

## Phenomenology and Metaphysics in Being and Time

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# Phenomenology and Metaphysics in *Being and Time*

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## Introduction

First I must apologize for changing my title “Heidegger and Nishida” into “Phenomenology and Metaphysics in *Being and Time*”. My first plan was: to compare the later Heidegger and the later Nishida. The later Heidegger finds the authentic meaning of phenomenology in tautological thinking. (cf. GA15,399) Phenomenology as tautological thinking is expressed in such statements as “the world worlds”, something like “the pump pumps”. (I saw this once at a gas station, of course, in America, not in Japan. As I started filling my tank, a sign came on: “Pump is pumping.”) The later Nishida’s favorite phrase is: The world (fact, present) determines the world (fact,

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(This paper was presented at a conference entitled “Phenomenology and Metaphysics East and West”, held at Rice University, in Houston, April 5, 1996. Unfortunately being short of time I could not read part III of this paper.

Here I would like to express my gratitude to the organizer of the conference, Professor Steven Crowell of Rice University, and the chair of our First Session, Professor Yoko Arisaka of the University of San Francisco. I would also like to gratefully acknowledge my indebtedness to Professor Ronald Bruzina of the University of Kentucky for many engaging discussions on the problem of phenomenology, including his unpublished book entitled *Edmund Husserl - Eugen Fink, 1928-1936: Beginnings and Ends in Phenomenology.*)

present) itself. We can paraphrase it: The world worlds.

Starting from a comparison of such expressions, one from the West and one from the East, I intended to treat our theme, "Phenomenology and Metaphysics". For this reason I brought the complete works of Nishida with me from East (Japan) to West (America). To my regret I am not quite ready to treat Nishida in this context. So I shall have to carry back from West to East this heavy set of Nishida's complete works and this still undone task, also heavy.

Here ends my apology.

We choose Heidegger's phenomenology now in order to treat our theme, "Phenomenology and Metaphysics". This is because Heidegger continues to ask the question of metaphysics. And the way he asks this question, I believe, determines modern discussions of metaphysics.

We can say that phenomenology dominates Heidegger's way of thinking. In this case "we can understand phenomenology only by seizing upon it as a possibility", as Heidegger says in *Being and Time* (SZ,38). The young Heidegger understands phenomenology as a pretheoretical protoscience. The old Heidegger finds the authentic meaning of phenomenology in tautological thinking. (cf. GA15,399) Heidegger remains faithful to his understanding of phenomenology as a possibility. Phenomenology as a pretheoretical protoscience or as tautological thinking are two of its possibilities.

Phenomonology in *Being and Time* is also one of its possibilities. It is our present aim to understand the possibility of phenomenology in *Being and Time*. The possibility of phenomenology in *Being and Time* is expressed as follows:

“Phenomenology radicalized in its ownmost possibility is nothing but the questioning of Plato and Aristotle brought back to life: the repetition, the retaking of the beginning of our scientific philosophy.” (GA20,184)

Phenomenology in *Being and Time* is performed as the repetition of the question that Plato and Aristotle pose. In this repetition we find the problem of the relationship between phenomenology and metaphysics. This is because the problem of metaphysics has arisen from their philosophy. We cannot simply maintain that *Being and Time* overturns metaphysical thought. Such a view oversimplifies *Being and Time*. Anyway we must first ask: “what is metaphysics?”

In *Being and Time* Heidegger says almost nothing about metaphysics, while he considers the concept of phenomenology thematically as a method of investigation. Even if he uses the term “metaphysics”, he uses it only in parentheses, namely not as his own term. When we look at the usage of the term “metaphysics” or “metaphysical” in *Being and Time*, we cannot find anything significant to say.

Do we have to introduce the determination of metaphysics from outside in order to speak of the relationship between phenomenology and metaphysics? We are, of course, free to define the meaning of metaphysics, as we like, and to decide whether or not phenomenology in *Being and Time* is metaphysical. Using such a criterion we could also decide whether or not Husserlian phenomenology and any other philosophy is metaphysical. But such a decision would mean a mere classification according to an arbitrary criterion.

We are also free to ask whether or not phenomenology is metaphysical in *Being and Time* itself. But here if we answer Yes or No, we

misunderstand *Being and Time*. If I may use an interpretive comment from our organizer, Professor Crowell, we could say: *Being and Time* is “a ‘layered’ document revealing many things that are stitched together”.

Heidegger’s conception of *Being and Time* is derived from his confrontation with metaphysics, namely from the repetition and reassumption of the problematic of metaphysics. Our aim here is not a mere decision or criticism, but to make clear the dimension in which Heidegger’s phenomenology operates. In this dimension we will find the problem of metaphysics. When the later Heidegger speaks of overcoming metaphysics, he also criticizes his own metaphysics. Heidegger’s criticism is self-criticism. The question of metaphysics dominates his way of thinking as a whole.

We begin our consideration with the concept of phenomenology in Section 7 of *Being and Time*. This will lead us to the problem of metaphysics.

In Section 7 “The Phenomenological Method of Investigation” Heidegger explains the concept of phenomenology by returning to the Greek terms *φαινόμενον* and *λόγος*”. This means that he tries to place phenomenology in Greek philosophy. For Heidegger, “phenomenology radicalized in its ownmost possibility is nothing but the questioning of Plato and Aristotle brought back to life.” In fact *λόγος* means the same as *δηλοῦν*, a term derived from Plato’s dialogue *Sophist*. In Section 7 Heidegger further refers to Plato’s doctrine of ideas. As for Aristotle it is obvious that the concept of phenomenology is determined against the background of Aristotle’s *De Anima*.

Now, in developing my interpretation, I want to focus on three problems pertaining to the relationship between phenomenology and

metaphysics.

(1) First, there is the problem of light for phenomena. Heidegger goes from phenomena back to the concept of light. What is required for them to be phenomena in the first place, that is, basic to phenomena is that they are “visible in light”. This basic character determining Heidegger’s phenomenology in *Being and Time* leads us to the metaphysics of light.

(2) Second, there is the problem of the phenomenon in phenomenology, which shows the characteristic of the Platonic idea. Phenomenology in *Being and Time* has a character of the doctrine of ideas. If metaphysics begins with the Platonic idea, then the concept of the phenomenon in phenomenology leads to the problem of metaphysics.

(3) Third, there is the problem of the phenomenology of Dasein. Phenomenology in *Being and Time* is called the phenomenology of Dasein. Behind this title we can find the dual conception of metaphysics as ontology and theology.

Our consideration will accordingly be divided into three parts.

- I . The light of phenomena and the metaphysics of light
- II . The phenomenon of phenomenology and the doctrine of ideas
- III . The phenomenology of Dasein and the dual conception of metaphysics

Here my introduction is over.

### I . The light of phenomena and the metaphysics of light

At the beginning of subsection A in Section 7 entitled “The Concept of Phenomenon”, Heidegger goes from phenomena back to the Greek terms *φαινόμενον*, and further *φαίνω* and *φῶς*.

“*φαίνω* comes from the stem *φα-*, like *φῶς*, light, brightness, namely that in which something can become manifest, visible in itself.” (GA2,28)

In this passage we find the thesis that “phenomena are visible in light”. At first glance, however, this seems to be a mere Heideggerian etymology. But this thesis is based on Aristotle’s *De Anima*. Judging from Heidegger’s WS 1923/24 lecture, we can see this to be obvious. This lecture, like *Being and Time*, goes back from the concept of Phenomenology to *φαινόμενον* and *λόγος*, and tries to define the concept of phenomenology on the basis of Aristotle’s *De Anima*. In fact the reference to *φῶς* recalls Aristotle’s *De Anima* (cf. GA19,650). Aristotle says: “As sight is the most highly developed sense, the name *φαντασία* has been formed from *φῶς* [= *φῶς*(light)] because it is not possible to see without light.” (429a2-4) This reference to light has a phenomenal ground. “The object of sight is the visible, and what is visible is color... That is why it is not visible except with the help of light; it is only in light that the color of a thing is seen.” (418a26ff.) So in Heidegger’s reference to light we find the *De Anima* in the background.

Further in the passage the statement that “it is only in the light that the color of a thing is seen” leads us to the agent intellect. “And in fact thought, as we have described it, is what it is by virtue of becoming all things, while there is something else which is what it is by virtue of making all things: this is a sort of positive state like light; for in a sense light makes potential colors into actual colors.” (430a14-17) In the *φῶς* to which Heidegger goes back, we find the light of the agent intellect. According to *Being and Time* man is called

Dasein. The being which bears the title "Da-sein" is one that has been lighted. The lighting of this lightedness lies in temporality. "Ecstasical temporality lights the "Da" primordially." (SZ, 351) Temporality in *Being and Time* is the light of the agent intellect.

The metaphor of light conducts us not only to the Aristotelian light of the agent intellect, but also to the Platonic idea in the *Republic*. Light in the *De Anima* is as the transparent that which lets something be seen through itself (cf. GA17,7). Heidegger interprets the Platonic idea as light. In the SS 1926 lecture *The Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy*, which is conceived in parallel with *Being and Time*, Heidegger tries to interpret the Allegory of the Cave in Plato's *Republic*. In this context Heidegger characterizes the understanding of Being as "seeing the light which lights beings qua beings" (GA22,104). Being as idea is the light which lights beings. Further on, Heidegger says the following: "The seeing and grasping of Being also need light. And this light by which Being as such is illuminated is the ἀγαθόν, the idea of the 'Good' ." (GA22,256) The idea of the Good is the light which illuminates Being.

In the Platonic doctrine of ideas in the *Republic* the light which lights beings is the idea. And the light which illuminates Being is the idea of the Good. We can distinguish three dimensions, namely beings, the idea, and the idea of the Good. This distinction corresponds exactly to three dimensions in *Being and Time*, namely, beings, Being, and time as the meaning of Being. In fact, using the metaphor of light, Heidegger says in his lectures: "Beings ... already stand in the light of Being" (GA29/30,519) And further "Being is understood in the light of time." (GA31,114f.) This metaphor of light corresponds exactly to Heidegger's interpretation of Platonic ideas. Using the



metaphor of light, we can express the fundamental question in *Being and Time*, namely, “From where does the understanding of Being receive the illuminating light ?”(GA31,55) So Heidegger expresses the fundamental task of *Being and Time* in terms of the Allegory of the Cave. “We, too, with this apparently quite abstract question about the condition of the possibility of the understanding of Being, want to do nothing but bring ourselves out of the cave into the light....”(GA24,404)

Heidegger goes from the phenomenon back to light. In his return to light we find Aristotle’s *De Anima*, especially the light of the agent intellect and Plato’s *Republic*, especially the light of the idea of the Good. In *Being and Time* such a light is temporality. Interpreting the light of phenomena we find the metaphysics of light in Heidegger’s phenomenology.

Phenomenology in *Being and Time* belongs to the metaphysics of light. In order to seize the scope and meaning of Heidegger’s phenomenology, it is inevitable to interpret it from the point of view of the metaphysics of light. This is the first point in my proposals on “Phenomenology and Metaphysics”.

The thesis that phenomena are visible in light is, however, related to the concept of the phenomenon of phenomenology. Beings are visible in the light of Being. In this case beings are phenomena as ordinarily understood, and Being is the phenomenon of phenomenology. And Being as phenomenon is also visible in the light of time as the meaning of Being. The phenomenon of phenomenology can be interpreted as light.

Now, therefore we have to consider the phenomenon of phenomenology.

## II. The phenomenon of phenomenology and the doctrine of ideas

Heidegger defines the phenomenon in phenomenology as follows:

“That which already shows itself in the appearance as prior to the ‘phenomenon’ as ordinarily understood and as accompanying it in every case, can, even though it thus shows itself unthematically, be brought thematically to show itself; and what thus shows itself in itself (the ‘forms of the intuition’) will be the ‘phenomena’ of phenomenology.” (SZ,31)

Our aim is here to find in this determination Plato’s doctrine of ideas. Is it strange? No, not if we argue as follows. The phenomenon of phenomenology shows itself as prior to the phenomenon as ordinarily understood. In other words it has the character of a priori. This a priori character is related to the Aristotelian concept of “prior by nature” (*πρότερον τῆ φύσει*) (cf. GA2,114 Anm.a, GA26,185, SG,185f.). But Heidegger interprets the a priori character as referring to the Platonic *ἀνάμνησις* (cf. GA26,186, GA22,262, GA24,464), which is connected with the doctrine of ideas. Ignoring the relation to Aristotelian philosophy I would like here to focus our consideration on the relation to the Platonic doctrine of ideas. Can we find the Platonic doctrine of ideas in the concept of the phenomenon of phenomenology?

We begin by asking why Heidegger gives Kant’s “forms of intuition” as an illustration of the phenomenon of phenomenology. Why does he illustrate the phenomenon of phenomenology by Kant’s “forms of intuition” with reservations as to other differences? In order to answer this question we need to go back to the lectures in WS 1924/25

entitled *Logic. The Question of Truth* where Heidegger interprets Kant's "forms of intuition". Heidegger's discovery of Kant is the final step to *Being and Time*.

In the following we would like to use the German word "Worauf" or "Woraufhin" untranslated. These two terms have the same meaning, namely that toward which one unthematically looks, that in regard to which something is understood as something. The Worauf or Woraufhin means that unthematic something in view of which we understand something as something. So Heidegger speaks of the Worauf or Woraufhin of a regard.

Now let us consider Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's forms of intuition.

Space and Time are the forms of intuition. According to Heidegger "Form means the Worauf of a regard which is represented as prior and unthematic". Form is interpreted as the Worauf or Woraufhin of a regard. This Worauf is represented unthematically as prior and as accompanying. This interpretation of the form as the Worauf of a regard obviously corresponds to the determination of the phenomenon of phenomenology, namely, "that which already shows itself in the appearance as prior to the 'phenomenon' as ordinarily understood and as accompanying it in every case, even though it thus shows itself unthematically".

Such a phenomenon in phenomenology can, however, be brought thematically to show itself. Kant's forms of intuition can be, in fact, brought thematically to show themselves by formal intuition. The forms of intuition can be intuited thematically by formal intuition.

Only by returning to Heidegger's interpretation of the forms of intuition can we understand the way the phenomenon of phenomenology

is determined. This interpretation is, however, possible “against the background of Husserl’s phenomenology” (GA25,409). In the SS 1924 lecture Heidegger tries to explain “acts of ideation” in Husserl’s phenomenology by an example of red balls insofar as they are alike.

“This being-alike can be seen at a glance or can be established in a comparative survey of the balls. But in all these cases the likeness as such is not thematically objective. In other words, it is that in-itself in regard to which [das, worauf hinsehend] the balls are compared. The to-which of the regard, namely the Worauf of the regard, is the ideal unity of likeness as such and not the likeness of the balls as real objects. . . . That toward which I look in comparing, the regard of the comparable, namely, the Worauf of the comparing regard can for its part be isolated in its pure state of affairs. I thus acquire the idea.” (GA20,91f.)

Here I also cite the interpretation of Husserl’s ideation which Fink gives in his “Sixth Cartesian Meditation” in the same way as Heidegger though Fink does not use the term “Worauf”. In Professor Bruzina’s translation Fink says the following:

“The knowing of what is pregiven already contains all knowledge of essence precisely in the mode of the unthematic, and we can at any time take possession of that knowledge by the activities of the categorial intuition of ideation. Ideation is only the thematic appropriation of a knowing that we already have, is an *ἀνάμνησις*.” (Eugen Fink, “VI. Cartesianische Metitation” Teil 1, S.91, p.81f.)

Anyway, we can here find the same structure as we have found in Heidegger's determination of the phenomenon of phenomenology and in his interpretation of Kant's forms. Heidegger's phenomenon of phenomenology, Kant's forms of intuition, and Husserl's idea of ideation, these three have the following characteristics in common.

(1) First they mean the toward-which of a regard, namely, the Worauf or Woraufhin of a regard (das Worauf oder Woraufhin des Hinblicks (der Hinsicht)).

(2) Second the Worauf or Woraufhin is not thematically objective in everyday experience. That which is thematically objective is the phenomenon as ordinarily understood, the phenomenon in space and time, or the red balls.

(3) Third the Worauf or Woraufhin can be thematically objective in the reflection, namely, by Heidegger's phenomenological investigation, Kant's formal intuition, or Husserl's ideation.

These three characteristics, I believe, remind us of the Platonic ideas. For Husserl we can acquire the idea by ideation. Ideation means "the apprehension of the idea" (GA20,98).

Starting from the phenomenon of phenomenology and moving back through Kant's forms of intuition and Husserl's ideation we reach the Platonic ideas. We can confirm this interpretation by reexamining the doctrine of ideas. Let's take some typical expressions related to the doctrine of ideas, comparing them with Heidegger's concept of the phenomenon of phenomenology. From Plato's dialogue *Euthyphro* (6e) I would like to cite a passage, in which we can find the birthplace of the Platonic doctrine of ideas.

“Teach me, therefore, what this very idea (*ιδέα*) is, that looking toward it (*ἀποβλέπων*), and using it as a paradigm (*παραδειγματι*), I may say that whatever thing of this kind you or any other does is holy, and whatever is not of this kind is unholy.”

We might also cite a typical expression of ideas from the *Republic*(596b):

“A craftsman makes a bed looking toward the idea of Bed (*πρὸς τὴν ἰδέαν βλέπων*).”

In these two expressions we find the following structures, which are common to Plato’s treatment of ideas in other dialogues.

(1) First the expression of the idea: “looking toward the idea” is a participle.

(2) Second that toward which one looks is an idea.

(3) Third this expression is based on our act of speaking or producing things.

We can also find these three characteristics in Heidegger’s explanation of ideation. Namely, in looking toward the likeness as such (*αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον*), we compare the red balls. If Husserl’s idea of ideation has the same structure as the phenomenon of phenomenology, the Platonic idea has also the same character as the phenomenon of phenomenology. We will show it by using the dialogue *Euthyphro*.

In order to say that a certain person is holy, we need to see previously the idea of the Holy. To put it in Heidegger’s term, the idea of the Holy shows itself as prior to a certain person, namely, a

phenomenon as ordinarily understood. And looking toward the idea of the Holy we can say that such a phenomenon is holy or not. In this case we thematically look at a concrete person, namely, a phenomenon as ordinarily understood, while we unthematically look toward the idea. To put it in Heidegger's terms, the idea of the Holy shows itself unthematically as accompanying a phenomenon as ordinarily understood. The participial expression: "looking toward the idea" expresses the way the idea shows itself unthematically as accompanying the phenomenon.

Can the idea be brought thematically to show itself? Yes, we can answer. In Plato's dialogue *Euthyphro* Socrates asks the question: "What is the Holy, namely the idea of the Holy?" This question tries to bring the idea to show itself thematically. The Socratic question "What is X?" has its aim to bring the unthematical Worauf into the thematical Worauf.

The phenomenon of phenomenology is determined as the Worauf or Woraufhin of the regard. Behind such a determination we find the Platonic doctrine of ideas. The concept of the phenomenon of phenomenology operates in the framework of the doctrine of ideas.

We can confirm our interpretation further by considering the determination of the Being of beings. According to Heidegger's phenomenological ontology the phenomenon of phenomenology is the Being of beings. In Section 2 of *Being and Time* Heidegger defines Being as follows:

"In the question which we are to work out, what is asked about is Being - that which determines beings as beings, that with respect to which [woraufhin] beings are already understood, however we may discuss them in detail. The Being of beings 'is' not itself a

being. If we are to understand the problem of Being, our first philosophical step consists in not *μῦθόν τινα διηγεῖσθαι*, in not 'telling a story' - that is to say, in not defining beings as beings by tracing them back in their origin to some other beings, as if Being had the character of some possible being." (SZ,6)

This is the one and only place in which Heidegger gives a determination of the Being of beings in *Being and Time*. And it is followed by a citation from Plato's dialogue *Sophist*. This is because the question of Being is established in Greek philosophy by the Platonic doctrine of ideas. It is not strange therefore to find that Heidegger's determination of Being has the character of ideas.

The Being of beings is that which determines beings as beings. This determination, I believe, reminds us of Plato's dialogue *Phaedo*. The Beautiful is that by which (*τῶ καλῶ*, 100e) beautiful things are beautiful.

The Being of beings is that with respect to which [woraufhin] beings are already understood. In other words, Being is that in respect to which we understand beings, namely, the "Woraufhin" of an understanding. This is the same as the Worauf or Woraufhin of the regard turned toward the Platonic ideas. The term "woraufhin" (that with respect to which) in the determination of Being shows us that Being has the character of ideas. "The Being of beings 'is' not itself a being". The ontological difference means that Being is beyond beings. Being in *Being and Time* is the transcendens. (SZ,38) The Platonic ideas are also beyond beings.

The Being of beings is the Woraufhin of a regard or the Woraufhin of an understanding. According to Heidegger understanding has the



character of a projection. Therefore the Woraufhin of an understanding is interpreted as the Woraufhin of a projection. Heidegger calls this Woraufhin meaning.

“Meaning is the Woraufhin of a projection in terms of which something becomes understandable as something.” (SZ,151)

The Being of beings is the Woraufhin of a projection in terms of which beings become understandable as beings. The Woraufhin of a projection is “that which makes possible what has been projected” (SZ,324), namely, the condition of the possibility of understanding of something (beings or Being). This Woraufhin is also expressed as that toward which [woraufhin] Dasein transcends (cf. GA26,238), namely, the Woraufhin of transcendence. In this sense Heidegger’s phenomenology is transcendental.

The term “Worauf” or “Woraufhin” leads us from the phenomenon of phenomenology through Husserl’s ideation and Kant’s forms of intuition to Plato’s idea. And the Woraufhin of a regard is interpreted as the Woraufhin of a projection, namely, as the condition of the possibility.

In the phenomenon of phenomenology we find the character of the Platonic ideas. This leads us at the same time to the problem of metaphysics, because metaphysics begins with the Platonic doctrine of ideas. According to Heidegger’s 1940 lecture course entitled *Nietzsche, The European Nihilism* philosophy as metaphysics begins with Plato’s interpreting Being as Ideas. This interpretation means that Being has the character of “a priori”, by which Being transcends beings. In this transcendence of Being Heidegger reads the beginning of meta-physics

which means *μετά τὰ φυσικά*. Further Heidegger finds the essence of ideas in the idea of the Good. The Good (*τὸ ἀγαθόν*) is that which makes beings possible. Being as idea has the character of making possible and is the condition of the possibility (Kant).

The interpretation of Being as idea means that Being has a double character, namely, apriority or transcendence and the condition of possibility. Being as the phenomenon of phenomenology has, as pointed out, this same double character. In other words the phenomenon of phenomenology has the character of ideas. Therefore phenomenology in *Being and Time* operates in the dimension of metaphysics which begins with the Platonic doctrine of ideas. This is the second point for our topic, "Phenomenology and Metaphysics".

Because Being as the phenomenon of phenomenology is the Being of beings, Being can be read off only from beings. This leads us to the problem of the phenomenology of Dasein.

### III. The phenomenology of Dasein and the dual conception of metaphysics

We would like to cite here once more the determination of the phenomenon of phenomenology.

"That which already shows itself in the appearance as prior to the 'phenomenon' as ordinarily understood and as accompanying it in every case, can, even though it thus shows itself unthematically, be brought thematically to show itself; and what thus shows itself in itself (the 'forms of the intuition') will be the 'phenomena' of phenomenology." (SZ,31)

In this determination we can distinguish two concepts of phenomenon, namely, the phenomenon as ordinarily understood (the ordinary concept of phenomenon) and the phenomenon of phenomenology (the phenomenological concept of phenomenon). In Heidegger's phenomenological ontology in *Being and Time*, the former means beings and the latter the Being of beings (and the meaning of Being).

Heidegger's phenomenology thematically treats the phenomenon of phenomenology, namely, the Being of beings. The Being of beings can be read off only from beings. Therefore in order to disclose Being, we must first bring forward beings themselves in the right way. And in this way the ordinary concept of phenomenon becomes phenomenologically relevant. This is the problem of a paradigmatic being. In Section 7 in *Being and Time* Heidegger calls it "the preliminary task of a 'phenomenological' securing of a paradigmatic being" (SZ,37) In *Being and Time* it is Dasein that is chosen as the paradigmatic being. Therefore the phenomenology in *Being and Time* is called "the phenomenology of Dasein" (SZ,37, cf. GA19,62, GA20,200).

In the phenomenology of Dasein the paradigmatic being is Dasein. This problem is taken up not only in Section 7, but also in Section 2 "The Formal Structure of the Question of Being" in the following way:

"From which being is the meaning of Being to be read off ?  
From which being is the disclosure of Being to get its start ? Is the starting point arbitrary, or does a certain being have priority in the elaboration of the question of Being ? Which is this paradigmatic being and in what sense does it have priority ?" (SZ,7)

Answering this question with Dasein, Heidegger reaches the idea of fundamental ontology as the analytic of Dasein. The phenomenology of Dasein as the problem of the paradigmatic being is related to the idea of fundamental ontology. But how is the problem of the paradigmatic being related to the problem of metaphysics? Heidegger's SS1927 lecture *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* refers to this problem of the paradigmatic being in the following way:

"God is the supreme being, summum ens, the most perfect being, ens perfectissimum. What most perfectly is, is obviously most suited to be the paradigmatic being, from which the idea of Being can be read off. ...Therefore, it is no accident that the science of Being is oriented in a distinctive sense toward the being which is God. This goes so far that Aristotle called the *πρώτη φιλοσοφία*, first philosophy, by the name of *θεολογία*." (GA24,38)

Heidegger here reads the problem of the paradigmatic being in the Aristotelian thesis that first philosophy is theology. This thesis is derived from Aristotle's *Metaphysics* E1.

"If there is an immovable substance, the science of this must be prior and must be first philosophy, and universal in this way, because it is first. And it will belong to this to consider beings qua beings - both what they are and the attributes which belong to them qua beings." (Met.E1, 1026a29-32)

Since ancient times almost all Aristotle interpreters have puzzled over this Aristotelian passage which raises the problem of the dual

conception of first philosophy or metaphysics as ontology and theology. In the SS 1926 lecture Heidegger interprets this passage. This lecture is conceived and given at the same time as *Being and Time*. So this lecture is very important for understanding the meaning and scope of *Being and Time*. Heidegger says the following:

“The dual conception of ontology (science of Being - theology) necessarily belongs together. With the science of beings qua beings we necessarily have the question of a certain being, in which the proper Being purest shows itself. Only in this being can the idea of Being be obtained. Therefore a discipline is necessary which studies the being understood as proper being. ... This orientation toward the proper being is not a special science, but is ontologically oriented. ... The science of Being and science of the supreme being.” (GA22,307)

Heidegger interprets the dual conception of first philosophy in the framework of ontology. Theology treats God or the immovable mover as the supreme being which satisfies the idea of Being in the most appropriate way. So theology is interpreted as oriented toward the idea of Being which belongs to ontology. The idea of Being in Aristotelian ontology is the idea of *energeia* which the immovable mover satisfies in the most appropriate way. Therefore theology is that ontology for which God is the paradigmatic being. Placed in the framework of ontology theology is sublated into ontology.

Right here Heidegger sees the problem of fundamental ontology. In the SS 1926 lecture he speaks of the problem of fundamental ontology in the following way:

“Problem: 1. Fundamental ontology: a being is necessarily paradigmatic and so becomes thematic, but in the aim of getting the understanding of Being in the sense of the concept of Being. ...” (GA22,180)

Heidegger sees the problem of fundamental ontology in the problem of the paradigmatic being. Therefore the question of fundamental ontology is: Which being is the paradigmatic being? For previous ontology the paradigmatic being is God, from which the idea of Being is read off. Confronting this ontology, Heidegger presents the idea of fundamental ontology for which the paradigmatic being is Dasein. Only in terms of this confrontation can we understand the meaning and scope of the phenomenology of Dasein. We find the problem of the dual conception of first philosophy behind this confrontation. *Being and Time* is conceived as a confrontation with previous ontology. Therefore *Being and Time* asks the question of the paradigmatic being as follows:

“From which being is the meaning of Being to be read off? ... Which is this paradigmatic being?” (SZ,7)

This question is the basic question of fundamental ontology. Its meaning and scope can be grasped only in terms of the dual conception of first philosophy as ontology and theology. This question is also related to the problem of an ontical foundation of ontology which Heidegger refers to in the last section in *Being and Time*.

Anyway Heidegger answers this question with Dasein. Fundamental ontology is developed as the analytic of Dasein, or as the phenomenology of Dasein. From the point of view of this conception the phenomenology

of Dasein means a confrontation with that previous ontology for which the paradigmatic being is God.

In this case for Heidegger theology is not Christian, but Greek. The idea of the Good in Plato and the immovable mover in Aristotle are as the divine the subjects of theology. What does it mean that Dasein replaces God as the paradigmatic being? Dasein as the paradigmatic being is determined by the characteristics that the divine has. The idea of the Good has the character of transcendence (*ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας*, beyond the ousia) and is interpreted from the “for-the-sake-of-which” (das Worumwillen, *τὸ ὄ ἐνεκα*) in Aristotle. The immovable mover as the thinking of thinking is pure *energeia*. The divine in Greek theology has the character of these three things, namely, transcendence, the “for-the-sake-of-which”, and *energeia*.

Dasein in *Being and Time* can be interpreted as determined by this triple character. “The transcendence of Dasein’s Being is a distinctive one.” (SZ,38) The “for-the-sake-of-which” (*τὸ ὄ ἐνεκα*) as Worumwillen is the possibility of Dasein. *Energeia* means Being-in-the-telos, namely, Being-at-an-end. For Heidegger “Being-at-an-end means existentially Being-towards-the-end” (SZ,25), namely, Being-towards-death. Being-towards-death as our way of living is a way of *energeia*. According to Aristotle living is a prominent example of *energeia*. Applied to the Being of Dasein, these three characteristics are, of course, transformed because of the finitude of Dasein.

But later concerning the problem of the paradigmatic being Heidegger adds a critical note. “Two different questions here stand side by side. Misleading, above all concerning the role of Dasein.” (GA2,9 Anm.c) The term “paradigmatic” is misleading. (GA2,9 Anm.b) What are these two different questions? One question is the problem of the

paradigmatic being from which the meaning of Being can be read off. The other question is the problem of Dasein as the place of the understanding of Being.

In *Being and Time* Dasein is the subject of investigation, because the understanding of Being belongs to Dasein. In other words this is because Dasein is the place of the understanding of Being, but not because the meaning of Being can be read off from Dasein.

Nevertheless Heidegger uses the term "paradigmatic". Behind this term we have to find his interpretation of and his confrontation with the dual conception of first philosophy or metaphysics. Only against the background of metaphysics can we understand the meaning and scope of the phenomenology of Dasein.

So the phenomenology of Dasein leads us to metaphysics. But this is not because the phenomenology of Dasein treats Dasein as subject and therefore is the metaphysics of subjectivity. One can say this very easily without knowing the dual conception of metaphysics. In our interpretation we can grasp the meaning and scope of the phenomenology of Dasein only by returning to the dual conception of metaphysics. Only in this sense can we see the problem of metaphysics in the phenomenology of Dasein. This is the third point for our topic, "Phenomenology and Metaphysics".

#### IV. The meaning of metaphysics

Now let us summarize our considerations.

In Section 7 in *Being and Time* we have picked up three characteristics of Heidegger's phenomenology. First: the light of phenomena (phenomena are visible in light), second: the phenomenon of phenomenology, and



third: the phenomenology of Dasein. And in these three characteristics we have found the problem of metaphysics. First: the metaphysics of light, second: metaphysics as the Platonic doctrine of ideas, and third: the dual conception of metaphysics as ontology and theology.

The first problem implies the difference of dimension between phenomena and light. Light is beyond phenomena in the sense that light makes phenomena visible. The character of light is the basic function of ideas, which transcend the sensible world. Therefore the first and second problems are related to the transcendence character of metaphysics. The term "meta" of metaphysics traditionally means "trans", namely, transcendence. The third problem is found in Aristotle's work entitled *Metaphysics* from which the very term "metaphysics" springs. The problem of the dual conception of metaphysics has traditionally been the central issue in interpreting Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. The traditional meaning of metaphysics has, I believe, a double character, namely, transcendence and the dual conception as ontology and theology. Our consideration has been oriented toward this traditional meaning of metaphysics.

But Heidegger himself continued to ask the question of metaphysics. So by combining our considerations with the way Heidegger questions metaphysics, we would like to confirm what metaphysics means.

First, the problem of the light of phenomena. In Heidegger's returning from the concept of phenomena to light, we have read off the thesis: "Phenomena are visible in light". This thesis originally expresses the structure of the sensible world. Transferring its sensible structure into the insensible we can say: "Beings are visible in the light of Being". Such a transference can be called metaphor. Here is the problem of "metaphor and metaphysics". The later Heidegger says

the following: "There is the metaphorical only within metaphysics." (*Der Satz vom Grund (The Principle of Reason)*, S.89) In this sense the problem of the light of phenomena leads us to the problem of metaphysics.

Second, the problem of the phenomenon of phenomenology. In this determination we have found the character of the Platonic ideas. Phenomenological ontology in *Being and Time* operates within the Platonic doctrine of ideas. According to Heidegger philosophy as metaphysics begins with Plato's interpreting Being as Ideas. When the later Heidegger criticises metaphysics, he also criticises his own previous philosophy, namely, *Being and Time*. Heidegger's criticism is self-criticism.

Third, the problem of the phenomenology of Dasein. Behind the idea of the phenomenology of Dasein we have discovered Heidegger's critical confrontation with the dual conception of metaphysics as ontology and theology. This dual conception was already important on the way to *Being and Time*. In the WS 1924/25 lecture Heidegger asks the question of the ground of this dual conception. This concept also dominates the path after *Being and Time*. The concept of fundamental ontology in *Being and Time* is transformed into that of metaphysics. Heidegger conceives his own metaphysics, namely, metaphysics as fundamental ontology and metontology, which Professor Crowell will discuss the day after tomorrow (April 7, "Metaphysics, Metontology, and the End of *Being and Time*"). Heidegger's own conception of metaphysics springs from his confrontation with metaphysics. This duality dominates completely his trilogy from 1929, namely, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, "The Essence of Reason", and "What is Metaphysics?". Heidegger's first conception of metaphysics can be called "the metaphysics of transcendence". At the time when Heidegger

criticizes metaphysics, metaphysics is also consistently characterized with this duality, namely, as onto-theo-logy. Phenomenology in *Being and Time* consciously operates within onto-theo-logy.

The later Heidegger characterizes this duality by means of transcendence as follows. "Ontology represents transcendence as the transcendental. Theology represents transcendence as the transcendent." (NII,349) The duality of metaphysics corresponds to these two sorts of transcendence. The problem of metaphysics lies in how one transcends the physical or beings, in other words, how one understands "meta" in "metaphysics". This problem is related to the issue of Professor Bruzina's paper which was given a little while ago. (April 5, "Phenomenological Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics")

From the point of view of metaphysics we have considered phenomenology in *Being and Time*. We have not, however, intended to criticize Heidegger's phenomenology as metaphysics or to find Heidegger's criticism of metaphysics in *Being and Time*. We have, I believe, made clear the dimension in which phenomenology operates in *Being and Time*. *Being and Time* tries to appropriate basic problems of metaphysics by interpreting and confronting metaphysics.

Heidegger seizes phenomenology as a possibility. In *Being and Time* he sees its possibility in the repetition of the question that Plato and Aristotle pose. Our aim here was to understand the possibility that Heidegger saw thus in phenomenology.

Thank you!