had generally been adopting in Europe.

In view of the failure of the American high-handed policy in the past, he adopted a good neighbor policy, which brought about friendly relations between the U.S.A. and the other countries of America. Thus he stressed the need of new policies to cope with new situations.

- d) When I pointed out that the economic oppression had made the Japanese people "impatient" , he annotated the term "modus vivendi" by saying that sometimes a "modus vivendi" is necessary in order to live, but I could not understand clearly what he really meant.

At our parting, I said that even though I knew there was a limit to what an ambassador could do, I could not help feeling keenly my responsibility to the present and coming generations of the Japanese people and that it was not my wish to be the last ambassador. To this, the President listened intently, and so did Hull.

Wednesday, November 12, 1941

Interview with Hull on the 12th

I had a talk for an hour and a half with Secretary of State Hull (WAKASUGI accompanied me; Valentine sat with Hull). Hull inquired of me whether the new Cabinet also would confirm the note dated August 28th (taking out the note) and he also handed to me a note, explaining their "suggestion" concerning peace between Japan and China, which he had made to me in our last interview.

As to our proposal on the three questions, he replied that the United States too, recognizing the acute state of the present situation, was hastily deliberating on them, but that it was difficult to settle overnight questions that had been pending for ten years. According to him, we shall have an answer the day after tomorrow.

- a) Asking him the connection between the aforesaid "suggestion" and the consummation of the Japanese-American negotiations, I inquired whether it could be construed that China held the key to the solution of Japanese-American relations, if it was his opinion that the Japanese-American negotiations would not be consummated in case mutual agreement between Japan and China is not reached. Hull, however, referred to the application the general principle to China and so on, but failed to give a clear answer to the above inquiry. Further, he told me that the U.S.A. had already apprised in a general way Britain and the Netherlands on this matter, and that he believed they were ready to sign simultaneously with the U.S.A. as soon as the basis of negotiations are agreed upon. To this Valentine added that, as had been stated in the proposal of June 21, Japan could not participate /" kanyo" / in the affairs of other countries with the conditions contrary to the principles the United States advocated.
- b) When I clarified that the period of stationing troops was not indefinite, he hinted that it was difficult to admit the indefinite stationing of troops under the policy of no interference in other countries' affairs.
- c) Referring to the Tripartite Alliance, he said that he found it very difficult to fully explain it to politicians and others, because some said it was peaceful while others maintained that Japan had an indivisible relation with Germany. He declared that since Hitler would not remain in power, he thought it necessary to devise a post-war program. He expressed the opinion that, if Japan would cooperate with the United States as "leaders" in a peaceful program, it would be unnecessary for Japan to remain in the Tripartite Alliance in case an agreement for general peace in the Pacific is reached. Thereupon I strongly explained to him the compatibility of the Tripartite Alliance and a peaceful plan, citing the Anglo-Japanese alliance as an example.
- d) I added that Japan naturally did not desire to resort to force and that she would have no need of force so long as she could obtain oil and other raw materials from the U.S.A. and the Dutch Indies.

Saturday, November 15, 1941

Accompanied by WAKASUGI, I called on Secretary Hull at 9:00 a.m. (Valentine was in company with Hull).

Ambassador KURUSU arrived here at 1:30 p.m.

Interview with Hull on the 15th

- 1) The proposals (including a proposal for a joint Japanese-American statement) for non-discrimination in trade and commerce were made.
- 2) When I insisted that the conversations had reached the stage of "negotiations", he declared that it would be very improper for us to announce that Japan and the U.S.A. had initiated negotiations between themselves only before the United States had negotiated with Britain and the Netherlands, because (as Japan, too, had hoped) it was necessary to negotiate with them too, in order to settle this issue. He was very much dissatisfied, saying that the Japanese demand was "peremptory."
- 3) As to the Tripartite Alliance, Hull said that, in view of the fact that Japan was attempting to arrive at a peaceful agreement with the U.S.A. on the one hand and stressing the military alliance with Germany on the other, he found it rather difficult to explain this contradiction to the American public and the world, though he himself understood my explanations. Such being the case, he wanted to confirm the intentions of the new Cabinet toward peaceful policies: namely, he would like to have the new Cabinet confirm the Japanese Government's statement which was presented last time and the Japanese Government's intention in regard to the American proposal of June 21 for political stability throughout the whole Pacific (though Japan wished to limit it to the south-western Pacific). He further stated that the U.S.A. would reply on the other two problems after receiving answers to today's proposals.

Hull further said that, although a neutrality treaty had been concluded between Japan and the Soviet Union, the United States did not desire to see large forces set up in opposition on the frontier, and that she also wished that the Tripartite Alliance Treaty would prove to be a scrap of paper when a Japanese-American understanding is reached. To this, I strongly elucidated the compatibility of the Tripartite Alliance and Japanese-American peace, giving him various explanations.

Upon my telling him at parting that Tokyo would be disappointed over our conversation today, he replied in such a manner as to give the impression that there was still room for negotiation.