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On the Pseudo-Imperative Construction and Its Extension

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0. Introduction

Sentences like (1) are examples of a construction examined in this paper, which we will henceforth call Pseudo-Imperative Construction (PIC).

- (1) a. Come closer and I'll give you five pounds.
b. Open the Guardian and you'll find three misprints on every page.
c. Miss this train and we'll never get there on time.
d. Like her and her friends will love you.
e. Come one step closer and I'll shoot.
f. Be quiet or I'll shoot you.

As these examples show, PIC is a conjunction or a disjunction of an imperative and a declarative clause. Our concern here is to demonstrate how the image-schematic analysis to the *and*-case made in Murao (1995) is extended to the *or*-case.

In the first section, we illustrate examples of the *and*-case in PIC

and categorize them into mainly two types: a prototypical case and a peripheral case. The prototypical cases include instances taking a positive interpretation according to Clark (1993). On the other hand, the peripheral cases which include instances taking a neutral interpretation are those having stative verbs or some nominal forms in their first conjuncts, and the like. Peripheral cases are considered to be an extensional case of the prototype. We would have one more kind of instances which take a negative interpretation according to Clark. We treat this as another kind of extensional case from the peripheral cases, though it is comparatively closer to the prototype. It should be mentioned that there are no such subtypes available in the *or*-case. Only positive interpretation is found there. Furthermore, comparing the *and*- and *or*-cases, we point out some syntactic and semantic properties between them.

In the second section, focusing on the *and*-case, we review Murao (1995) and make some revisions of the analysis given. Specifically, we present a frame structure where the schema of PIC given in Murao is activated, and give a more precise explanation to each subtype of the *and*-case in PIC.

In the final section, it is demonstrated that the frame structure presented in the preceding section is also applicable to the analysis of the *or*-case.

We conclude that all types of PIC are structured by the same image-schema and that their syntactic and semantic differences are induced by ways which show how the schema is reflected in the whole frame structure.

1 . Some Observations

Our purpose in this section is to classify several kinds of PIC into some distinct types comparing the *and*- and *or* -cases and to point out the similarities and differences between them.

1.1. Subtypes of the *and*-case

We classify the *and*-case into two main types in Murao (1995) : the prototypical case and the peripheral case. The prototypical case is defined as follows: it is a conjunction of a true imperative and a declarative clause like (2) :

- (2) a . Come closer and I'll give you five pounds. (=1a)
- b . Sit down and I'll make you some coffee.

These prototypes have two significant properties for their acceptability as will be shown in detail in Section 2 : one is the notion of *potentiality* which is gained by the whole sentence; the other is the *causal relation* between the two conjuncts. Since the first conjuncts are true imperatives, they have potentiality in themselves. Moreover the imperatives imply desirability or directiveness. The declaratives also have to indicate potentiality according to the imperatives. As for the second property, these have a causal relation in the sense that the first conjuncts are causes of the realization of the second conjuncts; in other words, the former is a condition of the realization of the latter.

This type of PIC is referred to as one which takes a positive interpretation according to Clark (1993). According to Clark, it is an interpretation

"where the speaker is taken actually to want the state of affairs described to be realised".

The peripheral case is illustrated in (3) :

- (3) a . Open the Guardian and you'll find three misprints on every page. (=1b)
- b . Miss this train and we'll never get there on time. (=1c)
- c . Like her and her friends will love you. (1d)
- d . One more beer and I'll leave.

In the case of (3a), though the first conjunct is undoubtedly an imperative from its syntactic and semantic characteristics, and it can be used independently for imperatives, it does not indicate any directive force, nor does it convey that anyone sees the state of affairs as desirable. In this case some conditional interpretation might only remain. Clark (1993) refers to this type of PIC as one which takes "a neutral interpretation where the speaker does not care whether the state of affairs described in the imperative is realised or not".

As for the case of (3b), there would be no desirability found in "Miss this train" and it would not be used independently for imperatives in normal contexts. Also its interpretation is similar to the case of conditionals. This would also take a neutral interpretation. (3c) and (3d) are cases where the first conjuncts are stative verbs or some nominal forms which cannot be used for imperatives in general. But, these are also said to have a conditional interpretation.

What we can claim now is that they have *neutral interpretation* and *causal relation* in common. In this sense, we treat all these examples

as peripheral cases of PIC in this paper, though Clark does not consider the examples in (3b)-(3d) to be PIC for the reason that their first conjuncts can not be considered to be imperatives. More detailed definition of the peripheral case will be suggested below.

Let us consider the final type of the *and*-case. (4) are examples of this type:

- (4) a. Talk and I'll shoot you.
- b. Come one step closer and I'll shoot. (Clark 1993)

This type of PIC is treated in Clark (1993) as a case taking "negative interpretation where the speaker does not want the state of affairs described in the imperative to be realised". The examples in (4) are similar to (3a) in that conjoined with the following declaratives, they do not take positive interpretation, though they can be independently used for imperatives. However, this does not mean no desirability can be seen in (4), in contrast to (3a). They have desirability in spite of the difference between the positive and the negative desirability, as stated above. In this sense, this case should not be categorized as peripheral. Rather, it should be seen as parallel with the prototype. So, we may say that it is some kind of extension from the prototype. But, if we assume that the peripheral case is also an extension from the prototype as suggested below, then (3) and (4) might be extended in different directions from each other. This problem will be discussed in detail in the following two sections.

1.2. Syntactic and Semantic Properties of the *Or*-case

While the *or*-case in PIC has some common properties with the *and*-case, it also shows some other different syntactic and semantic behaviors. Interestingly, the range of the *or*-case seems to be fairly limited unlike the *and*-case; namely, it does not have its subtypes as found in the *and*-case.

The examples in (5)-(8) indicate that no peripheral case is available in the *or*-case. As claimed above, the peripheral case is the one where desirability is not implied and only the conditional interpretation remains.

- (5) a. Say some more/* anymore.
b. Say some more /anymore and there'll be trouble.
c. Say some more/* anymore or I'll kill you.
- (6) a. Wear something/* anything.
b. Wear something/anything heavier and you won't catch cold.
c. Wear something /* anything heavier or you'll catch cold.
- (7) a. Know the answer and you'll get an A.
b. ?Know the answer or you won't get an A.
c. Like the film tonight and you'll enjoy the sequel too.
d. ?Like the film tonight or you won't enjoy the sequel.
- (8) a. One more beer and I'll leave.
b. ?One more beer or I won't leave.

As observed in (5a,b) and (6a,b), a negative polarity item *any*, which can appear in conditional sentences, but not in imperatives, is often seen in the peripheral *and*-case (but not in the prototypical

cases). This would be because the peripheral cases do not indicate any directive force; nor do they convey that anyone sees the state of affairs as desirable as in the case of true imperatives, so that only conditional interpretation remains.¹ However, *any* is not acceptable in the corresponding *or*-case as in (5c) and (6c).

Furthermore, stative verbs or some nominal forms, which are available in the peripheral *and*-case, could not come to the position at the first conjuncts in the *or*-case. Given these pieces of evidence, we can claim that there are no peripheral cases taking a neutral interpretation in the *or*-case.

Next, the *or*-case does not take a negative interpretation either. Let us look at the following examples:

- (9) a. Come one step closer and I'll shoot.
b. ?Leave immediately or I'll make you a nice dinner.

As these show, it would not be intended to persuade the hearer to "stay" by disjoining the declarative in (9b), in contrast to the *and*-case in (9a). Thus, the *or*-case would not take the negative interpretation, except for ironical interpretation or joking.

From the examples in (5)-(9), it should be concluded that only the prototypical cases taking *positive interpretation* in terms of Clark exist in the *or*-case.

We have considered the properties of the *or*-case distinct from the *and*-case. Now, we look at properties common to them. Let us examine the example (10) :

- (10) a . Be quiet or I'll shoot you.
b . *I'll shoot you or be quiet.

These are examples showing the asymmetry in the order of the conjuncts. This would be also true of the *and*-case as in (11) :

- (11) a . Come one step closer and I'll give you five pounds.
b . *I'll give you five pounds and come one step closer.

The reason for this behavior would be that the whole sentences have some causal relation where reversing the order changes their meanings, though the causal relation in the *or*-case can be different from that in the *and*-case.

Another property they have in common would be the notion of *potentiality*. It would be natural that the *or*-case shows potentiality, because only imperatives, which have potentiality themselves, are available in this case. We suggested above that the prototypical *and*-case also shows potentiality, though we have not referred to those subtypes. As for the subtypes, it will be demonstrated in the next section that they also have the property of *potentiality*.

Thus, we have examined the subtypes of PIC and shown the similarities and differences between the *and*- and *or*-case. In the next section, focusing on the *and*-case, we present a model which characterizes those subtypes adequately and by which properties of each type can be explained appropriately. Moreover, this model can capture the relation between the prototype and the subtypes. The problem as to the relation between the *and*- and *or*-case is discussed in Section 3.

2. Cognitively-Based Approach to the *And*-cases

In Murao (1995), we gave an appropriate explanation to the *and*-case in PIC in terms of cognitively-based semantics. We proposed that the prototypical *and*-case in PIC is produced by the compound of an imperative and a declarative clause, and that the image-schema of *source-path-goal* is reflected there and the causal or conditional interpretation is naturally induced by way of the schema without referring to *if*-constructions.² This approach was able to capture the relation between the prototypical cases and peripheral ones peculiar to the *and*-case by assuming that the latter cases are motivated by and extended from the former ones.

In this section, these points are suggested by reviewing Murao(1995), which is somewhat revised. This revised model can characterize the relation between the prototype and its several subtypes including the “negative interpretation”-case which is not dealt with in Murao. Furthermore, this model can also explain the *or*-case and the relation between *and*- and *or*-case as demonstrated in Section 3.

2.1. The Production of PIC

We observed the examples as illustrated in the following in Murao (1995) (some of them are newly presented here):

- (12) a. If you like her, she always comes here on Fridays.
b. ?Like her and she always comes here on Fridays.
c. I'm going to show you a picture of a girl. ?Like her and she'll come here on the next Friday.

- d. Like her and her friends will love you.
 - e. If you miss the next train, there'll be a waiting-room on platform one.
 - f. *Miss the next train and there'll be a waiting-room on platform one.
 - g. Miss this train and we'll never get there on time.
 - h. If you understand Chinese, I have a Chinese newspaper over here.
 - i. ?Understand Chinese and I have a Chinese newspaper over here.
 - j. If you buy me one more beer, it's mistaken that I'll leave.
 - k. ?Buy me one more beer and it's mistaken that I'll leave.
- (13) a. If you attend this college (=either if it should be the case in the future that you attend this college, or if it is at present the case that you attend this college), you'll know Nigel.
- b. Attend this college and you'll know Nigel (if it should be the case in the future that you attend this college....).
- (14) a. I'm going to make a special cake for you to try. Like it and you can take some home with you. (potentiality)
- b. I see you've tasted my special cake already. *Like it and you can take some home with you. (present possibility)
- c. ?Like the film and you'll enjoy the sequel too.
- d. Like the film tonight and you'll enjoy the sequel too.

These examples are peripheral cases as defined in Section 1, and (12) shows that cases in which a consequential relationship between the two

events (of the first conjunct and of the second conjunct) is hard to perceive are odd in PIC. We defined this causal relation (cause-effect) as a kind of *scenario* which is structured by the source-path-goal schema. Here, we redefine the causal relation in more detail as the *causality in the (socio) physical or real world*, not in the epistemic world, in terms of Sweetser (1990).³ Thus, the scenario used in PIC would refer to the causality in the (socio) physical world.

The examples in (13) were presented in order to show that the notion of *potentiality* as well as the causal relation preserves the acceptability of PIC. As (13) indicates, in *if*-constructions either reading of potentiality or present possibility may be available, while the corresponding PIC has only a potential reading. Moreover as shown by (14), peripheral PIC must be used with elements such as *tonight*, *next week* or in the context where the present possibility is excluded in order to be given an interpretation to exclude the present possibility (though the prototype originally has potentiality in itself, because a true imperative is used). Thus, the peripheral PIC stipulates the two constraints of the *consequential reading* and the *potentiality* for its acceptability, and these are also the crucial properties of the prototype.⁴ The potentiality and causal relation therefore are crucial constraints for licensing both the prototype and the peripheral.

Furthermore, we explained how the prototypical PIC can be produced and how those two constraints are related to each other and to the process of the production, what gives this construction consequential or conditional meaning, and how the peripheral cases are extended from the prototypical ones as illustrated in the following figure of the schema:




Figure 1

First, this schema shows how the prototypical cases, which are assumed to be a base of the peripheral ones, are produced. We characterize the causal structure of the whole sentence in PIC in terms of a source-path-goal image-schema. We assume that image-schemas are how some aspects of the external world are structured through the way human beings understand them, and are systematized in our cognitive system.⁵ The source-path-goal schema is extended to the relation of *cause* and *effect* by metaphorical mapping (cf. Lakoff 1987). *Source* and *goal* each correspond to *cause* and *effect*. This is shown in the top box of Figure 1. Because this schema is internalized in our cognitive system, if one state changes to another state, we can predict easily that some consequence would necessarily occur subsequently.

In the case of imperatives, too this schema would be reflected. Imperatives would be used when speakers want to make a transition

from a certain state to another. And in that case, the speakers would utter imperative sentences because they know there is potentiality that the transition of state can occur in the future. Imperatives, therefore, indicate the transition of state in the potential world, though the result of the transition is not necessarily explicit. So, in the case of imperatives the part of the *goal* in the schema is implicit and is not specified as a linguistic form but is implied as potential. If imperatives concerned the present possibility rather than potentiality, no transition of state would be found, hence no results of the transition. As a result, no structures conforming to the source-path-goal image-schema could be produced. The bottom left box of Figure 1 shows the case of imperatives. However, if a specific linguistic form like a declarative clause as in (1a) is imposed in the position after an imperative, it might follow that the imperative corresponds to the *cause* and the declarative clause to the *effect* in the schema from their linear order and the relation between the two events expressed by the imperative and the declarative.

In this way, PIC would be produced and its consequential interpretation would occur. It is because this *cause-effect* relation is activated in the potential world that the conditional interpretation is induced at the same time in PIC.^{6,7} This is shown by the bottom right box of the figure. This schema makes it clear why forms such as imperatives, interrogatives, or exclamatory sentences cannot appear at the position of the second conjunct in PIC. The whole structure would not conform to the schema if those forms are conjoined with imperatives in the first conjunct.

Thus, we have shown what contribution the two constraints -potentiality

and consequential relation- make to the process of the production of PIC and what relation they have to each other by adopting the image-schematic approach. They seem to be imposed unrelatedly on PIC and happen to be imposed together, but they have a close relationship to and are motivated by each other.

Now, we consider the schema we presented in Murao (1995) (Figure 1) more precisely. What is conveyed by PIC? We have argued the schema of PIC as if only one scenario were included in the frame of the potential world. The prototypical PIC, however, we assume, indicates that the selection of the scenario in question out of some possible scenarios is in the frame. Then, it is considered that there can be some scenarios in the frame originally, though the other scenarios except the selected one are integrated into the background of the frame as so called *ground* in *figure/ground* as shown in Figure 2 (Talmy




Figure 2

1978; Langacker 1987).^{8,9}

As this figure shows, the possibilities other than the scenario in question are excluded from perception as if they did not exist from the first. As a result they are out of the scope of the relevant frame. The importance of this refined schema of the prototypical PIC will be found when we consider the peripheral cases of PIC in Section 2.2.

The question to be answered here is why the other possible scenarios are integrated into the background in this case. In order to solve this problem, we have to examine a function of the second conjunct of PIC: declarative clauses. Following Clark (1993), a function of the declarative is to strengthen the force of the imperative. Clark claims:

...the declarative clause gives a reason for complying with the imperative and so make it more likely that the hearer will attempt to bring about the state of affairs described...the effect of the declarative clause is to give the hearer more reason for seeing the state of affairs described by the imperative clause as desirable.
(Clark 1993: 93)

Thus, we assume that this function of the declarative, in addition to the directive force of imperatives, weakens the possibilities of the scenarios other than the relevant one and shows the desirability for the scenario in question by strengthening the possibility of realization of the event expressed by the imperative. This would lead to the integration of the irrelevant scenarios into the background. Or it would be more correct to say that the linguistic form of PIC is taken so that this cognitive structure may be reflected.

In the case of the peripheral PIC, it is assumed to be an extension from the prototype on the basis of the schema in Figure 2 where the potentiality and the causal relation are reflected (these two properties in the peripheral cases are attested at the beginning of this section). In other words, the peripheral cases can be extended only if the situation described by it is perceived in terms of the same schema as in Figure 2, even if it lacks the other properties of the prototype (e.g., directiveness, desirability, etc.). As for the details of the frame structure of the peripheral cases, these will be discussed in the next subsection.

2.2. The Cognitive Structure of Peripheral Cases

As we observed in Section 1, the following cases are examples of the peripheral PIC:

- (15) a. Open the Guardian and you'll find three misprints on every page.
- b. Miss this train and we'll never get there on time.
- c. Catch the flu and you can be ill for weeks.
- d. Like her and her friends will love you.
- e. One more beer and I'll leave.¹⁰

We did not present a figure of the schema of the peripheral cases in Murao (1995), because we thought that the schema itself is the same as the prototype.¹¹ However, we are now also able to capture the precise differences between them having presented the whole frame structure which comprises the schema in Figure 1 as its part.

In contrast to the prototype, in the peripheral cases the most distinctive property is the lack of *desirability* and directive force which are properties of imperatives. Different reasons for the lack of desirability would be given from (15a) to (15e). As for (a), though "Open the Guardian" may be an imperative, the declarative seems to weaken the possibility of the realization of the event expressed by the imperative contrary to the prototypical cases. Because of this function of the declarative, the desirability would be weakened. In the cases from (b) to (e), since each of the first conjuncts is not independently imperative, it does not originally have the desirability or the directiveness. In either way, the desirability and the directiveness is lessened, so that only the conditional meaning of PIC remains and becomes prominent. But, the two crucial properties, *potentiality* and *causal relation* must be held to preserve the peripheral cases as PIC. These two properties are reflected in the schema in figure 1, or 2. Then, the peripheral




Figure 3

cases are assumed to be extended from the prototypical PIC by inheriting the schema. In that case, irrelevant scenarios integrated into the background in the case of the prototype would be regained as other possibilities. In other words, we could say that the other possibilities need not be integrated into the background and remain as a *figure* in the frame. Thus, in the peripheral cases, the scenario in question is just suggested as one of the possible scenarios in the frame and is given a specific linguistic form. Based on the frame in Figure 2, this could be illustrated as in Figure 3.

We are now in a position to redefine the extension of PIC in more detail. Namely, the extension in PIC is the case where only the schema, (not the whole frame), which itself is invariable, is inherited.

2.3. Another kind of Extension: negative interpretation of PIC

Let us consider the following cases of PIC:

- (16) a. Come one step closer and I'll shoot. (Clark 1993)
b. Talk and I'll shoot you.

These are the cases which Clark claims take a negative interpretation. We did not consider such cases in Murao (1995) because we thought that they were peripheral cases lacking the positive interpretation. However, it would be right to categorize these cases as a kind of the prototype, or as another kind of extensional case from the peripheral one in that they have a desirability in spite of the difference between positive and negative examples. So, we can present a frame of this type of PIC on the basis of the frame in Figure 2, though it must be

the one where the difference between positive and negative desirability is reflected. It could be shown by the following figure:




Figure 4

We saw that the declarative in the "positive" case strengthens the desirability of realization of the event described by the imperative. On the contrary, in the negative case the declarative strengthens the desirability of non-realization of the event described by the imperative. This interpretation would be given by posing the declarative so that the state of affairs described by the declarative may be undesirable to the hearer far more than that described by the imperative may be desirable.

Ultimately, because of desirability, the integration of other possible scenarios into the background would be found in this case as well. The important difference from the positive case is that there remains another scenario except the one specified as a linguistic form without being integrated into the background. These two scenarios have an

oppositional relation to each other, though the former is not specified as a linguistic form as shown in the figure. The negative interpretation in this type of PIC arises from this frame structure. Specifically, it would be conveyed that the state of 'a' is undesirable by the function of the declarative. If it is not selected, the only available item in the frame is 'c'. So, it would be shown that 'c' is a desirable state. But, the actual linguistic expression occupying the position of the first conjunct is what is describing the state in 'a'. Then, the negative implication would be induced.

Thus, we have reviewed Murao (1995) and revised it, presenting a more precise frame structure for PIC in this section. In the next section, we will investigate the *or*-case comparing it with the *and*-case.

3. The Cognitive Structure of the *Or*-case

In this section, we present a frame structure of the *or*-case, by which we can explain the properties both common to the *and*- and *or*-case and peculiar to the *or*-case as illustrated in Section 1.

3.1. The Structure of the Frame in the *Or*-case

As we saw in Section 1, while the *or*-case has some common properties with the *and*-case, it has other properties distinct from the *and*-case, repeated here in summary below:

similarities

1. asymmetry in the order of the conjuncts
2. Potentiality in the whole structure

differences

1. Only pure imperatives appear in the first conjunct. i.e. the unavailability of verbs such as stative verbs or nominal forms which cannot be used for imperatives in general.
2. There is neither neutral nor negative interpretation.
3. There is no extension as seen in the *and*-case.

In order to give a uniform explanation of these similarities and differences between the *and*- and *or*-case, we present a frame structure of the *or*-case here, which is based on the frame of the *and*-case. And it is important to note that the schema itself in the frame is the same as in the other cases we have examined. What is different in this case is also the whole frame structure. By assuming these factors, we claim that both the *and*- and *or*-cases are given their basic structures by the same image-schematic structure and their difference is induced from the difference of the way the schema is reflected in their frame structure.

In the *and*-case, it consists of an imperative, *and* and a declarative, which form a scenario structure as a whole. On the contrary, though the *or*-case consists of an imperative, *or* and a declarative it does not form a scenario structure like the *and*-case as a whole. Then, it might be apparently considered that the imperative and the declarative are each imposed independently.

We claim, however, that the *or*-case is not just a disjunction of an imperative and a declarative, but it has a rather complicated cognitive structure behind the surface linguistic form. Namely, we assume that the imperative and the declarative are each just a part of the two

scenario structures in the whole frame: the former is the *cause* part of the scenario II; the latter is the *effect* part of the scenario I as shown in the following figure:




Figure 5

These two scenarios are in opposition to each other. In the *or*-case, the declarative would also strengthen the possibility of the realization of a state of affairs described by the imperative as in the case of prototypical *and*-constructions. But the meaning of the 'strengthening' in the *or*-case is a little different from that in the prototypical *and*-case. While the declarative strengthens the force of the *cause* part described by the imperative in the same scenario in the prototypical *and*-case, in the *or*-case the declarative in one scenario strengthens the force of the cause part in the other scenario of the pair of scenarios. More specifically, the undesirable state of affairs to the hearers described by the declarative ('b') causes them not to select 'a' but to select 'c' in the oppositional scenario II to the scenario I. It would be

predicted by the characteristics of scenario structure that if 'c' is selected, 'd' occurs subsequently. Thus, the disjunction form, *or* would be used for these reasons.

Of course, there might exist other possible scenarios than this pair of scenarios in question, but they would be integrated into the background like the cases of figure 2 and 4, because the declarative, which shows an undesirable state of affairs to the hearer, strengthens the possibility of the realization of the state of affairs described by the imperative (the cause part of the scenario II). Since the *or*-case has no peripheral cases and only true imperatives are used in the first conjunct, it shows the desirability like the prototype. The declarative strengthens this desirability as stated now.

Notice here that this frame structure is very similar to that of the negative interpretation (cf. Figure 4). Compared with each other, they differ only in that their parts in the frame which are specified as linguistic forms are different.¹² To put it another way, we may say that they share the same frame. And when there exists a frame where two scenarios are in an oppositional relation, and 'c' is a desirable state of affairs as in the case in question, these two cases are differentiated by which is selected between 'a' and 'c' as a linguistic form ('b' is fixed). If 'a' is selected as a linguistic form, the negative interpretation case occurs; if 'c' is selected, the *or*-case occurs. When 'a' is selected, the reason why *and*-constructions are used is that both *cause* and *effect* are the parts of one scenario and they form the scenario structure. The negative interpretation is brought out by describing the opposite state of affairs to the desirable one. In contrast to this, 'c' selected, *or*-constructions are used, because the *cause* and the *effect*

would form a causal relation crossing two scenarios (some kind of pseudo-causal relation), where a disjunctive relation between scenario I and II is recognized. The positive interpretation would be brought about by describing the desirable state of affairs straightforwardly.¹³

Thus, we presented the frame structure of the *or*-case and showed that the same schema as in all the other cases is activated in the *or*-case as well. The remaining problem is to show that this frame gives an appropriate explanation to the problem of why the *or*-case has the properties we pointed out in Section 1 or in this section. We will consider this in the next subsection.

3.2. Some Consequences

Given the frame structure of the *or*-case, we can now explain why those 5 properties to which we referred at the head of Subsection 3.1 belong to the *or*-case as follows:

similarity 1 : The first conjunct and the second conjunct each function as a part of the scenario structures behind the surface linguistic form. So if the order is reversed, it would not conform to the scenario structure.

similarity 2 : This would follow by assuming that the schema in the *and*- constructions is also reflected in the *or*-case. Moreover it might also follow from the unavailability of verb forms excepting imperatives.

difference 1 : Stative verbs can only appear in the peripheral cases (the case of extension) in which a neutral

interpretation is taken. Following my definition, peripheral cases are preserved by inheriting the schema. In order to conform to the schema, they have to satisfy two properties: potentiality and causal relation. In the *or*-case, potentiality could not be inherited because of the frame structure. Namely, when the first conjunct is a stative verb or a nominal form, it would have to receive potentiality from the declarative in the second conjunct. However, the two conjuncts each belong to different scenarios in the frame in the *or*-case. One conjunct, therefore, might not receive potentiality from the other conjunct even if they seem to be in the same string in the surface linguistic form. Then, only true imperatives are available in this case. This could be proved by the following examples:

- (17) a. I see you've tasted my special cake
for you to try. *Like it and you can
take some home with you. / * Like it
or I'll give it to Mary.
- b. I'm going to make a special cake for
you to try. Like it and you can take
some home with you. / ? Like it or
I'll give it to Mary.

When an interpretation is given where potentiality

is excluded, neither *and*- nor *or*-case is accepted as in (17a). On the contrary, only *and*-case is accepted when an context is given where potentiality is given.

difference 2 : The phenomenon of “integrating into the background” is not found in the peripheral cases taking a neutral interpretation. As stated in “difference 1” above, the *or*-case does not have such peripheral cases because it permits only true imperatives in the first conjunct, which shows desirability. Then it lacks neutral interpretation case.

The unavailability of negative interpretation can be explained as follows: following the definition of negative interpretation in Subsection 2.3, a pair of “a” and “d” in the frame in Figure 5 is the negative-case. This pattern, however, would not be available in PIC except for indicating ironies. The only possible pattern in the *or*-case is therefore the pair of “c” and “b”.

difference 3 : We defined extension in PIC as follows: it occurs in cases where only the schema, not the whole frame structure, is inherited as claimed in “difference 1”. In that case, PIC takes a neutral interpretation because of the lack of desirability. Then, the *or*-case lacks the neutral interpretation as just mentioned above, leading to no extension.

Thus, in this section, we examined the *or*-case and showed how its characteristics is explained in terms of image-schema and frame structure.

4 . Conclusion

We examined several types of PIC in this paper. PIC is divided into the *and*- and the *or*-case; the former has further three subtypes. These several types of PIC show different syntactic and semantic behavior. Especially, the range of the *or*-case is fairly limited unlike the *and*-case.

We demonstrated that all of these types of PIC are structured by the same image-schema and that their differences are induced by ways which show how the schema is reflected in the whole frame structure.

Notes

- 1 . For detailed discussion of syntactic and semantic properties of the peripheral cases, see Murao (1995).
- 2 . For detailed arguments against the view that PIC is derived from conditional sentences by deletion or ellipsis, see Murao (1995).
- 3 . According to Sweetser, the causality in the (socio) physical world has a force-dynamic structure by Talmy, where the causal connection expressed is between the two real-world events expressed in the clauses. On the other hand, the causality in the epistemic world is a causal connection which is expressed between the logical premise and the conclusion which it causes in the speaker's mind.
It, therefore, has a force-dynamic structure in the epistemic world which is parallel to that of the sociophysical world.
- 4 . Originally, it is Davies (1986) who points out the importance of

these two constraints.

5. For the details of image-schemas, see Lakoff (1987) and Johnson (1987).
6. The conditional interpretation cannot be induced just because a transition is activated in the potential world as in the case of imperatives.
7. Notice that the sociophysical world and the potential world do not conflict with each other because they each belong to different conceptual levels.
8. Talmy (1978) and Langacker (1987) each characterize the figure and ground as follows:

The Figure object is a moving or conceptually movable point whose path or site is conceived as a variable the particular value of which is the salient issue.

The Ground object is a reference-point, having a stationary setting within a reference-frame, with respect to which the Figure's path or site receives characterization.

(Talmy 1978:627)

...(T) he figure within a scene is a substructure perceived as "standing out" from the remainder (the ground) and accorded special prominence as the pivotal entity around which the scene is organized and for which it provides a setting. Figure/ground organization is not in general automatically determined for a given scene; it is normally possible to structure the same scene with alternate choices of figure.

(Langacker 1987:120)

9. The relation between each scenario in the figure is not so important as those of the *negative interpretation*-case (cf. Figure 4) and the *or*-case (cf. Figure 5).
10. Clark classifies such instances as (a) into the *neutral interpretation*-case, while considering the types (b)-(e) not to be PIC and to be a different kind of construction from the prototype. We, however, consider (a)-(e) are all extended from the prototype (*positive interpretation*-case).
11. Actually, what we showed by the schema was a series of properties common to the prototypical cases and the peripheral cases. We were not able to show the differences between them by the schema itself.
12. I am indebted to Setsuko Arita of Kyushu University for assistance with this point.
13. The *or*-cases can be produced by a combination of "a" and "d" or "c" and "b". But, in the cases of *or*, events described by the declarative sentences must be an undesirable state of affairs for the hearers. In this case, the combination of "a" and "d" cannot be acceptable unless it conveys irony or humour.

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