

## 野村駐米大使日記

三輪, 宗弘  
九州共立大学経済学部

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# 野村駐米大使日記（II）

三 輪 宗 弘

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## 野村駐米大使日記（パートII 2/4）

（昭和16年9月1日～9月29日）

三輪 宗弘  
Munehiro MIWA

## 解題II

『九州共立大学経済学部紀要』第66号（1996年12月）に「野村駐米大使日記」を掲載してから、今回第77号（1999年5月）まで2年半もの月日を刻んでしまった。どうかお赦し願いたい。野村駐米大使日記の後半部分（昭和16年9月1日～12月31日）を本学紀要に載せるが、枚数の上限が18ページであるために、連続3回（第77号、78号、79号）に分けて掲載する。この点もどうか寛恕を請いたい。学園予算節約の財政下、紀要委員会の理解があり、活字でできたことを書き添えておきたい。

Stephan Saal氏、Fukiko Hayamizu Saal氏に深く感謝申し上げたい。家族全員で手書きの走り書きの英文をワープロ入力して下さった。ザール富貴子さんの話では「父親のStephanが音読し、長女が入力した」とのことである。過去の日米関係に関心がなければ、家族全員でワープロの打ち出しなどできるわけがない。Saal家の情熱に頭が下がる。筆者の代りに、ワシントン、D.C.で原稿とFDを受け取ってきてくれた専修大学大学院生大島久幸氏にも記してお礼を述べたい。

前回、近衛総理大臣を「KONOE」と表記したが、当時の文献では「KONOYE」となっている。訂正をお願いしたい。

「野村駐米大使日記」は『米国に使いして』（岩波書店、昭和21年）と大筋において内容に大差はない。匿名である人名が判明するのと、野村が日米交渉に行き詰まり辞意を固めていく過程などが読み取れる点が目新しい。日米間が閉塞に陥り、絶望感に苛まれる日々は『米国に使いして』では仔細に記述されていない。今回パートII（9月）では、近衛—ローズベルト首脳会談が頓挫する過程がわかる。米国側からの視点で「首脳会談」を記したものに、米国国務省編『平和と戦争』（協同出版社、昭和21年、167～74頁）がある。同書には「野村日記」には

書かれていないが、ハル国務長官に野村大使が語った内容が以下のように記されている。

「斯る会見は、日本国内に、日本をして新方向に転ぜしむる心理的効果を与へるものであり、日本に於ける枢軸友好分子の勢力を削減し、合衆国との平和関係を欲する分子に強力なる支持を供するものである」

日独伊三国同盟の実質的な骨抜きおよび支那駐兵から撤退が日米間の争点であった。

ところで野村駐米大使日記は、すでに奥村房夫氏が『日米交渉と太平洋戦争』（前野書店、1970、102～103頁）の中で言及している。管見の範囲では、野村日記を使っているのは奥村氏だけである。同書は、基本的な文献を網羅しており、しかもバランスがとれており一読の価値がある。特に米国の2次文献を読み込んでおられ、日本の文献も確かな選球眼で識別している。その他、前後15年にわたって外務省顧問であったフレデリック・モア（Frederick More）氏の『日米外交秘史 日本への指導者と共に』（法政大学出版局、昭和26年）には、駐米大使野村の人物像がきわめて好意的に描かれている。一方で特命全権大使來栖三郎には辛辣である。今日一次資料にアクセスできるが、それと読み比べても、モア氏の回想は信頼できる。戦時中にここまで冷静にかつ淡々と日本の指導者と日米関係の問題点を描き、摘出できたのか、筆者は不思議に感じた。日本人の思考パターンに関する鋭い洞察などがちりばめられており、日本人論・比較文化論としても考えさせられた。ぜひ野村日記を読む際にあわせて目を通していただきたい。

現在筆者は資産凍結・石油禁輸後の日米関係を鋭意研究している。野村日記の個々の内容はそのときに論じたい。紙幅の制約もあり、これにて解題に代えたい。

## Ambassador NOMURA' Diary

September 1 ~ September 29

Translated by Kotaro KUROSAWA

Monday, September 1, 1941.

Called on the Secretary of State at 8 p.m.

Tuesday, September 2, 1941.

No. 762 (dispatched, 3 p.m., September 2.)

Interview with Secretary of State Hull on September 1.

On the night of the first, I called on the Secretary of State, and made a proposal for maintaining secrecy and making previous arrangements for publication, as per your telegram No. 510. It seems that the president himself is taking charge of matter concerning the meeting. Since I understand that he has gone to Hyde Park and will return to Washington tomorrow and lunch with the Secretary of State, I expect to have an answer before long. The two seem to take a keen interest in the meeting, but I should judge that the Secretary of State is acting very cautiously in view of his official responsibility and also his own personality.

It appears that the Secretary of State considers that, though the maintenance of peace in the Pacific is desirable, there is the fear that adverse public opinion would force the KONOYE Cabinet to resign if it should all revert to peaceful policies from militaristic policies. As I understand that he is being warned against this fear by people at home and abroad, I explained that such a fear was absolutely unnecessary, in view of Prince KONOYE' s political position and also his determination to carry out a meeting which was an unprecedented one for a Japanese Premier. It seemed that the Secretary of State had been informed by Grew of all the editorials of the Japanese press, for he expressed the desire that the Japanese Government, through its own ingenuity, would so guide its public opinion, influential politicians, and military men as to make them concur in peaceful policies. (I presume that he wanted to avoid the criticism of interfering in the internal affairs of our country. He said that this would make it easier for the American side.)

As he said then that China did not wish peace and that the Chinese observed that there would appear in Japan a military cabinet before long, I replied that China was a spoiled child of America and said what she wished. The Secretary of State, as usual, said that it would be difficult for Japan and China to improve their friendly relations without provoking China to anger. He also stated the necessity of convincing Britain and other countries of this.

I then stated that, of the three existing questions, the right of self—defense was not so difficult; that there was a way to settle the principle of non—discrimination, as is was acknowledged in outline in the present statement and also contained in the KONOYE message; and that the stationing of troops in Inner Mongolia and North China could be settled, depending upon the circumstances of the time, inasmuch as the stationing of troops was not for an indefinite period of time. So I said that the Japanese Government would have some kind of a plan of her own.

In short, I made it clear that, when judged from a long range political view point, even the U.S.A. had no cause to wish for a two—front “trouble” and that there was not the slightest doubt that Japan cherished the maintenance of peace and tranquility in the Far East as was already indicated in the successive Imperial rescripts. So I urged a quick realization of the meeting.

The Secretary of State, too, said that it would be a matter for rejoicing if peace in the Pacific could be maintained.

Though our talks did not go so far as to discuss the place of the meeting, it is 3,400 miles to Honolulu and 3,800 miles to Juneau. The weather at Juneau is said to be good even in October. In any case, I think that, when we make the announcement, we had better state that the meeting is to be held at a certain place in the Pacific (halfway between Tokyo and Washington).

### Wednesday, September 3, 1941

At 5 p.m. had a secret interview with the President and the Secretary of State at the White House.

No. 778

### Interview with the President in the 3<sup>rd</sup>.

At 5 p.m. on the 3<sup>rd</sup> (Wednesday) I had an interview with the President. On reading what I had informed you of in my telegrams Nos. 776 and 777 the President stated

that he and Prince KONOYE, and the Secretary of State and I—all of us would strive for peace in the Pacific, but that both Japan and the U.S.A. had their respected public opinions. Saying that he had received frequently telegrams demanding no change in American policies in order to compromise with Japan, he stated that he sympathized with Prince KONOYE “very, very sincerely.”

And then the Secretary of State, who sat beside him, inquired about the present state of affairs in Japan. I replied that the Premier would proceed resolutely.

Regarding the three pending questions, I explained that we had already come to an agreement in principle on two of them, and that, as to the evacuation of troops, he Premier’s personal participation in the forthcoming conference showed that the Premier was confident of reaching an American-Japanese agreement in this point also.

The Secretary of State said that there were still some points on wording that he wished to discuss and again repeated the necessity of convincing Britain, the Netherlands Indies and China when an agreement is reached between the U.S.A. and Japan.

The President stated that he did not touch on the details of the adjustment of Japanese-American diplomatic relations in the course of his talks with Churchill, because of the difficulty of keeping things secret as is customary in Britain to let all things be known to the cabinet ministers, who in turn revealed the matters to the Parliament.

And as to the date of the meeting; the President seems to have no engagement for the present, except one at the end of September.

On parting, told the president that the maintenance of peace in the Pacific depended much on his high statesmanship. President concurred in this remark, but the Secretary of State asked a few more questions, worrying about the tone of the press comments in Tokyo.

The President had no objection to the statement of our standpoint, but the Secretary of State made no answer. As I am to meet the latter tomorrow morning, I shall confirm it then and inform you of his opinion. (Dispatched, 8:30 p.m., September 3.)

**Thursday, September 4, 1941.**

At 9 a.m. (accompanied by OBATA) I called on the Secretary of State.

The Foreign Minister made a proposal to Grew in Tokyo.

Telegram (Dispatched, 8 p.m., 4<sup>th</sup>)

No. 782

Interview with Hull on the 4<sup>th</sup>

At 9 a.m., on the 4<sup>th</sup>, I called on the Secretary of State Hull. Taking up the four principles of the oral statement, especially the principle of equal opportunity, Hull repeated his usual contentions. I expressed our desire to dispose of the unsettled questions first because the Japanese Government had no objection to them in principle, as was stated in our reply of the 29<sup>th</sup>.

To this, Hull replied that it was necessary to dispose of the fundamental principles first, for the U.S.A. did not wish to give the impression that she was trading off the third powers, such as Britain, China, and the Netherlands Indies. He added that it was necessary for Japan, too, to clarify that she stood for the same principles and thereby convince the third powers.

When I referred to the American proposal of June 21 and asked for the elimination of the proposal for exchanging official notes on the European War, Hull showed disapproval. I also gathered from what he said that he was opposed to the stationing of troops for anti-Commintern purpose and that he desired a complete evacuation. I noticed that the attitude of the other party had considerably stiffened.

**Saturday, September 6, 1941**

At 9:00 a.m. called on the Secretary of State and submitted the proposal of our Government.

(It was the same as the one made on the 4<sup>th</sup> by the Foreign Minister in Tokyo.)

**Dispatched, 3 p.m., September 6.No. 788**

Interview with Hull on September 6

At 9 a.m., on the 6<sup>th</sup> I called on Secretary of State Hull.

Saying that the views of the Imperial Government were as clarified in the proposals of August 6 and 28 and the Premier's message and documents annexed thereto, I explained that the present proposal, especially items B and C, should meet with the wishes of the American side; adding that, in my opinion, this was the maximum which the Japanese Government could do. Next I expressed the hope that the American side, with insight into the situation, would cooperate to bring about the swift materialization of the

meeting of the leaders of both sides. (The telegram regarding the proposal came to hand on the afternoon of the 4<sup>th</sup>.)

Hull replied that he had only read a part of Grew's report, but that he would thoroughly study it at the weekend. Moreover, showing great concern as to the reliability of the present Cabinet, he expressed the wish that, since arguments for adjusting diplomatic relations had arisen in the United States, Japan, too, would endeavor to guide her public opinion into this direction.

On my emphasizing the necessity of maintaining peace in the Pacific, he seemed to be very prudent in setting forth his opinion though he endorsed my view.

#### Sunday, September 7, 1941

The President's mother passed away. I went to Virginia Beach yesterday and came back today.

#### Monday, September 8, 1941

##### Telegraphic Report (Dispatched, 3 p.m., September 8<sup>th</sup>)

According to today's Gallup Poll report, the number of people favoring the checking of Japan's development at the risk of a war has suddenly increased from 51% in July to 70% today.

#### Wednesday, September 10, 1941

At 9 a.m. called on the Secretary of State.

At 3 p.m., Hamilton, Valentine, and Schmidt called on me and asked me questions regarding the documentary proposal submitted on the 6<sup>th</sup>. (Though I had "discouraged" the Secretary of State from asking questions about the business side of this case, they came to me under his instructions on the ground that they found it difficult to understand the papers because the wording of the documents tendered by our side in the past varied.)

#### TOKYO

On the night of the 10<sup>th</sup> the American Ambassador handed an American note to the Foreign Minister. The telegram informing that the answer to that note will be given in Tokyo came to hand on the 12<sup>th</sup>.

No. 728 (dispatched 4 p.m., 10<sup>th</sup>)

At 9 a.m., on the 10<sup>th</sup> (Wednesday) I called on Secretary of State Hull and, according to your instructions, requested that the President refrain from referring to matters concerning Japan in his radio speech tomorrow, the 11<sup>th</sup>.

On my asking when I shall have a reply to the proposal (made on the 6<sup>th</sup>) of the Japanese Government regarding the adjustment of diplomatic relations, he replied that it would be after he had had a talk with the President, which he expected to have when the President had finished his broadcasting on the 11<sup>th</sup> (tomorrow), because so far he had had no chance to meet the President, who left Washington last Friday.

Then, betraying his dissatisfaction in a measure, he said that the Japanese Government's reply had "narrowed down" a great deal the points discussed in the past. I explained that, as written down in our reply, we had specially picked out difficult points, omitting those upon which both sides were in agreement.

In short, the American side seemed to be consulting the views of Britain, China, and the Netherlands Indies.

He severely criticized Germany's faithlessness regarding the destroyer Greer.

Thursday, September 11, 1941

The President spoke on the radio.

My Opinion on the Stationing of Troops in China.

The Gist of Telegram No. 810 (dispatched, 8 p.m., September 11).

The difficult point in adjusting the diplomatic relations, as you have seen in my successive telegrams, lies in the stationing of troops for anti-Commintern purpose. I feel that the U.S.A. is not greatly opposed to the other points, but she seems to be strongly opposed to the stationing of troops. To effect a break in the deadlock, I wish you would consider a compromise to a proposal providing for the withdrawal of troops within two years after the restoration of peace without touching on the question of the stationing of troops. And I hereby ask you to decide your final attitude as quickly as possible as it is necessary for me to proceed with the negotiations. As this is primarily a question between China and Japan, and since America is obliged to comment upon it out of duty as intermediary, it may perhaps take a year or more under this proposal to bring about the meeting of the leaders of the two countries, conclude a detailed agreement, and then armistice and a peace conference.

Therefore, even if we promise now to evacuate within two years, we may be able to negotiate with China for the postponement of the evacuation according to the changing situation, or we may perhaps be able to keep our troops in order to protect the lives and property of Japanese residents. I don't think that this will necessarily lead to a result contrary to our past national policies. No doubt, I admit, it is a truly difficult question as a domestic issue, but it is my earnest desire that you would give me reply instructions some way or other as soon as possible. Regarding this, I think it might be a good idea to insert a clause for joint Sino-Japanese cooperation (non-military) for the purpose of checking activities harmful to national well-being, in place of a clause for the stationing of troops for anti-Commintern purpose.

**Saturday, September 13, 1941**

The reply to the American note, which the Foreign Minister had explained to Grew, came to hand on September 13<sup>th</sup>. (Nos. 561, 562, 563, and 564.)

In Tokyo, the evening of the 13<sup>th</sup>, the American Ambassador was requested to bring our proposal to the President's knowledge as quickly and to give an expression of intention thereto. (Telegram came to hand on the 13<sup>th</sup>.)

**Sunday, September 14, 1941**

Visited Philadelphia, stayed overnight on the way and came back on Monday.  
No. 819 (Dispatched, 7 p.m., 14<sup>th</sup>)

Regarding your telegrams Nos. 561-563, I wish to tell you below for your information what has come to my mind:

1. You may understand that my proposal made to Secretary of State Hull will be immediately brought to the President's knowledge if the President is in Washington. It appears that all preliminary talks are entrusted entirely to Hull. The President, for instance, once went so far as to say to me that "what cannot be settled between Hull and me" cannot be settled even if it is tackled by other persons. Hull himself said to me that the President and he had always agreed with each other on foreign policies during the past eight years.
2. The words "communistic and subversive activities" in the article on the stationing of troops may first draw their attention. Also the term "common defense in China" is

- likely to become a subject of discussion. Their doubt as to what the “agreements” definitely mean may still remain.
3. With regard to the intermediation between China and Japan, I believe it certain that, so long as the American side makes it a pre-requisite to be apprised unofficially of fair and square conditions, the U.S.A. will not comply with our request for intermediation even if we refrain from specifying our conditions.
  4. The plan to solve politically the interpretation of the Tripartite Treaty when the leaders meet will be unavailing in view of the state of affairs in this country and the President’s position. At any rate, I feel that there is no hope for a meeting of the leaders unless we come to an agreement in our preliminary talks.
  5. I will convey at once to Hull your intention to confine the present understanding to that between America and Japan only.
  6. I will do my utmost in accordance with the purport of your instructions. However, in respect to the points which you are negotiating at present in Tokyo, please note that I shall watch developments for a while, because of the fear of causing misunderstanding and of complicating the negotiations if I should deal with them at this end

Wednesday, September 17, 1941

Dispatched on September 17<sup>th</sup>, No. 822.

I acknowledged receipt of your telegram No. 554. Everything that you say therein is right, and I feel a deep responsibility for the few omissions contained in the translation.

Dispatched, September 17 (Wednesday), No. 823.

On August 6<sup>th</sup> (subsequently corrected as a mistake for September 3) I explained at the White House that we had already come to an agreement in principle on two of the three pending questions, while as to the evacuation of troops, the Premier’s decision to personally conduct the negotiations showed that the Premier was confident of reaching an American-Japanese agreement. There upon the Secretary of State said that there were still some points the wording of which he wished to discuss and bring them “up-to-date.” This was based on the June 21<sup>st</sup> proposal for understanding.

As to your instructions of July 15, though I received further instructions No. 397 dated July 24, I could do nothing and so left them unproposed because the negotiations had been suspended then. The talks were resumed through the new message period. In accordance with your instructions of May 11, I had negotiated more than ten times with the

Secretary of State, and had also conducted flanking operations in various ways during that time. The June 21 proposal for understanding contained developments of the negotiations up to the time of the Secretary of State's departure for a change of air. It is natural for Hull to be excessively attached to the draft which he had succeeded in making up so far after negotiating with me for several months. So I think it will be more acceptable to the American Government and will be convenient for expediting to the preliminary negotiations if we take in the forms and contents of the former negotiations as much as possible. And I add here that Hull once said that the negotiations were to be conducted here.

Such being the circumstances, I doubt whether we can conclude the preliminary talks by means of our proposal of September 4<sup>th</sup> alone. In any case, it is the most important matter to find out a measure acceptable to both America and Japan on the three pending problems, especially the questioning of stationing troops.

According to information from the usual source, a tendency favorable for Japanese-American negotiations developed among the Cabinet Secretaries at the Cabinet Conference last Friday, and there is no doubt that the President has a mind to personally appear at the meeting if the preliminary talks are concluded. However, according to the information NISHIYAMA obtained from a friend of his Hull told this friend that the President had gone too far during my interview with him.

(Dispatched, September 17.)

**Thursday, September 18, 1941.**

Dispatched, September 18 (Thursday), No. 829.

According to what NISHIYAMA heard from Desburnin [?] , Hull told him that the prospects for Japanese-American negotiations were not so good as they had been two weeks ago; that it was very difficult to predict the future because opinion in the Japanese Government was divided; that for the present no consideration would be given to the question of bartering silk for oil; and that the coming one or two weeks they could do nothing but watch developments in the situation.

Moreover, Hornbeck, who had been on leave for a fortnight since the last week — end, is said to have told an Associated Press correspondent that no developments would occur in the adjustment of Japanese-American relations during his furlough. I add this for your information.

Friday, September 19, 1941

At 9 p.m. called on Secretary of State.

Saturday, September 20, 1941

Dispatched September 20, No. 838

Interview with Secretary of State Hull on Friday

For the first time in nine days I visited Hull on the night of the 19<sup>th</sup> and asked his opinion on our proposal of September 4<sup>th</sup>. He gave me no substantial answer, but only said that he had expected that he might be handed some proposal that night as Grew had told him by wire that Japan would make in a few days a proposal which would be acceptable to the United States. He said that he was awaiting Japan's proposal. And to my question, he answered that the United States had not yet made any further suggestion concerning the interpretation of the Tripartite Treaty.

The following were what I understood to be his thoughts during the course of my conversation with him, and I submit them for your information.

1. Though he said that the United States, like Japan, had no intention of prolonging the conversation and that it was her wish to complete it as soon as possible, I think it advisable for us to take this as a reply for form's sake.
2. Repeating what he had told me before, he said that the United States was opposed to the policy of advocating peace on the one hand, and of using armed force on the other hand, that Japan was sure to make good progress through peaceful policies during the period of peace of the whole Pacific, and this would be advantageous to Japan also. He had once told me that the existence of a strong Japan was necessary for peace in the Far East and at the same time had said that, whereas it would not be acceptable to America if we had adopted a policy of partly peace and partly conquest, the American-Japanese problem would be settled in a single night if Japan would adopt a thoroughly peaceful policy, and that then the question of wording would be of no importance.
3. He recognized that the internal affairs of Japan were more difficult than those of the United States. He seemed to have received a report on the functions for commemorating the first anniversary of the [Tripartite] Alliance to be held on September 27, but he recognized that those who favored peace outnumbered those who wish to wage war on

the side of Germany.

4. He agreed to the proposal, contained in your telegram No. 560, to confine the talk to that between America and Japan only, but he said that it was necessary to keep in touch with the other interested powers in the Pacific.

In short, I think that what I told you in my telegraphic reports Nos. 822 (it might had been 823) and 829 has come true as a whole. (Further, Vice-President Wallace is said to have confidentially told Desburnin [?] during the course of a talk between them the other day that it was the policy of the U.S. Government not to effect any "appeasement" toward Japan.) It is a patent fact that the United States is skeptic of Japan. Frankly speaking, the United States recognizes that Japan will adopt an armed force policy, while trying "to appease" the United States.

Such being the case, I think the settlement of the problems lies not in their wording but is connected with their substance.

Your telegram No. 584 has duly come to hand. As to the attitude of the other party, please understand it from the aforesaid Hull's talk and my telegrams Nos. 822 and 829. (Dispatched, Saturday, 20<sup>th</sup>).

**Sunday, September 21, 1941**

At 6 p.m. had a six-minute telephone talk with my family at home (cost over \$30).

**Monday, September 22, 1941**

September 22 (dispatched on Monday) No. 839.

#### The Recent State of Affairs in America

As for the recent state of affairs in this country, America is still endeavoring to defeat Germany by supporting her own friendly powers. Though she was satisfied with the fight put up by the Soviet Union, which was better than what she had expected, she is now wishing, in view of the undeniably unfavorable tide of war against the Soviet Union, to assist that country jointly with Britain as much as possible in order to prevent her from making a separate peace or from surrendering, and thus make her tide over the winter and maintain her fighting power up to next spring. At this juncture the U.S.A. has further set up in the

budget the sum of six billion dollars for assisting other countries, and by this she intends to bolster the fighting spirit of the British people.

The landing operations against England have become extremely difficult, and besides, the U.S. Navy had undertaken an active convoying of shipping in the Atlantic. Moreover, she is planning to build for her own use alone six million tons of ships in deadweight during the next year. She thinks that when this is completed she will be able to tide over the crisis in the Atlantic and thereby make Britain safe. America, however, knows that she will not succeed by such a passive policy because the fighting spirit of the Germans is still strong. On the other hand, she is hoping against hope that Italy will fall out of the line of battle on account of the growing disaffection among the Italian people, and that, taking an exaggerated view of the unrest of the people's minds in the occupied areas, German endurance would also break down before long. And that is why there are some who think that the war will continue one or to years at the shortest, and even for five years or ten years if it becomes protracted. The people in general are self-composed and easy-going as is peculiar to a great nation; we may safely say that none of them think that they will ever be defeated in a war. As to war operations, they think that it will be sufficient to make the Navy to participate in the war and, apart from the preparations made by the Army authorities, it seems that the people are in no mood to send expeditionary forces on a large scale. But isolationism is gradually losing popularity in political circles and public opinion is nearing step by step toward that of supporting the Government's foreign policies. As to the Far Eastern question, the people in general are taking it in a further easy-going manner, thinking that it cannot be helped if a war should break out between Japan and America.

There are many comments on the comparative strength of the navies of both countries, but, in short, they claim that the United States will win in the end on the ground that in the [coming] Japanese-American War the navy will have a clear field, that a protracted war will be too strong a strain on Japan's economic strength, and also that American capacity for replenishing lost war ships is greater than that of Japan. So we find very little sign that they feel danger from Japan. Hence the opinion most prevails that, in respect to diplomatic problems, they should firmly maintain the past Far East policy and that it is wrong to compromise at this juncture at the expense of China. The Hyde Park news in The New York Times' Sunday edition, for instance, reports to the following effect: The adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the U.S.A. is at present in a deadlock. Prince KONOYE is now wishing for a direct negotiation with the President as the Japanese demand for the recognition of her special position in China disagrees with Hull's denial of

such a position. The President, however, is constantly consulting with Hull. The greater part of the U.S. Navy still remains in the Pacific but Japan is likely to move to the south or to the north, depending upon the situation of the Soviet Union. Consequently the U.S.A. is in danger of being obliged to fight in the two oceans at the same time. The President is especially giving this point careful consideration.

The paper further reported a rumor that, as the terms of peace, Japan will hold several treaty ports and the four provinces in North China, and may also station small units for guarding other places. In conclusion the report said that, although the U.S. Government was unwilling to compromise with Japan at the expense of China, she would be ready to revive commercial relations between Japan and the United States and give economic support to Japan if she would stop her armed aggression.

The foregoing commentary was written by Crackhorn and is most to the point. (Dispatched, September 22<sup>nd</sup>.)

#### Tuesday, September 23, 1941

Visited the old battlefield at Gettysburg (for the third time). Stayed overnight at Blue Ridge Summit.

At 9 a.m. called on Secretary of State Hull.

No. 842, September 23<sup>rd</sup> (Tuesday).

At 9 a.m. on the 23<sup>rd</sup> (Tuesday), I called on Hull and handed to him the English versions of your telegrams Nos. 562 and 564 and also our terms of peace between Japan and China, No. 590. On the basis of your successive instructions, I explained that we had already said all that we had to say, that we had nothing further to tell Ambassador Grew, that further matters concerning the Tripartite Alliance must be reserved for discussion in the meeting of the leaders of the two countries, and that the proposal made in TOKYO on the 4<sup>th</sup> did not "narrow down" the American proposal but rather expanded it. At the same time I stated the state of affairs in Tokyo on the basis of your telegraphic instruction No. 589 and then told him that our Government earnestly wished the swift realization of the meeting of the leaders of both countries.

To this, Hull said that they were taking much time to hasten the meeting of the leaders and then he asked how the guidance of Japanese public opinion, which he had requested in the past was getting on. I replied that, as I had repeatedly told him, our Government had been paying much attention to that, and that consequently the situation was

gradually improving.

Further, as he asked for my personal opinion, I told him that our Government considered the Tripartite Alliance could be compatible with the adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, and that we were sure that the meeting of the leaders of the two countries would strengthen peace in the Pacific.

Hull stated that, as to the conversation between Minister TOYODA and Ambassador Grew, he had received Grew's report and was studying it carefully in a friendly spirit, and that it was his desire to reply as soon as possible. I asked for his agreement to the meeting of the leaders in principle, but I could not get any definite reply.

Hull then referred to the situation of the world, saying that it would not be too early for Japan and the U.S.A. to think of reconstructing world peace at this time, and that, as for him, he thought that Japan and the United States had a golden opportunity to take the "leadership" of the world, but that he doubted whether the "statesmanship" of both countries would be competent to meet the situation. Then I explained that for that very purpose the meeting of the leaders of both countries would be necessary, and this ended our talk.

(Dispatched, 23<sup>rd</sup>)

**Wednesday, September 24, 1941**

At 7 p.m. called up Minister TOYODA on the telephone (for ten minutes).

Dispatched September 24. No. 847

Though I could grasp the general idea of your opinion through the telephone talk between us just now, there are still some points which I cannot understand thoroughly. As I reported to you in my telegram No. 842 of the 23<sup>rd</sup>, I told the Secretary of State in compliance with your instructions, that we had already said our say and had nothing further to tell Ambassador Grew in Tokyo. To this, he replied that he would endeavor to give an answer as early as possible. In short, I am now awaiting their attitude. At this juncture your telegraphic instructions No. 591 arrived. There being many points in it which I myself can hardly understand, I should be unable to reply to the other side if I should present it now to the other side. Not only that, I fear that the other side might interpret it to mean that we shall be able to station troops at any point throughout China. So please let me know as soon as possible, for my own confidential information, be return telegram, the explanatory statement to which you referred in our telephone talk. As you say, we have now come to the last five minutes. It is my intention to do my best so far as my side is concerned in compliance

with your instructions. (10:30 p.m.)

**Saturday, September 27, 1941**

Secretary MATSUDAIRA called on Valentine and handed him (with the request that it be delivered to the Secretary of State) No. 595 (a proposal for an understanding which had been drawn up in Tokyo, based on the proposal of June 21).

**Monday, September 29, 1941**

At 9 a.m. called on Secretary of State Hull, and in the afternoon visited Admiral Stark.

No. 867

**Interview with Secretary of State Hull**

On the morning of the 29<sup>th</sup> (Monday) I visited the Secretary of State and asked for a secret interview with the President in compliance with the purport of your instructions. He said that, as the President had been staying in Hyde Park since Thursday on account of the death of a relative, he would see the President as soon as the latter returned to Washington and give us a memorandum of the American Government in one or two days. He said that he had read yesterday the report from Grew and seemed to know everything about the matter.

During our conversation, Hull agreed to the opinion that we should submerge minor differences for greater common interests by taking a long-range view of things, but he asked me about the public opinion of entire Japan. I replied to the following effect: Our Government, the Army and the Navy are reaching an understanding between Japan and the U.S.A., but it will take much time for the whole nation to understand it. There are some people who wonder why the U.S.A., advocating, as she does, the Monroe Doctrine and holding as a matter of fact the leadership of the American Continent, should interfere so much in Asiatic affairs. Japanese public opinion cannot be expected to change over night to what the United States desires. To wait for this change would be like waiting one hundred years for the waters of the Yellow River to become clear.

(Dispatched on the afternoon of the 29 th.)

Tuesday, September 29, 1941

No. 881

On the 29 th (Monday) I called on Admiral Stark after a long interval and had a talk with him (Rear-Admiral Turner participated from the middle part of our talk). The Admiral acknowledged that the problem of stationing troops in China would be the stumbling block in the negotiation and that it was difficult to effect Japanese-American understanding unless the China Affair was settled. Apparently judging that Japan would not readily consent to the withdrawal of troops, Turner seemed to regard that it would be dangerous to hold the meeting of the leaders of the two countries before arriving at an agreement. While we were talking about the Tripartite Alliance, Admiral Stark said that the U.S.A. would never attack Japan on her own initiative. I should judge that when it comes to two-ocean operations the U.S.A. will naturally take a defensive or a passive-offensive position in the Pacific.

Admiral Stark is one of those persons who considers that a Japanese-American war will bring no benefit whatever to the two countries and that economic questions cannot be solved by force. As he has been always kind and good to me, I told him that I was overwhelmed with shame for my failure to bring about satisfactory results since my arrival here. To this he stated that all those who know me appreciated my efforts. And then he showed and urged me to read an article on the Far Eastern question appearing in the Business Conditions Weekly (the article said that a "show-down" between Japan and the U.S.A. was drawing near, but that there was no need for war to both Japan and the U.S.A. for the U.S. A. wished prosperity for Japan if Japan would so change her policies as to make possible the adjustment of diplomatic relations). He himself promised to do what he can. Please convey this to the Navy Minister.

(Dispatched, September 30.)