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九州共立大学経済学部紀要  
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## 野村駐米大使日記 (昭和16年 6 月 3 日～ 8 月30日)

Munehiro MIWA  
三 輪 宗 弘

### 解 題 (Introduction of Ambassador NOMURA's Diary)

野村吉三郎には昭和21 (1946) 年 7 月に世に問うた『米国に使いして』(岩波書店、昭和21年)がある。50年以上も歳月を刻んだのにもかかわらず、今日でも古書目録で散見でき、比較的ごろな値段で求めることができる。敗戦下の物資不足にもかかわらず、如何に多く印刷され、一般の目に触れたかわかる。『米国に使いして』の記述は具体的であり、詳細にわたっているから、一読すれば、日記かメモ類に基づき書かれたものであるとわかる。

さて、今回紹介する野村大使の日記は、昭和16年 6 月 3 日から12月31日までの期間の日記の英訳である。INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION の1686号と番号がふられ、日付けは1946年 5 月25日になっている。添付されたメモによれば、1941年のオリジナルは手元にあり、部分的に翻訳され、コピーは取っていないと記されている。この記述だけからは、野村日記が真珠湾攻撃直後に米国内で押収されたのか、それとも敗戦後野村が東京裁判のために提出したのか、知るすべはない。R.J.C.Butow の “The John Doe Associates Backdoor Diplomacy for Peace, 1941” (Stanford University Press, 1974, p458)によれば、占領中に野村日記は押収されたが、野村が取り戻したと書いてあるが、根拠は記されていない。また英訳にいたった詳細は不明である。英訳(rough translation)したのは、日系人の Kotaro Kurosawa 氏である。

今回活字にできたのは昭和16年 6 月 3 日から 8 月30日までであり、これを「パート I」とし

て九州共立大学経済学部紀要第66号に掲げ、現在入力中の昭和16年9月以降の日記は、できるだけはやく「パートII」として掲載する予定である。

R.J.C.Butow の“The John Doe Associates”の中に野村日記への言及があったので、それを手掛かりに、米国国立公文書館本館のマイクロフィルム室でさがし、幸運にも遭遇することができた。(RG331, IPS1686, Entry329-M1690-Roll238A/RG98) 私がコピーし、手書きの走り書きで英訳され、読みにくかったのを、メリーランド大学学生 of Leo Saal 氏に入力していただいた。歴史に関心のあるネイティブでなければ、判読に多大の時間を要する手書きの英文であった。判読を手伝って下さった父親も含めて、Saal 氏親子に感謝したい。

野村日記の原本そのものがまだ発掘されていない以上、日本人研究者にとっても、目を通す価値はあるだろう。少なくとも『米国に使いして』に記されなかった活動状況は把握可能になる。また、日本語を駆使できない海外の研究者に日米間の争点を明らかにし、それと同時に F. D. ローズベルト大統領 (Roosevelt) や C. ハル国務長官 (Cordell Hull) が日本と戦争をさけようと努力していたことを伝えてくれるであろう。日本側の英文史料として、日米開戦経緯の研究にとりわけ有用であろう。そういうふうになれば、英文の日記は活字にしておくだけの価値はある。50年も経過した今日、日本の立場を正当化しようなどとは思わないが、今回史料紹介する日記は、当時の記録であり、何を日米間で議論したのか、何が争点になったのか、野村大使が何を考えたのか、米国首脳は何を考えたのか、野村と松岡洋右外務大臣はなぜ意志の疎通をきたしたのか、なぜローズベルト大統領は強硬な属僚に断固たる処置を取らなかったのか、南部仏印進駐に対して米国はどうみていたのか、日米首脳会談は誰が熱心であったのか等、疑問を解く鍵を提供してくれるであろう。

私はローズベルト陰謀説に付随するローズベルト像やいわゆる「ハル・ノート」に伴うハル像というものに納得がいかなかった。そのため私はローズベルト大統領・ハル国務長官に関心を持ち続け今日に至っている。駐米大使野村になぜ大統領が何度も会う必要があるのだろうか、国務長官が頻繁に非公式に会う必要があるのだろうか、など考えてみれば、ローズベルトやハルはどちらかと言えば親日家と呼ぶべきではないのかと、これまで僕は考えてきた。ローズベルトの“public papers”を読んでも、どこにも日本への非難は出てこない。若き研究者であった私は、流布されている通説やイメージと資料との乖離がかくも大きいのかと、驚いたのを覚えている。H.L. イッキーズ (Ickes) 内務長官の“THE SECRET DIARY OF HAROLD L. ICKES III THE LOWERING CLOUDS 1939-1941” (SIMON AND SCHUSTER, NEW YORK, 1954) を読めば、ローズベルト大統領・ハル国務長官・ウォーカー郵政長官 (Frank C. Walker) と他の属僚との対日政策への姿勢の違いは明白である。関心あらば読みたい。

野村大使には帰国後提出された「言上書案」(昭和17年8月20日帰国直後に上奏された)「駐米任務報告」(年月不詳)があり、外交史料館に所蔵されている。後者の「駐米任務報告」は300ページからなる報告書であり、ローズベルト大統領・ハル国務長官との会談内容がそれぞれ纏められており、最初に大統領との面談内容が記述され、ついで国務長官と話し合われた内容が記載されている。前者の「言上書案」は昭和17年8月の帰国直後に上奏されたものであり、当時は戦争中であつたので、敗戦後書かれた『米国に使いして』とは書き方や表現には違いがある。戦時中と敗戦後では日本の米国に対する見方が違うのは当然であろうし、何人も時流に拘束されるのは当然であり、この差異から逆に過去を推察することができよう。しかし野村には時代に拘泥されない見方もあった。野村日記を読み進めるうえで、参考になる野村自身の日米交渉に対する全体像を摘録しておこう。

ハル国務長官に対して、野村は以下のような評価を下している。これは戦争に突入し、戦時中になされた回顧である。野村とハルの会談は、後段の付表Ⅰからわかるように10月9日から11月7日まで約1ヵ月間も行われなかった。二人の関係は、日米首脳会談の頓挫とともに、冷却期を迎えたのであろう。それがこの回想から読み取れる。

「惟フニ本交渉ヲ通ジ米国政府ハ終始東亜ノ現実ヲ無視シ其ノ抱懷スル空疎ナル独善的理想ヲ固執シ、之ヲ帝国ニ強要セントシ、帝国ノ国策タル新秩序達成ノ理想ヲ否認シ、甚シキハ帝国ノ三国同盟離脱ヲ求ムルノ態度ニ出デタノデアリマシテ、当初ハ多少ノ融通性ヲ示シテ居ツタ「ハル」モ属僚ニ相談シ又支、英其他第三国代表ト連絡スルニ及ビ、全ク硬化シ遂ニ前記ノ十一月二十六日ノ暴戾ナル提案トナツタノデアリマス。之ハ輿論——其若干ハ自ラ作りタルモノ——ニ束縛セラレ、官僚ニ拘束セラレ、第三国ノ妄動ヲ許シタルガ為カトモ思ハレマス。」(前掲「言上書案」116ページ)

ここに明言されているように、開戦の原因は11月26日の所謂ハル・ノートにある、としている。「今日猶真珠湾攻撃ハ国務省の十一月二十六日付通牒ヨリ論理的ニ予期スベキ結論タルコトヲ理解セザル者ガ多タアル」(124ページ)と書き、開戦の責任を米国に転嫁している。ハルが真珠湾攻撃直後野村に激情をあらわにしたことが、野村の頭から離れなかったのか、騙し打ちという米の非難に反撃したいという心情なのかはわからない。真珠湾攻撃は、野村とハルが非公式会談を続けている最中であり、ハル長官からみれば背信行為そのものである。対日強硬論者の一人であるイッキーズ内務長官は閣議でのハルの様子を“Hull was more than ever like

a Christian martyr at the Cabinet meeting.” (P.663)と書き、日本の陸海軍が攻撃の準備をしているのにもかかわらず、日米会談を続けていたことを無知であると指摘している。おそらく真珠湾攻撃直後はもちろんのこと、日本の敗戦後もこの類の批判はハルに放たれたであろうし、ハルは回顧録でも弁明しなくてはならなかったであろう。真剣に日本との交渉を進め、太平洋の平和を望んでいたとは、真珠湾攻撃後のメモアールでは書けなかっただろう。ドイツとの戦争に備えて、日本をなだめるために話し合ったという弁明の方が、ハル国務長官の名誉を傷つけなかったであろう。歴史家は一次史料に敬意を払うべきで、回想録に引きずられてはなるまい。筆者が関心を持っているのは、日米交渉に取り組んだハルであり、回顧録を書いているハルではない。野村はローズベルト大統領と比べるとハル国務長官には辛口であるが、南部仏印進駐までのハルの交渉姿勢には好意的な評価を下している。

「六月下旬迄ハ日米交渉ニ相当ノ熱ヲ示シ、三回モ病床デ面談シタノデ其ノ非礼ヲ陳謝シマシタル処此問題ハ重大デアルカラ自分モ辛抱強ク執着シテ居ルノダト申シマシタ。仏印南部進駐カラガラリト平和熱ハ冷却シマシタガ、ソレデモ或時ハ「ホワイトハウス」ニテ野村ニ対シテ君ト自分ハ共同ノ目的ニ向ッテ協力スルモノデアルト申シタコトモアリマス。」(前掲「言上書案」117—118ページ)

ところで一言マジック(暗号解読)についても触れておこう。米国が日本の外務省のやりとりを傍受していたことは知られているが、日本もまた米国大使館とワシントンのやりとりを傍受していた。陸軍参謀本部第18班・海軍軍令部特務班が中心になり、解読を行っていたが、どのように利用されたかは、先行研究もなく不明であり、関連資料も散在した状態である。例えば外務省外交史料館に所蔵されている『特殊情報綴』には、外務省に配付された、傍受した記録が残されているが、断片的な残された記録から、どのような情報がどのセクションに流されて、如何なる判断がくだされたのか、今後の解明を待ちたい。指摘するまでもないが、情報自体も大切であるが、その情報を文脈で読み取る政治的なセンスがいることは、今も昔も変りはない。断片的な情報がかえって疑心暗鬼を生むという場合も当然起りうるだろう。

野村吉三郎の経歴については、木場浩介編『野村吉三郎』(非売品、昭和36年)の年表で克明に追えるので、参照していただきたい。同書は「駐米任務報告」を基にして記述され、電文はじめ関連史料が丁寧に添付されているので、野村の英文日記を読む際座右に置いていただきたい。その他『追憶 野村吉三郎』(非売品、昭和40年)があるが、入手が難しい。塩崎弘明編『井川忠雄 日米交渉史料』(山川出版社、1982年)は、ぜひ通読していただきたい。野村と頻繁に

会ったウォーカ郵政長官に関する有益な記述・史料が収められている。また同書に収録された岩畔豪雄大佐の「アメリカに於ける日米交渉の経過」は、日米交渉に当った日米両国関係者の人物評価が記されており、野村日記を読むうえで理解の補助になる。外務省編纂『日米交渉資料』（原書房、昭和53年、覆刻原本＝昭和21年）には野村日記に番号付きで記されている電報が、同じく掲載されている。照らし合せられたい。

野村日記が日本の研究者だけでなく、海外の研究者の探求に役立てば幸である。各々の問題意識で野村日記が読まれることを望み、擱筆したい。

付記 外交史料館白石仁章氏に史料についてご教示いただいた。記して感謝したい。

日米交渉は informal conversation であるから、訳語が不自然という指摘があろうが、通例に従い日米交渉と表記した。

左上の数字例えば(1)は、手書き英文のページを表す。

#### 付表 I

##### 野村－ローズベルト大統領会談

2-14	Roosevelt	3-14	Roosevelt	7-24	Roosevelt	8-17	Roosevelt
8-28	Roosevelt	9-3	Roosevelt	11-10	Roosevelt	11-17	Roosevelt
11-27	Roosevelt						

##### 野村－ハル国務長官会談（ウェールズ国務長官代理）

3月

3-8 Hull

4月

4-14 Hull 4-16 Hull

5月

5-2 Hull 5-7 Hull 5-11 Hull 5-12 Hull 5-14 Hull 5-16 Hull

5-20 Hull 5-21 Hull 5-28 Hull

6月

6-3 Hull 6-7 Hull 6-15 Hull 6-19 Welles

6-21 Hull 6-22 Hull

7月

7-18 Welles 7-23 Welles 7-28 Welles 7-30 Welles 7-31 Welles

8月

8-6 Hull 8-8 Hull 8-13 Hull 8-16 Hull 8-23 Hull ②

8-27 Hull ② 8-28 Hull

9月

9-1 Hull 9-4 Hull 9-6 Hull 9-10 Hull 9-19 Hull

9-23 Hull 9-29 Hull

10月

10-2 Hull 10-3 Hull 10-9 Hull

11月

11-7 Hull 11-12 Hull 11-15 Hull 11-18 Hull 11-19 Hull

11-20 Hull 11-22 Hull 11-26 Hull

12月

12-1 Hull 12-2 Welles 12-5 Hull

[3-8は昭和16（1941）年3月8日の略記である。②は1日に2回会談したことを示す。]



## Ambassador NOMURA's Diary

June 3, 1941~August 30, 1941

Translated by Kotaro KUROSAWA

(1)

Tuesday, June 3, 1941

At 9 p.m. met the Secretary of State at his private residence and made preliminary arrangements as to the instructions to be given to our subordinates for amending the wording of the American counter-proposal which was handed to us by Valentine at 6 p.m., last Saturday (our amendment was submitted to them on Monday).

According to the Secretary of State, there are many on the American side who doubt whether Japan has the sincerity to maintain peace in the Pacific in view of Foreign Minister MATSUOKA's statement.

The Secretary disclosed that he found himself in a very

(2)

hard plight and he emphasized that the maintenance of peace in the Pacific was the basis of the present understanding and that the same applied to the relations between Japan and Australia and others, not to speak of Japanese-American relations.

As he repeated his past opinion regarding the "anti-Comintern" stationing of troops I explained that it was the inflexible policy of the Japanese government and then I said that, as for Japan, it would be well if the USA would advise China to make peace with

(3)

Japan and, and if China should refuse it, suspend American support of China.

Thereupon the Secretary expatiated on that he was racking his brain in regard to the treatment of this problem. The point to be aimed at, he said, is to so adjust Japanese-American relations as to make China not discontented and to bring about Sino-Japanese amity. He added that this was the arduous task.

Finally, he wished me to report to Tokyo that the maintenance of peace

in the Pacific was the basis.

(4)

**Wednesday, June 4, 1941**

Held a meeting of both countries, attended by Hamilton, Valentine, WAKASUGI, MATSUDAIRA, and IWAKURO (accompanied by IKAWA).

Attended and delivered a speech at the dinner party given under the auspices of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce at Waldorf-Astoria, New York. Admiral Pratt, General O'Ryan, and Mr. Zelders also made speeches. The party was a great success, attended by 800 people, including the hosts and guests.

(5)

**Friday, June 6, 1941**

Returned to Washington at noon.

**Saturday, June 7, 1941**

At 8:30 p.m. called (accompanied by IWAKURA and IKAWA) on the Secretary of State.

The stand taken heretofore by the other side has been as follows.

(1) The maintenance of peace in the Pacific being the basis of the present understanding, they wish to make this point so clear that everybody will be convinced of this. They do not wish to create the impression that there was bamboozlement.

(6)

If this is done, they can finally persuade business circles to participate in financial and economic co-operation between Japan and the USA. The Secretary repeated this two or three times.

(2) The Pacific question includes the relations of Japan and of the USA to the European War and the China Affair.

Saying that the China problem was the subject of his greatest worries, the Secretary of State said that the improvement of the relations of the three pairs, that is, the relations between Japan and the USA, China and the USA, Japan and China, was what was aimed at, but that caution must

(7)

be taken not to cause Chinese bad feelings towards the USA.

To my query as to whether the President could advise China to make peace for the sake of peace in the Pacific and for the happiness of whole mankind, he replied that it all depended on whether the two countries could come to a spiritual agreement on the present proposal for understanding.

(3) As to the European War, he repeated several times the self-defence argument characteristic of the USA, saying that Hitler was thinking of conquering

(8)

the world. If Britain should give in, the Atlantic Ocean would be at his mercy and South America would turn out to be his supply base of materials. This would endanger the USA. Fifteen countries have been destroyed because they had sat with folded arms till their borders were invaded. The United States cannot follow their steps, he declared. (I have tried hard to check this conception along the line of your instructions, but for the present there is no hope of success. The USA, however, is not likely to enter the war so soon. Holding the United States in restraint is the main

(9)

point of our future diplomatic policy towards the U.S.A.) Moreover, the view is held that the time for peace has not come yet. Winant's return to America is giving currency to various rumors, but the President denied them positively.

(4) Attaching importance to the principle of non-discrimination in trade and commerce in the Pacific area, he said that the United States was applying this principle to the other countries of America. By adopting it Japan would become prosperous and lose nothing, he said, adding that the

(10)

[Copy not readable, need to recopy]

(11)

**Monday, June 9, 1941**

At Tokyo's request wired the other party's proposal of May 31 (accompanied by a telegram giving some explanations). At the other party's wish this proposal was originally not intended to be wired to Tokyo.

\* On the night of June 7 (Sat.), the Secretary of State stated with much courtesy to me and Capt. IWAKURO, who accompanied me, that our private friendship would suffer no change in future. This gave me the impression that he was hinting that the Japanese-American parley would be discontinued.

(12)

That day we had a talk for about two hours but he was confined to his bed by illness since the following day, the 8th. From the 22nd or 23rd he went to Greenbriar for a change of air.

He declared positively that he had no interest whatever in the trifles of wording so long as we could not come to a mutual understanding for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific, the question of the right of self-defence, and the principle of non-discrimination in trade and commerce (extending over the whole Pacific).

(13)

**Tues., June 10, 1941**

Capt. IWAKURO and I discussed tonight the telegram from Tokyo with much indignation.

(14)

**Wednesday, June 11, 1941**

Made out the following draft of telegram but decided to put it off in accordance with Naval Attach Capt. IWAKURO's advice.

Your Excellency's private information only:

I had a dream last night. You must be well aware that I, who have been your friend for 30 years, am not a man who would act ultra vires or who would do anything that hurts others. Nevertheless, picking up a roadside rumor, you demanded my explanation of it last time.

The word you used then

(15)

were such as one would not dare to use in talking even to a common soldier. I obey your instructions to the end, but in carrying them out, I am only using my discretion

as to the order in which they should be put. Now when I have already received your dignified instructions and am carrying them into effect, why should there arise an affair of ultra vires over a matter akin to obtaining tickets? This is absolutely not that heroic Matsuoka. In view of the circumstances which lead me to come out of my retirement, the real Matsuoka should put more trust

(16)

in me.

Another world developed before me and there appeared God.

"I sympathize with you in your predicament," says He. "You have lost your prestige toward your subordinates, and, moreover, you look very tired. But remember, now that you have been dispatched to a foreign land as an envoy with a great mission on this important occasion by the Imperial command, you should with patience and prudence try not to fail in the fulfillment of the Imperial order, even at the risk of injuring fair name as a man of spotless integrity, which you have enjoyed for the past fifty

(17)

years."

To this, I answered: "I will always keep your advice in my mind and promise You that I will not do anything that will not be justified before heaven and earth."

(18)

**Friday, June 13, 1941**

Towards evening I obtained the following confidential information from the Post-Master General:

(1) From noon he had a talk with the key officials of the State Department. The gist of the problems discussed was:

(A) Chinese question.

If the stationing of troops on North China and Inner Mongolia is an exercise Japan's right of self-defence this would be justified no matter how long it may be carried out. But, it is another question if Japan intends to carry it out for an indefinite period on political grounds.

(19)

Therefore the United States wishes to understand that the withdrawal of troops in

connection with the China Affair will be completed by the withdrawal from North China and Inner Mongolia as the last.

(B) Question of coping with the European War.

Although the deletion of the words "the right of self defence," may be all right so far as it goes, their deletion deserves careful consideration because it is likely to be construed as a kind of "threat" to the U.S.A. Therefore in case these words are to be deleted, the United States desires to make some modifications to the other

(20)

clauses, or else modify the wording in question in such a way as to satisfy both sides.

(C) The Pacific Question.

The United States wishes to extend the application of the principle of non-discrimination, Secretary of State Hull's cherished opinion, to China and the South-Sea Islands. Therefore, it is desired that Japan make clear that Japan has no intention of seeking a monopoly in China, nor of restricting the rights of third countries there, as was stated in the KONO statement.

Though the United States will consider letting Japan share legitimately some of the rights and interests the U.S.A. has in the South-Sea

(21)

Islands, she wishes to avoid the insertion in the written understanding of anything that will infringe on the sovereignty of Britain or the Netherlands. This does not mean that the United States is unwilling to mediate between Japan and these countries.

The Post-Master General will talk over with the Secretary of State tonight the following items in the American proposal of May 31st:

- (a) The right of self-defence, etc. (as aforesaid).
- (b) The item regarding

(22)

the China Affair will be as it is in the Japanese proposition of June 8, but the name of "Chiang Kai-shek Regime" will be changed to "Chungking Regime".

- (c) The other item will be same as the original American proposal.

(2) Both the President and the Secretary of State wish the adoption of the draft

of understanding.

(23)

**Saturday, June 14, 1941**

At 1 p.m. called on Under-Secretary of State Welles (re TACHIBANA Incident)

At 5 p.m. called on Chief of Naval Operations Stark (ditto).

(24)

**Sunday, June 15, 1941**

At 10:30 A.M. met the Post-Master General and Mr. Drought.

At 11:00 A.M. met the Secretary of State at his request (accompanied by IWAKURO and NAKAGAWA; Valentine sat in company).

(The Secretary was in bed on account of illness.)

As he asked me about the state of affairs in Tokyo, I showed him the Japanese proposal of May 10 in accordance with the Government's instructions. I told him that since the receipt of the American proposal of May 31st, I had been negotiating without going beyond the bonds of

(25)

Government's instructions, not being influenced at all by what others said.

Thereupon he mentioned Mr. MATSUOKA's message to Italy and said that he had obtained information that in Tokyo Mr. MATSUOKA and his followers were trying to break down the present understanding.

Then as to the Pacific question, he talked of peace between Japan and Britain as well as peace between Japan and America and of "no discrimination". As to the China Affair, citing the opinions of

(26)

Chinese statesman, he urged amicable relations between Japan and China and said that the United States demanded non-discrimination in trade. In regards to the right of self-defence, he said nothing, but this is a pending question.

The Secretary said that if peace could be maintained in the Pacific, it would hasten the peace of the world and that he had been coping with this problem

with sincerity without resorting to any tactics. But being confined in bed now, he asked me to send a wire to Tokyo based on my own

(27)

judgment.

To this I replied that this answer was vague and promised to make some routine arrangements later.

(28)

**Tuesday, June 17, 1941**

At 10 a.m. Admiral Nimitz (the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Fleet) called on me accompanied by his Chief of Staff.

At 5:30 p.m. had a talk with the Post-Master General. He complained that whereas the U.S.A. entertained a special goodwill toward Japan, as maybe seen in the President's fire-side talk, in the freezing of the Axis funds, and in the closing out of consulates, Japan, on the other hand, had not returned any goodwill at all as seen in MATSUOKA's statements.

(29)

He said that the problems now pending were:

- a) The right of self-defence in connection with the Tripartite Alliance;
- b) The stationing of troops in North China and Inner Mongolia against the communists;
- c) The adoption of the principle of non-discrimination in trade.

If agreement on the aforesaid three points could be reached we would be able to arrive at an understanding, said he. Upon this, I fully explained the Japanese attitude and set forth in detail that while I was prepared to make a strong recommendation in respect to item c, some means must be devised in respect to items a and b, since these were very difficult matters.

(30)

[Blank]

(31)

**Wednesday, June 18, 1941**

WAKASUGI and Hamilton had a talk. The TACHIBANA question was settled.



(32) Hamilton is said to have stated in view of the Ambassador's request and out of consideration for the Ambassador's "earnest endeavor" to adjust Japanese-

American diplomatic relations, they will close the case, in spite of definite proof, on condition that he (TACHIBANA) immediately return to Japan.

**Thursday, June 19, 1941**

At 1 p.m. called on Under-Secretary of State Welles and thanked him for his efforts. He told me the same thing that Hamilton had told WAKASUGI (yesterday).

(33) I told him that in respect to the understanding now pending, too, I was confident of

success and believed in providential protection. I added that if the understanding is reached millions of "silent masses" would surely rejoice. To this he showed an attitude of concurrence.

(34) I called on and tendered my thanks to the Chief of Naval Operations.

**Saturday, June 21, 1941**

At 12:30 called on the Secretary of State and received an "oral statement" and the revised American proposal.

(35) According to him, Hitler, not being satisfied with the conquest of fifteen countries, is trying to conquer others. He is, as it were, a "wild tiger". It is fair and proper as a matter of self-defence to "resist" him.

Europe now stands on a "precipice" and will be confronted with "anarchy" and "bankruptcy". It goes without saying that peace in the Pacific is necessary, but frequent reports indicate that in Tokyo, on the contrary, many responsible persons are opposing Japanese-American understanding along the present "line".

The secretary of state said that he wanted the Japanese Government to

show

(36)

more sincerity one way or the other.

Hereupon, I told him positively that these were groundless and explained that I was negotiating within the bounds of the government's instructions.

(37)

**Sunday, June 22, 1941**

At 11 a.m. called (with IWAKURO and IKAWA) on the Post-Master General. The important matters in our talk were as follows. Took our leave at 1 p.m.

(1) There are some in Tokyo who obstruct Japanese-American understanding. It is necessary to remove this misunderstanding, since the U.S. Government is worried about this.

(38)

(2) In connection with the Tripartite Alliance, the U.S. Government, insisting on the right of self-defence, has attached an annex. It is difficult for Japan to agree to it.

(3) The anti-Comintern stationing of troops is a troublesome matter to the United States as it is contrary to the American principle of non-stationing of troops in foreign lands.

(39)

(4) Principle of non-discrimination in trade and commerce.

At 8:30 p.m. called on the Secretary of State, gave him our "oral statement" in response to the documents handed to us yesterday (Valentine sat with us), and explained the four items over which I had talked with Walker this morning. As to (2), he said that the United States

(40)

did not like to annoy Japan, nor did she like to be annoyed by Japan. As to (3), he said that even if Japan and the U.S.A. should come to an understanding, it would place the U.S.A. in an awkward situation, if Japan and China should disagree with each other.

He talked very courteously, showing full enthusiasm for reaching an understanding.

(41)

**Monday, June 23, 1941**

At 6:30 p.m. had a talk with the Post-Master General.

He remarked that he revered the Secretary of State as he did his own father, that Hull was a man of sincerity and not a double-tongued man. He also regretted that Hull was ill. According to him, Hull hopes for the consummation of an understanding, but with the obstinacy of old age, Hull desires to make sure of the true intentions of the Tokyo Government. Then,

(42)

saying that the anti-Comintern stationing of troops was the most difficult issue, he asked whether there was some way of making it consistent and taking it up as a problem between Japan and China.

To this I gave the same reply as I had given to Secretary Hull last night, namely, that I could not "commit" myself, in as much as this policy was a fixed policy of Japan, having been decided at a Cabinet meeting.

(43)

And again, he talked of the enthusiasm of both the President and the Secretary of State for the consummation of an understanding.

Today wired to Tokyo the "oral statement" which I had received the day before yesterday, and others.

(secret No. 424)

(44)

**Tuesday, June 24, 1941**

Was invited to dinner by Admiral and Mrs. Ingersoll.

**Wednesday, June 25, 1941**

Regarding the "oral statement" telegraphed the day before yesterday (Mon.), wired my opinion for the confidential information of the Minister only, because rumors had come to my ears that Ambassador

(45)

Grew had given the following incredible information to the Secretary of State.

As Ambassador Grew submitted to the Secretary of State secret information to the effect that Foreign Minister MATSUOKA had stated that Ambassador NOMURA's efforts for adjusting Japanese-American relations are ultra vires and hence he would "torpedo" it whatever

(46)

agreement might be reached, the State Department authorities were much puzzled, and the people close to the President wanted to ascertain the Japanese Government's true intentions before submitting the American Government's final proposal, because they thought that, if such were the case, there would be great danger of the understanding being broken, however much the United States might endeavor to make the American

(47)

proposal come closer to the Japanese proposal, and that in that case that would raise a grave question of responsibility. Thus reference was made to the matter in the "oral statement" of the Secretary of State.

(48)

**Thursday, June 26, 1941**

Called on Mrs. Benson (2420 Tracy Place, N.W.).

Admiral Benson, who died seven or eight years ago, was Chief of Naval Operations during my service as naval attache here.

(49)

**Saturday, June 28, 1941**

Drew up the [following] draft today and dispatched it to the Minister on the 29th.

I am waiting for your instructions with reference to my telegram of the 23rd. The Soviet-German war having broken out since then, I suppose you must be worried about various questions. I hereby forward my opinion once again.

(50)

The U.S.A. does not wish to make double-front operations. Consequently it goes without saying that she desires peace in the Pacific, but, as you

know, she is hastily making provisions for the time when this may become impossible.

As for her attitude toward the European War, she is trying to reserve freedom of action in her proposal for Japanese-American understanding, but as a practical

(51)

question, she will probably not participate in it for the time being. If a Japanese-American understanding is reached, there will be room for us to hold her in restraint against participation in war by diplomacy.

Since the outbreak of the Soviet-German War she has been paying special attention to the activities of Japan and she seems to have concluded that Japan would like a policy of wait and see for some time,

(52)

judging that, free as Japan is now on account of the removal of the Soviet Union's pressure on Japan, it will be difficult for her to advance into Siberia on a large scale as long as the China Affair is going on, and that she will be very cautious in making her advance to the south, as this is likely to cause a large scale war against Britain and the U.S.A., now that Britain, the U.S.A. and the Netherlands have fortified those districts

(53)

by airplanes and submarines, with the result that the defenses of these areas have been strengthened more than they were a few months ago. And I add that the underestimation of the strength of the Japanese air force is also one of the reasons of their above mentioned judgment.

As I have already reported to you, the U.S.A. is very scrupulous in supporting the Soviet Union; this, however, would not be so easy, even if she tried to carry it out.

(54)

Now, if the U.S. Government should lose hope in the realization of a Japanese-American understanding, efforts for the improvement of the relations between Japan and the U.S.A. would be stopped. There is considerable danger that this would bring about the severance of economic relations, then our advance to the south; and finally our clash with Britain and the U.S.A. Under these circumstances,

(55)

trade and communication between Japan and all the countries of America and the British possessions would be difficult to maintain, and eventually all diplomatic relations would be severed.

As I understand it, our fundamental policy is to make the Tripartite Alliance our keynote and to avoid

(56)

Japanese-American War. So long as there is no change in this policy, I believe that the Tripartite Alliance and peace in the Pacific will be compatible as the result of the realization of the proposed understanding.

As stated above, the realization of a Japanese-American understanding will be not only advantageous from a long range

(57)

viewpoint, but also provide a way for settling the three pending questions mentioned in my last telegram. So I wish that you would at once think out some means for realizing the understanding. And again, it is my desire to make it clear to the other side that the Japanese Government desires the realization of a Japanese-American understanding as I think it unwise to postpone this, and

(58)

keenly feel the greatness of my responsibility. I hereby ask for your instructions.

July, 1941

(59)

Thursday, July 3, 1941

Made a representation of my opinion to the following effect:

#### REPRESENTATION OF OPINION

If Japan should at this time when she is in a delicate situation, resolve to use armed force against the Soviet Union and prematurely participate in the war, and that in concert with Germany, who can say that this will not aggravate Japanese-American relations,

(60)

and to a critical point short of war? Therefore, even when such a resolve is made,

I wonder if it might not ease in some measure the aggravation of the relations between Japan and the U.S.A. if Japan should send the troops in the name of the maintenance of peace in East Asia and from Japan's own independent

(61)

standpoint at a period of political confusion which the collapse of the Russian armed force might occasion.

Furthermore, if such a policy is adapted, I wonder if it is not a good idea for Japan to have the pending understanding between Japan and the U.S.A. reached as quickly as possible and push on the negotiations on the pending issue of self-defence as a reciprocal matter.

(62)

And again, if you are resolved to use armed force against the Southern Regions at this time, there seems to be no room at all for adjusting Japanese-American relations. My judgment of the existing situation being as stated above, no matter what national policy you may adopt, I think it necessary to try some means or other toward the U.S.A. So

(63)

I await your instructions in return.

At noon, the Rev. Drought called on me.

At night the Post-Master General called me up on the phone.

(64)

**Friday, July 4, 1941**

At 6 p.m. sent for Councilor Valentine and asked him to communicate to Secretary of State Hull the purport of the Tokyo dispatch (we have no objection to your stating positively that there is no objection in the Government circles to the fundamental principle for adjusting Japanese-American relations on a fair and just basis).

(65)

This was written in a note addressed to Secretary of State Hull, who was recuperating.

(66)

Saturday, July 5, 1941

The Gist of the Telegram (Dispatched, July 6). Yesterday, on the 4th, I sent for Valentine and through him communicated to Secretary of State Hull that our Government had no objection to the fundamental principle for adjusting the relations between Japan and the U.S.A. under a fair and just basis. On the night of the 5th Hamilton called

(67)

on me with Valentine to inform me that they had communicated it to the Secretary of State.

They told me that, as stated in the oral statement of June 21st, the maintenance of peace in the Pacific was the foundation of a Japanese-American understanding. However, they had obtained information that Japan was, at last, going to wage

(68)

war against the Soviet Union. This was reported to the President (a military conference was held as soon as he returned home yesterday) and a telegraphic instruction was sent to Grew to ascertain the Japanese Government's intentions.

(69)

Then, taking out a newspaper clipping which he had brought with him, he talked of its contents (Japan will start within two weeks her advance to the South. First she will occupy Saigon and its vicinities and seek air bases in Thailand; on the one hand she will bomb the Burma route and on the other hand she will make preparations to advance southward to Singapore and the Netherlands Indies. She will endeavor to avoid

(70)

a conflict with Britain and the U.S.A. until the preparations are finished. By so doing, she will hold in check the U.S. Navy in the Pacific Ocean, in return for the recognition of the Nanking Regime by Germany and Italy.)

(71)

To this I replied that I had read the paper once, but that I had received no information; that,

however, so long as the U.S.A. helped Chiang Kai-shek, giving financial support,



sending airplanes and munitions and moreover dispatching pilots, it was only natural for Japan to take a counter-measure; that, as I had already told the Secretary of State, an American fleet had gone on a cruise of Australia; that the U. S.A. had stationed

(72)

military and naval attaches in various districts; that there was information purporting to be the nature of the conversations between the military authorities of the U. S.A. and the Netherlands Indies and the British territories; that, besides, there appeared to be military reinforcements in those districts; that moreover, there was afloat even the report that they were about to arrange for support with the Soviet

(73)

Union by strengthening the defence of the Aleutians and its vicinities; that this was tantamount to an encirclement of Japan from a strategic point of view; that furthermore, we had obtained information that the U.S.A. was about to place an embargo on oil; that if such a situation should develop, the maintenance of peace would become difficult; and that is why I was endeavoring to bring about

(74)

Japanese-American understanding. I further stated that the Japanese were exceedingly prudent toward war, and none, with the exception of a few, desired a Japanese-American war; that the Americans, on the contrary, were apt to treat war lightly and some blindly believed that they could beat Japan in a few months; that I knew that the responsible authorities did not cherish such an idea, but still

(75)

the situation, as seen from Japan's side, did not warrant optimism; and that, hence, I felt keenly the necessity of our arriving at a point of understanding somehow or other.

Hamilton said that he had come to me as a messenger of the Secretary of State.

According to the press, the Government

(76)

will make it its principle not to publish its policies, but to make them known to the people through its future activities. However, when we read the papers here, we cannot but feel that this statement alone would make the countries surrounding Japan very cautious, leading them gradually to build up political and strategic

citadels. Besides, the atmosphere here does not warrant optimism at all.  
(Reported by telegram on July 6.)

(77)

**Tuesday, July 8, 1941**

The Gist of the Telegram (Dispatched on July 8).

Many a day has passed since I asked for instructions, but still I have not received them. The other side, as seen clearly in their oral statement of June 21 st, has doubts about our true intentions. Though they appreciated our intentions to a certain extent as a result of

(78)

my explanation, in which I had clarified our Government's intentions in accordance with your telegraphic instructions, I have not succeeded yet in clearing away their doubts. On the contrary, the postponement of our reply, together with other circumstances, is giving them the impression that it substantiates their doubts,

(79)

thereby causing them to lose gradually hope for the adjustment of diplomatic relations and making the future of the negotiations harder.

A certain cabinet Secretary is said to have confided to a person connected with our embassy that, unless the negotiations are promptly resumed, the circumstances surrounding the American side are developing very unfavorably for the negotiations.

(80)

He said he was greatly worried over the situation.

It is a matter for regret that, the negotiation having come to such a standstill, I am unable to carry your instructions through.

Upon careful consideration of the situation in this country, I find that since the outbreak of the Soviet-German War the people have been paying particular attention to Japan's movements -

(81)

some observe that Japan will carry out at this juncture her long cherished policy of northward advance and, consequently, will not think much of the Soviet-Japanese treaty; others think that Japan, at this juncture, will make great strides southward, which will coincide with Germany's eager desire. In either case, they assert

(82)

that it is mere illusion to promise peace in the Pacific and the non-expansion of the war situation under such circumstances. Besides, we even find people who depreciate Japan's international faith.

The Secretary of State, however, has attached from the beginning much importance to the Japanese-American problem, and he has already conducted seventeen

(83)

conversations with me. Even after he was confined to bed, he repeated to me twice that he attached great importance of the problem.

The same impression has been gained by those who have been conducting flanking movements in close contact with Cabinet Secretaries with whom they are on intimate terms.

(84)

The President also is said to be of the same opinion. And Naval circles seem to favor this view as a whole.

This, I think, is quite natural for this country from a political standpoint, as well as from that of national defence. For all that, I cannot believe at all that they will by any possibility finally become conciliatory if we keep up our resolute attitude toward them. Judging from

(85)

the tone of argument seen in the newspapers and magazines, I should think that the United States Government will be unable to assume such an attitude. On the contrary, there is a considerable fear that the United States Government would take advantage of this opportunity to suspend negotiations. In this connection, I at this end will tax my ingenuity further in regard to the three pending points (self-defence, the question of stationing troops,

(86)

the principle of non-discrimination in commercial opportunity) and try to keep up contact with the other party by some means or other so as not to break it off. In case we succeed in thinking out a concrete plan, I shall report to you, but in the meantime please favor me with your early instructions in regard to the disposition of the American proposal which I have already reported to you. (Dispatched, July 8.)

(87)

Thursday, July 10, 1941

On the morning of the 10th I sent telegrams to the Navy Minister and the Chief of the Naval General Staff reporting the particulars of the adjustment of Japanese-American diplomatic relations. In response to that, I received on the 15th a telegram from the Navy Minister and the Chief of the Naval General Staff dissuading from resigning.

(88)

On this very day, I received a telegram from the [Japanese] authorities, ordering WAKASUGI to return to Japan because they wish to receive directly from him a report concerning the questions pending between Japan and the U.S.A. So I wired the following in return:

Gist of the Telegram

I acknowledge receipt

(89)

of your telegram no. 350 (ordering WAKASUGI home).

Just after the outbreak of the Soviet-German War, the American side seemed to have thought that it was to their advantage if they completed beforehand the adjustment of Japanese-American relations, but it seems that subsequently they began to

(90)

cast a considerable doubt upon the Japanese attitude on account of the information they had obtained. Accordingly, although there is still a ray of hope if our side should push on the negotiations swiftly, but if you intend to decide one way or the other after receiving the report on the situation from a person to be called back from here (it takes three weeks or so), there is no hope of arriving at an understanding and the diplomatic relations between

(91)

Japan and the U.S.A. will come very near to rupture.

(Request for permission to return to Japan)

Since under such circumstances my stay here would be meaningless and since I believe it is more appropriate for me to report on the situation to you [than to make another do it], I request your permission to return to Japan.

(92)

Friday, July 11, 1941

((Disapproval))

On the afternoon of the 11th, I received an instruction disapproving my request to return to Japan. The telegram read in part as follows:

"Aside from His Majesty's opinion, the feelings of our people will never acknowledge your leaving the place of your appointment at this time, . . ."

(93)

Saturday, July 12, 1941

Together with Mr. OBATA, I went to the Homestead Hot Springs, VA, and stayed there overnight.

(94)

Sunday, July 13, 1941

Arrived at the Greenbriar White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, at 11:30 a.m.

Paid a visit of inquiry to Secretary of State Hull, who had been recuperating here since the 23rd (Mon.) of June. His Private Secretary Mr. Gray received me on behalf of the Secretary of State. According to him, Mr. Hull is getting better and will probably be able to go back in

(95)

ten days or fortnight. Though the Secretary of State is declining to see his visitors under his doctor's advice, he expressed thanks for my kindness. Although he wished to resume the conversations, he had not thoroughly read the documents which had been relayed through Mr. Walker.

I requested Mr. Hull's private secretary to convey to Mr. Hull that, according to a dispatch from Tokyo, the Japanese Premier, Foreign Minister, War and Navy Minister, and

(96)

other Cabinet Ministers are all hoping for the adjustment of the diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States.

(97)

Monday, July 14, 1941

Telegram Informing my Remaining in Office for the Present.

I acknowledge receipt of your telegram no. 356. I am deeply moved by your favor. In accordance with your kind instructions, I will remain in office for the time being to exert myself until the pending problems are decided some way or other.

(98)

Being an amateur, I fear I have given you so much trouble that I do not know how to apologize for it. But, on my side, things have gone contrary to my expectations and we have constantly lost our prestige to a great extent at home and abroad as the result of your successive telegraphic instructions. I will try my best not to make gross mistakes in future by attending to my duties

(99)

with scrupulous care, but no matter how much I may try, I am afraid that I may again cause troubles to you and our country, since I come from circles where a certain extent of free reign is allowed under instructions and this has become my second nature. And at the same time, viewing from every angle, I keenly feel that it is necessary for me to resign from

(100)

my post as early as possible for the benefit of the country.

In this connection, I earnestly desire that you would, from a long range view of things, immediately replace me with a skilled person acceptable to you. I know perfectly well that I am not qualified for the post, and besides, from the very beginning, I have been a temporary

(101)

time-serving existence. Moreover, I have had no intention to remain long in this post, as I told you before my departure. So I make an earnest appeal for your favorable consideration.

(Dispatched on the afternoon of the 14th.)

On Monday afternoon Hamilton and Valentine came to me to return a courtesy visit at the Secretary of State's order.

(102)

**Tuesday, July 15, 1941**

The instructions asked for (in our telegram no. 424 sent on the 23rd of June) finally arrived.

At night Hamilton and Valentine called on me. After saying that they had come at the order of the Secretary of State, who was now recuperating, they said that, whereas, the conversations

(103)

centering around the problem of maintaining peace in the Pacific were now in progress, information had kept pouring in that Japan was establishing naval and aerial bases in French Indo-China. So they asked to know the actual facts of the case. To this I replied that I only knew what had been reported in the press, that I was not surprised in the least

(104)

by such a rumor at this time when Japan was being gradually sieged [SIC] by the increased British and American support of Chung King, by the co-operation among the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands Indies, and by the co-operation between the United States and the Soviet Union. I pointed out that, when compared to the fact that the U.S.A. had actually occupied Iceland and that there were rumors that she would take over the Azores and Dakar, it was not at all strange even if Japan should

(105)

carry out what the rumors said. I told them that anyway, I would give an answer after inquiring of our Government about it.

Then they asked me if there was, besides the Pact of Alliance, any special agreement with Germany or Italy that would place Japan under the obligation against the U.S.A. in the event of the latter's participation in war.

I replied that I didn't think there was any, but that

(106)

the obligations provided for in Article III of the Pact would arise under such circumstances. As to the particulars of the obligations, I told them that there was

no need to inquire of Tokyo, for they were just as they were written in the Treaty. Then I repeated what I had told the Secretary of State once before, namely, that the Japanese Government could not acknowledge in advance that all future actions of the United States would

(107)

be based solely on self-defence. There would be no way to judge them except by investigating each case minutely. I added that, the U.S.A. was in the safest condition as far as national defence was concerned, there was no fear at all of she being attacked by other countries. Moreover, pointing out that the United States was on especially friendly terms with Canada, that Mexico was just like what Manchukuo was to Japan, that the countries south of Panama, not to speak of north

(108)

of it, were gradually coming within the sphere of American influence, I declared there was no comparison between the United States and Japan in point of national security.

To this, they advanced the Secretary of State's own arguments. (Dispatched on the afternoon of July 16th.)

(109)

**Wednesday, July 16, 1941**

**Return of the Oral Statement**

On that occasion [T.N. when Ambassador NOMURA had a talk with Hamilton and Valentine on the 15th], I conveyed to them the complain of the Foreign Minister to the oral statement of June 21st. To this they replied that they had no intention at all of interfering in the internal affairs of Japan. On the 16th and the 17th

(110)

WAKASUGI called on the Secretary of State and returned the oral statement, with the consent of the Secretary of State. I telegraphed the particulars of the case to Tokyo.

(111)

**Friday, July 18, 1941**

At 6 p.m. I called on Under-Secretary of State Welles and asked for a friendly arrangement for the passage through the Panama Canal of the Japanese merchantmen lying at anchor at Panama. He said that the prohibition of passage



was for an indefinite period from the standpoint of national defence, but that he would give me an answer after making

(112)

a minute inquiry.

I also talked of the Cabinet change in Tokyo and of Japan's position from the standpoint of national defence. The Under-Secretary of State, on the other hand, wished to maintain peaceful relations between Japan and the U.S.A., which he said had extended for some 90 years.

(113)

**Saturday, July 19, 1941**

Today new Foreign Minister TOYODA sent me his compliments, asking for my co-operation. Accordingly, I made a representation with an introductory remark acknowledging receipt of his telegram and pledging to exert my utmost. I also asked for instructions again concerning the pending problems.

(114)

The latter part of the telegram ran as follows:

"In short, according to my view, it may not be quite impossible to find some means to come to terms on the question of the right of self-defence, but there is probably no room for compromise in respect to the stationing of troops for anti-Communist purpose. Therefore, we must find some wording which is acceptable to both sides and contrive to obtain the substance to our side, but this is the most difficult problem in my opinion."

(115)

**Sunday, July 20, 1941**

Called on Admiral Stark (he was out), and dropped in at Rear Admiral Turner's home and talked over with him the Japanese advance into French Indo-China, Japanese-American understanding, etc.

(116)

**Monday, July 21, 1941**

Went to New York and stayed at the "Plaza". At night received an

urgent telephone call from WAKASUGI and decided to leave here early next morning by air.

**Wednesday, July 23, 1941**

Wired the following telegram dated the 23rd. The Gist.

In my telegram of July 3 and 19 I reported on the effect of our southward advance on

(117)

Japanese-American relations. This effect is now developing with considerable speed, and there is a great fear that it will come very near to the critical point of severing diplomatic relations. Feeling the tenseness of the situation from the talk on Monday between WAKASUGI and the Under-Secretary

(118)

of State, I asked for an interview with the Under-Secretary on Tuesday, but received an appointment at 3 p.m. on Wednesday.

I met a certain Cabinet Secretary who hastily returned from a tour last night. He intimated to me that nothing could be done as Secretary of State Hull was recuperating, while Welles was much

(119)

embarrassed. As he asked my view, I told him that I would do my utmost according to my conviction, without losing hope. Anyway, it is my observation that the situation will come very near to the severance of diplomatic relations.

This rapid change of the sentiment here toward Japan is due to our southward advance. It is the

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observation here that this southward advance is the initial step in the eventual advance to Singapore and the Netherlands Indies. The Navy here seems to make the same observation. There appears to be the criticism that Japan is on the one hand purposing Japanese-American understanding, but on the other hand mapping

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out the policy of southward advance, thus dispising [sic] the Secretary of State. This, together with the state of his health has given rise to the rumor that the Secretary of State might resign.

Moreover, information which is likely to cause the people here to doubt our true intentions is pouring in from Tokyo. The most striking one

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says that (a) my negotiations here will be "torpedoed" in Tokyo, and (b) Japan has given to the Axis side the explanation that the adjustment of Japanese-American diplomatic relations is a stratagem employed to gain time until the completion of preparations for the southward advance. Even the highest responsible persons are said to have gradually begun to lend their

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ears to such reports. In short, there is no doubt that, while the negotiations were in progress, third parties have made slanderous reports to estrange Japan from the U.S.A. and opposition movements have occurred on both sides. We are now in a delicate situation indeed.

In this connection, I wish

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you would take this opportunity to express to the American Ambassador the Japanese Government's sincere wishes for the adjustment of Japanese-American diplomatic relations and explain our true intentions in respect to the advance into French Indo-China. I also request that you indicate to me privately the policies of the new Cabinet. I, on my part, am determined

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to do my very best as if I had revived from death. (Dispatched at noon on the 23rd.)

(126)

**Wednesday, July 23, 1941**

- At 1 p.m. was invited by Admiral Stark and dined with him.
- At 3 p.m. called on Acting Secretary of State Welles.

In my talk with Admiral Stark on the 23rd of July, I remarked that it seemed to me that the heads of the American Navy were made up of outstanding first-rate figures.

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Thereupon the Admiral said that Ingersoll was very able, Turner "especially good", and so was Tower of the Air Bureau. As for the fleets, he said that both Kimmel

and King, whom he had recommended, were men fitted for their posts. He also explained that Hart, though already beyond the age limit, was being retained in service because he was an able man.

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○ Telegraphic Report (9 p.m., the 23rd).

Interview with Welles.

In view of the nature of the interview between WAKASUGI and Welles, I had a talk with Welles on the afternoon of the 23rd and expatiated on the fact that our southward advance was based on

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indispensable necessity for national security and economy, especially that Japan alone could not assume an attitude of remaining idle, only to be destroyed, in an economic war in which every other country was carrying out "embargo". And then as to the problem of French Indo-China, I told him that, since there was prospect,

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according to the press, of a peaceful negotiation between Vichy and the Japanese Government, it would be desirable for the United States Government to watch the situation for a while and refrain from making a "hasty conclusion". I also told him that if an embargo was placed on oil too, I feared this would greatly incite the feelings of our people. As to the conclusion of a Japanese-American understanding, I informed him that the new Cabinet was as eager as the former Cabinet to arrive at an understanding.

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The Under Secretary of State, though he did not repeat what he had told WAKASUGI, said to the following effect:

"In brief, the spirit which has guided the conversations between Hull and me is incompatible with the Japanese policy toward French Indo-China. Neither the U.S.A., nor Great Britain will ever attack French Indo-China. Vichy's submission is due

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to Hitler's pressure. It is observed that Japan will further advance southward, making French Indo-China her foothold.

Then he added that the U.S. Government had never made a hasty conclusion for many years in the past, and that, in short, the United States was

(133) being influenced by Japan's policies." Though he did not refer to the future,  
he told me on parting that the Secretary of State would come back soon and would  
probably be pleased to resume the conversations with me. (9 p.m., 23rd)

(134)

**Thursday, July 24, 1941**

o Telegraphic Report (8 p.m., 24th).

Interview with the President.

Feeling keenly the urgency of the situation, I had asked the Chief of  
Naval Operations, during the course of a luncheon with him alone yesterday, the 23  
rd, to convey to the President my desire to have a talk with the President. At five  
this afternoon I met the President privately.

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In accordance with your successive instructions, I explained to the  
President in detail the unavoidable circumstances which necessitated Japan's  
advance into French Indo-China from the standpoint of national economy and  
stabilization of that area. I also explained Japan's respect for the territorial  
integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China. Next, after informing him that  
the new Cabinet was very eager to arrive at a Japanese-American understanding

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I urged him to give a political consideration based on a broad point of view to the  
maintenance of peace in the Pacific.

Then the President replied that, though public opinion had advocated  
strongly an embargo on oil export to Japan, he had so far persuaded the public as  
to the necessity [of exporting oil] in

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order to maintain peace in the Pacific. Saying that he had now lost the basis of this  
argument, he hinted that an embargo on oil export might be enforced. And as to  
the advance into French Indo-China, he clarified the views of the U.S. Government  
by stating the main points of the statement issued by the State Department today,  
the 24th.

(138) Then the President, with the

introductory remark that it was probably too late and that he had made no previous arrangements with the State Department in regard to this point, said to the following effect:

If Japan should withdraw her troops from French Indo-China, if all guaranteed her neutrality (as was done in the case of Switzerland), and then if some means could be found whereby all countries could

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obtain goods and materials freely and fairly from French Indo-China, he would do all he can for it. He himself had deep sympathy for Japan's efforts to procure materials.

The long and short of it was that I received the impression that some kind of an economic pressure will be enforced in the near future. The Chief

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of Naval Operations, who was specially called in, sat beside Under-Secretary of State Welles. (8 p.m., the 24th)

Interview with the President

In my interview with the President I explained the following, beside the problem of French Indo-China:

That the proposition for a Japanese-American understanding should aim to

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maintain peace in the Pacific; that it is a matter for regret there are some indications that the U.S. Government suspects the true intentions of the Japanese Government; that the Japanese Government has become much more enthusiastic since the present Cabinet was formed; and that, in my opinion, there are means for settling the three difficult points: namely, the right of self-defence, the

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stationing of our troops in inner Mongolia and in North China, which is not permanent, and non-discrimination in trade.

In our conversation the President declared that Hitler was scheming the conquest of

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the world (He said the same thing during my interview with him on the 14th of March. When asked for his view by the President, the Secretary of State, who sat

in company with him then, stated that he, too, was of the same opinion.); that after Europe, Africa would be the next victim, and so on --- there would be no end; that in ten years it might happen so happen that Japan will fight

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on the side of the U.S.A.

I refuted his view by saying that since ancient times it was proverbially said in Japan that 'when the people become warlike, the state will surely be in danger' and 'swords are for refuting false doctrines and bringing out the truth'.

2. As the President seemed to regard that our advance into French

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Indo-China would extend further southward under Germany's pressure, I refuted him by saying, that there was no German pressure upon us and that Japan was acting from her own independent standpoint. The President accepted my explanation at least in words. However, as you already know, public opinion in the U.S. A.

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believes that Japan either in concert with Germany or independently will advance southward or northward when a favorable opportunity offers.

(Dispatched at noon of the 25th)

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**Friday, July 25, 1941**

- At night the White House published a directive for "freezing" Japanese assets.

**Saturday, July 26, 1941**

- Went to New York by plane and stayed at the Hotel Plaza overnight.

Returned on Sunday.

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**Monday, July 28, 1941**

The Ms. TATSUTA-maru, not being permitted to enter port, anchored outside San Francisco harbor. Accordingly I called on Welles (at 5 p.m.) to find out the connection between the "freezing" and shipping movements.

## Telegraphic Report (Dispatched, 29th)

In my interview with Welles on the

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28th, I reminded him, as the sequence of my talk, that sometime ago he had told me that for the past 90 years peaceful relations had been maintained in unbroken succession between Japan and the United States. I then said that it was a matter of grave concern, that the two countries were moving more and more in the direction of a dangerous

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course, unless some harmonizing measure could be found against the policies which the two countries were now adopting. If there was no 'statesmanship' to avoid this, it would be a great sin against humanity, I said.

As he told me that it seemed that at the time of your Excellency's conversation with Ambassador Grew, you had not yet been informed of the President's

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proposal which was made the other day, in spite of its importance, I replied that I had submitted only the main points to you at that time, but that I had reported it to you in detail today.

What Welles said to me contained the same meaning as the President's, that is, he made it clear that, so long as Japan did not resort to armed occupation, the United States had no intention of preventing us from obtaining goods

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and materials under the principle of equal opportunity and there will be no fear of threat against the security of French Indo-China.

Now, under the present situation, we are proceeding single-handed toward the worst in East Asia, against America, Britain,

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the Netherlands Indies, China, and the Soviet Union. While Japan is performing her duty of checking the United States for the sake of Germany, Germany is facing the United States with the greatest possible care and prudence, contriving to moderate the American people's sentiment and also doing their best to avoid a German-American war, by bringing out peace terms as a flanking operation.

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It looks as if Japan were unwittingly venturing to plunge headlong single-handed into a war against Britain and the U.S.A.

It is my earnest desire that you would exercise the utmost prudence and cope with the situation for the benefit of a far-sighted state polity, by politically  
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taking a long view of the whole situation, even if quick decision is necessary from a military point of view. (Dispatched, 29th.)  
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Wednesday, July 30, 1941

At 11:45 a.m. called on Acting Secretary of State Welles at his request. He handed to me a note regarding the bombing of the gunboat *Tutuila* and, remarking that it was the President's order, stressed the following three points:

(a) The Japanese Government had given a guarantee for not repeating the mistake at the time of the *Panay* Case; (b) Are  
(157)

the Army and Navy invested with the power of doing such a thing? (c) The *Tutuila* and the American Embassy were located in the 'safety zone', which is on the opposite bank.

I replied that such an incident was likely to happen in the battlefield and that there was no way of absolutely avoiding such a mistake other than by giving up the bombing of  
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Chung King or by moving away the Embassy and the gunboat. However, I promised to report it to the Government.  
(159)

Thursday, July 31, 1941

At 6:45 p.m. called on Acting Secretary of State Welles and elucidated the viewpoint of the Imperial Japanese Government on the *Tutuila* Case. Took my leave after asking him to arrange for me a direct interview with the President should my explanation fail to settle the question.

Mr. Welles, after consulting with the President, announced to the press the

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settlement of the incident. (In my interview with him on Saturday, Welles told me that he had wired the above effect to Grew.)

In the afternoon Hideo IWAKURO (Colonel) and Tadao IKAWA started for San Francisco by airplane. I am very grateful for the cooperation they have given me. I also did my best for them.

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Further, Mr. Welles requested me to add Thailand, besides French Indo-China, in the President's proposal of the other day.

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**Friday, Aug. 1, 1941**

Tonight the embargo on oil was proclaimed. (It is published in the newspapers of the 2nd, Sat.)

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**Saturday, Aug. 2, 1941**

At 1:45 p.m. called on Acting Secretary of State Welles and asked him to use his influence for enabling the Ms. ATSUTA-maru to leave port. In view of the guarantees that he had given me several times, he felt very sorry for it and said that he would do something to cope with the litigation of private parties. He further asked me to call him up in case I wanted to see him as he would report for duty tomorrow,

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Sunday, too.

On this occasion I explained to him that in regard to the President's proposal, though I had not yet received instructions, it had become clearer and clearer that Tokyo was desirous of reaching a Japanese-American understanding. I added that it must be remembered that in Tokyo important problems are submitted to a Cabinet conference, and so things cannot be handled as expeditiously as in the U.S.A.,

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where the President decides things himself, with great authority.

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Sunday, Aug. 3, 1941

At 10 a.m. yesterday, Sat., I called on Post-Master General Walker, after asking him about the recent state of affairs, I told him the reasons for the advance of Japanese troops into Franco [SIC] Indo-China, explaining that the French-Japanese Treaty regarding French Indo-China had made it clear that the advance of Japanese troops was an unavoidable measure under the

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present state of affairs, and that this measure was not a permanent one by any means. Then I asked him if it was not a good idea to pledge non-aggression against the neighboring states --- the Straits Settlements, the Netherlands Indies and so on --- and to provide for the free exchange of goods and materials, thus going a step farther from the past negotiation. But he showed little

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interest in it, and asked me in return whether it was not true that Japan had been making preparations for an advance into Siberia.

He also said that, as we already knew, the President did not want war. However, as I see it, the U.S.A. is, first of all, trying to check the Japanese advance by economic war. All the authorities maintain

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that this is a counter-measure to the Japanese policies. And at the same time she is preparing for an armed clash and seems to be endeavoring to make China and the Soviet Union, not to speak of Britain and the Netherlands Indies, act in concert with her.

The fact that Germany's war against the Soviet Union is being prolonged more than it was

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expected, is, indeed, a good news for the U.S.A., but Walker did not talk so optimistically as the President had done at the press conference yesterday, or as Hopkins, a trusted follower of the President, is reported to have said in Moscow.

However he believed that Germany would not

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be able to undertake great operations for some time even if the eastern front is cleared off, because of the heavy loss in personnel and goods and materials sus-

tained by the German forces, and also because of the shortage of oil. Predicting that during this period production in the U.S.A. would make a great stride and thereby make the situation favorable to her, he believed that a protracted war of several years in duration would take place.

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Monday, Aug. 4, 1941

Request for the Despatch of Veteran Diplomats

(Dispatched, Mon., Aug. 4)

All the papers on Sunday (yesterday) devoted large spaces to comments on the Japanese-American problems, supporting in general the strong attitude of the U.S. Government. The Gallup Poll also showed that there were many people who favored a strong attitude, but they hinted that not all the doors have yet been

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closed. As a affairs now stand, public opinion is focusing its attention more on the relations between Japan and the U.S.A. than on the problems between the U.S.A. and Germany. As the days pass, some degree of moderation may be expected, but we cannot predict the future as it also depends on the war situation in Europe.

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Although WAKASUGI and IWAKURO will report to you the situation upon their return to Japan, the situation is developing so fast every moment that time is an important factor. As I will have no excuse to offer if I should commit mistakes at this time, and, besides, as there is a limit to my humble ability, I wish that you would be good enough to arrange to send some veteran diplomat who is well informed on the state of things at home and abroad (say, Ambassador KURUSU) by the first

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available ship in order to cooperate with me for the present.

In as much as I have no means of knowing the delicate phase of the Government's policies, and since I can do nothing about it here, I ask that you carry out promptly my recommendation after special consideration.

(Dispatched on the afternoon of the 4th)

(176)

Wednesday, August 6, 1941

Visit to Secretary of State Hull.

At 6 p.m. called on Secretary of State Hull at his private residence (accompanied by OKUMURA, Valentine sat in company). In compliance with your instructions I submitted the proposal written in English, as per attached, after explaining it in detail.

The Secretary of State showed little

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interest in our proposal, saying that he would examine it afterward. With an apology that he would state his own idea, apart from the proposal, he expatiated on the relations between Japan and the U.S.A.

In brief, he said that, apart from the relations between him and me, he could not but be deeply disappointed on observing Japan's successive

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actions; that as long as Japan did not stop her conquest by force, there was no room for reaching an understanding; that so long as the Japanese Government authorities termed the United States' actions as an "encircling" policy, there was nothing to be expected from Japan; that, whereas they /the Americans/ wish a peaceful life, it is Hitler's way of acting to smash up, in the name of "self-defence", everything that lies in his way. The Secretary of State apparently used a satire

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against Japan in saying so.

No matter how much we may explain, it is now difficult to make the other side understand our country's intentions, and, besides, we can unmistakably notice that the U.S. Government has made up its mind to cope with whatever situation that might arise.

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**Friday, August 8, 1941**

Visit to Secretary of State Hull on the 8th

No. 671 At 12:45 p.m. the Secretary of State handed to me the reply to our proposal of the 6th. The reply, just as the President had told me, did not yield a single step.

Further, I stated strongly the substance of your telegraphic instructions

and then proposed the holding of a meeting

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of the leaders of both countries in Hawaii.

There upon the Secretary of State pointed out that, while recuperating at the White Sulphur Springs, he had received information that the Japanese Government had decided to use armed force and that since then Japan had been carrying out steadily her decision. As this was inconsistent with what he had been talking over with me, he said that so long as there was no change in this policy there

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was no basis for our talks.

Then, to make sure, I sounded out Valentine, who sat in company with the Secretary of State, on this point. Repeating what the Secretary of State had said, Valentine declared with dissatisfaction that the use of armed force and the policy of maintaining peace in the Pacific were incompatible with each other; and that Japan was mistaken in regard to the "encircling policy", of which she mentioned so often.

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(The Secretary of State had already repeated that twice, while Welles had once said that the turn of expression was similar to that used by Germany.)

Thereupon I pointed out that, notwithstanding the fact that the U.S.A. was in a very safe position from the standpoint of national defence, she was speaking of various dangers and explaining the necessity of strengthening her national defence, of lengthening the term of military and naval service, and of increasing taxes. Saying that it was the

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same with Japan, I declared that what Japan had done or was doing was necessary to warn and awake the people.

In short, what the other party insists on is that America will resume the conversations only if Japan suspends the use of armed force. In this respect, the other side will never retreat and so long as there is no change in our policy, there is no longer any room for proceeding with the talks. Accordingly, please

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take into consideration the matter of conveying your intentions through Grew as occasion demands.

(Dispatched, 6 p.m., 8th)

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**Saturday, Aug. 9, 1941**

No. 673 Though it is not yet possible to find out the actual nature of the interview between Roosevelt and Churchill, of which I reported to you yesterday, rumors have it that the brains of the Army and the Navy here are participating in it. And there is also a rumor that they will issue a joint statement concerning the Far

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Eastern problem. Also in consideration of the fact that the relations between America and Britain on the one side and the Soviet Union on the other are becoming closer and closer, the Far Eastern problem, whether in the north or south, has become the common problem of the aforesaid states and there is no doubt that they will carry out concerted action or parallel operations on every occasion.

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Besides, China and the Netherlands Indies will follow thier example. Therefore I make this report even if it be a duplication.

(Dispatched in the afternoon of Sat., Aug. 9)

Dispatched, Aug. 9. No. 674

Upon the President's return I will endeavor to convince him of the point of your telegram, however as I have reported in my previous successive telegrams

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so long as Japan proceeds with the present policy, the U.S.A., too, will stick consistently to her own policy. In view of the U.S. Government's attitude which regards that our advance into the southern part of French Indo-China has made the trend of our country's policy definite (on this point, both the President and the Secretary of State are of

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the same mind), I think it is difficult to move the other party by merely having the Premier come out in person to carry on the negotiations (this is clear from my interviews on the 6th and the 8th). Almost no hope should be placed on my coming interview with the President. Accordingly, I believe that we cannot find a way out of the situation unless our Government takes some measure that would bring about

a change in the U.S. policy. (Dispatched, 4 p.m., Aug. 9.)

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**Wednesday, Aug. 13, 1941**

Visit to Walker on the 13th

Today (Wednesday, the 13th) I had a talk with Walker. He judged that the advance into French Indo-China had been carried out after all, in concert with Hitler, and that Hitler had brought considerable pressure to bear upon the puppet French Government. As he said that he was of the same opinion as the

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President and the Secretary of State on the question of maintaining peace in the Pacific, I retorted that, while it was impossible to withdraw our troops at once from French Indo-China, I thought it would be realized at a certain opportune time, as declared by the Japanese Government.

Then, referring to the meeting of the heads of both countries, I told him that, if such a meeting is held, we might be able to find out some measure which would be tolerably

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acceptable to both sides from a broad point of view, even if it might not be satisfactory. Although he did not seem to be much interested in it, he said that he would talk it over with Hull.

Next I pointed out that accounts in the press indicated that the U.S. fleets would be assigned to and concentrated in the Pacific, and that the British and American Navies would pool their strength and post necessary forces in the Pacific. I further pointed out that

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not a few persons had declared that American attention of late had been focused on Japan rather than on Germany, and that in Congressional quarters agreement of opinion was easily possible in respect to the policy against Japan. Though he did not venture to deny this, he stated that since the Japanese Navy was highly trained it would be able to cause a great "trouble" should it act in concert with Germany.

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And next he said that it was not because the U.S.A. favored the Soviet Union or because she did not anticipate annoying situation in the future, but that she could



not but cooperate with the Soviet Union now in order to beat Hitler before everything.

(196) I told him that the pressure upon Japan was harmful because it would only invite reaction and complicate the situation. If dealt with great political consideration, the common sense of the Japanese people would make them naturally adjust themselves, I said.

(Dispatched, 9 p.m., 13th)

Visit to Hull on the 13th

(197) At 4 p.m. today, Wednesday, I called on Secretary of State Hull at his request. He handed to me a note on the infringement of American rights and interests, explaining that this had no connection with the freezing of funds but concerned only individuals.

To this I said that it was becoming a reciprocal matter to say disagreeable against individuals and since such a "pinpricking" had no influence on the general situation but was unsavory from the moral point of view, both sides had better stop doing so.

(198) And as he next talked about our resumption /"saiko"/ of the bombing of Chungking, and so forth, I explained our standpoint.

Further, he asked me whether I would be in Washington at the weekend, which gave me the impression that they will propose something at that time.

(199) (Dispatched, 9 p.m., 13th)

**Friday, Aug. 15, 1941**

(200) As I had telephoned to Father James M. Drought last night to obtain his assistance, he took the trouble to call on me at 3 p.m. today.

**Saturday, Aug. 16, 1941**

Interview with Secretary of State Hull on the 16th (Sat.)

Dispatched at midnight of the 16th (Sat.)

In regard to the conference of the "Big Two" of Britain and America, I obtained the information that Britain tried to drag the United States into the war and to cope with her insecurity in the Far East from Japan by utilizing the United States mainly, while the United States, on the

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other hand, made Britain clarify her war aims and also tried to check British ambitions. Thus the information said, the joint statement contained just what America wanted, which would place Britain at a disadvantage. After careful consultation, I considered it necessary to try some sort of measure toward the United States before the President's return to Washington. Accordingly I called on the Secretary of State this afternoon and explained the necessity of adjusting diplomatic relations, laying to heart your successive instructions.

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The Secretary of State repeated what he had told me previously and said that, whereas he had intended to settle the problem by peaceful means between him and me, a "military domination" had been carried out.

To this I replied that the future was not difficult to predict if we left the matter as it was;

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that the Pacific War would not be such a simple matter as people in general presumed but that it would present a scene unprecedented in history; that success or failure would not be decided merely by the fact that America was rich and Japan poor, but that it was destined to be a war of attrition extending over several years; that both countries would profit nothing by it; that the statesman of both countries should not

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follow blindly what their "hotheads" advocate; and that they should not be off their guard since the war was very likely to be instigated by third countries.

Affirming the instigator movement of third powers, the Secretary of State said with a sympathetic attitude that there was such a movement in Japan and also in the United States, adding that some said that Hitler had started the war after

spying into Stalin's

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intentions.

As to "military domination", I strongly refuted his view, explaining that Japan was an everlasting country lead by the imperial family and possessing a history of two thousand six hundred years; that she was quite different in her origin from countries where revolutionists of the age staked the existence of the state and nation at a stroke; and that when we talked

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of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere we meant, not conquest, but neighborly friendship, co-existence, and co-prosperity, which was little different from the American policy of good neighborly relations.

The Secretary of State seemed to concur with me to some extent, and said that the United States recognized the equal position of

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every country and that she would never use armed force.

Then I explained that should outward pressure be brought to bear on Japan she would repel it and stiffen her attitude, but, otherwise, the common sense of the Japanese people would enable them to find out a way for adjusting themselves. The Secretary of State seemed to agree with me on this point.

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Then I said that, as to the conference of the leaders of both countries,

there were among the eight points taken up this time, several points which, in my personal opinion, coincided with those published in the KONOE statement and others, such that I felt rather encouraged; that I felt there would be a way somehow or other for the adjustment of diplomatic relations; and that I considered Japan's determination to send her leader for the negotiations to be an indication of her confidence in, and determination to achieve, success.

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And finally I asked the Secretary of State if the U.S. Government still thought it impossible.

Thereupon the Secretary of State replied that the matter was still in his hand and that he had not yet submitted it to his superior. He added, however, that, if I was confident that it stood a good chance of success, he would be glad to

convey it to the White House. Thus I found his answer to be different from previous ones.

Then he further asked me what I

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thought of the existing situation, so I replied that I felt it very dangerous to leave it as it was.

Incidentally, I have already been informed of the limit of the southward advance, but I hope you would kindly let me know confidentially Japan's intentions toward the north because here we hear many "alarming news" regarding Japan's attitude towards Siberia.

(Dispatched at midnight of the 16th)

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**Sunday, Aug. 17, 1941**

At 4:30 p.m., 17th (Sunday), at the request of the other party had an interview with the President, who had just returned to Washington. (The Secretary of State sat in company.) Wired home by an urgent telegram the necessary part of the interview and also wired home on the 18th the details of the conversation and my personal opinion about it. (See the accompanying papers Nos. 709 and 713.)

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**Monday, Aug. 18, 1941**

Father Drought came to Washington.

**Tuesday, Aug. 19, 1941**

Dispatched, Tuesday, Aug. 19. No. 719

The fact that the President received me last Sunday before anybody as soon as he had returned home and talked a few hours with the Secretary of State, attests fully to the importance of Japanese-American relations.

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What I reported to you in telegram No. 707 seems to have been prepared beforehand by the State Department. As I told you already, the President took the utmost

care in every way in reading it out to me. And it seems that much of the President's opinion was woven into what I reported in telegram No. 708. It looks that he has the intention of responding to our proposal and carrying it out,

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depending upon the conditions. When I said that the point depended on the President's statesmanship, he stated that it was not his desire to close the doors but that it was our turn now to take means for opening the door.

Judging by his cordiality throughout the interview, there is no doubt that he still cherishes some hopes and wishes that the situation would turn for the

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better. According to the press today, the President seems to feel that there is a great danger of the United States being dragged into a war in the Far East and considers the chances of Japan's starting a new aggression are almost fifty-fifty.

Although it is clear that the present proposal for a meeting has been effective in softening the intentions of the U.S. Government, the matter requires strict secrecy. Should it leak out, it must surely cause movements for wrecking it

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from every quarter. I feel keenly the necessity of guarding its secrecy in Tokyo, too.

Since I, too, am studying it here, I shall submit it to you for your reference in case I succeed in drawing up a definite program.

(Dispatched, 6 p.m., Aug. 19)

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**Wednesday, Aug. 20, 1941**

Visit to Walker on 20th (Wed.) Dispatched Aug. 20 (Wed.) No. 722

During my interview with Walker, he said that the President held a wide view of the world; that he was not anti-Japanese in the least; that in his speeches and the present statement the President did not refer to Japan; and that it was unprecedented for the President to take up, soon after returning to Washington,

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the Japanese proposal for a Japanese-American conversation from the State Department and reply direct to me. Under such circumstances, Walker declared, the Japanese Government should reciprocate.

Thereupon I said that it was a decisive measure on the part of the Japanese Government to go as far as this point on this problem.

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Walker replied it was so with the President, too. In the first place, he said, if this should transpire at a time when anti-Japanese sentiment was prevailing and the atmosphere in Congress also anti-Japanese, even if there were no grounds for it, there would be opposition all at once. But if we should succeed in it, and as a result peace in the Pacific should be maintained, the people would be satisfied with the result for the first time. He, too,

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would be satisfied that he had lived to some purpose for having made some efforts on this problem. Saying that it would be absolutely impossible to expect again from the President anything beyond this whole-hearted attitude, he expressed the wish that success would be achieved somehow or other.

(Dispatched, 6 p.m., 20th)

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Dispatched, August 20. No. 723

The President seems to have an idea that he might see Premier KONOE if circumstances require (my telegram No. 722). It is not difficult to see that he has the intention of taking up the matter himself and settle it quickly from a long-range viewpoint. I consider that the President made this proposal in order to display his final political ability

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at this time when anti-Japanese atmosphere is especially growing worse.

Accordingly, it is desirable that the Japanese side, too, give a resolute reply /“kakan naru oshu”/ to this. I believe that it is the most urgent matter at the present time to clarify our position, show the other side that our position is not inconsistent with the American policy, and resume this spring's unofficial conversations which have been since suspended, reserving the

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settlement of each concrete item to future negotiations. From this point of view I drew up a tentative plan as per telegram No. 724. The tentative plan, thought it may not fully convey our meaning as it was done in haste, and we shall inform you by telegram anything which may come to our mind,

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respects on the whole American intentions and policy, and at the same time explains Japan's firm national policy, and corrects misunderstandings concerning it, on the basis of the KONOE statement and other important statements made by Ministers HIRANUMA, ARITA, and MATSUOKA. I should imagine that this plan can be taken up for consideration by the United States as a satisfactory statement in so far as the points contained in the

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American proposal are concerned. No doubt it is unwise to refer at this time to the other points not touched upon by the President. The plan is merely an expediency for starting Japanese-American conversations, and is not a matter to be elucidated at home and abroad. I hope you would use the plan for reference bearing in mind the forgoing points.

Now that the Government has decided

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to adjust the diplomatic relations between Japan and the U.S.A., I don't think there will be another good chance if you should miss this one now.

If, as the President says, the meeting is to be held in the middle part of October, we shall have only a month for completing preliminary talks. And if the meeting is to materialize we shall have to arrange for a ship, select the suite, and make other preparations.

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So I wish you would kindly give me your instructions as early as possible.

(Dispatched, at midnight of August 20)

**Thursday, Aug. 21, 1941**

In the afternoon went to the Blue Ridge Summit and stayed there overnight.

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Dispatched, Aug. 21 (Thurs.) No. 725

According to information from the same source as that of my telegram No. 722, it seems that the President at least intends to embark himself upon the resumption of negotiations for adjusting Japanese-American diplomatic relations.

It is reported that the latter half of my telegram No. 708 was drafted by the President himself.

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Furthermore, there is a rumor that he is expecting to receive directly from me the Japanese reply to this. In this connection, I think it would be appropriate to draw up the reply as courteously and briefly as possible, omitting all argumentative matters. (Passage omitted)

Besides, I should think that rhetorical considerations should be given and that it is necessary to point out

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that Japan has a great concern over the guarantee of her security in the Far East.

(Dispatched, 1 p.m., Wed., Aug. 21)

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**Saturday, Aug. 23, 1941**

No. 735

This morning, Saturday, I called on the Secretary of State and thanked him for his good offices in arranging the interview at the White House last Sunday. When I told him that I expected to receive instructions from Tokyo in a few days, he expressed his doubt as to whether the Japanese Government could control those who

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advocated expansionism. Furthermore, he said that, whereas he and the President were of the same opinion in regard to the unofficial conversations between the U. S.A. and Japan and it was at the President's instruction to push on that the conversations had come to the present stage, it would be necessary to modify them so as to make them fit in with the present situation. He spoke of his pains in trying to make people at home and abroad agree to the conception embodied in

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the conversations.

In reply I told him that it was the same with the Japanese side and that it was necessary for responsible persons to be ready to make martyrs of themselves in order to strive for the sake of peace in the Pacific.

Then I stated that the transportation of planes to Vladivostok and the passage of munitions cargo-ships through Japanese home waters excited our people'



s susceptibilities. Since he referred to the Soviet-Japanese treaty and gave me a non-committal answer, I told him

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that we had also warned the Soviet Union about this. To this he listened intently.

And besides, during our conversation, I explained the meaning of additional dispatch of our troops to Manchuria. And on my referring to the release to the blocked funds for oil, he explained that this was under the jurisdiction of the Treasury Department and that it was to be decided

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after taking into consideration the British attitude. He therefore inquired of me about the progress of the negotiations between Japan and Britain.

(Dispatched, 5 p.m., Aug. 23)

No. 739

At 5 p.m. this Saturday I had a talk with the Secretary of State again. Regarding your telegram No. 495, I informed him that the Japanese Government was taking measures with the attitude of mind to give its reply as early as possible and to bring about an early meeting of the leaders.

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On my referring, in compliance with your instructions, to the Moscow conference and to our demand for the suspension of the transportation of goods and materials for support of the Soviet Union, he pointed out with a smile the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Treaty, as he done this morning, but failed to reply to the former. He added, however, that he would

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report to the President what I had requested. I understand that the President, before he went to Hyde Park, last Thursday, asked about the Japanese answer. He seems to be the most zealous of all.

(Dispatched, 7 p.m., Aug. 23)

**Sunday, Aug. 24, 1941**

At 7 p.m. talked with the Foreign Minister by telephone (When shall I have his answer? Has my telegram reached him? etc)

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**Monday, Aug. 25, 1941**

No. 740 (Dispatched, 1 p.m., Aug. 25)

By the British Premier's radio address the attention of all quarters has been directed more and more to Japanese-American relations. Hereafter, every sort of intrigue for interfering with the adjustment of diplomatic relations will be undertaken not only in the two countries, but also in third-countries. I feel that we should pay the greatest care and

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speedily effect the adjustment of diplomatic relations.

Though the President says that Britain does not wish disorder in the Far East, Britain, as I had already wired you, is reported to be maneuvering to make the U.S.A. fight against Japan and thus drag her into the European War. Britain and America seem to have the mind to refuse peace with Germany to the last.

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**Tuesday, Aug. 26, 1941**

Received telegram Nos. 501, 502, 503, and 504.

(Official proposal for a meeting of the leaders of the two countries, Premier's message, etc.)

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**Wednesday, Aug. 27, 1941**

No. 748 Aug. 27 (Wed.).

With reference to your telegram No. 501, I called on the Secretary of State at noon, Wednesday, and, in accordance with your instructions, handed a copy of the Premier's message, stated orally the points of your telegram No. 503 (its English translation being unfinished), and, after stressing the great significance of this meeting, asked for a direct interview with the President.

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He answered that it would be difficult to reply today, but that he would reply tomorrow morning.

In the course of the conversation I told him that Churchill's speech was harmful. Thereupon the Secretary of State referred to my reply to the reporters

(that I did not answer the detailed questions put to me by the reporters, but only talked about Churchill's eloquence, etc.) And as he also talked of his apprehension that,

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judging from the trend of press opinion in Tokyo, those who advocated expansionism would win out, I rejoined with appropriate remarks and tried my best to enlighten him.

(Dispatched, 6 p.m.)

#### Second Visit to the Secret of State

Calling on the Secretary of State at 8 p.m., I handed to him the translation of telegram No. 503, and talked with him for twenty minutes.

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Thursday, Aug. 28, 1941

#### Interview with the President

(Dispatched, 1:40 p.m., Aug. 28) No. 752

With reference to my telegram No. 748, I had an interview with the President (the Secretary of State sat in company) at 11 a.m. today (Thur., 28th) and handed to him the message and the English translation of No. 503, explaining the points of your instructions. On reading the message, the President highly commended it as very splendid.

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As he read that part of No. 503, which stated that it was difficult to distinguish the cause from the effect, he smiled as if to nod assent to it.

As to French Indo-China, he cynically remarked in a very light vein whether Japan was "not going to advance into Thailand during the course of the conversation between Prince KONOE and himself, just as Japan had advanced into French Indo-China during the progress of the conversations between Hull and myself."

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The President, however, seemed to be satisfied as a whole.

As to the conversation, he hoped for a meeting of about three days and appeared to sympathize with Japan's intention to save the situation by means of this

meeting.

As to Hawaii, he said that he would not be able to go there as it would take him three weeks to go and return from the meeting, pointing out that

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the President was required by the Constitution to sign or veto within ten days bills passed by Congress one after another, adding that this function could not be performed by the Vice-President as proxy. He explained that in this respect the President's position was quite different from the Japanese Premier, who may be represented by an acting Premier pro tempore [SIC]. But if it was Juneau, the President said, he would be able to realize his purpose in a fortnight, that is, two days as far

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as Seattle and two days more from there on, or ten days for a return trip. I replied that, since our objective was in the meeting itself and that the place was of secondary importance, I would report to Tokyo in detail the circumstances. And as to the date, I expressed my wish that the meeting would be held as early as possible. The President, though he did not seem to be opposed to an early date, did not give a ready answer

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about the date. And concerning the meeting with Churchill, he said that it had been proposed sometime in February but postponed on account of the Balkan War. He told me that this also was carried out after obtaining the approval of Congress.

Such was our talk and this is to be continued

(Dispatched, 1:40 p.m., 28th)

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No. 753

With reference to my telegram No. 752, it was mutually agreed between the Secretary of State and me that, in view of the fact that the White House had announced the appointed hour of the interview, an announcement should be made stating simply that I had transmitted the message of Premier KONOE, without any reference to the contents of the message.

(Dispatched, 1:40 p.m., 28th)

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Friday, Aug. 29, 1941

No. 756 (Dispatched, 6 p.m., Aug. 29)

Interview with Secretary of State Hull on the 28th

Concerning my telegram No. 752, I had a long talk with Hull on the night of the 28th. We talked of the subjects of the coming meeting and others, which may be summarized as follows:

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a) Since a grave consequence would arise in case the leaders of the two countries should fail to come to an agreement because one side stuck to its own opinion, it is the desire of the American side to have the questions discussed beforehand so that, when the two leaders meet together, the form of making final ratification (the word 'ratification' was really used) should be adopted. (Regarding this, see the latter part of my telegram No. 703.)

b) He repeatedly stated that,

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although it was necessary to bring our past talks 'up-to-date', the American side would find it difficult to adjust Japanese-American diplomatic relations if the China question was separated, because the China problem was an important one to the American side.

c) He stated that, whereas Japan talked of the United States acting merely as an intermediary between Japan and China, the American side, as had been repeated so often, did not wish to jeopardize Sino-American

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relations by improving Japanese-American relations; that the United States Government did not wish to "explode" China through its own acts; and that, consequently, it was necessary for the American Government to be well-informed of the principles underlying Sino-Japanese negotiations and to make China convinced. He declared that, after all, this was a very difficult task for the U.S. Government because

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it must 'placate' Japan and China and then make Britain, the Soviet Union and the Netherlands act in concert with her.

d) Regarding the withdrawal of our troops from China, I answered that I had nothing to add to what I had told him in the past. As to the right of self-defence, I also repeated the usual reply. However, I explained that since Prince

KONOE had decided

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to come in person, he must be confident of success with regard to these points. Thereupon he said that he wished to know the definite intentions of the Imperial Government because it was futile to proceed under the past understandings only.

Accordingly, I request that you give definite instructions of the Government regarding the questions of

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troop evacuation and the right of self-defence after referring to my telegram No. 540. Furthermore, please hear from Colonel IWAKURO with regard to the particulars of this case.

e) And next, as to the routine side of the meeting of the leaders, in case it is agreed to hold the meeting, I told him my private idea as follows:

1. Since the President

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considered it difficult to choose Hawaii as the place of the meeting, which was preferred by the Japanese side, because of geographical and also constitutional considerations, and proposed Juneau, which lies half way between Tokyo and Washington, it was my conjecture that Tokyo would also agree to it.

2. As to the date, I suggested between September 21 and the 25th.

3. As to the number of personnel I

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figured that five persons would be selected each from the Foreign Office, the Army, the Navy and the Embassy - twenty or so in all, but it might be less.

4. I thought Prince KONOE had better come on board a warship as this would take him about ten days.

5. As to the time of its announcement, I considered it necessary to make mutual arrangements and that, in my opinion, sometime after the departure of

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Prince KONOE would be proper.

The Secretary of State said that he would talk over with the President

with regard to the points mentioned above. Generally speaking, he is very careful and cautious in handling this question and he seems to have been giving it careful consideration from every angle. So it is my observation that the meeting of the leaders will not

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materialize unless both parties reach an agreement on the main points.

(Dispatched, 6 p.m., August 29th)

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**Saturday, Aug. 30, 1941**

No. 761

On the 30th the Italian Ambassador called on me and inquired about Japanese-American relations. Accordingly, within the bounds of your telegram No. 517 and your announcement, I explained that, since the relations had become so extremely tense such that

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the most influential Senator had dared to declare that the chances of a war were fifty-fifty, we had sent a message with a view to alleviating the situation.

As he asked me very inquisitively, I said that from a humanitarian point of view I wish the European War would end soon (he said that emphatically that he too felt the same); that Japan did not wish the U.S.A. to enter the war; that, needless to say, Japan was faithful to the Alliance;

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that the U.S.A. was very cautious about participating in the war because she knew Japan's faithfulness to the Alliance; and that the Pacific War, if it should ever come about, would be a protracted war. Then I remarked that the Americans, far from harboring ill-feeling toward Italy, were rather sympathetic toward her, which I attributed to the fact that there were several million Americans of

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Italian extraction.

He replied that socially there was nothing wrong and that the Americans were kind to them, though politically things were going difficult.

(Dispatched, 8 p.m., Aug. 30)