# Rule－Based Abduction for Logic Programming 

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## RIFIS Technical Report

# Rule-Based Abduction for Logic Programming 

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#### Abstract

In order to capture the nature of inference, a philosopher Peirce classified inference into three fundamental kinds: deduction, induction, and abduction. In this classification, which based on the form of syllogisms, abduction is characterized as the inference of a case $A$ from a rule $A \rightarrow C$ and a result $C$. Furthermore, he also placed these three kinds of inference at each stage of scientific inquiry. According to him, every scientific inquiry begins with an observation of a surprising fact. The first stage, abduction, of scientific inquiry proposes a hypothesis to explain why the fact arises. The second stage, deduction, derives new conclusions from the hypothesis. The third stage, induction, tests empirically or corroborates the hypothesis and the conclusions. Hence, abduction is not only a kind of inference, but also a method of scientific discovery. The inference schema of abduction as the first stage of scientific inquiry is described in the following three steps:


1. A surprising fact $C$ is observed.
2. If $A$ were true, then $C$ would be a matter of course.
3. Hence, there is reason to suspect that $A$ is true.

In computer science, the second stage, deduction, has been developed from viewpoints of automated theorem proving and logic programming. The third stage, induction, has been studied from viewpoints of inductive inference and machine learning. For the first stage, abduction, there are also many researches in various fields. In order to systematically understand them and clearly discuss abduction, first we classify abduction into five types: rule-selecting abduction, rule-finding abduction, rule-generating abduction, theory-selecting abduction, and theory-generating abduction. In this thesis, we examine such various researches on abduction so far developed, and show that most of them can be placed in our classification. Furthermore, we investigate the first three types of abduction, which we call together rule-based abduction, for logic programming.

The rule-selecting abduction for logic programming is abduction which selects a rule in a program and proposes a hypothesis to explain a surprising fact. From the philosophical viewpoint we mentioned above, we should consider the process of abduction which terminates. Hence, it is a main purpose in this thesis to identify the class
of logic programs for which the process of abduction terminates. We first introduce the concept of head-reducing programs. Then, we show that all the derivations for a head-reducing program and a surprising fact are finite. Hence, all the processes of rule-selecting abduction for a head-reducing program are finite.

In general, abduction is closely related to nonmonotonic reasoning. Thus, in this thesis, we compare rule-selecting abduction with default logic. In order to formulate the rule-selecting abduction for default logic, we define a surprising fact and a hypothesis in the default logic. We show that, if there exists a hypothesis which explains a surprising fact, then there also exists an extension of a given default theory, which includes the surprising fact. This extension is corresponding to the least Herbrand model of the definite program obtaining from the default theory.

Furthermore, we extend the concept of head-reducingness to that of breadth-first head-reducing programs, and the rule-selecting abduction to the breadth-first ruleselecting abduction. We also show that there exists a finite derivation for a breadthfirst head-reducing program and a surprising fact. Hence, the process of breadth-first rule-selecting abduction for a breadth-first head-reducing program is finite.

The rule-finding abduction for logic programming is abduction which finds a rule in a program in the set of programs and proposes a hypothesis to explain a surprising fact. In rule-finding abduction, we are interested in how to choose programs from the set of programs. Then, we pay our attention to choosing programs for which the process of rule-finding abduction terminates.

We introduce two concepts of loop-pair and loop-elimination. The loop-pair syntactically determines whether or not there exists an infinite process of rule-finding abduction for the choice of programs. We show that, if a loop-pair appears in a derivation, then the derivation becomes infinite. On the other hand, the loop-elimination is a transformation of programs. By using loop-elimination, we can choose the programs for which rule-finding abduction terminates. We also show that, for given two programs, if we transform one program by loop-elimination, then all the derivations for union of the transformed program and the rest are finite. In other words, by loop-elimination, we can choose the programs whose proof trees have no infinite branches.

In this thesis, we also discuss analogical reasoning from the viewpoint of abduction. In this thesis, we adopt the formulation of analogical reasoning by Haraguchi
and Arikawa. In their formulation, the main problem is how to detect an analogy. In order to solve this problem, we also adopt the concept of partial isomorphic generalizations. By using these concepts, we introduce the concept of deducible hypotheses, and formulate rule-finding abduction with analogy. We show that a deducible hypothesis is correct in the sense of analogical reasoning, and show that it is polynomial time computable with respect to the length of a surprising fact and the size of a proof tree. We design an algorithm of rule-finding abduction with analogy, and realize it as a Prolog program.

The rule-generating abduction for logic programming is abduction which generates a rule and proposes a hypothesis to explain a surprising fact. In rule-generating abduction, only one surprising fact is given. In order to generate a rule and propose a hypothesis, we need to generalize the surprising fact.

When we deal with generalizations, we should avoid overgeneralization. It should be determined whether or not a generalization is overgeneral by an intended model. However, it is hard to give in advance such an intended model in our rule-generating abduction. Hence, we introduce a syntactical generalization of one atom, called a safe generalization. In general, an atom is regarded as a relation between its arguments. Then, for safe generalizations, common ground terms are replaced by common variables.

If the class of definite programs is not restricted to some subclass, there may be infinitely many meaningless hypotheses. Hence, we introduce the subclass of headreducing programs, called weakly 2 -reducing programs. However, without any heuristic, the number of weakly 2 -reducing rules for rule-generating abduction also increases in exponential order with respect to the length of a surprising fact. On the other hand, safe generalizations in this class are characterized by only two types of substitutions.

Hence, by using two types of safe generalizations, we design an efficient algorithm of rule-generating abduction for weakly 2 -reducing programs. The number of rules and hypotheses obtained by this algorithm is at most the number of the arguments in a surprising fact. We show that this algorithm generates rules and proposes hypotheses in polynomial time with respect to the length of a surprising fact. Furthermore, we show that the selected common list in some argument of a surprising fact appears in the same argument of the hypothesis proposed by this algorithm.

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## Chapter 1

## Introduction


#### Abstract

"I have already explained to you that what is out of the common is usually a guide rather than a hindrance. In solving a problem of this sort, the grand thing is to be able to reason backward." - "A Study in Scarlet"


### 1.1 What Is Abduction?

The notion of abduction was first introduced by Charles Sanders Peirce, who was a philosopher, scientist and logician. He held that there were three fundamental kinds of inference: deduction, induction, and abduction. He classified three kinds of inference by the forms of syllogisms ([Pei65]).
(1) Deduction is an inference of a result from a rule and a case. For example, by deduction, we infer the result "these beans are white" from the rule "all the beans from this bag are white" and the case "these beans are from this bag". Deduction is characterized as follows:

| rule | All the beans from this bag are white. |
| :--- | :--- |
| case | These beans are from this bag. |
| result | These beans are white. |

By using logical formulas, the above syllogism is represented by the following one:

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
\text { rule } & \forall X(\text { from_this_bag }(X) \rightarrow \text { white }(X)) \\
\text { case } & \text { from_this_bag(these_beans) }
\end{array}
$$

(2) Induction is an inference of a rule from a case and a result. By induction, we infer the rule "all the beans from this bag are white" from the case "these beans are from this bag" and the result "these beans are white". Induction is characterized as follows:

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
\text { case } & \text { These beans are from this bag. } \\
\text { result } & \text { These beans are white. } \\
\hline \text { rule } & \text { All the beans from this bag are white. }
\end{array}
$$

By using logical formulas, the above syllogism is represented by the following one:

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
\begin{array}{l}
\text { case } \\
\text { result }
\end{array} & \begin{array}{l}
\text { from_this_bag_these_beans }) \\
\text { white }(\text { these_beans })
\end{array} \\
\hline \text { rule } & \forall X(\text { from_this_bag }(X) \rightarrow \text { white }(X))
\end{array}
$$

(3) Abduction is an inference of a case from a rule and a result. By abduction, we infer the case "these beans are from this bag" from the rule "all the beans from this bag are white" and the result "these beans are white". Abduction is characterized as follows:

| rule <br> result | All the beans from this bag are white. <br> These beans are white. |
| :--- | :--- |
| case | These beans are from this bag. |

By using logical formulas, the above syllogism is represented by the following one:

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
\text { rule } & \forall X(\text { from_this_bag }(X) \rightarrow \text { white }(X)) \\
\text { result } & \text { white(these_beans })
\end{array}
$$

According to Peirce, deduction is called analytic inference, while induction and abduction are called synthetic inference. Analytic inference is merely an application of general rules to particular cases, which is logically valid. On the other hand, synthetic inference brings on an extension of our empirical knowledge, which is not always logically valid.

Hence, we classify these three kinds of inference as follows (ibid.):

$$
\text { inference }\left\{\begin{array}{l}
\text { analytic inference }- \text { deduction } \\
\text { synthetic inference }\left\{\begin{array}{l}
\text { induction } \\
\text { abduction }
\end{array}\right.
\end{array}\right.
$$

Peirce not only classified these three kinds of inference, but also placed them at each stage of scientific inquiry. He asserted that every scientific inquiry consists of the following three stages.
(1) Every inquiry whatsoever takes its rise in the observation of some surprising phenomenon. At length a conjecture arises that furnishes a possible explanation (ibid.). Then, the first stage abduction is the process of forming an explanatory hypothesis (ibid.).
(2) The second stage, deduction, is the process of collecting consequences of the hypothesis (ibid.).
(3) The third stage, induction, is the process of ascertaining how far those consequents accord with experience, and of judging accordingly whether the hypothesis is sensibly correct, or requires some inessential modification, or must be entirely rejected (ibid.).

In other words, every scientific inquiry begins with an observation of a surprising fact. The first stage, abduction, of scientific inquiry proposes a hypothesis to explain why the fact arises. The second stage, deduction, derives new conclusions from the hypothesis. Finally, the third stage, induction, tests empirically or corroborates the hypothesis and the conclusions.

Peirce claimed that abduction, although it is very little hampered by logical rules, nevertheless is logical inference (ibid.). Then, the inference schema of abduction as the first stage of scientific inquiry is described in the following three steps (ibid.).

1. A surprising fact $C$ is observed.
2. If $A$ were true, then $C$ would be a matter of course.
3. Hence, there is reason to suspect that $A$ is true.

In general, the above inference schema is depicted by the following syllogisms:

$$
\frac{C A \rightarrow C}{A} \quad \text { or } \quad \frac{C C \leftarrow A}{A} .
$$

### 1.2 Philosophy of Science and Mathematics

In the philosophy of science, many philosophers discussed whether there could be a logic of discovery, after Peirce has discussed the logic of abduction.

Reichenbach [Reic38, Bro77, Cha79, Tha88] proposed a sharp distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification. He claimed that the philosophy of science should be concerned only with questions of confirmation and acceptance that belong in the context of justification, and that the topic of discovery should be relegated to psychology and sociology.

Furthermore, Popper [Popp59, Cha79] pointed deeply that the work of the scientist consists in putting forward and testing theories. He also distinguished sharply between the process of conceiving a new idea, and the methods and results of examining it logically. In the former, there is no such thing as a logical method of having new ideas, or a logical reconstruction of this process. Every discovery contains an irrational element. In the later, the scientific knowledge is never verified, and it is only falsified. In other words, the work of the scientist consists of the context of discovery and the context of falsification.

Reichenbach and Popper adopted this sharp distinction in order to eliminate psychologism. However, some philosophers, for example Kuhn [Kuh70] and Brown [Bro77], have resisted this restriction. Brown [Bro77] claimed that, in a scientific discovery, the context of justification is a part of the context of discovery, and we cannot draw a line clearly between the context of discovery and that of justification. In the philosophy of science, the relation between justification and discovery has left unclear.

Peirce's philosophy of science in Section 1.1 is compatible with the above philosophy of Reichenbach or Popper. The first stage, abduction, of scientific inquiry is corresponding to the context of discovery. The second and the third stage, deduction and induction, are also corresponding to the context of justification or falsification.

Note that the word "logical" in the above assertion of Popper can be interpreted as universal validity in formal logic. Then, Popper's assertion can be considered that the context of discovery is not necessarily universally valid. As mentioned in Section 1.1, abduction is not valid, and also causes a fallacy of affirming the consequent. Hence, we can regard abduction as the context of discovery, that is, the method of scientific discovery. Hanson [Han58] advanced the claim that abduction constitutes a logic of discovery.

For the methodology of mathematics, it is also an important problem to investigate the way of discovery of mathematics. Polya [Pol54a, Pol54b, Pol57] pointed out that there exist no infallible rules of discovery leading to the solution of all possible mathematical problems. Furthermore, he introduced the notion of heuristic reasoning or heuristic, which appears so baffling and elusive when approached from the viewpoint of purely demonstrative logic.

According to Polya, heuristic is reasoning not regarded as final and strict but as provisional and plausible only, whose purpose is to discover the solution of the present problem. We may need the provisional before we attain the final [Pol57].

He characterized such heuristic as the following heuristic syllogism:

If $A$ is true, then $B$ is also true, as we know.
Now, it turns out that $B$ true.
Therefore, A becomes more credible.
Still shorter:

$$
\begin{gathered}
\text { If } A \text { then } B \\
B \text { true } \\
\hline \text { A more credible }
\end{gathered}
$$

Furthermore, Lakatos [Lak76] developed the above Polya's mathematical discovery by incorporating with Popper's logic of scientific discovery.

It is obvious that Polya's heuristic reasoning is almost corresponding to Peirce's abduction. Hence, abduction is a suitable concept for discovery in not only the philosophy of science but also the methodology of mathematics.

### 1.3 Computer Science

In computer science, especially in computational logic and logic programming, many researchers have extensively studied the abduction from various viewpoints.

Plotkin [Plo71] studied abduction together with inductive generalization. There are researches of Shapiro's model inference system [Sha81] and inductive logic programming [MB88, Mug92, Lin89, LU89] as the extensions of Plotkin's work.

Muggleton [MB88] has introduced the method of inverting resolution to construct logic programming from finite examples. Such a methodology is called inductive logic programming. Inductive logic programming has been developed by Muggleton [Mug92]. Ling [Lin89, LU89] has paid his attention on the constructive method for inductive logic programming. These are also a kind of abduction, because they really propose hypotheses.

Genest et al. [GMP90] and Duval [Duv91] have suggested abduction for explanationbased generalization, which is an efficient technique for obtaining a general concept from examples and a background knowledge. Thagard [Tha88] has introduced analogical abduction, which is a kind of abduction incorporating with analogical reasoning.

Pople [Popl73, Kun87, Ino92] gave one direction for researches of abduction. There are researches of Poole's Theorist [Poo88], hypothesis-based reasoning [Kun87], and abductive logic programming [Dun91, EK89, KM90, KKT92] as the extensions of Pople's work.

Poole [Poo88] has discussed the relationship between Reiter's default logic [Reit80] and abduction, and shown that abduction can be viewed as a default logic, and implemented the system Theorist. Kunifuji [Kun87] has developed Poole's Theorist as a hypothesis-based reasoning system.

Eshghi and Kowalski [EK89] discussed the relationship between negation as failure and abduction in logic programming. Kakas and Mancarella [KM90], Dung [Dun91], and Kakas et al. [KKT92] have defined an abductive framework in nonmonotonic logic programming, and studied the semantics in that framework. Out of these studies there
has emerged a new field of abductive logic programming.
There are researches of abduction in terms of a model of belief, which is a kind of modal logic, by Levesque [Lev89] and Selman and Levesque [SL90]. These are regarded as general extensions of Poole's logic [Poo88]. Furthermore, they have claimed that different models of belief give rise to different forms of abductive reasoning, and have constructed a model of belief for abduction. They have also studied the relationship between the models of belief, default logic, and assumption-based truth-maintenance system.

Concerning expert systems, Cox and Pietrzykowski [CP87] have investigated diagnosis problems by abductive inference. Pirri and Pizzuti [PP90] have also combined the diagnosis problem with the stable model semantics which is one of the semantics of logic programming. Konolige [Kon92] has introduced a causal theory, and compared it with abduction. Bylander et al. [BATJ91] has formulated abduction in order to analyze the computational complexity of abduction for propositional logic and for the diagnosis problem.

In computational linguistics, Hobbs et al. [HSME88] has introduced abduction in order to interpret natural language. Stickel [Sti91] has also investigated abduction deeply, and suggested a Prolog-like inference system to interpret natural language.

### 1.4 Classification of Abduction

In order to systematically understand the above mentioned various researches of abduction in computer science and clearly discuss abduction, we classify abduction into five types: rule-selecting abduction, rule-finding abduction, rule-generating abduction, theory-selecting abduction, and theory-generating abduction. The first three types of abduction is called rule-based abduction, and the other two types of abduction theorybased abduction. This new classification is based on the interpretations of syllogism and the definitions of hypothesis. We examine such various researches on abduction so far developed, and show that most of them can be placed in our classification. Furthermore, we investigate rule-based abduction for logic programming.

The rule-selecting abduction for logic programming is abduction which selects a rule in a program and proposes a hypothesis to explain a surprising fact. We can easily realize the rule-selecting abduction as a Prolog program, which is a variant of partial evaluation [vHB88] or meta interpreter [SS86, SS94].

From the philosophical viewpoint we mentioned in Section 1.1, abduction is the first stage of scientific inquiry. Then, we should consider the process of abduction which terminates. Hence, in this thesis, we identify the class of logic programs for which the process of abduction terminates. In order to characterize such a class, we introduce two concepts of head-reducing and breadth-first head-reducing programs. The headreducing program is a program for which all the processes of rule-selecting abduction terminate. On the other hand, the breadth-first head-reducing program is a program for which the process of breadth-first rule-selecting abduction terminates.

In general, abduction is closely related to nonmonotonic reasoning, because both abduction and nonmonotonic reasoning are a kind of plausible inference. Thus, in this thesis, we compare rule-selecting abduction with Reiter's default logic [Reit80, Poo88]. Poole [Poo88] has already developed the relationship between abduction and default logic. We extend the result in Poole [Poo88] in a sense.

The rule-finding abduction for logic programming is abduction which finds a rule in a program in the set of programs and proposes a hypothesis to explain a surprising fact. Here, the set of programs is given in advance. In rule-finding abduction, we are interested in how to choose programs from the set of programs. Then, we pay our attention to choosing programs for which the process of rule-finding abduction terminates. It is our purpose to avoid an infinite process of rule-finding abduction when we choose the programs. Hence, we introduce two concepts of loop-pair and loop-elimination. The loop-pair syntactically determines whether or not there exists an infinite process of rule-finding abduction for the choice of programs. On the other hand, the loop-elimination is a transformation of programs. By using loop-elimination, we can choose the programs for which the process of rule-finding abduction terminates.

In computer science, there exist various researches for analogical reasoning, which
is an important tool for machine learning and knowledge acquisition. In this thesis, we also discuss analogical reasoning from the viewpoint of abduction, which is called rule-finding abduction with analogy.

Thargad [Tha88] and Duval [Duv91] have tried to discuss abduction and analogy into the same framework. However, even in such researches, the relationship between abduction and analogy are not clear, because the concepts of abduction and analogy they used are ambiguous.

Hence, in this thesis, we adopt the formulation of analogical reasoning by Haraguchi and Arikawa [Har85, HaA86, HiA94b]. They have defined a formal analogy for definite programs as a relation between elements in Herbrand universes. In their formulation, the main problem is how to detect an analogy. In order to solve this problem, we adopt the concept of partial isomorphic generalizations, which has been introduced by Hirowatari and Arikawa [HiA94b]. By using these concepts, we introduce the concept of deducible hypotheses, and formulate rule-finding abduction with analogy, which is an extension of rule-finding abduction. We also design an algorithm for rule-finding abduction with analogy, and realize it as a Prolog program.

The rule-generating abduction for logic programming is abduction which generates a rule and proposes a hypothesis to explain a surprising fact. In rule-generating abduction, only one surprising fact is given. In order to generate a rule and propose a hypothesis, we need to generalize a surprising fact.

A generalization is an important tool for inductive logic programming, program synthesis, and machine learning. Plotkin introduced and developed the least generalization and the relative least generalization [Plo70, Plo71]. Arimura et al. have developed Plotkin's least generalization as minimal multiple generalization [ASO91]. Note that all of these researches are on the generalization of at least two atoms. Thus, the following problem arises: Is the generalization of one atom worth or worthless? Hirowatari and Arikawa [HiA94b] have answered this problem affirmatively in the framework of analogical reasoning, by using the concept of partially isomorphic generalizations.

When we deal with generalizations, we should avoid overgeneralization. It should be determined whether or not a generalization is overgeneral by an intended model. However, it is hard to give in advance such an intended model in our rule-generating abduction. Hence, we introduce a syntactical generalization of one atom, called a safe generalization. In general, an atom is regarded as a relation between its arguments. Then, for safe generalizations, common ground terms are replaced by common variables.

In rule-generating abduction, if the class of definite programs is not restricted to some subclass, there may be infinitely many meaningless hypotheses. Hence, we introduce the subclass of head-reducing programs, called weakly 2-reducing programs. Many typical Prolog programs are included in this class. However, without any heuristic, the number of weakly 2-reducing rules for rule-generating abduction also increases in exponential order with respect to the length of a surprising fact. In order to obtain the hypotheses efficiently by using safe generalizations, we design an algorithm of rule-generating abduction for weakly 2 -reducing programs.

### 1.5 Outline of This Thesis

This thesis is organized as follows:
In Chapter 2, we prepare some notions to be necessary in the following chapters.
In Chapter 3, we classify abduction into five types. We examine various researches of abduction in computer science, and show that most of them can be placed in our classification.

In Chapter 4, we investigate rule-selecting abduction for logic programming. First, we prepare the notions of recursive definition and recursive program, which are valuable tools in order to analyze abduction for logic programming. By using these notions, we introduce the concept of head-reducing programs. Note that, in this thesis, we characterize the termination of abduction as the finiteness of derivations. Then, we show that all the derivations for a head-reducing program and a surprising fact are finite.

Furthermore, we compare rule-selecting abduction with default logic. In order to formulate rule-selecting abduction for default logic, we define a surprising fact and a hypothesis in a default logic. We show that, if there exists a hypothesis which explains a surprising fact, then there also exists an extension of a given default theory, which includes the surprising fact. This extension of the default theory is corresponding to the least Herbrand model of the definite program obtained from the default theory.

Since the class of head-reducing programs is not so large, we extend this concept to that of breadth-first head-reducing programs, and the rule-selecting abduction to the breadth-first rule-selecting abduction. Then, we also show that there exists a finite derivation for a breadth-first head-reducing program and a surprising fact.

In Chapter 5, we investigate rule-finding abduction for logic programming. First, we introduce two concepts of loop-pair and loop-elimination. We show that, if a looppair appears in a derivation, then the derivation becomes infinite. We also show that, for given two programs, if we transform one program by loop-elimination, then all the derivations for union of the transformed program and the rest are finite. In other words, by loop-elimination, we can choose the programs whose proof trees have no infinite branches.

Furthermore, we introduce the concept of deducible hypotheses, and formulate rulefinding abduction with analogy. In rule-finding abduction with analogy, the main problem is how to detect an analogy while constructing a deducible hypothesis. Then, we adopt the concept of partially isomorphic generalizations. In this concept, an analogy is regarded as a function. We show that a deducible hypothesis is correct in the sense of analogical reasoning. Also we show that a deducible hypothesis is polynomial time computable with respect to the length of a surprising fact and the size of a proof tree. We design an algorithm of rule-finding abduction with analogy concretely, and realize it by a Prolog program.

In Chapter 6, we investigate rule-generating abduction for logic programming. We formulate a safe generalization, which is based on the forms of atoms and substitutions instead of an intended model, and show some properties of safe generalizations. Also we
introduce the subclass of head-reducing programs, called weakly 2-reducing programs. Unfortunately, we show that the number of hypotheses in this class also increases in exponential order with respect to the length of a surprising fact.

On the other hand, in weakly 2-reducing programs, there are only two types of terms, constant symbols and lists. Then, safe generalizations in this class are characterized by only two types of substitutions, constant substitutions and list substitutions. A constant substitution $\theta_{c}$ consists of bindings $X:=c$, where $c$ is a constant symbol, while a list substitution $\theta_{l}$ consists of bindings $X:=l$, where $l$ is a list. For these substitutions, we investigate the condition under which the generalization is safe with respect to the composition $\theta_{c} \theta_{l}$ of $\theta_{c}$ and $\theta_{l}$.

Hence, by using such two types of safe generalizations, we design an algorithm of rule-generating abduction for weakly 2 -reducing programs. The number of rules and hypotheses obtained by this algorithm is at most the number of the arguments in a surprising fact. We show that this algorithm generates rules and proposes hypotheses in polynomial time with respect to the length of a surprising fact. Furthermore, we show that the selected common list in some argument of a surprising fact appears in the same argument of the hypothesis proposed by this algorithm.

## Chapter 2

## Preliminary

> "The case," said Sherlock Holmes, ..., "is one where, as in the investigations which you have chronicled under the names of the 'Study in Scarlet' and of the 'Sign of Four', we have been compelled to reason backward from effects to causes." - 'The Adventure of the Cardboard Box' "The Memories of Sherlock Holmes"

In this chapter, we give some basic notions and notational conventions needed in this thesis. We use fundamental concepts from first order logic and logic programming. More precise information on these concepts would be found in [CL73, Llo87, Men87, SS86, SS94].

In Section 2.1, we give definitions concerned with logic programming. In Section 2.2, we introduce Reiter's default logic [Reit80] for the discussion in Section 4.2. In Section 2.3, we introduce the formal definition of analogical reasoning by Haraguchi and Arikawa [Har85, HaA86] for the discussion in Section 5.6. In Section 2.4, we discuss the partially isomorphic generalization [HiA94b] for the discussion in Section 5.6 and Section 6.4.

### 2.1 Logic Programming

### 2.1.1 Basic definitions

A first order theory consists of an alphabet, a first order language, a set of axioms, and a set of inference rules. A first order language $\mathcal{L}$ consists of the well-formed formulas of the theory. The axioms are a designated subset of well-formed formulas. The axioms
and rules of inference are used to derive the theorems of the theory. We now proceed to define the alphabet and the first order language.

Definition 2.1 An alphabet consists of the following symbols:

1. Variables, denoted by the letters $X, Y, Z, W, U$ and $V$ possibly subscripted.
2. Function symbols, denoted by the letters $f, g$ and $h$ possibly subscripted.
3. Constant symbols, which are 0 -ary function symbols, denoted by the letters $a, b$ and c possibly subscripted.
4. Predicate symbols (or predicates, for short), denoted by the letters $p, q$ and $r$ possibly subscripted.
5. Logical symbols, which are $\neg, \vee, \wedge, \rightarrow, \forall$ and $\exists$.
6. Punctuation symbols, which are "(", ")" and ",".

In logic programming, the symbol " $\rightarrow$ " of logical implication is represented by the symbol " $\leftarrow$ " with inverse direction.

Definition 2.2 A term, denoted by the letters $t, s, u, v$, and $w$ possibly subscripted, is defined inductively as follows:

1. A variable is a term.
2. A constant symbol is a term.
3. If $f$ is an $n$-ary function symbol and $t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}$ are terms, then $f\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right)$ is a term.

For a term $t,|t|$ denotes the length of $t$, that is, the number of all occurrences of symbols in $t$ except punctuation symbols. For example, $|a|$ is 1 and $|f(f(a))|$ is 3 .

Definition 2.3 A (well-formed) formula is defined inductively as follows:

1. If $p$ is an $n$-ary predicate symbol and $t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}$ are terms, then $p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right)$ is a formula, called an atomic formula or an atom, and is denoted by $\alpha, \beta$, and $\gamma$.
2. If $F$ and $G$ are formulas, then so are $\neg F, F \vee G, F \wedge G, F \rightarrow G$.
3. If $F$ is a formula and $X$ is a variable, then $\forall X(F)$ is a formula.

For any atom $\alpha$, we denote the predicate symbol of $\alpha$ by $\operatorname{pred}(\alpha)$.
The first order language $\mathcal{L}$ is given by an alphabet consists of the set of all formulas constructed from the symbols of the alphabet.

The notions of $\vdash$ and $\vDash$ represent the provability and the satisfiability as in the general first order logic [CL73, Llo87, Men87]. The set $G$ of formulas is consistent if there exists no formula $\alpha$ such that $G \vdash \alpha$ and $G \nvdash \alpha$.

The scope of $\forall X$ in $\forall X(F)$ is $F$. A bound occurrence of a variable in a formula is an occurrence immediately following a quantifier or an occurrence within the scope of a quantifier, which has the same variable immediately after the quantifier. Any other occurrence of a variable is free. If $F$ is a formula, then $\forall(F)$ denotes the universal closure of $F$, which is the closed formula obtained by adding a universal quantifier for every variables having a free occurrence in $F$.

A clause is a well-formed formula of the form:

$$
\forall\left(A_{1} \vee \cdots \vee A_{m} \vee \neg B_{1} \vee \cdots \vee \neg B_{n}\right)
$$

where $A_{1}, \cdots, A_{m}, B_{1} \cdots, B_{n}$ are atoms and $n, m \geq 0$. We denote the above clause by the following forms:

$$
A_{1}, \cdots, A_{m} \leftarrow B_{1}, \cdots, B_{n} .
$$

The clause with $n=m=0$ is called a empty clause and denoted by $\square$.
A definite clause is a clause of the form:

$$
C=A \leftarrow B_{1}, \cdots, B_{n} .
$$

Here, $A$ is called the head of $C$, denoted by head $(C)$, and $B_{1}, \cdots, B_{n}$ is called the body of $C$. A clause with an empty body, that is, in the case $n=0$, is called a unit
clause or a fact. In particular, the clause whose head has the predicate symbol $p$ is called a definition clause of $p$. We identify a unit clause $A \leftarrow$ with an atom $A$. A definite program (program, for short) is a finite set of definite clauses. We sometimes represents $P=R \cup F$ for a definite program $P$, where $F$ is a set of all unit clauses in $P$ and $R=P-F$, that is the set of all definite clauses without unit clauses in $P$.

A goal is the clause of the form:

$$
\leftarrow B_{1}, \cdots, B_{n} .
$$

In Prolog programs, the symbol " $\leftarrow$ " of logical implication is represented by the symbol ":-". In particular, a goal $\leftarrow B_{1}, \cdots, B_{n}$ is represented by the following form:

$$
\text { ?:- B1, } \cdots, \text { Bn. }
$$

In this thesis, we use the typewriter font with the symbol ":-" for Prolog programs.
A word is either a term or an atom. An expression is either a word, a clause, or a definite program. When no variable appears in an expression, we sometimes call it a ground expression to emphasis this fact. Thus, we may use a ground term, a ground atom, and a ground clause to mean that no variable occurs in the respective expression.

A substitution $\theta$ is a finite set of the form $\left\{X_{1}:=t_{1}, \cdots, X_{n}:=t_{n}\right\}$, where each $X_{i}$ is a variable, each $t_{i}$ is a term distinct from $X_{i}$, and the variables $X_{1}, \cdots, X_{n}$ are mutually distinct. Each element $X_{i}:=t_{i}$ is called a binding for $X_{i}$. A substitution $\theta$ is called a ground substitution if all the terms $t_{i}$ are ground. The set of variables $\left\{X_{1}, \cdots, X_{n}\right\}$ is called the domain of the substitution $\theta$ and denoted by $\operatorname{dom}(\theta)$. For two substitutions $\theta=\left\{X_{1}:=t_{1}, \cdots, X_{n}:=t_{n}\right\}$ and $\sigma=\left\{Y_{1}:=s_{1}, \cdots, Y_{m}:=s_{m}\right\}$, the composition of $\theta$ and $\sigma$, denoted by $\theta \sigma$, is defined as the substitution obtained from the set

$$
\left\{X_{1}:=t_{1} \sigma, \cdots, X_{n}:=t_{n} \sigma, Y_{1}:=s_{1}, \cdots, Y_{m}:=s_{m}\right\}
$$

by deleting any binding $X_{i}:=t_{i} \sigma$ for which $X_{i}=t_{i} \sigma$ and deleting any binding $Y_{j}:=s_{j}$ for which $Y_{j} \in \operatorname{dom}(\theta)$.

Let $\theta=\left\{X_{1}:=t_{1}, \cdots, X_{n}:=t_{n}\right\}$ be a substitution and $E$ be an expression. Then $E \theta$, the instance of $E$ by $\theta$, is the expression obtained from $E$ by simultaneously
replacing each occurrence of the variable $X_{i}$ by the term $t_{i}(1 \leq i \leq n)$. If $E \theta$ is ground, then $E \theta$ is called a ground instance of $E$.

Let $S$ be a finite set $\left\{w_{1}, \cdots, w_{n}\right\}$ of words. A substitution $\theta$ is a unifier of $S$ if $w_{1} \theta=\cdots=w_{n} \theta$. If there exists a unifier for $S$, then $S$ is said to be unifiable. Also, words $w_{1}$ and $w_{2}$ are said to be unifiable if the set $\left\{w_{1}, w_{2}\right\}$ is unifiable. For a unifiable set, a unifier $\theta$ of $S$ is called most general unifier (mgu, for short) if, for every unifier $\sigma$ of $S$, there exists a substitution $\lambda$ such that $\sigma=\theta \lambda$.

### 2.1.2 Herbrand model

For a definite program $P, K(P), F^{n}(P)$, and $\Pi^{n}(P)$ denote all constant symbols in $P$, all $n$-ary function symbols in $P$, and all $n$-ary predicate symbols in $P$ respectively. $\Pi(P)$ denotes all predicate symbols in $P$.

For a definite program $P, H_{i}(P)(i \geq 0)$ is defined as follows:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& H_{0}(P)= \begin{cases}K(P) & \text { if } K(P) \neq \phi, \\
\{a\} & \text { otherwise, }\end{cases} \\
& H_{i+1}(P)=H_{i}(P) \cup\left\{f\left(t_{1} \cdots, t_{n}\right) \mid f \in F^{n}(P), t_{j} \in H_{i}(P), n \geq 1\right\}(i \geq 0) .
\end{aligned}
$$

Then, the Herbrand universe $H(P)$ of $P$ is:

$$
H(P)=\bigcup_{i \geq 0} H_{i}(P) .
$$

For a definite program $P$, the Herbrand base $B(P)$ of $P$ is:

$$
B(P)=\left\{p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right) \mid p \in \Pi^{n}(P), t_{i} \in H(P), n \geq 1\right\}
$$

The Herbrand interpretation $I_{P}$ of $P$ is the interpretation given as follows:

1. The domain of the interpretation is the Herbrand universe $H(P)$.
2. For any $a \in H_{0}(P), I_{P}(a)=a$.
3. For any $f \in F^{n}(P)$ and $t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n} \in H(P)$,

$$
\left.I_{P}(f)\left(I_{P}\left(t_{1}\right), \cdots, t_{n}\right)\right)=f\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right)
$$

4. For any $p \in \Pi^{n}(P), I_{P}(p)$ is a mapping from $B(P)$ to $\{0,1\}$.

For a definite program $P$, the Herbrand model $M(P)$ of $P$ is the Herbrand interpretation $I_{P}$ of $P$ such that $I_{P} \models P$.

Let $P$ be a definite program and $\left\{M_{i}(P)\right\}_{i \in I}$ be a non-empty set of Herbrand models of $P$. Then, the intersection $\bigcap_{i \in I} M_{i}(P)$ of $M_{i}(P)$, called the least Herbrand model of $P$ and denoted by $M(P)$, is also an Herbrand model of $P$ [Llo87]. Hence, we adopt this model as the model-theoretic semantics for logic programming.

### 2.1.3 SLD-resolution, SLD-tree, and proof tree

Let $G$ be a goal $\leftarrow A_{1}, \cdots, A_{m}, \cdots, A_{k}$ and $C$ be a definite clause $A \leftarrow B_{1}, \cdots, B_{q}$. Then, a goal $G^{\prime}$ is derived from $G$ and $C$ using mgu $\theta$ if the following conditions hold:

1. $A_{m}$ is an atom, called the selected atom, in $G$.
2. $\theta$ is an mgu of $A_{m}$ and $A$.
3. $G^{\prime}$ is the goal $\leftarrow\left(A_{1}, \cdots, A_{m-1}, B_{1}, \cdots, B_{q}, A_{m+1}, \cdots, A_{k}\right) \theta$

In resolution terminology, $G^{\prime}$ is called a resolvent of $G$ and $C$.
Let $P$ be a definite program and $G$ be a definite goal. An $S L D$-derivation, or derivation, of $P \cup\{G\}$ consists of a (finite or infinite) sequence $G=G_{0}, G_{1}, \cdots$ of goals, a sequence $C_{1}, C_{2}, \cdots$ of variants of definite clauses of $P$, and a sequence $\theta_{1}, \theta_{2}, \cdots$ of mgu's such that each $G_{i+1}$ is derived from $G_{i}$ and $C_{i+1}$ using $\theta_{i}$. Each definite clause $C_{1}, C_{2}, \cdots$ is called an input clause of the derivation.

An SLD-derivation may be finite or infinite. A finite SLD-derivation may be successful or failed. A successful SLD-derivation is one that ends in the empty clause. A failed SLD-derivation is one that ends in a non-empty goal with the property that the selected atom in this goal does not unify with the head of any definite clause.

For a program $P$ and a goal $G$, an $S L D$-tree for $P \cup\{G\}$ is a tree satisfying the following conditions:

1. Each node if the tree is a (possible empty) definite goal.
2. The root node is $G$.
3. Let $\leftarrow A_{1} \cdots, A_{m}, \cdots, A_{k}(k \geq 1)$ be a node in the tree and suppose that $A_{m}$ is the selected atom. Then, for each input clause $A \leftarrow B_{1}, \cdots, B_{q}$ such that $A_{m}$ and $A$ are unifiable with mgu $\theta$, the node has a child

$$
\leftarrow\left(A_{1}, \cdots, A_{m-1}, B_{1}, \cdots, B_{q}, A_{m+1}, \cdots, A_{k}\right) \theta .
$$

4. Nodes which are the empty clause have no children.

Each branch of an SLD-tree is corresponding to an SLD-derivation of $P \cup\{G\}$.
For a program $P$ and a ground atom $\alpha$, a proof tree of $\alpha$ on $P$ is a tree which satisfies the following conditions:

1. Each node of the tree is an atom.
2. The root node is $\alpha$.
3. For each internal node $A$ and its children $B_{1}, \cdots, B_{n}(n \geq 1), A \leftarrow B_{1}, \cdots, B_{n}$ is an instance of a clause in $P$.

Note that the condition 1 of proof tree is different from the following general definition of proof tree:

1'. Each node of the tree is a ground atom.

Under the above conditions $1^{\prime}, 2$, and 3 , it is a problem whether or not the nodes of the proof tree are elements of an Herbrand model of $P$. On the other hand, in this thesis, since we are interested in the forms of the nodes of the proof tree, we adopt the condition 1 instead of the condition 1'. A proof tree is corresponding to an SLD-derivation, and a branch of an SLD-tree.

### 2.2 Default Logic

Default logic, introduced by Reiter [Reit80], is an important tool for nonmonotonic reasoning. Poole [Poo88] investigated the relationship between default logic and ab-
ductive framework. This thesis deeply investigates this relationship in Section 4.2. In this section, we prepare the basic notions for default logic.

A default is an expression of the following form:

$$
\frac{\alpha(\bar{X}): \beta_{1}(\bar{X}), \cdots, \beta_{m}(\bar{X})}{w(\bar{X})}
$$

where $\alpha(\bar{X}), \beta_{i}(\bar{X}), w(\bar{X})$ are atoms whose free variables are among those of $\bar{X}=$ $X_{1}, \cdots, X_{n}$. In particular, a default with the following form is called a normal default:

$$
\frac{\alpha(\bar{X}): w(\bar{X})}{w(\bar{X})} .
$$

A default theory is a pair $(D, W)$, where $D$ is a set of defaults and $W$ is a set of closed formulas. A normal default theory is a pair $(D, W)$, where $D$ is a set of normal defaults and $W$ is a set of closed formulas. In this thesis, since we deal with a definite program, $W$ is assumed a definite program.

In default logic, it is a main problem to construct the set of formulas assumed true, which is called an extension. Then, we define the concept of an extension for default theory as follows.

Definition 2.4 Let $\Delta=(D, W)$ be a default theory and

$$
\frac{\alpha(\bar{X}): \beta_{1}(\bar{X}), \cdots, \beta_{m}(\bar{X})}{w(\bar{X})} \in D
$$

For any set $S$ of closed formulas, let $\Gamma(S)$ be the smallest set satisfying the following conditions:

1. $W \subseteq \Gamma(S)$,
2. $T h(\Gamma(S))=\Gamma(S)$, and
3. if $\frac{\alpha(\bar{X}): \beta_{1}(\bar{X}), \cdots, \beta_{m}(\bar{X})}{w(\bar{X})} \in D, \Gamma(S) \vdash \alpha$, and $S \nvdash \neg \beta_{j}(1 \leq j \leq m)$, then $w \in \Gamma(S)$.

In condition 2, $\operatorname{Th}(\Gamma(S))$ means the set $\{\alpha \mid \Gamma(S) \vdash \alpha\}$ of theorems for $\Gamma(S)$. Then, a set $E$ of closed formulas is an extension for $\Delta$ if $\Gamma(E)=E$.

Reiter [Reit80] has shown the following two theorems.

Theorem 2.1 (Reiter [Reit80]) Let $E$ be a set of closed formulas, and $\Delta=(D, W)$ be a default theory. Define

$$
E_{0}=W
$$

and for any $i$

$$
E_{i+1}=\operatorname{Th}\left(E_{i}\right) \cup\left\{w \left\lvert\, \frac{\beta: w}{w} \in D\right., \beta \in E_{i}, \neg w \notin E\right\} .
$$

Then, $E$ is an extension for $\Delta$ if and only if $E=\bigcup_{i \geq 0} E_{i}$.
Theorem 2.2 (Reiter [Reit80]) Every normal default theory has an extension.

A default theory has an inconsistent extension if one of its extensions is the set of all closed formulas of $\mathcal{L}$. As an immediate corollary of Theorem 2.1 we have:

Corollary 2.1 (Reiter [Reit80]) A default theory ( $D, W$ ) has an inconsistent extension if and only if $W$ is inconsistent.

A default theory is consistent if it has a consistent extension. By Corollary 2.1, if ( $D, W$ ) is consistent, then $W$ is consistent.

### 2.3 Analogical Reasoning

In computer science, there are various researches for analogical reasoning. In Section 5.6, we discuss abduction and analogical reasoning in the same framework. In this thesis, we adopt the analogical reasoning introduced by Haraguchi and Arikawa [Har85, HaA86, HiA94b].

Haraguchi and Arikawa [Har85, HaA86, HiA94b] formulated analogical reasoning for logic programming, and defined a formal analogy as the relation between elements in Herbrand universes. In this section, we prepare some concepts on analogical reasoning necessary for the discussion in Section 5.6.

Let $P_{b}$ and $P_{t}$ be programs. The program $P_{b}$ is called a base program and $P_{t}$ a target program. Then, a finite set $\varphi \subseteq U\left(P_{b}\right) \times U\left(P_{t}\right)$ is called a pairing, where $U\left(P_{b}\right)$ and $U\left(P_{t}\right)$ are Herbrand universes for $P_{b}$ and $P_{t}$, respectively. We assume implicitly that $U\left(P_{b}\right) \cap U\left(P_{t}\right) \neq \phi$.

Definition 2.5 Let $\varphi \subseteq U\left(P_{b}\right) \times U\left(P_{t}\right)$ be a pairing. The set $\varphi^{+} \subseteq U\left(P_{b}\right) \times U\left(P_{t}\right)$ is defined to be the smallest set that satisfies the following conditions:

1. $\varphi \subseteq \varphi^{+}$.
2. If $\left\langle t_{1}, s_{1}\right\rangle, \cdots,\left\langle t_{n}, s_{n}\right\rangle \in \varphi^{+}$, then $\left\langle f\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right), f\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)\right\rangle \in \varphi^{+}$.

Definition 2.6 Let $\alpha$ and $\beta$ be ground atoms, and $\varphi \subseteq U\left(P_{b}\right) \times U\left(P_{t}\right)$ be a pairing. Then, $\alpha$ and $\beta$ are identical by $\varphi$, denoted by $\alpha \varphi \beta$, if $\alpha, \beta$, and $\varphi$ satisfy the following condition:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \alpha=p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right) \\
& \beta=p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right) \\
& \left\langle t_{i}, s_{i}\right\rangle \in \varphi^{+}(1 \leq i \leq n)
\end{aligned}
$$

Definition 2.7 Let $\varphi \subseteq U\left(P_{b}\right) \times U\left(P_{t}\right)$ be a pairing. Then, $\varphi$ is a partial identity between $P_{b}$ and $P_{t}$ if $\varphi^{+}$is a one-to-one relation.

In order to discuss analogical reasoning from the viewpoint of abduction in Section 5.6, we introduce the following notations: Let $\varphi \subseteq U\left(P_{b}\right) \times U\left(P_{t}\right)$ be a partial identity between $P_{b}$ and $P_{t}$.

1. Let $t$ and $s$ be terms in $P_{b}$ and $P_{t}$, respectively. Then, $t \varphi$ is a term which is obtained by replacing any term $t^{\prime}$ in $t$ such that $\left\langle t^{\prime}, s^{\prime}\right\rangle \in \varphi$ with a term $s^{\prime}$. Similarly, $\varphi s$ is a term which is obtained by replacing any term $s^{\prime}$ in $s$ such that $\left\langle t^{\prime}, s^{\prime}\right\rangle \in \varphi$ with a term $t^{\prime}$.
2. Let $\alpha=p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right)$ and $\beta=p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{m}\right)$ be atoms in $P_{b}$ and $P_{t}$, respectively. Then, atoms $\alpha \varphi$ and $\varphi \beta$ are defined as follows:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\alpha \varphi & =p\left(t_{1} \varphi, \cdots, t_{n} \varphi\right) \\
\varphi \beta & =p\left(\varphi s_{1}, \cdots, \varphi s_{m}\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

3. Let $C=A \leftarrow A_{1}, \cdots, A_{n}$ and $D=B \leftarrow B_{1}, \cdots, B_{m}$ be clauses in $P_{b}$ and in $P_{t}$, respectively. Then, clauses $C \varphi$ and $\varphi D$ are defined as follows:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& C \varphi=A \varphi \leftarrow A_{1} \varphi, \cdots, A_{n} \varphi, \\
& \varphi D=\varphi B \leftarrow \varphi B_{1}, \cdots, \varphi B_{m} .
\end{aligned}
$$

4. Let $P_{b}=\left\{C_{1}, \cdots, C_{n}\right\}$ and $P_{t}=\left\{D_{1}, \cdots, D_{m}\right\}$. Then, programs $P_{b} \varphi$ and $\varphi P_{t}$ are respectively defined as follows:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& P_{b} \varphi=\left\{C_{1} \varphi, \cdots, C_{n} \varphi\right\}, \\
& \varphi P_{t}=\left\{\varphi D_{1}, \cdots, \varphi D_{m}\right\} .
\end{aligned}
$$

### 2.4 Partially Isomorphic Generalization

Hirowatari and Arikawa [HiA94b] introduced the concept of a partially isomorphic generalization, which is a generalization of one atom and is the useful tool for analogical reasoning. In this section, we prepare the notions for partially isomorphic generalizations to be necessary in Section 5.6 and 6.4.

Let $\alpha$ be an atom. A term $t$ is a replaceable term of $\alpha$ if $t$ is a constant symbol or a term $f\left(X_{1}, \cdots, X_{n}\right)$, where $f$ is a function symbol and each $X_{i}$ is a variable which does not appear in the other terms in $\alpha$. For a replaceable term $t$ of $\alpha$, let $\alpha[t]$ be an atom obtained by replacing each $t$ in $\alpha$ by a new variable $Z$ which does not appear in $\alpha$. Then, we write $\alpha \rightarrow \beta$ when $\alpha[t]$ is a variant of $\beta$. We define $\rightarrow^{*}$ as the reflexive and transitive closure of $\rightarrow$.

Definition 2.8 (Hirowatari and Arikawa [HiA94b]) Let $\alpha$ and $\beta$ be atoms. Then, $\beta$ is a partially isomorphic generalization of $\alpha$ if $\alpha \rightarrow^{*} \beta$.

For a set of atoms $S$, let $[S]$ denote the equivalence class of all atoms in $S$. In particular, for any $\alpha \in[S]$ and $\beta \in[S], \alpha$ is a variant of $\beta$.

We can develop analogical reasoning [Har85, HaA86] by the notions of partially isomorphic generalizations. Hirowatari and Arikawa [HiA94b] have shown the following three theorems.

Theorem 2.3 (Hirowatari and Arikawa [HiA94b]) Let $\alpha$ be an atom and $S$ be the set of all partially isomorphic generalizations of $\alpha$. Then, $[S]$ is a lattice whose partial
order is $\rightarrow^{*}$, meet operator is the greatest instantiation, and join operator is the least generalization.

Theorem 2.4 (Hirowatari and Arikawa [HiA94b]) Let $\alpha$ be a ground atom $p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right)$ and $k=\left|t_{1}\right|+\cdots+\left|t_{n}\right|$. Then, a partially isomorphic generalization of $\alpha$ can be computed in $O\left(k^{2}\right)$ time.

Theorem 2.5 (Hirowatari and Arikawa [HiA94b]) Let $\alpha$ and $\beta$ be ground atoms in $P_{b}$ and $P_{t}$, respectively, and $\alpha^{\prime}$ be the greatest partially isomorphic generalization of $\alpha$. If there exists a substitution $\theta$ such that $\alpha^{\prime}=\beta \theta$, then there exists an analogy $\varphi \subseteq U\left(P_{b}\right) \times U\left(P_{t}\right)$ such that $\alpha \varphi \beta$.

Here, an analogy $\varphi$ is regarded as a partial function from $U\left(P_{b}\right)$ to $U\left(P_{t}\right)$. By partially isomorphic generalizations, we can obtain the analogy which is guaranteed one direction of partial identity.

## Chapter 3

## Classification of Abduction

"Deeply interested - yes. There is a thread here which we have not yet grasped, and which might lead us through the tangle."

- 'The Adventure of the Devil's Foot'
"His Last Bow"

In Chapter 1, the inference schema of abduction has been depicted by the following syllogism:

$$
\frac{C A \rightarrow C}{A}
$$

The following examples of $A$ and $C$ in the above inference schema are found in literature:
(a) $C$ : 'these beans are white',
$A$ : 'these beans are from this bag' [Pei65, Ino92];
(b) $C$ : 'I heard somebody scream at midnight', $A$ : 'I thought she was attacked' [Uey79];
(c) $C$ : 'I met a man upon horseback, surrounded by four horsemen holding a canopy over his head', $A$ : 'I inferred that he was the personage' [Pei65, Yon82];
(d) $C$ : 'fossil shells are found, but far in the interior of the country',
$A$ : 'the sea once washed over this land' [Pei65, Yon82];
(e) $C$ : 'numberless documents and monuments refer to a conqueror called Napoleon Bonaparte',
$A$ : ‘Napoleon Bonaparte really existed' [Pei65, Yon82];
(f) $C$ : 'the Atlantic coastline in Africa and America are similar', $A$ : 'the continental drift theory' [Uey79];
(g) $C$ : 'the evolutionary fact remaining of fossil', $A$ : 'the theory of natural selection in biology' [Uey79];
(h) $C$ : 'the data of observations of planets by Tycho Brahe', $A$ : 'an orbit of planets is an oval (Kepler's first law)' [Pei65, Uey79, Yon82].

For the above examples, Peirce showed that there exist the following three types of explanatory hypotheses, which are proposed by abduction [Yon82].
(1) The first type is an explanatory hypothesis on the facts which can be confirmed, even if it is not confirmed at the abduction. The examples (a), (b), and (c) belong to this type.
(2) The second type is an explanatory hypothesis on the facts which physically cannot be confirmed. The examples (d) and (e) belong to this type, because we cannot confirm that there used to be a sea and there existed Napoleon Bonaparte.
(3) The third type is an explanatory hypothesis on the facts which in practice and in principle cannot be confirmed by our scientific knowledge. The examples (f), (g), and (h) belong to this type, because each hypothesis $A$ cannot be derived from the scientific knowledge they had at that time.

Peirce expressed these three types of abduction by just one syllogism. This is obviously unreasonable. These types of abduction should be expressed by different syllogisms, which is a point we want to make in this thesis.

In this chapter, we apply these three types to the abduction in computer science. In Section 3.1, we introduce the new classification of abduction. In Section 3.2, we apply this classification to the researches of abduction in computer science.

This chapter is based on the papers [Hir93a, Hir93b].

### 3.1 Five Types of Abduction

Various researches about abduction in computer science and computational logic are also related to at least one type of explanatory hypotheses. Hence, in this section, we introduce the classification which is based on three types of explanatory hypotheses. Note that, in the researches of abduction in computer science, a background theory is assumed in order to explain a surprising fact. First, by the definition of a background theory, we classify abduction in computer science into two types, abduction of a rule and of a theory. Here, a rule means an element of a background theory, while a theory means a background theory itself. Abduction of a rule is called rule-based abduction, while that of a theory theory-based abduction.

In rule-based abduction, a hypothesis $A$ in a syllogism is a set of atoms. Then, for a surprising fact $C$ and a hypothesis $A$, we denote rule-based abduction by $A \rightarrow C$ in a syllogism. Hence, rule-based abduction is depicted by the following syllogism:

$$
\frac{C \quad A \rightarrow C}{A}
$$

On the other hand, in theory-based abduction, a hypothesis $A$ in a syllogism is a theory. Then, for a surprising fact $C$ and a hypothesis $A$, we denote theory-based abduction by $A \vdash C$ in a syllogism. Hence, theory-based abduction is also depicted by the following syllogism:

$$
\frac{C A \vdash C}{A} .
$$

For rule-based abduction, it is our purpose to obtain a rule $A \rightarrow C$ and a hypothesis $A$ to explain a surprising fact $C$. In order to capture the properties of rule-based abduction, we apply three types of explanatory hypotheses to rule-based abduction.

According to Peirce, abduction begins with an observation of a surprising fact [Pei65, Uey79, Yon82]. Hence, in rule-based abduction, a surprising fact must be surprising with respect to the background theory given in advance. Let $P$ be a background theory, $A$ be a set of atoms $A$, and $C$ be a surprising fact with respect to $P$.
(1) The first type is an abduction that assumes existence of the rules in a given background theory. In this type, for a surprising fact $C$, we select a rule $C \leftarrow A$ in a background theory $P$, and propose a hypothesis $A$ in $P$ such that $C$ is explained by the selected rule $C \leftarrow A$ and the hypothesis $A$. We call this type of abduction rule-selecting abduction. An inference schema of rule-selecting abduction is depicted by the following syllogism.

$$
\begin{aligned}
& C: \text { surprising fact wrt } P \\
& \text { Select a rule } C \leftarrow A \text { in } P \\
& \hline \text { Propose a hypothesis } A \text { in } P
\end{aligned}
$$

(2) The second type is an abduction that assumes existence of the rules in a background theory other than a given one. In this type, we assume that the set of background theories is given in advance. Then, for a surprising fact $C$, we find a rule $C \leftarrow A$ in a background theory $P^{\prime}$, possibly not $P$, and propose a hypothesis $A$. We call this type rule-finding abduction. An inference schema of rule-finding abduction is depicted by the following syllogism.

$$
\begin{aligned}
& C: \text { surprising fact wrt } P \\
& \text { Find a rule } C \leftarrow A \text { in } P^{\prime}(\neq P) \\
& \hline \text { Propose a hypothesis } A \text { in } P
\end{aligned}
$$

(3) The third type is an abduction that cannot assume existence of the rules in any background theory. In this type, for a surprising fact $C$, we newly generate a rule $C \leftarrow A$ in a background theory $P$, and propose a hypothesis $A$ in $P$ such that $C$ is explained by the generated rule $C \leftarrow A$ and the hypothesis $A$. We call this type rulegenerating abduction. An inference schema of rule-generating abduction is depicted by the following syllogism.

$$
\begin{aligned}
& C: \text { surprising fact wrt } P \\
& \hline \text { Generate a rule } C \leftarrow A \text { in } P \\
& \text { Propose a hypothesis } A \text { in } P
\end{aligned}
$$

If we apply the above three types to abduction for logic programming, then the syllogisms of rule-based abduction are illustrated as in Figure 3.1, where sf stands for a surprising fact. In rule-based abduction for logic programming, a surprising fact $C$

| (1) rule-selecting | $\frac{P \nvdash C(C: \text { sf wrt } P) C \leftarrow A \text { in } P}{A(\text { set of atoms })}$ |
| :--- | :---: |
| (2) rule-finding | $\frac{P \nvdash C(C: \text { sf wrt } P) C \leftarrow A \text { in } P^{\prime}}{A(\text { set of atoms })}$ |
| (3) rule-generating | $\frac{P \nvdash C(C: \text { sf wrt } P)}{C \leftarrow A \text { in } P A(\text { set of atoms })}$ |

Figure 3.1: Rule-based abduction for logic programming
with respect to a program $P$ is regarded as a ground atom such that $P \nvdash C$. In other words, $C$ is explained by $P$ if $C$ is provable in $P$. Note that, in the syllogisms of ruleselecting and rule-generating abduction, $P \cup A \vdash C$ holds for a proposed hypothesis $A$ and a program $P$, by regarding $A$ as the set $\{A\}$ of atoms.

For theory-based abduction, it is our purpose to obtain a theory $A$ to explain a surprising fact $C$. In order to capture the properties of theory-based abduction, we also apply three types of explanatory hypotheses to theory-based abduction.

Let $B$ be a background theory and $C$ be a surprising fact with respect to $B$.
(4) The first type is an abduction that assumes existence of the theory in a given set of background theories. Note here that the set of background theories are given in advance. In this type, we can select and propose a theory $A$ which makes the surprising fact $C$ true. We call this type of abduction theory-selecting abduction. An inference schema of theory-selecting abduction is depicted by the following syllogism.

$$
C: \text { surprising fact wrt } B
$$

| Select a theory $A$ such that $A$ makes $C$ true |
| :--- |
| Propose a hypothesis $A$ |

(5) The second type of abduction which we could call theory-finding abduction is the same as the theory-selecting abduction above, because we must assume that there exists a set of background theories.
(6) The third type is an abduction that cannot assume existence of the theory in the set of background theories. In this type, we generate and propose a theory $A$ which makes the surprising fact $C$ true. We call this type rule-generating abduction. An

| (4) theory-selecting | $\frac{B \nvdash C(C: \text { sf wrt } B) \quad A \vdash C}{A(\text { theory })}$ |
| :--- | :---: |
| (6) theory-generating | $\frac{B \nvdash C(C: \text { sf wrt } B)}{A \vdash C A(\text { theory })}$ |

Figure 3.2: Theory-based abduction for logic programming
inference schema of theory-generating abduction is depicted by the following syllogism.
$C$ : surprising fact wrt $B$
Generate a theory $A$ such that $A$ makes $C$ true
Propose a hypothesis $A$

If we apply the above two types to abduction for logic programming, then the syllogisms of theory-based abduction are illustrated as Figure 3.2. In theory-based abduction for logic programming, a surprising fact $C$ with respect to a program $B$ is also regarded as a ground atom such that $B \nvdash C$.

### 3.2 Application to Previous Researches

Now we examine the various researches on abduction so far developed and show that all of them can be placed in our classification.
(1) Rule-selecting abduction: Abductive logic programming [Dun91, EK89, KM90, KKT92] is a kind of rule-selecting abduction. It is different from Peirce's abduction in the following viewpoint: Peirce has asserted that abduction begins with an observation of a surprising fact [Pei65, Uey79, Yon82]. However, in their works on abductive logic programming, Eshghi and Kowalski [EK89], Kakas and Mancarella [KM90], Dung [Dun91], and Kakas et al. [KKT92] have asserted that a hypothesis to explain the observed fact can be formed in the abductive framework. Kakas and Mancarella [KM90] have also asserted that the abductive framework is vacuous and ill-defined if there exist no models to explain the observation. Therefore, they cannot deal with the surprising fact in the sense of Peirce's abduction.

Abduction for explanation-based generalization by Genest et al. [GMP90] is a kind
of rule-selecting abduction. However, it depends on heuristics which makes the surprising fact surprising.

Abduction for natural language interpretation by Hobbs et al. [HSME88] and Stickel [Sti91] is a kind of rule-selecting abduction. In the formulation of Hobbs et al. [HSME88], they have dealt with first order formulas with costs as the logical forms of abduction. On the other hand, Stickel [Sti91] has dealt with function-free definite programs as the logical forms of abduction.

Concerning expert system, abduction for diagnosis problem by Cox and Pietrzykowski [CP87] is a kind of rule-selecting abduction. They have introduced the concept of a cause, and dealt with resolutions for computing fundamental causes. Furthermore, the research of Pirri and Pizzuti [PP90] can be regarded as the diagnosis problem in abductive logic programming.
(2) Rule-finding abduction: Duval's abduction [Duv91] is a kind of rule-finding abduction. Duval [Duv91] has dealt with the following abduction for explanationbased generalization: Let $D$ be a domain theory, $A \leftarrow B \wedge C$ be a rule in $D$, and $C$ be a surprising fact with respect to $D$. Then, his system finds $C^{\prime} \in D$ which is analogous to $C$, and adds a rule $A \leftarrow B \wedge C^{\prime}$ to $D$. He called such adding rule abduction.

Thagard's analogical abduction [Tha88] is also a kind of rule-finding abduction.
(3) Rule-generating abduction: The constructive operators such as $V$ and $W$ operators [Mug92, MB88, Lin89, LU89] in inductive logic programming are a kind of rule-generating abduction. Concretely, the constructive operators generate definite clauses from a finite surprising facts, called examples. Hence, examples are regarded as surprising facts in Peirce's sense.
(4) Theory-selecting abduction: Poole's Theorist [Poo88] and hypothesis-based reasoning [Kun87] are theory-selecting abduction, where the candidates of a hypothesis are given in advance. The main part of their researches is how to select a suitable hypothesis from the candidates.

As the extensions of Poole's research, there exists the research of abduction for a
model of belief by Levesque [Lev89] and Selman and Levesque [SL90]. Their frameworks of abduction depend on a model of belief, which is a kind of modal logic. It is their purpose to construct a model of belief for abduction, not to find an explanation. However, we can regard their abduction as the extension of Poole's abduction [Ino92].

Konolige [Kon92] has investigated the relationship between abduction and the diagnosis problem by introducing a causal theory. We can regard it as the extension of Poole's abduction.

Bylander et al. [BATJ91] have introduce the another framework of abduction for propositional logic. They have extended the symbol " $\rightarrow$ " of logical implication to the causal relation, and analyze the computational complexity of abduction and the diagnosis problem. We can also regard it as the extension of Poole's abduction for propositional logic.
(6) Theory-generating abduction: Shapiro's model inference system [Sha81] and inductive logic programming [Mug92, MB88, Lin89, LU89] are a kind of theory-generating abduction. Model inference system and inductive logic programming inductively make definite programs. By the above systems, the definite programs are constructed by surprising facts, if we regard examples as surprising facts.

It is the main purpose of rule-selecting and theory-selecting abduction to find a hypothesis to explain a surprising fact. Then, they are related to nonmonotonic logic, the diagnosis problem in expert system, and knowledge representation. On the other hand, it is the main purpose of rule-generating and theory-generating abduction to obtain a hypothesis to explain a surprising fact. Then, they are related to inductive logic programming, machine learning, and knowledge acquisition. It is the main purpose of rule-finding abduction to find a hypothesis in the given set of background theories. Then, it is related to analogical reasoning.

Theory-based abduction is considered as the extensions of rule-based abduction, and rule-based abduction is an essential abduction. Hence, in the following chapters, we investigate each types of rule-based abduction for logic programming.

## Chapter 4

## Rule-Selecting Abduction

"It is not really difficult to construct a series of inferences, each dependent upon its predecessor and each simple in itself."

- 'The Adventure of the Dancing Men'
"The Return of Sherlock Holmes"

Let $P$ be a definite program. Throughout this thesis, a surprising fact $C$ with respect to $P$ is regarded as a ground atom such that $P \nvdash C$. Note here that $P$ is given before $C$ is given. The rule-selecting abduction is a type of abduction which selects a rule in $P$ and proposes a hypothesis to explain the surprising fact $C$. An inference schema of rule-selecting abduction is described by the following three steps:

1. A surprising fact $C$ is observed.
2. A rule $C \leftarrow A$ is selected in $P$.
3. A hypothesis $A$ is proposed.

For a surprising fact $C$, we regard the above inference schema as the following one by identifying a hypothesis $A$ with the set $\{A\}$ of atoms:

1. A ground atom $C$ such that $P \nvdash C$ is given.
2. A rule $C^{\prime} \leftarrow A_{1}^{\prime}, \cdots, A_{n}^{\prime}$ is selected in $P$, where $C^{\prime} \theta=C$ and $A_{i}^{\prime} \theta=A_{i}(1 \leq i \leq$ $n)$.
3. A hypothesis $\left\{A_{1}, \cdots, A_{n}\right\}$ is proposed. Then, $P \cup\left\{A_{1}, \cdots, A_{n}\right\} \vdash C$.

Note that the above inference schema is similar to abductive framework [Dun91, EK89, KM90, Poo88]. However, we are not interested in how semantics is suggested in the abductive framework, but we are interested in how a hypothesis is proposed. Also we are interested in abduction for definite program.

In this chapter, we investigate rule-selecting abduction for logic programming. In Section 4.1, we discuss the termination of rule-selecting abduction. We introduce the head-reducing programs, and show that all the derivations for a head-reducing program and a surprising fact are finite. In Section 4.2, we formulate abduction for default logic. We show that if there exists a hypothesis which explains a surprising fact, then there also exists the extension of a given default theory, which includes the surprising fact. In Section 4.3, we extend the concept of head-reducingness to that of breadth-first headreducing programs, and the rule-selecting abduction to the breadth-first rule-selecting abduction. We also show that there exists a finite derivation for a breadth-first headreducing program and a surprising fact. In Section 4.4, we realize the above three types of rule-selecting abduction as Prolog programs.

This chapter is based on the papers [Hir93a, Hir93b].

### 4.1 Rule-Selecting Abduction for Logic Programming

Let us consider the following definite program $P_{1}$ :

$$
P_{1}=\left\{\begin{array}{l}
C_{1}: p(f(X), f(Y)) \leftarrow p(X, Y), q(X), r(Y) \\
C_{2}: q(f(X)) \leftarrow q(X) \\
C_{3}: r(f(X)) \leftarrow r(X) \\
C_{4}: r(a)
\end{array}\right\}
$$

The least Herbrand model $M\left(P_{1}\right)$ of $P_{1}$ is $\left\{r(a), r(f(a)), r\left(f^{2}(a)\right), \cdots\right\}$. There exists no atom $\alpha$ with the predicate symbol $p$ in $M\left(P_{1}\right)$. Also a ground atom $p\left(f(a), f^{2}(b)\right)$ is given as a surprising fact with respect to $P_{1}$, that is, $P_{1} \nvdash p\left(f(a), f^{2}(b)\right)$. Then, rule-selecting abduction for $P_{1}$ is the following process:

1. If we select no rules, then we obtain the following hypothesis $H_{1}$ by rule-selecting abduction for $P_{1}$ :

$$
H_{1}=\left\{p\left(f(a), f^{2}(b)\right)\right\}
$$

2. If we select the rule $C_{1}$, then we obtain the following hypothesis $H_{2}$ by ruleselecting abduction for $P_{1}$ :

$$
H_{2}=\{p(a, f(b)), q(a), r(f(b))\}
$$

3. If we select the rules $C_{1}$ and $C_{3}$, then we obtain the following hypothesis $H_{3}$ by rule-selecting abduction for $P_{1}$ :

$$
H_{3}=\{p(a, f(b)), q(a), r(b)\}
$$

Note that, for each $H_{i}(1 \leq i \leq 3), P_{1} \cup H_{i} \vdash p\left(f(a), f^{2}(b)\right)$.
Hence, for a surprising fact $\alpha$, rule-selecting abduction for $P$ is the proposal of hypotheses $H$ such that $P \cup H \vdash \alpha$.

The rule-selecting abduction can be realized in the following Prolog program rs_abd, which is a variant of partial evaluation in van Harmelen and Bundy [vHB88].

```
rs_abd(Goal,Leaves) :- clause(Goal,Clause),rs_abd(Clause,Leaves).
rs_abd((Goal1,Goal2),(Leaf1,Leaf2)) :-
    !,rs_abd(Goal1,Leaf1),rs_abd(Goal2,Leaf2).
rs_abd(Leaf,Leaf) :- !.
```

Since abduction is the first stage of scientific inquiry, we should consider the process of abduction which terminates. If abduction terminates, then we can automatically propose some hypotheses. Hence, in this section, we discuss the termination of ruleselecting abduction. It is our purpose to identify the class of definite programs for which all the processes of rule-selecting abduction terminate.

First, we introduce the following definitions.

Definition 4.1 Let $P$ be a definite program and $p$ be a predicate symbol. Then, a recursive definition of $p$ for $P$, denoted by $\operatorname{rec}(P, p)$, is a definition clause of $p$ constructed by the following procedure:

1. Select a clause in $P$ whose head has the predicate $p$, and let it be $\operatorname{rec}(P, p)$.
2. For $r e c(P, p)=A \leftarrow B_{1}, \cdots, B_{l}, \cdots, B_{n}$, if there exists a clause $E \leftarrow F_{1}, \cdots, F_{m}$ such that $B_{l} \theta=E \theta$ for a substitution $\theta$, and $\operatorname{pred}\left(B_{l}\right)(=\operatorname{pred}(E)) \neq p$, then eliminate the clause $E \leftarrow F_{1}, \cdots, F_{m}$ from $P$, and put

$$
\operatorname{rec}(P, p)=\left(A \leftarrow B_{1}, \cdots, B_{l-1}, F_{1}, \cdots, F_{m}, B_{l+1}, \cdots, B_{n}\right) \theta .
$$

3. Repeat 2 until it cannot be applied.

A recursive program of $p$ for $P$, denoted by $R P(P, p)$, is a program consisting of a recursive definition $\operatorname{rec}(P, p)$ and the applied clauses in constructing $\operatorname{rec}(P, p)$.

For a definite program $P$ and a predicate symbol $p, r e c(P, p)$ and $R P(P, p)$ are not unique in general.

Example 4.1 Let $P_{2}, P_{3}$ and $P_{4}$ be the following definite programs:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& P_{2}=\left\{\begin{array}{l}
p(f(X)) \leftarrow p(X), q(X, Y) \\
q(f(X), f(Y)) \leftarrow q(f(X), Y)
\end{array}\right\}, \\
& P_{3}=\left\{\begin{array}{l}
p(f(X)) \leftarrow p(X), q(X, Y) \\
q(f(X), f(Y)) \leftarrow q(X, f(Y))
\end{array}\right\}, \\
& P_{4}=\left\{\begin{array}{l}
p(f(X)) \leftarrow p\left(f^{2}(X)\right), q(X, Y) \\
q(f(X), f(Y)) \leftarrow q(f(X), Y)
\end{array}\right\} .
\end{aligned}
$$

Then, the recursive definitions rec $\left(P_{i}, p\right)$ and the recursive programs $R P\left(P_{i}, p\right)(2 \leq$ $i \leq 4)$ are as follows:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& r e c\left(P_{2}, p\right)=p\left(f^{2}(X)\right) \leftarrow p(f(X)), q(f(X), Y), \\
& r e c\left(P_{3}, p\right)=p\left(f^{2}(X)\right) \leftarrow p(f(X)), q(X, f(Y)), \\
& r e c\left(P_{4}, p\right)=p\left(f^{2}(X)\right) \leftarrow p\left(f^{3}(X)\right), q(f(X), Y), \\
& R P\left(P_{2}, p\right)=\left\{\begin{array}{l}
p\left(f^{2}(X)\right) \leftarrow p(f(X)), q(f(X), Y) \\
q(f(X), f(Y)) \leftarrow q(f(X), Y)
\end{array}\right\}, \\
& R P\left(P_{3}, p\right)=\left\{\begin{array}{l}
p\left(f^{2}(X)\right) \leftarrow p(f(X)), q(X, f(Y)) \\
q(f(X), f(Y)) \leftarrow q(X, f(Y))
\end{array}\right\}, \\
& R P\left(P_{4}, p\right)=\left\{\begin{array}{l}
p\left(f^{2}(X)\right) \leftarrow p\left(f^{3}(X)\right), q(f(X), Y) \\
q(f(X), f(Y)) \leftarrow q(f(X), Y)
\end{array}\right\} .
\end{aligned}
$$

On the other hand, let $P_{5}$ be the following definite program:

$$
P_{5}=\left\{\begin{array}{l}
p(f(X)) \leftarrow p(X), q(X, Y) \\
p(f(X)) \leftarrow p\left(f^{2}(X)\right), q(X, Y) \\
q(f(X), f(Y)) \leftarrow q(X, Y)
\end{array}\right\} .
$$

Then, there exist the following two recursive definitions $\operatorname{rec}\left(P_{5}, p\right)$ :

$$
\begin{aligned}
& p\left(f^{2}(X)\right) \leftarrow p(f(X)), q(f(X), Y), \\
& p\left(f^{2}(X)\right) \leftarrow p\left(f^{3}(X)\right), q(f(X), Y)
\end{aligned}
$$

There also exist the following two recursive programs $R P\left(P_{5}, p\right)$ corresponding to the above recursive definitions $\operatorname{rec}\left(P_{5}, p\right)$ :

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \left\{\begin{array}{l}
p\left(f^{2}(X)\right) \leftarrow p(f(X)), q(f(X), Y) \\
q(f(X), f(Y)) \leftarrow q(X, Y)
\end{array}\right\} \\
& \left\{\begin{array}{l}
p\left(f^{2}(X)\right) \leftarrow p\left(f^{3}(X)\right), q(f(X), Y) \\
q(f(X), f(Y)) \leftarrow q(X, Y)
\end{array}\right\} .
\end{aligned}
$$

A clause $p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right) \leftarrow B_{1}, \cdots, B_{m}$ is said to be $p$-reducing with respect to the $i$-th argument if $\left|t_{i} \theta\right|>\left|s_{i}^{l} \theta\right|$ for any substitution $\theta$ and for any index $l$ such that $\operatorname{pred}\left(B_{l}\right)=p$, where $s_{i}^{l}$ is the $i$-th argument's term of $B_{l}$. A $p$-reducing clause with respect to some argument is called a $p$-reducing clause simply. These definitions are the extensions of reducing and weakly reducing programs by Yamamoto [Yam92].

Example 4.2 In Example 4.1, the definition clause of $p$ in $P_{2}$ and $P_{3}$ are p-reducing. The recursive programs rec $\left(P_{2}, p\right)$ and $\operatorname{rec}\left(P_{3}, p\right)$ are also $p$-reducing. On the other hand, the definition clause of $p$ in $P_{4}$ and the recursive definition $\operatorname{rec}\left(P_{4}, p\right)$ is not p-reducing.

For a $p$-reducing clause, the following lemma holds.
Lemma 4.1 Let $C$ be a $p$-reducing clause $p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right) \leftarrow B_{1}, \cdots, B_{m}$ and $p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)$ be a ground atom. Then, all the SLD-derivations of $\{C\} \cup\left\{\leftarrow p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)\right\}$ are finite.

Proof. Suppose that $C$ is $p$-reducing with respect to the $i$-th argument.

If $p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right)$ and $p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)$ are not unifiable, then the derivation of $\{C\} \cup\{\leftarrow$ $\left.p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)\right\}$ is finitely failed.

Suppose that $p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right)$ and $p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)$ are unifiable. Since $p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)$ is ground, there exists a unifier $\theta$ for $p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right)$ and $p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)$ such that $p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right) \theta=$ $p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)$. If $B_{j} \theta$ is the selected atom of the goal $\leftarrow B_{1} \theta, \cdots, B_{m} \theta$, and $B_{j} \theta$ and $p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right)$ are not unifiable, then the derivation of $\{C\} \cup\left\{\leftarrow B_{1} \theta, \cdots, B_{m} \theta\right\}$ is finitely failed. Otherwise, suppose that $B_{l} \theta$ is the selected atom of the goal $\leftarrow B_{1} \theta, \cdots, B_{m} \theta$. Also suppose that $B_{l} \theta$ and $p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right)$ are unifiable. Note that $s_{i}^{l} \theta$ is ground, where $s_{i}^{l}$ is the $i$-th argument's term in $B_{l}$. By the definition of a $p$-reducing clause,

$$
\left|s_{i}^{l} \theta\right|<\left|t_{i} \theta\right|=\left|s_{i}\right| .
$$

Furthermore, if $p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right)$ and $B_{l} \theta$ are unifiable, then, for the derivation of $\{C\} \cup\{\leftarrow$ $\left.B_{l} \theta\right\}$, there exists a unifier $\sigma$ for $B_{l} \theta$ and $p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right)$ such that $B_{l} \theta \sigma=p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right) \sigma$. Then,

$$
\left|s_{i}^{l} \sigma\right|<\left|t_{i} \sigma\right|=\left|s_{i}^{l} \theta \sigma\right|=\left|s_{i}^{l} \theta\right|<\left|s_{i}\right| .
$$

Hence, the longest derivation of $\{C\} \cup\left\{\leftarrow B_{1} \theta, \cdots, B_{m} \theta\right\}$ is constructed in the following way: Let $G_{0}$ be the initial goal $\leftarrow B_{1} \theta, \cdots, B_{m} \theta$, and $G_{i}$ be the $i$-th resolvent. Then, by selecting each atom $B_{l} \theta$ in the derivation, we can obtain the following resolvent $G_{m}$ of the derivation:

$$
\leftarrow\left(B_{1} \theta_{1}, \cdots, B_{m} \theta_{1}\right),\left(B_{1} \theta_{2}, \cdots, B_{m} \theta_{2}\right), \cdots,\left(B_{1} \theta_{m}, \cdots, B_{m} \theta_{m}\right) .
$$

For any $B_{l} \theta_{k}(1 \leq l, k \leq m),\left|s_{i}^{l} \theta_{k}\right|<\left|s_{i}\right|$. Furthermore, by selecting each atom $B_{l} \theta_{k}$ in the derivation, we can also obtain the following resolvent $G_{m+m^{2}}$ of the derivation:

$$
\leftarrow\left(\left(B_{1} \theta_{1}^{\prime}, \cdots, B_{m} \theta_{1}^{\prime}\right), \cdots,\left(B_{1} \theta_{m}^{\prime}, \cdots, B_{m} \theta_{m}^{\prime}\right)\right), \cdots,\left(\cdots,\left(B_{1} \theta_{m^{2}}^{\prime}, \cdots, B_{m} \theta_{m^{2}}^{\prime}\right)\right)
$$

For any $B_{l} \theta_{k}^{\prime}\left(1 \leq l \leq m, 1 \leq k \leq m^{2}\right),\left|s_{i}^{l} \theta_{k}^{\prime}\right|<\left|s_{i}\right|-1$.
Hence, the length of the derivation of $\{C\} \cup\left\{\leftarrow B_{1} \theta, \cdots, B_{m} \theta\right\}$ is at most $\sum_{k=1}^{\left|s_{i}\right|} m^{k}$, and the length of the derivation of $\{C\} \cup\left\{\leftarrow p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)\right\}$ is at most $1+\sum_{k=1}^{\left|s_{i}\right|} m^{k}$.

Whether or not the process of rule-selecting abduction for a definite program terminates is characterized as the following concept of head-reducing.

Definition 4.2 Let $\operatorname{rec}(P, p)$ be a recursive definition $p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right) \leftarrow B_{1}, \cdots, B_{m}$ of $p$ for $P$. Then, a recursive program $R P(P, p)$ is called head-reducing if it satisfies the following conditions:

1. If there exists an index $k$ such that $B_{k}=p\left(s_{1}^{k}, \cdots, s_{n}^{k}\right)$, then
(a) there exists an index $j$ such that $\left|t_{j} \theta\right|>\left|s_{j}^{k} \theta\right|$ for any such $k$ and for any substitution $\theta$, and
(b) any atom $B_{l}$ such that $B_{l}=q_{l}\left(u_{1}^{l}, \cdots, u_{n_{l}}^{l}\right)\left(p \neq q_{l}\right)$ satisfies one of the following conditions:
(b-i) there exists the $i$-th argument's term $u_{i}^{l}$ in $B_{l}$ which is constructed by the variables appearing in $t_{j}$, and the definition clause of $q_{l}$ is $q_{l}$-reducing with respect to the $i$-th argument, or
(b-ii) the definition clause of $q_{l}$ is not included in $R P(P, p)$.
2. Otherwise, any $B_{l}=q_{l}\left(u_{1}^{l}, \cdots, u_{n_{l}}^{l}\right)$ satisfies one of the following conditions:
(c) there exists the $i$-th argument's term $u_{i}^{l}$ in $B_{l}$ which is constructed by the variables appearing in all arguments' terms $t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}$ in $p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right)$, and the definition clause of $q_{l}$ is $q_{l}$-reducing with respect to $i$-th argument, or
(d) the definition clause of $q_{l}$ is not included in $R P(P, p)$.

Furthermore, $P$ is head-reducing with respect to the predicate $p$ if any recursive program $R P(P, p)$ of $p$ for $P$ is head-reducing.

Example 4.3 In Example 4.1, $P_{3}$ is head-reducing with respect to $p$. On the other hand, $P_{2}$ is not head-reducing with respect to $p$, because the recursive program $R P\left(P_{2}, p\right)$ does not satisfy the condition (b-i) of Definition 4.2. Also $P_{4}$ is not head-reducing, because the recursive program $R P\left(P_{4}, p\right)$ does not satisfy the condition (a) of Definition 4.2.

For $P_{5}$, the first recursive program is head-reducing, but the second recursive program is not head-reducing, because it does not satisfy the condition (a) of Definition 4.2. Then, $P_{5}$ is not head-reducing with respect to $p$.

Furthermore, the following typical Prolog programs [SS86, SS94] are head-reducing with respect to the predicate of the head.

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \{\operatorname{member}(X,[W \mid Y]) \leftarrow \operatorname{member}(X, Y)\}, \\
& \{\operatorname{append}([W \mid X], Y,[W \mid Z]) \leftarrow \operatorname{append}(X, Y, Z)\}, \\
& \{\operatorname{concat}(X,[W \mid Y],[W \mid Z]) \leftarrow \operatorname{concat}(X, Y, Z)\} .
\end{aligned}
$$

On the termination of rule-selecting abduction, the following theorem holds.

Theorem 4.1 Let $P$ be a definite program and $p$ be a predicate symbol. If $P$ is head-reducing with respect to $p$, then all the SLD-derivations of $P \cup\left\{\leftarrow p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)\right\}$ are finite.

Proof. The result is proven by mathematical induction on the number of clauses in $P$. If the number is 1 , then Lemma 4.1 implies the result.

Next suppose that all the derivations of $P \cup\left\{\leftarrow p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)\right\}$ are finite for $P=$ $\left\{C_{1}, \cdots, C_{k}\right\}$, and let $P^{\prime}$ be $P \cup\left\{C_{k+1}\right\}$. Also suppose that any $R P\left(P^{\prime}, p\right)$ is headreducing. Let $C_{k+1}$ be the following clause:

$$
C_{k+1}: p_{k+1}\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n_{k+1}}\right) \leftarrow B_{1}, \cdots, B_{l} .
$$

If the predicate symbol $p_{k+1}$ does not occur in $P$, then all the input clauses of the derivation of $P \cup\left\{\leftarrow p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)\right\}$ do not include the clause $C_{k+1}$. Thus, the derivation of $P^{\prime} \cup\left\{\leftarrow p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)\right\}$ is equal to one of $P \cup\left\{\leftarrow p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)\right\}$. Consequently, the derivation of $P^{\prime} \cup\left\{\leftarrow p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)\right\}$ is finite by the induction hypothesis.

If the predicate symbol $p_{k+1}$ occurs in the clause $C_{i}$ of $P$, then there exists a clause $C_{i}$ in $P$, and one of the following cases holds:

1. $p_{k+1}$ occurs in the body of $C_{i}$, or
2. $p_{k+1}$ occurs in the head of $C_{i}$.

If any $R P(P, p)$ does not include the clause $C_{i}$, then all the input clauses of the derivation of $P \cup\left\{\leftarrow p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)\right\}$ do not include $C_{i}$. Thus, the derivation of $P^{\prime} \cup$ $\left\{\leftarrow p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)\right\}$ is equal to one of $P \cup\left\{\leftarrow p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)\right\}$. In both cases, which are corresponding to the condition (b-ii) or (d) of Definition 4.2, the derivation of $P \cup\left\{\leftarrow p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)\right\}$ is finite by the induction hypothesis.

Thus, suppose that some $R P(P, p)$ includes $C_{i}$.

1. Suppose that $p_{k+1}$ occurs in the body of $C_{i}$. Let $C_{i}$ be the following clause:

$$
C_{i}: p_{i}\left(u_{1}, \cdots, u_{n_{i}}\right) \leftarrow D_{1}, \cdots, D_{j}, \cdots, D_{m}
$$

where $\operatorname{pred}\left(D_{j}\right)=p_{k+1}$. By the induction hypothesis, if there exists an infinite derivation of $P^{\prime} \cup\left\{\leftarrow p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)\right\}$, and $D_{j} \lambda$ and $p_{k+1}\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n_{k+1}}\right)$ are unifiable, where $\lambda$ is a substitution, then the derivation of $P^{\prime} \cup\left\{\leftarrow D_{j} \lambda\right\}$ is infinite. However, we can show that all the derivations of $P^{\prime} \cup\left\{\leftarrow D_{j} \lambda\right\}$ are finite by the following discussion.

Suppose that the derivation of $P^{\prime} \cup\left\{\leftarrow D_{j} \lambda\right\}$ is infinite. Then, the derivation of $P^{\prime} \cup\left\{\leftarrow B_{1} \sigma, \cdots, B_{l} \sigma\right\}$ is also infinite, where $\sigma$ is a unifier of $D_{j} \lambda$ and $p_{k+1}\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n_{k+1}}\right)$. For any $B_{i} \sigma$, consider the predicate symbol $\operatorname{pred}\left(B_{i}\right)$.
(a) Suppose that for any $i, \operatorname{pred}\left(B_{i}\right)$ does not occur in $P$ or $\operatorname{pred}\left(B_{i}\right)$ is $p_{k+1}$. Then, all the input clauses of the derivation of $P^{\prime} \cup\left\{\leftarrow D_{j} \lambda\right\}$ include only the clause $C_{k+1}$. Since $R P(P, p)$ is head-reducing, then $D_{j} \lambda$ has the argument's term which is ground, and $C_{k+1}$ is $p_{k+1}$-reducing with respect to this argument by the condition (b-i) or (c) of Definition 4.2. By Lemma 4.1, the derivation of $P^{\prime} \cup\left\{\leftarrow D_{j} \lambda\right\}$ is finite.
(b) Suppose that there exists an index $i$ such that $\operatorname{pred}\left(B_{i}\right)$ occurs in $P$ and $\operatorname{pred}\left(B_{i}\right) \neq p_{k+1}$. For any such $i$, one of the following two cases holds.
i. Suppose that there exists a clause $C_{j}$ such that $\operatorname{pred}\left(B_{i}\right)=\operatorname{pred}\left(\operatorname{head}\left(C_{j}\right)\right)$ and some $R P(P, p)$ includes $C_{j}$. If head $\left(C_{j}\right)$ and $B_{i}$ are not unifiable, then the derivation of $P^{\prime} \cup\left\{\leftarrow B_{i} \sigma\right\}$ is finite, because all the input
clauses of the derivation of $P^{\prime} \cup\left\{\leftarrow B_{i} \sigma\right\}$ do not include $C_{j}$. Otherwise, suppose that head $\left(C_{j}\right)$ and $B_{i}$ are unifiable. Since any $R P\left(P^{\prime}, p\right)$ is head-reducing and includes $C_{j}, C_{j}$ is $\operatorname{pred}\left(B_{i}\right)$-reducing with respect to some argument. Note that this argument's term of $B_{i} \sigma$ is ground. By Lemma 4.1, the derivation of $P^{\prime} \cup\left\{\leftarrow B_{i} \sigma\right\}$ is finite.
ii. Suppose that there exists a clause $C_{j}$ such that $\operatorname{pred}\left(B_{i}\right)=\operatorname{pred}\left(\operatorname{head}\left(C_{j}\right)\right)$ and any $R P(P, p)$ does not include $C_{j}$. Then, all the input clauses of the derivation of $P^{\prime} \cup\left\{\leftarrow B_{i} \sigma\right\}$ do not include any clause of any $R P(P, p)$. By the case (a), the SLD-derivation of $P^{\prime} \cup\left\{\leftarrow B_{i} \sigma\right\}$ is finite.

By the cases (a) and (b), there exist no infinite SLD-derivations of $P^{\prime} \cup\{\leftarrow$ $\left.B_{1} \sigma, \cdots, B_{m} \sigma\right\}$.
2. Suppose that $p_{k+1}$ occurs in the head of $C_{i}$. Let $C_{i}$ be the following clause:

$$
A \leftarrow D_{1}, \cdots, D_{m},
$$

where $\operatorname{pred}(A)=p_{k+1}$. Let $\leftarrow G_{1} \tau, \cdots, G_{j} \tau, \cdots, G_{l} \tau$ be the resolvent whose input clause is $A \leftarrow D_{1}, \cdots, D_{m}$ in the SLD-derivation of $P \cup\left\{\leftarrow p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)\right\}$. By the induction hypothesis, if there exists an infinite SLD-derivation of $P^{\prime} \cup$ $\left\{\leftarrow p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)\right\}$, and $G_{j} \tau$ and $A$ are unifiable, then the SLD-derivation of $P^{\prime} \cup\left\{\leftarrow G_{j} \tau\right\}$ is infinite. Then, the SLD-derivation of $P^{\prime} \cup\left\{\leftarrow B_{1} \sigma, \cdots, B_{l} \sigma\right\}$ is infinite, where $\sigma$ is a unifier of $G_{j} \tau$ and $A$. However, by the same proof as the case 1 , there exist no infinite SLD-derivations of $P^{\prime} \cup\left\{\leftarrow B_{1} \sigma, \cdots, B_{l} \sigma\right\}$.

Hence, all the derivations of $P^{\prime} \cup\left\{\leftarrow D_{j} \lambda\right\}$ are finite. Therefore, all the SLD-derivations of $P^{\prime} \cup\left\{\leftarrow p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)\right\}$ are also finite.

### 4.2 Rule-Selecting Abduction for Default Logic

In general, abduction is deeply related to nonmonotonic reasoning, because both abduction and nonmonotonic reasoning are a kind of plausible inference. There exist various researches for nonmonotonic logic; nonmonotonic modal logic [McD82, MD80],
autoepistemic logic [Moo85], belief logic [Lev89, SL90], default logic [Reit80, Poo88], and circumscription [McC80, McC86, Lif85, Hir92, Hir94a]. In this section, we compare rule-selecting abduction with Reiter's default logic [Reit80].

Poole [Poo88, Ino92] has defined an abductive framework and discussed the relationship between it and Reiter's default logic [Reit80]. We can describe the result of Poole [Poo88] in term of our abduction in the following way:

Theorem 4.2 (Poole [Poo88]) Suppose that $P \nvdash \alpha$. Then, there exists a hypothesis $H$ such that $P \cup H \vdash \alpha$ if and only if there exists an extension $E$ of default theory $\left(D_{H}, P\right)$ such that $\alpha \in E$, where

$$
D_{H}=\left\{\left.\frac{: w(X)}{w(X)} \right\rvert\, w(X) \in H\right\}
$$

The above theorem means that there exists an extension which includes the explainable fact $\alpha$, while it does not mean how a hypothesis is constructed when a surprising fact is observed. In other words, Poole's abduction is an abduction for logic programming in term of default logic, but not an abduction for default logic itself. Hence, we study abduction for default logic. Here, we deal with function-free closed normal default theories whose conclusions are positive atoms, because there exists an extension for such a default theory by Theorem 2.2. Also we deal with a definite program and an integrity constraint $I C$ as negative information. The integrity constraint $I C$ is of the form $I C=\bigvee_{i=1}^{n}\left(\leftarrow G_{i}\right)$, where $G_{i}=G_{1}{ }^{i} \wedge \cdots \wedge G_{n_{i}}{ }^{i}$ and $G_{j}{ }^{i}$ is an atom.

The following lemma is shown by the definition of integrity constraints and the monotonicity of definite programs.

Lemma 4.2 Let $P$ be a definite program and $I C$ be an integrity constraint. If $P \cup I C$ is consistent, then the least Herbrand model $M(P)$ of $P$ is the model of $P \cup I C$ under the closed-world assumption [Llo87].

In Section 4.1, a surprising fact is defined as a ground atom $\alpha$ such that $P \nvdash \alpha$, and rule-selecting abduction is the proposal of a hypothesis $H$ such that $P \cup H \vdash \alpha$. In default logic, a surprising fact is considered as a ground atom $\alpha$ which is not included
in any extension of a given default theory $(D, P)$. For the surprising fact $\alpha$, it is our purpose to propose the new default theory $(D, P \cup H)$, instead of $(D, P)$, such that there exists an extension which includes $\alpha$. Then, we regard such an $H$ as a hypothesis for rule-selecting abduction for default logic.

In order to define a surprising fact and a hypothesis for default logic, first we introduce the transformation from the following set of default rules $D$

$$
D=\left\{\left.\frac{\alpha_{i}(\bar{X}): w_{i}(\bar{X})}{w_{i}(\bar{X})} \right\rvert\, 1 \leq i \leq l\right\} \quad(\bar{X}: \text { tuple of variables })
$$

to the following definite program $P_{D}$ :

$$
P_{D}=\left\{w_{i}(\bar{X}) \leftarrow \alpha_{i}(\bar{X}) \left\lvert\, \frac{\alpha_{i}(\bar{X}): w_{i}(\bar{X})}{w_{i}(\bar{X})} \in D\right., 1 \leq i \leq l\right\} .
$$

For such $P_{D}$, the following lemma holds.

Lemma 4.3 Let $(D, P)$ be a closed default theory and $\alpha$ be a ground atom. If $P \cup P_{D} \nvdash$ $\alpha$, then there exists no extension of $(D, P)$ which includes $\alpha$.

Proof. Let $E$ be an extension of $(D, P)$. By Theorem 2.1, $E$ is constructed in the following way:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& E_{0}=P \\
& E_{i+1}=\operatorname{Th}\left(E_{i}\right) \cup\left\{w \left\lvert\, \frac{\beta: w}{w} \in D\right., \beta \in E_{i}, \neg w \notin E\right\} \\
& E=\bigcup_{i \geq 0} E_{i}
\end{aligned}
$$

Since $P_{D}=\left\{w \leftarrow \beta \left\lvert\, \frac{\beta: w}{w} \in D\right.\right\}, E_{i+1} \subseteq \operatorname{Th}\left(E_{i}\right) \cup M\left(P_{D}\right)$ for any $i$. Then, $E \subseteq$ $M\left(P \cup P_{D}\right)$. Hence, if $P \cup P_{D} \nvdash \alpha$, that is, $\alpha \notin M\left(P \cup P_{D}\right)$, then $\alpha \notin E$.

By the above lemma, we define a surprising fact for a default theory $(D, P)$ as a ground atom $\alpha$ such that $P \cup P_{D} \nvdash \alpha$.

Furthermore, a hypothesis for default logic is defined as follows:

Definition 4.3 Let $\alpha$ be a surprising fact and ( $D, P \cup I C$ ) be a closed normal default theory, where $P$ is a definite program and $I C$ is an integrity constraint. Then, $H$ is a hypothesis of $\alpha$ for a default theory ( $D, P \cup I C$ ) if it satisfies one of the following conditions:

1. $P \cup H \vdash \alpha$ and $P \cup H \cup I C$ is consistent, or
2. $P \cup H \nvdash \alpha, P \cup P_{D} \cup H \vdash \alpha$, and $P \cup P_{D} \cup H \cup I C$ is consistent.

Note that a hypothesis in a default logic is assumed to be minimal with respect to set inclusion.

Example 4.4 Let $(D, P)$ be the following closed normal default theory:

$$
\begin{gathered}
D=\left\{\frac{\operatorname{bird}(X): f y(X)}{\operatorname{fly}(X)}, \frac{f \sin (X): \operatorname{swim}(X)}{\operatorname{swim}(X)}\right\}, \\
P=\left\{\begin{array}{l}
\operatorname{swim}(X) \leftarrow \operatorname{penguin}(X) \\
\operatorname{bird}(X) \leftarrow \operatorname{penguin}(X)
\end{array}\right\} .
\end{gathered}
$$

Then, the transformed definite program $P_{D}$ from $D$ is:

$$
P_{D}=\left\{\begin{array}{l}
\operatorname{fly}(X) \leftarrow \operatorname{bird}(X) \\
\operatorname{swim}(X) \leftarrow \operatorname{fish}(X)
\end{array}\right\} .
$$

Let $I C_{1}$ be an integrity constraint $\leftarrow \operatorname{fly}(X)$, $\operatorname{swim}(X)$.

1. For a ground atom $f l y(j o h n), P \cup P_{D} \nvdash f l y(j o h n)$. Then, $f l y(j o h n)$ is a surprising fact for $(D, P)$. The candidates for hypotheses are obtained as follows:

$$
H_{1}=\{f l y(j o h n)\}, H_{2}=\{b i r d(j o h n)\}, H_{3}=\{\text { penguin }(j o h n)\} .
$$

For each $H_{i}(1 \leq i \leq 3), H_{1}$ satisfies the first condition, and $H_{2}$ satisfies the second condition of Definition 4.3. However, $H_{3}$ satisfies neither condition of Definition 4.3, because $P \cup H_{3} \cup I C_{1}$ is inconsistent. Hence, $H_{1}$ and $H_{2}$ are the hypotheses of fly $(j o h n)$ for $\left(D, P \cup I C_{1}\right)$.
2. For a ground atom $\operatorname{swim}(j o h n), P \cup P_{D} \nvdash \operatorname{swim}(j o h n)$. Then, $\operatorname{swim}(j o h n)$ is a surprising fact for $(D, P)$. The candidates for hypotheses are obtained as follows:

$$
H_{4}=\{\operatorname{swim}(j o h n)\}, H_{5}=\{\text { fish }(j o h n)\}, H_{6}=\{\text { penguin }(j o h n)\} .
$$

For each $H_{i}(4 \leq i \leq 6), H_{4}$ and $H_{6}$ satisfy the first condition, and $H_{5}$ satisfies the second condition of Definition 4.3. Hence, all of $H_{4}, H_{5}$ and $H_{6}$ are the hypotheses of swim(john) for $\left(D, P \cup I C_{1}\right)$.

Let $I C_{2}$ be an integrity constraint $\leftarrow \operatorname{bird}(X), \operatorname{swim}(X)$.
3. For a surprising fact fly (john), we obtain the same candidates $H_{1}, H_{2}$, and $H_{3}$ of hypotheses just as the case 1. For each $H_{i}(1 \leq i \leq 3), H_{1}$ satisfies the first condition, and $H_{2}$ satisfies the second condition of Definition 4.3. However, $H_{3}$ satisfies neither condition of Definition 4.3, because $P \cup H_{3} \cup I C_{2}$ is inconsistent. Hence, $H_{1}$ and $H_{2}$ are the hypotheses of fly $(j o h n)$ for $\left(D, P \cup I C_{2}\right)$.
4. For a surprising fact swim(john), we obtain the same candidates $H_{4}, H_{5}$, and $H_{6}$ of hypotheses just as the case 2. For each $H_{i}(4 \leq i \leq 6), H_{4}$ satisfies the first condition, and $H_{5}$ satisfies the second condition of Definition 4.3. However, $H_{6}$ satisfies neither condition of Definition 4.3, because $P \cup H_{6} \cup I C_{2}$ is inconsistent. Hence, $H_{4}$ and $H_{5}$ are the hypotheses of swim(john) for ( $D, P \cup I C_{2}$ ).

For a definite program $P$ and a transformed program $P_{D}$ from $D$, the following two lemmas hold:

Lemma 4.4 Let $(D, P)$ be a default theory. Then, the least Herbrand model $M(P \cup$ $\left.P_{D}\right)$ of $P \cup P_{D}$ is an extension of $(D, P)$.

Proof. Suppose that $E$ is constructed in the following way:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& E_{0}=\{f \mid f \leftarrow \in P\}, \\
& E_{i+1}=\operatorname{Th}\left(E_{i}\right) \cup\left\{w \left\lvert\, \frac{\alpha: w}{w} \in D\right., \alpha \in E_{i}\right\}, \\
& E=\bigcup_{i \geq 0} E_{i} .
\end{aligned}
$$

Since $\frac{\alpha: w}{w} \in D$ is equivalent to $w \leftarrow \alpha \in P_{D}, M\left(P \cup P_{D}\right)=E$. By the closed-world assumption, $\neg w \notin E$ for any $w$. By Definition 2.4, $E$ is an extension of $(D, P)$.

Lemma 4.5 Let $(D, P)$ be a default theory. If $P \cup P_{D} \vdash \alpha$, then $M\left(P \cup P_{D}\right)$ is an extension of $(D, P)$ which includes $\alpha$.

Proof. Since $P \cup P_{D} \vdash \alpha, \alpha \in M\left(P \cup P_{D}\right)$. By Lemma 4.4, $M\left(P \cup P_{D}\right)$ is an extension of $(D, P)$.

For an integrity constraint $I C$ and a default theory $(D, P)$, the following lemma holds:

Lemma 4.6 Let $(D, P \cup I C)$ be a default theory, where $P$ is a definite program and $I C$ is an integrity constraint. If $(D, P \cup I C)$ satisfies one of the following conditions, then $M\left(P \cup P_{D}\right)$ is a consistent extension of $(D, P \cup I C)$ which includes $\alpha$.

1. $P \vdash \alpha$, and $P \cup I C$ is consistent.
2. $P \nvdash \alpha, P \cup P_{D} \vdash \alpha$, and $P \cup P_{D} \cup I C$ is consistent.

Proof. Suppose $(D, P \cup I C)$ satisfies the above condition 1. By Lemma 4.2 and the consistency of $P \cup I C, M(P)$ is the model of $P \cup I C$. Since $P \vdash \alpha, \alpha \in M(P)$. For any $\beta, P \vdash \beta$ if and only if $P \cup I C \vdash \beta$. Then, $E$ is an extension of $(D, P)$ if and only if $E$ is an extension of $(D, P \cup I C)$. Since $M\left(P \cup P_{D}\right)$ is an extension of $(D, P)$, $M\left(P \cup P_{D}\right)$ is also an extension of $(D, P \cup I C)$.

Suppose ( $D, P \cup I C$ ) satisfies the above condition 2. By Lemma 4.2 and the consistency of $P \cup P_{D} \cup I C, M\left(P \cup P_{D}\right)$ is the model of $P \cup P_{D} \cup I C$. Since $P \cup P_{D} \vdash \alpha$, $\alpha \in M\left(P \cup P_{D}\right)$. If $P \cup I C$ is inconsistent, then $P \cup P_{D} \cup I C$ is also inconsistent, which contradicts the condition 2. Then, $P \cup I C$ is consistent. Hence, for any $\beta, P \vdash \beta$ if and only if $P \cup I C \vdash \beta$. Then, $E$ is an extension of $(D, P)$ if and only if $E$ is an extension of $(D, P \cup I C)$. By Lemma 4.5, $E=M\left(P \cup P_{D}\right)$, and $\alpha \in E$. By Lemma 4.4, $E$ is an extension of $(D, P)$. Hence, $M\left(P \cup P_{D}\right)$ is an extension of $(D, P \cup I C)$.

By Corollary 2.1, if $P \cup I C$ is consistent, then an extension of $(D, P \cup I C)$ is also consistent. Hence, the extension of $(D, P \cup I C)$ which includes $\alpha$ is also consistent.

For a closed normal default theory $(D, P)$, the following theorem asserts that if there exists the hypothesis $H$ satisfying one of the conditions of Definition 4.3, then there exists an extension of $(D, P \cup H)$. Hence, we can propose a default theory in which we believe a surprising fact, when it is observed.

Theorem 4.3 Let $(D, P)$ be a closed normal default theory and $I C$ be an integrity constraint. Suppose that $P \cup P_{D} \nvdash \alpha$. If there exists a hypothesis $H$ of $\alpha$ for $(D, P \cup I C)$, then $M\left(P \cup P_{D} \cup H\right)$ is a consistent extension of $(D, P \cup H \cup I C)$ which includes $\alpha$.

Proof. By replacing $P$ with $P \cup H$ in the proof of Lemma 4.6, we can obtain the result.

Example 4.5 Consider the default theory $(D, P)$ in Example 4.4. For the integrity constraint $I C_{1}$, we obtain the following extensions $E_{i}$ of ( $D, P \cup H_{i} \cup I C_{1}$ ) corresponding to the hypotheses $H_{i}$ :

$$
\begin{gathered}
E_{1}=\{\operatorname{fly}(j o h n)\}, E_{2}=\{\operatorname{bird}(j o h n), f l y(j o h n)\}, \\
E_{4}=\{\operatorname{swim}(j o h n)\}, E_{5}=\{\operatorname{jish}(j o h n), \operatorname{swim}(j o h n)\}, \\
E_{6}=\{\operatorname{penguin}(j o h n), \operatorname{swim}(j o h n), \operatorname{bird}(j o h n)\} .
\end{gathered}
$$

On the other hand, for the integrity constraint $I C_{2}$, we also obtain the following extensions $E_{i}$ of $\left(D, P \cup H_{i} \cup I C_{2}\right)$ corresponding to the hypotheses $H_{i}$ :

$$
\begin{gathered}
E_{1}=\{f l y(j o h n)\}, E_{2}=\{\operatorname{bird}(j o h n), f l y(j o h n)\}, \\
E_{4}=\{\operatorname{swim}(j o h n)\}, E_{5}=\{\operatorname{fish}(j o h n), \operatorname{swim}(j o h n)\} .
\end{gathered}
$$

### 4.3 Breadth-First Rule-Selecting Abduction

In Section 4.1, we have introduced the subclass of definite programs, called headreducing programs. In this class, all derivations are finite. However, this class is not so large. For example, let $P_{1}$ be the following program defining reversal of list:

$$
P_{1}=\left\{\begin{array}{l}
\operatorname{reverse}([W \mid X], Y) \leftarrow \operatorname{reverse}(X, Z), \operatorname{concat}(W, Z, Y) \\
\operatorname{concat}(X,[W \mid Y],[W \mid Z]) \leftarrow \operatorname{concat}(X, Y, Z)
\end{array}\right\} .
$$

The recursive program $R P\left(P_{1}\right.$, reverse $)$ is not head-reducing, and $P_{1}$ is not headreducing with respect to the predicate reverse. Hence, for a surprising fact $\alpha$ with the predicate reverse, rule-selecting abduction does not terminate for the program $P$ and the goal $\leftarrow \alpha$. Then, in this section, we introduce new abduction, called breadthfirst rule-selecting abduction for which termination is guaranteed in the above reverse programs.

The breadth-first rule-selecting abduction is a rule-selecting abduction which terminates by a fail branch in proof trees. Here, a fail branch is found by breadth-first search. For the above program $P_{1}$, suppose that a surprising fact reverse $([a, b],[b, a])$
is given. From the proof trees of $P_{1} \cup\{\leftarrow \operatorname{reverse}([a, b],[b, a])\}$ with the depth 0,1 , and 2, we obtain the following hypotheses $H_{0}, H_{1}$, and $H_{2}$ :

$$
\begin{aligned}
& H_{0}=\{\operatorname{reverse}([a, b],[b, a])\}, \\
& H_{1}=\{\operatorname{reverse}([b], X), \operatorname{concat}(a, X,[b, a])\} \\
& H_{2}=\{\operatorname{reverse}([], X), \operatorname{concat}(b, X,[b \mid Y]), \operatorname{concat}(a, Y,[a])\} .
\end{aligned}
$$

In the proof tree of $P_{1} \cup\{\leftarrow \operatorname{reverse}([a, b],[b, a])\}$, since there exists a branch with depth 2, breadth-first rule-selecting abduction for $P_{1}$ terminates.

The termination of breadth-first rule-selecting abduction is reduced to the problem whether or not there exists a finite derivation. In order to characterize the termination of breadth-first rule-selecting abduction, we introduce the following concept of breadthfirst head-reducing programs:

Definition 4.4 Let rec $(P, p)$ be a recursive definition $p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right) \leftarrow B_{1}, \cdots, B_{m}$ of $p$ for $P$. Then, the recursive program $R P(P, p)$ is breadth-first head-reducing if it satisfies one of the following conditions:

1. there exist an atom $B_{i}$ and an index $l$ such that $\operatorname{pred}\left(B_{i}\right)=p$ and $\left|t_{l} \theta\right|>\left|s_{l} \theta\right|$ for any substitution $\theta$ and the $l$-th argument's term $s_{l}$ of $B_{i}$, or
2. for the atom such that $\operatorname{pred}\left(B_{i}\right) \neq p$, one of the following conditions holds:
(a) the definition clause of $\operatorname{pred}\left(B_{i}\right)$ is not included in $R P(P, p)$, or
(b) there exist terms $t_{l}$ in $p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right)$ and $s_{j}^{k}$ in $B_{k}$ such that $\left|t_{l} \theta\right|>\left|s_{j}^{k} \theta\right|$ for any substitution $\theta$, and the definition clause of $\operatorname{pred}\left(B_{k}\right)$ is $\operatorname{pred}\left(B_{k}\right)$-reducing with respect to the $j$-th argument.

Furthermore, $P$ is breadth-first head-reducing with respect to the predicate $p$ if any recursive program $R P(P, p)$ of $p$ for $P$ is breadth-first head-reducing.

Example 4.6 For the above program $P_{1}$, a recursive definition rec $\left(P_{1}\right.$, reverse) is obtained uniquely as follows:

$$
\operatorname{rec}\left(P_{1}, \operatorname{reverse}\right)=\operatorname{reverse}([W \mid X],[V \mid Y]) \leftarrow \operatorname{reverse}(X,[V \mid Z]), \operatorname{concat}(W, Z, Y)
$$

Then, recursive program $R P\left(P_{1}\right.$, reverse $)$ is also obtained as follows:
$R P\left(P_{1}\right.$, reverse $)=\left\{\begin{array}{l}\operatorname{reverse}([W \mid X],[V \mid Y]) \leftarrow \operatorname{reverse}(X,[V \mid Z]), \operatorname{concat}(W, Z, Y) \\ \operatorname{concat}(X,[W \mid Y],[W \mid Z]) \leftarrow \operatorname{concat}(X, Y, Z)\end{array}\right\}$.
It is clear that $R P\left(P_{1}\right.$, reverse) satisfies the condition 1 of Definition 4.4. Hence, $P$ is breadth-first head-reducing with respect to the predicate reverse. Furthermore, the following programs $P_{2}$ and $P_{3}$ are also breadth-first head-reducing with respect to the predicates isort and qsort respectively, where $s$ is a successor function:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& P_{2}=\left\{\begin{array}{l}
\text { isort }([X \mid X s], Y s) \leftarrow \text { isort }(X s, Z s), \text { insert }(X, Z s, Y s) \\
\text { insert }(X,[Y \mid Y s],[Y \mid Z s]) \leftarrow \text { greater }(X, Y), \text { insert }(X, Y s, Z s) \\
\text { insert }(X,[Y \mid Y s],[Y \mid Z s]) \leftarrow \text { less_or_eq }(X, Y) \\
\text { greater }(s(X), Y) \leftarrow \text { greater }(X, Y) \\
\text { less_or_eq }(X, s(Y)) \leftarrow \text { less_or_eq }(X, Y)
\end{array}\right\}, \\
& P_{3}=\left\{\begin{array}{l}
\text { qsort }([X \mid X s], Y s) \leftarrow \operatorname{partition~}(X s, X, \text { Littles, Bigs }), \\
\quad \text { qsort }(\text { Littles, Ls }), \\
\quad \text { qsort }(\text { Bigs }, B s), \\
\text { append }(\text { Lss, }[X \mid B s], Y s) \\
\text { partition }([X \mid X s], Y,[X \mid L s], B s) \leftarrow \text { less_or_eq }(X, Y), \\
\text { partition }(X s, Y, L s, B s) \\
\text { partition }([X \mid X s], Y, L s,[X \mid B s]) \leftarrow \text { greater }(X, Y), \\
\text { partition }(X s, Y, L s, B s) \\
\text { append }([W \mid X], Y,[W \mid Z]) \leftarrow \text { append }(X, Y, Z) \\
\text { greater }(s(X), Y) \leftarrow \text { greater }(X, Y) \\
\text { less_or_eq }(X, s(Y)) \leftarrow \text { less_or_eq }(X, Y)
\end{array}\right\} .
\end{aligned}
$$

On the other hand, the following programs $P_{4}, P_{5}$, and $P_{6}$ are not breadth-first head-reducing with respect to the predicate $p$ :

$$
\begin{aligned}
& P_{4}=\{p(X) \leftarrow p(X)\} \\
& P_{5}=\left\{\begin{array}{c}
p(X) \leftarrow q(X) \\
q(X) \leftarrow p(X)
\end{array}\right\}, \\
& P_{6}=\{p(X, Z) \leftarrow p(X, Y), p(Y, Z)\} .
\end{aligned}
$$

Lemma 4.7 Let $C$ be a clause $p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right) \leftarrow B_{1}, \cdots, B_{m}$ and $p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)$ be a ground atom. If there exists an atom $B_{i}$ which satisfies one of the following condition, then there exists a finitely failed SLD-derivation of $\{C\} \cup\left\{\leftarrow p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)\right\}$ :

1. $\operatorname{pred}\left(B_{i}\right) \neq p$, or
2. $\operatorname{pred}\left(B_{i}\right)=p$, and there exists an index $j$ such that $\left|t_{j} \theta\right|>\left|s_{j}^{i} \theta\right|$ for any substitution $\theta$.

Proof. If $\{C\} \cup\left\{\leftarrow p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)\right\}$ holds the condition 1 , then this derivation is finitely failed with a depth 1 by selecting an atom $B_{i}$.

Suppose that the condition 1 does not hold. Then, for any $k, \operatorname{pred}\left(B_{k}\right)=p$. If the condition 2 holds, then, by selecting an atom $B_{i}$ which satisfies the condition 2 , the resolvent

$$
\leftarrow B_{1} \theta, \cdots, B_{i} \theta, \cdots, B_{m} \theta
$$

is obtained from the goal $\leftarrow p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)$ and clause $C$. Since $\left|t_{j} \theta\right|>\left|s_{j}^{i} \theta\right|$,

$$
\left|s_{j}^{i} \theta\right|<\left|t_{j} \theta\right|=\left|s_{j}\right| .
$$

Furthermore, by selecting an atom $B_{i} \theta$, the length of the $j$-th argument's term is decrease by 1 step by step for this derivation of $\{C\} \cup\left\{\leftarrow p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)\right\}$. Hence, this derivation is finitely failed with at most the depth $\left|s_{j}\right| \leq \max \left\{\left|s_{j}\right| \mid 1 \leq j \leq n\right\}$.

Then, we can show the following theorem for the termination of breadth-first ruleselecting abduction.

Theorem 4.4 Let $P$ be a definite program and $\alpha$ be a ground atom with a predicate $p$. If $P$ is breadth-first head-reducing with respect to $p$, then there exists a finitely failed SLD-derivation of $P \cup\{\leftarrow \alpha\}$.

Proof. Let $r e c(P, p)$ be $p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right) \leftarrow B_{1}, \cdots, B_{m}$. If $P$ satisfies the condition 1 or 2 of Definition 4.4, then Lemma 4.7 implies the result.

Suppose that $P$ does not satisfy the conditions 1 and 2 , and satisfies the condition 3 in Definition 4.4. Let $B_{k}$ be an atom $q\left(s_{1}^{k}, \cdots, s_{h}^{k}\right)$, and $\left|t_{l} \theta\right|>\left|s_{j}^{k} \theta\right|$ for any substitution $\theta$. Let $C$ be a definition clause $q\left(u_{1}, \cdots, u_{h}\right) \leftarrow A_{1}, \cdots, A_{l^{\prime}}$ of $q$ in $R P(P, p)$. Since $C$ is $q$-reducing with respect to the $j$-th argument, then, for any $i$ such that $\operatorname{pred}\left(A_{i}\right)=q$, $\left|u_{j} \theta\right|>\left|v_{j} \theta\right|$, where $A_{i}=q\left(v_{1}, \cdots, v_{h}\right)$. By the definition of $\operatorname{rec}(P, p)$, the following resolvent is obtained in the derivation of $P \cup\{\leftarrow \alpha\}$ :

$$
\leftarrow B_{1} \theta, \cdots, B_{k} \theta, \cdots, B_{m} \theta,
$$

where $\theta$ is a unifier of $\alpha$ and $p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right)$. Since $\left|s_{j}^{k} \theta\right|<\left|t_{l} \theta\right|=\left|s_{l}\right|$, and $s_{l}$ is ground, $s_{j}^{k} \theta$ is also ground. By selecting an atom $B_{k} \theta$, the resolvent

$$
\leftarrow B_{1} \theta \sigma, \cdots, B_{k-1} \theta \sigma,\left(A_{1} \sigma, \cdots, A_{l^{\prime}} \sigma\right), B_{k+1} \theta \sigma, \cdots, B_{m} \theta \sigma
$$

is obtained from the above goal and the clause $C$. For the $j$-th argument $v_{j}$ in $A_{i} \sigma$,

$$
\left|v_{j} \sigma\right|<\left|u_{j} \sigma\right|=\left|s_{j}^{k} \theta\right|<\left|t_{l} \theta\right|=\left|s_{l}\right|
$$

and $v_{j} \sigma$ is ground. Furthermore, we can select an atom $A_{i} \sigma$ applied to $C$. Consequently, this derivation is finitely failed with at most the depth $\left|s_{l}\right|<\max \left\{\left|s_{j}\right| \mid 1 \leq\right.$ $j \leq n\}$.

### 4.4 Prolog Implementation

As mentioned in Section 4.1, the rule-selecting abduction can be realized in the following Prolog program rs_abd.

```
rs_abd(Goal,Leaves) :- clause(Goal,Clause),rs_abd(Clause,Leaves).
rs_abd((Goal1,Goal2), (Leaf1,Leaf2)) :-
    !,rs_abd(Goal1,Leaf1),rs_abd(Goal2,Leaf2).
rs_abd(Leaf,Leaf) :- !.
```

Furthermore, we can improve the program rs_abd as the following program msrs_abd by using the concept of most specific abduction in Stickel [Sti91, Duv91, Ino92].

```
msrs_abd(Goal,Leaves) :- clause(Goal,Clause),msrs_abd(Clause,Leaves).
msrs_abd((Goal1,Goal2),(Leaf1,Leaf2)) :-
    !,msrs_abd(Goal1,Leaf1),msrs_abd(Goal2, Leaf2).
msrs_abd(Leaf,Leaf) :- (not clause(Leaf,X) -> true).
```

The program msrs_abd returns the combinations of the leaves for all proof trees as hypotheses, while the rs_abd program returns the combinations of the nodes for all proof trees. Furthermore, for the above programs, the following corollary of Theorem 4.1 holds:

Corollary 4.1 Let $P$ be a definite program and $p$ be a predicate symbol. If $P$ is head-reducing with respect to the predicate $p$, then the following goals

$$
\begin{aligned}
& ?-\operatorname{rs\_ abd}\left(p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right), \mathrm{X}\right) \\
& ?-\operatorname{msrs} \_a b d\left(p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right), \mathrm{X}\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

terminate for any ground atom $p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)$.

The breadth-first rule-selecting abduction can also be realized in the following Prolog program bfrs_abd. It returns the hypotheses as its second argument for a ground atom as its first argument and a depth as its third argument.

```
bfrs_abd(Goal,Leaves,Depth) :-
    Depth > 0,clause(Goal,Clause),Depth1 is Depth-1,
    bfrs_abd(Clause,Leaves,Depth1).
bfrs_abd((Goal1,Goal2),(Leaf1,Leaf2),Depth) :-
    !,bfrs_abd(Goal1,Leaf1,Depth),bfrs_abd(Goal2,Leaf2,Depth).
bfrs_abd(Leaf,Leaf,0) :- !.
```

Note that, for the program bfrs_abd, we must give a natural number as the depth in its third argument.

For example, for the following reverse program in Section 4.3

```
reverse([W|X],Y) :- reverse(X,Z),concat(W,Z,Y).
concat(X,[W|Y],[W|Z]) :- concat(X,Y,Z).
```

the results of the goal ?- bfrs_abd(reverse ( $[a, b],[b, a]), X, D)$ are as follows:

```
: ?- bfrs_abd(reverse([a,b],[b,a]),X,0). %%% depth = 0
X = reverse([a,b],[b,a]);
no
: ?- bfrs_abd(reverse([a,b],[b,a]),X,1). %%% depth = 1
X = reverse([b],_260),concat(a,_260,[b,a]);
no
: ?- bfrs_abd(reverse([a,b],[b,a]),X,2). %%% depth = 2
X = (reverse([],_376), concat(b,_376,[b|_514])),concat(a,_514,[a]);
no
: ?- bfrs_abd(reverse([a,b],[b,a]),X,3). %%% depth = 3
no
```

For the program bfrs_abd, the following corollary of Theorem 4.4 holds:

```
hyp(Goal,Hyp,IC) :-
    rs_abd(Goal,Hyp),
    ((rep_assert(Hyp), consistent(Goal,Hyp,IC),rep_retract(Hyp))
            ->true;!,fail).
consistent(Goal,Hyp,IC) :-
    (call(Goal)->
            (call(ic(IC))->(write(': consistent'),nl) ;
            (write(': inconsistent'),nl)) ;
    (write(': inconsistent'),nl)).
ic(IC) :- (call(IC)->fail;true).
rep_assert((Atom1,Atom2)) :-
    (atom(Atom1)->assert(Atom1);rep_assert(Atom1)),
    (atom(Atom2)->assert(Atom2);rep_assert(Atom2)).
rep_assert(Atom) :- assert(Atom).
rep_retract((Atom1,Atom2)) :-
    (atom(Atom1)->retract(Atom1);rep_retract(Atom1)),
    (atom(Atom2)->retract(Atom2);rep_retract(Atom2)).
rep_retract(Atom) :- retract(Atom).
```

Figure 4.1: Program hyp
Corollary 4.2 Let $\alpha$ be a ground atom with predicate $p$. If $P$ is breadth-first headreducing with respect to the predicate $p$, then there exists a depth d such that the goal

$$
\text { ?- } \operatorname{bfrss} \text { _abd }(\alpha, \mathrm{X}, \mathrm{~d})
$$

returns "no".

For the above example, the depth in Corollary 4.2 is 3 .
The rule-selecting abduction for default logic is also realized as the Prolog program hyp in Figure 4.1. The program checks the consistency under an integrity constraint and outputs hypotheses. An integrity constraint is given as the form of disjunctions (expressed by ';') of conjunctions (expressed by ',') of atoms in the third argument of hyp. If there exists no refutation of a goal as conjunctions of the atoms in the integrity constraint, then the hypotheses are consistent with the given program and the integrity constraint.

The predicate hyp in Figure 4.1 works as follows: The predicate rs_abd returns a hypothesis as its second argument for a surprising fact as its first argument. The
predicate rep_assert adds the hypothesis obtained by rs_abd to the original program. The predicate consistent checks consistency for the hypothesis and the integrity constraint, which is given as the third argument of hyp. The predicate repretract removes the hypothesis added by rep_assert from the original program. The predicate ic calls the integrity constraint, and returns 'true' (resp., 'fail') if the integrity constraint fails (resp., succeeds) on the original program.

The termination of the program hyp is also guaranteed by the following corollary of Theorem 4.1:

Corollary 4.3 Let $P$ be a definite program, $I C$ be an integrity constraint, and $p$ be a predicate symbol. For any predicate symbol $q$ in $I C$, if $P$ is head-reducing with respect to the predicate $p$ and $q$, then the goal

$$
?-\operatorname{hyp}\left(p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right), \mathrm{X}, \mathrm{IC}\right)
$$

terminates for any ground atom $p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)$.
In order to apply default logic to the above program, we transform the set of default rules $D$ to the following definite program $P_{D}^{+}$:

$$
\left\{\begin{array}{l|l}
w(\bar{X}) \leftarrow \alpha(\bar{X}), \text { default_} \_(\bar{X}) & \frac{\alpha(\bar{X}): w(\bar{X})}{w(\bar{X})} \in D
\end{array}\right\}
$$

Thus, we interpret default_w( $\bar{t})$ appearing in a hypothesis as $w(\bar{t})$.
Example 4.7 Consider $P \cup P_{D}^{+}$which consists of the following clauses:

```
fly(X) :- bird(X),default_fly(X). %%% default
swim(X) :- fish(X),default_swim(X). %%% default
swim(X) :- penguin(X). %%% theory
bird(X) :- penguin(X). %%% theory
```

Let $I C_{1}$ and $I C_{2}$ be integrity constraints $\leftarrow f l y(Y), \operatorname{swim}(Y)$ and $\leftarrow \operatorname{bird}(Y), \operatorname{swim}(Y)$, respectively. Since the above $P \cup P_{D}^{+}$and $I C_{i}(i=1,2)$ satisfy the conditions of Corollary 4.3, the hyp program terminates and outputs the following hypotheses:

```
: ?- hyp(fly(john),X,(fly(Y),swim(Y))).
                                    %%% IC1 %%%
penguin(john) , default_fly(john): inconsistent
bird(john) , default_fly(john): consistent
```

```
fly(john): consistent
```

```
: ?- hyp(swim(john),X,(fly(Y),swim(Y))). %%% IC1 %%%
fish(john) , default_swim(john): consistent
penguin(john): consistent
swim(john): consistent
: ?- hyp(fly(john),X,(bird(Y),swim(Y))). %%% IC2 %%%
penguin(john) , default_fly(john): inconsistent
bird(john) , default_fly(john): consistent
fly(john): consistent
: ?- hyp(swim(john),X,(bird(Y),swim(Y))). %%% IC2 %%%
fish(john) , default_swim(john): consistent
penguin(john): inconsistent
swim(john): consistent
```

The predicate hyp is also applied to explanation-based generalization. Explanationbased generalization (for short, EBG) [Duv91, GMP90, HiA94a, MKKC86, vHB88] takes as inputs a domain theory, a training example, a goal concept and an operationally criterion. It constructs an explanation in term of the domain theory that proves how the training example satisfies the goal concept definition. Then, it determines a set of operationally sufficient conditions for the goal concept under which the explanation holds, and returns it as an output.

When we realize EBG as a Prolog program, we regard the domain theory and the training example as a definite program. Then, we construct a proof tree, which is called an explanation tree [HiA94a], and generalize it to obtain the general definition of goal concept. On the other hand, rule-selecting abduction is an inference from rules to facts. Then, it is corresponding to obtaining a training example from a domain theory in EBG.

Consider the safe-to-stack problem in Mitchell et al. [MKKC86]. A domain theory $D$ of the safe-to-stack problem is the following definite program.

```
safe_to_stack(X,Y) :- lighter(X,Y).
lighter(X,Y) :- weight(X,W1),weight(Y,W2),less(W1,W2).
weight(X,500) :- isa(X,table).
weight(X,Y) :- volume(X,V), density(X,D),times(V,D,Y).
```

For the domain theory $D$, the goal

```
?- rs_abd(safe_to_stack(box1,table1),X)
```

terminates, because there exists exactly one recursive program $R P(D$, safe_to_stack) of the predicate safe_to_stack for $D$, and it is head-reducing. Furthermore, since $D$ and an integrity constraint $\neg i s a(b o x 1$, table $) \vee \neg i s a(t a b l e 1$, box) satisfy the condition of Corollary 4.3, the following goal

```
?- hyp(safe_to_stack(box1,table1),X,(isa(box1,table);isa(table1,box)))
```

terminates. Hence, we obtain the following hypotheses as the second argument:

```
isa(box1,table),isa(table1,table),less(500,500): inconsistent
isa(box1,table),
(volume(table1,_510), density(table1, _506),times(_510, _506, _310)),
less(500,_310)
: inconsistent
```

isa(box1,table), weight(table1,_310), less (500, _310): inconsistent
(volume (box1, _430), density(box1, _426), times (_430, _426, _314)),
isa(table1,table), less (_314,500)
: consistent
(volume (box1, _430), density (box1, _426), times (_430, _426, _314)),
(volume (table1,_608), density (table1,_604), times (_608,_604, _310)),
less(_314,_310)
: consistent
(volume (box1, _430), density (box1, _426), times (_430, _426, _314)),
weight (table1, _310), less (_314, _310)
: consistent
weight (box1,_314), isa(table1,table), less(_314,500): consistent
weight(box1, _314),
(volume (table1, _456), density (table1,_452), times (_456, _452, _310)),
less(_314,_310)
: consistent
weight(box1,_314), weight(table1,_310), less(_314,_310): consistent
lighter(box1,table1): consistent
safe_to_stack(box1,table1): consistent

Then, it is sufficient for EBG to give a training example as ground examples of a consistent hypotheses. Furthermore, if we consider that a hypothesis is the set of
leaves in explanation tree, then, by replacing the predicate rs_abd with the predicate msrs_abd in the program hyp, we can obtain the first four outputs as hypotheses.

## Chapter 5

## Rule-Finding Abduction

"How absurdly simple!" I cried.<br>"Quite so!" said he, a little nettled. "Every problem becomes very childish when once it is explained to you."<br>- 'The Adventure of the Dancing Men'<br>"The Return of Sherlock Holmes"

Let $P$ and $P^{\prime}$ be definite programs and $C$ be a surprising fact with respect to $P$. Note here that $P$ and $P^{\prime}$ are given before $\alpha$ is given. The rule-finding abduction is a type of abduction which finds a rule in $P^{\prime}$ and proposes a hypothesis to explain the surprising fact $C$. An inference schema of rule-finding abduction is described by the following three steps:

1. A surprising fact $C$ is observed.
2. A rule $C \leftarrow A$ is found in $P^{\prime}$.
3. A hypothesis $A$ is proposed.

For a surprising fact $C$, we regard the above inference schema as the following one by identifying $A$ with the set $\{A\}$ of atoms:

1. A ground atom $C$ such that $P \nvdash C$ is given.
2. A rule $C^{\prime} \leftarrow A_{1}^{\prime}, \cdots, A_{n}^{\prime}$ is found in $P^{\prime}$, where $C^{\prime} \theta=C$ and $A_{i}^{\prime} \theta=A_{i}$.
3. A hypothesis $\left\{A_{1}, \cdots, A_{n}\right\}$ is proposed in $P$.

In general, since we assume the set $\left\{P_{1}, \cdots, P_{l}\right\}$ of definite programs in rule-finding abduction, the above $P^{\prime}$ is equal to some $P_{i}(1 \leq i \leq l)$.

In this chapter, we investigate rule-finding abduction for logic programming. In Section 5.1, we give two examples, and explain what rule-finding abduction is. In Section 5.2, we investigate the concept of abducible in the abductive framework. In Section 5.3, we introduce the concept of loop-pair. It syntactically determines whether or not there exists an infinite process of rule-finding abduction. In Section 5.4, we also introduce the concept of loop-elimination, which is a transformation of programs for which rule-finding abduction terminates. In Section 5.5, we realize rule-finding abduction and loop-elimination as Prolog programs. In Section 5.6, we discuss analogical reasoning from the viewpoint of rule-finding abduction.

This chapter is based on the paper [Hir94d].

### 5.1 Rule-Finding Abduction for Logic Programming

Consider the following fossil-shell example. Let $P_{i}(1 \leq i \leq 3)$ be the following sets of clauses:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& P_{1}=\{\text { find }(X, \text { fossil_shell }, Y) \leftarrow \text { sea }(Y)\}, \\
& P_{2}=\left\{\begin{array}{l}
\text { find }(X, \text { fossil_shell }, Y) \leftarrow \text { used_to_be }(Y, \text { sea }) \\
\text { used_to_be }(X, Y) \leftarrow b e(X, Y)
\end{array}\right\}, \\
& P_{3}=\left\{\begin{array}{l}
\text { find }(X, \text { fossil_shell }, Y) \leftarrow \text { move }(\text { fossil_shell }, \text { sea }, Y) \\
\text { move }\left(f o s s i l \_ \text {shell }, X, Y\right) \leftarrow \text { slow_move }\left(f o s s i l \_s h e l l, ~\right. \\
\text { slow_move }(X, Y) \\
\text { slow_move }(X, Y, Z) \leftarrow \text { has_not_leg }(X)
\end{array}\right\} .
\end{aligned}
$$

Let $\alpha$ be a surprising fact find(i,fossil_shell, mountain). In rule-finding abduction, by selecting a program $P_{i}$ from the set $\left\{P_{1}, P_{2}, P_{3}\right\}$ of programs, we find a rule and propose a hypothesis to explain the surprising fact $\alpha$. We call such a selected program an applied program of $\alpha$ for $\left\{P_{1}, P_{2}, P_{3}\right\}$. Then, Figure 5.1 illustrates the applied programs and hypotheses $H_{i}$ of $\alpha$ for $\left\{P_{1}, P_{2}, P_{3}\right\}$. For the applied program $P_{1}, P_{1} \cup$ $H_{1} \vdash \alpha$. For the applied program $P_{2}, P_{2} \cup H_{2} \vdash \alpha$ and $P_{2} \cup H_{3} \vdash \alpha$. For the applied

| applied programs | hypotheses |
| :--- | :--- |
| nothing | $H_{0}=\{$ find $($ i,fossil_shell, mountain $)\}$ |
| $P_{1}$ | $H_{1}=\{$ sea(mountain $\left.)\right\}$ |
| $P_{2}$ | $H_{2}=\{$ be $($ mountain, sea $)\}$ |
| $P_{3}$ | $H_{3}=\{$ used_to_be $($ mountain, sea $)\}$ |
|  | $H_{4}=\{$ has_not_leg $($ fossil_shell $)\}$ |
|  | $H_{5}=\{$ has_not_wing $($ fossil_shell $)\}$ |
|  | $H_{6}=\{$ slow_move $($ fossil_shell, sea, mountain $)\}$ |
|  | $H_{7}=\{$ move $($ fossil_shell, sea, mountain $)\}$ |

Figure 5.1: Applied programs and hypotheses $H_{i}$ of $\alpha$ for $\left\{P_{1}, P_{2}, P_{3}\right\}$

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
\text { applied programs } & \text { hypotheses } \\
\text { nothing } & K_{0}=\left\{p\left(f^{3}(a)\right)\right\} \\
P_{4} & K_{1}=\left\{p(f(a)), q\left(f^{2}(a)\right)\right\} \\
P_{4}, P_{5} & K_{2}=\{p(f(a)), q(a), r(a, f(a)), r(f(a), f(a))\} \\
& K_{3}=\left\{p(f(a)), q(f(a)), r\left(f(a), f^{2}(a)\right)\right\} \\
P_{4}, P_{5}, P_{6} & K_{4}=\{p(f(a)), q(a), r(a, f(a)), r(a, f(a))\} \\
& K_{5}=\{p(f(a)), q(f(a)), r(a, f(a))\}
\end{array}
$$

Figure 5.2: Applied programs and hypotheses $K_{i}$ of $\beta$ for $\left\{P_{4}, P_{5}, P_{6}\right\}$
program $P_{3}, P_{3} \cup H_{i} \vdash \alpha(4 \leq i \leq 7)$. The hypothesis $H_{0}$ is a trivial hypothesis, that is, $H_{0} \vdash \alpha$.

Furthermore, we can give the example of programs with function symbols and recursion. Let $P_{i}(4 \leq i \leq 6)$ be the following sets of clauses:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& P_{4}=\left\{p\left(f^{2}(X)\right) \leftarrow p(X), q(f(X))\right\}, \\
& P_{5}=\{q(f(X)) \leftarrow q(X), r(X, f(X))\}, \\
& P_{6}=\{r(f(X), f(Y)) \leftarrow r(X, Y)\} .
\end{aligned}
$$

For a surprising fact $\beta=p\left(f^{3}(a)\right)$, Figure 5.2 illustrates the applied programs and hypotheses of $\beta$ for $\left\{P_{4}, P_{5}, P_{6}\right\}$. For the applied program $P_{4}, P_{4} \cup K_{1} \vdash \beta$. For the applied programs $P_{4}$ and $P_{5}, P_{4} \cup P_{5} \cup K_{2} \vdash \beta$ and $P_{4} \cup P_{5} \cup K_{3} \vdash \beta$. For the applied programs $P_{4}, P_{5}$, and $P_{6}, P_{4} \cup P_{5} \cup P_{6} \cup K_{4} \vdash \beta$ and $P_{4} \cup P_{5} \cup P_{6} \cup K_{5} \vdash \beta$. The
hypothesis $K_{0}$ is a trivial hypothesis, that is, $K_{0} \vdash \beta$.
Let $P_{i}$ be a program for $1 \leq i \leq n$. If any program $P_{i}$ is given before we apply to rule-finding abduction, then the termination of rule-finding abduction is reduced to one of rule-selecting abduction for the union $P_{1} \cup \cdots \cup P_{n}$ of programs, and we have already discussed it in Chapter 4.

On the other hand, when we discuss the termination of abduction, we can adopt at least two strategies. One is the restriction of class of logic programs. The discussion in Chapter 4 gives an example of it. The other is the introduction of the criterion of termination. For example, in EBG, it is given as an operationality criterion. In the following sections, we discuss the later strategy for the termination of rule-finding abduction.

In rule-finding abduction, we should choose the programs for which rule-finding abduction terminates. Hence, it is our purpose in the following sections how to choose the programs to avoid an infinite process of rule-finding abduction.

### 5.2 Abducible Predicate

An abducible predicate (abducible, for short) is defined in an abductive framework [Dun91, EK89, KM90, Poo88]. First, we give the definition of the abductive framework as follows:

Definition 5.1 (Poole [Poo88]) An abductive framework is defined as the triple ( $P, I, A$ ), where $P$ is a set of Horn clause, $I$ is an integrity constraint, and $A$ is a set of predicate symbols called abducible.

In this chapter, we only deal with an abductive framework of definite programs. Then, an abductive framework is defined as the pair $(P, A)$ without an integrity constraint, where $P$ is a definite program. Here, an abducible means the set of predicate symbols of atoms which are assumed true or are hypotheses.

In an abductive framework, an explanation of $\alpha$ for $(P, A)$ is defined as follows:

Definition 5.2 Let $\alpha$ be a ground atom, and $(P, A)$ be an abductive framework. Then, an explanation of $\alpha$ for $(P, A)$ is a set $H$ of atoms such that $P \cup H \vdash \alpha$ and $\Pi(H) \subseteq A$.

Example 5.1 Let $P$ be the following program and $A=\{q\}$.

$$
P=\left\{\begin{array}{l}
p(X) \leftarrow q(X) \\
q(X) \leftarrow p(X)
\end{array}\right\} .
$$

Then, for a ground atom $\alpha=p(a)$, the set $H=\{q(a)\}$ is an explanation of $\alpha$ for $(P, A)$. On the other hand, let $A^{\prime}=\{r\}$. Then, there exist no explanations of $\alpha$ for $\left(P, A^{\prime}\right)$.

An abducible is similar to an operationality criterion, which is introduced in EBG. Note that the purpose of abductive framework is different from that of EBG. An abductive framework is related to nonmonotonic reasoning or knowledge representation, while EBG is related to machine learning or knowledge acquisition.

For a ground atom $\alpha$, the leaves of the proof tree of $\alpha$ given by EBG are elements of an operationality criterion, and we can regard them as abducible. Note that, in EBG, an operationality criterion is given before a proof tree is constructed. In other words, an operationality criterion is introduced in order to guarantee that the proof tree is finite.

Then, which of atoms is an abducible?
If a proof tree is finite, then the leaves of it are possible to be an abducible. Furthermore, for the set $H$ of nodes in the proof tree, if any branch of the proof tree includes at least one element of $H$, then $H$ can be regarded as an abducible. In Section 5.5, we realize the program whose outputs are such an $H$ as Prolog program, if all proof trees are finite.

However, if the class of programs is not restricted, we cannot determine before the proof tree is constructed whether or not the branch of a proof tree is finite. Hence, in the next section, we investigate the syntactical characterization of programs whose proof trees have an infinite branch.

### 5.3 Loop-Pair

When we debug a Prolog program, we search for the proof trees of it, and check whether or not it correctly works according as our intention. If there exists an infinite branch of the proof trees, then this program is not designed with our intention. Hence, it is an important view for Prolog debugging to determine whether or not the branch of a proof tree is infinite. In order to solve this problem, we introduce the concept of a loop-pair. We deal with the loop-pair to syntactically characterize the termination of rule-finding abduction.

Definition 5.3 Let $s$ and $t$ be terms. Then, a loop-pair $\langle\langle s, t\rangle\rangle$ is inductively defined as follows:

1. If $s$ is a constant symbol $a$, then $t$ is a term which includes the constant symbol $a$ or a variable $X$ as subterm.
2. If $s$ is a variable $X$, then $t$ is either a term which includes the variable $X$ as subterm, or a variable $Y$.
3. If $s$ is a term $f\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{m}\right), t$ is a term $f\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{m}\right)$, and $\left\langle\left\langle s_{i}, t_{i}\right\rangle\right\rangle$ is a loop-pair for any $i(1 \leq i \leq m)$, then so is $\langle\langle s, t\rangle\rangle$.

Example 5.2 The following pairs are loop-pairs:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \langle\langle a, a\rangle\rangle,\langle\langle a, f(a)\rangle\rangle,\langle\langle a, X\rangle\rangle,\langle\langle a, f(X)\rangle\rangle, \\
& \langle\langle X, X\rangle\rangle,\langle\langle X, f(X)\rangle,\langle\langle X, Y\rangle\rangle, \\
& \langle\langle f(a, b), f(X, b)\rangle\rangle,\langle\langle g(a, f(X)), g(X, f(Y))\rangle\rangle .
\end{aligned}
$$

Definition 5.4 Let $\alpha$ and $\beta$ be atoms $p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)$ and $p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right)$, respectively. Then, $\langle\langle\alpha, \beta\rangle\rangle$ is a loop-pair if $\left\langle\left\langle s_{i}, t_{i}\right\rangle\right\rangle$ is a loop-pair for any $i(1 \leq i \leq n)$.

Lemma 5.1 Let $\alpha$ and $\beta$ be atoms $p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)$ and $\beta=p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right)$, respectively. Let $C$ be the following clause:

$$
C=p\left(u_{1}, \cdots, u_{n}\right) \leftarrow p\left(v_{1}, \cdots, v_{n}\right) .
$$

If $\langle\langle\alpha, \beta\rangle\rangle$ is a loop-pair, $\alpha \theta=p\left(u_{1}, \cdots, u_{n}\right) \theta$, and $\beta=p\left(v_{1}, \cdots, v_{n}\right) \theta$, then there exists an atom $\gamma$ such that

1. $\langle\langle\beta, \gamma\rangle\rangle$ is a loop-pair,
2. there exists a substitution $\sigma$ such that $\beta \sigma=p\left(u_{1}, \cdots, u_{n}\right) \sigma$, and
3. $\gamma=p\left(v_{1}, \cdots, v_{n}\right) \sigma$.

Proof. Let $\gamma$ be an atom $p\left(w_{1}, \cdots, w_{n}\right)$. The result is proven by mathematical induction on the structure of $t_{i}$. Note that different capital letters represent different variables.

1. If $t_{i}$ is a constant symbol $a$, then $s_{i}=a$ and $u_{i}=v_{i}=X$. Hence, $w_{i}=a$.
2. If $t_{i}$ is a variable $X$, then the following three cases hold:
(a) If $s_{i}$ is a constant symbol $a$, then $u_{i}=U$ and $v_{i}=V$. Hence, $w_{i}=W$.
(b) If $s_{i}$ is the variable $X$, then $u_{i}=v_{i}=U$. Hence, $w_{i}=X$.
(c) If $s_{i}$ is a variable $Y$ different from $X$, then $u_{i}=U$ and $v_{i}=V$. Hence, $w_{i}=W$.
3. If $t_{i}$ is the form of $f\left(t_{1}^{\prime}, \cdots, t_{n}^{\prime}\right)$, then the following two cases hold:
(a) If $s_{i}$ is a subterm of $t_{i}$, then $u_{i}$ is also a subterm of $v_{i}$. Hence, $t_{i}$ is a subterm of $w_{i}$.
(b) Otherwise, $s_{i}$ is the form of $f\left(s_{1}^{\prime}, \cdots, s_{n}^{\prime}\right)$ and suppose that $\left\langle\left\langle s_{i}^{\prime}, t_{i}^{\prime}\right\rangle\right\rangle$ is a loop-pair for any $i(1 \leq i \leq n)$. Then, $s_{i}^{\prime} \theta=u_{i}^{\prime} \theta, t_{i}^{\prime}=v_{i}^{\prime} \theta, t_{i}^{\prime} \sigma=u_{i}^{\prime} \sigma$, and $v_{i}^{\prime}=v_{i}^{\prime} \sigma$. Hence, $s_{i} \sigma=u_{i} \sigma$ and $w_{i}=v_{i} \sigma$.

Hence, in each case, $\left\langle\left\langle t_{i}, w_{i}\right\rangle\right\rangle$ is a loop-pair, and $w_{i}=v_{i} \sigma$ for some substitution $\sigma$. Therefore, $\langle\langle\beta, \gamma\rangle\rangle$ is a loop-pair, $\beta \sigma=p\left(u_{1}, \cdots, u_{n}\right) \sigma$, and $\gamma=p\left(v_{1}, \cdots, v_{n}\right) \sigma$.

Theorem 5.1 Let $P$ be a definite program, $\alpha$ and $\beta$ be atoms, and $C_{1}, \cdots, C_{n} \in P$ be the applied clauses in the derivation from the goal $\leftarrow \alpha$ to the goal $\leftarrow \beta$ in $P$. If $\langle\langle\alpha, \beta\rangle\rangle$ is a loop-pair, then there exists an atom $\gamma$ such that

1. $\langle\langle\beta, \gamma\rangle\rangle$ is a loop-pair, and
2. the goal $\leftarrow \gamma$ is derived from $\leftarrow \beta$ by applying the clauses $C_{1}, \cdots, C_{n} \in P$.

Proof. For any $C_{i}$, by applying the selected atoms in the derivation from $\leftarrow \alpha$ to $\leftarrow \beta$, there exists an atom $\gamma$ which satisfies the above condition 2 . Then, we can reduce the result to Lemma 5.1.

Let $P$ be a definite program. If all predicate symbols in the heads of clauses in $P$ are mutually distinct, then the input clauses in a derivation are determined uniquely for a goal. Hence, the following corollary holds:

Corollary 5.1 Let $P$ be a definite program and $\alpha$ be an atom. Suppose that all predicate symbols in the heads of clauses in $P$ are mutually distinct. If a loop-pair appears in the branch of the proof tree of $\alpha$ on $P$, then this branch is infinite.

By Corollary 5.1, we can select the programs which do not include such a branch, in order to avoid infinite branches of the proof tree.

### 5.4 Loop-Elimination

In rule-finding abduction, we can deal with the several programs given in advance. Then, in this section, we discuss the termination of rule-finding abduction by choosing programs.

It is a useful method for Prolog debugging to obtain and to analyze the transformed program whose termination is guaranteed, and to debug the original one. In this section, we discuss the termination of rule-finding abduction from this viewpoint. In Chapter 4, we have already captured the termination of rule-selecting abduction as head-reducing programs. Hence, this section also begins with head-reducing programs.

For a program $P^{\prime}$, if a program $P$ is head-reducing with respect to the predicate $p$, is the union $P \cup P^{\prime}$ head-reducing with respect to the predicate $p$ ?

Example 5.3 Let $P_{1}$ and $P_{2}$ be programs $\{p(X) \leftarrow q(X)\}$ and $\{q(X) \leftarrow p(X)\}$. Clearly $P_{1}$ and $P_{2}$ are head-reducing with respect to the predicate $p$. Then, the union $P_{1} \cup P_{2}$ is the following program:

$$
P_{1} \cup P_{2}=\left\{\begin{array}{l}
p(X) \leftarrow q(X) \\
q(X) \leftarrow p(X)
\end{array}\right\}
$$

Obviously, $P_{1} \cup P_{2}$ is not head-reducing with respect to the predicate $p$.

In general, even if $P$ and $P^{\prime}$ are head-reducing with respect to the some predicate, $P \cup P^{\prime}$ is not always head-reducing with respect to the same predicate. Then, is there the choice of programs whose union is head-reducing? In particular, for a clause $C$ and a head-reducing program $P$ with respect to the predicate $p$, we consider the condition under which $P \cup\{C\}$ is head-reducing with respect to $p$. First, we define reducing programs, which are more restricted than head-reducing programs, introduced by Yamamoto [Yam92].

Definition 5.5 (Yamamoto [Yam92]) A clause $A \leftarrow B_{1}, \cdots, B_{n}$ is reducing if $|A \theta|>$ $\left|B_{i} \theta\right|(1 \leq i \leq n)$ for any substitution $\theta$. A program $P$ is a reducing program if all clauses in $P$ are reducing.

By Definition 5.5, any reducing program is also head-reducing with respect to any predicate. Furthermore, if $P$ is a reducing program and $C$ is reducing, then $P \cup\{C\}$ is also a reducing program. Then, $P \cup\{C\}$ is head-reducing with respect to any predicate. However, the following cases 1 and 2 hold:

1. Let $P_{3}$ be a program $\left\{p\left(f^{2}(X)\right) \leftarrow p(X), q(f(X))\right\}$, and $C_{3}$ be a clause $q(X) \leftarrow$ $p\left(f^{3}(X)\right)$. Then, $P_{3} \cup\left\{C_{3}\right\}$ is not head-reducing with respect to the predicate $p$. Hence, even if $P$ is a reducing program and $C$ is $p$-reducing with respect to all arguments, $P \cup\{C\}$ is not always head-reducing with respect to $p$.
2. Let $P_{4}$ be a program $\{p(X) \leftarrow q(Y)\}$ and $C_{4}$ be a clause $q(f(X)) \leftarrow p(X)$. Then, $P_{4} \cup\left\{C_{4}\right\}$ is not head-reducing with respect to the predicate $p$. Hence, even if $P$ is head-reducing with respect to the predicate $p$ and $C$ is reducing, $P \cup\{C\}$ is not always head-reducing with respect to $p$.

Hence, if we extend a reducing program $P$ to a head-reducing program with respect to the predicate $p$, or extend a reducing clause $C$ to a $p$-reducing clause with respect to all arguments, then $P \cup\{C\}$ is not always head-reducing with respect to the predicate p.

Let $P$ be a head-reducing program with respect to the predicate $p$ and $C$ be a $p$-reducing clause with respect to all arguments. In the remainder of this section, we consider the method to combine $P$ with $C$. Then, it is our purpose to eliminate the infinite branches of proof trees of $P \cup\{C\}$.

First, we introduce the following transformation of a clause $C$ for a program $P$.

Definition 5.6 Let $P$ be a program and $C$ be a clause $A \leftarrow B_{1}, \cdots, B_{l}$. Then, loopelimination of $C$ for $P$, denoted by $l e(C, P)$, is a clause which is replaced the predicate symbol $q$ in $B_{i}(1 \leq i \leq l)$ appearing in some head of $P$ by the predicate true_q.

Then, the following lemma holds.

Lemma 5.2 Let $P$ be a program $\left\{p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right) \leftarrow D_{1}, \cdots, D_{m}\right\}$ and $C$ be a clause. If $P$ is head-reducing with respect to the predicate $p$ and $C$ is pred (head $(C))$-reducing with respect to all arguments, then $P \cup\{l e(C, P)\}$ is head-reducing with respect to the predicate symbol $p$.

Proof. Suppose that $C$ is a clause $A \leftarrow B_{1}, \cdots, B_{l}$.
If any $D_{j}$ and $A$ are not unifiable, then the result trivially holds. Suppose $D_{j} \theta=$ $A \theta$. Let $l e(C, P)$ be loop-elimination $A \leftarrow B_{1}^{\prime}, \cdots, B_{l}^{\prime}$ of $C$ for $P$. Then, $\operatorname{rec}(P \cup$ $\{l e(C, P)\}, p)$ is constructed in the following way:

$$
p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right) \theta \leftarrow D_{1} \theta, \cdots, D_{j-1} \theta,\left(B_{1}^{\prime} \theta, \cdots, B_{l}^{\prime} \theta\right), D_{j+1} \theta, \cdots, D_{m} \theta .
$$

Then, $R P(P \cup\{l e(C, P)\}, p)=\{r e c(P \cup\{l e(C, P)\}, p), l e(C, P)\}$. By Definition 5.6, the predicate $p$ appearing in the bodies of $l e(C, P)$ is replaced by true $p$. Then, the predicate $p$ does not appear in the part $\left(B_{1}^{\prime} \theta, \cdots, B_{l}^{\prime} \theta\right)$ in the body of $\operatorname{rec}(P \cup$ $\{l e(C, P)\}, p)$. Furthermore, since $C$ is $\operatorname{pred}(A)$-reducing with respect to all arguments,
for $B_{i}$ such that $\operatorname{pred}(A)=\operatorname{pred}\left(B_{i}^{\prime}\right),\left|t_{k} \theta\right|>\left|s_{k} \theta\right|$ for any argument's term $t_{k}$ and $s_{k}$ $(1 \leq k \leq n)$ of $A$ and $B_{i}^{\prime}$. For $B_{i}^{\prime}$ such that $\operatorname{pred}(A) \neq \operatorname{pred}\left(B_{i}^{\prime}\right)$, any definition clauses of $\operatorname{pred}\left(B_{i}^{\prime}\right)$ does not appear in $R P(P \cup\{l e(C, P)\}, p)$. Hence, $R P(P \cup\{l e(C, P)\}, p)$ is head-reducing with respect to $p$.

If a clause $C$ is not $\operatorname{pred}(A)$-reducing with respect to all arguments, then there exists the following counterexample of Lemma 5.2.

Let $P_{5}$ be a program $\{p(f(X)) \leftarrow q(X, Y)\}$ and $C_{5}$ be a clause $q(X, f(Y)) \leftarrow$ $q(f(X), Y)$. Then, $P_{5}$ is head-reducing with respect to the predicate $p$, but $C_{5}$ is not $q$-reducing with respect to the first argument. Note that $l e\left(C_{5}, P_{5}\right)$ is equal to $C_{5}$ itself. Then, for the goal $\leftarrow p\left(f^{2}(a)\right)$, the derivations of $P_{5} \cup\left\{C_{5}\right\} \cup\left\{\leftarrow p\left(f^{2}(a)\right)\right\}$ are infinite.

The next theorem claims that, by loop-elimination, we can choose the several programs whose union is head-reducing. In other words, rule-finding abduction for $P \cup\{l e(C, P)\}$ terminates.

Theorem 5.2 Let $P$ be a program and $C$ be a clause. If $P$ is head-reducing with respect to the predicate $p, P$ includes the definition clause of $p$, and $C$ is pred $($ head $(C))$ reducing with respect to all arguments, then $P \cup\{l e(C, P)\}$ is also head-reducing with respect to the predicate symbol $p$.

Proof. The result is proven by mathematical induction on the number $|P|$ of clauses in $P$. If the number is 1 , that is, $|P|=1$, then Lemma 5.2 implies the result.

Suppose that the result is true for $|P|=n$, and consider the result for $|P|=n+1$. Let $P$ be a program $\left\{C_{1}, \cdots, C_{n}\right\}$ and $P^{\prime}$ be a program $P \cup\left\{C_{n+1}\right\}$. Let $C, l e(C, P)$ and $l e\left(C, P^{\prime}\right)$ be the following clauses:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& C=A \leftarrow B_{1}, \cdots, B_{l} \\
& l e(C, P)=A \leftarrow B_{1}^{\prime}, \cdots, B_{l}^{\prime} \\
& l e\left(C, P^{\prime}\right)=A \leftarrow B_{1}^{\prime \prime}, \cdots, B_{l}^{\prime \prime} .
\end{aligned}
$$

By the induction hypothesis, all of programs $P, P \cup\{l e(C, P)\}$, and $P^{\prime}$ are headreducing with respect to $p$. If $C_{n+1}$ is not applied to the construction of $\operatorname{rec}\left(P^{\prime}, p\right)$,
then $\operatorname{rec}\left(P^{\prime}, p\right)=\operatorname{rec}(P, p)$, and the result holds by the induction hypothesis.
Suppose that $C_{n+1}$ is applied to the construction of $\operatorname{rec}\left(P^{\prime}, p\right)$. Then, there exists an index $i$ such that head $\left(C_{n+1}\right)$ is unifiable with an atom in the body of $C_{i}$. Let $C_{i}$ and $C_{n+1}$ be the following clauses:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& C_{i}=D \leftarrow E_{1}, \cdots, E_{j}, \cdots, E_{m} \\
& C_{n+1}=F \leftarrow G_{1}, \cdots, G_{k}, \cdots, G_{f}
\end{aligned}
$$

Then, the recursive definition $\operatorname{rec}\left(P^{\prime} \cup\left\{l e\left(C, P^{\prime}\right)\right\}, p\right)$ is constructed in the following way: Suppose that the following clause is an intermediate clause in constructing the recursive definition:

$$
p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{h}\right) \leftarrow A_{1}, \cdots, D^{\prime}, \cdots, A_{g} .
$$

Since $C_{n+1}$ is applied to the construction of $\operatorname{rec}\left(P^{\prime}, p\right)$, suppose that $D^{\prime} \sigma=D \sigma$. Then, by application of $C_{i}$, we obtain the following clause:

$$
p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{h}\right) \sigma \leftarrow A_{1} \sigma, \cdots,\left(E_{1} \sigma, \cdots, E_{j} \sigma, \cdots, E_{m} \sigma\right), \cdots, A_{g} \sigma .
$$

Since head $\left(C_{n+1}\right)$ is unifiable with an atom in the body of $C_{i}$, suppose that $E_{j} \sigma \theta=F \theta$. Then, by application of $C_{n+1}$, we also obtain the following clause:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{h}\right) \sigma \theta \leftarrow \\
& \quad A_{1} \sigma \theta, \cdots,\left(E_{1} \sigma \theta, \cdots,\left(G_{1} \theta, \cdots, G_{k} \theta, \cdots, G_{f} \theta\right), \cdots, E_{m} \sigma \theta\right), \cdots, A_{g} \sigma \theta
\end{aligned}
$$

For any index $k(1 \leq k \leq f)$, if $G_{k} \theta$ and $A$ are not unifiable, then, by the induction hypothesis, $P \cup\{l e(C, P)\}$ is head-reducing with respect to $p$. Hence, $P^{\prime} \cup\left\{l e\left(C, P^{\prime}\right)\right\}$ is also head-reducing with respect to $p$.

Otherwise, suppose that there exists a unifier $\lambda$ for $G_{k} \theta$ and $A$. Then, $G_{k} \theta \lambda=A \lambda$. The recursive definition $\operatorname{rec}\left(P^{\prime} \cup\left\{l e\left(C, P^{\prime}\right)\right\}, p\right)$ is also constructed in the following way:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{h}\right) \sigma \theta \lambda \leftarrow \\
& A_{1} \sigma \theta \lambda, \cdots,\left(E_{1} \sigma \theta \lambda, \cdots,\right. \\
&\left(G_{1} \theta \lambda, \cdots,\left(B_{1}^{\prime \prime} \lambda, \cdots, B_{l}^{\prime \prime} \lambda\right), \cdots, G_{f} \theta \lambda\right), \\
&\left.\cdots, E_{m} \sigma \theta \lambda\right), \cdots, A_{g} \sigma \theta .
\end{aligned}
$$

By the definition of $l e\left(C, P^{\prime}\right)$ and by the construction of $\operatorname{rec}\left(P^{\prime} \cup\left\{l e\left(C, P^{\prime}\right)\right\}, p\right), B_{i}^{\prime \prime}$ and any head of the clauses in $P^{\prime}$ are not unifiable. Consequently, for some substitution $\mu$, the recursive definition $\operatorname{rec}\left(P^{\prime} \cup\left\{l e\left(C, P^{\prime}\right)\right\}, p\right)$ is constructed as follows:

$$
p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{h}\right) \mu \leftarrow H_{1} \mu, \cdots,\left(B_{1}^{\prime \prime} \mu, \cdots, B_{l}^{\prime \prime} \mu\right), \cdots, H_{s} \mu
$$

Since $P^{\prime}$ is head-reducing with respect to $p$ by the induction hypothesis, an atom $H_{r} \mu$ except $B_{i}^{\prime \prime} \mu(1 \leq i \leq l)$ satisfies the conditions that $R P\left(P^{\prime} \cup\left\{l e\left(C, P^{\prime}\right)\right\}, p\right)$ is head-reducing with respect to $p$. Furthermore, for any atom $B_{i}^{\prime \prime} \mu(1 \leq i \leq l)$, the definition clause of $\operatorname{pred}\left(B_{i}^{\prime \prime}\right)$ does not appear in $P^{\prime}$ by the definition of $l e\left(C, P^{\prime \prime}\right)$. On the other hand, $C$, so $l e\left(C, P^{\prime \prime}\right)$, is pred $(A)$-reducing with respect to all arguments. Hence, $R P\left(P^{\prime} \cup\left\{l e\left(C, P^{\prime}\right)\right\}, p\right)$, which includes $\operatorname{rec}\left(P^{\prime} \cup\left\{l e\left(C, P^{\prime}\right)\right\}, p\right)$, is head-reducing with respect to $p$.

Therefore, $P^{\prime} \cup\left\{l e\left(C, P^{\prime}\right)\right\}$ is head-reducing with respect to $p$.

The loop-elimination of $P^{\prime}$ for $P$, denoted by $l e\left(P^{\prime}, P\right)$, is the set of $l e(C, P)$, where $C$ is a clause in $P^{\prime}$. In other words,

$$
l e\left(P^{\prime}, P\right)=\left\{l e(C, P) \mid C \in P^{\prime}\right\}
$$

By Theorem 5.2, when the programs $P$ and $P^{\prime}$ are given, rule-finding abduction for $P \cup l e\left(P^{\prime}, P\right)$ also terminates.

Example 5.4 Let $P_{6}$ and $P_{7}$ be the following programs:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& P_{6}=\left\{\begin{array}{l}
p(f(X)) \leftarrow q(X) \\
q(X) \leftarrow p(X)
\end{array}\right\}, \\
& P_{7}=\left\{\begin{array}{l}
p(X) \leftarrow q(X) \\
q(X) \leftarrow r(X), s(X) .
\end{array}\right\} .
\end{aligned}
$$

Since the union $P_{6} \cup P_{7}$ is not head-reducing with respect to the predicate $p$ nor $q$, this program falls into an infinite loop for any ground goal with the predicates $p$ and $q$.

On the other hand, after transforming $P_{7}$ to loop-elimination le $\left(P_{7}, P_{6}\right)$ of $P_{7}$ for $P_{6}$, then we obtain the following set of clauses:

$$
l e\left(P_{7}, P_{6}\right)=\left\{\begin{array}{l}
p(f(X)) \leftarrow q(X) \\
q(X) \leftarrow p(X) \\
p(X) \leftarrow \operatorname{true}-q(X) \\
q(X) \leftarrow r(X), s(X)
\end{array}\right\}
$$

Furthermore, after transforming $P_{6}$ to loop-elimination le $\left(P_{6}, P_{7}\right)$ of $P_{6}$ for $P_{7}$, we also obtain the following set of clauses:

$$
l e\left(P_{6}, P_{7}\right)=\left\{\begin{array}{l}
p(f(X)) \leftarrow q(X) \\
q(X) \leftarrow \text { true_p }(X) \\
p(X) \leftarrow q(X) \\
q(X) \leftarrow r(X), s(X)
\end{array}\right\}
$$

By Theorem 5.2, rule-finding abduction for both $l e\left(P_{7}, P_{6}\right)$ and le $\left(P_{6}, P_{7}\right)$ terminate for any ground goal.

### 5.5 Prolog Implementation

In rule-finding abduction, since we consider the several programs, the clause is given in the following form:

```
fact(World,clause(Head,Bodies)),
```

where the first argument World represents a program. Here, we give the programs on $w_{1}, w_{2}, \cdots$. A Prolog clause fact(wi, clause(Head,Body)) means that the clause Head $\leftarrow$ Body is an element of $P_{i}$.

The rule-finding abduction is realized by improving rule-selecting abduction as the following rf_abd program. Note that the third argument of rf_abd represents the set of programs and is returned as a list.

```
rf_abd(Goal,Leaves,World) :-
    fact(AnyWorld, clause(Goal,Clause)), member(AnyWorld,World),
    rf_abd(Clause,Leaves,World).
rf_abd((Goal1,Goal2),(Leaf1,Leaf2),World) :-
    !,rf_abd(Goal1,Leaf1,World),rf_abd(Goal2,Leaf2,World).
rf_abd(Leaf,Leaf,World) :- !.
member(X,[X|Y]) :- !.
member(X,[Y|Z]) :- member(X,Z) :- !.
```

We can apply the above program to examples in Section 5.1. For the first example, each clause of $P_{i}(1 \leq i \leq 3)$ is given in the following forms:

```
fact(w1,clause(find(X,fossil_shell,Y),sea(Y))).
fact(w2,clause(find(X,fossil_shell,Y),used_to_be(Y,sea))).
fact(w2,clause(used_to_be(X,Y),be(X,Y))).
fact(w3,clause(find(X,fossil_shell,Y),move(fossil_shell,sea,Y))).
fact(w3,clause(move(fossil_shell,X,Y),slow_move(fossil_shell, X,Y))).
fact(w3,clause(slow_move(X,Y,Z),has_not_leg(X))).
fact(w3,clause(slow_move(X,Y,Z),has_not_wing(X))).
```

Then, for the surprising fact find(i,fossil_shell,mountain), the results of rule-finding abduction are obtained as follows:

```
: ?- rf_abd(find(i,fossil_shell,mountain),X,W).
X = sea(mountain), %%% H1 %%%
W = [w1|_252] ;
X = be(mountain,sea), %%% H2 %%%
W = [w2|_254] ;
X = used_to_be(mountain,sea), %%% H3 %%%
W = [W2|_254] ;
X = has_not_leg(fossil_shell), %%% H4 %%%
W = [w3|_256] ;
X = has_not_wing(fossil_shell), %%% H5 %%%
W = [w3|_256] ;
X = slow_move(fossil_shell,sea,mountain), %%% H6 %%%
W = [w3|_256] ;
X = move(fossil_shell,sea,mountain), %%% H7 %%%
W = [w3|_256] ;
X = find(i,fossil_shell,mountain), %%% HO %%%
W = W ;
no
```

For the second example in Section 5.1 , each clause of $P_{i}(4 \leq i \leq 6)$ is also given in the following forms:

```
fact(w4,clause(p(f(f(X))),(p(X),q(f(X))))).
fact(w5,clause(q(f(X)),(q(X),r(X,f(X))))).
fact(w6,clause(r(f(X),f(Y)),r(X,Y))).
```

Then, for the surprising fact $p\left(f^{3}(a)\right)$, the results of rule-finding abduction are obtained as follows:

```
: ?- rf_abd(p(f(f(f(a)))),X,W).
X = p(f(a)), (q(a),r(a,f(a))),r(a,f(a)), %%% K4 %%%
W = [w4,w5,w6|_566] ;
X = p(f(a)),(q(a),r(a,f(a))),r(f(a),f(f(a))), %%% K2 %%%
W = [w4,w5l_386] ;
X=p(f(a)),q(f(a)),r(a,f(a)), %%% K5 %%%
```

```
W = [w4,w5,w6|_480] ;
X = p(f(a)),q(f(a)),r(f(a),f(f(a))), %%% K3 %%%
W = [w4,w5l_386] ;
X = p(f(a)),q(f(f(a))), %%% K1 %%%
W = [w4|_282] ;
X = p(f(f(f(a)))), %%% K0 %%%
W = W ;
no
```

Furthermore, we can realize breadth-first rule-finding abduction in the following program bfrf_abd just as in Section 4.3:

```
bfrf_abd(Goal,Leaves,World,Depth) :-
    Depth > 0,
    fact(AnyWorld,clause(Goal,Clause)),
    member(AnyWorld,World),
    Depth1 is Depth-1,
    bfrf_abd(Clause,Leaves,World,Depth1).
bfrf_abd((Goal1,Goal2),(Leaf1,Leaf2),World,Depth) :-
    !,
    bfrf_abd(Goal1,Leaf1,World,Depth),
    bfrf_abd(Goal2,Leaf2,World,Depth).
bfrf_abd(Leaf,Leaf,World,0).
```

In Section 5.2, we discuss an abducible, which is similar to an operationality criterion. We can realize the abducible in the following program rf_abd_prd. The predicate rf_abd_prd returns the choice of programs as the third argument and the abducible as the fourth argument, if all the proof trees of a program for a goal are finite.

```
rf_abd_prd(Goal,Leaves,World,OC) :-
    fact(AnyWorld,clause(Goal,Clause)),
    member(AnyWorld,World),
    rf_abd_prd(Clause,Leaves,World,OC).
rf_abd_prd((Goal1,Goal2),(Leaf1,Leaf2),World,OC) :-
    !,
    rf_abd_prd(Goal1,Leaf1,World,OC),
    rf_abd_prd(Goal2,Leaf2,World,OC).
rf_abd_prd(Goal,Goal,World,OC) :-
    functor(Goal,Pred,_),
    Pred \= (,),
    member(Pred,OC).
```

We can also realize the loop-elimination in the following programs. The predicate le_main returns a loop-eliminated clause for a given program as the second argument. (Full Prolog version will be described in Appendix of this thesis.)

```
le_main(fact(World,clause(Head,Bodies)),fact(World,clause(Head,NewBody))) :-
    setof(Y,le(fact(World,clause(Head,Bodies)),Y),List),
    isort(List,List2),
    List2 = [MaxFact|List3],
    MaxFact = fact(World,clause(Head,NewBody)).
```

By Theorem 5.2, the program rf_abd terminates for any surprising fact of $p$ and $q$. Incorporating loop-elimination with rule-finding abduction, we can give the following results.

Let $P_{1}$ and $C$ be the following program and clause:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& P_{1}=\left\{\begin{array}{l}
p(f(X)) \leftarrow q(X) \\
q(f(X)) \leftarrow p(f(X))
\end{array}\right\} \\
& C_{1}=p(X) \leftarrow q(X), q(g(X))
\end{aligned}
$$

Then, $P_{1} \cup\left\{C_{1}\right\}$ is not head-reducing with respect to the predicate $p$ nor $q$. On the other hand, we obtain the following loop-elimination $l e\left(C_{1}, P_{1}\right)$ of $C_{1}$ in $P_{1}$ :

$$
l e\left(C_{1}, P_{1}\right)=p(X) \leftarrow t r u e_{-} q(X), q(g(X)) .
$$

Here, $P_{1} \cup\left\{l e\left(C_{1}, P_{1}\right)\right\}$ is head-reducing with respect to the predicate $p$.
In order to apply the program le_main to the above $P_{1}$ and $C_{1}$, let $P_{1}$ be the following clauses:

```
fact(w1,clause(p(f(X)),q(X))).
fact(w1,clause(q(f(X)),p(f(X)))).
```

When we give the clause fact(w2, clause ( $p(X),(q(X), q(g(X))))$ ) in the first argument in the predicate le_main, then the predicate le_main returns a loop-elimination of the first argument's clause as the second argument. By the predicate assert, we add it to the program $P_{1}$. Finally, we obtain the hypothesis of a surprising fact $p\left(f^{3}(a)\right)$ as follows:

```
: ?- le_main(fact(w2,clause(p(X),(q(X),q(g(X))))),Y),
    assert(Y),rf_abd(p(f(f(f(a)))),H,W).
X = f(_594),
Y = fact(w2, clause(p(f(_594)),(true(q,f(_594)),q(g(f(_594)))))),
H}=q(a)
W = [w1|_1300];
```

```
X = f(_594),
Y = fact(w2,clause(p(f(_594)),(true(q,f(_594)),q(g(f(_594)))))),
H = true(q,f(a)),q(g(f(a))),
W = [w1,w2l_1494] ;
X = f(_594),
Y = fact(w2,clause(p(f(_594)),(true(q,f(_594)),q(g(f(_594)))))),
H}=p(f(a))
W = [w1l_1300] ;
X=f(_594),
Y = fact(w2, clause(p(f(_594)),(true(q,f(_594)),q(g(f(_594)))))),
H=q(f(a)),
W = [w1|_1300] ;
X = f(_594),
Y = fact(w2, clause(p(f(_594)),(true(q,f(_594)),q(g(f(_594)))))),
H = true(q,f(f(a))),q(g(f(f(a)))),
W = [w1,w2l_1422] ;
X = f(_594),
Y = fact(w2, clause(p(f(_594)),(true(q,f(_594)),q(g(f(_594)))))),
H = p(f(f(a))),
W = [w1l_1300] ;
X = f(_594),
Y = fact(w2,clause(p(f(_594)),(true(q,f(_594)),q(g(f(_594)))))),
H=q(f(f(a))),
W = [w1 __1300] ;
X = f(_594),
Y = fact(w2, clause(p(f(_594)),(true(q,f(_594)),q(g(f(_594)))))),
H=true(q,f(f(f(a)))),q(g(f(f(f(a))))),
W = [w2|_1324] ;
X = f(_594),
Y = fact(w2,clause(p(f(_594)),(true(q,f(_594)),q(g(f(_594)))))),
H = p(f(f(f(a)))),
W = W ;
no
```

Note that, by loop-elimination, we obtain the atomstrue(q,a), $\operatorname{true}(q, f(a))$, and true $(\mathrm{q}, \mathrm{f}(\mathrm{f}((\mathrm{a}))))$ in the above hypotheses. Then, we can interpret them as $q(a)$, $q(f(a))$, and $q\left(f^{2}(a)\right)$ respectively.

### 5.6 Rule-Finding Abduction with Analogy

In the previous sections, we have discussed rule-finding abduction. In these discussions, we assumed that the found rules are not ground. If all of the rules in programs are ground, then we cannot apply rule-finding abduction to them, because the application of rule-finding abduction is based on the unification. Consider the following example.

Example 5.5 Let $p(a)$ be a surprising fact, and $P_{1}$ and $P_{2}$ be the following programs:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& P_{1}=\phi, \\
& P_{2}=\{p(b) \leftarrow q(b)\} .
\end{aligned}
$$

By rule-finding abduction for $P_{1} \cup P_{2}$, we can propose only a trivial hypothesis $\{p(a)\}$ of $p(a)$.

In Example 5.5, if we introduce the analogy such that $a$ is analogous to $b$, then we can obtain a hypothesis $\{q(a)\}$. Hence, in this section, we discuss analogical reasoning from the viewpoint of rule-finding abduction.

Thargad [Tha88] and Duval [Duv91] have tried to discuss abduction and analogy in the same framework. Thagard [Tha88] has applied Kuhn's philosophy of science [Kuh70] to computer science, and dealt with analogical abduction, which is one of the methods of discovery. On the other hand, Duval [Duv91] has also dealt with abduction and analogy in the framework of explanation-based generalization. However, in such researches, the relationship between abduction and analogy are not clear, since their concepts of abduction and analogy are ambiguous.

In this thesis, we adopt the formulation of analogical reasoning by Haraguchi and Arikawa [Har85, HaA86, HiA94a, HiA94b]. It is based on the analogy between Herbrand universes of a base program $P_{b}$ and that of a target program $P_{t}$.

Let $P_{b}$ be a base program, $P_{t}$ be a target program, and $\alpha$ be a ground atom. Then, a proof tree of $\alpha$ for $P_{b}\left(\right.$ resp., $\left.P_{t}\right)$ is denoted by $T_{\alpha}^{b}\left(\right.$ resp.,$\left.T_{\alpha}^{t}\right)$. The leaves of $T_{\alpha}^{b}$ (resp., $T_{\alpha}^{b}$ ) is denoted by leaves $\left(T_{\alpha}^{b}\right)$ (resp., leaves $\left(T_{\alpha}^{t}\right)$ ).

In the formulation of analogical reasoning [Har85, HaA86, HiA94a, HiA94b], it is natural to consider that a surprising fact is given in a target program $P_{t}$, not in a base program $P_{b}$. Hence, in the definitions in this section, a surprising fact is also given in a target program $P_{t}$.

In this section, it is our purpose to formulate rule-finding abduction incorporating with analogical reasoning. In other words, we deal with the concept of analogy in order to extend rule-finding abduction. Such the abduction is called rule-finding abduction


Figure 5.3: Deducible hypothesis, where $P_{b} \vdash \varphi \beta$
with analogy.
First, we formulate a simple hypothesis of rule-finding abduction with analogy as follows:

Definition 5.7 Let $P_{b}=R_{b} \cup F_{b}$ and $P_{t}$ be programs, and $\alpha$ be a surprising fact with respect to $P_{t}$. Let $\varphi \subseteq U\left(P_{b}\right) \times U\left(P_{t} \cup\{\alpha\}\right)$ be a partial identity. Then, a set $H$ of atoms is a simple hypothesis of $\alpha$ for $P_{b}$ and $P_{t}$ with analogy $\varphi$ if $H$ satisfies the following condition:

$$
R_{b} \varphi \cup P_{t} \cup H \vdash \alpha
$$

However, for the simple hypothesis, the variables in $P_{b}$ or $P_{t}$ are substituted by ground terms in $P_{b} \cup P_{t}$. In order to solve this problem, we introduce another hypothesis of rule-finding abduction with analogy, called a deducible hypothesis, as follows:

Definition 5.8 Let $\alpha$ be a surprising fact, that is, $P_{t} \nvdash \alpha$, and $\varphi \subseteq U\left(P_{b}\right) \times U\left(P_{t} \cup\{\alpha\}\right)$ be a partial identity. Suppose that $P_{t} \cup H_{0} \vdash \alpha$. For any $\beta \in H_{0}$, if $P_{b} \vdash \varphi \beta$, then $H=\left(H_{0}-\{\beta\}\right) \cup H_{1} \varphi$, where $H_{1}$ is the set of nodes in $T_{\varphi \beta}^{1}$. Then, $H$ is called a deducible hypothesis of $\alpha$ for $P_{b}$ and $P_{t}$ with analogy $\varphi$.

```
deducible hypothesis \(H_{\text {leaves }} \quad / *\) based on the leaves of the proof tree */
input \(P_{b}, P_{t}\) : programs,
    \(\alpha\) : a ground atom,
    \(\varphi \subseteq U\left(P_{b}\right) \times U\left(P_{t} \cup\{\alpha\}\right):\) a partial identity
output \(H_{\text {leaves }}\) : a deducible hypothesis
\(H:=\operatorname{leaves}\left(T_{\alpha}^{t}\right)\);
while there exists a ground atom \(\beta \in H\) such that \(P_{b} \vdash \varphi \beta\) do
    \(H_{1}:=\operatorname{leaves}\left(T_{\varphi \beta}^{b}\right) ;\)
    \(H^{\prime}:=H_{1} \varphi ;\)
    \(H^{\prime \prime}:=\phi\);
    while \(H^{\prime}=\phi\) do
        choose \(\gamma \in H^{\prime}\);
        \(H^{\prime \prime}:=H^{\prime \prime} \cup \operatorname{leaves}\left(T_{\gamma}^{t}\right) ;\)
        \(H^{\prime}:=H^{\prime}-\{\gamma\} ;\)
    end
    \(H_{\text {leaves }}:=(H-\{\beta\}) \cup H^{\prime \prime} ;\)
end
output \(H_{\text {leaves }}\)
end
```

Figure 5.4: Algorithm to construct a deducible hypothesis $H_{\text {leaves }}$
Figure 5.3 illustrates the formulation of deducible hypotheses. It is clear that, if $H$ is a deducible hypothesis, then it is a simple hypothesis. Furthermore, the variables in $P_{b}\left(\right.$ resp.,$\left.P_{t}\right)$ are substituted by only ground terms in $P_{b}\left(\right.$ resp., $\left.P_{t}\right)$.

It arises a problem how to choose the deducible hypothesis $H$. For a proof tree, if we choose any combination of nodes in $T_{\varphi \beta}^{b}$, then it is very difficult to obtain all deducible hypotheses. Even if we choose two sets of nodes in $T_{\varphi \beta}^{b}$, after the above procedure to obtain deducible hypotheses in $n$ times, the number of deducible hypotheses is at most $2^{n}$. Hence, for a proof tree, we adopt the choice of only one hypothesis in $T_{\varphi \beta}^{b}$.

In order to construct a deducible hypothesis concretely, we introduce a deducible hypothesis $H_{\text {leaves }}$ which is based on the leaves of a proof tree. A deducible hypothesis $H_{\text {leaves }}$ is obtained by the algorithm in Figure 5.4. In this algorithm, $H_{0}$ and $H_{1}$ in Figure 5.3 are the leaves of $T_{\alpha}^{t}$ and $T_{\varphi \beta}^{t}$, respectively.

Let $P_{b}$ and $P_{t}$ be programs, and $\alpha$ be a ground atom. By $P_{\alpha}^{b}$ (resp., $P_{\alpha}^{t}$ ), we denote the set of clauses which are applied to a proof tree $T_{\alpha}^{b}\left(\right.$ resp., $\left.T_{\alpha}^{t}\right)$ of $\alpha$ in $P_{b}\left(\right.$ resp.,$\left.P_{t}\right)$. Then, the following theorem holds:

Theorem 5.3 Let $P_{b}$ and $P_{t}$ be programs, and $\alpha$ be a ground atom. Let $\varphi \subseteq U\left(P_{b}\right) \times$ $U\left(P_{t} \cup\{\alpha\}\right)$ be a partial identity and leaves $\left(T_{\alpha}^{t}\right)$ be a set $\left\{\beta_{j} \mid 1 \leq j \leq k\right\}$ of leaves in $T_{\alpha}^{t}$. Suppose that $P_{t} \nvdash \alpha$. If $P_{b} \vdash \varphi \beta_{j}(1 \leq j \leq k)$, then $\left\{\bigcup_{j=1}^{k} P_{\varphi \beta_{j}}^{b} \varphi\right\} \cup P_{\alpha}^{t} \vdash \alpha$.

Proof. For $\beta_{j}, H_{\text {leaves }}^{j}$ denotes the deducible hypothesis of $\beta_{j}$. Then, $H_{\text {leaves }}^{j} \subseteq P_{\varphi \beta_{j}}^{b} \varphi$, and the clauses in $P_{\varphi \beta_{j}}^{b} \varphi$ are applied to $P_{t}$. Hence,

$$
P_{\varphi \beta_{j}}^{b} \varphi \cup P_{\alpha}^{t} \cup\left\{\operatorname{leaves}\left(T_{\alpha}^{t}\right)-\left\{\beta_{j}\right\}\right\} \vdash \alpha .
$$

By applying the above consideration to $\beta_{j}$ for $1 \leq j \leq k$, we can obtain the result.
Since a deducible hypothesis is included in $\left\{\bigcup_{j=1}^{k} P_{\varphi \beta_{j}}^{b} \varphi\right\}$, Theorem 5.3 means that a deducible hypothesis is correct in the sense of analogical reasoning.

In this formulation, we assume that a partial identity $\varphi$ is given in advance. This assumption is unreasonable. In analogical reasoning, an analogy $\varphi$ is not given in advance, and it is a main problem to detect the $\varphi$. Then, in order to obtain an analogy $\varphi$ while constructing $H_{\text {leaves }}$, we adopt the concept of partially isomorphic generalizations, which has been introduced by Hirowatari and Arikawa [HiA94b]. They have regarded an analogy as a partial function from $U\left(P_{b}\right)$ to $U\left(P_{t} \cup\{\alpha\}\right)$, not a partial identity. They have also reduced the problem of the detection of partial identity to the unification of partially isomorphic generalization as Theorem 2.5. In rule-finding abduction with analogy, we also follow this consideration.

Consider the following examples.

Example 5.6 Let $P_{3}$ be the following base program:

$$
P_{3}=\left\{\begin{array}{l}
C_{1}: p(a, b) \\
C_{2}: p(f(X), b) \leftarrow p(X, b)
\end{array}\right\}
$$

Let $\alpha$ be a surprising fact $p\left(f^{2}(c), f^{2}(d)\right)$ with respect to an empty target program.

1. The partially isomorphic generalization $P C_{1}$ of $C_{1}$ is as follows:

$$
P C_{1}: p(X, Y)
$$

Since head $\left(P C_{1}\right)$ and $\alpha$ are unifiable, and $p(a, b)$ is provable in $P_{b}$, we obtain the following deducible hypothesis $H_{1}$ :

$$
H_{1}=\left\{p\left(f^{2}(c), f^{2}(d)\right)\right\}
$$

There exist substitutions $\theta_{1}=\{X:=a, Y:=b\}$ and $\theta_{2}=\left\{X:=f^{2}(c), Y:=\right.$ $\left.f^{2}(d)\right\}$ such that head $\left(P C_{1}\right) \theta_{1}=p(a, b)$, and head $\left(P C_{1}\right) \theta_{2}=\alpha$. Then, by Theorem 2.5, there exists the analogy $\varphi_{1} \subseteq U\left(P_{3}\right) \times U(\{\alpha\})$ which is obtained by:

$$
\varphi_{1}=\left\{\langle t, s\rangle \mid X:=t \in \theta_{1}, X:=s \in \theta_{2}\right\}
$$

Hence, the analogy $\varphi_{1}$ for $H_{1}$ is a set $\left\{\left\langle a, f^{2}(c)\right\rangle,\left\langle b, f^{2}(d)\right\rangle\right\}$.
2. The partially isomorphic generalization $P C_{2}$ of $C_{2}$ is as follows:

$$
P C_{2}: p(f(X), Y) \leftarrow p(X, Y)
$$

Since head $\left(P C_{2}\right)$ and $\alpha$ are unifiable, we obtain the following candidate $K_{1}$ of deducible hypotheses:

$$
K_{1}=\left\{p\left(f(c), f^{2}(d)\right)\right\}
$$

For an element $p\left(f(c), f^{2}(d)\right)$ of $K_{1}$, we also continue the above discussion 1 and 2. Then, from $K_{1}$, we obtain the following deducible hypothesis $H_{2}$ and the analogy $\varphi_{2} \subseteq U\left(P_{3}\right) \times U(\{\alpha\}):$

$$
H_{2}=\left\{p\left(f(c), f^{2}(d)\right)\right\}, \varphi_{2}=\left\{\langle a, f(c)\rangle,\left\langle b, f^{2}(d)\right\rangle\right\} .
$$

Also we obtain the following candidate $K_{2}$ of deducible hypotheses:

$$
K_{2}=\left\{p\left(c, f^{2}(d)\right)\right\} .
$$



Figure 5.5: Deducible hypotheses $H_{1}, H_{2}$, and $H_{3}$, and proof trees
For an element $p\left(c, f^{2}(d)\right)$ of $K_{2}$, head $\left(P C_{1}\right)$ and $p\left(c, f^{2}(d)\right)$ are unifiable, while head $\left(P C_{2}\right)$ and $p\left(c, f^{2}(d)\right)$ are not. Furthermore, $p(a, b)$ is provable in $P_{t}$. Then, from $K_{2}$, we obtain the following deducible hypothesis $H_{3}$ and the analogy $\varphi_{3} \subseteq U\left(P_{3}\right) \times U(\{\alpha\})$ :

$$
H_{3}=\left\{p\left(c, f^{2}(d)\right)\right\}, \varphi_{3}=\left\{\langle a, c\rangle,\left\langle b, f^{2}(d)\right\rangle\right\} .
$$

Figure 5.5 illustrates three deducible hypotheses $H_{1}, H_{2}$, and $H_{3}$, and proof trees which are corresponding to $H_{i}$. For each proof tree, the root node is analogous to a surprising fact $\alpha$ under the analogy $\varphi_{i}$, and the atom which is analogous to leaf node under $\varphi_{i}$ is corresponding to a deducible hypothesis $H_{i}$.

Example 5.7 For $P_{3}$, if a surprising fact is a ground atom $p\left(f^{2}(c), c\right)$, then we obtain the following deducible hypotheses $H_{j}$ and analogies $\varphi_{j}(4 \leq j \leq 6)$ :

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
H_{4}=\{p(a, b)\}, & \varphi_{4}=\left\{\left\langle a, f^{2}(c)\right\rangle,\langle b, c\rangle\right\}, \\
H_{5}=\{p(f(a), b)\}, & \varphi_{5}=\{\langle a, f(c)\rangle,\langle b, c\rangle\}, \\
H_{6}=\left\{p\left(f^{2}(a), b\right)\right\}, & \varphi_{6}=\{\langle a, c\rangle,\langle b, c\rangle\} .
\end{array}
$$

Note that $\varphi_{j}(4 \leq j \leq 6)$ is a function from $U\left(P_{3}\right)$ to $U(\{\alpha\})$.
On the other hand, let $P_{4}$ be the following base program:

$$
P_{4}=\left\{\begin{array}{l}
C_{3}: p(a, a) \\
C_{4}: p(f(X), a) \leftarrow p(X, a)
\end{array}\right\} .
$$

If either $p\left(f^{2}(c), f(d)\right)$ or $p\left(f^{2}(c), d\right)$ is given as a surprising fact $\beta$, then there exist no deducible hypotheses. Because we regard an analogy $\varphi$ as a function from $U\left(P_{4}\right)$ to $U(\{\beta\})$, and, for the above surprising facts and the base program $P_{4}$, there exist no such the analogies. On the other hand, let $p\left(f^{2}(c), c\right)$ be a surprising fact. Then, we obtain the following deducible hypothesis $H_{7}$ and the analogy $\varphi_{7}$ :

$$
H_{7}=\{p(c, c)\}, \varphi_{7}=\{\langle a, c\rangle\} .
$$

We can realize rule-finding abduction with analogy as the Prolog program in Figure 5.6. The program ab_ana computes a deducible hypothesis $H_{\text {leaves }}$ and an analogy. Note that, this program assumes that a target program is empty, that is, only the first while-loop in Figure 5.4 is realized. (Full Prolog version will be described in Appendix of this thesis.)

The predicate ab_ana in Figure 5.6 is given a surprising fact as its first argument. Then, it returns a deducible hypothesis as its second argument, a pairing as its third argument, and a world as its fourth argument. The predicate analogy returns the pairing as the third argument between the base rule given as the second argument and the target rule given as the first argument. The predicate provable checks provability in a base program $P_{b}$, and, if so, then it proposes a deducible hypothesis as the third argument. The predicate pig_rule returns the partially isomorphic generalization PG:-PGs of the rule $B G:-B G s$ as the second argument.

For a clause $C$, by $\operatorname{pig}(C)$, we denote the partially isomorphic generalization of $C$. For a program $P$, by $\operatorname{pig}(P)$, we denote the set $\{\operatorname{pig}(C) \mid C \in P\}$. The termination of the Prolog program ab_ana, which is rule-finding abduction with analogy, is characterized in the following theorem as the corollary of Theorem 4.1.

Corollary 5.2 Let $P_{b}=R_{b} \cup F_{b}$ and $P_{t}$ be programs and $p$ be a predicate symbol. If $p i g\left(R_{b}\right) \cup P_{t}$ is head-reducing with respect to the predicate $p$, then all the derivations of $\operatorname{pig}\left(R_{b}\right) \cup P_{t} \cup\left\{\leftarrow p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)\right\}$ are finite for any ground atom $p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)$.

In the program ab_ana, a target program $P_{t}$ is assumed an empty set. Hence, by Corollary 5.2 and Theorem 2.5, if pig $\left(R_{b}\right)$ is head-reducing with respect to the predicate

```
ab_ana(TG,TG,Pair,WorldTarget):-
    functor(TG,Pred,Arity),functor(BG,Pred,Arity),
    world(WorldBase,WorldTarget),
    fact(WorldBase,(BG:-true)),
    analogy((TG:-true),(BG:-true),Pair).
ab_ana(TG,TGs,Pair,WorldTarget):-
    functor(TG,Pred,Arity),functor(BG,Pred,Arity),
    provable(TG,BG,TGs,BGs,WorldTarget),
    not TG==TGs,
    analogy((TG:-TGs),(BG:-BGs),Pair).
provable(TG,BG,TL,BL,WorldTarget) :-
    rule(TG,BG,TGs,BGs,WorldTarget),
    provable(TGs,BGs,TL,BL,WorldTarget).
provable((TG,TGs),(BG,BGs),(TL,TLs),(BL,BLs),WorldTarget):-
    provable(TG,BG,TL,BL,WorldTarget),
    provable(TGs,BGs,TLs,BLs,WorldTarget).
provable(TG,BG,TG,BG,WorldTarget):-
    world(WorldBase,WorldTarget),fact(WorldBase,(BG:-true)),!.
rule(TG,BG,TGs,BGs,WorldTarget) :-
    world(WorldBase,WorldTarget),
    fact(WorldBase,(BG:-BGs)),
    not BGs=true,
    pig_rule((BG:-BGs),(PG:-PGs)),
    copy((PG:-PGs),(TG:-TGs)).
```

Figure 5.6: Program ab_ana
$p$, then, for any surprising fact $p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)$, the goal

$$
\text { ?- ab_ana }\left(p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right), \mathrm{X}, \mathrm{P}, \mathrm{~W}\right)
$$

terminates, and returns the deducible hypotheses as its second argument and the pairings as its third argument.

For the program in Figure 5.6, if the proof tree of a base program is obtained, then the computational complexity to obtain the deducible hypothesis is characterized as the following theorem:

Theorem 5.4 Let $P_{b}$ be a base program and $\alpha$ be a ground atom. For a given proof tree in $P_{b}$, a ground atom $\alpha^{\prime}$ is a root and $H^{\prime}$ is the set of leaves. Suppose that $|\alpha|=k$ and $\left|H^{\prime}\right|=l$. Then, a deducible hypothesis is computed in $O\left(k^{3} l\right)$ time.

Proof. By Theorem 2.4, for a root $\alpha^{\prime}$, the partially isomorphic generalization $\beta$ of $\alpha^{\prime}$ is computed in $O\left(k^{3}\right)$. Since $\alpha$ is ground, whether or not $\beta$ and $\alpha$ are unifiable is determined in $O(k)$. If $\beta$ and $\alpha$ are unifiable, then, by Theorem 2.5, an analogy $\varphi$ can be computed simultaneously. The time complexity to apply this $\varphi$ to $H^{\prime}$ is $O(l)$. Hence, a deducible hypothesis $H^{\prime} \varphi$ is computed in $O\left(k^{3} l\right)$ time.

The base program in Example 5.6 is represented as follows:

```
fact(w1,(p(a,b):-true)).
fact(w1,(p(f(X),b):-p(X,b))).
world(w1,w2).
```

Here, the atom world ( $\mathrm{w} 1, \mathrm{w} 2$ ) represents that w 1 is a base program and w2 is a target program. In this program, a target program w2 is empty. Then, we obtain the following results:

```
: ?- ab_ana(p(f(f(c)),f(f(d))),X,P,W).
X = p(f(f(c)),f(f(d))),
P = [a--f(f(c)),b--f(f(d))],
W = w2 ;
X = p(c,f(f(d))),
P=[a--c,b--f(f(d))],
W = w2 ;
X = p(f(c),f(f(d))),
```

```
P=[a--f(c),b--f(f(d))],
W = w2 ;
no
: ?- ab_ana(p(c,d),X,P,W).
X = p(c,d),
P = [a--c,b--d],
W = w2 ;
no
```

Note that the solution $[a--f(f(c)), b--f(f(d))]$ of the third argument for the program ab_ana means the pairing $\left\{\left\langle a, f^{2}(c)\right\rangle,\left\langle b, f^{2}(d)\right\rangle\right\}$.

On the other hand, the base program in Example 5.7 is represented as follows:

```
fact(w1, (p(a,a):-true)).
fact(w1,(p(f(X),a):-p(X,a))).
world(w1,w2).
```

Then, we obtain the following results:

```
: ?- ab_ana(p(f(f(c)),f(d)),X,P,W).
no
: ?- ab_ana(p(f(f(c)),d),X,P,W).
no
: ?- ab_ana(p(f(f(c)),c),X,P,W).
X = p(c,c),
P = [a--c],
W = w2 ;
no
: ?- ab_ana(p(f(f(c)),f(c)),X,P,W).
X = p(f(c),f(c)),
P = [a--f(c)],
W = w2 ;
no
```

Since we regard an analogy as a function, for the first two goals, we obtain no analogies.
Then, we also obtain no deducible hypotheses.

## Chapter 6

## Rule-Generating Abduction

"The ideal reasoner", he remarked, "would, when he has once been shown a single fact in all its bearings, deduce from it not only all the chain of events which led up to it, but also all the results which would follow from it." - 'The Five Orange Pips' "The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes"

Let $P$ be a definite program and $C$ be a surprising fact. The rule-generating abduction is a type of abduction which generates a rule in $P$ and proposes a hypothesis to explain the surprising fact $C$. An inference schema of rule-generating abduction is described by the following three steps:

1. A surprising fact $C$ is observed.
2. A rule $C \leftarrow A$ is generated in $P$.
3. A hypothesis $A$ is proposed.

For a surprising fact $C$, we regard the above inference schema as the following one by identifying $A$ with the set $\{A\}$ of atoms:

1. A ground atom $C$ such that $P \nvdash C$ is given.
2. A rule $C^{\prime} \leftarrow A_{1}^{\prime}, \cdots, A_{n}^{\prime}$ is generated in $P$, where $C^{\prime} \theta=C$ and $A_{i}^{\prime} \theta=A_{i}$.
3. A hypothesis $\left\{A_{1}, \cdots, A_{n}\right\}$ is proposed. Then, $P \cup\left\{A_{1}, \cdots, A_{n}\right\} \vdash C$.

For the above inference schema, even in propositional logic, there exist infinitely many hypotheses and rules. In definite programs, if the class of programs is not restricted to some subclass, then there are also infinitely many meaningless hypotheses. Hence, we introduce the subclass of definite programs for rule-generating abduction. Furthermore, in rule-generating abduction, a surprising fact is given only once. Hence, we also need to generalize one ground atom.

In this chapter, we investigate rule-generating abduction for logic programming. In Section 6.1, we introduce the subclass of head-reducing programs in Chapter 4. In Section 6.2, we introduce the concept of a safe generalization, and discuss the properties of it. In Section 6.3, we investigate the number of hypotheses by rule-generating abduction. In Section 6.4, we design an efficient algorithm of rule-generating abduction for the introduced class by using safe generalization. In Section 6.6, we realize this algorithm as a Prolog program, and consider several examples.

This chapter is based on the papers [Hir94b, Hir94c].

### 6.1 Weakly 2-Reducing Programs

In this chapter, we deal with the following class of programs:

$$
\left\{\begin{array}{l}
p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right) \leftarrow p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right) \\
p\left(u_{1}, \cdots, u_{n}\right)
\end{array}\right\} .
$$

In Chapter 4, we have introduced the class of head-reducing programs. As mentioned in Chapter 4, for a head-reducing program $P$ and a ground atom $\alpha$, all the derivations of $P \cup\{\leftarrow \alpha\}$ are finite. In this section, in order to characterize such programs as we mentioned above, we give the definitions as the special case of head-reducing programs.

In this chapter, we deal with lists as terms. Then, we assume that a list constructor [|] and an empty list [] are included in first order language $\mathcal{L}$. For a term $t,|t|$ denotes the length of $t$. In particular, for a list $l$, the length $|l|$ of $l$ is defined as follows: $|l|=1$, if $l$ is an empty list [ ]. Otherwise $|l|=n+1$, if $t$ is a list [a|list] and $|l i s t|=n$.

For rule-generating abduction, we introduce some classes of definite programs. Let $C$ be a definite clause $p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right) \leftarrow p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)$. Suppose that a definite program
has the form of $\{C\}$. By the discussion in Chapter $4,\{C\}$ is head-reducing with respect to the predicate $p$ if and only if $C$ is $p$-reducing with respect to some argument. In this section, a clause $C$ is called head-reducing if there exists an argument $i$ such that $\left|t_{i} \theta\right|>\left|s_{i} \theta\right|$ for any substitution $\theta$. Furthermore, we also introduce the following definitions:

Definition 6.1 (Hirata [Hir93a, Hir93b], Yamamoto [Yam92]) Let $C$ be a definite clause $p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right) \leftarrow p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)$.

1. $C$ is weakly reducing if $\left|t_{i} \theta\right| \geq\left|s_{i} \theta\right|$ for any substitution $\theta$ and for any $i$.
2. $C$ is weakly head-reducing if it is head-reducing and weakly reducing.

In other words, a clause $p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right) \leftarrow p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)$ is weakly head-reducing if $\left|t_{i} \theta\right| \geq$ $\left|s_{i} \theta\right|$ for any $i$, and $\left|t_{k} \theta\right|>\left|s_{k} \theta\right|$ for at least one argument $k$ and for any ground substitution $\theta$.

There are many Prolog clauses for list processing such that any argument of the head has the form of either $X$ or $[W \mid X]$, and the body has the form of $Y$. Then, we restrict the form of clause as follows: A clause $p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right) \leftarrow p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)$ is 2reducing, if it is head-reducing, and $t_{i}$ has the form of either $X_{i}$ or $\left[W_{i} \mid X_{i}\right]$ and $s_{i}$ has the form of $Y_{i}$ for any $i$. In 2-reducing programs, $Y_{i}$ is not necessarily equal to $X_{i}$. A clause $p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right) \leftarrow p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)$ is weakly 2-reducing if it is weakly reducing and 2-reducing. In other words, a clause $p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right) \leftarrow p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)$ is weakly 2-reducing if $t_{i}$ has the form of either $X_{i}$ or $\left[W_{i} \mid X_{i}\right]$ and $s_{i}$ has the form of $X_{i}$ for any $i$.

Example 6.1 The following Prolog clauses in Sterling and Shapiro [SS86, SS94] are weakly 2-reducing:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \operatorname{member}(X,[W \mid Y]) \leftarrow \operatorname{member}(X, Y), \\
& \operatorname{prefix}([W \mid X],[W \mid Y]) \leftarrow \operatorname{prefix}(X, Y), \\
& \operatorname{suffix}(X,[W \mid Y]) \leftarrow \operatorname{suffix}(X, Y), \\
& \operatorname{append}([W \mid X], Y,[W \mid Z]) \leftarrow \operatorname{append}(X, Y, Z), \\
& \operatorname{concat}(X,[W \mid Y],[W \mid Z]) \leftarrow \operatorname{concat}(X, Y, Z) .
\end{aligned}
$$

Note that the clauses of member and suffix have the same forms. The first argument of member is a constant symbol, while that of suffix is a list.

For the above clauses, the following corollary of Theorem 4.1 holds.

Corollary 6.1 (Hirata [Hir93a, Hir93b], Yamamoto [Yam92]) Let $p$ be a predicate symbol, $\alpha$ be a ground atom with $p$, and $C$ be a clause $p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right) \leftarrow p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)$.

1. If $C$ is head-reducing, in particular 2-reducing, then all the derivation of $\{C\} \cup\{\leftarrow$ $\alpha\}$ are finite.
2. If $C$ is weakly head-reducing, in particular weakly 2 -reducing, then all the derivation of $\{C\} \cup\{\leftarrow \alpha\}$ are finite, and all the nodes of the derivation are ground.

### 6.2 Safe Generalization

It is an important problem to avoid overgeneralization when we deal with generalizations. In general, whether or not a generalization $\beta$ of $\alpha$ is overgeneral is determined by an intended model. For an atom $\alpha$, suppose that $\beta \theta=\alpha$ and $M$ is an intended model. Then, $\beta$ is an overgeneralization of $\alpha$ if there exists a ground atom $\gamma$ such that $\forall \beta \vdash \gamma$ and $M \not \models \gamma$ for $M$. However, the decision problem of whether or not there exists such the ground atom $\gamma$ is undecidable. On the other hand, in rule-generating abduction, only one surprising fact is given, and it is hard to give in advance an intended model. To overcome these difficulties, in this section, we introduce the following syntactical generalization of one atom.

Let $\theta$ be a ground substitution, that is, $\theta=\cup_{i=1}^{n}\left\{X_{i}:=t_{i}\right\}$ and every term $t_{i}$ is ground. Let $\alpha$ be a ground atom and $\beta$ be an atom such that $\beta \theta=\alpha$. Note that, throughout this chapter, if $\beta \theta=\alpha$, then a variable $X_{i} \in \operatorname{dom}(\theta)$ appears in $\beta$ and $t_{i} \neq[]$. A substitution $\theta$ is well-defined if, for any $t_{i}$, there exists no term $t_{j}$ which is a subterm of $t_{i}$.

Example 6.2 Let $\alpha$ be a ground atom $p([a, b],[b])$. Let $\beta_{i}$ be the following atoms $(1 \leq i \leq 5):$

$$
\begin{gathered}
\beta_{1}=p([a, X],[b]), \beta_{2}=p([a \mid X],[b]), \beta_{3}=p([X \mid Y], Y), \\
\beta_{4}=p([a \mid X],[Y]), \beta_{5}=p([a \mid X], Y)
\end{gathered}
$$

For any $\beta_{i}$, there exist the following substitutions $\theta_{i}$ such that $\beta_{i} \theta_{i}=\alpha(1 \leq i \leq 5)$ :

$$
\begin{gathered}
\theta_{1}=\{X:=b\}, \theta_{2}=\{X:=[b]\}, \theta_{3}=\{X:=a, Y:=[b]\}, \\
\theta_{4}=\{X:=[b], Y:=b\}, \theta_{5}=\{X:=[b], Y:=[b]\} .
\end{gathered}
$$

Then, $\theta_{1}, \theta_{2}$, and $\theta_{3}$ are well-defined, while $\theta_{4}$ and $\theta_{5}$ are not.
Let $\alpha$ be a ground atom and $\beta$ be an atom such that $\beta \theta=\alpha$. If a substitution $\theta=\cup_{i=1}^{n}\left\{X_{i}:=t_{i}\right\}$ is well-defined, then we can define a reversal $\theta^{-1}=\cup_{i=1}^{n}\left\{t_{i}:=X_{i}\right\}$. Note that, if $\theta$ is well-defined, then, for any $t_{i}$ and $X_{i}$, there exists no term $t_{j}$ such that $t_{j}$ is a subterm of $t_{i}$ and no variable $X_{i}$ such that $X_{i}=X_{j}(j \neq i)$. However, even if $\theta$ is well-defined, $\beta$ is not always $\alpha \theta^{-1}$.

Example 6.3 For $\beta_{1}$ and $\beta_{2}$ in Example 6.2,

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \alpha \theta_{1}^{-1}=p([a, b],[b])\{b:=X\}=p([a, X],[X]) \neq \beta_{1}, \\
& \alpha \theta_{2}^{-1}=p([a, b],[b])\{[b]:=X\}=p([a \mid X], X) \neq \beta_{2} .
\end{aligned}
$$

On the other hand,

$$
\alpha \theta_{3}^{-1}=p([a, b],[b])\{a:=X,[b]:=Y\}=p([X \mid Y], Y)=\beta_{3} .
$$

For the reversal $\theta^{-1}$, the following lemma holds.

Lemma 6.1 Let $\alpha$ be a ground atom and $\beta$ be an atom such that $\beta \theta=\alpha$. Suppose that a substitution $\theta=\cup_{i=1}^{n}\left\{X_{i}:=t_{i}\right\}$ is well-defined. Then, $\beta=\alpha \theta^{-1}$ if and only if no term $t_{i}$ appears in $\beta$.

Proof. Suppose that $\beta=\alpha \theta^{-1}$. By the definition of $\theta^{-1}, \alpha \theta^{-1}$ is an atom which replaces all the terms $t_{i}$ in $\alpha$ with the variable $X_{i}$. Then, no term $t_{i}$ appears in $\alpha \theta^{-1}=\beta$.

For simplicity, suppose that $\theta=\{X:=t\}$. If a term $t$ appears once in $\alpha$, that is, $\alpha$ has the form of $p(\cdots t \cdots)$, then $\alpha \theta^{-1}=p(\cdots t \cdots)\{t:=X\}=p(\cdots X \cdots)$. Since $\alpha$ is ground and $\beta \theta=\alpha, \alpha \theta^{-1}=\beta$.

If a term $t$ appears at least twice in $\alpha$, that is, $\alpha$ has the form of $p(\cdots t \cdots t \cdots)$, then $\beta$ has the form of $p(\cdots X \cdots Y \cdots)$. If $X \neq Y$, then, by $\beta \theta=\alpha, \theta$ has the form of $\{X:=t, Y:=t\}$. This $\theta$ is not well-defined. Hence, it is contradiction. Then, $X=Y$, $\theta=\{X:=t\}$, and $\beta$ has the form of $p(\cdots X \cdots X \cdots)$. Hence, $\beta=\alpha \theta^{-1}$.

A ground term $t(\neq[])$ is a common term in $\alpha$ if $t$ appears at least twice in $\alpha$. In particular, if a common term is a ground list, it is called a common list. Then, we formulate a safe generalization which is based on the syntax of one ground atom as follows:

Definition 6.2 Let $\alpha$ be a ground atom, $\theta$ be a substitution $\cup_{i=1}^{n}\left\{X_{i}:=t_{i}\right\}$, and $\beta$ be an atom such that $\beta \theta=\alpha$. An atom $\beta$ is a safe generalization of $\alpha$ if $(\beta, \theta)$ satisfies the following safeness conditions:

1. $\theta$ is well-defined,
2. $\beta=\alpha \theta^{-1}$, and
3. if there exist common terms in $\alpha$, then there exists a ground term $t_{j} \in \cup_{i=1}^{n}\left\{t_{i}\right\}$ such that $t_{j}$ is a common term in $\alpha$.

Let $\alpha$ be a ground atom and $\beta$ be an atom such that $\beta \theta=\alpha$. Let $t$ be some common term in $\alpha$. If $\theta$ is well-defined and $\theta^{-1}$ has the form of $\{t:=X\}$, then $\beta$ is safe on $\alpha$.

Example 6.4 Let $\alpha$ be a ground atom $p([a, b],[b])$ and $\beta_{i}$ be an atom such that $\beta_{i} \theta_{i}=$ $\alpha(6 \leq i \leq 8)$. Then, the common terms in $\alpha$ are $[b]$ and $b$.

1. Let $\beta_{6}$ be an atom $p(X, Y)$ and $\theta_{6}$ be a substitution $\{X:=[a, b], Y:=[b]\}$. By the safeness condition $1, \beta_{6}$ is not safe on $\alpha$.
2. Let $\beta_{7}$ be an atom $p([X, b],[Y])$ and $\theta_{7}$ be a substitution $\{X:=a, Y:=b\}$. By the safeness condition $2, \beta_{7}$ is not safe on $\alpha$.
3. Let $\beta_{8}$ be an atom $p(X,[b])$ and $\theta_{8}$ be a substitution $\{X:=[a, b]\}$. By the safeness condition $3, \beta_{8}$ is not safe on $\alpha$.

For the above $\alpha$, atoms $p([a \mid X], X), p([a, X],[X]), p([Y, X],[X])$, and $p([Y \mid X], X)$ are safe on $\alpha$.

In general, an atom is regarded as a relation between its arguments. Thus, the syntactical generalization of one atom should be obtained by replacing common terms with common variables. The safe generalization is an example of such generalizations. On the other hand, in weakly 2 -reducing programs, it suffices to consider only two types of terms, constant symbols and lists. Then, we also define the following two types of substitutions.

Let $\theta$ be a substitution $\cup_{i=1}^{n}\left\{X_{i}:=t_{i}\right\}$. Then, $\theta$ is a constant substitution (resp., a list substitution) if every $t_{i}$ is a constant symbol (resp., a ground list) without an empty list [].

In particular, a constant substitution is related to partially isomorphic generalizations which have been introduced by Hirowatari and Arikawa [HiA94b]. Note that, though a replaceable term includes an empty list [], the definition of a replaceable term is independent of the proof of Theorem 2.3. Let $R T$ be the set of all replaceable terms of $\alpha$ and $T \subseteq R T$. Then, we can re-formulate a partially isomorphic generalization by using $T$ instead of $R T$, and show that Theorem 2.3 also holds for the set $T$ of replaceable terms. Let $\alpha$ be a ground atom, $\theta_{c}$ be a constant substitution, and $\beta$ be an atom such that $\beta \theta_{c}=\alpha$. Thus, we assume that $\beta$ is a partially isomorphic generalization of $\alpha$, whose replaceable terms are all constant symbols in $\alpha$ except an empty list [].

In Section 6.4, we apply rule-generating abduction to a list substitution $\theta_{l}$ and a constant substitution $\theta_{c}$ in the following way: Let $\alpha$ be a ground atom, that is, a surprising fact. First, by using a list substitution, we obtain an atom $\beta$ such that
$\beta \theta_{l}=\alpha$ and $\beta$ is safe on $\alpha$. Secondly, by using a constant substitution, we obtain an atom $\gamma$ such that $\gamma \theta_{c}=\beta$ and $\gamma$ is safe on $\beta$. By the above assumption, $\gamma$ is also a partially isomorphic generalization of $\beta$.

Unfortunately, $\theta_{c} \theta_{l}$ is not always well-defined, and $\gamma$ is not always safe on $\alpha$. For example, let $\alpha$ be a ground atom $p([a, b, c],[b, c],[a, b, c])$. Then, there exist the following atoms $\beta_{i}$ such that $\beta_{i} \theta_{i}=\alpha$ and $\theta_{i}$ is a well-defined list substitution $(9 \leq i \leq 11)$ :

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
\beta_{9}=p([a, b \mid X],[b \mid X],[a, b \mid X]) & \theta_{9}=\{X:=[c]\} \\
\beta_{10}=p([a \mid Y], Y,[a \mid Y]) & \theta_{10}=\{Y:=[b, c]\} \\
\beta_{11}=p(Z,[b, c], Z) & \theta_{11}=\{Z:=[a, b, c]\} .
\end{array}
$$

Then, there exist no generalization $\gamma$ of $\beta$ and substitution $\sigma(\neq \varepsilon)$ such that $\gamma \sigma=\beta_{11}$ and $\theta_{11} \sigma$ is well-defined. Note that there does not exist the greatest list generalization of $\alpha$.

Let $\alpha$ be a ground atom. Let $\beta$ and $\gamma$ be atoms such that $\beta \theta_{l}=\alpha$ and $\gamma \theta_{c}=\beta$. Suppose that both $\left(\beta, \theta_{l}\right)$ and $\left(\gamma, \theta_{c}\right)$ satisfy the safeness conditions. Then, the following two theorems hold.

Theorem 6.1 If $\theta_{c} \theta_{l}$ is well-defined, then $\gamma$ is a safe generalization of $\alpha$.

Proof. Suppose that $\theta_{c} \theta_{l}$ is well-defined. Then, $\left(\gamma, \theta_{c} \theta_{l}\right)$ satisfies the safeness condition 1.

Since both $\left(\beta, \theta_{l}\right)$ and $\left(\gamma, \theta_{c}\right)$ satisfy the safeness conditions, $\left(\gamma, \theta_{c} \theta_{l}\right)$ satisfies the safeness condition 3.

By the supposition, $\beta=\alpha \theta_{l}^{-1}$ and $\gamma=\beta \theta_{c}^{-1}$. The list substitution $\theta_{l}$ replaces the common lists in $\alpha$ by variables. The constant substitution $\theta_{c}$ replaces the same constant symbols in $\beta$ by the same variables and other constant symbols by other variables. Hence, the composition $\theta_{c} \theta_{l}$ replaces the common lists in $\alpha$ by variables, the same constant symbols in $\alpha$ except common lists by the same variables, and other constant symbols by other variables. By Lemma 6.1 and since $\theta_{c} \theta_{l}$ is well-defined, then $\left(\gamma, \theta_{c} \theta_{l}\right)$ satisfies the safeness condition 2.

Theorem 6.2 Suppose that any constant symbol appearing in common lists in $\alpha$ does not appear elsewhere in $\alpha$ except in the lists. If $\beta=\alpha \theta_{l}^{-1}$ and $\gamma=\beta \theta_{c}^{-1}$, then $\theta_{c} \theta_{l}$ is well-defined. Hence, $\gamma$ is a safe generalization of $\alpha$.

Proof. Suppose that $\theta_{l}=\cup_{i=1}^{n}\left\{X_{i}:=l_{i}\right\}$, where $l_{i}$ is a common list in $\alpha$. For any $j$-th argument's term $t_{j}$ of $\alpha$, if $t_{j}$ includes $l_{i}$, then $t_{j}=\left[a_{1}^{j}, a_{2}^{j}, \cdots, a_{n_{j}}^{j} \mid l_{i}\right]$, and no constant symbols $a_{1}^{j}, a_{2}^{j}, \cdots, a_{n_{j}}^{j}$ appear in $l_{i}$. Then, $\theta_{c}$ does not include the binding $X:=c$ such that $c$ appears in $l_{i}$. Hence, $\theta_{c} \theta_{l}$ is well-defined. By Theorem 6.1, $\left(\gamma, \theta_{c} \theta_{l}\right)$ satisfies the safeness conditions. Then, for $\gamma$ such that $\gamma \theta_{c} \theta_{l}=\alpha, \gamma$ is a safe generalization of $\alpha$.

### 6.3 Number of Hypotheses

In Chapter 4, we have discussed the head-reducing programs for which all the derivations are finite. For a given ground atom $p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right)$, the head-reducing rule

$$
p\left(t_{1}^{\prime}, \cdots, t_{n}^{\prime}\right) \leftarrow p\left(s_{1}^{\prime}, \cdots, s_{n}^{\prime}\right)
$$

is generated and the hypothesis $p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)$ is proposed by rule-generating abduction, where

$$
\begin{aligned}
p\left(t_{1}^{\prime}, \cdots, t_{n}^{\prime}\right) \theta & =p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right) \\
p\left(s_{1}^{\prime}, \cdots, s_{n}^{\prime}\right) \theta & =p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

An inference schema is depicted by the following syllogism:

$$
\frac{p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right)}{p\left(t_{1}^{\prime}, \cdots, t_{n}^{\prime}\right) \leftarrow p\left(s_{1}^{\prime}, \cdots, s_{n}^{\prime}\right)} \quad p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right) .
$$

Unfortunately, even if the generated rule is 2-reducing or weakly 2-reducing, the number of hypotheses increases in exponential order with respect to the length of an atom as follows:

Theorem 6.3 Let $p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right)$ be a surprising fact.

1. The number of 2 -reducing rule which satisfies the above syllogism is at most $6^{n}$.
2. The number of weakly 2 -reducing rule which satisfies the above syllogism is at most $3^{n}$.

Proof. Suppose that the generated rule is the form $p\left(u_{1}, \cdots, u_{n}\right) \leftarrow p\left(v_{1}, \cdots, v_{n}\right)$.
First, we show the case 1. Suppose that the generated rule is 2 -reducing. The number of combinations such that $u_{i}$ has the form of $\left[W_{i} \mid X_{i}\right]$ for $j$ arguments in $n$ arguments is at most ${ }_{n} C_{j}$. In such $j$ arguments, the number of combinations such that at least one $v_{i}$ has the form of $X_{i}$ is at most

$$
\sum_{i=2}^{j}{ }_{j} C_{i},
$$

where ${ }_{1} C_{2}$ is assumed to be 1 . In such $j$ arguments, the number of combinations such that at least two $W_{l}$ and $W_{k}(l \neq k)$ are the same is also at most

$$
\sum_{i=2}^{j}{ }_{j} C_{i} .
$$

In the remained $(n-j)$ arguments, the number of combinations for the variables of body is at most $2^{n-j}$.

Then, the total number of hypotheses is at most

$$
\sum_{j=1}^{n}{ }_{n} C_{j} \times\left(\sum_{i=2}^{j}{ }_{j} C_{i}\right)^{2} \times 2^{n-j}
$$

Hence, we obtain the following formulas:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\sum_{j=1}^{n}{ }_{n} C_{j} \times\left(\sum_{i=2}^{j}{ }_{j} C_{i}\right)^{2} \times 2^{n-j} & =\sum_{j=1}^{n}{ }_{n} C_{j} \times\left(2^{j}-j-1\right)^{2} \times 2^{n-j} \\
& \leq \sum_{j=1}^{n}{ }_{n} C_{j} \times 2^{2 j} \times 2^{n-j} \\
& =\sum_{j=1}^{n}{ }_{n} C_{j} \times 2^{n+j} \\
& =\left(\sum_{j=1}^{n}{ }_{n} C_{j} \times 2^{j}\right) \times 2^{n} \\
& =\left\{(1+2)^{n}-1\right\} \times 2^{n} \\
& \leq 6^{n} .
\end{aligned}
$$

Here, we have used the following formula:

$$
\sum_{i=0}^{n}{ }_{n} C_{i} \times x^{i}=(1+x)^{n}
$$

Now, we also show the case 2 . Suppose that the generated rule is weakly 2 -reducing. The number of combinations such that $u_{i}$ has the form of $\left[W_{i} \mid X_{i}\right]$ for $j$ arguments in $n$ arguments is at most ${ }_{n} C_{j}$. In such $j$ arguments, the number of combinations such that at least one $v_{i}$ has the form of $X_{i}$ is at most

$$
\sum_{i=2}^{j}{ }_{j} C_{i},
$$

where ${ }_{1} C_{2}$ is assumed to be 1 .
Then, the total number of hypotheses is at most

$$
\sum_{j=1}^{n}{ }_{n} C_{j} \times\left(\sum_{i=2}^{j}{ }_{j} C_{i}\right)
$$

Hence, we obtain the following formulas:

$$
\sum_{j=1}^{n}{ }_{n} C_{j} \times\left(\sum_{i=2}^{j}{ }_{j} C_{i}\right)=\sum_{j=1}^{n}{ }_{n} C_{j} \times\left(2^{j}-j-1\right) \leq \sum_{j=1}^{n}{ }_{n} C_{j} \times 2^{j} \leq 3^{n} .
$$

On the other hand, by using safe generalizations in Section 6.2, we design an algorithm to generate weakly 2 -reducing rules as follows: Suppose that a ground atom $\alpha$ is given. First, by generalizing $\alpha$ with a list substitution $\theta_{l}$, we obtain an atom $\beta$ such that $\beta \theta_{l}=\alpha$ and $\beta$ is safe on $\alpha$. We call such a $\beta$ a list generalization of $\alpha$. Secondly, by generalizing $\beta$ with a constant substitution $\theta_{c}$, we obtain an atom $\gamma$ such that $\gamma \theta_{c}=\beta$ and $\gamma$ is safe on $\beta$. We call such a $\gamma$ a constant generalization of $\beta$. Note that $\gamma$ is also assumed to be a partially isomorphic generalization of $\beta$. For this algorithm, the number of rules is at most the number of generalizations. Then, we investigate the number of generalizations, in particular, the number of maximal generalizations.

Let $\alpha$ be a ground atom $p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right)$. For all common lists in $\alpha$, we can classify them by the sublist relation. For example, let $\alpha$ be the following ground atom:

$$
p([a, b, c, d],[c, d],[b, c],[c],[b, c, d])\left(=p\left(t_{1}, t_{2}, t_{3}, t_{4}, t_{5}\right)\right),
$$

and $t_{i}$ be the $i$-th argument's term of $\alpha$. Then, $t_{2}, t_{4}$, and $t_{5}$ are common lists in $\alpha$. By the sublist relation, we classify them into $\left\{t_{2}, t_{5}\right\}$ and $\left\{t_{4}\right\}$.

The number of maximal generalizations is characterized as the following theorem.

Theorem 6.4 Let $l$ be the number of classes by the sublist relation. Then, the number of the maximal generalizations is at most

$$
\left(\frac{(\sqrt{2})^{n}}{l}\right)^{l}
$$

Even in case $l=1$, the number of the maximal list generalizations of $\alpha$ is at most $(\sqrt{2})^{n}$.

Proof. Let $\alpha$ be a ground atom $p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right)$ and $K_{n}$ be the number of the maximal list generalizations of $\alpha$. If $l=1$, then we can find the upper bound of $K_{n}$ in the following way.

For simplicity, suppose that the common lists in $\alpha$ are $t_{1}, t_{2}, \cdots, t_{n-1}$, and $\left|t_{1}\right|>$ $\left|t_{2}\right|>\cdots>\left|t_{n-1}\right|$. We denote the generalization $\alpha\left\{t_{j_{1}}:=X_{j_{1}}, \cdots, t_{j_{f}}:=X_{j_{f}}\right\}$ by $\beta_{\left(j_{1}, \cdots, j_{f}\right)}$. Note that $t_{j_{i}+1}$ is not a common list in $\beta_{\left(j_{i}\right)}$. Furthermore, for $\beta_{\left(j_{i}, j_{i}+a, j_{i}+a+b\right)}$ $(a, b=2$ or 3$)$, there exist substitutions $\theta_{j_{i}+a+b}, \theta_{j_{i}+a}$, and $\theta_{j_{i}}$ such that

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \beta_{\left(j_{i}, j_{i}+a\right)}=\beta_{\left(j_{i}, j_{i}+a, j_{i}+a+b\right)} \theta_{j_{i}+a+b}, \\
& \beta_{\left(j_{i}, j_{i}+a+b\right)}=\beta_{\left(j_{i}, j_{i}+a, j_{i}+a+b\right)} \theta_{j_{i}+a}, \\
& \beta_{\left(j_{i}+a, j_{i}+a+b\right)}=\beta_{\left(j_{i}, j_{i}+a, j_{i}+a+b\right)} \theta_{j_{i}} .
\end{aligned}
$$

Hence, $\beta_{\left(j_{i}, j_{i}+a\right)}, \beta_{\left(j_{i}, j_{i}+a+b\right)}$, and $\beta_{\left(j_{i}+a, j_{i}+a+b\right)}$ are not maximal list generalizations.
By using the indices of $\beta, K_{n}$ is equal to the number of the sequences $\left(j_{1}, \cdots, j_{f}\right)$ which satisfy the following conditions:

1. $j_{1}=1$ or 2 ,
2. $j_{f}=n-1$ or $n$, and
3. the adjacent number of $j_{i}$ is either $j_{i}+2$ or $j_{i}+3$.

For example, if $n=8$, then the following seven sequences

$$
(1,3,5,7),(1,3,6),(1,4,6),(1,4,7),(2,4,6),(2,4,7),(2,5,8)
$$

satisfy the above conditions. For the sequence $\left(j_{1}, \cdots, j_{f}\right)$ which satisfies the above conditions, the number of sequences such that $j_{1}=1$ is greater than $j_{1}=2$. Let $A_{n}$ be the set of the sequences $\left(j_{1}, \cdots, j_{f}\right)$ which satisfy the above conditions and $j_{1}=1$. Then, $K_{n} \leq 2\left|A_{n}\right|$. Furthermore, for $n \geq 6$, we can construct the set $A_{n}$ in the following way:

1. if $\left(j_{1}, \cdots, j_{f}\right) \in A_{n-2}$, then $\left(j_{1}, \cdots, j_{f}, n\right) \in A_{n}$, and
2. if $\left(j_{1}^{\prime}, \cdots, j_{f}^{\prime}\right) \in A_{n-3}$, then $\left(j_{1}^{\prime}, \cdots, j_{f}^{\prime}, n-1\right) \in A_{n}$.

Hence, $\left|A_{n}\right|$ satisfies the following equations:

$$
\left|A_{3}\right|=1,\left|A_{4}\right|=1,\left|A_{5}\right|=2,\left|A_{n}\right|=\left|A_{n-2}\right|+\left|A_{n-3}\right|(n \geq 6) .
$$

By mathematical induction on $n$, we obtain the following formula:

$$
(\sqrt[3]{2})^{n-2} \leq\left|A_{n}\right| \leq(\sqrt{2})^{n-2} \quad(n \geq 6)
$$

Hence, the number $K_{n}$ of the maximal list generalizations is characterized by the following formula:

$$
K_{n} \leq 2(\sqrt{2})^{n-2}=(\sqrt{2})^{n}
$$

Note that this formula also holds for any $n \geq 1$.
Let $l$ be the number of classes by the sublist relation and $C_{j}$ be such a class for $1 \leq j \leq l$. For any $C_{j}$, the number of the sequences which satisfy the above conditions is at most $(\sqrt{2})^{\left|C_{j}\right|}$. Then, the number $K_{n}$ of the maximal generalizations is at most

$$
(\sqrt{2})^{\left|C_{1}\right|} \times \cdots \times(\sqrt{2})^{\left|C_{l}\right|}
$$

Hence, $K_{n}$ is also characterized as the following formula:

$$
K_{n} \leq\left(\frac{(\sqrt{2})^{n}}{l}\right)^{l}
$$

By Theorem 6.4, the number of weakly 2-reducing rules, even if we adopt the maximal list generalizations, increases exponentially with respect to $n$. Hence, in the next section, we restrict the forms of generalizations, and design the algorithm for rule-generating abduction whose number of hypotheses is at most $n$.

### 6.4 Algorithm PROPOSE

In this section, we design an efficient algorithm for rule-generating abduction, which is called PROPOSE. In the algorithm PROPOSE illustrated in Figure 6.1, we restrict the reversal for list generalizations to the form of $\{t:=X\}$, where $t$ is both a common list in $\alpha$ and some argument's term of $\alpha$. Obviously, the list generalization $\alpha\{X:=t\}$ is safe on $\alpha$. Then, the following lemma holds.

Lemma 6.2 The number of weakly 2-reducing rules generated by the algorithm $P R O$ POSE is at most $n$.

Proof. The number of terms that are both a common term and some argument's term is at most $n$. Then, the number of elements of $L$ is at most $n$. Hence, the number of hypotheses is also at most $n$.

An important basis on the algorithm PROPOSE is that, if the $i$-th argument's term is some common list in $\alpha$, then the $i$-th argument's term of the head of the generated rule is a variable; otherwise, it is a list. Furthermore, by the algorithm PROPOSE, the clauses in Example 6.1 are constructed from one ground atom.

In Figure 6.1, rs_abd (fact, head $\leftarrow$ body, hyp $)$, which is rule-selecting abduction, is a procedure to propose a hypothesis hyp such that (head) $\sigma=$ fact and (body) $\sigma=h y p$ for some substitution $\sigma$.

For the algorithm PROPOSE, the following two theorems hold.

Theorem 6.5 Let $\alpha$ be a ground atom $p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right)$ and $k=\left|t_{1}\right|+\cdots+\left|t_{n}\right|$. Then, the algorithm PROPOSE computes the rules and hypotheses in $O\left(k^{3}\right)$ time.

Proof. For any $t_{i}$, it can be determined whether or not $t_{i}$ is a sublist of $t_{j}$ in $O\left(\left|t_{i}\right|\right)$. Then, for any $i$, it can be determined whether or not $t_{i}$ is a sublist of any $t_{j}(j \neq i)$ in $O\left((n-1)\left|t_{i}\right|\right)$. Hence, the set $L$ in the algorithm PROPOSE can be constructed in $O((n-1) k)$.

```
Algorithm \(\operatorname{PROPOSE}(\alpha\), head \(\leftarrow\) body, hyp \()\)
    input \(\alpha=p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right)\) : a fact, i.e., a ground atom
    output head \(\leftarrow\) body : a rule
            \(\delta:\) a hypothesis
    \(L:=\left\{\beta \mid \beta=\alpha\left\{t_{i}:=V_{i}\right\}, t_{i}\right.\) is a common list in \(\left.\alpha\right\} \cup\{\alpha\} ;\)
                                    \(/^{*} \beta\) : safe on \(\alpha^{*} /\)
    while \(L \neq \phi\) do
        select \(\beta \in L\);
        \(\gamma:=\) the greatest constant generalization \(p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)\) of \(\beta\);
        for \(i=1\) to \(n\)
            if \(s_{i}=[]\) then
                output \(\gamma \leftarrow\) true \(\quad / *\) a rule */
                output true /* a hypothesis */
                halt;
            else if \(s_{i}\) is a variable then \(\quad / *\) induction step */
                \(h_{\text {head_arg }}^{i}\) : \(=X_{i} ; \quad /^{*} X_{i}\) is a new variable */
                body_arg \(_{i}:=X_{i} ;\)
            else
                \(h e a d_{-} \arg _{i}:=\left[W_{1}^{i} \mid X_{i}\right] ; \quad /^{*} X_{i}\) is a new variable */
            end
        end
        head \(:=p\left(\right.\) head_arg \(_{1}, \cdots\), head_arg \(\left._{n}\right) ; \quad /^{*}\) head_arg \(_{i}=\left[W_{1}^{i} \mid X_{i}\right]\) or \(X_{i} * /\)
        body \(:=p\left(X_{1}, \cdots, X_{n}\right)\);
        output head \(\leftarrow\) body \(\quad /^{*}\) a rule */
        \(r s \_a b d(\alpha\), head \(\leftarrow b o d y, \delta) ; \quad / *\) rule-selecting abduction */
        output \(\delta \quad /^{*}\) a hypothesis */
        \(L:=L-\{\beta\} ;\)
    end
```

Figure 6.1: Algorithm PROPOSE

For the selected $\beta$ in $L$, the greatest constant generalization of $\beta$ is also a partially isomorphic generalization of $\beta$. By Theorem 2.4, a partially isomorphic generalization $\gamma$ of $\beta$ can be computed in $O\left(k^{2}\right)$. Since the procedures in the for-loop can be computed in $O(n)$, the for-loop terminates in $O\left(n^{2}\right)$. Then, the procedures in while-loop can be computed in $O\left(k^{2}+n^{2}\right)$. Since the number of elements in $L$ is at most $n$ by Lemma 6.2, the while-loop terminates in $O\left(k^{2} n+n^{3}\right)$. Hence, the algorithm PROPOSE terminates in $O\left((n-1) k+k^{2} n+n^{3}\right)$.

Since $n \leq k$, the algorithm $P R O P O S E$ computes rules and hypotheses in $O\left(k^{3}\right)$ time.

Theorem 6.6 Let $\alpha$ be a ground atom $p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right)$ and $\delta$ be the proposed hypothesis $p\left(s_{1}, \cdots, s_{n}\right)$ by PROPOSE. If there exists a selected common list $l$ in $\alpha$ by the algorithm PROPOSE and $l$ appears in $t_{i}$, then $l$ also appears in $s_{i}$.

Proof. Let $l$ be the selected common list in $\alpha$ by PROPOSE. If the $i$-th argument's term $t_{i}$ of $\alpha$ is $l$ itself, then the $i$-th argument's terms of both the head and the body of the generated rules are variables $X_{i}$. Then, the $i$-th argument's term $s_{i}$ of $\delta$ is also $l$.

Suppose that $l$ appears in another argument's term of $\alpha$, and $t_{i}$ has the form of $\left[a_{1}^{i}, a_{2}^{i}, \cdots, a_{n_{i}}^{i} \mid l\right]$. By the algorithm PROPOSE, the $i$-th argument's term of the head of the generated rule is a list $\left[Y_{1}^{i} \mid X_{i}\right]$, where $Y_{1}^{i}$ is a variable corresponding to $a_{1}^{i}$, while one of the body is a variable $X_{i}$. Then, for the hypothesis $\delta$, the $i$-th argument's term $s_{i}$ of $\delta$ has the form of $\left[a_{2}^{i}, \cdots, a_{n_{i}}^{i} \mid l\right]$.

Hence, the selected common list $l$ also appears in the $i$-th argument's term $s_{i}$ of $\delta$.

Theorem 6.6 claims that, if a given ground atom satisfies the relation on common lists, then the proposed hypothesis by the algorithm $\operatorname{PROPOSE}$ also satisfies it.

### 6.5 Examples

In this section, we discuss the several examples for the algorithm PROPOSE.

Example 6.5 Let $\alpha$ be a ground atom $p([a, b],[c, d],[a, b, c, d])$. The list $[c, d]$ is both a common list in $\alpha$ and the second argument's term of $\alpha$. By the construction of $L, \beta=$ $p\left([a, b], V_{2},\left[a, b \mid V_{2}\right]\right)$ is a safe list generalization of $\alpha$, and $\gamma=p\left([X, Y], V_{2},\left[X, Y \mid V_{2}\right]\right)$ is the greatest constant generalization of $\beta$. The first argument's term of $\gamma$ is a list which begins with $X$, the second argument's term is a variable $V_{2}$, and the third argument's term is also a list which begins with $X$. By the for-loop in PROPOSE, we obtain a head $p\left(\left[X \mid X_{1}\right], X_{2},\left[X \mid X_{3}\right]\right)$ and a body $p\left(X_{1}, X_{2}, X_{3}\right)$. Hence, PROPOSE generates a rule

$$
p\left(\left[X \mid X_{1}\right], X_{2},\left[X \mid X_{3}\right]\right) \leftarrow p\left(X_{1}, X_{2}, X_{3}\right)
$$

and proposes a hypothesis $p([b],[c, d],[b, c, d])$. Note that the predicate $p$ means the append in Example 6.1.

Since $L$ includes $\alpha$, then $\beta=\alpha$, and $\gamma=p([X, Y],[Z, W],[X, Y, Z, W])$. The first argument's term of $\gamma$ is a list which begins with $X$, the second argument's term is a list which begins with $Z$, and the third argument's term is also a list which begins with X. By the for-loop in PROPOSE, we obtain a head $p\left(\left[X \mid X_{1}\right],\left[Z \mid X_{2}\right],\left[X \mid X_{3}\right]\right)$ and a body $p\left(X_{1}, X_{2}, X_{3}\right)$. Hence, PROPOSE generates a rule

$$
p\left(\left[X \mid X_{1}\right],\left[Z \mid X_{2}\right],\left[X \mid X_{3}\right]\right) \leftarrow p\left(X_{1}, X_{2}, X_{3}\right)
$$

and proposes a hypothesis $p([b],[d],[b, c, d])$.
Furthermore, each of the rules and hypotheses by PROPOSE respectively satisfies the following syllogisms:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \frac{p([a, b],[c, d],[a, b, c, d])}{p\left(\left[X \mid X_{1}\right], X_{2},\left[X \mid X_{3}\right]\right) \leftarrow p\left(X_{1}, X_{2}, X_{3}\right)} \quad p([b],[c, d],[b, c, d]) \\
& \frac{p([a, b],[c, d],[a, b, c, d])}{p\left(\left[X \mid X_{1}\right],\left[Z \mid X_{2}\right],\left[X \mid X_{3}\right]\right) \leftarrow p\left(X_{1}, X_{2}, X_{3}\right)} \quad p([b],[d],[b, c, d])
\end{aligned}
$$

Example 6.6 Let $\alpha$ be a ground atom $p(a,[a, b])$. Since there exist no common lists in $\alpha$, then $\beta=p(a,[a, b])$, and $\gamma=p(X,[X, Y])$. The first argument's term of $\gamma$ is a variable $X$, and the second argument's term is a list which begins with $X$. By the for-loop in PROPOSE, we obtain a head $p\left(X_{1},\left[X \mid X_{2}\right]\right)$ and a body $p\left(X_{1}, X_{2}\right)$. Hence, PROPOSE generates a rule

$$
p\left(X_{1},\left[X \mid X_{2}\right]\right) \leftarrow p\left(X_{1}, X_{2}\right),
$$

and proposes a hypothesis $p(a,[b])$. Note that the predicate $p$ means the member in Example 6.1.

Let $\alpha$ be a ground atom $p([a],[a, b])$. Since there exist no common lists in $\alpha$, $\beta=p([a],[a, b])$ and $\gamma=p([X],[X, Y])$. The first argument's term of $\gamma$ is a list which begins with $X$, and the second argument's term is also a list which begins with $X$. By the for-loop in PROPOSE, we obtain a head $p\left(\left[X \mid X_{1}\right],\left[X \mid X_{2}\right]\right)$ and a body $p\left(X_{1}, X_{2}\right)$. Hence, PROPOSE generates a rule

$$
p\left(\left[X \mid X_{1}\right],\left[X \mid X_{2}\right]\right) \leftarrow p\left(X_{1}, X_{2}\right)
$$

and proposes a hypothesis $p([],[b])$. Note that the predicate $p$ means the prefix in Example 6.1.

Let $\alpha$ be a ground atom $p([b],[a, b])$. The list $[b]$ is both a common list in $\alpha$ and the first argument's term of $\alpha$. Then, $\beta=p\left(V_{1},\left[a \mid V_{1}\right]\right)$ and $\gamma=p\left(V_{1},\left[X \mid V_{1}\right]\right)$. The first argument's term of $\gamma$ is a variable $V_{1}$, and the second argument's term is a list which begins with $X$. By the for-loop in PROPOSE, we obtain a head $p\left(X_{1},\left[X \mid X_{2}\right]\right)$ and a body $p\left(X_{1}, X_{2}\right)$. Hence, PROPOSE generates a rule

$$
p\left(X_{1},\left[X \mid X_{2}\right]\right) \leftarrow p\left(X_{1}, X_{2}\right),
$$

and proposes a hypothesis $p([b],[b])$. Note that the predicate $p$ means the suffix in Example 6.1. On the other hand, since $L$ includes $\alpha=p([b],[a, b])$, then $\beta=\alpha$, and $\gamma=p([X],[Y, X])$. The first argument's term of $\gamma$ is a list which begins with $X$, and the second argument's term is a list which begins with $Y$. By the for-loop in PROPOSE, we obtain a head $p\left(\left[X \mid X_{1}\right],\left[Y \mid X_{2}\right]\right)$ and a body $p\left(X_{1}, X_{2}\right)$. Hence, PROPOSE generates a rule

$$
p\left(\left[X \mid X_{1}\right],\left[Y \mid X_{2}\right]\right) \leftarrow p\left(X_{1}, X_{2}\right)
$$

and proposes a hypothesis $p([],[b])$. Note that the predicate $p$ means the defining lists, that is, all arguments' terms are lists.

If $\alpha=p([a, b],[c, d],[a, b, c, d])$, then PROPOSE generates a rule

$$
p\left(\left[X \mid X_{1}\right], X_{2},\left[X \mid X_{3}\right]\right) \leftarrow p\left(X_{1}, X_{2}, X_{3}\right),
$$

and proposes a hypothesis $p([b],[c, d],[b, c, d])$. If $\alpha=p([a, b],[a, b, c, d],[c, d])$, then PROPOSE also generates a rule

$$
p\left(\left[X \mid X_{1}\right],\left[X \mid X_{2}\right], X_{3}\right) \leftarrow p\left(X_{1}, X_{2}, X_{3}\right)
$$

and proposes a hypothesis $p([b],[b, c, d],[c, d])$. Hence, the algorithm PROPOSE is independent of the order of arguments.

Furthermore, by the construction of member and suffix in Example 6.6, the algorithm PROPOSE is also independent of the types of argument. In other words, PROPOSE needs no types of arguments.

### 6.6 Prolog Implementation

We can realize the algorithm PROPOSE in a Prolog program as in Figure 6.2. The predicate propose returns a generated rule as the third argument. It also returns a hypothesis proposed by the generated rule as the second argument. (Full Prolog version will be described in Appendix of this thesis.)

The predicate propose in Figure 6.2 returns a proposed hypothesis as its second argument and a generated rule as its third argument for a surprising fact as its first argument. The predicate while_loop means the while-loop in the algorithm PROPOSE. The remainder which follows the predicate while_loop in the predicate propose means the construction of base step in the algorithm PROPOSE. The predicate list_gen and const_gen mean list and constant generalizations, respectively.

For the following five surprising facts

$$
\begin{gathered}
p([a, b],[c, d],[a, b, c, d]), p(a,[a, b]), p([a],[a, b]), \\
p([b],[a, b]), p([a, b, c],[b, c],[a, b, c]),
\end{gathered}
$$

```
propose(Fact,Atoms,(NewHead:-NewBody)) :-
    !,
    while_loop(Fact,(NewHead:-TmpNewBody)),
    (NewHead == TmpNewBody ->
        NewBody = true,
        const_gen(Fact,TmpHead1),
        list_gen_main(TmpHead1,TmpHead2),
        replace_term(TmpHead2,list, _,NewHead),!;
        NewBody = TmpNewBody,
        assert((NewHead:-NewBody)),
        rs_abd(Fact,Atoms),
        retract((NewHead:-NewBody))).
while_loop(X,(NewHead:-NewBody)) :-
    list_gen(X,List),
    member_of(W,List),
    common_list_var(W,NW),
    const_gen(NW,Head),
    create(Head, Body),
    create2(Head,Body,NewHead,NewBody).
```

Figure 6.2: Program propose
the results of propose are as follows:

```
: ?- propose(p([a,b],[c,d],[a,b,c,d]),X,Y).
X = p([b],[d],[b,c,d]),
Y = p([_2046|_2602],[_1378|_2600],[_2046|_2598]):-p(_2602,_2600,_2598) ;
X = p([b],[c,d],[b,c,d]),
Y = p([_1578|_2070],_2058,[_1578|_2066]):-p(_2070,_2058,_2066) ;
no
```

```
: ?- propose(p(a,[a,b]),X,Y).
X = p(a,[b]),
Y = p(_1334,[_972|_1340]):-p(_1334,_1340) ;
no
```

```
: ?- propose(p([a],[a,b]),X,Y).
X = p([],[b]),
Y = p([_1016|_1418],[_1016|_1416]):-p(_1418,_1416) ;
no
```

: ?- propose(p([b],[a,b]),X,Y).
$X=p([],[b])$,
$Y=p\left(\left[\_1158 \mid \_1560\right],\left[\_904 \mid \_1558\right]\right):-p\left(\_1560, \_1558\right) ;$
$X=p([b],[b])$,
$\mathrm{Y}=\mathrm{p}\left(\_1220,\left[\_872 \mid \_1226\right]\right):-\mathrm{p}\left(\_1220, \_1226\right) ;$
no

```
: ?- propose(p([a,b,c],[b,c],[a,b,c]),X,Y).
X = p([b,c],[c],[b,c]),
Y = p([_2066|_2622],[_1738|_2620],[_2066|_2618]):-p(_2622,_2620,_2618);
X = p([b,c],[b,c],[b,c]),
Y = p([_1638।_2102],_2090,[_1638|_2098]):-p(_2102,_2090,_2098) ;
X = p([a,b,c],[c],[a,b,c]),
Y = p(_2360,[_1670|_2368],_2356):-p(_2360,_2368,_2356);
no
```

Note that, in the last example, two atoms $\beta_{1}=p\left(\left[a \mid V_{2}\right], V_{2},\left[a \mid V_{2}\right]\right)$ and $\beta_{2}=p\left(V_{1},[b, c], V_{1}\right)$ are the safe list generalizations of $p([a, b, c],[b, c],[a, b, c])$ obtaining by the algorithm PROPOSE. Hence, for a ground atom $p([a, b, c],[b, c],[a, b, c])$, there are three hypotheses and rules. The first rule obtained by $P R O P O S E$ means that all arguments' terms are lists, and the first and the third arguments' terms begin with the same constant symbols. The second rule means that the second argument's term is the sublist of the first and the third arguments' terms. The third rule means that the first argument's term is equal to the third argument.

On the other hand, for a ground atom $p([a, b, c],[d, e],[a, b, c])$, the predicate propose returns the following two rules and hypotheses:

```
: ?- propose(p([a,b,c],[d,e],[a,b,c]),X,Y).
x = p([b,c],[e],[b,c]),
Y = p([_2510|_3066],[_1490I_3064],[_2510।_3062]):-p(_3066,_3064,_3062) ;
X = p([a,b,c],[e],[a,b,c]),
Y = p(_2056,[_1366|_2064],_2052):-p(_2056,_2064,_2052);
no
```

From this surprising fact, the rule whose second argument's term is the sublist of the first and the third arguments' terms is not generated by PROPOSE.

By the algorithm $P R O P O S E$, we can obtain a rule. If an intended model $M$ is given, and an oracle to determine whether or not $M^{\prime} \subseteq M$ is also given, then we can design the algorithm as Figure 6.3.

Consider Example 6.5. Let $p([a, b],[c, d],[a, b, c, d])$ be a surprising fact. we obtain the following two rules $R_{i}$ and hypotheses $H_{i}$ by $\operatorname{PROPOSE}$ :

$$
\left\{\begin{array}{l}
R_{1}: p\left(\left[X \mid X_{1}\right], X_{2},\left[X \mid X_{3}\right]\right) \leftarrow p\left(X_{1}, X_{2}, X_{3}\right) \\
H_{1}: p([b],[c, d],[b, c, d])
\end{array}\right\}
$$

```
input \(\alpha=p\left(t_{1}, \cdots, t_{n}\right)\) : a fact, i.e., a ground atom
    \(M\) : the least Herbrand model of \(P\)
output \(P^{\prime}\) : a 2 -reducing program
select \(\alpha \in M\);
PROPOSE ( \(\alpha\), rule, hyp);
\(M^{\prime}:=\) the least Herbrand model of \(\{\) rule, hyp \(\} ;\)
if \(M^{\prime} \subseteq M\) then \(\quad / *\) oracle */
    output \(P^{\prime}:=\{\) rule, hyp \(\}\)
halt
```

Figure 6.3: PROPOSE and oracle

$$
\left\{\begin{array}{l}
R_{2}: p\left(\left[X \mid X_{1}\right],\left[Z \mid X_{2}\right],\left[X \mid X_{3}\right]\right) \leftarrow p\left(X_{1}, X_{2}, X_{3}\right) \\
H_{2}: p([b],[d],[b, c, d])
\end{array}\right\} .
$$

Suppose that an intended model is given as the least Herbrand model $M_{1}$ of the following program append:

$$
\left\{\begin{array}{l}
\operatorname{append}([], X, X) \\
\operatorname{append}([W \mid X], Y,[W \mid Z]) \leftarrow \operatorname{append}(X, Y, Z)
\end{array}\right\} .
$$

Then, the least Herbrand model of $\left\{R_{1}, H_{1}\right\}$ is a subset of $M_{1}$, while one of $\left\{R_{2}, H_{2}\right\}$ is not a subset of $M_{1}$. Hence, the program $\left\{R_{1}, H_{1}\right\}$ is obtained by the algorithm in Figure 6.3. The program append means that the third argument's list is the result of concatenating the first and the second arguments' lists.

On the other hand, suppose that an intended model is given as the least Herbrand model $M_{2}$ of the following program list:

$$
\left\{\begin{array}{l}
\operatorname{list}([],[],[]) \\
\operatorname{list}\left(\left[W_{1} \mid X\right],\left[W_{2} \mid Y\right],\left[W_{3} \mid Z\right]\right) \leftarrow \operatorname{list}(X, Y, Z)
\end{array}\right\} .
$$

Then, both the least Herbrand models of $\left\{R_{1}, H_{1}\right\}$ and of $\left\{R_{2}, H_{2}\right\}$ are subsets of $M_{2}$. Hence, the programs $\left\{R_{1}, H_{1}\right\}$ and $\left\{R_{2}, H_{2}\right\}$ are obtained by the algorithm in Figure 6.3. The program list means that all arguments' terms are lists.

## Chapter 7

## Conclusion

"The case has been an interesting one," remarked Holmes, when our visitors had left, "because it serves to show very clearly how simple the explanation may be of an affair which at first sight seems to be almost inexplicable." - 'The Adventure of the Noble Bachelor' "The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes"

This thesis has discussed abduction for logic programming.
In Chapter 3, we have classified abduction in computer science into five types: ruleselecting abduction, rule-finding abduction, rule-generating abduction, theory-selecting abduction, and theory-generating abduction. This classification is based on the interpretation of syllogism and the definition of hypothesis. Furthermore, we have examined various researches on abduction in computer science so far developed, and shown that most of them can be placed in our classification.

In Chapter 4, we have investigated rule-selecting abduction for logic programming. From the philosophical viewpoint, abduction is the first stage of scientific inquiry. Then, we should consider the process of abduction which terminates. In order to characterize the termination, we have introduced the concept of head-reducing programs. We have shown that all the derivations for a head-reducing program and a surprising fact are finite. Hence, all the processes of rule-selecting abduction for a head-reducing program are finite.

Furthermore, we have compared rule-selecting abduction with default logic. We have formulated a surprising fact and a hypothesis for default logic, and shown that,
if there exists a hypothesis which explains a surprising fact, then there also exists an extension of a given default theory, which includes the surprising fact. This extension is corresponding to the least Herbrand model of the definite program obtaining from the default theory. This result is an extension of Poole's theory [Poo88].

Since the class of head-reducing programs is not so large, we have extended the concept of head-reducingness to that of breadth-first head-reducing programs, and the rule-selecting abduction to the breadth-first rule-selecting abduction. We have shown that there exists a finite derivation for a breadth-first head-reducing program and a surprising fact. Hence, the process of breadth-first rule-selecting abduction for a breadth-first head-reducing program is finite.

Finally, rule-selecting abduction for logic programming and for default logic, and breadth-first rule-selecting abduction have been implemented by Prolog programs.

In Chapter 5, we have investigated rule-finding abduction for logic programming. We have introduced two concepts of loop-pair and loop-elimination. The loop-pair syntactically determines whether or not there exists an infinite process of rule-finding abduction. On the other hand, the loop-elimination is a transformation of programs. By using loop-elimination, we can choose the programs for which the process of rulefinding abduction terminates. We have shown that if a loop-pair appears in a derivation, then the derivation becomes infinite. We have also shown that, for given two programs, if we transform one program by loop-elimination, then all the derivations for union of the transformed program and the rest are finite.

Furthermore, we have formulated rule-finding abduction with analogy, which is an extension of rule-finding abduction. We have introduced the concept of deducible hypotheses, which are hypotheses for rule-finding abduction and are guaranteed correct in the sense of analogical reasoning. In this formulation, in order to obtain an analogy while constructing a deducible hypothesis, we have adopted partially isomorphic generalizations. By using these concepts, we have designed an algorithm of rule-finding abduction with analogy, and implemented it by a Prolog program.

In Chapter 6, we have investigated rule-generating abduction for logic program-
ming. We have introduced weakly 2 -reducing programs for rule-generating abduction. We have also discussed a safe generalization, which is a generalization of one atom whose common terms are replaced by common variables. We have given some properties of safe generalizations.

In rule-generating abduction for weakly 2 -reducing programs, we have shown that the number of hypotheses increases in exponential order with respect to the length of a surprising fact. On the other hand, by using safe generalizations, we have designed an algorithm $\operatorname{PROPOSE}$ to construct weakly 2-reducing rules. The number of hypotheses by PROPOSE is at most the length of a surprising fact. We have shown that the algorithm PROPOSE generates rules and proposes hypotheses in polynomial time with respect to the length of a surprising fact. Also we have shown that the selected common list in some argument of a surprising fact appears in the same argument of the hypothesis proposed by $P R O P O S E$.

We have left several problems as future works.
In this thesis, a surprising fact has been defined by a ground atom $\alpha$ such that $P \nvdash \alpha$ for a background theory $P$. However, the definition of a surprising fact may possibly be extended by introducing probability, cost [HSME88, Sti91], modality [Lev89, SL90], or causal weight [BATJ91]. It is a future work to investigate what a surprising fact is in these new settings.

In this thesis, we have dealt with rule-based abduction, but not theory-based abduction. Many systems which are related to theory-based abduction have already designed and realized. For example, there are Shapiro's model inference system [Sha81], inductive logic programming [Mug92, MB88, Lin89, LU89], Poole's Theorist [Poo88], and hypothesis-based reasoning [Kun87]. Concerning these systems, we have left the problems to find the abduction, to characterize the class of objects, and to investigate the theoretical properties such as termination and computational complexity.

We have discussed abduction for definite programs. On the other hand, ruleselecting abduction is related to nonmonotonic logic. When we discuss the relationship between nonmonotonic logic and logic programming, we can also deal with such ex-
tensions of definite programs as normal program, general program, and disjunctive program [Dun91, EK89, KM90, KKT92, Llo87]. Abductive logic programming is a kind of rule-selecting abduction for such programs, while the surprising fact in this setting is not surprising in our sense. Hence, we need to extend the class of programs for abduction and investigate the property of their abduction in our sense.

This thesis has also discussed rule-finding abduction and analogical reasoning in the same framework. This is a certain step toward acquiring the knowledge from abductive and analogical viewpoints, although we have just shown a few theoretical results. We need to formulate so called analogy by abduction other than abduction with analogy. We also need to solve the problem of incorporating rule-finding abduction with rule-generating abduction by using analogy.

Abduction is an inference to propose hypotheses which should be used before deduction and induction are applied. We have left the problem to combine abduction, in particular rule-generating abduction, and inductive logic programming. Ling [Lin89, LU89] has introduced the constructive inductive logic programming. There may exist a relationship between such works and ours.

Furthermore, as to the inductive logic programming, we have left the problem of predicate invention. In general, the number of rules and hypotheses proposed in predicate invention becomes exponentially large. Hence, we need to introduce some heuristics such as on the number of local variables, invented predicate symbols and rules, a distinction between necessary and useful intermediate terms, and so on.

All researches on abduction in computer science are based on computational logic, and the abduction beyond the scope of computational logic such as abduction for formal language or numerical data has not yet been studied. On the other hand, abduction begins with a surprising fact. In machine learning, a surprising fact is considered as a good example. Hence, abduction is regarded as learning from good examples. We need to study the abduction for various frameworks together with machine learning. This should be one of the most important future works.

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## Chapter 8

## Appendix: Prolog Implementation

> "You really are an automaton - a calculating machine," I cried.
> - "The Sign of Four"

In this appendix, we express the three Prolog programs, loop-elimination, rule-finding abduction with analogy, and PROPOSE. All of them have been realized by K-Prolog Compiler version 3.10.

### 8.1 Loop-Elimination

We describe our realization of the loop-elimination for rule-finding abduction as the following Prolog programs.

```
%%%%% loop-elimination of Fact
%%%%% le_main(Fact,NewFact) :-
%%%%% NewFact is loop-elimination of Fact.
%%%%%% le(PFact,Fact,NewFact) :-
%%%% PFact is a priori fact, Fact is a clause to eliminate loop,
%%%%% as a result. Then, we can obtain NewFact as loop-elimination.
le_main(fact(World,clause(Head,Bodies)),fact(World,clause(Head,NewBody))) :-
    setof(Y,le(fact(World,clause(Head,Bodies)),Y),List),
    isort(List,List2),
    List2 = [MaxFact|List3],
    MaxFact = fact(World,clause(Head,NewBody)).
le(fact(World, clause(Head,Bodies)),fact(World,clause(Head,NewBody))) :-
    fact(PW,clause(PH,PB)),
    PW \= World,
    le(Bodies,PH,NewBody).
Ie(SingleBody,PH,NewBody) :-
```

```
    PH = SingleBody ->
    (fact(PW, clause(PH,PB)),
    functor(PH,F1,Arg),
    functor(SingleBody,F2,Arg),
        (F1 = F2 ->
        Arg1 is Arg+1,
        functor(TrueBody,true, Arg1),
        arg(1,TrueBody,F2),
        (between(2,N,Arg1),
            M is N-1,
            arg(M,SingleBody,Var),
            arg(N,TrueBody,Var)),
        replace_term(SingleBody,SingleBody,TrueBody,NewBody) ;
        fail),!).
le((Body1,Body2), PH, (NewBody1,NewBody2)) :-
    !,
    (fact(PW,clause(PH,_)),le(Body1, PH,NewBody1)),
    (fact(PW, clause(PH2,_)),le(Body2,PH2,NewBody2)).
le(Body,PH,Body) :- fact(PW, clause(PH,PB)),!.
isort([],[]).
isort([E|X],Z) :- isort(X,Y),insert(E,Y,Z).
insert(E,[],[E]).
insert(E,[X|Y],[X|Z]) :- E @< X,insert(E,Y,Z).
insert(E,[X|Y],[E,X|Y]) :- E @>= X.
between(Low, Low,Up).
between(Low,I,Up) :- between(Low,Old,Up),I is 0ld+1,((I > Up,!,fail);true).
```


### 8.2 Rule-Finding Abduction with Analogy

The rule-finding abduction with analogy in Section 5.6 is realized as the following Prolog program. In this program, the least generalization 1g refers to Flach's Prolog text [Fla94], and the partially isomorphic generalizations pig_rule and pig Hirowatari and Arikawa [HiA94b].

```
%%%%%%%%%% Rule-Finding Abduction with Analogy %%%%%%%%%
```

$\% \% \% \% \% \% \% \% \% \quad$ using Partially Isomorphic Generalization \%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%

```
ab_ana(TG,TG,Pair,WorldTarget) :-
    functor(TG,Pred,Arity),functor(BG,Pred,Arity),
    world(WorldBase,WorldTarget),
    fact(WorldBase,(BG:-true)),
    analogy ((TG:-true), (BG:-true),Pair).
```

```
ab_ana(TG,TGs,Pair,WorldTarget) :-
    functor(TG,Pred,Arity),functor(BG,Pred,Arity),
    provable(TG,BG,TGs,BGs,WorldTarget),
    not TG==TGs,
    analogy((TG:-TGs),(BG:-BGs),Pair).
provable(TG,BG,TL,BL,WorldTarget) :-
    rule(TG,BG,TGs,BGs,WorldTarget),
    provable(TGs,BGs,TL,BL,WorldTarget).
provable((TG,TGs),(BG,BGs),(TL,TLs),(BL,BLs),WorldTarget) :-
    provable(TG,BG,TL, BL, WorldTarget),
    provable(TGs,BGs,TLs,BLs,WorldTarget).
provable(TG,BG,TG,BG,WorldTarget) :-
    world(WorldBase,WorldTarget),fact(WorldBase,(BG:-true)),!.
rule(TG,BG,TGs,BGs,WorldTarget) :-
    world(WorldBase,WorldTarget),
    fact(WorldBase,(BG:-BGs)),
    not BGs=true,
    pig_rule((BG:-BGs),(PG:-PGs)),
    copy((PG:-PGs),(TG:-TGs)).
copy(Old,New) :-
    (retract('$maker'(_)),fail;
        assert('$maker'(Old)),retract('$maker'(New))),!.
analogy((TG:-true),(BG:-true),Pairing) :-
    pig(BG,GG), analogy(TG,GG,BG, Pairing),!.
analogy((TG:-TL),(BG:-BL),Pairing) :-
    pig_rule((BG:-BL), (GG:-GL)),
    analogy((TG:-TL),(GG:-GL),(BG:-BL),Pairing).
analogy((TL1,TL2),(GL1,GL2),(BL1,BL2),Pairing) :-
    analogy(TL1,GL1,BL1,Pairing1),
    analogy(TL2,GL2,BL2,Pairing2),!,
    append(Pairing1,Pairing2,Pairing).
analogy(TA,GA,BA,P) :-
    lg(TA,GA,LGG,[],S1, [],S2),
    lg(BA,GA,LGG,[],S3,[],S4),
    pairing1(P,S1,S2,S3,S4).
pairing1([],[],[],[],[]).
pairing1([T1--T2|X],[V<-T2|S1],[V<-W|S2],[V<-T1|S3],[V<-W|S4]) :-
    pairing1(X,S1,S2,S3,S4).
```

$\% \% \% \% \% \% \% \%$ least generalization by Flach \%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%

```
lg(Term1,Term2,Term1,S1,S1,S2,S2) :-
    Term1 == Term2,!.
lg(Term1,Term2,V,S1,S1,S2,S2) :-
    subs_lookup(S1,S2,Term1,Term2,V),!.
lg(Term1,Term2,Term,S10,S1,S20,S2) :-
    nonvar(Term1), nonvar(Term2),
    functor(Term1,F,N),functor(Term2,F,N),!,
    functor(Term,F,N),
    lg_args(N,Term1,Term2,Term,S10,S1,S20,S2).
lg(Term1,Term2,V,S10,[V<-Term1|S10],S20, [V<-Term2|S20]).
lg_args(0,Term1,Term2,Term,S1,S1,S2,S2).
lg_args(N,Term1,Term2,Term,S10,S1,S20,S2) :-
    N>0,N1 is N-1,
    arg(N,Term1,Arg1),
    arg(N,Term2,Arg2),
    arg(N,Term,Arg),
    lg(Arg1,Arg2,Arg,S10,S11, S20,S21),
    lg_args(N1,Term1,Term2,Term,S11,S1,S21,S2).
subs_lookup([V<-T1|Subs1],[V<-T2|Subs2],Term1,Term2,V) :-
    T1 == Term1,T2 == Term2,!.
subs_lookup([S1|Subs1],[S2|Subs2],Term1,Term2,V) :-
    subs_lookup(Subs1,Subs2,Term1,Term2,V).
%%%%%%%%% Partially Isomorphic Generalization %%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%% by Hirowatari and Arikawa %%%%%%%%%%
pig(Atom1,Atom) :-
    nonvar(Atom1), functor(Atom1, F,N),N>0,!,
    functor(Atom, F,N),pig(N,Atom1,Atom,0).
pig(0,_,_,_) :-!.
pig(N,Atom1,Atom,Cnt1) :-
    Cnt1=0,
    arg(N,Atom1,Arg1),
    search(Arg1,Arg,Atom1,Cnt1,Cnt),
    (nonvar(Arg) -> pig_A(N,Arg,Atom1,Atom,Cnt) ;
        pig_B(N,Arg1,Atom1,Atom)),!.
pig(N,Atom1,Atom,Cnt1) :-
    arg(N,Atom1,Arg1),
    search1(Arg1,Arg2,Atom1,Cnt1,Cnt2),
    search(Arg2,Arg,Atom1,Cnt1,Cnt),
    (nonvar(Arg) -> pig_A(N,Arg,Atom1,Atom,Cnt) ;
            pig_B(N,Arg1,Atom1,Atom)),!.
pig_A(N,Arg,Atom1,Atom,Cnt) :-
    replace_term(Atom1,Arg,Var,Atom2),pig(N,Atom2,Atom, Cnt).
pig_B(N,Arg,Atom1,Atom) :-
M is N-1, arg(N,Atom,Arg), pig(M,Atom1,Atom,0).
```

```
search1(Term1,Term,Atom,Cnt1,Cnt) :- var(Term1),!.
search1(Term1,Term,Atom,Cnt1,Cnt) :-
functor(Term1,F,N), check1(N,Term1), Cnt is Cnt1-1,!.
search1(Term1,Term,Atom,Cnt1,Cnt) :-
functor(Term1, F,N), search2(N,Term1,Term,Atom, Cnt1, Cnt).
search2(N,Term1,Term,Atom,Cnt1,Cnt) :-
    arg(N,Term1,Arg1),
    search1(Arg1,Term,Atom, Cnt1, Cnt2),
    (Cnt2=0,Term is Arg1 ;
            M is N-1, search2(M,Term1,Term,Atom, Cnt2,Cnt)).
search(Term1,Term,Atom, Cnt1,Cnt) :-
    (check(Term1,Term,Atom,Cnt1,Cnt) ;
            search_A(Term1,Term,Atom, Cnt1, Cnt)).
search_A(Term1,Term,Atom,Cnt,Cnt) :- var(Term1),!.
search_A(Term1,Term,Atom,Cnt1,Cnt) :-
    functor(Term1,F,N), check1(N,Term1), Cnt is Cnt1+1,!.
search_A(Term1,Term,Atom,Cnt1,Cnt) :-
    functor(Term1,F,N), search_B(N,Term1,Term,Atom, Cnt1, Cnt).
search_B(0,_,_,_,Cnt,Cnt) :- !.
search_B(N,Term1,Term,Atom,Cnt1,Cnt) :-
    arg(N,Term1,Arg1), search(Arg1,Term,Atom, Cnt1, Cnt2),
    (nonvar(Term) ;
        M is N-1, search_B(M,Term1,Term,Atom,Cnt2, Cnt)).
check(Term,Term,Atom,Cnt,Cnt) :- atomic(Term),!.
check(Term,Term,Atom, Cnt,Cnt) :-
    nonvar(Term), functor(Term, F,N),
    check2(N,Term, [],List1),
    replace_term(Atom,Term,Var,Atom1),
    var_set(Atom1,List2),
    intersection(List1,List2,List3),List3=[].
check1(0,_) :- !.
check1(N,Term) :- arg(N,Term,Arg),var(Arg),!,M is N-1, check1(M,Term).
check2(0,_,List,List) :-!.
check2(N,Term,List1,List) :-
    arg(N,Term,Arg),var(Arg),!,
union(Arg,List1,List2),
    M is N-1, check2(M,Term,List2,List).
var_set(Atom,List) :- functor(Atom,F,N),var_set(N,Atom,[],List).
var_set(0, _,List,List) :- !.
var_set(N,Atom,List1,List) :-
        arg(N,Atom,Arg),
```

```
    var_check(Arg,List1,List2),
    M is N-1,
    var_set(M,Atom,List2,List).
var_check(Term,List,List) :- atomic(Term),!.
var_check(Term,List1,List) :- var(Term),!,union(Term,List1,List).
var_check(Term,List1,List) :-
    functor(Term,F,N),
    arg(N,Term,Arg),
    var_check(Arg,List1,List2),
    M is N-1,
    var_set(M,Term,List2,List).
intersection([],X,[]).
intersection([X|R],Y,[X|Z]) :- member(X,Y),!,intersection(R,Y,Z).
intersection([X|R],Y,Z) :- intersection(R,Y,Z).
union(X,Y,Y) :- member(X,Y),!.
union(X,Y,[X|Z]) :- Y=Z.
member(X,[Y|_]) :- X==Y,!.
member(X,[_|Y]) :- member(X,Y).
%%%%%%%%%%% Partially Isomorphic Generalization of Rule %%%%%%%%%%%
```

```
pig_rule(Rule,PigRule) :-
```

pig_rule(Rule,PigRule) :-
functor(Rule,:-,2),
functor(Rule,:-,2),
arg(1,Rule,Head),
arg(1,Rule,Head),
arg(2,Rule,Body),!,
arg(2,Rule,Body),!,
pig_atoms((Head,Body),(PigHead,PigBody)),!,
pig_atoms((Head,Body),(PigHead,PigBody)),!,
functor(PigRule,:-,2),
functor(PigRule,:-,2),
arg(1,PigRule,PigHead),
arg(1,PigRule,PigHead),
arg(2,PigRule,PigBody).
arg(2,PigRule,PigBody).
pig_atoms(Atoms,PigAtoms) :-
pig_atoms(Atoms,PigAtoms) :-
list(Atoms,Pred,Num,List),
list(Atoms,Pred,Num,List),
append([newatom],List,Lists),
append([newatom],List,Lists),
NewAtom =.. Lists,
NewAtom =.. Lists,
pig(NewAtom,PigNewAtom),!,
pig(NewAtom,PigNewAtom),!,
PigNewAtom =.. NewLists,
PigNewAtom =.. NewLists,
append([newatom],NewList,NewLists),
append([newatom],NewList,NewLists),
list(PigAtoms,Pred,Num,NewList).
list(PigAtoms,Pred,Num,NewList).
list((Atom,Atoms),[Pred1|Pred2],[Num1|Num2],List) :-
list((Atom,Atoms),[Pred1|Pred2],[Num1|Num2],List) :-
list(Atom, Pred1,Num1,List1),
list(Atom, Pred1,Num1,List1),
list(Atoms, Pred2,Num2,List2),
list(Atoms, Pred2,Num2,List2),
append(List1,List2,List).
append(List1,List2,List).
list(Atom,F,N,List) :-
list(Atom,F,N,List) :-
functor(Atom,F,N),
functor(Atom,F,N),
Atom =.. List1,
Atom =.. List1,
append([F],List,List1).

```
    append([F],List,List1).
```

append ([],A,A) :- !.
append $([X \mid A], B,[X \mid C])$ :- append $(A, B, C)$.

### 8.3 PROPOSE

We also describe our realization of the algorithm PROPOSE in Section 6.4 as the following Prolog program.
\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\% Algorithm PROPOSE \%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%

```
propose(Fact,Atoms,(NewHead:-NewBody)) :-
    !,
    while_loop(Fact,(NewHead:-TmpNewBody)),
    (NewHead == TmpNewBody ->
                NewBody = true,
                const_gen(Fact,TmpHead1),
                list_gen_main(TmpHead1,TmpHead2),
                replace_term(TmpHead2,list,_,NewHead),!;
                NewBody = TmpNewBody,
                assert((NewHead:-NewBody)),
                rs_abd(Fact,Atoms),
                retract((NewHead:-NewBody))).
while_loop(X,(NewHead:-NewBody)) :-
    list_gen(X,List),
    member_of(W,List),
    common_list_var(W,NW),
    const_gen(NW, Head),
    create(Head, Body),
    create2(Head, Body,NewHead,NewBody).
```

$\% \% \% \%$ rule-selecting abduction \%\%\%\%\%

```
rs_abd(Goal,Leaves) :- clause(Goal,Leaves). %%% one step hypothesis
```

\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%
\%\%\%\%\% construction of recursive program \%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%\%
\%\%\%\%\% create(Head,Body) :-
$\% \% \% \%$ construct pred(Head)-reducing clause clause(Head,Body)
$\% \% \% \%$ create a recursive part with reducing_rec/2
create(Head, Body) :-
functor(Head, Pred, Arg),
functor (Body, Pred, Arg),
reducing(Head, Body, Arg).
reducing(_,_,0) :- !.

```
reducing(Head,Body,Arg) :-
    arg(Arg,Head,Term1),
    (var(Term1) -> arg(Arg,Body,Term1) ;
        proper_subterm(Term1,Term2), arg(Arg,Body,Term2)),
    Arg1 is Arg-1,
    reducing(Head,Body,Arg1).
%%%%% proper_subterm(Term1,Term2)
%%%%% :- find all proper subterm Term2 of Term1
proper_subterm([X|Y],Y).
proper_subterm([],[]) :- !.
%%%%% create a recursive part with reducing_rec/2
create2(Head, Body,NewHead,NewBody) :-
    functor(Head, Pred,Arg),
    functor(Body,Pred,Arg),
    functor(NewHead, Pred,Arg),
    functor(NewBody,Pred,Arg),
    create2(Head, Body,NewHead,NewBody, Arg).
create2(Head, Body,NewHead,NewBody,0) :- !.
create2(Head,Body,NewHead,NewBody,Arg) :-
    arg(Arg,Head,TermHead),
    arg(Arg,Body,TermBody),
    replace_term(TermBody,TermBody,X,TermNewBody),
    replace_term(TermHead,TermBody,X,TermNewHead),
    arg(Arg,NewHead,TermNewHead),
    arg(Arg,NewBody,TermNewBody),
    Arg1 is Arg-1,
    create2(Head, Body,NewHead,NewBody, Arg1).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%% list_gen(Term1,GenTerm)
%%%%% common (sub)term -> one variable
list_gen(Formula,List) :-
    setof(GenForm,list_gen_main(Formula,GenForm),TmpList),
    set(TmpList,List).
list_gen_main(Formula,GenForm) :-
    functor(Formula,Pred,Arg),
    between(1, I,Arg),
    between(1, J, Arg),
    I \= J,
    arg(I,Formula,List1),
    arg(J,Formula,List2),
    (sublist(List1,List2),List1 \== [],
    replace_term(Formula,List1,list,GenForm)) ; GenForm=Formula ,!.
sublist(X,X) :- list(X).
sublist(X,[W|Y]) :- sublist(X,Y).
```

```
list([]).
list([X|Y]) :- list(Y).
set(X,Y) :- set(X,[],Y).
set([Element|TmpList],X,List) :-
    (NewElement = Element }->\mathrm{ > set(TmpList, [NewElement|X],List) ;
    set(TmpList,X,List)).
set ([],X,X).
member_of (X,[X|_]).
member_of(X,[Y|Z]) :- member_of(X,Z).
pop(X,[X|L],L).
push(X,L,[X|L]).
common_list_var(A,B) :-
    functor(A,F,N),
    functor(B,F,N),
    common_list_var(A,B,N).
common_list_var(A,B,O) :- !.
common_list_var(A,B,N) :-
    arg(N,A,Term1),
    replace_term(Term1,list,_,Term2),
    arg(N,B,Term2),
    M is N-1,
    common_list_var(A,B,M).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%% const_gen(Term1,Term2) :-
%%%%%% Term2 is a term which the constant symbols in Term1
%%%%% is replaced by variable, in particular, same constant
%%%%% symbol is replaced by same variable.
const_gen(Term1,Term2) :-
    clear,
    assert(constlist([])),
    assert(data(1)),
    gen(Term1,Term2),!.
gen(Term1,Term2) :- \+search_const(Term1) -> replace(Term1,Term2).
replace(Term1,Term2) :-
    constlist(List),
    length(List,N),
    replace (N,Term1,Term2).
replace([],[]) :- !.
replace(Term1,Term1) :- !.
replace(0,Term1,Term1) :- !.
replace(N,Term1,Term2) :-
```

```
    constlist(List),
    (N > 0 ->
        (pop(Const,List,NewList),
            retract(constlist(List)),
            replace_term(Term1,Const,Var,Term),
            assert(constlist(NewList)),
                M is N-1,
                replace(M,Term,Term2))).
```

search_const(Term) :-
functor(Term, F, Arg),
data(N),
(Arg >= N $\rightarrow$ search_const( $N$,Term)),
$M$ is $N+1$,
retract(data(N)),
assert (data(M)),
search_const(Term).
search_const( $N, T e r m$ ) :- (var(Term) ; Term=[]),!.
search_const ( $N$,Term) :-
functor (Term, F, M),
(between(1,L,M), arg(L, Term, Subterm), search_const(L, Subterm)).
search_const( $\mathbb{N}$, Term) :-
functor (Term, F, 0),
constlist(OldList),
( $\+$ member_cut(Term,OldList) $\rightarrow$ push(Term,01dList,NewList)),
retract(constlist(01dList)),
assert(constlist(NewList)).
between (Low, Low, Up).
between(Low, I, Up) :- between(Low,01d,Up),I is Old+1,( (I > Up,!,fail);true).
member_cut(X,[X|Y]) :- !.
member_cut(X,[Y|Z]) :- member_cut(X,Z),!.
clear :- retractall(data(_)), retractall(constlist(_)).
retractall(X) :- retract(X),fail,!.
retractall(_).

