U.S.-Japan Relations in the 1960s and the U.S. Policy toward the Emerging Regionalism in Asia: Nationalism, Regionalism and Collective Security

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Introduction

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Introduction

A State Department paper reviewing the diplomatic contours of the Lyndon B. Johnson administration from November 1963 through January 1969 recorded that “there has emerged in East Asia a sense of regional interdependence and cooperation” and that the United States had assisted in two areas, security and assistance in social and economic development. The paper further emphasized that the United States was “consistently positive” toward the growth of regional cooperation during this period and assisted “in the emergence and the improvement of international developmental institutions” for “helping the less-developed nations build modern societies.” It also added that “these two tasks are interdependent”, emphasizing that “unless there is the sense of confidence that comes from security, there will be little economic progress, little national cohesiveness, and little improvement in the quality of life of the individual”.¹ An authoritative work on Southeast Asia confirms it, saying that “the growth of regional and subregional cooperation ... was one of the most significant developments of the latter half of the 1960s.” President Johnson himself wrote that “the concept of

¹ Administrative History of the Department of State, Vol. 1, chapter 7, LBJ library, Austin, Texas.

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regionalism in areas outside Europe emerged as one of my administration's most serious commitments in its efforts to build a stable world order."2

The paper will discuss and analyze the regionalism of the 1960s in the context of U.S. foreign policy toward Asia with an emphasis on U.S.-Japan relations. In doing so, it will also try to identify the kinds of challenges that the U.S. government faced as well as the forces that made for the Asian impulses for regionalism in the 1960s. Based upon the analysis of the regionalism of the 1960s, a brief observation will be offered concerning the development of U.S.-Japan relations in the 1960s and its subsequent implications for the peace and stability of this region.

I The Rise of Regionalism and the Johnson Administration

(1) The Johns Hopkins University Speech of April 1965 and Asian Countries' Responses

After the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, Walt W. Rostow, chairman of the State Department Policy Planning Council (PPC) began to come to grips with the issue of regionalism in the developing regions and finally produced a formal PPC paper entitled "Some Reflections on National Security Policy," April 1965. The author of this paper characterized the global situation since the Cuban missile crisis as (a) "a scene marked by some decline in the pressure being exerted from Moscow on the outside world"; (b) "a heightening in various Communist efforts in subversion and guerrilla warfare"; and (c) "a marked rise in assertive nationalism within both the Communist and non-Communist worlds". In other words, the Soviet Union appeared "less formidable" and "on the defensive" in Europe and elsewhere. The Sino-Soviet split and the tendency towards fragmentation within the Communist movement had worsened. The failure of nuclear blackmail in Cuba increasingly forced Communists to turn their attention to the methods of "indirect aggression" such as guerrilla warfare, subversion, programs of aid and trade and ideological struggle. Southeast Asia was under critical test for these methods. Furthermore, the rising nationalism often caused disputes and conflicts in the developing nations, on the one hand, and on

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the other, reflected on their tendency both to reduce their dependence on the United States and to assert a larger role for themselves in world affairs.3

On the basis of the above global assessment, the PPC paper proposed a regionalist approach to resolve "the triangular dilemma" observable in many parts of the world; that is, the clash between simple nationalism, on the one hand, and, on the other, collective security and the requirements for collective action in the solution of social and economic problems.4 Added to the triangular dilemma was another observation about U.S. domestic affairs, that is, American public opinion tended to turn inward and discussion of overcommitment was on their lips. President Johnson, in describing the public mood at that time, observed in his memoirs as follows: "I believed that we had reached a turning point in our relations with the rest of the world. After twenty years of sacrifice, generosity, and often lonely responsibility, the American people felt that other nations should do more for themselves. What worried me most was that we might be tempted to pull away from the world too quickly, before solid foundations could be built to support the desire of other nations for self-reliance. I knew that there was a deep current of isolationism in our country that two world wars had not eliminated."5

President Johnson and his advisors believed there was a middle way between isolationism and overcommitment: to use Johnson's words, "to pull back, but not too far; to reduce our share of the burden, but not too fast; and to urge others to take a larger hand in their own destiny, but not more quickly than they could manage."6

It is important to note that throughout the discussions of the issue of regionalism, there was a consistent realization among Johnson and his advisors of the inadequacy of narrow nationalism and national states as instruments for solving key security, economic, and political problems faced by the developing regions at that time. Even though these policymakers in Washington were aware of their continuing reliance on U.S. power, resources, and political leader-

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3 Rostow memo to Rusk, 3/29/65, LBJ White House Central File, Confidential File, Box 44, LBJ library.
5 Rostow, ibid., p.36. LBJ, The Vantage Point, op. cit., p.347.
6 LBJ, The Vantage Point, p.348.
ship, they also believed that neither the security nor the economic problems confronted in the developing regions could be solved on a simple national or bilateral basis. A proposal submitted at the end of 1965 by Secretary of State Dean Rusk while President Johnson was working on the 1966 State of the Union message also emphasized that “no nation, including the United States, can guarantee its security, its prosperity, or its tranquility by pursuing narrow policies of nationalism.” Therefore, the Rusk memo concluded that Washington’s task was to “find ways of working together”, while respecting “the inescapable interdependence of us all in a world of modern weapons, communications, and close economic linkages.”

Based upon the above observation and analysis of the problems the United States faced, the regionalism advocated by the Johnson administration was expected to cope with the following problems. Firstly, regionalism or “regional cohesion” might moderate unrestrained nationalism and prevent explosive and dangerous situations that such nationalism could create. Secondly, regional cohesion might also make Communist political or military penetration more difficult. Thirdly, it was expected to “provide mutual reinforcements in economic development efforts.” Fourthly, it would permit the United States to downsize its commitments to the extent that regional cooperation yielded those results mentioned above.

President Johnson’s speech delivered at the Johns Hopkins University on April 4, 1965 was the first of its kind that had announced his intention to promote cooperative efforts in Asia for economic and social development in a regional framework. He urged the countries of Southeast Asia “to associate themselves in a greatly expanded cooperative effort for development” and stated that he would ask the Congress to join in a billion dollar American investment in this effort. When Johnson made this speech, he had in mind the development of the Mekong Valley but its focus soon shifted towards the concept of an Asian Development Bank. The Bank’s charter entered into force in August 1966. Following immediately upon normalization of Japan-ROK relations in December 1965, the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), a consultative body of nine nations designed to foster economic and political harmony in the region was launched at

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7 ibid., p.347.
8 Rostow, op.cit., p.37.
South Korean instigation and its creation was announced in June 1966. Then riding on the wave of regionalist impulses, the most important institutional development for regional cooperation followed, that is, the emergence of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on August 8, 1967. Johnson’s Baltimore speech of April 1966 had urged “the countries of Southeast Asia to associate themselves in a greatly expanded cooperative effort for development, and so ASEAN was regarded as a significant diplomatic achievement in Washington.

The United States was substantially involved in the whole process of regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. However, in pursuing this objective, “dramatic U.S. pressure” was considered counterproductive, and U.S. policymakers took the position that the initiative should come from Asian countries. As the State Department’s Administrative History noted, “much of the dynamic of East Asia today derives from what Asians themselves have done.”

So it is necessary to examine how Asian countries responded to Washington’s call for regional cooperation as well as what forces made Asian regional cooperation in the 1960s “not absurd,” though certainly not inevitable.

According to Walt Rostow, there were three forces that made Asian regional cooperation in the 1960s “not absurd”. Firstly, each Asian country had its own local rationale for cooperation on a regional level. South Korea would benefit from a larger grouping in which Japan-ROK relations would be intimate enough but it would not be overwhelmed by Japan, and within which it could obtain a wider support in confronting Moscow, Peking, and/or Pyongyang. For Japan, multilateral institutions would give a mechanism through which Tokyo could play a larger role in the region without evoking painful memories of Japanese imperialism among Asian neighbors. For the Philippines and Thailand, Asian regionalism was a way of finding “local strength and support” and “diluting the image of American tutelage”. For Malaysia and Singapore as well as Australia and New Zealand, Asian regionalism was expected to make up for the British withdrawal as well as closer political and economic association with the dominant trading partner, Japan. For Taiwan, regionalism provided a larger base of political support vis-a-vis Communist China. For Indonesia, after

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9 Administrative History of the State Department, Vol.1, chapter 7, p.7.
the failure of the Communist coup in October 1965, regionalism provided a framework in which to manage its relations with smaller neighbors in an atmosphere of mutual confidence.\textsuperscript{10}

The second reason for the impulse for Asian regionalism in the 1960s was security closely related at that time with the movement of Communist China and the situation within China after the Cultural Revolution. The third reason for the desire of Asian countries for regional cooperation was closely related to the second reason, that is, the feeling shared more clearly after 1966, that the American effort in Vietnam would not last forever. Such a feeling was strengthened by the rising antiwar demonstrations in the United States as well as the Johnson administration's repeated urgings that Asian countries should increase their share of the burden in nation-building. On June 15, Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew said in reference to the American role in Vietnam that the United States was "buying time" for the nations of Asia and "...if we just sit down and believe people are going to buy time forever after for us, then we deserve to perish."\textsuperscript{11}

From his own experiences as well as his own analysis and observation, Rostow made the following generalization about the forces that made for regional cohesion. These forces were (1) the desire "to generate increased strength through greater unity in the face of a heightened security threat"; (2) "to create, through cohesion, a position of greater bargaining strength and dignity" vis-à-vis a large, supportive ally (e.g. the United States) or a disproportionately large or strong member of the regional group (e.g., Japan, Indonesia); (3) "to exploit the narrow economic advantages of regional cooperation".\textsuperscript{12}

American policymakers correctly observed that Japan could play a larger role in this American effort to forge regional multilateral institutions to cope with economic and security challenges including the Vietnam War that Washington had to confront. The subsequent chapters are an attempt to analyze such forces, particularly in connection with U.S.-Japan relations, and see what kind of transformation had occurred in the nature and scope of the U.S.-Japan security treaty system during the 1960s. In our discussion and analysis of these, we will

\textsuperscript{10} Rostow, \textit{op.cit.}, pp.24-25.

\textsuperscript{11} ibid., pp.25-26. Lee's remarks are quoted from ibid., p.14.

\textsuperscript{12} ibid., p.55.
also pay special attention to the differing views of security that existed between
the United States and Japan as such perception gaps about what constituted a
nation's security still continues into the present relationship between the two.

II The Rise of Nationalism and Japan’s Role in Asia

(1) Postwar American conception of Japan’s role

The examination of postwar American conception of Japan’s role in Asia
demonstrates that there were three continuing major themes. Firstly, the
defense of the home islands was Japan’s primary responsibility, so Japan should
increase its defense forces to the extent that the Japanese could defend their
home islands themselves. To that end, the United States encouraged and
assisted Japan to develop military forces against the prevailing pacifist senti-
mements of the Japanese people who strongly supported article 9 of the constitu-
tion. Japan's militarization, therefore, was pushed often under strong U.S.
pressures. Secondly, starting in the late 1950s and the early 1960s, American
policymakers began to show an increasing interest in Japan’s role in extending
technical and economic assistance to the less developed countries in Asia, which
matched the desire of the rising nationalism among the Japanese to play a larger
role in the region. The United States expected Japan to contribute to the
economic development of other Asian countries that would promote their politi-
cal stability. Many Japanese regarded such a role as serving the American
objective of strengthening the free world institutions as well as the peace and
stability of the Asia-Pacific region. However, the United States was not satis-
fied with it because the ultimate U.S. objective was Japan’s security (military in
nature) contribution to the common defense of the free world as well as to the
peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. Therefore, the United States
tried to integrate Japan into the American-led anti-Communist collective secu-
ritry arrangement. Even though this goal declined in priority from the mid-1950s
onward, it never disappeared or was abandoned throughout the Cold War years.
This was the third theme in an American conception of Japan’s role in Asia.

The major change that had occurred in the postwar years was that the
priority shifted from the first and the second theme to the third.
(2) The rise of Japanese nationalism and the Sato administration’s Response to Regionalism

The American Embassy in Tokyo late December 1964 reviewed the situation in defense relationship between the United States and Japan. The review stated U.S. objectives toward Japan in defense field as follows: (a) defense of Japan; (b) use of Japan and closely related area of Okinawa in the whole U.S. and free world military position in the Far East; (c) winning of Japan firmly to the U.S. side as a positive rather than passive participant in U.S. and free world objectives in the Far East. It also stated that (c) was “most important.” Furthermore, the American embassy estimated that the next 3 to 5 years was likely to set the pattern of Japanese thinking and action which would determine a situation in these matters for a long time to come, and recommended that the U.S. government should emphasize Japan’s self-interest in current and future problems of “regional nature in [the] Far East” and the fact that meaningful Japanese defense was possible “only in [the] context of this broader defense effort.” Such a recommendation stressing Japan’s interest in regional security was based upon the critical reflections on the narrow approaches that tended to discuss Japanese defense problems with the Japanese government in the narrow context of the threat to the Japanese islands themselves and the need for Japanese increase of their defense effort to counter this threat or in the narrower context of the need for Japan to buy more military hardware from the United States to offset U.S. military expenditure in the country and ease the global flow problem. These approaches had “produced meager results.” Therefore, the United States thereafter began to emphasize Japan’s interest in regional security.13

On the other hand, the American embassy in Tokyo found within Japan that there was a great deal of discussion in government and private circles of the need for Japan to increase its assistance to developing nations. They also noted a growing realization that Japan had a responsible role to play in assisting LDCs to overcome their political instability.14 A State Department document stated, “Coincident with the improvement of Japan’s aid program was a recognition by Japan that its interests could be seriously affected by foreign political and

13 Reischauer to Rusk, cable 2013, 12/23/64, NSF Country File, Japan, Sato’s Visit, memos and cables [1 of 2], Box 253, LBJ library.
14 Ibid.
economic stability” and as a result, “it became progressively more active in the field of Asian regionalism.”

Prime Minister Eisaku Sato who assumed office in November 1964 himself considered that “Asia defense line runs from the 38th parallel in Korea through Taiwan strait to Vietnam.” Sato’s attitude toward security was closer to U. S. expectations. American ambassador to Japan Edwin O. Reischauer also got an impression that Sato understood and appreciated the contribution of the Okinawa base “to the overall security of Japan and the Far East.” Japanese government circles also stressed that the first emphasis was placed on the recognition of the importance of U.S. bases in Ryukyu “for maintenance of security in [the] Far East.”

Therefore, Sato particularly welcomed the idea that was proposed in the Johns Hopkins University address made by President Johnson. The idea of promoting the economic and social development of Southeast Asia fitted in with Japan’s role in Asia because Sato felt that Japan was not in a position to make military contributions. Encouraged by the Baltimore speech, the Japanese government took the initiative in holding a conference of Asian leaders, and the Southeast Asian Ministerial Conference, the first major postwar international meeting was hosted by Japan in April 1966. Japan stated at the conference that it intended to devote 1% of its GNP to development assistance. It was thereafter held annually and became, in the words of a State Department official, “one of the major institutions of Asian regionalism.”

What was more important as “one of the major institutions of Asian regionalism” was the establishment of the Asian Development Bank. Japan played an early and major role in its creation of November 1966. The Japanese capital contribution of $200 million was equal to that of the United States. Japan was also the first nation to commit part of a $100 million pledge to the ADB special fund. The Sato cabinet was highly conscious of the prestige aspect of the $200 million pledge since this was the first time any nation had matched a major U. S. contribution to an international organization. The Sato cabinet’s concern

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15 Administrative History of the State Department, vol.1, chapter 7, p.32, Box 3.
16 Tokyo to Rusk, cable 2058, 12/29/64, NSF Country file, Japan, memos and cables, Sato Visit Briefing Book [1 of 2].
17 Tokyo to Rusk, cable 2076, 12/30/64, ibid.
with national prestige also reflected on the government’s all-out efforts to bring the ADB headquarters to Tokyo. Even though the efforts did not succeed, the prestige factor was so important the cabinet had made the decision to yield the presidency of the Bank and exert all efforts toward obtaining the headquarters.18

Soon after Sato assumed office in 1964, he took a more high-posture approach to Japan’s role in Asia, which contrasted with his predecessor Hayato Ikeda’s low posture approach. Takeshi Watanabe who was in charge of negotiations with Asian countries and who would become the first ADB president, was quite sensitive to the dangers of such a high-posture approach to Asian neighbors. He felt that Asian nations were not ready to accept an active Japanese role in the region and so took a cautious low-posture approach on the ADB question.19 Sato also found a safer way to pursue his more visible role in Asia, that is, to rely on regional multilateral institutions. Multilateral institutions were to give Japan a convenient mechanism through which Japan could play a larger role in Asia without evoking past memories of Japanese imperialism among Asian neighbors and/or without alienating them by exerting an active leadership.

At the same time, Watanabe’s fears were a little exaggerated. Asia underwent a regional organization boom between 1965 and 1970. Asian countries such as Thailand and South Korea were showing increasing interest in regional economic cooperation. They understood that Japan’s active role was essential in economic cooperation. When chief delegate Koichiro Asakai delivered a lukewarm endorsement of the ADB at the 21st ECAF meeting held in Wellington, New Zealand in early 1965, Asian delegations castigated Japan. Asakai had to quickly cable the Foreign Ministry asking for authorization to co-sponsor rather than merely support the ADB proposal and the request was granted. This episode shows that other Asian countries wanted Japan to play a positive role in the ADB. Ambassador Reischauer observed in April 1965 that some argue the Japanese were “not acceptable in the Far East as leader” but “this is probably not true anymore, especially if the Japanese come bearing enough gifts.”20 Rostow’s generalization that exploitation of “the narrow economic

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19 *ibid.*, p.39.
advantages of regional cooperation” was one of the powerful forces for Asian regionalism seems to apply here.

Lyndon Johnson wrote in his memoirs that there was a deep current of isolationism in American society in the mid-1960s. The American public’s feelings of overcommitment meant to President Johnson and his advisors that the U.S. government had to “pull back, but not too far; to reduce our share of the burden, but not too fast; and to urge others to take a larger hand in their own destiny, but not more quickly than they could manage.” It was pointed out in the previous chapter that American policymakers were well aware of the inadequacy of the nation-state to handle by itself the enormous problems of social and economic development, political stability, and security faced by the developing regions at the time. The desire of the United States to reduce its commitments created a situation conducive to the Asian impulse for regionalism. On the one hand, the United States urged Asian countries to take a larger responsibility for their own destiny. Thus Asian countries felt compelled to “generate increased strength through greater unity in the face of a heightened security threat.” Moreover, Asian countries were still economically weak and needed economic and technical assistance in developing their economies, which also necessitated regional cooperation.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk, in his talks of U.S.-Japan relations with Japanese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Ushiba, pointed out that 400～500 Americans were dying weekly in Vietnam to prove American commitment to her Asian allies and stated that “no longer will the American people accept the role of unilateral policemen and the key question for them is who else will share these responsibilities.” The U.S. desire to withdraw in accordance with the corresponding larger share of responsibility by Asian countries worked as a powerful force behind the Asian impulse for regionalism.

[2 of 2], vol.III, 9/64～10/65, Box 250. LBJ library.
III The Vietnam War and Different Conceptions of National Security

(1) Postwar Japanese conception of security and the Ikeda government

The United States during the Cold War years regarded the military dimension of national security as the most important. We may call it the military-oriented conception of national security or the Cold War conception of national security. On the other hand, a great majority of the Japanese regarded the non-military dimensions as more important in advancing national security. In general, the postwar Japanese conception of national security was largely defined by the strong pacifist sentiments based on the wartime experiences, the postwar occupation reforms, article 9 of the constitution, and the economic constraints. It was also influenced by the difference in perception of threat to Japan's security. National Security Council 5516/1 dated on April 9, 1955, in analyzing the principal conflicts between U.S. and Japanese objectives and interests, complained that “Japan does not regard the threat of aggression against it as seriously as does the United States.” Consequently, although the Japanese looked upon U.S. bases in Japan as protection for Japan, they also regarded them as “serving U.S. strategic interests and as dangerously exposing Japan to nuclear attack in the event of war.” Furthermore, the Japanese conception of national security was influenced by “serious doubt as to whether an acceptable defense of Japan is possible in the event of nuclear war.” Consequently, Japan “puts the development of political stability and economic strength ahead of the development of military power.”

Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda's conception of national security was significantly colored by his observation that the world was becoming increasingly interdependent and economics was becoming the major driving force in world affairs in the 1960s. Ikeda's belief in the power of economics to promote diplomacy and security was further reinforced by his encounter with the EEC in Western Europe during his trip to European countries. After his return from the trip in November 1963, Ikeda delivered a speech at the Hibiya City Hall on the 29th to the effect that the EEC would become stronger economically, and would eventually have the power to deter war. With Japan's role in Asia in

22 NSC 5516/1 “U.S. Policy toward Japan,” Records of NSC, RG 273, National Archives, Washington D.C.
mind, he emphasized in the speech that the world was becoming interdependent and no country would be prosperous in isolation or without mutual cooperation.

In early 1964 Rusk met Ikeda at the Prime Minister’s residence and urged Japan to increase its defense effort. Ikeda replied that Japan wanted to “show the countries of Southeast Asia what can be done by adopting the philosophy of free institutions and that “Japan’s national mission” was “to contribute to solving the north-south problem by making greater contribution to the development of the countries in Southeast Asia.”

Article 2 of the U.S.-Japan security treaty revised in 1960 states that the parties “will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations” (a) “by strengthening their free institutions,” (b) “by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded,” and (c) “by promoting conditions of stability and well-being.” This so-called “economic clause” reflected a realization of policymakers of both countries that the bilateral security relations must be built on a broader economic and political foundation. The Joint U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs was established following the Ikeda-Kennedy meeting in June 1961 to achieve the purposes stated in Article 2 of the revised security treaty. Such a redefinition of the security treaty matched Prime Minister Ikeda’s conception of Japan’s role as a rising economic power in Asia against the background of the growing desire of the Japanese to play a larger role in the region in terms of technical and economic assistance to the developing countries.

(2) The Sato government and the Vietnam War

Prime Minister Sato’s own personal conception of national security was closer to a more traditional conception of security based upon the balance of power. However, even Sato could not and did not deny the prevailing Japanese view that economics could contribute to stability and peace in Asia.

The years of the Sato government corresponded to the years of escalation of the Vietnam war, which severely strained the bilateral relations. Rusk,

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during the luncheon meeting with the Japanese delegation to the 4th meeting of the Joint U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs in July 1965, observed that "nothing since the security treaty riots of 1960 has so seriously affected American-Japanese relations as our recent actions in Vietnam."24

Behind the strained relations involving the Vietnam War were different conceptions of national security between Japanese and Americans. From a Japanese perspective the Vietnam war was America's war. On the other hand, from an American perspective it was fought against Communism and for the free world. Moreover, it seemed to Sato and the Japanese people that the United States relied too much upon military means in the war without fully exploiting avenues of negotiations and talks. When Reischauer met Sato on December 29, 1964, the Prime Minister stated that he recognized U.S. making great sacrifices in Vietnam but stressed that the most important problem was "to create civil stability and protect against guerrillas." He further added that it would be much easier for Japan to assist in a framework of the United Nations which could get involved in some way, through technical assistance, UNICEF, WHO, etc.25

The gap in perception of threat also continued to influence the bilateral relations. A briefing paper prepared in November 1967 for Prime Minister Sato's visit to Washington D.C. pointed out that the factors that had inhibited an accelerated Japanese defense build-up in the postwar period "are diminishing in importance" but that Japanese still felt there was "little likelihood of an attack from U.S.S.R. or Communist China" and therefore the military rationale for a more concentrated effort for the defense build-up was lacking.26 Nowhere was such perception gap greater in their attitude toward Communist China. In early 1964 Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira said to Rusk that he understood American attitudes and feelings toward Communist China explainable by bitter experiences in Korea, Southeast Asia, etc., but that Japanese people felt differently about China. In October 1964 George F. Kennan published an article in Foreign Affairs in which he noted the difference between American and Japanese

conceptions of China and suggested that the United States should not prevent Japan from improving relations with China. This article, according to Reischauer aroused “considerable interest in Japan”, “already producing strong reactions.” The ambassador felt it particularly desirable to refute Kennan’s assumption that the United States was a chief restraining factor in development of Japanese-Chinese relations. He pointed out that “this is belief of many of the intellectuals with whom he [Kennan] talked but not of the government.” He at least confirmed that Japanese public opinion felt differently from the Japanese government. Despite Prime Minister Sato’s tougher stance toward Communist China, Secretary Rusk, in his as late as September 4 1967 memorandum to the President, was still complaining that Japan lacked a mature and responsible attitude with regards to the threat posed by Communist China and its neighboring countries’ domestic instability.

(3) Perception Gap about the Role of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty

The difference in perception of threats and interests between the two countries naturally had an impact on the differing views about the role of the security treaty. The primary and ultimate objective of the United States was Japan’s contribution to regional security, so the treaty was expected to serve “the maintenance of peace and stability in the Far East.” A Policy Planning Council paper of December 1968 described it clearly.

“Even now, there are no major U.S. units in Japan directly committed to the defense of Japan... The preponderance of U.S. forces in Japan are combat and service support units related to the execution of U.S. general war and contingency plans with regional scope and tasks, not exclusively for defense of Japan... Their missions include logistic support for operations in Korea; and defense of Northeast Asia; strategic force operations in the Western Pacific/Asia area; and forward maintenance and repair for the fleet... There are no U.S. forces with missions exclusively for air defense of Japan. To those Japanese who do not see their country’s security in regional context, the presence of U.S. bases which...
serve a regional purpose means nothing but trouble with no compensating gains."29

On the other hand, the Japanese tended to confine its role to the defense of Japan proper. Therefore, as a State Department Policy Planning Council paper of December 1968 stated, U.S. policymakers thought it "prudent to share with the Japanese some responsibilities associated with defense of Japan," and at the same time "to stress the benefits to Japan of the broader regional security role of U.S. forces which depend on U.S. bases in Japanese territory." A memorandum prepared in the American embassy in Tokyo in June 1968 also pointed out that U.S. bases in Japan were regarded by Japanese as "a nuisance which must be tolerated" and "a price to be paid for other aspects as such do not constitute any political asset on which the Japanese leadership can capitalize...."30 Because of such Japanese attitude, President Johnson made stern remarks to Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson that "if our relationship was to survive in the long run, the Japanese would have to overcome their one-sided view of that relationship." He was convinced that "Japan cannot go on accepting security gratis from U.S. without better recognizing its own obligations implied by our presently close relationship."31 American-Japanese perception gaps about the role of the security treaty remained substantial throughout the Cold War years and continued to be a major source of contention in the bilateral security relations.

IV Conclusions

During the 1960s the United States faced "the triangular dilemma", that is, the clash between nationalism, collective security, and the requirements for collective action in the solution of social and economic problems. Added to this triangular dilemma was the problem of growing isolationist sentiments in American society. The latter found its expression in the persistent U.S. effort to pressure Asian countries to share a larger responsibility for their own destiny. Closely related to such U.S. impulses for burden-sharing was a consistent realiza-

31 Alfred Jenkins, memo for Mr. Rostow, 6/14/68, NSF Country File, Japan, memos, Vol. VI, 10/67-12/68. Box 252. LBJ library.
tion among Washington policymakers of the inadequacy of narrow nationalism and national states including the U.S. as instruments for solving key security, economic, political problems faced by the developing regions at that time. The regionalism advocated by the Johnson administration was expected to cope with these problems of the 1960s.

These problems that the United States faced, combined with the U.S. desire to reduce its commitments, also significantly influenced the attitudes of Asian countries including Japan, and produced the forces that made for Asian regionalism in the 1960s. These forces were the desire (a) to generate increased strength through associations and regional cooperation in the face of a heightened security threat; (b) to create, through a multilateral framework, a position of greater bargaining power and autonomy vis-a-vis a powerful ally or a disproportionately strong member of the regional group, and (c) to try to obtain economic benefits by regional cooperation.

Washington policymakers correctly observed that they could take advantage of Japan's growing nationalism to build regional multilateral institutions through which Japanese technical and economic assistance could be usefully channeled into the developing countries for economic development and political stability. In Washington's view Japan's economic achievements restored confidence among the Japanese and they were considered ready to play a larger role in Asia. Moreover, Japan's contribution to the economic development and stability of the region would not only help contain the Communist encroachments but also meet the American public's growing desire to reduce the U.S. commitments in their increased disillusionment with the war in Vietnam.

In their efforts to induce Japan to play a larger role, the U.S. government soon found there were obstacles to overcome; the differences in conception of security and perception of threats that were deeply rooted in the wartime experiences among the Japanese. A briefing paper entitled "defense of Japan" prepared in mid-November 1967 for the visit to Washington D.C. of Prime Minister Sato listed "the factors that have inhibited an accelerated Japanese defense build-up in the postwar period" as follows: (a) a lack of a sense of an attack from the Soviet Union or Communist China, (b) constitutional restrictions, (c) widespread pacifism, (d) concern about an adverse reaction from formerly Japanese-occupied countries, (e) the Japanese public's continuing
"nuclear allergy", and (f) a continuing reluctance to divert resources from economic goals to defense.\(^{32}\) Such differences were sharpened by the war in Vietnam and its adverse impact on the Japanese domestic opinion. As the above briefing paper mentions, the difference in perceptions of threats and interests between the two countries also led to the differing views about the role of the bilateral security treaty. On the one hand, Washington wanted Japan to contribute to regional security, and, on the other, Japan continued to restrict the role of the Japanese self-defense forces to the defense of Japan proper.

However, it should be noted that Washington officials made strenuous efforts during this period to persuade the Sato government to recognize not only the benefits to Japan of the broader regional security role of U.S. forces stationed in Japan, but also the need for Japan to play a security role of regional nature. Prime Minister Sato accepted the challenge and began a vigorous campaign to educate the Japanese along the lines suggested by Washington.\(^{33}\) Such efforts by the Sato government gradually began to have an impact on the Japanese public, and the same document went on to observe that these inhibitions "are diminishing in importance."\(^{34}\)

The process through which the attitude of the Japanese public toward the bilateral security treaty changed was a long-term one and their subsequent attitudinal change a result of many related forces (factors) that influenced them. Nevertheless, the Sato government's campaign to educate the public was one of the important elements for the significant change of the Japanese attitude toward the bilateral security system. The Sato government paved a way for narrowing the persistent gaps between the two countries with respect to the difference in perceptions of threats and interests as well as their differing conceptions of national security which reflected upon their views of the role of the U.S.-Japan security system in East Asia.

\(^{34}\) see note (30)

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However, it is important to bear in mind that all of these inhibitions have formed the basis of the postwar Japanese conception of national security that emphasizes non-military dimensions and that they remained substantial throughout the 1960s, though in varying degrees of intensity. Moreover, Japan played a significant role in contributing to the peace and stability of this region, and such a contribution in the non-military field was made possible by the Japanese people's adherence to their own conception of national security and their wisdom to keep the "division of labor" between Japan and the U.S. within the framework of the bilateral alliance.

This conception has competed with the military-oriented Cold War conception of national security pursued by the United States. The Nye initiative that began in November 1994 to expand Japan's security role from the defense of Japan proper to region-wide and global security was one of the most recent such efforts to challenge the prevailing Japanese conception of national security deeply rooted in the costly and tragic wartime experiences of the Japanese people and the lessons learned from those experiences. There is no doubt such Japanese conception of security as well as the lessons learned from the defeat in the Asia-Pacific war is under serious challenge today. How the Japanese people handle the "new guidelines" bills now under deliberations in the Diet will have serious future implications and consequences not only for the security and prosperity of the Japanese people but also for the stability and peace in the Asia-Pacific as a whole. In this context as well as at this critical juncture of U.S.-Japan relations, it is worth paying due recognition to the historical significance of the important contribution that the Japanese people made during the Cold War period in promoting the economic development and political stability of this region as such non-military contribution certainly has no less significant security implications.