

A Metarepresentational Account of Surface and Deep Anaphora: Beyond Linguistic Control and Pragmatic Control

大津, 隆広
九州大学大学院言語文化研究院

<https://hdl.handle.net/2324/2004803>

出版情報 : 2007-07-08. International Pragmatics Association
バージョン :
権利関係 :

**A Metarepresentational Account of Surface and Deep Anaphora:
Beyond Linguistic Control and Pragmatic Control**

Takahiro Otsu

Faculty of Languages and Cultures

Kyushu University, Japan

It is now commonly accepted that natural language involves two different anaphoric processes: deep anaphora can be used deictically, allowing pragmatic control, whereas surface anaphora requires syntactic parallelism between anaphor and linguistic antecedent (cf. Hankamer and Sag (1976)). However, this dichotomy is intrinsically incomplete. In the first instance, it fails to explain why some types of surface anaphora, verb-phrase ellipsis for example, are pragmatically controlled in discourse initial contexts. Ad hoc explanations have been made on the basis of them being exceptions (cf. Hankamer and Sag (1976), Schachter (1977), Stanley (2000), Merchant (2004)). In fact, pragmatically-controlled surface anaphora is not limited to verb-phrase ellipsis. Secondly, even deep anaphora is subject to morphosyntactic control such as number marking (cf. Ryck and Verluyten (1981, 1985)). Thirdly, there is a difference in the degree of syntactic consistency between surface anaphor and antecedent. Consistency constraints applying to verb-phrase ellipsis or sluicing are more gentle than those constraints on other types of surface anaphora (cf. Murphy (1985)). Besides, surface anaphors used across speakers are likely to have a more flexible consistency than those used by a single speaker.

I reject the characterization of surface and deep anaphora in terms of linguistic and pragmatic control, and instead propose that anaphoric processes are controlled by the same cognitive principle: metarepresentations (i.e. interpreted thoughts or utterances) (Wilson (2000), Noh (2000)) involve a pragmatic enrichment of the incomplete logical form of anaphoric expressions. Anaphora resolution relies heavily on the addressees metarepresentational abilities in the sense that the referents of anaphoric expressions are accessible in the conceptual mental representations of the speaker who uses those expressions. Anaphoric expressions, phonologically realized or not, encode a procedure of instructing the addressee to search for their referent within these metarepresentations. Given a metarepresentational aspect, deictic expressions and deep anaphors, which had formally been placed in the same category, encode a different interpretive procedure for referent identification: deictic expressions require the addressee to refer to a real-world object or situation, whereas deep anaphoric expressions instruct the addressee to get access to the speakers conceptual metarepresentation. One might find a crucial difference in the purpose of accessing the speakers metarepresentations between the two types of anaphora. Representing another representation is the very purpose for the interpretation of deep anaphora, and therefore, definite identification of the referent is not necessarily required. In the case of surface anaphora, it serves as a means for recovering the propositional content of the incomplete linguistic expression. Hence, more precise identification drawn from the immediate discourse is an inevitable step towards the interpretation of the utterance in which surface anaphoric expressions occur.

<https://cdn.ymaws.com/pragmatics.international/resource/collection/C57D1855-A3BB-40D8-A977-4732784F7B21/10th%20IPC%20abstracts-Göteborg.pdf>