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1. Opening Remarks

Societies change endlessly. In the process of this endless change, society will come upon decisive turning points that define eras. Humanity's most recent fundamental change of era is denoted as the 'modern' era and the shift from pre-modern to modern encompasses perhaps the most radical transitions of human history. Of course, the definition of modernity differs between scholars and schools of thoughts. Nevertheless, the majority of studies conducted regarding modernity would concur that the defining institutional configurations of modernity include the national state and the capitalist economy. Previously diverse forms of the state were all but universally unified into national states of centralized power, while virtually all nations converged into the capitalist market economy.

These radical Changes in political and economic structures also insinuates the fundamental restructuring of individual lives. The concepts of time and space may be the most vital elements of this restructuring. As time and space provide the two axes around which the daily lives of individuals are built, conceptual changes to such would naturally bring about new forms of daily life. In particular, the invasiveness of imperialism pervaded through international borders and bound the world into one collective system. As previously unrelated nations became direct and mutual influences, regionally organized individual perceptions of time and space adjusted to the new concepts of world time and world space. With this change, events that occurred in any one place could have influence in unexpected and seemingly unrelated other places, and the perception of time and space as being demarcated by the unit of a single nation grew obsolete. A singularly located temporal transition from pre-modern to modern would then transcend geographical boundaries to echo across the space of the entire globe. This indeed describes the globalization of modernity – movement that is all but impossible to reverse once it is started.

With all this in mind, changing time and space are apparently just as inherently associative to shifting modernity as changing social institutions. In that vein, this article intends to examine what changes in temporal and spatial concepts were brought about by the onset of modernity and how those changes affected both the daily lives of individuals and the administrations of the state in Korea. The emergence of modernity began with Chosun's opening of its ports and subsequent interactions with foreigners during the late nineteenth century. And the trend toward modernity became further accelarated and irreversible during the colonial period. As such, this article will focus on how the Chosun dynasty's traditional concepts of time and space were modernized across the late nineteenth century, particularly under the Japanese colonial rule.

This process of the transition to modernity could not have been entirely smooth, and the dissensions and disarticulations it involved demand examination. It is inevitable that the changes in time and spice felt by the individuals living in this era would be uneven. This tendency was visible throughout the late nineteenth century, as notably demonstrated by two definitive events in early modern Korean history – the Tonghak Peasant War and the Kabo Reform Move-

ment. These two attempts to overcome the threats of encroaching imperialism were the most historically critical steps in the process of transforming to modernity. If these efforts could have been collaborated and unified, history would most likely have taken a very different trajectory. Unfortunately, the two movements established themselves at odds rather than as allies, aggravating national crises and ultimately consigning Chosun to Japanese imperialism. In that vein, this article also seeks to analyze the differences in how the key figures of the Tonghak Peasant War and the Kabo Reform Movement perceived time and space, and how these disparities hindered their cooperation and thereby Korea's voluntary shift to modernity.

2. Traditional Perceptions of Time and Space

When regarding the human perception of time and space, the most basic question is how this perception is formed. Immanuel Kant and Emile Durkheim offer two of the most representative theories on the perception of time and space. Kant suggests that the categories of time and space are a human's most fundamental paradigm for understanding the world. Kant's time and space are a priori perceptions established from the moment of birth because they logically precede the human experience and thus condition it. They are immanent in the human mind by virtue of its inborn constitution. However, Durkheim diametrically challenged Kant's theory by stating that the perceptive categories of time and space originate from societal foundations. As evidence against Kant's claims, Durkheim called upon the understanding that time and space are not eternally fixed structures, but that they themselves change with places and time. As a result of such variability, both time and space must be continually made, unmade and remade (Durkheim, 1965: 28). The ostensibly eternal categories of time and space are subject to variability because they are structures created by society.

If society forms time and space, the core of such "society" is ultimately religion. In order for a particular time and space to be recognized, that time and space must be distinguished and differentiated from others. These differentiations are a matter of collectives, and the most basic collective representations of primitive humanity often coalesced around religion. Durkheim (1965: 23) believed that the division of time into days, weeks, months, years, etc. corresponded to the periodical recurrences of rites, feasts, and public ceremonies. The same is largely true of the perception of space. Spatial representation consists essentially in primary coordination of the data of sensuous experience, which is made possible by placing things differently – putting some at the right, others at the left, these at the north, those at the south, etc. In this way, space could not be what it is if it were not, like time, divided and differentiated. It is evident, for Durkheim (1965: 24), that all these differentiations and distinctions come from the fact that different yet sympathetic, and quite religious, values have been attributed to various regions.

The perception of time and space within traditional Korean society can be understood largely along the same lines. After the founding of Chosun, Confucianism took place as the official state ideology and thus the perceptions of Confucianism were conflated with the perceptions of individuals. The calendar (*ryok,* 歷) – the fundamental Confucian framework for understanding time – was organized according to the cycles of nature. The sun would rise, the moon would rise, and so seasons would pass and years would pass in time with the laws of nature, yet Confucianism further assigned manufactured differentiations and philosophical interpretations to these laws. As the Confucian understanding of the changes in nature hinged on organic reciprocity and the symmetrical harmony of *yin* (陰) and *yang* (陽), these principles likewise inspired the laws and order of the world. The rotational cycles of the sun and moon formed the basis for twelve partitions of the day, which were then endowed with the signs of the zodiac (干支). The cycle between the moon's full-

ness and its disappearance constituted a month, and twelve of these months added up to a year. The changes exhibited by the sun throughout the year delineated the separate seasons and their subdivisions (*cholki,* 節氣).

In this way, traditional Korean society differentiated units of time first and foremost according to the cycles of nature. Utilizing these natural cycles as perceptions of time was a particularly indispensable practice to any traditional agrarian society. Properly timing the processes of sowing seeds, raising crops, and harvesting yields was a crucial matter of survival. Yet the practice of regarding the changing seasons as time carried religious significance as well. Religious rituals invoking an abundant harvest were conducted at the beginning of each year's farming, while feasts were held at the end of every harvest seasons as a means of giving thanks to nature and to the mutual generosity and cooperation of the community. Likewise, the passage of time in the individual's life was also regulated through religious functions. Coming of age rites inducted one into adulthood, families were formed through marriages, funerals were conducted upon death, and the dead were commemorated through ancestral rites, thus fulfilling the four major ceremonies of life stipulated by Confucian religious principles. Even the perception of time within management of the state involved religious meaning. According to Confucian political ideology, the ruler must conduct state business in harmony with the cycles of nature and thus hold appropriate state ceremonies each month and each season (Chung, 2005: 222).

Since their concept of time was established according to natural cycles imbued with religious significance, the Chosun Dynasty's organization of time was circulatory. The cycle of day passing, night falling, night ending, and day returning constituted the unit of one full day. Meanwhile, the succession of spring, summer, fall and winter demarcated the unit of one year. The natural cyclical orders of the universe mandated that the 'part' and the 'whole' were understood as one continuous organism. Furthermore, even subsequent societal changes were not perceived as unilinear progressions, but rather as returns to the past dictated by cyclical logic. The ideal society envisioned in Confucianism was not a figment of a future world but a reproduction of the historical past. This propensity is demonstrated in the reverence of the *yao-shun* (堯舜) era, or the *xia* (夏)*, yin* (殷)*, zhou* (周), as ideal states, as well as the attempts to reenact them as such.

As with the concept of time, the Chosun Dynasty's chief concept of space was imbued with Confucian ideology. The cardinal bearings of north, south, east and west – a core concept to the organization of space – are profoundly important to Confucian religious rites. When conducting ancestral rites, the placement of the ancestral tablet, organization of the food offerings, and arrangement of the descendants participating in the ceremonies are decided according to these bearings. Such arrangement schemes are designed in accordance with Confucian religious meaning. In arranging the world as well, there was a middle civilization at the center of the world, and the surrounding northern, southern, eastern, western directions were each believed to host different forms of barbarism. As such, the fundamental structure for understanding the world was the dichotomy between civilization and barbarism, a division rationalized by the principle of *yin* and *yang*. In the early nineteenth century, the intensified threat that Western aggression posed towards China was understood as a manifestation of the cycle of *yin* and *yang*. This dynamic was interpreted as the Chinese embodiment of *yang* waning in strength while the spirit of *yin* that the West represented came into power (Chung, 2005: 207-208).

The spatial dichotomy known as *hwaikwan* (the civilization and barbarism world view) organized the world according to a Sino-centric perspective, one that designated China as the center of civilization while the rest of the world was divided between a variety of barbarians. This doctrine was hugely influential to Confucian scholars in Chosun. As Yu In-Sok (1973a[1917]: 506) tellingly stated, "China is the standard for the world, the center of sky and earth. The whole

world reels and the heavens crumble when China falls." Though this world order also classified the Chosun dynasty as barbarian (*dongyi* – Eastern barbarians), Chosun's Confucian scholars rationalized that Chosun's assumption of Confucianism had inducted it into the civilized world. Some even went so far as to claim that Chosun's adoption of Confucianism placed it in the tradition of minor Sino-centrism (小中華) and thus away from the customs of barbarism – furthermore, after China fell under the control of such ostensible barbarians and assumed the new name and form of the Qing dynasty, Chosun remained the last true civilized territory in the world (Yu, 1973b[1917]: 6).

Since this organization of the world was contingent on the manufactured dichotomy between China and its surrounding territories, or civilization and barbarism, changes in this traditionally established hierarchy of nations brought on pandemic chaos. For instance, were the peripheral barbarian state of Japan to successfully modernize before Chosun and ascend to superior status, then Chosun intellectuals would be forced to radically revise their spatial understanding of the world. The same was true for the perception of the West. Chosun typically viewed the West as a barbarous place, home to savage hordes. Most crucially, Westerners were a crowd that prioritized gains over virtues and thus must be considered beasts rather than human beings. In this light, Chosun's Confucian intellectuals initially regarded enlightened Japan and Europe with extreme reticence, justifying their unforthcoming reserve with the slogan of "keeping orthodoxy and rejecting heterodoxy" (Yi, 1975[1899]: 391).[1)] Of course, when familiarized with the potency of the West and Japan, such attitudes changed considerably and movements even emerged to campaign for learning from these foreign powers. However, it took an appreciable amount of time for such changes to occur, and the world order would undergo much upheaval before they did.

Hence, it is evident that Confucianism was massively influential in molding individual perceptions of time and space in traditional society. Furthermore, there existed another key authority in formulating these individual perceptions: the particularities of everyday life in an agrarian society. At a time when under-developed industry required the majority of individuals to engage in agriculture, this economic landscape was a decisive factor in daily life – to say nothing of the concepts of time and space. Excepting procedures that specifically required communal efforts (such as seed transplantation or crop harvest), the agricultural production of Chosun was largely regulated through individual labor. For those participating in such production activity, daily life was necessarily structured to optimize agricultural labor efficiency. As a result, time was perceived according to nature and management of labor was developed correspondingly. Time was organized thusly – sunrise meant the start of the workday, hunger was the signal for mealtime, and sunset provided the cue to return home. Rain meant work had to be stopped and the cold that followed the harvest brought time to a virtual standstill. As such, with a few exceptions, the management of time was generally contingent on the individual and thus a personal and innate concept.

The most distinct characteristic of spatial perception in the agrarian society is the conflation of workplace and household. As with any agrarian society, Chosun's agricultural production required a consistently concentrated workforce built on the fundamental unit of the family. All members of the family were utilized as manpower, regardless of gender or age. As the gender division of labor had not yet fully instituitionalized, women often had to shoulder the burden of undertaking both agricultural and domestic works. Children without the latitude of playtime were often indis-

1）Yi Hang-ro, a principal Confucian scholar of the late Chosun dynasty, argued that the West's greed for interest severed them from ethics and etiquette and resulted in the pursuit of heterodoxy; conversely, Chosun's reverence of morals and manners set them on the path of orthodoxy. Such views were widespread amongst Chosun Confucian scholars who had interactions with the West.

criminately mobilized as part of the labor force at home and in the field. Thus the domestic space of the family became a space of concentration of the workforce, not especially distinguishable from the adjoining workplace. The entire family would begin working in the field as the sun rose, and return home with the sunset. The crops produced in the field would be transferred to the domestic space and stored there until undergoing a refinement process and ultimately being consumed by the family or commercialized at the market. In this way, the inextricable coalescence of spaces became one of the defining characteristics of the agrarian society.

3. Modern Transformation in the Perceptions of Time and Space

The abiding pre-modern perceptions of time and space first began to change as a reaction to external turbulence. In particular, China, the purported center of the world, was faltering under the encroachment of the West while China's associate in civilization, Chosun, was facing invasion by Japan considered to be placed in the barbarous periphery. Under the circumstances, reshaping the structure of space was inevitable. The traditional perception of time was weathering fundamental turmoil as well. Unable to reform its cyclical concept of time, Chosun ran aground of its own ineffectual limits while opposing invasion by successfully modernized Japan, based on the linearized and evolutionary concept of time.

Overcoming these limits would require establishing untried organizations of time and space, bolstered by the theory of evolution and the theory of international law (*mankuk kongpub,* 萬國公法). The theory of evolution was disseminated as a solution to the national crises of the late nineteenth century. Existing studies regarding this subject come to divergent conclusions about the effect that the theory of social evolution had on societal change in Korea. While evolutionism is frequently regarded as the progressive theory that engendered democracy and launched the national enlightenment movement, other interpretations suggest that it introduced the logic that would eventually accommodate the dominance of Japanese imperialism (Kim, 2004a: 214).[2)] Despite such conflicting evaluations, the importance of evolutionism in fundamentally rearranging Chosun intellectuals' perceptions of time is undeniable.

The theory of evolution transformed the concept of time from a cyclical retrogression to the past to a linear movement into the future. As evolutionary terminology such as "competition for survival" and "survival of the fittest" was popularized, Chosun society was gradually impelled by the idea that surviving or surpassing competition between nations entailed looking to the future rather than the past (Kim, 1994: 64). Evolutionism at the time strongly argued that evolution was essentially progression, and society's capacities would therefore increase over time. The idea was spread that progression of time did not simply indicate the passage of time but rather advancement over the past. The current powerhouses of the West and Japan were thought to be able to survive competition that spanned the passage of time since these nations had successfully developed through modernization and enlightenment. Conversely, Chosun's national crises were had come about due to the nation traversing the same passage of time and yet failing to move forward through that time. The only solution to the problems Chosun faced was to navigate the time of the future through modernization – thus the notion of needing to incorporate various Western practices circulated widely.

As the concept of time moved from the traditional to the modern, the transition called for a similar conversion of the concept of space. In particular, the previously derided barbarianism of the West and Japan had demonstrated mili-

2） The former interpretation is represented by Shin (1995), and the latter by Ju (1988).

tary and economic prowess far superior to those of Chosun. Thus, these nations were no longer considered barbaric but now regarded as civilized regions. Furthermore, they now provided models for the processes of enlightenment that Chosun would have to undergo, whereas China, once the center of the world, was now expelled from the realm of civilization. And so the boundaries of civilization and barbarism were newly drawn and the nations within were duly reordered.

The theory of international law (*mankuk kongpub*) reflected this new world order. The expression *mankuk kongpub* was adopted and popularized in Chosun from its origin in a Chinese translation by American missionaries William Martin of the book *Elements of International Law*, written by Henry Wheaton (Oh, 2004: 122). The name of *mankuk kongpub* drew particular significance from the idea of *mankuk*, or "all nations." The term *mankuk* indicated laws would apply to all of the world's nations or their interrelations, referring to the previously unfamiliar modern concepts of nation and equality between nations. Previously, the king and the state had been synonymous entities, and the state was seen as being less a public body than it was private property. Yet in the late nineteenth century, there emerged the modern concept of the state as a nation governed not by the individuality of the sovereign but by collective regulations and laws. *Mankuk kongpub* was a vital contributing factor to this transition.

Once the state was recognized as a public body, it began to take the central importance in the perception of spaces. As mentioned above, the traditional organization of space did not hinge on the unit of the nation, but rather on the dichotomy between civilized and barbaric regions. However, if separate nations were to be linked to one another through treaty or legislation, then nations themselves needed to be recognized as valid units of space. Similarly, if nations wanted to be ratified under international legislation, then separate nations needed to be recognized as equal. As nations that were not on equal standing could not agree to any treaty, the proliferation of international laws served as an impetus for reconfiguring the world order. Of course, realpolitik sometimes involved powerful nations utilizing international law to justify their imperialism over less developed nations; nevertheless, the introduction of international laws formally organized equality between nations. For this reason, Chosun intellectuals optimistically expected to use international law as a means to defend their national independence against the invasion of imperialism. These expectations drove much of Chosun society before the Protectorate Treaty of 1905 effectively staunched the ability of international laws to protect Chosun and rendered such hopes meaningless.[3)]

The theories of evolution and international law that had been introduced to Chosun in the late nineteenth century ultimately could not prevent the colonization of Chosun yet still had an indelible effect on the change of Chosun intellectuals' consciousness, particularly with regards to time and space. New perceptions of time and space continued to evolve through the modernization conducted under Japanese imperialism, and gained traction with the elementary changes inflicted on the daily lives of individuals. Electricity was installed, telegraphy was introduced, railroads were laid, roads were constructed, modern education was established, factories were built with the inception of industrialization, new cities were mapped out, Western houses were constructed, and virtually all aspects of daily life were touched. Naturally, such changes altered the perceptions of time and space, sometimes even demanding new perceptions altogether.

The most critical change to the perception of time was that the previously individual standards of time were now

3）After 1905, the Chosun intellectuals' evaluation on international law was fundamentally changed. From this point, intellectuals such as Yu Kil-jun, Park Eun-sik and Shin Chae-ho began adopting critical stances on *mankuk kongpub* (Oh, 2004: 154-155).

orchestrated by collective units into the concept of 'social time.' Whereas individuals once moved independently at their own convenience, personal movement was now regulated through communal and simultaneous gatherings, conveyances, and dispersions. This change can be attributed to several factors but most visible is the change in means of transportation. The new transportation amenities of trains and buses demanded a new structuring of time. The previous practices of starting, stopping, resting and going whenever one wanted was no longer applicable to modes of movement such as trains or buses. A new pattern of collective movement was devised - all had to gather at the train station at a designated time, take the train through uniformly plotted stations, and disembark at a predetermined destination. Such means of movement transformed the idea of individual and personal time to the idea of universally applied and enforced social time. Failing to adjust to this new organization of time would almost definitely mean facing great difficulty in moving through modern spaces or at least being unable to share in certain benefits of modernity.

Schools and factories were other social premises that introduced new experiences of time. As modern schools were established, students were required to gather at school, study certain subjects, and return home, all at a designated time. These regulations of time were not conducted on any personal level but were rather identically applied to all students. Labor culture saw similar changes. The development of industrialization meant a consistent proportion of the population moved to the city to find employment at factories. Unlike in an agrarian society where the labor was conducted solely at the discretion of the individual farmer, the labor process of a factory environment once again demanded a shift to collective social time. Regardless of changes in nature or personal physical conditions, the same rules of time would be identically applied to all. All are required to gather at that designated time to work regardless of the weather conditions, and all are required to eat at the designated time regardless of whether they are hungry.

Discarding the concept of time that was organized according to nature and one's personal preference and volitions was by no means an easy process. The process of switching from individual time to social time required some fairly arduous discipline. The most elementary methods involved notifying all of the mandatory times to keep and instilling these standards into the individual through the utilization of timetables. Train stations, bus stations, classrooms, and workstations all had timetables made, and thus the flow of time began to be controlled. At the same time, individuals were constantly impressed upon that following societally controlled time was both necessary and inevitable.

In order to achieve these ends, several social campaigns were conducted regarding modernized time. In the 1920s, Chosun intellectuals took the initiative to create a discourse about methods of modernly orchestrating time. Various newspapers and magazines carried articles discussing daily routines and time management, while filling out timetables was advertised as a way of improving one's quality of life (Jung, 2006: 111). The colonial government introduced the event known as the 'time day (時の紀念日)' to Chosun in an attempt to alter the general perception of time. The event conducted campaigns touting the virtues of respect for time and punctuality while also distributing clocks. In an era when clocks were fairly rare to own, distributing clocks for the sake of revamping the perception of time was quite a significant task. Clock towers were raised at train stations, important public offices and other strategic locales throughout the city, while schools and factories rang bells and sirens in keeping with time, all in the name of publicizing the modern idea of time. The presence of Westernized clock towers in colonized key cities across the globe is hardly coincidental – they are the remnants of conscious imperialist efforts to enforce modernized mores.

As changes in time are inevitably linked to changes in space, the introduction of modernity is manifest in the concept of space as well. Primarily, the development of industrialization restructured the economy and established urban

spaces as the new economic centers, thus introducing the factory workplace as a new space within daily life. The convergence of people into the city newly regulated the space of the city as well. As urban populations grew to exceed amounts that the traditional cities of Chosun were equipped to handle, the cities began to expand and the concept of city planning was introduced for the first time. Roads were built branching from the heart of the city to its fringes and spaces within the city were distributed and aligned along gridlines (Kim, 2004b). Kyongsung (the old name for Seoul) had been made in the image of a modernized, Westernized city, yet the structure of the grid provided segregation lines that split the city into the Japanese-populated southern section and the Chosun-populated northern section.

Along with urbanization, industrialization changed the scope of space by giving rise to the workplace of the factory. Unlike the largely conflated living and labor spaces of the agrarian society, industrial factories were distant from home and thus induced the separation of work and family. As the conventional wisdom frequently enumerates, this division of space brought on by the development of industry facilitated the gender division of labor with the man going to work and the woman keeping the household.[4)] Archetypically speaking, the division of space dictated that the husband should go to the workplace and labor, while the wife should maintain and manage the domestic space, and the children should go to school and study. Of course, it was a considerable time before this idealized image became universal in reality, but this fundamental pattern was emergent along with the beginning of modernization.

While the domestic space was privatized, the workplace of the factory was transformed into a place of public regulation. In particular, the control of the labor process was conducted in a radically different way. Unlike the agrarian society, wherein the farmer autonomously regulated the entire labor process, the factory operated on a system of divided work, and thus the individual was reduced to one link in a vast chain of labor. Within the system of division of labor, each section of labor could potentially affect the whole production process, requiring strict control of the individual's every action. This form of control was facilitated by managing the individual's labor process through the categories of time and space.

Under the umbrella of ostensibly rational management, modern control of the labor process was conducted through previously discussed systematic division of time as well as extensive division of space. Within the factory, the individual must be placed in a way that maximizes productivity, meaning the individual would be accordingly arranged in any of many decentralized and compartmentalized spaces. The entire labor process is divided as systematically as possible, with the individual spaces being similarly partitioned so as to avoid repetition. Generally speaking, the arrangement of space would minimize the movement of the individual worker in order to maximize use of time and generally optimize production efficiency (Kang, 1997: 148-149). Just as the labor process of the individual is relegated to being one cog of an impersonal machine, the partition of space demands that the worker remain stranded in a small section of the vast space within the factory.

4. Transition in Troubles

Transitioning from traditional concepts of time and space to the modernized versions cannot ever be a completely smooth, harmonious process. Since time and space comprise the most important axis of perception within any individual life, drastic changes to this perception essentially necessitate adopting an unknown lifestyle and worldview. Accord-

4）The schism of workplace and domestic space went beyond simple division of labor and connected to gender inequality. As women were separated and excluded from the public sphere, they assumed an inferior position to men and were designated 'the second sex' (Beauvoir, 1972).

ingly, any transition that couches the individual in completely unfamiliar functions of time and space runs the natural risk of inciting ontological insecurities (Giddens, 1990: 92). Such insecurities can be overcome by forming a collective that is regulated by these novel principles and consolidating the individuals through community, logic that explains some of the emphasis on the modern concept of nation as well as attempts to coalesce individuals through the principles of nationalism. If the previously dominant collectives had been the units of family and local community, individuals were newly conceptualized as members of nations and nationalities while the concepts of nation and nationality became the principal agents of historical narrative. In particular, third-world nations formed the contingent of nation in order to confront the incursion of imperialism and in doing so, created new methods of fulfilling the transition from traditional to modern.

Similar instances can be found in Korean history as well. The crucial impetus for the transition from tradition to modernity was a moment of national crisis and the various efforts put forth to remedy it. Most notable among these were the Tonghak Peasant War and Kabo Reform Movement of 1894. Unfortunately both these endeavors foundered and thus Chosun failed at autonomously achieving modernization and experienced the disgrace of being relegated to a Japanese colony. The fact that the two movements with parallel goals could not unify or at least cooperate is one of the great tragedies of Korean history. The reason they regarded one another with animosity rather than allegiance is due to their disparate perceptions of time and space as necessities of modernization. They judged one another as presences that could not share the same (literal or imagined) space of nationality, while their respective directions for reform were also staked on different understandings of time. Similar to other third-world nations, Chosun adopted the concepts of nation and 'nationality,' which became a new rallying point for overcoming national crises. The question of who belonged in this virtual space of 'nationality' and the question of how the future of nationality should be temporally organized were essentially important issues. Yet the two movements lost the chance of collaborating when they were shown to have fundamentally different perceptions of both questions.

When the relationship between two social movement parties is understood through the framework of nationality, the first and foremost issue is demarcating the boundaries of the 'we' that can share that space of nationality. Although primordialists would state that biological factors such as bloodline, or cultural inheritance such as language and history are the most natural indicators of a shared 'we,' more often than not 'we' must be decided by more artificial and more societal standards. Even when sharing similar biology and histories, different worldviews, political ideologies or class distinctions may draw different nationalistic boundaries and thus formulate different kinds of nationality. When arguing for multiplicity of nationalism, one must even go so far as to reevaluate the claim that nationalism can consolidate a society. The more persuasive claim is that nationalism is not intrinsically inclined towards unification, but can facilitate such only under particular societal circumstances. If anything, nationalism can potentially incite cleavage, conflict, violence and oppression between nationals that share inherent commonalities (Kim, 2012: 386-397).

From this theoretical perspective, the societal agents of the time invoked nationalistic activities with the intention of overcoming national crises, yet could not concur on how to delineate the members of this nation. The reform-oriented bureaucrats and Tonghak peasant army of 1894 fell into this morass as well. Whether due to their as yet underdeveloped concept of nationality or their pursuit of disparate versions of nationalism, they were unable to properly utilize the functionality of social integration nationalism could incur. As previously discussed in this paper, the parameters between 'us' and 'them' within the Chosun dynasty were traditionally determined by the long-standing civilization and

barbarism worldview of Confucian scholars. Accordingly, the classification of 'us' would not be congruent with the concepts of particular nation or nationality, but rather with the Sino-centric Confucian standards of civilization (Kim, 2010: 204). The space called Chosun was not regarded as a space meant for people who shared the same blood, culture, and history, but as a piece of the virtual space meant for those who had accepted the teachings of Confucianism and the Sino-centric world order.

Ironically, though the Kabo reformers sought to change the traditional political structures dominated by Confucian scholars, the two worldviews were not all that drastically different. The reformers divided the world into the two primary factions of 'enlightened' and 'unenlightened,' sometimes with the addition of a 'semi-enlightened' few, which was basically in line with a dichotomous Confucian philosophy essentially developed and adapted from the division of civilization and barbarism. Within these standards, Chosun could not be recognized by Chosun's own esoteric standards. The reformers too organized the world not by the structures of nationalism but by a different, still somewhat vague, version of civilization and barbarism. Although the members of the 'civilization' they idealized differed from those by the Confucian scholars, they are unmistakably similar in their eschewal of the concept of nationality in coordinating their worldviews.

The Tonghak leaders are generally understood to be somewhat clearer on the concept of nationality. Their antagonism towards the West and Japan had been established since the formation of the Tonghak religious sect and became more visible in 1894. During the Tonghak Peasant War, the peasant army's chief slogans included "Rejecting barbarous Japan and the West," clearly illustrating their enmity towards the foreign nations. Moreover, their expressed aversion towards China was indicative of a more distinct and definite sense of Chosun identity. The Tonghak scripture *Yongdam Yusa* (written completely in native vernacular, rather than Chinese characters as in another script *Tongkyoung Taejon*) clearly outlines hostility towards China and the Qing dynasty in particular. And yet even the Tonghak expressed an attitude of reverence towards the cardinal Chinese civilization of the Ming, suggesting that their principles did not extend into complete nationalism but rather remained at the level of proto-nationalism.

Considering that the Kabo reformers and the Tonghak were primarily focused on, respectively, a dichotomous worldview only incidentally concerned with 'Chosun' identity, and a self-identifying type of proto-nationalism, the possibility of them sharing a communal sense of 'us' was slight. If anything, their perspectives precluded each other from the concept of 'us' and even posed one another as threats. It was dubious that the peasant army diametrically opposing to the Japanese army would extend any amity to the reform administration supported by Japanese patronage. In their eyes, the reform cabinet would be a traitorous crowd of Japanese collaborators who posed a threat to the king through their association with Japan. Inversely, the political reformers considered the peasant army no better than a "pack of thieves insisting on a failed state" who were "leading a reckless charge against civilization" (Kim, 1989: 327). In the end, there was no room in either's definition of 'us' for the other party.

Another such reason that the two factions could only regard each other with hostility is that their contradictory directions and methods of social reform placed them on conflicting trajectories that could most likely never be reconciled. This signifies that the frameworks of time each would apply to the nation are essentially dissimilar. The Kabo reformers intended to relinquish the past and venture into modernity in the pursuit of universal reform, while the Tonghak peasant army, by all appearances, intended to remain couched in the time of the past known as tradition.

The Tonghak peasant army demonstrated a certain amount of intent towards modern reforms, such as the abolish-

ment of the social status system, but primarily strove towards a conventionally traditional society. The Tonghak army's envisioned improvement of the governmental and economic structures didn't involve introduction of any modernized reforms, but rather aimed to effectively restore traditional systems (Kim, 2009: 80-81). In that light, their attempts at introducing modernity were generally limited and they strongly tended towards maintaining familiar traditions. As is evident in both Tonghak scripture and the peasant army's 'Righteous Statement,' their idealized reforms involved patterning structures after ancient Chinese civilization such as the *yao-shun* era (oh, 1940: 108). Such statements clarify their desire to replace and rebuild ideal ancient systems for the nineteenth century Chosun.

In this vein, the modern endeavors of the Kabo reformers are all the more discordant with the aims of the Tonghak peasant army. When the peasant army was willing to undertake forward-looking endeavors, as exemplified in their demand for the eradication of social status system, the Kabo reformers favorably responded to them by putting their demands into practice. Unfortunately, however, this type of collaboration between the two parties was rather an exception. In most cases, without the premise of the same directionality of time, reconciliation was all but impossible between them. To further understand the issue from the concept of time, ultimately the Tonghak peasant army and the Kabo reformers could not reconcile with one another within their different frameworks of the past and future, while the peasant army and conservative Confucian scholars were quarreling within the frameworks of the traditions of the past.

5. Concluding Remarks

The process of moving from tradition to modernity is not simply a passage of time, but a sweeping change that reverberates throughout all aspects of society. Not only do the broader institutions of politics and economy change, but the minute lives of individuals must change as well. And underpinning all of these shifts into modernity are the shifts in the perception of space and time. Of course, changing perceptions is no simple process either. New institutions can be implemented and enforced upon the individual from above, but the change of perception requires the process of socialization, through which the individual must personally and autonomously internalize new concepts. In particular, time and space form the most basic pillars of any individual's life, making them all the more contentious to change. Take the individual who worked according to the turns of nature in an open field and place them in the space of a factory where multitudes move according to the same timetables – impossible, without some fundamental revisions to one's worldview.

In this way, changing perceptions of time and space invite fundamental redesigns of society. Turning one society into another requires both the disintegration of the old and the construction of the news, imbuing the process with the dual anxiety of the destruction and the unity of the rebuild (Kern, 1983: 88). The psychological stability we received from long-standing systems of time and space is converted into psychological chaos when those systems become something new. The trigger for this change can be brought on by a shift in time or in space. Time and space are inexorably connected – movement in one inevitably means movement in the other.

Commonly, new systems of time demand new methods of perceiving space and vice versa. For instance, when a new mode of transportation of a train is introduced, the perceptions of space and time will change simultaneously. The train is conventionally a means of moving through space, but in order to use it, we must keep and follow a predetermined structure of time. Thus time and space are inexorably linked, but the element mediating the two is velocity. The speed that the individuals feels when moving from one place to another is quite significant to the perception of time and

space. If the speed is slow, the individual feels continuity during movement and all places between departure and destination develop their own independent significances. Yet if the speed is fast, the departure and arrival will feel like two disparate spots with no connection, the places in between lose all meaning and, if anything, gain meaning as time. Passengers stepped into the train at one place and stepped out of it at another, without much consciousness of having overcome distance. While in train they were more often engaged in captive reading time than gazing out of the carriage window. Particularly if passengers were preoccupied with books and newspapers in the compartment, the train is transformed into a time- or time-space machine (Beaumont and Freeman, 2005: 22-24). No wonder we can imagine that the experience of a Confucian scholar on the back of mule or a farmer who once walked everywhere at his own will now riding on fast moving train might be somewhat similar.

While the changing perceptions of time and space may invite some amount of confusion and anxiety, they can also serve to unify the bonds between individuals. It was particularly because modern perceptions of time and space are not built around the individual but rather structured on the societal level. While not nearly as voluntary or free as expenditure of individual time and space in traditional agrarian societies, almost all individuals are now compelled to move according to the same time and share the same space. People now get on the train, go to school, go to work according to the timetables, and everyone shares the same trains, schools, factories, and spaces. When everyone lives in the same controlled spaces and times and does standardized behaviors, there is an unmistakable sense of unity amongst such individuals.

If sharing new spaces and times does not foster a sense of unity, the society is at risk of falling apart. Accordingly, a necessary element of modernity is taking various measures to ensure that sharing time and space invokes a sense of unity. The standardization of time is practiced by every nation and even across national borders on a global level. The fact that 'nation' and 'nationality' are being rediscovered and emphasized as spaces where one can solidify a sense of personal identity can be understood as another attempt to complete social changes towards modernity. How successfully these changes can be implemented will ultimately decide how successfully modernity can take root. The pioneering nations that succeeded early in such processes achieved modernity to become imperialist nations, while other nations a step behind fell to their colonies. That is how the nations followed heterogeneous trajectories of history in their shift from the traditional to the modern and experienced different pictures of modernity.

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