

The Recruiting Strategies and Mechanisms of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood under Authoritarian Regimes

モハメド, シャミ, ムクボア, アブデウルカハル

<https://doi.org/10.15017/1866239>

出版情報 : 九州大学, 2017, 博士 (比較社会文化), 課程博士
バージョン :
権利関係 :

**THE RECRUITING STRATEGIES AND
MECHANISMS OF THE EGYPTIAN
MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD
UNDER AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES**

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April, 2017

Abstract

This study examines and analyzes the role played by Islamic ideology, organizational structure, economic activities and social services, and media involvement in recruiting many Egyptians to support the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (EMB). The study scrutinizes the continuing impact of these factors since the inception of the organization in 1928 to date on the EMB's political mobilization. The study argues that the interpretation of Islam, the anti-colonialism rhetoric, the renaissance of Islam and the move to establish an International Muslim bloc used by the organization are still relevant and were useful in bringing the Brotherhood to power in 2012.

Moreover, the organizational structure and the different branches supervised by the headquarters play a crucial role in consolidating the movement and sustaining its political and social engagements. Further, the economic activities and social and welfare services also play a vital role in the EMB's political mobilization. Lastly, the Brotherhood effectively uses media in propagating its ideology and agenda, especially through the use of social media, which is currently one of the most effective media sources used by the organization to survive from the suppressive tactics used by the Egyptian government authority.

The EMB's political mobilization is basically the combination of several strategies and mechanisms, from the monarchy era to date, headed by focusing more on preaching its ideology, providing economic activities and social services during the monarchy era in the 1930s, due to the none-burden usage of mosques by the organization and the miserable economic situations the country faced. Moreover, the EMB continued enlarging and consolidating its organizational structure in the 1960s and 1970s as the organization became national-wide, and, finally, using all available media tools provided by the information technology and the use of international broadcasts.

In the 1980s to date, the organization again shaped its ideology through preaching democracy, flexible interpretation of the Islamic *sharia* to fit the democratic and economic dynamisms enhanced by the 21st century. Furthermore, evaluating the roles played by the different sections embodied by the organizational structure has been achieved by the organization in order to preserve its existence from the various suppressive tactics used by Mubarak and later by Abdel Fattah al-Sisi's regimes.

With the break of fear generated by the Egyptian Uprising in January 2011, the EMB used all its political ideology, its organizational structure, its economic and social services through its social media coverage and the Qatari Al-Jazeera channel to win the parliamentary and presidential elections in 2012.

It is obvious that the Brotherhood, now legally disbanded, but spiritually intact in the minds of many Egyptians, is likely to continue surviving and evolve due to its continuous revision of its political strategies and mechanisms. Even though it underwent during mainly a period of brutal suppression under Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the organization might be able to constantly adjust its political tactics in order to come back to the Egyptian political scene.

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For all my family members, professors and friends, especially Mohamed Misbahou and Atin Supartini besides Moukrimah, Bisharah, Moutassem and Rafiqah, who supported me during my research period. Thank you all for your encouragement and kindness.

Definitions of Terminology

Middle East: is restricted to the Arab native-speaking countries, plus Turkey and Iran

Strategies: Indirect Recruitment

Mechanisms: Direct Recruitment

Arab World: All countries where the Arabic language is the mother tongue. Iran and Turkey are excluded.

North Africa: Includes Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and a part of Egypt west of the Gulf of Suez Canal.

Arab Uprising: Arab Spring or Arab Awakening: Huge protests against governments in some countries including Egypt; started from Tunisia in 2010.

Ulama: An Arabic word meaning ‘scholars’.

Vanguard party: A concept invented by Lenin to describe the communist party as a revolutionary party, well committed to reach its goal.

Ijtihad: Arabic word with several interpretations: Diligence, judgment, conscientiousness, assiduity, studiousness.

Supreme Caliph: In the past, Muslims’ leaders used to be called *Caliph* like the president or prime minister according to today’s concepts. However, a *Caliph* has more power than today’s presidents or prime ministers.

Islamism: Although it has diverse interpretations, it has the same meaning as Political Islam in this study.

Political Islam: The definitions have been highlighted in chapter 1. It is interpreted here as the ideology of the Brotherhood.

Khilafah: An Arabic word meaning *Caliphate*.

Sharia: Law or constitution generated by the Islamic school of thought.

U.S. State Department: The department of the U.S. federal government that sets forth and maintains the foreign policy of the United States.

Tasht: Name of an Egyptian communist party in the past.

The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Centre: An Israeli-based research group with close ties to the Israel Defense Forces.

Abbreviations

AARP	American Association of Retired Persons
AKP	The Turkish Justice and Development Party
<i>Al-Islah</i> (YCR)	Yemeni Congregation for Reform
CDU	the Christian Democratic Union of Germany
CPSU	The Communist Party of the Soviet Union
EGP	Egyptian pound
EMB	Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood
FJP	The Freedom and Justice Party
FO	Free Officers
<i>Hamas</i>	The Palestinian Hamas
ICP	Italian Communist Party
LJCP	The Libyan Justice and Construction Party
MB	Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan
ODEP	Open Door Economy Policy
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PT	period of time
SMB	the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood
The <i>Ennahda</i>	The (Renaissance) Movement Party of Tunisia
USDS	United States Department of State

Chapter I

Introduction

The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (EMB) is the oldest, the most controversial and most active Islamist movement compared to others such as *al-Takfir wa'l Hijrah*, *al-Jihad al-Islami* and *al-Jama al-Islamiyya* and also compared to its analogues in Palestine, Syria, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco and so forth, not only in the Middle East region but also in the World. “During the period of its inception in the 1930s, there existed a few Islamic associations, youth movements and a political party which appealed to the same groups as the EMB, and propagated, at least in certain periods, a similar ideology. None of them, however, experienced an expansion comparable to that of the EMB” (Lia 1998, 2). The EMB and its analogues are large umbrella organizations encompassing individuals and factions with different and at times conflicting worldview, values and opinions (Wickham 2013, 7). Rubin’s work leads him to conclude about the EMB’s expansionism; “[I]n the 1930s, EMB’s members reached tens of thousands, large arms caches and a strong base in the police and army” (Rubin 1990, 10). This robust movement is considered to be the heart and the soul of several Muslim Brotherhood movements in the Middle East and in the entire World (Pargeter 2010, 15). According to Ben Morris Lindstrom-Ives, “due largely to its successful work as a benevolent society in Egypt along with growing protests against Zionist settlements in the British Mandate of Palestine, membership in the Brotherhood would increase from around 800 in 1936 to 200,000 by 1938. By 1938, the Brotherhood was for the first time in its history truly engaged in politics”¹ (Lindstrom-Ives 2015, 9).

The organization is a social movement that functions as a political party in some instances. Since its foundation in 1928, under successive authoritarian Egyptian regimes, the Brotherhood has continued increasing its supporters within Egyptian society (Mitchell 1969, 5). The social, religious and political activities engaged in by the movement made it one of the main actors in Egyptian politics, especially after the organization formally dismissed its connections to violence, stating that Islamists who have engaged in violence have formally left the Brotherhood and often renounced it prior to their embrace of jihadism (Al-Baz 2010, 182).

The influence of the EMB reached its height in the 1940s and 1950s. Accordingly, it is argued, the Brotherhood’s institutions reached throughout Egyptian society, including a section called the Secret Apparatus which was responsible for military training. “By 1948, the

¹ In a recorded interview with Aljazeera’s journalist Ahmed Mansour in 2006, Yusuf Nada, the noted businessman and Muslim Brotherhood financial strategist, who was in charge of the international Relations’ affairs of the EMB, claimed that the Muslim Brotherhood’s members in general are about 7,000,000. However, this particular study did not verify nor consider this number because this study is exclusively about the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt only.

Muslim Brotherhood played a particularly prominent role in raising funds, purchasing weapons, running military training camps, and sending hundreds of volunteers to fight in Palestine. By this time, the Brotherhood's membership had risen to over half a million. Students, workers, civil servants, and the urban poor attended its meetings and enthusiastically echoed its ideology" (Rubin 1990, 11). Consequently, the EMB experienced conflicts, but also alliances, with most regimes, including the royal power that started in 1923 and ended in 1952 (Al-Baz 2010, 215). Furthermore, during the military regime that began on July 23, 1952, until the end of President Hosni Mubarak's era on February 11, 2011, the organization used different strategies and mechanisms to mobilize supporters (Bal 2014, 263).

As for its agenda, the movement's primary short-term goal has been to rule Egypt under influential Islamic policy (Rubin 1990, 17). However, the movement stresses its willingness to participate in the democratic process (Pargeter 2010, 9). In addition, it projects itself as pacific, although some of its branches were directly involved in violent action in the 1960s and 1970s as well (Pargeter 2010, 11). Consequently, the historical legacy of violence became a cause for condemnation of the movement. The secondary controversial characteristics of the EMB is its transnational agenda that emphasizes the unity of the entire Muslim World starting from the Arab region under its leadership (Monier & Ranko 2013). "When one visits the EMB's own wiki site, Ikhwanwiki, there is a section dedicated to its diverse presence and connections not only across the Middle East and North Africa (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, the Palestinian Territories, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahraini, Qatar and Yemen) but also elsewhere across the globe including Indonesia, the United States of America, Germany, Bosnia Herzegovina, Chechnya, Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, Senegal, Nigeria, Mauritania, Pakistan and Afghanistan" (Milton-Edwards 2016, 5). This international plan causes severe political confrontations with national and regional governments (Fuller 2004). This suggests that the organization is considered as a political opponent of both the socialist and monarchy regimes in the Middle East in particular. In the international arena, the EMB is controversial among various powers, such as the United States, under successive administrations, the European Union and others (Vidino 2013).

In the past, during oppressive tactics by the governments when it appeared as a threat in the eyes of government authorities, the organization has been cloaked in secrecy (Pargeter 2010, 16). Its members have been banned in several Middle Eastern states. Under some Middle East regimes, its members were subject to intimidation, detention and torture (Reuters 2015). The fear of being connected to the Brotherhood has contributed to a culture of suppression. This has inspired accusations of 'double speak,' creating the impression in some quarters that the movement is not to be trusted (UCIS 2010). Ambiguity over many issues, such as violence, the role of women, the role of non-Muslim minorities in Egypt and

others, has further contributed to this perception (Vidino 2013, 2). Although the Brotherhood has adopted a more open and transparent approach in recent years, the negative effects of this tradition of mystery continue to trouble the movement even though it was in conflict with the secessionist group known as Muhammad's Youth (Shabab Muhammad) in 1939-40 (Lia 1998, 10) and currently in conflict with violent Islamist organizations such as al-Qaeda. "Perhaps the most frequently cited example of this latter point is the one-time Brother and now leading al-Qaeda as its ideologue, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who famously criticized the Brotherhood in his 1991 book: *The Bitter Harvest (al-Hisad al-murr)* for forsaking the Islamic obligations of jihad" (Rosen 2008).

In spite of the foregoing, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood "remains a potent force both in the Middle East and in the political Islamist movements more widely" (Pargeter 2010, 10). This is due in part because it falls within the tradition of the reformist school that emerged in Egypt in the late 19th century (Rubin 1990, 31). This ideology was criticized as "stern anti-Westernism, Fanatism and xenophobia by an American researcher, Christina P. Harris in 1964" (Harris 1964). According to Brynjar Lia, "this was evidently the traditional view of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950s and 1960s" (Lia 1998, 4). Furthermore, the organization focuses on issues of public morality and the preservation of traditional values, as much as it has engaged in politics (Mitchell 1969, 2). During the Egyptian Uprising that started on January 25, 2011, a political opportunity was offered to the Brotherhood. Its active members worked days and nights to gain more sympathizers and supporters to participate in the struggle to remove Mubarak from power. These activities were well executed by the Brotherhood, due to its experience in the field of social services and welfare activities and others from its inception in 1928. In fact, its opponents often recognize the long experience of the Brotherhood in the field of political mobilization, especially 'the *Wafd*,' the Egyptian historical and nationalist political party (Rubin 1990, 32).

As a political power, the movement gained the attention of the international community as it worked to replace the Egyptian authority after the collapse of the Mubarak's regime. This attention was due to the movement's organizational and mobilization capability through its consolidated network across the country. According to the second chairman of the organization, Khairat al-Shateri, more than 200 international institutions, such as Embassies, journalists, political parties, foreign ministers and so forth from around the World, held meetings on a weekly basis with the organization's leadership after the collapse of the Mubarak's regime, in order to get accurate information about its ideology and its political agenda (Aljazeera 2011). In the case of the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, the U.S. expected the EMB to take a flexible approach towards the existing peace treaty, made in 1979 between the Egyptian and the Israeli authorities (Alpher & Shikaki 1998). However, there was no trust from either the U.S. or the Israeli authorities toward the organization according to the analysis suggested by the author of this work, due to mainly its

full support on Hamas, an Islamist organization fighting against the Israeli authorities since its formation in 1987 (Janssen 2009).

The events of the Egyptian Uprising in 2011, however, brought the Brotherhood to power through democratic elections held in 2012. Subsequently, the movement ruled the country from 30 June, 2012 to 3 July, 2013. This short regime was controversial in the eyes of its opponents because, in part, of an attempt to introduce a fundamentalist Islamic theocracy, lack of clear political and economic programs, monopolization of the judiciary, parliamentary and executive powers under the EMB's leadership, and a failure to provide for the basic survival of the citizens (Sheira 2013, 18). Nevertheless, the organization and its supporters rejected all these allegations, accusing the military and other opponents of working to undermine the new regime through the old regime's dominance of key positions of the state. These economic and judiciary failures led to an uprising against the regime of the Brotherhood. The military intervened and finally carried out a *coup d'état* against the new regime. This regime change was accomplished by the military with suppressive and brutal actions that cost many lives and caused severe injuries. According to Huwaidi (2013), the EMB lost 2700 members and supporters, with 16, 000 injured.

The quest for a deeper understanding of the EMB is a challenge researchers of Middle East studies continue to face. However, among the vital aspects of the study of the Muslim Brotherhood organization that should be presented, examined and analyzed are its main recruiting strategies and mechanisms. This study shows that the main recruiting mechanisms and strategies of the Brotherhood are the ideology, the organizational structure, its economic and social services and its media involvement. The author of this study came up with these four factors as results of intensive examination in a larger number of literature highlighting the rise of the EMB from its inception in 1928 to date. However, as far as this particular study is concerned, this dissertation provided detailed explanation of the EMB's ideology, its organizational structure, its economic and social activities and the media involvement in order to present them as the principal arguments behind the EMB's political mobilization. This study, therefore, determines how the oldest and foremost Islamist organization in the world has been able to attract an unprecedented number of members and public support, not only in the Egyptian presidential election 2012, but also in the Egyptian parliamentary elections of 2005 and 2012 and beyond, as well as in previous elections in professional organizations within Egyptian society. Since its formation in Egypt in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood has spread to every state in the Islamic world and has claimed the allegiance of millions of people from virtually every segment of society.

At the height of its popularity, it had half a million active members in an Egyptian population of less than twenty million in the 1930s through the 1950s, proportionally more than twice as large as the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) in the United States today. The Muslim

Brotherhood also spawned many of the militant Islamic groups that exist today, including organizations such as Hamas, the Islamic Jihad, and Jam'ah Islamiyah. Despite its importance, however, scholars still know little about the mobilization techniques practiced by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. (Munson 2001, 487)

Accordingly, to present the findings of this study, the first part of chapter one presents a detailed background highlighting the special factors that have influenced the conceptualization and execution of this study. The second section acknowledges the major academic works linked to the research topic. The third part specifies the research questions by means of which the dissertation intends to identify clear answers behind the EMB's recruiting phenomenon. The fourth section presents the analytical frameworks for the dissertation, separate from the review of literature. The fifth section specifically highlights the objectives of the study in order to facilitate for readers a clear understanding of the aim of the study. The sixth part covers the significance of the research in order to demonstrate the importance of this particular study. The seventh section indicates the boundaries and limitations of the whole dissertation, as the study did not cover all aspects of the EMB. The eighth section provides an overview of the research methodology used in this study. At the end of this chapter, the dissertation provides the organization of the study.

1. Background

The rise of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, before and after the Egyptian Uprising on January 2011, raised a number of questions among scholars of the Middle East and the North African regions. The victory of the EMB's candidate in the presidential election on June 30, 2012, inspired political scientists to focus on studying the different strategies and mechanisms followed by the organization to recruit supporters and members. Moreover, the unexpected removal of Muhammad Morsi from power by Marshal Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on July 3, 2013, followed by the dissolution of the EMB in 2014,² increases the importance of such study as it might predict the future of the organization. Several studies have separately presented the different backgrounds and mechanisms that supported recruiting from the 1930s to 2016. Subsequently, building on the work of others, this dissertation intends to determine, explain and evaluate four different strategies and mechanisms, including the ideology used by the organization, the organizational structure and its impact on the recruiting process, the economic activities and its social services and finally the use of media to propagate the ideology and the activities of the organization for the purpose of mobilizing Egyptians to vote for this Islamist movement.

² The 2014 dissolution of the EMB was the fourth dissolution. The organization was also dissolved in 1948, 1981 and 1954.

Among other factors contributing to the importance of the EMB is its international influence. After the Egyptian Uprising in 2011, representatives of approximately 200 international governmental and non-governmental institutions, including statesmen from EU members, U.S., Japan and beyond, visited the EMB's leaders in order to meet and understand its political and social platforms (Aljazeera 2011). The reasons behind this importance might have been the EMB's move to collaborate with the international community. This move might also have been the result of the stand of several human rights organizations against Mubarak regime during several trials against Egyptian political activists, including the EMB's members; but also the international community was interested in understanding the EMB's view on democracy, equality with the Christian minority (Copt), Pan-Islamism, radicalism, reform, the Palestinian issue and gender equality.

Furthermore, the EMB is seen as an Islamist organization that can be the alternative of the violent organizations, such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) and others. In the EMB's history, radical Islamists left the organization due to its pacific approach, especially during the leadership of Umar al-Tilmisani in the 1970s (Rubin 1990). Since then, radical organizations that opposed the EMB's pacifism have provided it with the opportunity to be considered as a non-terrorist organization, particularly after September 11, 2001. This position has led researchers to compare the EMB to other Islamist organizations. Furthermore, due to the current conflict between the Egyptian government and the EMB, understanding the organization and its mobilization strategies and mechanisms is both timely and important.

2. Literature Review

Middle East scholars have been keenly aware of the general growth of Islamist movements, particularly in Egypt, since at least the early 1970s.³ Among other factors, scholars separately pointed out to explain the rise of the EMB are the expression of anti-Westernism, violent Muslim reactionism, transnational phenomenon, waning force, the force of gravitating towards the exclusivism and rigidity of the Hanbalite school and so forth (Lia 1998, 4). However, even though much of such literature is devoted to understanding the rise of these movements, the most direct challenge to scholars is to explain and analyze the origins of this continuous growth. Accordingly, this study proposes an in-depth analysis of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, which represents the oldest and principal Islamic movement in the world. Searching the scholarly works focused on the EMB such as (Mitchell 1969); (Rubin 1990); (Al-Anani's 2007 & 2013); (Pargeter 2010); (Wickham 2013) and many others may

³ The resurgence of political Islam from the late 19th Century has been abundantly studied by several scholars of the Middle East. However, the main stream of their research was to provide explanations, concepts and theories behind the revival of the Islamist movements headed by the EMB.

help one to comprehend in detail the different strategies and mechanisms behind the continuous growth of Islamist organizations, knowing that the EMB is considered as the center of gravity of all Islamist movements in the world. However, we shall highlight brief historical overviews of the Egyptian socio-political situations [chapter 2] before presenting and analyzing the results of this study, specifically, 1) the impact of the EMB's ideology on mobilizing supporters along its history [chapter 3], followed by 2) the organizational structure [chapter 4], 3) the economic activities and social services [chapter 5], and, finally, 4) the media involvement [chapter 6]. The study selected and highlighted the scholarly works covering these four factors and has explained and analyzed each of them in order to show how important they are in terms of political mobilization within the Egyptian society.

① **Egyptian History in the Light of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's Revival**

Regarding the period of the Egyptian monarchy from 1923 to 1954, the U.S. state Department (1954), Mitchell (1969), Wendell (1978), Kepal (1993), Lia (1998), Al-Baz (2001), Munson (2001), Milton-Edwards (2016) and others, each separately mentions anti-colonialism, the renaissance of Islam and the aim to establish an international Muslim bloc as the core of the ideological trend within the Egyptian politics during the Egyptian Monarchy among various political movements, like other Northern African and Middle Eastern countries in general and beyond. In fact, the ant-imperialism was supported by almost all nationalist movements. Thus, the EMB presented itself as an effective organization capable to challenge mainly the British and French colonialism along with other nationalist movements, beside its Islamic ideology. However, the EMB's status quo relationship with the monarchy in the 1930s, created political controversy among the existing nationalist movements. For instance, "[T]he *Wafd*, the only political party with a mass following accused the EMB of protecting the king's autocratic prerogatives against the democratically oriented *Wafdist* movement. In 1937, the Muslim Brotherhood made an oath of allegiance on the Qur'an to the King in front of Abidin Palace on the day of the King's coronation" (Lia 1998, 6-7).

For the history of the Egyptian political, social and economic conditions in general, earlier studies have stressed factors like deteriorating socio-economic conditions, widening class differences, large scale rural emigration to cities, unemployment among the rapidly growing, educated middle class, the process of Westernization and secularization, the inertia of religious establishment and the presence of a colonial power within the Egyptian society as the circumstances in which Egyptian people experienced for many decades (Lia 1998, 2). During al-Banna's early life, most Egyptians lived in the rural lands of the Nile Delta in villages and hamlets where livelihoods were derived from centuries-old economic and social

relations (Keddie 1983). Historian Albert Hourani called this period one of ‘changing ways and thought’ where life in the countryside polarized; populations and cities grew; travel, education, and new media opened new intellectual horizons; and Islam both in its elite and mass form would emerge changed (Khalid 2005, 202). However, beside the anti-Westernism among Egyptian political movements, Islamism and secularism significantly divided the society. “In the 1960s, Islamism was essentially seen as a transitional phenomenon and waning force” (Lia 1998, 4). Mitchell wrote in his introduction that secular reform nationalism now in vogue in the Arab world will continue to operate to end the earlier appeal of the EMB (Mitchell 1969, xxiv). Furthermore, the Brotherhood found itself in distinction not only to secularist nationalist and socialist opponents but also to the elites of institutional Islam represented by al-Azhar University (Milton-Edwards 2016, 16).

During Jamal Abdel Nasser’s regime started officially from 1956 to 1970, the EMB’s political mobilization can be seen as having two phases: 1) In the beginning of the regime, the EMB enjoyed political opportunity as a political partner with the Free Officers headed by Nasser against the British imperialism. Subsequently, the EMB propagated its ideology without restrictions through its related social services sections and its publication sections. Concerning this period, scholars of the Middle East studies intensively write about the resurgence of political Islam. 2) In the middle and the end of Nasser’s regime, the deadly confrontations between the government authority and the Brotherhood reduced the EMB’s political influence (Mitchell 1969; Munson 2001. ed.).

In the case of Anwar Sadat’s regime from 1970 to 1981, the Brotherhood enjoyed freedom of activities after a large number of its members were freed from jails. However, the organization concentrated among others more on promoting democracy through their two most widely read publications, *al-Da’wa* and *al-’Itisam*, based on Islamic etiquette (Hassan 2006, 7). The growth of the EMB’s political language during this period focused more on freedom of expression, while other competitive Egyptian Islamist movements continued preaching the Islamic values and practices in accordance with traditional methods. “When violence escalated between the government and the Islamists in Egypt, Sadat’s façade for civil rights and democracy further empowered the Brotherhood’s struggle and advanced them along a language that spoke of a democracy that was undeveloped and derailed within the country’s system” (Hassan 2006, 7).

Hosni Mubarak’s regime (1981- 2011) suppressed the Brotherhood through the emergency law that provided the authority to arrest, detain, and interrogate Egyptian citizens suspected of terrorism-related crimes for prolonged periods of time without adhering to international standards of due process (UCIS 2010). This law increased the tension between Mubarak’s regime and the Brotherhood. However, due to the economic failure of the government, the Brotherhood got the political opportunity to raise its popularity through its organizational structure, presenting itself as the alternative political power of Mubarak’s

regime. Within the framework of its organization, the social services and the propagation of its political agenda emerged in the Egyptian society side-by-side with other political and social movements.

Based on the current development brought by the Egyptian uprising in 2011, the EMB increased its popularity due to the break of the fear tactics used by Mubarak's regime. This newly political atmosphere opened the door to the EMB's candidate, Mohamed Morsi, to win the presidential election on June 30, 2012.

In sum, the literature review highlighted by the above-mentioned scholars of Middle East studies suggests that the history of the EMB's mobilization in the context of the Egyptian history can be explained by its anti-colonialism ideology, its Islamic renaissance, its struggle to unite Muslims under its umbrella and patronized an organizational structure. These factors facilitated the organization to continue doing its social services and preaching its ideology through mosques, newspapers and other social media in the 20th and 21st centuries. Therefore, the following section highlights the literature that explains the entire ideology of the EMB from the 1930s, the organizational structure, the economic and social services and the entire media involvement that involved bringing the EMB's candidate to power in 2012.

② The Impact of the EMB's Ideology on Mobilization

Among many other scholars, Mitchell (1969) highlights valuable work in his book, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*. In the case of the role played by the EMB's ideology in recruiting supporters, Mitchell emphasizes how Islam has been defined by the Brotherhood. Accordingly, Mitchell notes that the EMB's adherents considered Islam as a total system, applicable to all times and to all places (Mitchell 1969, 14). In addition, the founder of the Brotherhood advised his followers to not accept Islam being separated from politics and vice versa (Mitchell 1969, 30). This is how the EMB's Supreme Guides have interpreted Islamic ideology since the 1930s. However, in his entire book, Mitchell did not prioritize the ideology, the organizational structure, the economic and social activities neither the use of the media as the EMB's recruitment mechanisms or strategies compared to other factors. To evaluate Mitchell's work, Marius Deeb pointed out that it lacks historical perspective. The study of the EMB's ideology and its ideological confrontation with the state and other Egyptians political actors, such as the *Wafd* Party, has been done at length compared to the study of the organizational structure, the economic and social services and the communication and indoctrination strategies of the EMB. This is to argue that, with Mitchell, the ideology seems to be treated as the most important source of the EMB's mobilization without being noticed clearly as the primary source behind the EMB's recruitment. In addition, Mitchell did not analyze the four factors as the main arguments behind the EMB's political support within the

Egyptian society.

Al-Anani (2007) mainly extended Mitchell's work by adding further to the explanation of the EMB's modern transformation, mainly in 2005 after it secured 25% of the Egyptian parliament in the election the same year. Al-Anani (2007) discusses the importance to the EMB ideology of the Islamic religion in its recruiting mechanism, after emphasizing the importance of religion for Egyptian society as a whole (Al-Anani 2007, 276). Based on interviews conducted during his field research, 75% of the EMB's members claimed that they joined the organization due to its Islamist ideology (Al-Anani 2007, 75). However, al-Anani summarizes the main reasons behind joining the organization into two factors: one is the religion base, and the second is the sociology of hope, as described by the French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs (1877-1945). According to al-Anani's explanation on Halbwachs' analysis, people usually intend to distance themselves from this world due to the failure they are facing in their daily life. Overall, al-Anani mentioned the importance of the EMB's ideology as Mitchell did, however, neither of them approaches the ideological aspect as one of the four factors behind the EMB's political mobilization as this study does.

Munson (2001) claims in his article '*Islamic Mobilization: Social Movement Theory and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood*', that the basic worldview of the Brotherhood is rooted in the *Hanbali* school of Islamic thought⁴ (Munson 2001, 489). He emphasizes that the EMB's political growth was a reaction against foreign dominance and the poverty and decline of morals among Egyptians (Munson 2001, 490). He suggests that the EMB's members believed that the solution to these problems was an embrace of Islamic teachings and an understanding that all Muslims comprise a single cohesive community and must work together to resist the corrupt practice of Western influence (Munson 2001, 490). He concludes his explanation by pointing out that the attractiveness of the EMB's ideology is a legacy of the famed Islamic scholar, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, who is credited with spawning modern Pan-Islamic thought (Harris 1964). From the previous explanation of the EMB's ideology, Munson recognizes the importance of the ideology, but, as was the case with both Mitchell and al-Anani, there is no analysis in his work that considers beside the ideology, the organizational structure, the economic and social services and the media involvement as the main arguments behind the EMB's political mobilization.

There are other scholars who discuss the importance of ideology in the recruitment and mobilization of the EMB's members and sympathizers, such as Al-Baz (2001), Pargeter (2010), U.S. State Department Institute (1954), Said (1997), Ibrahim (2002) and the Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS) (2014). However, most of these arguments seem to be similar to those of Mitchell, al-Anani and Munson. This is to argue that these scholars did not emphasize on framing the different recruiting strategies and mechanisms used by the

⁴ In the Islamic school of thought, there are four famous schools: *Shafi*, *Maliki*, *Hanafi* and *Hanbali*. All interpret the Islamic teaching sources through keeping the fundamental rules and regulations and differing from each other in the details.

Brotherhood into ideology, organizational structure, economic activities and social services and finally the use of media.

③ Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's Organization Sources and Activities

There were several scholars cited by this study who investigated about the role played by the organizational structure. However, the works done by Mitchell (1969), Munson (2001) and al-Anani (2007) are connected to the results of this research. These three scholars agree that the existing organizational structures do not fundamentally differ from the old organizational structure (Al-Anani 2007, 95). However, the expansion of the organization in terms of members and activities brought about the expansion of activities in order to adapt to the social and political developments in Egypt.

Mitchell (1969), he provides details about the organization's branches and their respective roles. In terms of recruitment, he emphasizes the role played by the propagation of the EMB's message. He points out the role played by missionaries, labor and peasants, students, and professionals (Mitchell 1969, 171-172). In addition, he also highlights the liaison with the Islamic World.⁵ The most important part related to this particular study is the function of the family section. This section is the engine to recruit members through the organization's structure, as this circle has the duty to search for new members as has been mentioned in chapter four. In his work, Mitchell could provide to his reader information on the different levels of the members, from the regular to the supreme leader of the organization. However, as this particular study is concerned, Mitchell's work did not highlight whether this role of the organization played a fundamental role in recruiting members or not. The entire work was about providing almost all necessary scholarly information regarding the oldest and principal political Islam organization in the world including its organizational structure.

The evidence presented by Munson (2001) is that the organizational structure played a great role in expanding the structure of authority in a network of branch offices spread over the country. He states that the branch leaders played a critical role as links between the regular members with the central leadership (Munson 2001, 487). The organization shifted coordination and communication responsibilities of the entire organization from one branch office to another. He also emphasizes the role played by the federated system in terms of consolidating the branches⁶ (Munson 2001, 487). In this regard, Munson explains the consolidation of the organization by members. Yet, he did not provide

⁵ The research topic of the author of this particular study in his master thesis highlighted and analyzed *Political Islam in the Middle East: Impact of the United States' Foreign Policy on the Muslim Brotherhood's Agenda*. In the thesis, the author highlighted the EMB's liaison.

⁶ The expression 'federated system' is another presentation of 'the organizational structure' of the EMB. Therefore, the reader should keep in mind the different uses of the EMB's institution by scholars of the Middle East studies.

an explanation about the role played by the organizational structure in terms of members' recruitment. He states that the federation system is the core of the Brotherhood's organizational strength. In addition, Munson compares the Brotherhood and the Egyptian communist organization. His comparative approach shows that the communist organization was concentrated and one-dimensional, while the Brotherhood's was decentralized. Thus, the communist organization had little defense against the security agencies (Munson 2001, 510). Again, the study does not analytically highlight and provide a weight of the role played by the organizational structure beside other recruiting factors as this study does.

Al-Anani (2007) claims that in general the current organizational structure does not differ much from the old one. He is much more specific in highlighting that the organization starts from the family section and ends up with the general guide (Al-Anani 2007, 95). However, he adds that there have been serious changes in strategies as a result of new developments within Egyptian politics over the last three years. The changes correspond to the new objectives developed by the organization. For example, there were some changes in the case of promoting members, as direct elections currently became the mechanism of choosing key positions. Recently, the organization insisted on the importance of electing, instead of selecting their leaders. Furthermore, it is essential to understand that the whole organization is divided into administrative and technical sections. Here, the readers will notice that al-Anani's work did not state how important the organizational structure was besides other factors in terms of recruitment.

The overall result of the above explanations was to highlight the different sections and their respective duties in light of the EMB's consolidation of its organizational structure that helped the organization to survive until today. In addition, the organizational structure together with the EMB's ideology, its economic and social services and its media constitute the argument behind the EMB's political mobilization according to this particular study.

④ The Economic Activities and Social Services

The literature on Islamist Economic Activities and Social Services has been weighted toward Egypt. However, there was more attention on the Muslim Brotherhood's economic activities and social services compared to other Egyptian Islamist organizations. The reason behind this emphasis on the Brotherhood might be the huge number of services provided by this organization and the EMB's political influence in the country compared to others. Yet it remains true that the economic activities and social services play a major role in the Brotherhood's political support. As the analysis of the study relies more on the work of Mitchell (1969), Masoud (2014) and Brooke (2014), we need to analyze the literature of these three scholars and then discuss other scholars' existing works in short.

Mitchell's contribution in this particular section mainly covers the reason behind the

creation of the welfare section, the cooperation between the EMB and the government in the 1940s, the original purpose of the EMB's business enterprises. In the case of the creation of the welfare section, Mitchell states that when this section was established, it reflected the great upsurge in the activity of the organization in order to exemplify its belief in the totality and applicability of Islamic teaching. He indicates that for days and nights, schools and institutes were established for girls, boys and adults. In addition, welfare activity was supplemented by social work, largely in rural areas, and medical work in the form of hospitals, clinics and dispensaries (Mitchell 1969, 37). The important part, from the viewpoint of this particular study, is the preference of the rural, rather than urban areas for the welfare provision. This statement made scholars believe that the EMB's political support was largely in the rural areas.⁷ Historically speaking, this is true, but with time and the urbanization of Egyptian society, this belief has started to lose validity as the Brotherhood displays an increasingly strong base within urban areas, such as in Cairo and Alexandria.

Another interesting point raised by Mitchell is the EMB's cooperation with the government in the 1940s. This cooperation was due to the social services provided by both of them. In this issue, Mitchell notes that due to Law 49/1945, concerning organized charity and social work, the EMB submitted its records to the ministry of social affairs for inspection. The ministry discovered that the organization was political, social and religious, and that the law recognized it as a welfare society. As a result of these multiple roles of the EMB, Mitchell notes, the organization was divided into two parts (Mitchell 1969, 36). This allowed the organization to receive money from the government. Accordingly, the organization found itself in a defensive position toward its political opponents, as it began to be treated as a government agent. This situation led al-Banna to call a special meeting to explain that any money coming to the organization from the government was a legitimate contribution to its welfare activities (Mitchell 1969, 48).

In the case of the original purpose of the EMB's business enterprises, Mitchell mentions that it was a result of the development of the national economy. Accordingly, al-Banna was not the initiator of the business projects when it was first put into effect. However, he strongly supported the concept by stating that the idea should not be considered only as a means to contribute to the national wealth, but also as a means to destroy the control of foreigners over the economy (Mitchell 1969, 274). Al-Banna's argument ties in with the analysis that the reason behind the EMB's foundation was to combat colonialism.⁸ The organization established a workhouse school for women in an effort to provide a means of livelihood for the destitute in the area involved, but this project remained a local and

⁷ The EMB 'social services' political strategy is considered as the key factor of the EMB's mobilization according to several Muslim Brotherhood scholars such as Associate Professor at Nihon University, Yokota Takayuki, in one of his presentations in Kyushu University in 2012. However, based on this particular study, we need to consider also the role played by the ideology and the consolidation of the EMB's organizational expertise as all the driving force of the social services' performance of the organization.

⁸ 'Combatting colonialism' is a part of the EMB's ideology, especially in the 1930th.

ineffective venture. However, the larger enterprises followed the rise of the EMB to fame on the Cairo scene (Mitchell 1969, 274-5).

Mitchell discusses in detail the economic activities and social services of the EMB. Nevertheless, it seems unclear for this study whether the political support was mainly based on those activities or not. This is to argue that my study is about analyzing the work of Mitchell and providing a clear answer to the researchers who may want to know the political role played by the economic activities and social services, besides the ideology, the organizational structure and the media involvement of the organization.

Masoud's work (2014) is basically about asking why political or social competitors to Islamists do not also pursue the same strategy of winning votes. He also questions whether there is anything preventing nonreligious parties from distributing the bottles of oil and bags of sugar that many of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's detractors credit with the movement's rise to power in 2011 (Masoud 2014, 24). Among other answers, Masoud suggests three potential answers to this question.

The first potential answer holds that Islamists possess an organizational model built on a highly selective recruitment method, the inculcation of norms of loyalty to fellow members and obedience to superiors, and a regimented system of promotion that makes the organization more capable of concerted action than those who lack such a model (Masoud 2014, 24). In this analysis, Islamists are better able to provide services because their internal organizational structure makes them better at doing the job. However, there is a reason to doubt this account. The Egyptian Communist organizations did similar things, thoroughly vetting initiates, employing systems of clandestine cells and emphasizing loyalty among their members, yet they were unable to become anything more than fringe groups in Egyptian political life (Munson 2001, 497).

The second argument holds that Islamists are better able to provide services because of their religious nature. Masoud (2014) adds that, on one hand, their religious focus is supposed to make them more concerned with service provision than their rivals. This may be the case, and he clearly mentions that he has not collected data on the question. He gave an example to support his argument, looking at the operations of leftist parties in Latin America to illustrate that a concern for the poor is not a special characteristic of religious groups. However, he reports that the experience of Leftist parties around the world belies the notion that Islamist organizations such as the Brotherhood have a monopoly on religion (Masoud, 2014, 24-5).

The third answer, and one that the study agrees with Masoud on, is that Islamist organizations simply possess greater opportunities for service provision than their rivals in Muslim countries. Ordinary citizens are embedded, providing religious leaders with numerous conduits through which to reach potential voters especially when restrictions on

such activities are lessened.⁹ (Masoud 2014, 25)

In the case of Brook (2014), he states that most of the studies of Islamist groups written over the past three decades contain some version of the idea that “Islamists’ networks of hospitals, day cares, soup kitchens, and other social services help the group to win elections, Islamize the population or recruit and retain members, delegitimize the state, or demonstrate their commitment to Islam.” Brook emphasizes that “yet, rare was the study that provided enough empirical evidence to evaluate these causal claims.” Accordingly, he suggests that “there is a need to change this method; however, as a number of analytically sophisticated and empirically rich studies have begun to evaluate these arguments across a number of geographic contexts” (Brooke 2014, 12). However, Brook states that one answer is that Islamists’ facilities might be better equipped or their staff more highly trained. If so, the strategy might be to assess the objective quality of services Islamists offer and the provision of Islamist vocational training. But, he adds, that may also mean that people simply enjoy the experience at Islamists’ facilities more. He means that we should focus on exploring recipients’ subjective views of Islamists’ social service efforts. He questioned whether citizens are happy with the healthcare they received, or are satisfied with their child’s educational progress (Brooke, 2014, 13). Brook’s suggestion is interesting, as he prefers to look at the political impact of the services from the recipient’s perspective, not just judging the distribution of the welfare to the citizens and the political success of Islamist organizations such as the Brotherhood. To sum up this impact, Brook does not yet agree with the arguments demonstrating that the Brotherhood won the 2012 presidential election due to the social services the organization provided to the Egyptian society.

To summarize the main argument of this study highlighting the impact of the economic activities and social services on the EMB’s political support, there are several scholars who discuss the provision of social services and the economic activities of Islamist movements, including the EMB, among them Atia (2014), al-Arian (2014) and Lynch (2014). However, Mitchell (1969), Masoud (2014) and Brooke (2014) analyzed this particular theme in such a way that much of the discussion has little connection to the main argument of this particular study. The main argument is that without the EMB Islamic interpretation, the organizational structure, the economic activities and social services and the media, the organization might not perform well in terms of political mobilization.

⑤ The Impact of the Media Involvement on the EMB’s Political Support

The media experience of the Brotherhood has been discussed by several scholars, such as

⁹ Several mosques in the Muslim world permanently place donation boxes outside or inside mosques for the needy in the society. In addition, giving charity to the needy is one of the familiar customs within the Muslims’ communities. Accordingly, members of political Islam’s organizations grow up with these practices and subsequently they become experts in this domain.

Mitchell (1969), Munson (2001), Breuer (2014) and Khashaba (2014). In this section, the study presents the different approaches and analyses provided by each of these scholars in light of the main arguments of the study.

Mitchell (1969) notes that al-Banna admitted having learned the importance and the usefulness of the technique of propaganda from the West. Therefore, al-Banna thought about establishing a press to spread his message and to rebut the challenges of his adversaries (Mitchell 1969, 185). The use of the different publications, including newspapers, lectures, and meetings, was supervised by the media section of the organization for the purpose of mobilization and recruitment. This argument is not contradicted by any of the scholars cited by this work. However, the vital contribution of Mitchell is his observation on the change of the content of the publications.¹⁰ He noticed that from 1951, there was a noticeable change in tone and emphasis on the question of Islam, its nature, meaning, and destiny, but the method of exposition was much more specific (Mitchell 1969, 189). “This means a more consciously scientific approach to the problem of Islam. The section for the propagation of the message now began to make use of the talent available to it among its professional members in the fields of law, economics, society, education, chemistry, engineering and zoology” (Mitchell 1969, 189). Accordingly, the media involvement was oriented professionally by covering many aspects and many themes, not only about Islamic lectures.

One aspect of Mitchell’s work is the small size of the chapter in which he discussed about the media involvement of the EMB, perhaps because it was a newly adopted strategy compared to the emphasis on preaching the ideology in mosques and the importance of consolidating members through the organizational structure. This would seem to be essential, as indeed the media involvement in mobilizing support has been classified as the fourth most important reason for the EMB’s mobilization.

The second scholar who effectively discussed the political media’s involvement is Munson (2001). Munson precisely mentions ‘newsletters’ as the most effective publication used by the Brotherhood in the period of quasi-colonial British control of Egypt in the 1930s to 1950s (Munson 2001, 488). He states that the Brotherhood produced several new publications during that time and increased the frequency of its public rallies (Munson 2001, 489). In order to understand the role of the media’s political involvement, Munson notes that, after being released from prison in the period of Jamal Abdel-Nasser and Anwar Sadat, members were allowed to resume their public recruitment and propaganda activities through restarting the activity of the public section. In short, Munson’s valuable work highlights the use of the media by the Brotherhood without evaluating its impact on its political support.

The third scholar who has analyzed the use of the media is Breuer (2014). To keep recruiting members, Breuer states that during Nasser’s regime, the mosques constituted the

¹⁰ Changing the content of its publications based on the political transformation is one of the EMB’s political strategies practiced by its editors.

group's most important resource for communication and recruitment. He states that except for sport events, mosques were the only place where the public assembly of a large number of people was tolerated by the government (Breuer 2014, 3). Moreover, Breuer notes that during Sadat's regime through the late 1970s and early 1980s, a magazine called *Al-Dawa* played the principal role of publication, in a way that Hamza (2009) describes as the EMB's most prolific and active media experience (Hamza 2009, 4). Breuer's work is mainly describing the status of media during Nasser and Sadat's regimes. Reading from his work, the study concluded that the media was very effective in recruiting members during that period.¹¹ This is also to argue that the available media tools often play a crucial role whenever political freedom is restricted.

The fourth scholar describing the media involvement in mobilization is Khashaba (2014). His contribution is specific and valuable to this study. This is because Khashaba notes that in the Middle East-North Africa (MENA) region, the population growth is such that youth under the age of 24 constitute up to 65% (Khashaba 2014, 2). Therefore, regarding the communication strategies of Islamic faith-based parties, social media and the Internet as an alternative sphere for public discourse gained particular relevance under the secular regimes of Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and Iraq (Khashaba 2014, 3).

To summarize and discuss the literature review of this dissertation, the study notes that there is an agreement among scholars of the Middle East studies about the general growth of the Islamist movements. However, as the study is more about the specific strategies and mechanisms of the EMB's member recruitment, Mitchell's (1969) observation that al-Banna taught the EMB's adherents to never accept a distinction between Islam and politics is significant as politics is a part of Islam. In his book, the focus on the EMB's ideology is larger than the role played by the organizational structure. This is to argue that al-Banna's comprehensive Islam was challenging the Western modernization suggesting that the EMB's ideology would successfully resolve the Egyptian political, social and economic problems. In the case of the organizational structure, he emphasizes the role played by the section of propagation, demonstrating the effective works implemented by professional preachers. In addition, he explains the important part of the family section as the engine to recruit members. In chapter 4, the study presented and highlighted the different sections and their respective roles in order to demonstrate how effective the organizational structure is in terms of political mobilization. Moreover, like other scholars, Mitchell indicates that the economic and social services played a major role, mainly in the lower class living in the rural areas in the 1930s. This latter argument is rejected by several scholars due to the rise of the EMB's membership among educated middle class and elites. The use of newspapers and magazines to propagate the ideology of the organization was the available tool through which the EMB effectively

¹¹ This argument does not mean the social services were not practiced during this particular period, because the EMB's schools, health centers and the distribution of welfare existed. However, the media's involvement was more visible and remarkable in the society while other factors were not.

employed to propagate the EMB's political, social and economic agenda.

The establishment of the welfare system was a result of the great upsurge in the activity of the organization. Mitchell reports the EMB's cooperation with the government through the welfare activities in the 1940s. Thus, the EMB got financial support from the government to continue its welfare activities to respond the need of a large number of the Egyptian society who suffered from economic misery. Nevertheless, this issue placed the EMB's political position as a pro-government organization, though the movement did not want to be considered that way. Engaging in business entrepreneurship, the EMB just followed the national economic development. Additionally, the media political involvement was such that al-Banna admitted having learned the importance of the technique of propaganda from the West. More importantly, the EMB reviewed the content of its publications due to social and economic development in order to respond to the need of Egyptian society.

Furthermore, Munson (2001) notes that the EMB's basic worldview was rooted in the *Hanbali* School of thought.¹² However, scholars might reject this opinion, as the current organization does not pay attention to the differences argued by Islamic scholars of jurisprudence. He points out the anti-Western influence within the EMB's ideology. For the role played by what he calls a federated system that consolidates the different sections of the organization, he compares the EMB's organizational structure with the communist organization in Egypt, arguing that the latter organization was concentrated and one-dimensional while the Brotherhood's was decentralized, thus the latter could survive while the first disappeared. For the media involvement, newsletters have been used since the period of quasi-colonial control of Egypt in the 1930s and 1950s.

Next, based on interviewing the EMB supporters, al-Anani (2007) found that 75% supported the organization because of religious belief (Al-Anani 2007, 75). Al-Anani believes that the EMB's political base is due to its religious base and what sociologist Maurice Halbwachs calls the 'sociology of hope'. For the role played by the organization, al-Anani mentions that there was little change inspired by the new political and social developments in Egypt. Elections are currently practiced by the EMB to nominate members to key positions. In the case of the economic and social services, Masoud (2014) claims that the organizational model and giving charity to the needy is a custom for religion. However, he emphasizes on the greater opportunity religious people have in the Muslim World. Brooke (2014), however, doubts the methods several scholars pursued to come with their own conclusion that social services have an impact on political weight. However, he believes that perhaps the Islamists' facilities might be better equipped or their staff more highly trained.

In the case of media involvement, Breuer (2014) states that during Nasser's regime,

¹² In the Islamic school of thought, there are 4 famous schools: *Shafi*, *Maliki*, *Hanafi* and *Hanbali*. All interpret the Islamic teaching sources through keeping the fundamental rules and regulations and differing from each other with the details.

the mosques constituted the group's most important resource for communication and recruitment. Nevertheless, Khashaba (2014) argues that the Internet, as an alternative sphere for public discourse gained particular relevance under the secular regimes of Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and Iraq (Khashaba 2014, 3). This argument is powerful, since the facilities provided by the Internet play a fundamental role in consolidating the organization, as well as allowing the organization to keep encouraging Egyptian citizens to not give up but to continue requesting Egyptians to press for the former Egyptian president to return to power.

The literature review provided here relates to the main argument of this dissertation, as it provides elements demonstrating the role played by the ideology that inspires a better performance of the consolidation of the organizational structure, the economic activities and social services, and the media's involvement on the EMB's political power within Egyptian politics. However, for the purposes of this particular study, the above-mentioned scholarly works did not clearly and arguably discuss whether ideology, the organizational structure, the economic and social services or the media involvement should be considered to be the fundamental reasons behind the EMB's political mobilization in Egypt. However, there may be a great emphasis on one or another, based on the existing political situation.

3. Research Questions

The following two questions are the focus of the study:

1. How did the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood employ ideology, organizational structure, economic and social services, and media for the purpose of political mobilization?
2. What methods did the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood use to mobilize support for the movement, leading to parliamentary wins of 25% and 47% in 2005 and 2012 respectively, and a win of 51.7% in the 2012 presidential election?

4. Analytical Frameworks of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's Mobilization

A number of analytical frameworks have been suggested here to explain why Islamist movements such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood could recruit a large number of Egyptian citizens to vote for them in the precedent years for parliamentary elections, in the Egyptian professional syndicates, but most importantly in 2005 and 2012 parliamentary elections with the EMB's share of the vote at 25% and 47% respectively. The study begins by examining those analyses describing the initiation of the huge mobilization of the Brotherhood, and then considers analytical approaches highlighting the reasons behind the

EMB's success to win the presidential election in 2012 with 51.7% of the vote.¹³ In undertaking this examination, the study has divided the different explanations as well as descriptions into large-scale (socio-politico-religious conditions of Egypt) and small-scale analytical approaches (examining separately, the ideology, the organizational structure, the economic and social services and the media involvement analytically and theoretically).

The large-scale analytical explanations present, explain and investigate the revival of Islamist movements in the Middle East from the late 19th century. The social, political and economic conditions in Egypt have been briefly highlighted within chapter 1 and chapter 2 in order to allow the reader to understand the various circumstances the Egyptian people live in the late 19th century and beyond. Subsequently, these explanations provide a better understanding of the socio-politico-religious conditions of Egypt. I discuss in the large-scale analysis the importance of these theories as a comprehensive background for a better understanding of the small-scale processes such as people joining collective action. In fact, "Political Science depends, on its knowledge of the origins of the authority and subordination, of social control, and of the springs of political organization, upon the general science which deals with the whole of society" (Barnes 1924, 25). In addition, the use of these analyses to explain the EMB's mobilization requires an understanding on political science explanation which analyzes the conflict and cooperation within any given public organization (Heywood 2013). As Barnes (1924) states, Political Science theory deals with all public organizations through which an interest-group seeks to promote its specific objects and ambitions (Barnes 1924, 114-115).

In the case of the small-scale analyses, this study provides explanations of the role played by the ideology [chapter 3], the organizational structure [chapter 4], the economic and social services [chapter 5] and, finally, the media involvement [chapter 6] in the process of member and sympathizer recruitment.

A. Large-scale Analytical Explanations

Generally, there is a large amount of literature, including scholarly books, journals and so forth, describing the resurgence of political Islam in the Middle East. However, the study has selected analyses that serve for a better understanding of the conditions from which the Brotherhood could mobilize Egyptians to support the organization.

1. Deprivation Analysis

The deprivation theory claims that suppressive actions against Islamists generate support

¹³ The political ground of the EMB in Egypt is undeniable during all regimes. However, the study selected the EMB's victory in 2005 and 2012 parliamentary and presidential elections as it is more visible and academically arguable.

from society. With this explanation, scholars argue that the EMB's popularity was "a reaction to relative deprivation, especially under social inequality and political oppression" (Knudsen 2003, 3). This explanation is supported by Vandembroucke (1983), Edgar (1987), Cassandra (1995), Munson (2001) and others. The core assumption of the relative deprivation explanation "shows that discontent arising from the perception of relative deprivation is the basic, initiating condition for participants in collective violence" (Gurr 1970, 13). This is what has happened with the Brotherhood, from its formation in 1928 until today. The study assumes that if the political atmosphere was favorable for all political actors in Egypt, the organization might not enjoy huge popularity due to the economic and social challenges the country is facing. This is to argue that the victimization of the Brotherhood plays a great role in providing a favorable political mobilization for the organization.

As result of the suppressive tactics from different government authorities, theories of rebellion dominate the political scene in Egypt. "Theories of rebellion occur when people attempt to change the institutions, personnel, or policies of the government by resorting to illegal or aggressive methods of collective political action" (Muller 1994, 40). The EMB has been accused of assassinating the Egyptian Prime Minister, Nukrashi Pasha in 1948, of another attempt to assassinate Jamal Abdel Nasser in 1954, and it has also been accused of participating in the plot against the president Anwar Sadat in 1981 and so forth. However, the organization has denied all those allegations. "Contemporary empirical research on the causes of violent conflict has been guided by two competing theoretical perspectives. One is grounded in the assumption that people who engage in rebellious political behavior are motivated principally by anger resulting from frustration or relative deprivation; the other is grounded in the assumption that rebellious political behavior is motivated by rational calculation of expected gain" (Muller 1994)

2. Anomie or Strain Analyses

Anomie is a social condition in which there is a lack of cohesion and order, especially in relation to norms and values (Crossman 2014). These explanations, led by the sociologist Émile Durkheim (1951) in the 19th century, show that a social movement's mobilization, such as the Brotherhood's, is a result of anomie and social disorganization, an image well captured in the phrase 'the madding crowd' by McPhail (1991). During the period of the colonialism in the 1930s, there was a social disorder and an uncomfortable atmosphere among Egyptians due to the economic misery and the social injustice that characterized the society divided in colonizers, Egyptian elites (*Effendi*) and extremely poor citizens. Al-baz (2001) stated that Egypt was rigorously controlled by the winners of World War I (British and French colonialism), due to the country's strategic position, embodied by the Suez Canal (Al-baz 2001, 50-51).

This period saw the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, followed by British and French colonialism [chapter 2 & chapter 3]. The country was ruled by the Egyptian royal family without considering the equal distribution of income. In the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, the main argument is that the discontent among the population and strains of modernization, and especially Westernization, led to problems that some believed could be solved by turning to Islamic ideals rather than to normal, institutional means (Dessouki 1982; Kazemi 1984).

3. Social Solidarity Analysis

Social solidarity shows that “participants’ recognition of their common interests translates a potential for a movement into action by mobilizing consensus, movement’s entrepreneurs in stimulating such consensus” (Tarrow 1994, 11). This analysis expands deep-rooted feelings of solidarity or identity. This almost certainly is why nationalism, ethnicity or religion has been a more reliable basis of movement organization in the past than the categorical imperative of social class (Anderson 1990; C. Smith ed. 1996). Egyptian society, in fact of Western culture from the late 19th century, attempted to protect its own identity. Hassan al-Banna and his friends were not happy with the promotion of Western values within Egyptian society (Munson 2001). This sociological condition facilitated the EMB’s founder to establish the organization and rapidly recruit a huge number of members in the 1930s [chapter 3].

4. Resurgence Theories

Resurgence theories take as their starting point that the Islamic revival is foremost a reaction to the failure of modernization in the Middle East (Milton-Edwards 1996). The starting point is the colonial era that created a number of artificial nation-states, whose leaders embraced Western-oriented secular ideologies and Pan-Arabism to forge a national identity and legitimize their grip on power. The defeat of Arab forces by Israel in 1948, 1967 and 1973 led to a widespread identity crisis that made the masses turn away from the secular nation-state and embrace Islam as a vehicle towards spiritual renewal and a revival of the Islamic state (Milton-Edwards 1996). Discussing the relevance of this theory to the Palestinian case, Milton- Edwards (1996) finds that rather than linked to the chain of events after 1967, it was a result of traits inherent in the Palestinian situation itself that served as a catalyst for political Islam, mainly after 1982 when the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was defeated in Lebanon. The radicalization within Palestine was in large part encouraged by Israeli policies meant to suppress and eradicate the nationalist movements, but was neither defeatist nor the result of an identity crisis (Milton-Edwards 1996). This explanation offered a recruiting opportunity for the Brotherhood in the past and the present.

5. The Implications of Social Movement Theories

In general, organizations constitute the basic unit of analysis of collective action. For Tilly, protest politics is much more complex than groups: since it involves interactions. Moreover, he says “[C]ollective action is about power and politics” (Tilly 1978). He thus proposes a definition of collective action that takes into account power and politics in an interactive framework. He defines a social movement as a sustained series of interactions between power-holders and persons successfully claiming to speak on behalf of a constituency lacking formal representation, in the course of which those persons make publicly visible demands for changes in the distribution or exercise of power, and back those demands with public demonstrations of support (Tilly 1984, 306).

Furthermore, the use of social movement theories to describe and analyse the nature and the interactions within the Brotherhood on one part, and with the Egyptian authorities, on the other, is acceptable in the sense that one of the emerging social movements is religious organizations, mainly in the Middle East (Passy 2009, 353). More importantly, the Brotherhood with its scripts, ideology, shared understanding, narratives and networks would be a challenging and interesting subject for analysis both in large-scale and small-scale (Stinchcombe 2005).

In sum, the above-explanations would be implied in the case of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, which seeks power through consolidating its internal network in order to challenge well organized institutions namely, the Egyptian authorities [chapter 4]. Due to the size and the potential characterizing the Egyptian governments, the organization sustains a series of interactions inside its robust organization on one side and with the governments on the other [chapter 4]. The EMB with its visibility within the Egyptian society, through its social and economic activities attempts to gain public support in order to change the political system from secularism to Islamism [chapter 5]. This political conflict between the Egyptian authorities and the Brotherhood has become more complex due to the interference of the regional and international political actors who recognize the importance of Egypt in the regional and international spheres.

6. Islamist Movement Mobilization

In the case of the EMB’s ideological impact on its political mobilization, ‘Islam is the Solution’, ‘the anti-colonialism’ and ‘the renaissance of the Muslims’ pride’ after the collapse of the Othman Empire continue to be considered as the influential factors for the EMB’s political mobilization within the Egyptian Muslim society [chapter 3]. These elements create attractions but also interactions among the internal and external political actors such as the EMB’s General Headquarters’ members on one side and the Egyptian Muslim ordinary

citizens on the other. The latter consists of Islamist sympathizers, liberal, secular adherents and others. The Islamist sympathizers are dynamically recruited via religious congregations such as Friday prayers' sermons or formal or informal Islamic seminars where the Brotherhood ideologists dominate the management system.

Based on a comprehensive analysis presented by Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, I examined the phenomenon of the Brotherhood's mobilization. For Wickham, the literature on contemporary Islamist groups in general seeks to identify whether and how their participation in the domain of formal politics has contributed to the 'moderation' of their goals and strategies (Wickham 2013, 5). This is to argue that the moderation of those Islamist organizations, such as the Brotherhood, would open the door to recruit more members or sympathizers within their respective countries. Due to its comprehensive Islamic interpretation compared to other Islamist groups, the Brotherhood is the most moderate and subject to continuous evaluation of its political performance based on examining the Egyptian people's socio-religious-political situation. The decision of renounce violence completely during al-Tilmisani from 1972 and adopt a broader worldview has gradually increased its supporters.

Accordingly, "The above analysis can be applied to both individual actors and to the institution as a whole. This analysis includes the process of behavioural or ideological change when in fact an Islamist group may 'moderate' its official rhetoric and practice in some areas while retaining or even radicalizing them in others" (Wickham 2013, 5). In the case of the Brotherhood, the results of this particular study show that the Brotherhood's members are divided into reformists and conservatives. This division within the Brotherhood is caused by the different opinions on certain issues, such as the scope for political and intellectual pluralism, the rights of women and non-Muslims, and relations with the West. In addition, the reformists within the organization have criticized the conservatives' culture of obedience existing in the family section and other branches (Wickham 2013). The culture of obedience is greatly supported by the conservatives.

In sum, "the emergence of the 'reformists' trend has triggered new debates within the Brotherhood circle. Such debates, which have typically occurred behind closed doors in settings removed from public scrutiny, have taken the form of puzzling, arguing, and deliberating about the modern coordinates of sharia rule" (Wickham 2013, 12). Wickham says,

As constructivist scholars observe, new forms of political engagement can also produce self-conscious shifts in the commitments of political actors as a result of new experiences and exposure to new information and ideas. For example, studies by Bermeo, Roberts, and McCoy on the evolution of the radical left during 'third wave' democratic transitions in southern Europe and Latin America suggest that the views of socialist leaders were fundamentally transformed by their close interactions with leaders of other groups in exile or

in prison. Such interactions triggered a process of soul-searching and a critical re-examination of the rigid ideological certainties that had fuelled their calls for revolution in the past. (Wickham 2013, 12)

The Brotherhood students' interactions with others in Egyptian universities, professional syndicates and humanitarian organizations in Egypt, have given an intellectual opportunity to the reformists to keep suggesting new ideas in order to be accepted in the society. From this, one can conclude that the rational choice theory is exemplified by the action of the Brotherhood through the consultative Assembly and other lower branches around Egypt.




Figure 1. Analytical Framework

This figure summarizes the two main analytical categories explaining the EMB's mobilization's sources. The large-scale explanations are divided into six categories, while the small-scale explanations are divided into four categories. The large-scale explanations explain the socio-politico-religious factors facilitating the EMB's political mobilization. The small-scale explanations are highlighting the roles played by the ideology, organizational factors, economic and social services and the media involvement on the EMB's political strategies and mechanisms.

B. Small-scale Explanations

These explanations try to answer the following question: Under what conditions can groups act collectively to achieve shared interests? "The key problem is not how to induce individuals to join in the production of a collective good, but how to motivate and direct the actions of agents within organizations" (Walder 1994, 402). Therefore, the main focus of this section is to present analysis highlighting the different mechanisms or strategies employed by the organizations to recruit members or sympathizers. In other words, this section provides the analytical frameworks justifying the effectiveness of the use of ideology, organizational structure, economic activities and social services, and the media in the recruiting process. The

detailed examination of the EMB may be generalizable to other organizations for researcher of anthropology and beyond.

1. Ideology: Discursive Analysis

Ideology is defined by Walder (1986) “as one means by which an organization, especially a movement organization seeks to solve problems of discipline, commitment, motivation, and security among its adherents”. Although the ideology of a movement organization may, as Popkin (1979) states, help to overcome free-rider problems as a movement appeals to potential adherents, this study takes the position that ideology for the Brotherhood is a cluster of principals, rules and regulations that members should fulfil.

These principals are defined by Geertz (1973) as “A system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and secondary to the main question, which is how Islam is played out in the daily lives of Muslims, especially how Islam is used as a vehicle for political mobilization” (Moaddel 2002, 375).

In addition to the foregoing, Schumann (1966) divides ideology into pure ideology and practical ideology. “Pure ideology is the worldview and political values articulated by a movement organization. Practical ideology is a means of communication based on essentially an organizational doctrine bound up with the idea of the ‘party line’” (Schurmann 1966, 22). Analyzing both ideologies, the EMB would seem to belong to the practical ideology category.

As important figures utilizing this explanation, Eickelman (2003) and Piscatori (1991) point out two processes that shape Muslim politics. “First is ‘objectification’, which means that Islam is no longer simply practiced, but questioned by its practitioners. The second process is ‘fragmentation’, meaning that the clergy (*ulama*) are no longer the sole interpreters of Islamic doctrine, but challenged by a mixed breed of professionals (doctors, lawyers etc.) who likewise seek intellectual control of Islam” (Moaddel 2002, 375-376). These explanations fit the case of the Brotherhood, as internal debates often occur among traditionalists and progressivists inside the organization.

2. Organizational Structure and Activities: Contentious Collective Action Analyses

Contentious collective action analyses “serve as the basis of social movements, not because movements are always violent or extreme, but because it is the main and often the only recourse that most ordinary people possess to demonstrate their claims against better-equipped opponents or powerful states” (Tarrow 1994, 7-8). This does not mean that movements do nothing else but resist, rather they build organizations, elaborate ideologies, and socialize and mobilize constituencies, and their members engage in self-development and

the construction of collective identities. In this regard, Munson (2001) states that “a great deal of social movements provides the basic tools for thinking about how the organizational structures contributed to the Muslim Brotherhood’s spectacular growth” (Tarrow 1994, 8). McCarthy and Zald (1977) discussed the advantages of a federated organizational structure in their original formulation of the resource mobilization perspective, focusing largely on American civil rights groups of the 1960s. More recently, Munson includes “the federated organizational structure as one of several methods of overcoming free-rider problems in opposition movements” (Munson 2011, 497).

Comparatively, the role played by the organizational structure within the EMB has been demonstrated in the case of the communist parties in the 1930s, even in the 1950s and 60s in China with their social theories of Marxism. “Lenin’s writings on the necessity for a ‘party of a new type,’ the revolutionary vanguard party, described an organization at once flexible and highly disciplined. Such a party would expect extraordinarily high levels of member commitment and would seek to impose a military-like discipline on its members” (Selznick 1952). The Brotherhood shares the three recruiting principals adopted by what Lenin called a “party of a new type”, first, by recruiting members selectively and by imposing heavy costs for exit. Members are selected based on demonstrated commitment through a period of ‘testing’ and ‘development’, in which the recruit is tested through the performance of delegated tasks (Selznick 1952; Walder 1986). “A second mechanism is a systematic effort to educate new and prospective members into the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism. A third type of mechanism is close monitoring of the actions and utterances of members or and sympathizers” (Walder 1986, 406-407).

3. The impact of Economic Activities and Social Services on Political Advantages: Textual, Urban Sociological and Neoliberalism Analyses

On the assumption that the political advantage behind the economic activities and social services provided by the EMB to the Egyptian society should be supported by analytical arguments, this study identifies three analyses explaining the relationship between economic activities, social services, and political mobilization. The three analyses are: 1) Textual theories, 2) Urban sociological theories and 3) Neoliberalism theories. In the case of the impact of economic activities and social services on the EMB’s political advantage, the textual explanations indicate that within the Islamic doctrine, distributing wealth to the needy would create a better relationship between the poor and the wealthy classes.¹⁴ This explanation is used by almost all religions, atheism, secularism and ideologies such as communism. However, the fundamental question would be why only Islamist movements

¹⁴ The 3rd pillar of the Islamic religion is called ‘*Zakat*’. This pillar is an obligation for every Muslim to give the poor 2, 5% of its earning based on specific rules and regulations.

such as the Brotherhood are active, rather than others within the Egyptian society. The answer might be “the historical re-emergence of the Islamic movement during the early 1970s. This decade is noted for the rise of a vibrant Islamic youth movement based in Egypt’s colleges and universities” (Al-Arian 2014, 8). In addition, the failure of the Mubarak regime’s economic policy provided a better opportunity for the Brotherhood to engage itself in economic activities and social services, especially as the government indirectly appreciated those activities.

The second analyses are the urban sociological explanations that claim that the rise of a new middle class during the second half of the twentieth century, what Wickham (2002) has termed the ‘Lumpen Intelligentsia,’ provided the well-organized the EMB with a fresh base of support. Resulting from a shift in state policy that began under Gamal Abdel Nasser in the 1970s, this change is also defined by recently urbanized, educated professionals, many of whom specialize in fields such as medicine and engineering (Al-Arian 2014, 8). The rise of the ‘lumpen intelligentsia’ within the Brotherhood facilitated their ability to engage in economic activities and social services. However, the fundamental question would be, “What are the specific mechanisms by which social service provision translates into votes or public support, which was highlighted by the textual explanations? One example highlighting these theories is the use of the same strategy by the Italian Communist Party (ICP).

The Italian Communist Party succeeded in the decades following WWII to connect vast networks of co-ops into a supermarket chain known as “Coop,” which is today one of the largest, if not the single largest network in Italy. The purpose at the time was both economic activities and social services to provide foodstuffs across the country at discounted prices to prop up the party’s social image. This facilitated its social and political agenda, in addition to being a successful economic venture. (Adly 2014)

The third analysis is within the ‘neoliberalism theories’. This explanation goes along with what is termed ‘Pious neoliberalism,’ which is about the reconfiguration of religious performs in line with doctrines of economic rationality, productivity and privatization. According to Atia (2014), Islamic practices simultaneously neo-liberalized, as characteristics of faith, seen as incompatible with neo-liberalism (like social equity) are diluted, while new religious practices are formed. Pious neoliberalism represents the incorporation of a market-orientation with faith. Furthermore, pious neoliberalism means a change in both religious practices and modalities of capitalism. It denotes compatibility between business and virtue that have produced different kinds of institutions, systems of knowledge production and subjectivities. As such, charitable acts are as much economic interferences as they are political ones, and there are various and sometimes inconsistent aspects of the mixture of Islamism and neo-liberalism (Atia 2014, 10-11).

4. Analyses on Mass Media

This study defines media as “those societal institutions that are concerned with the production and distribution of broadcast media (television and radio) and the ‘print’ media (newspapers and magazines) and beyond. The ‘new media’ (cable and satellite telecommunications, the Internet and so on) has subverted the notion of mass media by dramatically increasing audience fragmentation” (Heywood 2013, 178). Based on the availability, these tools have served the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in its social and political activities since its formation in 1928. However, the circumstances and the political opportunity offered by the different Egyptian regimes often shape the kinds of media the organization had to use. This section examines the different analyses explaining the crucial role played by the media for political purpose. Next, the research will focus on the implication of those analyses on the various media and political communication means used by the Brotherhood. This study found three developments and one theory that can be used to analyze the case of the EMB’ usage of media in political mobilization.

The first development is “the impact of the so-called ‘primary’ agents of political socialization, such as the family and social class” (Heywood 2013, 178). Analyzing the effectiveness of this concept, the study presents what is termed ‘vertical communication’ (face to face, meetings and discussions). This mechanism was of much use, as Breuer (2014) states, “Alongside its public works, the group relied on a strategy of vertical word of mouth communication” (Breuer 2014, 1). In addition, group discussions, seminars and lectures in mosques, Islamic centers and other places played a very important role for the organization in reaching many Egyptians. The second development is “the development of a mass television audience from the 1950s onwards, and more recently the proliferation of channels and media’s penetration of people’s everyday lives” (Heywood 2013, 178).

The second development was not initially utilized by the Brotherhood because, in the 1950s and 1960s, there was high tension between the authorities and the Brotherhood. Recently, after the emergence of channels such as Aljazeera, the EMB’s leaders have used them through different programs.

The third development is the media’s economic aspect. In this regard, Heywood (2013) notes that “media businesses such as Microsoft, Time Warner, Disney and News Corporation have accumulated so much economic and market power that no government can afford to ignore them”. As far as this study is concerned, no academic work highlighting the use of media for business could be found, though the Brotherhood has several economic activities and social services in Egypt, as well as abroad.

As for the analytical aspect, the study analyzed four different theories regarding the media’s political impact. According to Heyward (2013), the most important of these are: 1) the pluralist model; 2) the dominant-ideology model; 3) the elite-value model and 4) the

market model. Only the ‘pluralist model’ is an explanation with the potential to fit the case of the Brotherhood. By definition,

Pluralism generally highlights diversity and multiplicity. The pluralist model of the mass media portrays the media as an ideological marketplace in which a wide range of political views are debated and discussed. This theory shows that power is checked. Some, moreover, argue that the advent of the new media, and particularly the Internet, has strengthened pluralism and political competition by giving protest groups, including anti-capitalist activities, a relatively cheap and highly effective means of disseminating information and organizing campaigns. (Heywood 2013, 179)

Ultimately, the Brotherhood benefits from pluralism, as it is the only political media theory applicable to the Brotherhood at this moment. The Internet actually plays a crucial role, not only for the Brotherhood, but for all Islamist movements. Facebook, Twitter and other Internet-related forms of communication have become influential political media used by the Brotherhood to communicate with the public. However, recently, the Egyptian government can and does block many of the sites and other Internet outlets due to the high amount of tension between the Egyptian authorities and the EMB.

5. Objectives and Originality of the Study

This section presents the objectives and originality of the entire study in order to enable the reader to pursue this work objectively. To begin with, the primary objective of this study is to suggest a precise and clear explanation for the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s political growth. Accordingly, the dissertation presents and highlights the EMB’s ideology, its organizational structure, its economic and social services and finally its media involvement as the reasons behind the organization’s successful political mobilization. In order to reach this goal, the study suggests two objectives:

First, the reader will be presented pertinent information about: the ideology; the organizational structure (with its branches and relative activities); the economic activities and social services; and the use of the media in propagating the ideas of the organization. These four factors have been employed systematically according to the Egyptian political situation since its inception in 1928. The organization might use its branches and mosques to teach its ideology inside and outside the organizational structure if there are no political restrictions to do so. Otherwise, the EMB might reinforce its economic and social services or the use of media in case of suppressive strategies from the authorities. Furthermore, this study will highlight the major literature and theoretical framework that cover the different scholarly sources of the recruiting strategies and mechanisms used by the EMB.

Second, the study evaluates the results and places altogether the ideology, the role played by the organizational structure, the economic and social services and the media involvement as the driven force behind the EMB's good performance in its political activities compared to others such as the tremendous role played by the founder of the organization or to only consider one of the above- mentioned factors. This to argue that the four mentioned elements are the most reliable factors to explain the EMB's political mobilization. This is the first major originality of this study.

Third, testing of these four studied variables with other political movements may well shorten the method from which researchers may pursue an understanding of the phenomenon of social and political movements' mobilization. This is the second major outcome of this study.

6. Significance of the Study

Since 1994, I questioned the reasons behind the popularity of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, as compared to other Islamist movements. Based on the available literature, the study has concluded that there are several reasons for the political grassroots success of the EMB, raised by scholars of Middle East studies. Through an analytical approach, looking at the ideology, the organizational structure, the economic activities, the social services and, finally, the media involvement of the EMB, it seems that the potential arguments explaining the EMB's huge mobilization in Egypt must prioritize the use of multi-political strategies namely, the role the ideology plays, with the organizational structure, the economic activities and social services and the media involvement. This claim might be useful to academics who may continue doing further empirical research to test this method, as well as to examine other Islamist movements and beyond.

The EMB is recognized as the most organized and influential Islamist organization among many others.¹⁵ Therefore, understanding its mobilization' strategies and mechanisms might lead other researchers to understand the organizational behavior of Islamist movements, including those like the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and so forth. In addition, the EMB is currently a potential political challenger of the current Egyptian government. Therefore, the research highlights a current issue preoccupying not only the Egyptian political actors, but also scholars of the Middle Eastern region and North Africa, knowing that Egypt represents the biggest country in terms of population in the Arab World, with an estimated population of 83,386,739 as of July 1, 2014 (World meters 2014). As a result, the research topic has potential importance to scholars and political actors of the Arab

¹⁵ One of the severe critics against the EMB's political ambition is its historical legacy. Leaders of violent organizations such as Al-Qu'ida's leaders were the EMB's members and separated from the organization. In brief, the EMB is considered as the mother of all Political Islam organizations including the violent organizations.

World, as any possible political change in Egypt may affect the whole region.

7. Boundaries and Limitations of the Study

In this section, the study presents the limits of the whole dissertation in order to provide support to the reader. First, we need to examine the term ‘Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’ (EMB). This term shows that the study concentrates only on one organization from among several Muslim Brotherhoods (MB), mainly in the Middle East and North Africa. Therefore, the reader is asked to consider the EMB as a social and political party founded in 1928. Moreover, The Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) was founded in 2011 in order to legalize the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood by changing the name, as it was compulsory for the organization to be authorized legally. Like Lia (1998) and Mitchell (1969), this study provided to the reader a brief treatment of the socio-economic and cultural factors of the Egyptian society mainly in chapter 2. However, in this regard, earlier studies have stressed factors like deteriorating socio-economic conditions, widening class differences, large scale rural emigration to cities, unemployment among the rapidly growing, educated middle class, the process of Westernization and secularization, the inertia of religious establishment and the presence of a colonial power within the Egyptian society (Lia 1998, 2). While fully acknowledging the importance of all of these factors, this study focused more on explaining and analyzing the EMB’s ideology, its organizational structure, its economic and social services and its media involvement.

Theoretically, the following Islamist organizations adopt a similar political ideology to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. According to scholars of the Middle East studies, the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP), The *Ennahda* (Renaissance) Movement Party of Tunisia, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, the Libyan Justice and Construction Party, the Palestinian organization Hamas, *Al-Islah* (Yemeni Congregation for Reform), the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan are ambiguously considered as Muslim Brotherhood. The ambiguity is due to the unofficial common ground of all the latter movements. For this, it is necessary to consider only the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (the Egyptian branch) as it is, in fact, the mother of all other Muslim Brotherhood in the World.

Another boundary of the study is the recruiting strategies and mechanisms of the EMB. It could be argued that the study should cover several features of the EMB, however, this particular study concentrates on the recruiting aspect of members or sympathizers, and does not go beyond the strategies and mechanisms of the Brotherhood’s mobilization to a significant degree. To limit the period of the study, the research concentrates mainly on data from 1928 to 2015, although the author did analyze a few secondary sources written in 2016 and 2017. In the case of the methodology, the chaotic situation in Egypt since the start of the Arab Uprising to date has not allowed the study to engage field research in Egypt, and it was

unsafe to deal with this particular research topic in Egypt during the research period. Subsequently, the author of this particular study collected and selected the major works of the Muslim Brotherhood written before and after the Arab Uprising. However, I met with Middle East scholars and the EMB's members and sympathizers in Malaysia (2013), Ankara (2014), Istanbul (2014) and the Union of Comoros (2015) and elsewhere. During the researched discussions, each of the scholars who involved in supporting this study enthusiastically answered my questions, but almost all of them did not want to be known as participants in the study, maybe for security matter.

8. Methodology

This section explains the different methods used in carrying out the study, giving special emphasis to the analysis of its result. It should be noted at the outset that the methodology, to a certain extent, was informed and impacted by the current situation in Egypt between the main actors of this particular study - the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian government - which took shape as the study progressed. As a mainly qualitative study,¹⁶ the research analyzed and evaluated primary sources and selected secondary sources. In the case of the secondary sources, several scholarly works have been examined in order to focus on the empirical and field research before identifying the result of the study.

As has been mentioned previously, the study mainly relied on analyzing data from selected primary sources and secondary sources. In the case of the primary sources, the memo of the EMB's founder, called '*Rasa'il* Hassan al-Banna' is available. This collection is still considered an important source for researchers of the EMB. In addition, recorded meetings between the EMB's leader for International Relations, Yusuf Nada, and Aljazeera journalists were examined. I exchanged personal emails with Nada. However, after a short period, he stopped responding to the emails. The author believes it was because of security, as he was accused of financing Islamist organizations several years ago. Furthermore, through personal emails, the leading scholar of the Middle East studies, Khalil al-Anani, was kind enough to respond to a few questions, especially about the most reliable scholarly books or journals for analysis purposes.

The study of this topic first took place in Egypt, when I was a student there at *al-Azhar* University from 1994 to 1998. Without spending this period of time and observing the political environment in which both the authority and the EMB worked, I may not have been able to analyze the data of this study. Furthermore, as the research topic of the master's study at Kyushu University from 2010 to 2012 was about analyzing the EMB's viewpoint on the Middle East foreign policy of the United States, I could investigate and have access to

¹⁶ The study is qualitative because the result and the conclusion are mainly based on analytical approach. Without reading carefully chapter 3 to chapter 6, the reader may have difficulty understanding the originality of the study.

selective primary and secondary sources used in this study during the PhD course begun in October 2012. Although I was inevitably aware of the situations and actions of the EMB's members who did not want to show up in the study for security purposes, my primary concern was about answering the questions often addressed during the study, which were mainly about identifying the role played by the ideology, the organizational structure, the social services and the media involvement in recruiting members or sympathizers to the organization.

The results of the study were analyzed using three strategies. First, the content of selected primary and secondary sources was divided into four parts. Each part represents a chapter of the dissertation. Second, each category was examined qualitatively. Third, I interviewed a few EMB sympathizers or members (some members may not reveal themselves as members for security matter) in order to confirm the result of the study.

To summarize the previous explanation, it should be emphasized that the study used mainly qualitative approaches. The memo of the EMB's founder and other key member's recordings helped the study to analyze the result of the dissertation.

9. The Structure of the Study

This section is intended to help the readers to follow the flow of the results of the study from chapter 2 to chapter 7. Following the order suggested by this study from the introduction to the conclusion would help the reader to systematically understand the content of the dissertation.

The aim of chapter 2 is to briefly highlight an overview of the Egyptian history. In the chapter, Egyptian history, from the monarchy era to the end of the Mubarak's regime, is examined. In addition, this chapter highlighted the socio-political transformations of Egypt from the monarchy to Mubarak regime. Moreover, the Arab Uprising and the following political developments are slightly presented in the end of chapter 2, and explained in detail in the end of chapter 3 due to their importance.

Chapter 3 discusses the history of the EMB's ideology, along with the different ideological approaches employed by the organization. Furthermore, the definitions and interpretations of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's ideology and interpretations are elaborated. However, the reader should be aware that the main focus of the chapter is to examine, present and highlight the EMB's ideological transformations from its founder, Hassan al-Banna to the last supreme guide (Murshid) of the organization, Mohamed Badie and the political impact on the EMB's recruiting process.

Chapter 4 provides a more elaborated understanding of the organizational structure of the EMB with their respective activities inside the various divisions. The organizational structure from its headquarters to the lowest level called 'family section' is given. It is shown

that the process of recruitment usually follows a bottom-up method. The internal debate engaged by the traditionalists and revolutionists inside the organization is also discussed.

Chapter 5 highlights the Egyptian economic conditions allowing the Brotherhood to focus more on the economic activities and social services within Egyptian society. Additionally, the chapter is divided into economic activities and social services. However, the social services are more elaborated by the study since it is more important than the economic activities in the eyes of the author. Both activities play a crucial role in mobilizing many Egyptians to support the organization.

Chapter 6 covers the various communication resources used by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, from the traditional publications to the significant role played by the Internet to encourage Egyptians to support the organization.

Chapter 7 is the conclusion of the study. This presents the general findings of the study from the introduction to the end of chapter 6. In the end of this section, the study suggested further research field studies in order to include quantitative method to support the main argument of the dissertation.

Chapter II

Historical Overview and Current Episodes of Egyptian History with the Muslim Brotherhood's Resurgence

This chapter presents a comprehensive summary of historical and momentous episodes of Egyptian history with the principal main actor of 'political Islam.'¹⁷

Concerning the organization and its relationship with Egyptian successive governments, Rubin's argument is that,

In the 1940s and early 1950s, organized fundamentalism was larger, more united, and more threatening to the existing system than it has been at any time since. But the Nasir regime smashed the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950s and 1960s, producing experiences so traumatic that they made the group timid and subject to government intimidation thereafter. Sadat allowed the Brotherhood to revive in the 1970s, setting off a new wave of fundamentalism that included revolutionary groups, which sought to overthrow the government. Sadat repressed the extremists, who gained revenge by assassinating him. The Mubarak regime was able to make a modus vivendi with the Brotherhood and moderate opposition parties by permitting them to function as long as they avoided violence and limited their attacks on the authorities. It continued to repress the small revolutionary fundamentalist groups, which failed to win any broad following. (Rubin 1990, 10)

This chapter has attempted to identify the historical episodes signifying the political turning-points of the Egyptian history during the EMB' struggle for power from its inception in 1928 to the end of the Mubarak regime in 2011.

2.1. Egyptian Monarchy from 1923 to 1952

The Egyptian monarchy era started in 1923, corresponding with the end of World War I and ended in 1954 after a bloodless *coup* led by the Free Officers Movement (FOM) in 1952. This royal power was backed by British and French colonialism as the result of the official collapse in 1924 of the Ottoman Empire. The Turkish Empire (Ottoman Empire) was the most powerful empire in the World for almost six centuries (Adams 2000). As the British and French became the principal winners of the war in the Middle Eastern and North African

¹⁷ 'Political Islam' has many definitions and interpretations due to the different sects characterizing the ambition of Islam to be presented as a political force in the Middle East, in particular. Due to such confusion, many authors, including John Esposito, Edward Said, and James Piscatori, avoid giving a definition altogether, leaving to the reader to conclude the many meanings of Political Islam. According to Hirschkind, the shortest definition of Political Islam is that in general, it is "Islam used to a political end" (Hirschkind 1997).

regions, the World War I winners due to its strategic position exemplified by the Suez Canal, rigorously controlled Egypt. In the 1930s, the British and French authorities ruled the country behind the Egyptian royal family without sharing and distributing the country's income proportionally. In this regard, Al-baz (2011) notes that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's founder, Hassan al- Banna observed that Muslim citizens in the region looked at the French and British colonizers at the beginning of the 20th century with suspicious politeness, especially in Egypt, where an upwelling uprising of bad feelings among citizens, particularly against the British imperialism, was remarkable (Al-baz 2011, 51). Al-Banna states, "I still remember the scene of a small group of British soldiers who landed in the village and camped there. The British soldiers confronted the citizens in such a way that the citizens ran after the soldiers and beat them with leather belts until the soldiers left the area. I also still remember the civil guard who had been trained and prepared by the villagers, themselves, who took turns for many nights in order to block the British soldiers from entering their homes" (Al-Bazi 2011, 51).

According to Al-baz, Hassan al-Banna, MB's founder, was "involved in the labour right struggles against the policy of the French and British monopolistic companies" (pp. 50-51). Al-baz also mentions that, "[W]hen al-Banna was working under the British rule, before engaging in his enduring job as a school teacher in Ismailia, he embraced an anti-imperialism ideology" (Al-baz 2011, 108). In this regard, Richard Mitchell notes, al-Banna "was afterwards to remember with special bitterness the sight of British forces in occupation of his hometown at this time. He took these memories with him as he prepared, when just under fourteen, to enrol in the Primary Teachers' Training School at Damanhur, thirteen miles south-west of Mahmuddiyya (al-Banna' small hometown)" (Mitchell 1969, 3).

Hassan al-Banna and his friends were also unhappy about the promotion of Western values within Egyptian society. In this regard, Pargeter (2010) suggests that the EMB's founder was concerned about the western influence over Egyptian society. He states that Hassan al-Banna did not reject the West in itself, but certainly had major concerns about the impact of Western culture on his own society, asserting that Western civilization had invaded them by force and with aggression on the level of science and money, of politics and luxury, of pleasures and negligence, and of various aspects of life that were comfortable, exciting and seductive (Mitchell 1969, 330). The concern of western culture's influence was highlighted by Munson (2001), who claims that, ideologically, continued British occupation of Egypt after the First World War created a highly visible target on which to focus the growing discontent of the population (Munson 2001, 6).

The Muslim Brotherhood was an explicitly apolitical religious reform and mutual aid society during the organization's early years in the 1930s. However, as Munson (2001) states, when the organization became politicized in the late 1930s, most of the invective in its newsletters and speeches of its leaders was directed against the British (Wendell 1978; Kepel

1993), and it was ultimately the British who first tried to suppress the organization (Munson 2001, 495). Under the British influence in 1941, “the government revoked the Brothers’ licence to publish *al-Manar*” (Mitchell 1969, 186). The tension of the political confrontation between the EMB and the British increased when the latter supported the establishment of the state of Israel. The EMB, in its turn, “raised money to help striking Palestinians, collecting food for the war effort, and recruiting volunteers to fight in Palestine. Such efforts helped to focus the group’s activities and provided a degree of political legitimacy for their work in Egypt” (Munson 2001, 496). With this successful mobilization, in September 1943, the family section system¹⁸ was established. The political dynamism of the Brotherhood and the organization’s involvement in military training, inspired by the Palestinian issue became a challenge against the Egyptian authority. During the same period, elements of the “Rover Scouts” and the Secrete Apparatus engaged in street battles with *Wafdists* and communists, and in March 1946, some 50 students were killed in police clashes with British authorities. “On May 31 and on June 8 conflicts between rival supporters of the *Wafd* Party and supporters of the Brotherhood occurred. *Wafd* officials placed the Brotherhood under surveillance. Al-Banna responded by urging Prime Minister Sidqi to end the persecution of the Brotherhood” (Lindstrom-Ives 2015, 30). Further, the EMB could unofficially participate in 1948 Arab–Israeli War, as authentic documents show that “A large number of volunteers from the Muslim Brotherhood joined the Egyptian Army in the war” (Morris 2008, 14). Consequently, the Egyptian authority accused the Brotherhood of trying to challenge the state order by violence.

In this regard, Mitchell (1969) states, “Between 1946 to 1948 culminating in the latter year in the murder by a Brother, of the Egyptian prime minister Nuqrashi Pasha, the dissolution of the organization, and the officially inspired murder of its leader, the Muslim Brotherhood continued recruiting members and sympathizers underground, as most of its activities were in secretive channels” (Mitchell 1969, ix). The government dissolved the society in 1948, but the U.S. State Department received reports of secret mass meetings, the society organizing in mosques, and pamphleteering throughout Egypt during this time (USDS 1954). The group was still sufficiently organized, even after three years of formal dissolution, to produce a demonstration of over three thousand members on less than a day’s notice in early 1951, and to carry out well organized rallies at every branch office in Egypt the day after the ban on the organization was lifted on May 1, 1951 (USDS 1954). This was possible because the organization devoted its energy to membership recruitment, private discussions of religion and moral reform, and building a social service organization.

Overall, during the monarchy era, the EMB’s political mobilization mainly depended on an anti-colonialism ideology and the renaissance of a powerful institutional Muslim bloc

¹⁸ The “family section” represents the first step of the Muslim Brotherhood’s organization. The family section was regarded by the society as the active fulfillment of the meaning of Islam among the Brotherhood, and the most fundamental of its educational instruments.

besides other nationalist political parties in the Egyptian political scene, such as *Wafd*. Furthermore, the organization preached the Islamic message in mosques and under a consolidated organizational structure, especially after the dissolution of the organization in 1948 and during Jamal Abdel Nasser's influence started from 1952.

2.2. Jamal Abdel Nasser's Power from 1952 to 1970

Jamal Abdel Nasser is known as the figure of Pan-Arabism.¹⁹ His influence lasted from 1952 until 1970. His regime of the 1950s and 1960s corresponded to the height of the Cold War between the two polarized powers of the world. Many countries of the world were able to use the Cold War card to its advantage, by receiving competing assistance from both sides in the war. Egypt was not different from other underdeveloped nations in that it used the Cold War to its advantage as well (Jankowski 2002). In the beginning, Nasser (office officially: 23 June 1956 - 28 September 1970) announced an aggressive development program in 1950s, for which he was lobbying for funds from around the world. He started by raising funds mainly through the U.N., World Bank and the Western Democratic nations, but soon sought the assistance of Communist nations (Freedman 2004). The nationalization of the Suez Canal took the world by surprise, especially the British and French stockholders who had owned the Suez Canal Company for years. Consequently, arrangements to attack Egypt were made by Britain and France for Israel to make the initial invasion against Egypt and occupy the side of the Suez Canal (Podeh & Winckler 2004). After few weeks of diplomatic discussions mainly by Britain and France, the crisis ended with the 'tripartite'²⁰ troops from the Canal Zone (The Suez crisis 2006).

This event made Nasser a hero and gave him political power, not only in Egypt, but in the Arab World also. In 1954, an attempt to assassinate Nasser by some Brotherhood members gave a chance to Nasser to attempt to eradicate the organization. A major wave of arrests followed the dissolution of the EMB and destroyed the organization's headquarters and many branches (Mitchell 1969). To describe this incidence, Barry Rubin states,

In a speech on August 29, 1965, Nasser stated that his security forces had thwarted a Brotherhood plot to kill him and overthrow the regime. As many as 27,000 people were arrested, hundreds were sentenced by a special court, and 26 were tortured to death. Three

¹⁹ "Nationalist notion of cultural and political unity among Arab countries. Its origins lie in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when increased literacy led to a cultural and literary renaissance among Arabs of the Middle East. This contributed to political agitation and led to the independence of most Arab states from the Ottoman Empire (1918) and from the European powers (by the mid-20th century). An important event was the founding in 1943 of the Ba'ath Party, which formed branches in several countries and became the ruling party in Syria and Iraq. Another was the founding of the Arab League" (The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica 2015). The famous hero of the idea of the Pan-Arabism is Jamal Abdel Nasser (Leadership: 1952-1970).

²⁰ Tripartite is the coalition of 3 armies against Egypt: Britain, France and Israel.

top leaders- Qutb himself, Yusuf Hawash, and ‘Abd al-Fattah Isma’il were hanged in Cairo on August 29, 1966. Investigations into the army and police uncovered numerous Brotherhood cells. During the trial, there were charges that the movement was aided by Saudi Arabia. The Brotherhood’s foreign representative, Sa’id Ramadan, was sentenced in absentia on charges of being a Western agent and went into exile in Switzerland. (Rubin 1990, 15)

Although almost nothing is known about the inner workings of the outlawed organization during the Suppressive Nasser era, an account of Nasser’s Pan-Arabist, anti-Islamic policies is essential to an understanding of how those policies served to clarify the goals of the banned organization, and how those goals ultimately acted as a springboard for the creation of what would eventually become the single most influential Muslim organization in the world (Lindstrom-Ives 2015, 41). However, there was a nationalistic sentiment in Egypt whenever there would be a war between the Arab and Israel. This sentiment often reinforces the relationship between all political actors including opponents among themselves. This is what happened few years later when the war between Arabs and Israel led by Nasser took place in 1967 and caused the defeat of Pan-Arabism by the Israeli Army (Knudsen 2003). This defeat was the second one after another defeat in 1948 during the establishment of Israel.

The argument advanced by Rubin (1990) explains how bitter the conflict between Nasser’s regime and the EMB was, “In the crisis, Nasser took over as head of state and moved quickly to destroy his rivals. Six Brotherhood leaders were subsequently executed; Supreme Guide Hassan al-Hudaibi was sentenced to hard labour for life; more than 800 militants were given heavy prison sentences; and as many as 6000 others were imprisoned without trial. The Brotherhood was outlawed and this proud, power full organization disappeared from the Egyptian political map literally overnight” (Rubin 1990, 12-13).

This period was the start of the huge migration of Egyptian Islamists to Europe and Gulf countries. Since then, the Brotherhood’s global network started to be visible. In this regard, Breuer (2014) states, “During the 1950s and 1960s, thousands of Muslim students left the Middle East to study at German universities, drawn not only by the German institutions’ technical reputations, but also by a desire to escape repressive regimes. Egyptian ruler, Jamal Abdel Nasser was firmly vigorous to root out the Islamist opposition” (Breuer 2014, 2-3). West Germany provided a welcome refuge for many of the EMB’s members (Mitchell 1979). The members’ presence in Europe was noticeable due to Muslims’ activities, including the EMB’s establishment of Mosques and Islamic centres. Even after the death of Nasser in 1970, many EMB’s members continued to live abroad until today.²¹

²¹ During Nasser’s suppressive tactics in the 1950s and 60s, the EMB started to spread its worldwide network known as ‘international *Tanzeem*’.

In brief, the EMB's political mobilization during Nasser's regime could be considered to have occurred in two phases. First, in the beginning of the regime, the EMB enjoyed political opportunity as a political partner with the Free Officers (FO), headed by Nasser against the British imperialism. Subsequently, the EMB propagated its ideology without restrictions through its related social service sections and its publication sections. Secondly, in the middle and the end of Nasser's regime, the deadly confrontations between the government authority and the Brotherhood reduced the EMB's political influence. However, in the height of his regime, Nasser started to release the EMB's leaders from prisons. "In 1964, Nasser, at the height of his power and confidence freed the remaining Brotherhood prisoners in a general amnesty. Nasser, like Sadat a decade later, wanted the fundamentalists to help him counter the Marxist left. Muslim Brothers were returned to government posts they had once held and paid salary arrears for the period of their imprisonment" (Rubin 1990, 14). However, because of the violent legacy of the EMB, Nasser again "drove the Muslim Brotherhood underground for five more years because of the following reason:

On October 26, 1954, Muslim Brother, Mohammed Abdel Latif joined the crowd in Alexandria's Manshiya Square to hear Nasser deliver a speech in celebration of the British military withdrawal which was being broadcast to the Arab world via radio. Latif managed to move to a position just 25 feet from where Nasser was standing. He pulled out a gun and fired eight shots, none of which struck Nasser. Panic ensued. Latif was seized and placed under arrest. Nasser, who had not stirred from the podium, appealed for calm. With extraordinary aplomb, he turned to the crowd and addressed it and his radio audience: "My countrymen," he said, "my blood spills for you and Egypt. I will live for your sake and die for the sake of your honour and freedom. Let them kill me. It does not concern me so long as I have instilled pride, honour, and freedom in you. If Gamal Abdel Nasser should die, each of you shall be Gamal Abdel Nasser... Gamal Abdel Nasser is of you and from you and he is willing to sacrifice his life for the nation." The crowd roared in approval and the radio audience throughout the Arab world was electrified" (Lindstrom-Ives 2015, 53).

During these periods, Nasser was considered a hero, not only in Egypt but in the entire Arab world and beyond. At the Bandung Conference of 25 Asian and African states, on April, 1955, he was welcomed as the leading spokesman of the Arabs. He argued in that occasion that the case for the independence of the French North African colonies, the Palestinian 'right of return,' and the application of UN resolutions in regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In September of the same year, encouraged by his popularity, Nasser decisively turned his back on the U.S. In addition, "Nasser with the help of his deputy Anwar Sadat engineered the creation of a new Egyptian constitution that established a single-party system under the

auspices of the National Union (NU), a reconfiguration of his “Liberation Rally” (Lindstrom-Ives 2015, 56).

2.3. Anwar Sadat Regime from 1970 to 1981

At the beginning of the regime of Jamal Abdel Nasser’s successor in 1970, there was a decline of Nasserism under Anwar Sadat’s regime: the new president (15 October 1970 - 6 October 1981). The new president opened a door for the multiparty system to return to the political sphere. In the spirit of the political change, Sadat abandoned the single party system adopted by the Socialist Nasser, as a new strategy to weaken the latter’s Pan-Arabism influence and initiate political relief (Baker 1990, 811). According to Ibrahim (2002), “Sadat’s main program was divided into four pillars: The Open Door Economy Policy (ODEP) (*‘Infitah’* in Arabic), democratization, alliance with the West and away from the Soviet, and finally conciliation with neighbouring Israel” (Ibrahim 2002, 166). Accordingly, during this regime, political entities enjoyed the new political system, including the EMB, except the Nasserites, who became defensive against allegations as they were accused of anti-democracy and anti-liberal economy. Meanwhile, this new political atmosphere created a status quo in politics between the Brotherhood and Sadat in the 1970s.

However, in the last part of Sadat’s regime to his assassination in October 1981, “the *Infitah* (openness) system led to a massive labour migration of Egyptian labour to oil-rich Arab states, and a reappearance of the old bourgeoisie that had lost much of its wealth to nationalization and socialism under Nasser” (Hassan 2005, 6). Consequently, the gap between the rich and poor was getting larger and larger until Sadat announced that he would “terminate subsidies of basic commodities on top of sky-rocking prices, declining incomes, problems with transportation, food, clothing and housing. Further, Sadat polarized afflicted citizens in which the economic reforms in their views failed to consider them” (Hassan 2005, 6-7). This complaint from mainly the lower class gave an occasion to the Brotherhood to attack the regime. “For instance, former editor of Al-Da’wa (Brotherhood’s Newspaper), Omar al-Tilmasani, explained that the *Infitah* policy was devoted to luxury items and was used for embezzlement rather than productive enterprises for the masses” (Ibrahim 2002, 40). As the end of Sadat’s regime was characterized by anti-USSR to pro-U.S. A,

[T]he Brotherhood had its own reasons for opposing the Marxists, whose secularism conflicted with its Islamic orientation. The group was socially and economically conservative. Its leading members tended to be, as one study put it, primarily found among engineers, doctors, and other professionals, i.e., other elements of the social structure who tend to benefit from a ‘capitalist’ rather than a ‘socialist’ economic system. Many businessmen, particularly from among former emigrants to the pious Persian Gulf states,

supported it. In addition, the Brotherhood itself was still not a legal organization and its leaders hoped to win from Sadat the right to function openly. (Rubin 1990, 16)

In the case of the Brotherhood's mobilization during Sadat's regime, the EMB, through Sadat's 'de-Nasserization', enjoyed freedom of activities after a large number of its members were freed from jail. However, the organization concentrated more on promoting democracy through their two most widely read publications, *Al-Da'wa* and *Al-'Itisam* based on Islamic vision. The growth of the EMB's political language during this period focused more on freedom of expression, while other Egyptian Islamist movements continued preaching the Islamic values and practices according to the traditional methods. As Hassan (2006) notes, "When violence escalated between the government and the Islamists in Egypt, Sadat's façade for civil rights and democracy further empowered the Brotherhood's struggle and advanced them along a language that spoke of a democracy that was undeveloped and derailed within the country's system (Hassan 2005, 7)." During this period, after Brotherhood' struggle to form a political party, Sadat offered instead to register the EMB as an association under the authority of the Ministry of Social Affairs. According to various reports, al-Tilmisani, the Brotherhood's Supreme Guide rejected Sadat's proposal because it would both limit the scope of the Brotherhood's activities to the narrow domain of social and charitable work and compromise its independence. Thus, the Brotherhood remained both inside and outside the system, allowed to publish its own journal and lobby parliament but lacking formal recognition as either an association or a political party (Wickham 2013, 30-31).

Under those circumstances, especially after Sadat's conciliation with Israel, embodied by the Oslo Peace agreement between Egypt and Israel in 1979,²² Sibila (2013) states, "Just three years after the signing, Sadat was assassinated on October 6th, 1981 at Egypt's annual parade ironically celebrating the October 1973 War with Israel." According to those who were pro-Sadat, including his family, the Brotherhood was involved in the plot. However, the organization rejected the accusation, claiming that the Islamist group known as *Al-Takfir Wal Hijra* was behind Sadat's death (Hassan 2002, 7). However, based on several Western sources, the Brotherhood participated in Sadat's assassination, as some of the participants in the *coup* were previously members of the Brotherhood, but were disconnected from the organization due to its pacifist strategic approach during that period according to the EMB's official claim.

²² According to Carter (2016), "The peace treaty that Israel and Egypt signed in March 1979 closely reflected President Carter's proposals at Camp David and formally ended the state of war that had existed between the two countries. Israel agreed to withdraw from Sinai, and Egypt promised to establish normal diplomatic relations between the two countries and open the Suez Canal to Israeli ships."

2.4. Hosni Mubarak's Regime from 1981 to 2011

Sadat's successor, Hosni Mubarak inherited an unstable country from 1981 to 2011 politically and economically. According to Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, "the first three years of the Mubarak era were relatively calm, with both the regime and the opposition seeking to avoid a resumption of the cycle of protest and repression that culminated in Sadat's assassination. In the fall of 1981, Mubarak signalled a commitment to a gradual increase in public freedoms with the release in stages of opposition activists Sadat had imprisoned" (Wickham 2013, 46). Under the leadership of Umar al-Tilmisani, the Brotherhood took some time to evaluate its options and assess how it might take advantage of the country's more open political climate. At the start point to enter the political scene within the Mubarak regime, "in May 1984, the Brotherhood entered parliamentary elections as an organized force for the first time since its unsuccessful run in the 1940s" (Wickham 2013, 46-47). However, the Brotherhood could not participate in those elections without entering into tactical alliance with the secular nationalist *Wafd* party. With attention to win the elections, "the eminently reasonable logic was that the *Wafd* provided a legal channel while the Brotherhood offered a popular base, thereby enabling both to reclaim their place on the national stage after long years of state-enforced absence" (El- Ghobashy 2005).

Three years later, in the parliamentary elections of April 1987, the EMB joined with the Socialist Labour Party to form the Islamic Alliance under the banner 'Islam is the Solution'. The Brotherhood was obviously the leading force in the Coalition. During the campaign period, which perceived the highest public displays of pro-Islamicist sentiment in the history of Egyptian parliamentary elections, the EMB overspread the country with posters carrying messages such as 'Give your vote to Allah, Give it to the Muslim Brotherhood'. The Alliance won fifty-six seats, of which thirty-six went to the Muslim Brotherhood, compared with thirty-five for the *Wafd* party, making the Brotherhood the single largest opposition bloc in parliament for the first time (Wickham 2013, 47). Under the opposition rhetoric in the Egyptian parliament led by the EMB, Mubarak's regime ultimately engaged a sort of autocratic doctrine known as 'the Emergency Laws' (*Qanun At-Tawari* in Arabic) that would manage to go on for nearly a quarter century (Hassan 2002, 8). The emergency law "provides the authority to arrest, detain, and interrogate Egyptian citizens suspected of terrorism-related crimes for prolonged periods of time without adhering to international standards of due process; thousands of Egyptians have been taken into custody for suspected involvement with the Muslim Brotherhood" (UCIS 2010). This law increased the tension between Mubarak regime and the Brotherhood, especially after Hamas routed secular Fatah in Palestinian elections in 2006.

In light of the economic situation during Mubarak's regime, Egyptians severely suffered considerably, compared to the previous 80 years. During Mubarak's regime, the

Egyptian society suffered greatly from high unemployment and poverty between 2004 to 2011. During this period, the ruling elite headed by Jamal Mubarak (Mubarak's son) monopolized the country's assets according to the Egyptian opposition parties in general. The country was about to experience a complete collapse caused by corruption, the new capitalism and a low rate of economic performance. Unfortunately, this situation was the result of the privatization policy and the shift towards a market economy (Al-Anani 2007, 53). Furthermore, corruption began to spread within Egyptian society, especially with the crime of bribery that became worse in various governmental and private sectors (Puddephatt 2012, 5). Over the preceding decade, corruption spread throughout the financial and banking sectors (Al-Anani 2007, 53). Because of the corruption in granting loans and the negative impact of political and financial interventions to break rules and laws, the country was almost chaotic.

The Egyptian Central Bank cited in its statistical Bulletin for the month of June 2005 that doubtful debt was about 14.4 % of the actual loans provided by Egyptian banks in March 2005 (Al-Anani 2007, 53). This means that the total value of doubtful debt reached 49 billion Egyptian pounds. The uncollected interest was much greater than the previous amount. Indeed, the loans of the private sector rose from 29 billion Egyptian pounds in 1992. This phenomenon took place when the program of shifting towards a free market economy demanded about 204 billion Egyptian pounds in 2004, according to the Egyptian Central Bank (Al-Anani 2007, 53). These data help to highlight the financial and economic mismanagement that contributed to the worsening of Egyptian society's financial conditions.

Nevertheless, Mubarak's regime could coercive power using democratic venues with limited and restricted political liberty. This policy increased societal and political tensions that reached the international level. Thus, the state backed by its strong executive, legislative hegemony, a judiciary pro government, Egyptian police forces, the intelligence apparatus, the National Democratic Party and the Egyptian military could enable the regime to resist the domestic and international pressures and live 27 years. However, the silent political movement against Mubarak's regime through the social media and international broadcasts such as Aljazeera channel, revolted against the Egyptian authority, resulting in Mubarak's resignation on February 11th, 2011 under the wave of the Arab Uprising.

In brief, during Mubarak's regime, the Arab Uprising was a wave of mass protests and demonstrations started from Tunisia in 2010. These demonstrations could change the regime in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Syria is still suffered from the influence of this turmoil. In Egypt, the discontent was caused by a high level of unemployment, unsatisfactory living conditions, limited civil rights and corruption. In Egypt, these protests gave a political opportunity to the Brotherhood to mobilize many Egyptians through its experienced and consolidated organizational structure, its economic and social activities to mobilize against the authority.

In Egypt, "the Uprising started in Alexandria against police brutality and soon

expanded into a nationwide protest against social injustice, economic deprivation, and political repression under the presidency of Mubarak” (Breuer 2014, 5). During the 18 day long protests started from January 25, 2011 to February 11, the Brotherhood was well prepared to deal with the political game for more than 80 years. Consequently, the organization was structured and equipped to get into the protests under Muhammad Badie’ s leadership. Yunus (2013) stated that 2500 to 3000 young members of the organization participated on January 25, 2011 without the EMB’s consent. In the middle of the protests, after the organization under Badie decided to officially join the protest on January 27 (Bal 2013, 137), the Brotherhood’s active members worked days and nights to gain more sympathizers and supporters to participate in the struggle to remove Mubarak from power in the middle of the Uprising as it has been highlighted in chapter 3.

Chapter 3

The Power of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood: The Impact of Ideology on Political Mobilization under its Successive Leaders

3.1. Introduction

The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is an Islamic group established in Egypt in 1928 by a 22-year-old elementary school teacher, Hassan al-Banna, who was born in 1906 to a traditional lower middle class family. According to Mitchell (1969), al-Banna founded the organization with six friends working at the Suez Canal under British rule (Mitchell 1969, 8). From its inception in 1928, the organization occasionally increased its members under authoritarian regimes from the 1930s until today. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is known as the centre of gravity of influential political Islam in the World, as it is the oldest and the most successful Islamic organization in terms of mobilization in the 20th and 21st centuries. Furthermore, the EMB coordinates with its international network, known as the 'International Tanzeem'.

One of the exclusive characteristics of the organization is its interchange cooperation and clashes at the same time with and against Egyptian successive governments. Furthermore, the organization is well-known for its social activities, such as building health centres and schools within Egyptian society. This organizational and social model spread out to several Islamist organizations in the Middle East and beyond. Based on the EMB's multiple-roles within Egyptian political and social activities, Pargeter (2010) defined the organization in short as,

a social movement that functions as a political party in some instances; a transnational organization that emphasizes the independence of its national branches; it declares that the ultimate aim is to establish an Islamic state, but asserts its willingness to participate in the democratic process; it projects itself as pacific, yet some of its branches have been directly involved in violent actions; it broadly rejects the West and Western values, yet is increasingly anxious to be seen in Western eyes as a moderate organization that can represent the voice of Muslims. (Pargeter 2010, 9)

With respect to Pargeter's definition, rejecting western values and engaging in violent action patterns are debated by scholars of Middle East studies as well as among political actors in the Middle East and beyond the region. The debate is based on whether the organization should be classified as a terrorist movement or an Islamist movement intending to gain power

through the democratic game.²³ Consequently, the above-mentioned definition might demonstrate the challenges scholars have to face in explaining and analysing the nature of this dynamic socio-politico-religious organization.

To discuss about the Brotherhood's ideology, the reader should go back to the history of the Muslim world. The closest Muslim history to the 20th century is the influence of the Ottoman Empire. In the preceding centuries, the Ottoman Empire governed much of the region and represented itself as the Muslim caliphate, following in the footsteps of the original caliphate that was first well-known following the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 AD, and later, at the time of the *al-Umayyads* and *Abbasids*, grew into a large and powerful empire that ruled the Muslim world for centuries up until its destruction by the Mongols in 1258 AD. In years preceding World War I, the Ottomans were in decline and were seriously weakened. Due to its alliance with Germany in WWI and its consequent defeat, the Ottoman Empire was surrounded by European colonial powers who decided to split control of the various areas of the Middle East that were previously provinces during the Ottoman Empire (Rapoport 2002).

After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's revolution took place followed by the establishment of modern Turkey in 1923. Moreover, the European domination of the Arab world brought about the division of the Levant, Arabia and North Africa into newly founded nation-states that were initially dominated by artificial elites who were backed by colonial powers namely, Britain, France and Italy. During this time, various secular nationalist movements emerged in the Middle East that advocated opposition to colonial influences and independence (Rapoport 2002, 53).

'Islam is the Solution' is the EMB's slogan projected to be powerful anti-colonialism, but also to bring back the Muslims' pride. However, different from other Islamist movements in the Middle East and beyond, the revival of the ideology of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (EMB) known as 'political Islam' became the anti-western colonialism in the Middle East after the end of the World War I in 1923 beside the renaissance of the Ottoman Empire that collapsed in the same period and forming a Muslim bloc that should be led by the organization. This ideology mainly embodied and preached by the EMB has a long history but well-known from the late 19th century (Rajsekhar 2014). However, the roots of this ideology go back as far as the 8th and 9th centuries. Therefore, the influence of the Islamic religion within the Egyptian society (when Islam reached Egypt) gave the Brotherhood a better recruiting opportunity, especially with the idea of updating the content of its preaching method based on the political, social and economic transformations within the Egyptian society.

²³ One of the controversial debates for some scholars and political actors in the Middle East and in the Western world is the status of the MB whether it should be considered as a political party, a social organization or a violent movement.

3.2. The Resurgence of Political Islam in Egypt from 1924 to 1928

The resurgence of political Islam is characterized by increases in levels of moderate or radical religiosity amongst individuals and organizations. This Islamist resurgence gained gradually more supporters who adhered to a radical or moderate interpretation of Islam that seeks to transform majority Muslim societies into Islamic states and/or unite the *ummah* (global community of Muslims). One of the fundamental reasons behind the emphasis on returning to Islam is “the bankruptcy of the constitutional order established in 1923 that emphasized by other anti-system groups and movements at the time, including the militant nationalist *Misr al-Fatah* and various leftist and communist groups” (Wickham 2013, 22). One of the influential Islamist movements in the context of the resurgence of Political Islam is the EMB.

According to Carrie Wickham, “What distinguished the Brotherhood was its religious interpretation of the causes of the country’s malaise and the proper framework for its solution” (Wickham 2013, 22). Scholars of the Middle East studies show that this resurgence started from the late of the 19th century (Mitchell 1960; Adams 2000; Knudsen 2003; Ramadan 2011, 159; Huntington 1996; Said 1997). In a similar case, in Western Europe, there was a resurgence of Christian political influence, but in the Mid-20th century. This latter period was the advent of some notable Christian democratic parties after the collapse of the Nazi dictatorship at the end of World War II in 1945, such as the current ruling party in Germany: The Christian Democratic Union of Germany founded on June 26, 1945 (CDU) (BBC: One-Minute World News 2005). In the case of the revival of political Islam, few imminent Muslim scholars engaged themselves to persuade Muslims to look at the industrial revolution of the 18th and 19th centuries in Europe, and in the U.S. in the 20th century as human efforts, encouraged by Islam as well²⁴ more than 1000 years ago (Ramadan 2011). “The prominent Muslim reformist scholars of the EMB’s ideology (political Islam) are Jamal Ad-Din Al-Afghani (1838-1897), Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) and Muhammad Rashid Reda (1865-1935)” (Ramadan 2011, 159). The latter has greatly influenced the EMB founder’s ideology according to David Rapoport, “al-Banna was greatly influenced by the fundamentalist writings of the prominent Salafi²⁵ ideologue, Rashid Reda, in the official Salafi publication *al-Manar*” (Rapoport 2002, 53). The focus of the above-mentioned Muslim scholars was to present Islam as a religion that encourages economic and social development based on Islamic principles and values (Ramadan 211).

The core arguments of these three Muslim scholars are mainly based on two features:
1) Muslims should not be proud of western culture, as Islam itself should be a better

²⁴ The Islamic textual theories emphasized on the economic, political and social spheres that have been practiced by the Prophet Muhammad and his companions.

²⁵ “The name ‘*Salafiyya*’ was derived from the phrase ‘*al-Salaf al-Salihin*’, meaning ‘the pious ancestors,’ which refers to the early Muslim generations, the time of the Prophet Muhammad and the subsequent four rightly-guided caliphs” (Rapoport 2002, 44).

reference for them to rely on, for establishing successful countries in all aspects of life; 2) being independent from foreign economic and cultural dominances is the key for Muslims to be able to compete with the Western dominance in the political, economic and social domains (Ramadan 2011). According to Charles Adams, “The father of political Islam, al-Afghani, was attached on the idea of re-establishing the Islamic unity after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1924 (Adams 2000). Analyzing the political struggle of Afghani, this particular study found that his core objective, was not just agitating against the western dominance in several Muslim countries, but also working for re-establishing the destroyed Caliphate. In this regard, Adams (2000) highlights that,

The chief aim of Jamal al-Din in all his untiring efforts and ceaseless agitation was the accomplishment of the unification of all Muslim peoples, under one Islamic movement, over which the one Supreme Caliph should bear undisputed rule, as in the glorious days of Islam before its power had been dissipated in endless dissensions and divisions, and the Muslims’ lands had lapsed into ignorance. (Adams 2000, 13)

This rise of the ideology of political Islam is an attempt to re-establish the unity and power Muslims had in the era of the Prophet Muhammad which is considered much better compared to the era of the Ottoman Empire. The reader should remember that due to the collapse of the empire in March 1924, the region had been fragmented in terms of Religious-Socio-Politics. Accordingly, one of the EMB’s leaders, Hassan Nada, argues that “the Ottoman Empire committed big mistakes when the Caliphates started to conquer other non-Islamic countries in Europe in the 16th and the 17th centuries” (Nada 2006). This criticism from Nada demonstrates that the EMB wants to project a message to the West that its long term agenda intends to limit its influence within predominantly Muslim countries, not to follow the expansionism practiced by the Ottoman Empire in Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries.

Furthermore, the EMB wants to be seen as a reformist movement mainly in the West compared to the Ottoman Empire politically, socially and economically. However, as Afghani was an extremely bitter foe of any kind of political authoritarianism, it appears that the EMB inherited from Afghani its current confrontation with all Egyptian authorities since its inception in 1928. Besides its domestic and international confrontations, the EMB looked at the Western political, social and economic interventions in the Middle East region as a threat and vice versa, as Afghani did in the 19th century (Al-Namnam 2011, 148). In addition, Afghani attempted to unite all Muslim countries under one leadership, as the EMB tries to do the same thing, but with different methods, characterized by its continuous cooperation and confrontation with the domestic, but also with the regional and international authorities.

As a result, the EMB’s political strategies differ from those of the Ottoman Empire.

The latter conquered and outmaneuvered countries aggressively such as the last sultans of the Empire in the Italo-Turkish War (1911), the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), and the continuous unrest caused by the Counter *Coup*, which preceded the 31st March Incident (Restoration), 1912 Ottoman *coup d'état* (Saviors) and the 1913 Ottoman *coup d'état* in the Empire up to World War I (Al-Namnam 2011). Therefore, the reader may notice that the tie between the Empire, Afghani and al-Banna was mainly the importance of uniting all Muslims under the Islamic ideology and umbrella.

This study shows that the EMB's ideology is also influenced by Egyptian nationalist and Egyptian Islamist scholar Muhammad Abduh who is known as Afghani's student. In the case of the linkage between Muhammad Abduh and al-Banna, al-Namnam states, Muhammad Abduh was one of the Egyptian figures of the nationalist movement who fought for the country's independence. Consequently, he joined the Egyptian revolution of 1919, led by Ahmed Urabi (Al-Namnam 2011, 149). During the revolution of 1919, al-Banna was elementary school student aged 13 (Al-Baz 2010, 50). Comparatively, Abduh shared with al-Banna the anti-colonialism struggle. In fact, al-Banna revolted against the promotion of western culture within the Egyptian society. In the light of the roles played by Afghani, Abduh and Reda cooperated in stimulating political Islam as follows:

Afghani sees the problems and warns; Abduh teaches and thinks and Rida writes and records. As al-Banna puts it, all are merely religious and moral reformers, lacking the comprehensive view of Islam which characterized the Brothers. Towards Afghani, the Brothers felt a special kinship. Many felt him to be the 'spiritual father' of the movement and al-Banna was most often compared to him. That, this self-conscious sense of identity with Afghani among Brothers was related to his activism seems self-evident. (Mitchell 1969, 321-2)

Another key element to explain the revival of political Islam is the effects resulting from the World War II that "started in September, 1939 to July end in 1945 after Japan had been defeated" (Wells 2011, 223). WW II shaped the international, regional and domestic politics. No matter the size of the formation of the political organization was, each political actor in the world tried to reposition itself according to the new balance of power characterized by the losers and the winners of the war. Accordingly, "in the beginning of the War, the EMB suggested to the Egyptian government to be neutral concerning the conflict and just keep the actual relationship with Britain" (Al-baz 2010, 314). Strategically, according to al-Banna,²⁶ the war provided a suitable ground to the EMB's focus on its social activities due to the fact that the Egyptian authority had to focus on the international turmoil rather than conflicting with the domestic political competitors such as the EMB. For this reason, the organization expanded its power inside Egyptian society. Under these circumstances, the organization

²⁶ Al-Banna's Memoir became a reference of MB and others.

considered the conflict as the best time to “renounce the article number 7 under the British treaty over the Egyptian authority” (Al-baz 2010, 315).²⁷

Although this might be true after the World War II, the influence of religious institutions in general, such as Christian churches declined or there was a new shape characterized by diversity (Beckman 2000). By the same token, Jeff Haynes suggests, “After the World War II, apparent decline of religious faith and growing secularization in Western Europe fitted neatly with the idea that technological development and the application of science to overcome perennial social problems of poverty, hunger, and disease would result in sustained progress for all. And in this process, it was believed that religion would be an inevitable casualty” (Haynes 2010). In contrast of this religious decline after the World War II in 1945, the influence of the EMB’s Islamist ideology has gradually increased.

Additionally, the effect of political Islam might have been seen as the alternative of the defeat of nationalist authorities in the Arab world by the Israeli army from 1948 and beyond. The defeat provided more political opportunity to the organization, especially during the alliance between the Free Officers (FO) and the EMB in the 1950s. In this regard, Said (2000) claims that “Political Islam became widely recognized in 1967, starting from the crushing military defeats of Arabic countries at the hands of Israeli forces” (Said 2000, 123). This argument has also been made by Knudsen (2003), who states, “The defeat of the Arabs in 1967 marked the end of what so-called Pan-Arabism” (n.p.). After the defeat, the Arab public was searching for an alternative to fight against Israel. As a result, the Islamist movements became the main opponents of the socialist and nationalist parties on the domestic levels. Additionally, Islamist movements represent themselves as the best option among other political actors in the region to face Israel through religious backlash: Judaism versus Islamism.

The defeats of the Arabs by the Israeli army in 1948 and 1967 made many Arabs disappointed and gave the Brotherhood a recruiting opportunity to appeal as the alternative political force in Egypt and in the Arab World. This was the beginning of anti-Arabism and the emergence of political Islam influence. Accordingly, “During these painful periods, the popularity of the Brotherhood in Egypt reached a tremendous influence, especially in the 1960s, after the defeat of Pan-Arabism, which began in 1967 after the Six Day War” (Said 2000, 123). The Brotherhood became influential in 1967 as the organization offered severe criticism of the way the war had been managed by the nationalistic army’s leadership (Said 2000, 123). Interestingly, some of the Middle-Eastern literature mentions that the Brotherhood participated in the war under the Egyptian military forces against the Israeli army in 1948, 1967 and 1973 (Ajami 1978). The defeat eroded popular hopes of Arab

²⁷ The treaty mentioned that the “Egyptian government has to pay duty to the British authority, but those privileges should be only served inside of Egypt” (Al-baz 2010, 315). The treaty however was observed bias and unacceptable by the MB’s leadership.

nationalism and failed to challenge Israel and its western backers in the 1948 and 1967 wars (Hirschkind 1997). As a result, Islamism represented by MB presents itself as the best option among other political ideologies in the Middle East and North African regions capable of challenging the Israeli economic and military powers. Both the struggle for economic and security

Independence from the West, an alternative ideology against Israel and the idea of the Islam resurgence might be considered as the arguments behind the ‘resurgence of political Islam’ in the Arab World that generated the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Further, there is another argument claiming that the resurgence of Political Islam in Egypt is due to the brutal and suppressive acts against Islamists in the Middle East by successive Egyptian authorities [see Theoretical Framework]. For this reason, “the EMB under Hasan al-Banna’s leadership, however, flourished and involved millions of Egyptians via several strategies and mechanisms such as attending seminars in mosques, growing number of women adopted Islamic fashion in public (hijab) and so forth.

3.3. The Founder of the Brotherhood: Hassan al-Banna from 1928 to 1949

This section highlights the EMB’s founder and the different ideological strategies and mechanisms used for mobilizing and consolidating his movement, focusing on collective action from its inception in 1928 until his death in 1949. The literature shows that al-Banna who was born in 1906, lived the era of two consecutive kingdoms, but died three years before the end of the last Egyptian monarchy under king Farouk who stepped down from the Egyptian monarchy in 1952. The two consecutive monarchies are the era of King Fu’ad (office: 1922 - 1936) and the era of Fuad’ son, king Farouk (office: 1936 - 1952). In the precedent years, in 1919, at the age of 13, he witnessed the British occupation of his town, which had a profound impact on his thinking and deeply affected his worldview” (Rapoport 2002, 44). In the case of the EMB’s establishment in 1928 when al-Banna was just 22 years old, Richard Mitchel states, “six members of the British camp labour force came to see him with their own words, formally launched the Society of the Muslim Brothers” (Mitchell, 1969, 8). However, before this particular meeting, Hassan al-Banna propagated the seeds of the EMB among many other colleagues in his small town of Mahmudiyya, in the province of Buhayra, 90 miles north east of Cairo (Al-Anani 2013, 5). The role played by the EMB’s founder is extensively covered by the EMB’s writers, leaders and scholars of the Middle Eastern studies. In this regard, Pargeter states,

The MB’s website, full of reports of al-Banna’s personal talents and his devotion to the organization is testimony to this. One article on the website cites the reason for the movement’s expansion as the enthusiastic and marvellous nature of al-Banna. It goes on to

describe him as a man with a high capacity for hard work, stating that he visited every village in the Upper Egypt in twenty days, sometimes he would be in Bani-Sweif in the morning, have lunch in Beba, in al-Wasta in the evening and stay the night in al-Fayoom²⁸, he regarded the Call of Allah first and foremost. (Pargeter 2010, 18)

Therefore, discussions about al-Banna himself, is one of the well-known areas of the EMB' studies. Accordingly, there are several reasons why discussing al-Banna tends to focus more on his personal attributes than the organization itself. Firstly, such descriptions reflect the fact that he appears to have a special charisma, according to the EMB' supporters. He certainly had the personal touch, and those who knew him relate that he made them feel as he had an intimate connection to them. Farid Abdel Khaliq, who went on to become al-Banna's personal secretary, mentioned that he used to follow him everywhere he went to preach in order to record his lectures (Pargeter, 2010, 18). Al-Banna's conferences used to be published in the EMB's periodic newspapers or magazines, and they can currently be found in the EMB's official websites²⁹. However, several commentators accuse the EMB's members of exaggerating when they describe the leadership's quality of al-Banna. Nerveless, a significant part of al-Banna's political and religious thinking is considered as the EMB's official ideology, subsequently, his thought was written and published in the 1940s (Lia 1998, 2).

Nevertheless, there is a common view among political Islam scholars cited in this particular study that Hassan al-Banna, himself, embodied peaceful political strategies due to his conviction of a gradual process toward his long term goal: establishing a vast and influential Muslims' bloc in the World. However, this peaceful strategy has been treated as treason and lack of consistency against tyrants, claimed by nationalistic political parties, as he used to cooperate in his entire life with king Fu'ad and king Farouk until his death in 1949 (Al-Namnam 2011, 180). Beside his peaceful political strategies through forming alliances with the Egyptian monarchy, al-Banna served Islamist ideology in his untiring effort to mobilize and recruit members to join and work for the organization. "To al-Banna and other religious conservatives, the problems of foreign economic, political, and military domination were compounded by the spread of Western secular values and practices. The secular models of law and education borrowed from Europe were out of touch with the religious beliefs and sentiments of Egyptian society; likewise, the 'cheap,' 'lewd', and 'suggestive' content of popular media, films, and music undermined traditional values and created moral and sexual problems for youth" (Wickham 2013, 22).

The source of the ideology embodied by the EMB's founder is from the Islamic religion. According to al-Banna's memo, "Our ideology is guided by the Book of God and the life of his Prophet" (Lindstrom-Ives 2015, 20). However, the exclusivity of his Islamic

²⁸ These are names of Egyptian cities, villages and districts.

²⁹ The main website is: <http://www.ikhwanonline.com/>

comprehensiveness is the combination of ‘religion and state’, the Islamic Renaissance [*al-nahda al-islamiyya*] or Islamic renewal and anti-Imperialism known as ‘Anglo Egyptian Sudan’. Regarding the notion of combining ‘religion and state’, al-Banna rejects the notion of secularism. Therefore, in order to insist on the applicability of religion with the state, the founder of the EMB states, “[T]he one who thinks that Islam does not include politics or politics is not one of the constituents of Islam, he or she committed injustice against himself and against his knowledge *vis-à-vis* Islam” (Rasa’il al-Banna 1906-1949, 199).³⁰

In an address to the Student Section of the Brotherhood in March 1938, al-Banna posed the question: “Tell me, Brothers: if Islam is something other than politics, society, economy and culture ? And elsewhere, he declared that Islam is worship and leadership, religion and state, spirituality and action, prayer and jihad...” (Lindstrom-Ives 2015, 25). To support al-Banna’s view, Yusuf al-Qaradawi³¹, the most respected scholar among Muslim Brotherhood’s adherents nowadays states, “For the West, Christianity means the Church, the Pope, the tyranny of the priesthood and the spirit. Where is this in Islam?” (Qaradawi 2001, 13). Qaradawi’s question refers to the origin of separating Christianity from state in Western Europe before and after the French revolution in the 18th century. However, it seems that Western scholars in the 21st century do not necessarily argue based on the historical aspect, but they back their arguments against religious involvement in the state based on their own view of the positive impact of secularism on modernism, and the negative impact on religious doctrine against human progress. Similarly, for some liberal political thinkers in the west, opposition to Christianity as a state religion is based on their belief in ‘reasonable pluralism’ and their belief that the state should not endorse any particular conception of the good life.

Nevertheless, the religious doctrine presented by al-Banna attempts to fit the social, political and economic aspects, the world was facing at his time. Therefore, to preach the EMB’s understanding of Islam to as many people as possible started from the 1930s, through one of the three Islamic sources called ‘*Ijma*’³² (consensus), the EMB under al-Banna and beyond changed its mobilization strategies and expanded its network over the five continents under its headquarters in Egypt. The concept ‘*Ijma*’ can be defined by this study as the process of achieving consensus through selective experts in the area of Islamic jurisprudence and beyond. The actors of ‘*Ijma*’ according to the Islamic sources³³, should be the most

³⁰ ‘Rasa’il al-Banna 1906-1949’ is a primary source constitutes of collection of the EMB’s founder’s own articles, seminars, essays and so forth. This collection is the most well-known source in terms of the EMB’s historical references.

³¹ Yusuf al-Qaradawi is an Egyptian Islamic theologian, and currently chairman of the International Union of Muslim Scholars. He is also considered as an ideological figure of the Brotherhood as he was an EMB’s active member in the past.

³² The three Islamic sources are *Qur’an*, *Sunnah* and *Ijma*. The source of the Arabic concept ‘*Ijma*’ or consensus in English are the scholars of Islamic *sharia* (Jurisprudence). These scholars through *Qur’an* and *Sunnah* may come to a consensus to decide non-clear issues in Islamic jurisprudence related to the continuous changes and development of the social and economic dynamics of human history.

³³ Quran: chapter 3, verse 104; and chapter 9, verse 122.

educated people in the society or in any given institution who is capable to carefully examine and investigate any actual case study considering the existing challenges the society is facing in any given time. Therefore, the EMB established the Consultative Assembly as the main section of the General Headquarters situated in Cairo in order to evaluate the different steps taken by the organization [see chapter 4]. This is to argue that the main job of the Consultative Assembly is to identify whether and how the participation of the organization in the domain of formal politics would contribute to the political development.³⁴

‘*Ijma*’ generates another terminology more flexible called ‘*Ijtihad*’³⁵ (diligent). Through *Ijtihad*, the EMB’s members participated in the Consultative Assembly to continuously study, the social, religious, political and economic transformations of the Egyptian society in order to adjust its political rhetoric and behavior. This sort of political check and balance explains the fact that the development of the EMB’s political Islam has not been a series of achievements only but also relatively a succession of phases of evolution shortened by strategic skillfulness (Rubin 1990, 10). For example, “studies by Bermeo, Roberts, and McCoy on the evolution of the radical left during ‘third wave’ democratic transitions in southern Europe and Latin America suggest that the views of socialist leaders were fundamentally transformed by their close interactions with leaders of other groups in exile or in prison. Such interactions triggered a process of soul-searching and a critical reexamination of the rigid ideological certainties that had fueled their calls for revolution in the past” (Wickham 2013, 12).

However, the organization experienced limited public backing and unlimited confidence for possessing a significant public backing support according to its adherents (Pargeter 2011, 60). One of the cases explaining the role played by ‘*Ijtihad*’ was during “the first general conference, in May, 1933 with the problem of Christian missionary activity and the way to block it. To stop over the missionary activities, a letter was sent to King Fu’ad outlining the organization’s belief in the importance of bringing the activities of the foreign missionaries under control” (Mitchell 1969, 13). This kind of decision had been taken by the Consultative Assembly of the organization based on *Ijma’a and Ijtihad*.

In order to diminish the Western influence in Egypt in the 1930s, political Islam had to cooperate with nationalist movements for the purpose of mobilizing Egyptians in favor of the country’s independence. This common goal with nationalist movements of anti-colonialism was spread out among citizens in the Middle Eastern and North African regions in particular. Accordingly, Albaz notes that “Muslim citizens in the region looked at the French and the British colonizers in the beginning of the 20th century as enemies,

³⁴ ‘Moderation’ “may refer to changes in behavior, such as renunciation of violence, and/or to changes in broader worldviews, goals, and values, such as a growing commitment to freedom of expression or women’s rights” (Wickham 2013, 5)

³⁵ ‘*Ijtihad*’ “is an Islamic legal term that means independent reasoning or utmost effort an individual can put forth in an activity” (Rhode 2012).

especially in Egypt where an uprising of bad feelings among the citizens against particularly the British imperialism was remarkable (Albaz 2011, 51). Forthwith, MB's founder involved in supporting the labor right struggles against the policy of the French and British monopolistic companies in the 1930s, especially the Suez Canal in Isma'ilia, the north-eastern part of Egypt (Albaz 2011,105). The same author mentions that when al-Banna was working under the British rule, before engaging his enduring job as a school teacher later on, in Ismailia, he embraced an anti-imperialism ideology (Albaz 2011, 109).

Hassan al-Banna's group was not happy at all *vis-à-vis* the promotion of the Western values within the Egyptian society (Mitchell 1969, 7). However, the group presented itself as anti-cultural invasion not anti-Western world. In this regard, Pargeter states, al-Banna did not reject the West in itself, but he certainly had major concerns on the impact of Western culture on his own society, asserting that western civilization has invaded the Muslim world by force and with aggression on the level of science and money, of politics and luxury, of pleasures and negligence, and of various aspects of life that are comfortable, exciting and seductive (Pargeter 2010, 20).

However, to respond to the principle of liberalism preached by the western way of life, the founder of the Brotherhood, al-Banna, "crafted three principal dimensions of the Brotherhood's ideology: comprehensiveness and inclusiveness, adaptability and elasticity, and applicability and practicality" (Al-Anani 2011, 13). However, before examining these three dimensions, one needs to stress that "al-Banna treated his Islamic understanding not as an abstract and fixed concept but rather a dynamic and flexible idea that can fit within different political circumstances" (Al-Banna 2013, 8).

A. Inclusiveness and Comprehensiveness

Al-Banna perceived his Islamism to be an inclusive system of norms, values, and regulations that could adapt Islamic teachings and ideologies into everyday life practices. He thought that Islam as a comprehensive faith should include all phases of human life. Accordingly, al-Banna emphasized, "We believe that Islam is an inclusive system; it is a faith and worship, a state, nationality and religion, a spirit and deed, a holy text and a sword" (Al-Rasa'il 2002, 171). Obviously, al-Banna's notion of inclusiveness derived from his view of Islam as a way of life rather than a holy text only. Thus, he wanted to transform this perception into a program of daily life. Not surprisingly, the solution al-Banna proposed to Egypt's political, economic and social situations was dependent on the return to Islam as a comprehensive order for human existence (Commins ed. Rahnema 1994, 134).

Building on his concept of inclusiveness of Islam, al-Banna tried to connect the mundane with the sacred, not through a strict and doctrinal approach, but by searching for a practicable and solid platform for reform (Al-Rasa'il 1906-1949, 209). More importantly,

al-Banna conveyed the notion of inclusiveness to the minds and hearts of his followers by using actual arguments. In one of his speeches, al-Banna defined himself as the following: “I am a traveler seeking the truth, a human searching for the meaning of humanity and a citizen seeking dignity, freedom, stability and welfare under the shade of Islam. I am a free man who is aware of the purpose of his existence and who proclaims” (Al-Rasa’il 1906-1949, 13).

Obviously, al-Banna’s concepts may be by coincidence similar to western conceptions that are outlined in his ideology. Words like freedom, stability, and welfare were unfamiliar to Egyptian society in a time where independence from foreign occupation was the main goal for almost all political and social movements in Egypt. Ironically,

Al-Banna employed the concept of Islamic inclusiveness to de-legitimize western ideologies such as communism and capitalism. He relentlessly asserted that Islam includes all the benefits of other ideologies. It, according to al-Banna, overrides socialism, capitalism, east and the west, nationalism and universalism. (Al-Rasa’il 1906-1949, 171)

B. Elasticity and Adaptability

The second key element of the EMB’s concept of Islam is elasticity and adaptability. These two notions define Islam as a religion that goes beyond time and space and that accommodates all other ideologies and philosophies. Al-Banna emphasized that Islam, as the last revealed monotheist religion, is compatible with all ages and nations (Al-Rasa’il 1906-1949, 173). To prove his argument, al-Banna stated that Islam is consistent with science. He pointed out that Islamic civilization contributed to great advancements and provided humanity with many original ideas in science and technology (Al-Rasa’il 1906-1949, 174). Further, al-Banna’s belief in the elasticity of Islamic identity is highlighted in his attempts to fit it into the existing Egyptian political system (Commins 1994, 136). It is widely accepted that al-Banna did not attempt to take over the political regime in Egypt during the 1930s and 1940s (Al-Anani 2013).

Moreover, al-Banna raised the issue of the constitutional form of government that, according to him, was the closest version of other political schemes to Islam as it held people accountable (Al-Rasa’il 1906-1949, 25). Despite the disagreement between al-Banna and the Egyptian government, he did not try to de-legitimize King Farouk (1936-1952). Conversely, al-Banna had a good relationship with the palace and acknowledged the legitimacy of king Farouk despite the latter’s relationship with the British (Lia 1998, 140). This flexibility was one of the underlying factors behind the EMB’s strength. Ironically, the EMB has always been criticized for its noticeable elasticity with the authorities by its opponents, as was stated previously.

C. Applicability and Practicality

The third aspect of the Islamic interpretation according to the EMB's founder, is applicability and practicality. Unlike many Islamic ideologues, al-Banna was extremely practical. He tried to turn the EMB's ideology into plans and a clear platform. He criticized other Islamic scholars and associations for not being practical. The practical aspect defined by al-Banna can be found through the social status of his followers who are in a large number, engineers, medical doctors, syndicalists, lawyers, geologists, biologists, university's professors and so forth in the rank of the Brotherhood. Thus, he questioned his followers, "Are We Practical People?" He also stressed the importance of having an incremental and persistent program for reform (Al-Anani 2013, 10-11). Obviously, al-Banna was keen to present himself not as a traditional theoretician but as a mere social activist. Drawing on the concept of inclusiveness, al-Banna stressed the comprehensiveness of Islamic methodology, which denotes that Islamic ideology cannot succeed without being applied in a complete program for everyday life. He said, He "[I]f you study the Islamic teachings, you will find that Islam has set all proper rules and laws for human life; for men and women, for the family and nations" (Al-Rasa'il 1906-1949, 42). Then, al-Banna provided a detailed program for restructuring, from political and social issues to health, science, and ethics of everyday life (Al-Rasa'il 1906-1949, 209). Al-Banna was keen to incorporate these elements into the foundations of the EMB's ideology. For instance, the emphasis of al-Banna on the comprehensiveness of Islam is interpreted into the enduring character of the Brotherhood as a multi-faceted movement (Al-Rasa'il 1906-1949, 17).

The multi-faceted movement is highlighted through "the following eight principles, goals, and sub-goals: 1. A *Salafi*³⁶ Movement; 2. Following the Sunna;³⁷ 3. Living the *Sufi*³⁸ Way; 4. Political Activism; 5. Physical Health; 6. Scientific and Cultural Study; 7. An Economic Foundation; 8. A Social Ideology" (Gaskew 2009). Furthermore, six sub-goals exist based on the above-mentioned basic principles: "1. Building the Muslim individual; 2. Building the Muslim family; 3. Building the Muslim society; 4. Building the Muslim state; 5. Building the *Khilafah*; 6. Mastering the world with Islam" (Gaskew 2009). This multi-faceted definition discloses the tireless efforts of al-Banna to describe the Brotherhood as an inclusive organization that can realize different goals for many purposes. He described the

³⁶ "The word *salafi* or 'early Muslim' in traditional Islamic scholarship means someone who died within the first four hundred years after the Prophet Muhammad, including the well-known Muslim scholars such as Abu Hanifa, Malik, Shafi'i, and Ahmad ibn Hanbal. Anyone who died after this is one of the *khalaf* or 'latter-day Muslims'" (Keller 1995).

³⁷ '*Sunna*' is Arabic name which means the way of the Prophet's life.

³⁸ "*Sufism* is a school for the actualization of divine ethics. It involves an enlightened inner being, not intellectual proof; revelation and witnessing, not logic. By divine ethics, we are referring to ethics that transcend mere social convention; a way of being that is the actualization of the attributes of God" (Nimatullahi 2014).

Brotherhood as “a comprehensive movement [that] contains all reform meanings” (Al-Rasa’il 1906-1949, 174). This broad and inclusive definition provides the Brotherhood’s leadership with a philosophical, symbolic and religious powers that could be used to generate collective action and enlarge the organizational and social network across different levels of society. In addition, it differentiates the organization from other Islamic organizations that keep their ideology and activities to one dimension of everyday life.

The notion of inclusiveness has been persistently used by al-Banna’s successors. For instance, Mohamed Badie, the current Supreme Guide of the EMB, states that the organization views Islam as a comprehensive system encompassing all aspects of life (Al-Anani 2013, 17). He states, “MB does not differentiate between religion and politics, it views Islam as an inclusive system that extends to all life. It encompasses politics, economics, society, culture and so forth. We worship Allah by politics and preaching together and do not separate between them” (Rasa’il 2002, 174). More importantly, this inclusiveness is incorporated into the internal structure of the EMB, which has different sections to supervise politics, social activities, students and welfare affairs.




Figure 2. EMB’s Framework of Ideology

This figure shows that the EMB’s ideology is characterized by comprehensiveness, flexibility and practicability.

The figure comprises of the key ideological elements used by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood to mainly attract many young Egyptians not just to join the organization, but also to work for it. The leaders of the organization continue presenting and analyzing the ideology of the EMB as the most suitable philosophy for the social and political developments of Egypt.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the pragmatic aspect of al-Banna’s ideology has been perceived by its opponents as opportunistic and dishonest. Islamic societies and political

forces in Egypt criticize the EMB's ambiguous and vague character. However, this flexibility has played a vital role in mobilizing many Egyptians to join the organization compared to al-Nour al-Salafi, al-Takfir wa'l Hijrah, al-Jihad al-Islami and al-Jama al-Islamiyya. In the 1930s, the EMB's members reached tens of thousands due to the organizational structure, many activities but most importantly due to the Israeli-Palestinian crisis between Arabs and Muslims on one side and Israel and many western countries including the U.S. on the other. In this conflict, the Arabs in general consider themselves victims of the unconditional support of the U.S. in particular to its Israeli ally in the Middle East. This victimization gave the Brotherhood under al-Banna and beyond a political opportunity within the Egyptian society as the EMB presented itself as the political actor capable of fighting Israel. To highlight the most severe case against the Arabs by the Israeli paramilitaries during a backlash in 1936, Lindstrom-Ives mentions,

On April 15, 1936 the Palestinian Arab Revolt against British rule in Palestine and mass Jewish immigration began when a Jewish truck convoy traveling on the road from Nablus, 30 miles north of Jerusalem, to the nearby village of Tulkarm was attacked. Two drivers were shot, one dying immediately, the other dying five days later. The assailants were Arabs, probably members of the anti-Zionist Qassamite organization. The next day, gunmen affiliated with the pro-Zionist Irgun shot and killed two Arab workers sleeping in a hut near Petah Tikva and a three-year cycle of violence that would eventually claim the lives of over 5,000 Arabs, over 300 Jews, and nearly 300 British soldiers and administrators began. Over 15,000, more than ten percent of the adult male Palestinian Arab population were killed, wounded, or exiled. Thousands of Arabs would be held without trial in unsanitary and overcrowded prison camps. (Lindstrom-Ives 2015, 23)

Accordingly, with no doubt, al-Banna could get the support from the more than the 95% Muslims representing the Egyptian population who is continuously supporting the Palestinians against Israel. In this regard, the EMB several times claimed, "[T]he Secret Apparatus was created as the clandestine and militant wing of the Muslim Brotherhood by Saleh el-Asmawi in 1942 to join the war against Israel" (Lindstrom-Ives 2015, 29). To actively support the Palestinians, the Brotherhood as an Egyptian independent political and social actor supported the Palestinians financially and militarily. "By 1948, the Muslim Brotherhood played a particularly prominent role in raising funds, purchasing weapons, running military training camps, and sending hundreds of volunteers to fight in Palestine" (Rubin 1990).

The Israeli-Palestinian crisis has its own negative impact on the Egyptian security as well as its neighboring countries such as Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. In the case of Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood participated in the fight against Israeli as an independent movement.

This position has created conflict with the country's army which is the only legitimate institution to use force against any inside or outside enemy. However, due to the defeat against the Arabs in the wars with Israel, the Brotherhood secretly established the 'Secret Apparatus'. This division is controversial among the Brotherhood's leaders and strongly considered as a danger against the Egyptian authorities in the 1940s and afterward. This unit due to several conflicts with the Egyptian governments became largely responsible for many of the Brotherhood's clandestine operations against the Egyptian authorities. In the 1940s and 1950s, the influence of this unit reached its height. Accordingly, it is argued, the Brotherhood's institutions reached throughout Egyptian society, including the Secret Organization which was responsible for military training. It has been reported that "in 1944, the Secret Apparatus began to infiltrate the Egyptian Communist Party as well, which the Muslim Brothers considered an enemy political entity" (Lindstrom-Ives 2015, 29). In the meantime, from the perspective of the Egyptian government and its British overseer, al-Banna and the Brothers remained as a threat. By mid-1943, al-Banna was so convinced that the British intended to exile him, that he wrote a farewell message to his followers.

This political conflict led the Brotherhood to think about establishing a political power, "in 1945 new parliamentary elections were held, al-Banna, secure in the belief that the popularity of the Brotherhood would prevail at the polls, stood for Parliament along with five members of the Brotherhood. However, the elections bids of al-Banna and the other Brotherhood candidates were defeated. Al-Banna and several members of the Brotherhood were briefly detained" (Lindstrom-Ives 2015, 29). Despite these setbacks and the defeat, "the Brotherhood flourished after the conclusion of the Second World War. In al-Banna's view, the end of the war was a signal to summon all the resources of the Brotherhood in an effort to eradicate British influence in Egypt" (Lindstrom-Ives 2015, 29).

Nevertheless, few years before the death of al-Banna in 1949, violent incidents and political circumstances between the EMB and the Egyptian authorities took place because of political conflict. Mitchell states, "In the 1940s and early 1950s, fundamentalism was larger, more united, and more threatening to the existing system than it has been at any time since the EMB was accused of assassinating the Egyptian prime minister Nuqrashi Pasha in 1948" (Mitchell 1969, 73). This incident caused the dissolution of the organization in the same year, followed by the assassination of the EMB's founder in 1949 by an agent said to be sanctioned by the Egyptian state (Mitchell 1969). Under these circumstances, the EMB has been accused of having large arms caches and a strong base in the police and army" (Rubin 1990, 10). During this period, "the EMB was also seen by many as terrorist organization in the sense of marginal and anti-modern. One study, for example, spoke of the rigid Islamic fundamentalism' of the Brotherhood as excluding them from full participation in the ever expanding opportunities of secular education, and their exclusive religious concentration on fundamentalist Islam" (Mitchell 1969, xvi). This is to say, the EMB's ideological direction

was going far from a position of intellectual leadership as result of being too much anti-Western: Israel' supporters in the eyes of the Brotherhood.

For a large majority of the Brotherhood membership, the assassination of al-Banna, the founder of the organization was a stunning development that left the movement leaderless, in disarray and adrift. Nevertheless, the organization needed a head and both the leadership and the rank in file understood that the person ultimately chosen to play that role would be hugely influential in determining not only the political and social thrust of the Brotherhood, but the ultimate fate of the organization itself (Lindstrom-Ives 2015, 34). Therefore, a host of candidates, all of them close associates of al-Banna, but each of them adhering to a particular ideological point of view from the extreme right to the left, began to maneuver, negotiate, and position himself in the hope of assuming the leadership. The first and most probable successor to the post of al-Banna was the Deputy Leader of the organization, Salih al-Ashmawi, who had been leading the Brotherhood's 'Secret Apparatus' for some time (Mitchell 1969, 36).

According to the Brotherhood's constitution that time, in the absence of a fully approved leader, al-Ashmawi, was al-Banna's designated successor. All those concerned, however, understood that to choose al-Ashmawi as a leader would have its drawbacks. The Deputy Leader believed that the way ahead for the Brotherhood lay in its clandestine operations, and no one doubted that choosing him as leader would steer the organization along a path that would brand it as a terrorist entity and ultimately deny it reconciliation with the government. The other strong candidates included al-Banna's brother 'Abd al-Rahman al-Banna, his brother-in-law 'Abd al-Hakim'Abidin, who served as the Brotherhood's 'Secretary General,' respected cleric Shaykh Hassan al-Baquiri, and Mustafa Mu'min who led the Brotherhood's student organization (Mitchell 1969, 38).

In the 1950s, the level of religious commitment was gradually increasing in Egyptian society, Islamic renaissance and the Egyptian revolution. As a result, the EMB sought to raise its own adherents with a rigorous Islamic upbringing and subsequently recruiting them in religious outreach to the broader public (Pargeter 2010, 31). This wide spread of the Brotherhood caused conflicts with the authority, especially after the death of prime minister, Nuqrashi Pasha under the suspicion of the organization, the death of a judge called Ahmed El-Khazinda Bey, President of the Court of Appeal, who had given a prison sentence to a Muslim Brother for attacking British soldiers in 1948, followed by the assassination of the EMB's founder in 1949.

As Egypt still was under martial law, and the Brotherhood was still banned due to the assassination of the Prime Minister Nuqrashi, the choice of the right leader was an issue of utmost importance. The importance of making the right choice became particularly acute in May 1949 when a group of Brothers attempted to assassinate the following Prime Minister, Awni Abd al-Hadi. By July, some 4,000 Brotherhood members were under arrest. With both

the case of the assassination of Prime Minister, Nuqrashi, and that of the so-called ‘Jeep Case’ terrorist attack being heard in the military criminal courts, the leadership decided to allow al-Ashmawi to preside over the day-to-day affairs of the Brotherhood for the time being, but with considerable oversight, and denying him for the moment at least the title *Murshid* (Supreme Guide) (Lindstrom-Ives 2015, 35).

According to Alison Pargeter, the death of Al-Banna obliged to bring the various tensions afterward that had been bubbling for years well and truly to the forefront started from the new EMB’s selected leader, Hassan al-Hudaibi (Pargeter 2010, 31).

3.4. The Second Supreme Guide of the Brotherhood: Hassan al-Hudaibi from 1949 to 1972

In the organizational structure under al-Banna’s leadership, no policy was managed to choose al-Banna’s successor in the Brotherhood, which meant that after his death rival factions wanted to claim leadership of the organization. With this tension, the organization selected Hassan Isma’il al-Hudaibi, age 60, a judge of more than twenty-five years’ standing in the Cairo judicial system (Lindstrom-Ives 2015, 7), as the Second General Guide of the Brotherhood (Mitchell 1969, 85). The strategic reason behind appointing a judge as the Supreme Guide of the organization was that he would calm the judiciary and the legal matter *vis-à-vis* the death of judge Khazindar that had not been forgotten. Further, the palace would be assuaged as Hudaibi’s brother-in-law was chief of the royal household, and would thus help to speed up the return to legality (Pargeter 2010, 31). Under such circumstances, the Society needed a new face, new blood, and a new personality to appear before the community. According to al-Banna’s deputy since 1947, Salih Ashmawi, it was necessary that the names of the terrorists, which had been made by the press the subject of stories of fear and terror, to disappear for a while (Mitchell 1969, 85-86). To conclude Hudaibi’s ideological philosophy, Ben Morris Lindstrom-Ives states,

From Hudaibi’s perspective, however, an Islamic State could only be created through joint accommodation and cooperation with not only the Egyptian Government, but also with all tenets of modern society. Hudaibi’s willingness to cooperate with the Egyptian Government, is reflective of the fact that he sincerely believed that ‘Islamization’ of the Egyptian state could only be made possible through peaceful and popular consent amongst its citizens. (Lindstrom-Ives 2015, 7)

“One of Hudaibi’s first demands was that the ‘Secret Apparatus’ would be dissolved, a decision that put him at odds with Salih al-Ashmawi, who had ceded power to him” (Lindstrom-Ives 2015, 37). The new leader’s performance was not satisfactory and unable to

consolidate the movement as a whole and to recruit new members as al-Banna used to do. Consequently, the Brotherhood became paralyzed under his leadership. As its membership began to decline and disagreement among the ranks increased, Hudaibi was accused of turning the Brotherhood into a movement of words not action. Yet, while Hudaibi was weak, he cannot be blamed as entirely responsible for the movement's demise. It was also a reflection of the changing political environment in Egypt (Pargeter 1969, 33). Shortly after Hudaibi's appointment as leader, Muhammad Najib and Gamal Abdel Nasser came to power through their nationalist revolution of 1952. As a part of the nationalistic movement against the monarchy, the Brotherhood had maintained good relations with the army and other nationalist parties before they had come to power. The Brotherhood had high hopes for their future and expected to be given space in which to operate under the new regime (Pargeter 2010, 34). Some Brothers were overjoyed as Nasser's coming to power, as they believed that he would move to bring about Islamic rules and regulations (Pargeter 2010).

Conversely, as it became gradually clear that Nasser had no plan of applying Islamic law in his socialist regime, the Brotherhood became increasingly disappointed and fierce disagreements occurred within the inner circle over the extent to which the movement should be prepared to work with the regime (Abdul-Halim 2004, 44). Nasser began to view the Brotherhood as an irritant, not least because it was resisting some of his policies. In January 1954, the new cabinet plunged the Brotherhood into disaster by dissolving the Muslim Brotherhood. It also launched an aggressive press campaign against the movement and arrested scores of Brothers, provoking yet further discord among the Brothers' ranks (Mourad 2012). It was in such extreme circumstances that the Secret Apparatus seemed to come into their own, as if they had been given the opportunity to act and to declare their domination (Pargeter 2010). They took it upon themselves to issue threatening letters to members of the Brotherhood who had escaped detention, judging their lack of torture, an indication that they had been conspiring with the regime (Rapoport 2002).

Hudaibi's attempts to act as peacemaker fell on deaf ears and his willingness to act, especially after Nasser signed an evacuation treaty with the British that many Brotherhood's members considered to be equal to 'giving away the nation'. This situation encouraged some elements within the Secret Apparatus to initiate a more radical plan (Row 2015, 154). On 26 October 1954 as Nasser gave a speech in Cairo to celebrate the British evacuation treaty, he was shot at eight times, but escaped unharmed. The truth of who exactly was involved in this plot aside from the supposed assassin, Mahmoud Abdel Latif, a tinsmith from Imbaba beside Cairo, and how much the Brotherhood's leadership knew about it, it is still not clear. However, the consequences for the Brotherhood were severe: the regime retaliated by hanging six men and arresting thousands of the EMB, essentially crushing the organization (Pargeter 2010, 34).

Thus, Hudaibi failed to lead the more activist elements for the Brotherhood and the

movement was effectively disorganized during the second half of the 1950s and throughout the 1960s due to the fact that so many members had been imprisoned and others adopted more radical approach (Jones 2013). However, rather than diminishing these more radical elements' desire for action, their spell in prison only hardened them and made them even more determined to challenge the Nasser's regime. Despite the organizational continuity, there was a number of ideological developments during this time that served to reinforce these more hardline elements (Pargeter 2010, 34).

These ideological developments were the first since the movement's inception in 1928. Qutb who was influential pedagogue and writer quickly established himself as being the primary socio-religious theorist of the Brotherhood and established ties with the Brotherhood Supreme Guide, Hassan al-Hudaibi:

Born in the village of Musha, Upper Egypt, in 1906, the son of a landowner and estate manager, Qutb spent a largely uneventful childhood in a home steeped in piety. By the time he was a teenager, he could recite large portions of the Qur'an. In about 1929, Qutb moved from his home village of Musha to Cairo where he enrolled in a British-style school, where he remained until 1933. Like Hassan al-Banna, Qutb was hired as a teacher by the Ministry of Public Education. In that same year, he found a publisher for his first book, a literary study: 'The Task of the Poet in Life and the Poetry of the Contemporary Generation'. In 1935, he published another literary study, al-Shati al-Majhul" (The Unknown Beach). Qutb wrote and published his first non-literary work around 1949, al-Adala al-Ijtima'iyya fil-Islam (Social Justice in Islam). In 1954, Qutb published the first installment of what will prove to be a highly influential commentary on the Qur'an, Fi Zilal al-Quran (In the Shade of the Qur'an), a work done in prison that would eventually extend to an extraordinary 30 volumes. (Lindstrom-Ives 2015, 48)

Omar Sacirbey, a Qutb's expert states,

Qutb's experts are divided on whether he was ultimately more disenchanted with the United States or with authoritarian Islamic governments that themselves did not live up to Muslim ideals. Born in 1906, Qutb received both a Western and Islamic education, and in the 1930s, he became a civil servant in Egypt's education ministry. He made his name as a writer, specializing in social and religious issues. In 1948, Qutb was sent to study the American education system. Some scholars say Qutb already viewed America negatively because of its ties with Great Britain, Egypt's former colonial master, and later because of its support for Israel. As he has been well documented by numerous scholars, Qutb came to advocate that the leaders of Egypt and Egyptian society could be considered as part of *jahiliya* (pre-Islamic ignorance) and were therefore legitimate targets in the struggle to create an

Islamic order. (Sacirbey 2011)

In a movement that was so dominated by organizers and parched of thinkers, Qutb's ideas came to breathe new life into the organization. For those of a more militant persuasion, it would seem that it was in Qutb that they found a real successor to al-Banna, a man whose ideas could provide the intellectual justifications for the action they so craved (LoSordo 2014, 14). By the mid-1960s, the Qutbists had formed their own movement within the Brotherhood, which became known as Organization 1965. Pargeter argues, because Qutb's ideological development was not a secret, we can also conclude that Hudaibi was aware of the ideological foundation of Organization 1965. In any case, Hudaibi made no effort to object to the group or Qutb's theories, and it can be assumed that he chose to tacitly accept, if not support the activities of Organization 1965 (Pargeter 2010, 35). To explain Qutb's ideology, Carrie Wickham states,

Qutb developed the concept of *jahiliyya* and *hakimiyyah* initially proposed by the Pakistani revivalist Islamist thinkers Abu Ala' al-Maududi and Abu Hassan al-Nadawi and applying them directly to an analysis of the Brotherhood's persecution under Nasser. This analysis gave Qutbists clarity and force. *Jahiliyyah* (ignorance) originally referred to society in Arabia prior to the advent of Islam. In its modern formulation, as elaborated upon and popularized by Qutb, it referred to a state of willful blindness of God's sovereign power. All systems based on man-made laws, whatever their orientation, fell within the category of *jahiliyya*, including the democratic systems of the West. Against *Hakimiyyah* stood one alternative, *hakimiyyat Allah* (the absolute sovereignty of God), meaning the imposition of a system of Islamic law derived from the texts of the Quran and the Sunna. The Nasser's regime, 'as seen from the vantage point of a man who knew only its concentration camps,' epitomized the intrinsic flaws and excesses of all *jahili* systems, exposing the depths of human suffering that resulted when some of God's subjects arrogated the right to rule over others. (Wickham 2013, 28)

Analyzing from whether Hudaibi was aware about Qutb's theories or not, I found two different views from scholars. First, Hudaibi was a weak leader in front of the growing Qutb's fraction, though, he believed that Qutb's '*Jahiliya*' concept would lead the organization to a failure based on his published famous book: '*Du'ah La Qudah*' (Preachers, Not Judges). Hudaibi means from the title of his book that the Brotherhood should focus on preaching its views, not to judge individuals nor society as good or bad. Hudaibi's book criticizes Qutb's radical view written in his influential tract: *Ma'alim fii al-Tariq* (Signposts Along the Path). What made Qutb's ideology famous? Or what is the summary of his famous book? To answer these two questions, Lindstrom-Ives provided a short summary about

Qutb's ideology:

By contrast the radical Islamic philosopher and theologian, Sayyid Qutb became the leader of the 'radical' and '*jihadist*' factions of the Brotherhood. Qutb would develop very significant attitudes and beliefs towards the United States and the West, concluding that both areas of the world were entering into serious moral decay, having evolved into what Qutb called 'apostate' states. This meant in turn that Qutb believed that the former colonial powers of Great Britain and the United States were by nature cancerous, and that they sought to spread all the evil and corrupt tenets of 'modernity' and secularism to Egypt and the greater Muslim World. Moreover, Qutb believed that any form of organized government was blasphemous by nature, and that only God (Allah) could be worshipped as a sovereign. This sacred 'sovereignty' which Qutb envisioned was broken and betrayed by modern day governments in their worship of leaders which in turn marked versions of idolatry. (Lindstrom-Ives 2015, 7)

Comparatively, "no period in the Egyptian history, until the rise of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in 2014, did the Muslim Brotherhood experience a greater degree of oppression than it did under the rule of Gamal Abdel Nasser during the sixteen-year period from 1954 to 1970" (Wickham 2013, 40). However, once the regime began to clamp down on this group, accusing it of plotting to overthrow the state and executing a number of those involved, including Qutb himself, who was hanged in 1966, as well as arresting many brothers, Hudaibi worked to dismiss Qutb's ideology and distance himself from the group (Sabrin 2010). The reason behind Qutb's sentence,

In 1957 and 1958 a group of Brotherhood activists, some of whom had just been released from prison, organized a secret network and asked Sayyid Qutb to serve as their spiritual guide. In fact, it has been suggested that Qutb wrote *Signposts* as a text to be used in the group's instruction. Uncovered by the security police in 1965, members of the network (dubbed in court as 'Organization 1965') were accused of plotting to overthrow the regime. Named as the group's primary source of inspiration (with the police claiming that 'copies of *Signposts* had been found in each and every search'), Qutb, who had been released from prison at the behest of Iraqi president Abd al-Salam Arif in late 1964, was re-arrested, tried in court, and hanged on August 29, 1966, thereafter to be honored as a martyr (*shahid*) for the Islamic cause. (Wickham 2013, 28)

Many of those who had followed Qutb, including Mustafa Shukri who went on to establish the militant *Takfir wal Hijra* (known as Jamat al Muslimin) group, could not stomach the idea of taking a conciliatory approach towards the state and split off from the Brotherhood to

follow an ultimately self-destructive path (PWHCE 2003). Although serious questions have been raised as to whether Hudaibi was pressurized into writing the book against Qutb's ideology by the regime, or whether he wrote it at all, it is used by the Brotherhood today as evidence of his peaceful stance and his re-channeling the movement back to its original moderate direction as comprehended by al-Banna. Overall, Hudaibi is regarded as a realist who rejected the radical interpretation of Islam that Sayyid Qutb was deeply invested in promoting (Lindstrom-Ives 2015, 4).

The breakaway by the more militant Qutbist elements within the Brotherhood and Hudaibi's reassertion of the Brotherhood's non-confrontational stance did not bring an end to the divisions. However, there has been a new wave and recruiting mechanisms used by the Brotherhood in the end of Hudaibi's term. In this regard, Alison Pargeter has stated two main activities pursued by the Brotherhood shortly after Sadat coming to power in October 1970. In his explanation, Pargeter mentioned that Sadat released from prison the most active members who were considered the Secret Apparatus' affiliates. The members of this group are Mustafa Mashour, Ahmed al-Malat, Kamal Sananiri, Ahmed Hasanein and Hosni Abdelbaqi. This group took upon themselves to struggle to take over the movement from Hudaibi who appeared weak in front of them. Shortly, they nominated themselves as members of the Guidance Office at that time, giving themselves the reins of power (Pargeter 2010, 36).

This group tried hard to restructure the organization, which had by this point become so weak and fragmented that it was more the shell of a movement than a force in itself. This group, hardened by their prison experience, sought to turn the Brotherhood into a body fit to pose a real and robust challenge to the state. Pargeter states that they focused their energies on trying to re-establish some sort of legal recognition by the state, but the main push was to try to recruit new members to fill the Brotherhood's empty ranks. Furthermore, Pargeter shows that the most obvious place to start recruiting was on the university campuses that had by this point become key centers of political activism, both left-wing and Islamist. He argued that the reason behind this new political consciousness among the country's student population was in part fueled by international events such as the humiliating defeat of the Arabs against Israel in 1967, but was a reflection of the failing of the nationalist state (Pargeter 2010, 37).

In addition to the domestic and international political opportunity given to the Islamist in the 1970s, Pargeter explained that the rise of the Islamists was also due to the fact that Sadat had permitted space for Islamist groups to operate on the campuses, apparently in a bid to act as a counterweight to the Nasserists and Leftists that were a potential challenge to his rule. This situation resulted numerous Islamist groups and cells. According to Pargeter, these groups sprung up on campuses across the country (Pargeter 2010). The important development here is that they grouped themselves under umbrella name of *al-Jama'at*

al-Islamiya. Among the leaders of these groups were figures such as Abdul Moneim Abul Futuh, Issam al-Iryan, Abu Ala Madhi and Mahmoud Ghazlan, all names that were to show large in the Brotherhood. Pargeter did not mention whether these leaders were monitored by the Brotherhood's headquarters or not during these activities. Nevertheless, later on, these figures become the Brotherhood's well-known figures, even though, they are known as the reformists of the Brotherhood. Pargeter also states, although these groups were politicized and opposed to what they considered to be the un-Islamic nature of the Egyptian regime, they were predominantly preoccupied with enforcing Islamic morals and behavior within their own milieu (Pargeter 2010, 38).

Ideologically, these activists "focused their attentions on issues such as encouraging female students to wear the hijab, ensuring there was sufficient segregation of the sexes within the university campuses and seeing that lectures were stopped in order for students to pray. Their slogan at this time were 'all for Sharia and all against atheism and nudism and were neither East nor west, but for Qur'anic Islam'" (Pargeter 2010, 38). As all of these activities were on university campuses, they could capture the student mood of the day and they spread with remarkable speed. Moreover, according to Pargeter, they succeeded in taking control of the student unions. In the late 1970s, *al-Jama'at al-Islamiya* led the unions in eight out of the twelve universities including in Cairo, Minya and Alexandria. By the end of the 1970s, they had become so strong that they were able to take their activism beyond the campuses, organizing public prayers and gatherings that attracted thousands and that were attended by famous Islamic scholars such as Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi and Sheikh Mohamed al-Ghazali (Pargeter 2010, 39).

In short, Pargeter's work concludes that *al-Jama'at al-Islamiya* had become the most effective populist Islamist movement in Egypt, able to achieve what had always fled the Brotherhood mass popular support. The next was how the leaders of *al-Jama'at al-Islamiya* started to be in contacts with members of the Brotherhood, Pargeter explained the cases of al-Ariyani who become later the spokesman of the Brotherhood for international affairs and Abul Futuh, the student union leader and Abu Ala Madhi. Al-Ariyani who has been a medical student at Qasir al-Aini Hospital in Cairo and given treatment to some Brotherhood prisoners states,

It was a dream for me to meet the Sheikhs of the Brotherhood as we used to hear stories that were full of terror and fear about them. But when we saw them and talked with them we found them to be different people. We found *mujahideen* who sacrificed themselves for the sake of *al-Dawa*. They refused to compromise even though their fate was prison and torture and sometimes death. (Pargeter 2010, 39)

Presenting and explaining the recruiting mechanism, the above author suggests that the

Brotherhood began actively recruiting these student leaders. As example, Abu Ala Madhi recounts how Mustafa Mshour used to visit him at home in order to convince him to join the movement. Another case showed that Kamal Sananiri, a Brotherhood's activist used to summon these young student activists to try to persuade them to join the Brotherhood's ranks. For Abul Futuh, Sananiri was for him a symbol of a preacher and a *mujahid* that they needed to take as an example. He went on to observe, the characters of the leaders captured them and had the biggest impact in their desire to join their group. Pargeter clarified the reasons the student's leaders were so attracted to these characters as the EMB's members' militant stance, which was in tune with the student radicalism of the day. To prove this latter reason Abul Futuh said,

Our ideas and our methodology was close to the methodology and the way of thinking of the Organization 1965 (leaders of the Apparatus) ... Even more than that I see in the brothers of the Secret Apparatus such as Mustafa Mashour, Kamal Sananiri, Hosni Abdelbaqi, Ahmed Hassanein and Ahmed al-Malat that their methodology was close to us and when they left prison they were carrying the same ideas as us. Therefore, they were closer to us at that time than the older generation of the Brotherhood who was brought up at the time of al-Banna. (Pargeter 2010, 40)

Following Hassan al-Hudaybi's death in 1973, the leadership of the organization would be passed on to Umar al-Tilmisani. President Sadat would play a significant role in the development of the Brotherhood by liberalizing laws which had violently suppressed the existence of Islamist groups in Egypt. As part of Sadat's policy of '*infitah*' (openness), he would eventually open the door to the Brotherhood and lead to full legalization of the organization" (Lindstrom-Ives 2015, 68). The third Supreme Guide, Umar Al-Tilmisani could somehow achieve what Hudaibi failed to do: Reinforcing the peaceful and gradualist political approach as the ultimate political mobilization of the organization.

3.5. The Third Supreme Guide of the Brotherhood: Umar al-Tilmisani from 1972 to 1986

One year after Hudaibi's death, the chief spokesman for the EMB, "al-Tilmisani was appointed as the third Supreme Guide of the organization from 1972 to his death in 1986, and consolidated Hudaibi's gradualist method to the Islamic education reform of the society and the state" (Wickham 2013). Overall, as Sadat's regime started from 1970 to 1981, al-Tilmisani's leadership covers Sadat's new political policy known as *Infitah* (openness) and the first five years of Mubarak's regime. Therefore, it is reasonable that during his leadership the Brotherhood could enjoy the political opportunity provided by Sadat's regime

from 1971.

In this period, the EMB's mobilization process openly used various ways such as preaching the ideology in their seminars, mosques or through their social activities due to the new regime policy after the death of Nasser in 1970. Nevertheless, Qutb's ideology who is considered 'martyr' was still influential within several key members of the EMB's leadership. Under the two main divisions in the inner circle, there were the old guards and the reformists including al-Tilmisani himself. The organization worked harder under al-Tilmisani's leadership to boost the moderate strategies in the organization, far away from any kind of confrontation with the government. In the case of various accusations for violence against the organization, al-Tilmisani firmly rejected all allegations and considered them as fabrications against a political rivalry as he worked for opening a kind of new page with the authority (Wickham 2013).

Regarding the EMB's violent legacy, al-Tilmisani argued that there had been rebellious members who ultimately abandoned the organization and formed separated organizations such as *Jamat Takfir Wa Ihijrah and Al-Takfir wa Lhijra*. These latter organizations understood *sharia* differently from how the Brotherhood interpreted the Islamic texts according to al-Tilmisani, especially in the case of dealing with the opponents of the Islamic state, during Islam's early years. He asserted that "Byzantine employees filled the offices of the Islamic government and, during the era of the Abbasids, Christians participated in government and, during the era of the Fatimids, Copts served in the ministries. But the Coptic Christians who are accused of provocations and attacks on Muslims by some violent members in the past could be targeted for suppression, especially those in the Christian centers of Minya and Asyut" (Rubin 1990, 145).

This continuous peaceful approach adopted by al-Tilmisani from the 1970s to 1986, is considered by Middle East scholars as a turning point from the organization's historical conflicting atmosphere against the Egyptian authorities, however, mainly the old guards believe that from its foundation, the Brotherhood under its founder al-Banna pursued a gradual and pacific political approach. To highlight al-Tilmisani's moderate approach, Barry Rubin states,

The leader in this process from militancy to moderation was the third leader of the EMB, Umar al-Tilimsani (1974–1986), a lawyer by training, a member of the Brotherhood since the early 1930s, and a close associate of founder Hassan al-Banna. Not only al-Tilmisani initiated the pacific political strategy, but also he was an active preacher of it. He openly and frequently talked about the Brotherhood's new moderate approach. However, he kept rejecting the slogan "No religion in politics and no politics in religion. This is to argue that the EMB did not change its ultimate agenda and goals, but the organization only changes tactics. (Rubin 1990, 30)

Barry Rubin's explanation presenting al-Tilmisani's leadership as the start point of the Brotherhood's moderation is supported by Middle East scholars, however, along my research on this work from several sources, Hudaibi played the fundamental role to bring the organization to adopt the actual peaceful political strategy which also encouraged the Brotherhood to adopt democracy in their political agenda until today. What the reader should put in mind about this organization is whether certain activities would be useful or not in mobilizing the public to support the organization. In this regard, Mustafa Bal states, the organization "over the years was a subject to change both on the organizational level and ideological domain" (Bal 2014, 105). Furthermore, El-Ghobashy states that "[T]he Brotherhood's political engagement through electoral competition, among other factors, had a considerable effect on this transformation from a religious mass movement to what looked very much like a modern political party" (El-Ghobashy 2005, 374). Using moderate political tactics, rather than confrontational tactics, the Brotherhood adopted a new strategy which was about criticizing the governments' conduct of policy, the extent of corruption and so forth. This negative politics adopted by the Brotherhood was an effective attack against the authorities compared to the violent counterattacks with the governments in the 1940s and 1950s.

Another effective mobilization strategy used by al-Tilmisani was the victimization and a peaceful approach *vis-à-vis* the oppressive tactics used by the Egyptian authorities. In one of his clear statements, al-Tilmisani, stated that from the reign of King Farouk (1936-1952) until today, Egyptian governments have closed the doors to the Brotherhood while unlocked to everyone else, as though, they were not Egyptian citizens. Before this, there was the Political Parties Law which completely isolated the Brotherhood (Rubin 1990, 30). The new Electoral Law of 1983 ruled that political activism would be restricted to the realms of political parties that had been sanctioned by the Parties' Committee, forced the Brotherhood to think in a different way... Indeed, the organization was so successful because it presented itself as a group that blended politics with being a religious and cultural social movement (Pargeter 2010, 45). Subsequently, al-Tilmisani himself claimed, the regime did not give them back their legal status and they have not ceased from calling for the restoration of their rights, but they receive no answer (Rubin 1990, 30)

Although the organization faced restrictions, violent or brutal suppressions from successive Egyptian authorities during the end of Sadat's regime and during Mubarak's regime, the al-Tilmisani's leadership still functioned and recruited supporters through its pacifist political strategy. This is to argue that the EMB's pacifism has played so far a significant role in recruiting a large number of Egyptians to the movement who oppose the violent approach used by *Jam'a Islamiya*, *al-Jihad* and others within the Egyptian politics. The pacifist strategy pursued by al-Tilmisani has given also the organization a political opportunity to form coalitions with other legalized political parties, such as *Wafd* Party.

Evidence also indicates that most of time, the Brotherhood has cooperated with *Wafd*. In this regard, El-Mikawy states, they forgot about the ideological differences, less problematic than with the *Wafd*, and gained a more accommodating partner, willing to accept the Muslim Brothers' dominance (El-Mikawy 1999, 90). However, in an interview, Abul Futuh acknowledges that there was a current tactic within the Brotherhood which shared the vision of the possibility of using peaceful approach around 1984 when the Brotherhood had a major reassessment and decided to condemn the use of violence forever (Pargeter 2010, 41).

Another strategy embodied by al-Tilmisani's leadership as a counterweight to more conservative figures inside the Brotherhood such as Mustafa Mashour who would be a Supreme Guide later, was about bringing back more reformist figures such as Farid Abdel Khaliq into the Guidance Office (Pargeter 2010). Based on the consistency of using this peaceful strategy and the rise of the EMB's political mobilization, al-Tilmisani at a large meeting in Cairo in 1983 suggested the idea of establishing a political party that would not eclipse the Brotherhood, but that would work alongside with it. However, Mehdi Akef³⁹ who would be the seventh Supreme Guide later rejected the idea (Wickham 2013). Nevertheless, in 1984, the organization decided to take part in the parliamentary elections and gaining eight seats by allying itself with the New *Wafd* party. This peaceful strategy was the key to have the opportunity to form alliance later with other political parties such as the Liberals and the Socialist Labor parties in 1978 parliamentary elections under al-Tilmisani and in the 1995 parliamentary elections and beyond under Abu al-Nasr, al-Tilmisani 's successor.

3.6. The Fourth Supreme Guide of the Brotherhood: Mohamed Hamed Abu al-Nasr from 1986 to 1996

Listening to several speeches and statements from Abu al-Nasr, the fourth Supreme Guide of the EMB, this author of this study found him more conservative than al-Tilmisani. His speeches show him to be a firm and a devoted person to the EMB's ideology and agenda. He often emphasizes on the importance of implementing *Shari'a* rule in Egypt as the ultimate solution of the challenges the country faced during his era. Accordingly, Abu al-Nasr, explained, the general atmosphere is not conducive to the establishment of an Islamic state ... The most important thing is to work for the implementation of the Islamic *Shari'ah* and try to persuade the authorities to abolish the freedom-restricting laws... Everything can be done on the basis of the *Shari'ah* from education to the methods of government. Islam should govern all aspects of activity. That is what they ask for (Robin 1990, 32). In addition, Abu al-Nasr

³⁹ Mahdi Akef who has worked as a member of the Guidance Bureau of the EMB; the highest leadership body inside the organization since 1987, is the seventh Supreme Guide (office: 2004-2010) and belongs to the conservative wing of the Brotherhood. Akef agreed and supported the leadership method of all except Al-Tilmisani's. He said that "he disagreed with Umar al-Talmasani because al-Talmasani viewed the consultation as an instructor rather than as binding in the context of Islamic Jurisprudence. This means that Akef disagreed somehow the very moderate policy adopted by Al-Tilmisani (Middle East Monitor 2014).

had thought that Mubarak's regime did not oppose *Shari'a*, but it was a matter of time, he states, "As Muslims, the [government] officials are not really against implementation of the Islamic *Shari'ah*; it is just that there are pressures here and there to delay its implementation" (Rubin 1990, 34). Based on his political conviction, al-Nasr decided to participate in the 1987 parliamentary elections.

The 1987 parliamentary elections were indeed an impressive show of the Brotherhood's popularity. The government had clear advantages in publicity, money, and power, and the ruling party won 339 seats with 70 per cent of the vote. But, the 'Islamic Alliance' of the Socialist Labour Party, the Liberal Party and the Brotherhood won 60 seats with 17%. Most of these voters and members of parliament belonged to the Brotherhood. As one Brotherhood activist, Ma'mun al-Hudaibi, ironically commented, it is not wise policy for any state to deny the presence of a large segment of the population that espouses a certain ideology and whose members are cohesively and strongly bound together" (Rubin 1990, 25). Therefore, intentionally or unintentionally, in the 1980s, the demand for *sharia* had receded and was replaced for calls for freedom to establish political parties and join elections and have newspapers ect" (Pargeter 2010, 44)

Due to this new apologetic interaction between the EMB and the authority under al-Nasr, it has been proved through the following years that Abu al-Nasr's leadership was the shift in the balance of power between the conservatives and the reformists [chapter 4]⁴⁰. This is because during his leadership, the conservatives were more visible and powerful compared to the reformists who became weak in the EMB's decision-making process. According to Khalil al-Anani, a veteran member who spent more than twenty years in jail under Nasser's leadership, Abu al-Nasr was less progressive than his predecessor, al-Tilmisani, and his weak leadership created space for the conservatives to become powerful and dominant in the organization. In his recent book, *'Inside the Muslim Brotherhood: Religion, Identity, and Politics'*, al-Anani (2016) states, during the first half of the 1990s, the conservative solidified its grip on power by dominating the Guidance Bureau, the *Shura* Council, and the Administrative Offices [chapter 4] (Al-Anani 2016).

Since then, the dominance carried out by the conservatives inside the Brotherhood's inner circle became the Brotherhood's mainstream ideology until the new millennium as it has been highlighted by Reuters (2016). In this period, the current Brotherhood's reformist was on the position of fading away. Only Abul Futuh remained on the Guidance Bureau among the reformists, which was otherwise dominated by the conservatives. Other reformist figures, such as al-Aryan, Mohamed Habib, Gamal Heshmat and Ibrahim al-Za'farani were sidelined. The new conservative power center was primarily led by Khairat al-Shater who is in jail this time and Mahmoud Ezzat who left the country. The latter is currently acting as the Supreme

⁴⁰ In chapter 4 [4.11.], the study has presented and examined various Groups within the conservatives and the reformists of the organization.

Guide of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, making him the leader of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement. He assumed this position in August 2013 to date, following the arrest and imprisonment of then-Supreme Guide Mohammed Badie, the Eighth and last Supreme Guide of the Brotherhood whom the Egyptian court has sentenced to life in prison with other 35 members from 2013 after the army overthrew ex-president Mohamed Morsi in 2013 to date (Reuters 2016).

One of the most well-known cases to explain the EMB's political mobilization during Abu al-Nasr's command, was after the earthquake in Egypt. In response to the earthquake in Egypt in 1992, the new-generation activists mobilized their resources in the syndicates, as well as in the organization itself, ensuring a rapid and efficient transfer of resources to the rescue of the earthquake victims. This rapid response outmaneuvered the government, and embarrassed it in the eyes of the public (Zahid 2012,). As result, the regime could not practically dissolve the organization due to two main reasons. First, the international political atmosphere was much concerned about the Egyptian human rights' record, especially after the government had been accused of torture and several other anti-human rights practices in the Egyptian prisons. Second, the Brotherhood, with its social service activities, directly or indirectly helped the government to reduce the burden of the heavy social and economic crisis the country was facing [chapter 5].

However, regardless of the EMB's social activities under al-Nasr' leadership, Mubarak's regime continued repressing the Brotherhood's political activities, the regime introduced a new strategy of reconciliation with other opposition parties excluding the Brotherhood, especially their leaders. In actual fact, the intention was to reinforce political agreement in which the authority could allow the anti-government's voice to function in exchange for their restraint. Mubarak's political cooperation with political parties also aimed to demonstrate his concern about all Islamist parties in the country, but the main target was actually to isolate the Brotherhood. In one of the occasions, Mubarak stated, "The fundamentalists will kill you before they kill me, stressing their common interest in stability and limiting Islamic extremism" (Rubin 1990, 23). With this belief, "On 23 November 1995, Egypt's Supreme Military Court sentenced 54 leading members of the Muslim Brotherhood to prison terms ranging from 3 to 5 years with hard labour. The trial marked the culmination of a turbulent four-year period which witnessed a deterioration of the state's tolerance for the outlawed Brotherhood" (Campagna 1996, 278).

3.7. The Fifth Supreme Guide of the Brotherhood: Mustafa Mashhour from 1996 to 2002

In coincidence with the diminishing influence of the reformists, a new line of conservatives began consolidating its power over the organization. After the death of al-Nasr in January

1996, the conservatives chose one of their own to become the new general guide. In a strong show of power, a small group of the conservative leaders declared Mustafa Mashhour who was in jail more than 20 years as the fifth General Guide (office: 1996-2002)⁴¹ immediately after al-Nasr's burial, in what became widely known as the 'cemetery pledge of allegiance' ('bay'at al-maqabir') (Campagna 1996, 149). El-Ghobashy describes the moment: A tight-knit circle led by Guidance Bureau members Ma'mun al-Hudaibi who would become the Sixth Supreme Guide (2002-2004) after Mashhour, essentially anointed Mashhour who was a key figure of the Secret Apparatus, to the highest executive post without election or consultation with *Shura* Council members, citing as justification the security clampdown on the last *Shura* Council meeting in 1995 (El-Ghobashy 2005).

The way of choosing Mashhour who joined the Brotherhood in 1938 when he was 17, upset the reformists and made them weaker (Associated Press 2002). To boycott the decision, a key member belonged to the reformist group called Sultan went to Mashhour and asked him why he had been chosen in this unorthodox manner. Mashhour, who claimed he had been surprised by Ma'mun al-Hudaibi's choosing him, told Sultan: 'Allah has chosen for the group; Allah chose Hassan al-Banna, and then Allah chose Hassan al-Hudaibi, and then Omar al-Tilmisani, then Hamed Abu al-Nasr and then the poor slave [i.e. himself] (Pargeter 2010, 49).

Mashhour's inauguration in 1996 was a declaration of the extreme shift in power toward the conservatives and paved the way for conservatives to control the Brotherhood in the following years. Under Mashhour's tenure, which was dominated by his bold deputy, Ma'mun al-Hudaybi⁴², the conservatives adopted an uncompromising stance toward the reformists, resulting in the Al-Wasat crisis in 1996⁴³. The ideological and religious development of the Brotherhood was stalled and unenforceable. Mashhour, for example, declared that Copts should pay *jizya* (a poll tax) instead of serving in the army. By the end of the 1990s, the Brotherhood had come under the control of the conservatives, who did not tolerate calls from reformists to implement reforms or share power with them (Al-Aanani 2016, 148-149).

To understand Mashhour's political strategy, the author has examined his long article

⁴¹ Mustafa Mashhour a hard-liner within the conservative wing was considered as a member of the Secret Apparatus for many years in the past (Pargeter 2010, 40).

⁴² Ma'mun al-Hudaybi is the son of the second Supreme Guide of the Brotherhood, Hasan al-Hudaibi and sixth Supreme Guide. His ideological leadership was similar to Mashhour's in a way that some said Mashhour was Ma'mun al-Hudaibi's puppet. However, even though this study did not identify whether he was a puppet or not, both belong to the conservative approach and embodied the same view.

⁴³ On January 10, 1996, a group of leaders associated with the Brotherhood's 'reformists' current, led by thirty-seven-year-old engineer Aboul 'Ela Madi, announced their plans to form a new party and submitted their proposal to the government's Political Parties Committee. Defined by Madi as 'civic platform based on the Islamic faith, which believes in pluralism and the alternation of power', the Wasat (Center) party. This new development was very influential in the media propagating the collapse of the Brotherhood (Wickham 2013, 81).

published in 1987. In this article, Mshhour echoed the EMB's gradual political themes in the pages of the Brotherhood affiliated journal *Liwa' al-Islam*. In his article, Mashhour offered a detailed exposition of the Brotherhood's rationale for participating in elections and, in so doing, sought to allay any doubts and reservations harbored by the journal's readership (Wickham 2013 2010, 49).

Mashhour observed, "as to the question of whether[the Brotherhood's] entry into parliamentary elections represents a new path, the answer was clearly no, given that Hassan al-Banna himself stood as a candidate for parliament in the 1940s" (Wickham 2013, 49). This is one of the conflicting problems that the EMB's reformists have against the conservatives. The latter often argue based on what they have seen from the founder regardless of whether the current circumstances permit certain decisions to be taken or not. Mashhour's leadership from 1996 to 2002 could not easily accept suggestions from the reformists. However, he helped the group gain influence by forging alliances with legitimate parties (Associated Press 2002). In the end of Mashhour's term, the reformists could influence the decision of the organization due to the attacks of 11 September 2001

The post 9/11 brought a continuation of reform debate within the Brotherhood and of the seemingly endless questions about how best to engage in the political process without selling out on the movement's core Islamic principles under pressures from the West. During this period, the world began to focus its attention more on the various Islamist movements including the Brotherhood which is still considered as the source of other Islamist organizations. Governments were quick to pick up on this sea change of sentiment and use the 9/11 attacks as evidence that they had been right to climb down so hard on their Islamist opponents. In these circumstances, the Egyptian authorities were not exception. Therefore, the Brotherhood was targeted and domestic media incited the organization's violent legacy and accused the organization of inspiring the creation of al-Qaeda in the 1970s' Afghanistan conflict against USSR (Pargeter 2010, 53). During this suppressive political circumstances against almost all Islamist organizations, the Brotherhood appointed Ma'mun al-Hudaibi, 82, to run party affairs since Mr. Mashhour's hospitalization, and would succeed to the leadership post after Mashhour death in November 2002.

3.8. The Sixth Supreme Guide of the Brotherhood: Ma'mun al-Hudaibi from 2002 to 2004

Ma'mun al-Hudaibi is the son of the second Supreme Guide, Hassan al-Hudaibi and the main supporter of Mustafa Mashhour's leadership ideology. Therefore, shortly before Mashhour's death, the Guidance Bureau appointed a committee to vet the preferences discussed by the General Consultation's members regarding his replacement. Therefore, it was not a big deal to choose Ma'mun al-Hudaibi for the post (Wickham 2013, 102). In one of his statements

highlighting his ideology, Ma'Mun al-Hudaibi' mentioned that it is assumed that the distinctiveness of the EMB's ideology plays a great role to strengthen and stimulate the courage of the movement. Based on his assumption, the EMB's activist, Ma'mun al-Hudaibi continues, in every phase "[W]e never tired of searching for a way out of our situation because we did not want to remain illegal. If the Brotherhood attacked the government, it also did not use violence and it criticized the radicals who did" (Rubin 1990, 26). Consequently, Barry Rubin's assessment seems to be accurate. He says,

Challenging the government was a losing proposition. Men who had spent many years in terrible prisons had no wish to return there. The younger revolutionaries and radicals saw this conclusion as a betrayal. But fiery ideologues preaching new interpretations of Islam gained few followers and those resorting to violence were quickly imprisoned or executed. The growth of observance of Islam among the populace seemed to reconcile the masses with the status quo rather than radicalize them. Nasser and Sadat had enjoyed similar periods when Islamic organizations were apparently crushed or tamed. While these groups had never seemed likely to overthrow the regime, they did cause it considerable trouble. (Rubin 1990, 27)

During his short time, the Brotherhood almost remained the same as Mashhour's leadership. However, the study could find a booklet written and published by Ma'mun al-Hudaibi explaining the Brotherhood's mission based on his vision. The booklet analyzed by Rosefsky Wickham, under the title '*Politics in Islam*' offers a detailed exposition of the Brotherhood's mission and position on key issues in English. According to Wickham (2013), the booklet has an interesting provenance, as it was written in response to a query from the student-run *Harvard International Review*. Like the Brotherhood position's papers released in 1994 and 1995, *Politics in Islam* exhibits in incoherent mix of religious and democratic themes. For example, it asserts that the '*umma*' is the source of authority but immediately undercuts this statement by emphasizing that members of the *umma* are obligated to submit to the provisions of Islamic law (Wickham 2013). As it declares,

The Muslim Nation is obligated to submit to Allah alone and to sanctify the laws of the Glorious Quran and the blessed Sunna (Translations of the Prophet), and believes that man does not have the right to rule except with that which was revealed by Allah in the form of *sharia*. In that sense, it cannot nominate anyone to act on its behalf except if he is willing to rule in accordance with the *Law of Allah*. (Hudaibi 1997)

In addition, the text affirms that the specific rulings contained in the sacred texts of Islam must be enforced: "The sharia includes texts relating to systems which nowadays are considered to

be an integral part of politics. We, the Muslim Brotherhood, demand that these particular Islamic injunctions be adhered to and acted upon. They cannot be disregarded, neglected, or their application and enforcement ignored” (Wickham 2013, 95). To address his statement to the West, Ma'mun al-Hudaibi continued to frame the program of the Brotherhood as aiming toward the ultimate establishment of sharia's rule. Like other Brotherhood's veteran leaders, Ma'mun al-Hudaibi responded to growing external and internal criticism by affirming the movement's historical mission and emphasizing the duty of absolute loyalty and obedience to those at its helm. This is to argue that the ideology of the Brotherhood's leaders even within the conservative wing attempts to be adjusted based on the socio-political transformation in Egypt. Nevertheless, Ma'mun al-Hudaibi, the last great figure of his generation lived in the repressive climate of the internal dispute between his conservative wing and the reformists led by Abul Futuh who states, “[T]he climate of repression and exclusion has aborted the conduct of internal elections within the Brotherhood and strengthened the hand of those who reject the growth of democracy within the group to the point that it has stopped completely” (Wickham 2013, 102).

3.9. The Seventh Supreme Guide of the Brotherhood: Mahdi Akef from 2004 to 2010

For the change of the leadership, just days after Ma'mun al-Hudaibi's death, Mohamed Mahdi Akef was nominated as the new Supreme Guide. According to Hossam Tammam, the quick confirmation of Akef by the Guide Bureau and Shura Council members reflected the perception that he was more capable than other candidates of bridging the group's internal divides” (Tammam 2011). Pargeter suggests that like Mashhour, Akef had been an active member of the 'Secet Apparatus' during the interwar period; and during the Nasser era he had served twenty years in prison (1954-74). However, even though he clearly affiliated by age and life experience with the Brotherhood's old guard, Akef was seen as having a more flexible personality than other senior Guidance Bureau members. Further, while many of the latter had spent their entire careers managing group affairs from inside, Akef had broader experience in public life. For example, he served in parliament from 1987 to 1990 as a member of the Islamic Alliance and ran again as an independent in 1995 and 2000. Such experience enhanced his credibility among the Brotherhood's reformists such as al-Ariyan and Abul Futuh. As Tammam observed,

“it was widely known that he was the closest of the members of the Guidance Bureau to the reformists, and the best equipped to absorb them and reach an understanding with their leaders. In another nod toward inclusiveness, Muhammad Habib who belongs to the group of reformists, a former science professor, was chosen as the Supreme Guide's first deputy, and Khayrat al-Shatir, a businessman, as his second deputy; both were younger than the

members of the Brotherhood's old guard and maintained good relations with the middle and younger generation reformists within its ranks. (Tamam 2010, 102-103)

Over time, Mehdi Akef emphasized on the comprehensiveness of the Brotherhood's ideology, he states, "I told al-Tilmisani that my understanding of the Brotherhood was that it was a comprehensive organization" (Pargeter 2010, 45). Surprisingly, once he claimed that he was the key founder of al-Wasat Party: "Akef, however, asserts that the whole al-Wasat projects was his idea and said: 'I am the one who came with the idea of Hizb al-Wasat. We came with it in order to embarrass the government'" (Pargeter 2013, 54).

However, during Akef's term, the Egyptian socio-political life has been rapidly changing. The number of the Egyptian people against the government increased dramatically, giving the Brotherhood a political opportunity under Akef to continue its political pressure against Mubarak's regime in a very careful move. Therefore, the Brotherhood with its peaceful and gradual political strategy could be politically and systematically active, especially in consolidating its internal institution, such as reforming its social welfare human resources. In this period, the Brotherhood's network of social services has deeply embedded themselves in Egypt's cities and villages and earned the movement a reservoir of gratitude, if not outright support. As long as this network continues to exist, it will serve as a potential site of opposition against Egypt's rulers the following years, a place where activists from the Brotherhood could build support by leveraging their resources to help Egyptians managing their everyday problems" (Brooke 2015, 3).

For Akef's view, consolidating the organization from inside was a priority. Due to his flexible approach, both the reformists and the old guards could reduce the gap of misunderstanding. Subsequently, the Brotherhood could increase its political mobilization that helped to gradually raise the tension against the Mubarak's regime from 2004 to 2010. His term expired in January 2010 and Muhammad Badi who is currently in jail, was chosen to succeed him although Akef (in jail) is still present in the organisation (Middle East Monitor 2014).

3.10. The Eight and Last Supreme Guide of the Brotherhood: Mohamed Badie from 2010 to Present

Mohamed Badie joined the Brotherhood while in his early 20s. He studied veterinary medicine at Cairo University and graduated in 1965 and was appointed as a lecturer at Assiut University, Egypt. As one of the Brotherhood's political strategies is to choose influential personalities in its hierarchy, "Badie was identified as one of the 100 influential personalities in the Arab world by the Egyptian State Information Service in 1999. He was given this recognition for his creativity, scientific contributions and achievements in the field of

veterinary medicine” (Middle East Moniator 2014). In the beginning of the year 2010, there was a kind of ‘a carrot and stick’ game monitored by the government. To face the growing influence of the EMB and other local Islamist groups, Mubarak’s regime remained firmly in control, tolerating but not appeasing the Brotherhood and the moderate fundamentalists. Analysing the EMB’s ideology and its political strategies from 2010, the study could examine the behaviour of both the Egyptian political actors, in general, and the Brotherhood in particular. Accordingly, the worry of allowing the EMB to enjoy political influence became a main concern of the state, due to the historical legacy of bloody confrontation between successive governments and the organization. As a result of this conflicting atmosphere, the Mubarak’s regime was able to make a modus vivendi with the Brotherhood and moderate opposition parties by permitting them to function as long as they avoided violence and limited their attacks on the authorities (Pargeter 2010). However, focusing only on the EMB’s political activities, had given political opportunities to other political actors, especially the Egyptian youth, to prepare the Egyptian uprising against the government through their expertise in employing the social media and other strategies for the success of the Egyptian Uprising one year later, after the Tunisian Uprising in 2010.

A. Arab Uprising

The Arab Uprising, Arab Awakening, and Arab Spring are all terms used to describe the huge mobilization against ruling elites in the Middle East and the North African regions. The Arab Uprising is a term related to a wave of mass protests and demonstrations, which could be observed from December, 2010, in Tunisia. In numerous Middle East countries, the turmoil transformed from street riots into armed battles of protesters with the forces of the defending regimes. The situation in the region where riots took place is still unstable (Maszner 2011). The increasingly intense protests were both political and economic in nature. The social discontent was caused by a high level of unemployment, unsatisfactory living conditions, limited civil rights and corruption observed in political circles. Members of the conflicts were kindled by the representatives of political and religious movements, which considered this a chance to implement their own agenda. One important aspect of the Arab Uprising was the social involvement of new media in the course of events and the use of technologies, such as the Internet, as a carrier of information supporting the activity of the rebels. Rewizorski (2011) suggested that the Arab Uprising was really about jobs, bread, and housing, rather than democracy, which was of secondary importance (Rewizorski 2011, 10).

The tension against the government increased after the 2010 parliamentary elections in Egypt, followed by a new cycle of repression (Bal 2011, 125). In these elections, the EMB and other opposition parties were almost eliminated from the political scene. This is because “it turned out to be one of the most fraudulent elections of the Egyptian history: Mubarak’s

National Democratic Party won 420 of 444 contested seats in the parliament. The New *Wafd* became the second with only six seats followed by independent candidates belonged to the Brotherhood with only one seat. This was a frustrated result for the Brotherhood who won 83 seats in 2005 parliamentary election” (Bal 2011, 133). The anger against the regime was amplified again after the issue of heredity succession from Mubarak to his son, Jamal, a move that was widely condemned by the domestic political actors.

Another factor providing the EMB political advantages was the high rate of domestic unemployment. During this period, the young generations-those in their early 30s-were highly educated, yet with high rates of unemployment and high rates of poverty. This crisis allowed the Brotherhood to recruit supporters through the social activities detailed in chapter 5. Regarding the same crisis, Bal (2011) mentions that about 30,000 civil society organizations enjoyed independent media facilities and the use of social media. These facilities contributed to the greater awareness of state repression and political activism among the youth largely sympathetic to the Brotherhood (Bal 2011, 125). All of this was a fertile ground for the Egyptian uprising that opened the door to the EMB to win both the parliamentary and presidential elections in 2012. Another incident generating a political opportunity for the Brotherhood was the brutal killing of a young Egyptian activist called Khalid Said by the state police. This incident surprised all Egyptians in a way that a large number of Egyptians showed support to the Brotherhood showing their anger against the state. This indicates that, in some cases, Egyptians supported the Brotherhood, not necessarily to support its ideology and agenda but to manifest their anger against the state.

This agitation ultimately removed Mubarak’s regime on January 25th 2011. These activities for the Brotherhood were well performed and coordinated, due to the organization’s experience in the field of social services and welfare activities since its inception in 1928. The Brotherhood has been described by Middle East scholarly sources as a well-organized political institution within the Egyptian political sphere and dynamic in terms of recruitment. However, within Egyptian politics, the debate has been whether the Brotherhood played a fundamental role in the success of the uprising or not. Based on the investigation of this particular study, the Brotherhood, with its well organized structure, played a crucial role in terms of mobilization in the middle of the protests, but they were not the source of the uprising that toppled Hosni Mubarak from power after almost three decades in authoritarian leadership.

Moreover, the establishment of the political arm of the EMB, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) in 2011, may help political scientists to arrive at a better understanding on the EMB’s political move than before. In the past, the EMB did not present to the Egyptian political scene a formal political party platform. Nevertheless, the organization participated in the political process as an association or through other nationalist political parties such as the *Wafd* party or as independent candidates during preceding parliamentary elections despite the

constant waves of repression and exclusion as it has been previously highlighted, not under Mubarak's regime only, but also under earlier regimes.

Overall, under the Arab Uprising, the EMB raised its popularity due to the breakdown of the fear tactics used by the regime. This newly political atmosphere opened the door to the EMB's candidate, Mohamed Morsi to win the presidential election on June 30, 2012.

Arguably, together with the above factors, forces at work in the post-uprising period played a significant role in bringing Morsi to power. In the beginning, the organization was reluctant and very careful toward the protest development. Therefore, until today, there is a belief that the EMB joined the protest in the middle of the uprising. Nevertheless, its young activists called for mass demonstrations on January 25th without the order of the EMB's headquarters (Bal 2013, 143). In fact, it seems needlessly to identify whether an activist is a Brotherhood member or not, since recently, membership was not considered important, and it was, in fact, better to avoid state security by denying membership. Thus, the organization was not the initiator of the uprising. However, 20 members of the organization were arrested on January 28th. During the protest from January 25th 2011 until February 11th, the Brotherhood was actually planning, examining and analyzing the situation in order to be sure that they would take the right decision at the right time. One of the crucial cases supporting this argument is the EMB's decision not to present any candidate for the presidential elections, although a few weeks later, they did the opposite.

During this turmoil, the government consistently accused the Brotherhood of provoking incidents, with the EMB rejecting the accusations. Even so, there were claims that Hezbollah and Hamas arranged the breakout from detention of the leaders of the EMB (Bal 2013, 210). The Islamist movements headed by the Brotherhood reaped the benefit of the uprising by achieving unexpected levels of success in the parliamentary elections, in 2012, with 47 percent of the total seats for the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), followed by the hardline Salafist Nour party with 24 percent. In addition, in the same year, the EMB won the presidential election with 51.7%. This achievement was the result of the Islamists' long-term grassroots within Egyptian society (Bal 2013, 223).

B. Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's Election Program

The elections program of the Brotherhood brought the name of the Freedom and Justice Party. The program started with "In the name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful." This citation is recommended when Muslims start any given activity. As an Islamist organization, this start is important, as it also sends a message to the public that the organization intends to reinforce the Islamic teaching and practices. In the election program, it states:

Pursuant to the blessed revolution of the great Egyptian people, who were able with God's will and power to overturn the tyrannical corrupt former regime, and out of loyalty to the martyrs of the revolution, and in response to the thundering voice of our people and their just demands to complete the demolition of the repressive regime, to purge the country of corruption and to begin a new phase of building and development of Egypt, we proudly present this program as an integrated vision for the next phase with all its political, security, economic, social, cultural, scientific ... and other requirements. (Parliamentary Elections 2011, 2)

The above introduction is revolutionary in nature and was intended to inspire all Egyptians who supported the Egyptian Uprising. The secondary notice of the introduction is to qualify Mubarak's regime as a tyrant, corrupt and repressive. Even though the organization often criticizes the regime, this time the language projected unrestrained freedom and lack of fear. The third purpose of the introduction was to inform Egyptians that the country has already entered a new phase of political, social and economic prosperity. As it was a period of elections preceded by violent agitation, Egyptian expectations were high. Therefore, such an introduction was welcomed by a large number of Egyptians.

In its extensive introduction, it is stated, "[T]he program is based on the priorities of the people and reflects their aspirations for practical initiatives and programs that will achieve the freedom, *Shura* (consultation), dignity, security, safety, justice, stability, development, progress, advancement and leadership they deserve" (Parliamentary Elections 2011, 2). In one of the election campaigns, Al-Shateri claimed that the program had been revised by experts of each domain. In fact, the group several times won elections for leadership of professional organizations such as lawyers, journalists, engineers and university student unions. The following statements have been selected from the program to illustrate how it addresses Egyptians for electoral purposes:

We present this election program to our people, and we are confident that:

Together, we can get our country to safety.

Together, we can rebuild free strong leading dear Egypt.

Together, we can protect Egypt's national unity and preserve its security and achieve stability.

Together, we can develop Egypt's resources and its economy and perfect its rejuvenation.

Together, we can raise Egypt's status, restore its vital role and take it to leadership position.

Because we believe that our free people who accomplished for Egypt - with God's Grace - the great goals of liberation and purging of corruption, are able-with God's help - to accomplish the tasks of leadership, construction and development. (Parliamentary Elections 2011, 3)

The full program is similar to any modern political party except that some of the different amendments highlighting the program are revolutionary. Surprisingly, the controversial issues such as Egypt & Israel Camp David accords and the Sharia were not mentioned as problematic as many observers might think.⁴⁴

C. The Brotherhood's Easy-going Approach to its Opposition Counterparts

The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood attempted to cooperate with all other political entities except the old regime during the elections campaign. Furthermore, the organization showed flexibility with them in order to find a common ground. This was due to the EMB's strong political base compared to the other political entities. However, this was not the case with all secular parties. Copt Christians and the revolutionary youth, for example, consistently refused to cooperate or to vote for the EMB's candidate. "Some secular interviewers stated that although they did not like the candidate supported by the former regime, Ahmed Shafik, they voted for him because they were not sure of the intentions of the Muslim Brotherhood" (Bal 2013, 226).

During the parliamentary and presidential elections in 2011 and 2012 respectively, the questions of the Camp David Treaty and the implementation of Sharia law remained as the same as they were during all precedent regimes. The reason was that the political atmosphere after the Egyptian uprising was not suitable for the organization to touch such sensitive issues. To do so, the EMB might risk its popularity and loose the few Christians and other secular supporters who voted for the organization's candidate just to reject Mubarak's regime candidate. Ultimately, the EMB's political strategies reached their goal in 2012, as the candidate of the organization won the presidential election and became the first Egyptian president elected democratically, according to all international observers who scrutinized the process of the elections held on 23 and 24 of May, 2012, and the second elections on 16 and 17 of June in the same year.

D. Electoral Mechanisms Used to Bring Mohamed Morsi to Power.

In Egypt, citizens often participate in politics but the elections after the 2011 uprising were comparatively important because of the hope of organizing faire and free elections. In fact, the 2012 parliamentary and presidential elections were fair and freely organized according to the international observers. Therefore, the opposition parties led by the Brotherhood enjoyed the new electoral atmosphere and did their best to manage their political plan. In the case of the Brotherhood, the leadership introduced its political agenda in order to win both the

⁴⁴ (Parliamentary Elections 2011, 2)
<file:///D:/CHAMI2011/CSPA%20Thesis/Progress/FJP%20Platform.pdf>

parliamentary and presidential elections held respectively on 28 November 2011 to 11 January 2012 and on 23 and 24 of May, followed by the second round on 16 and 17 June 2012. Nevertheless, the agenda pursued by the organization did not differ greatly from what that which they followed in their other activities, such as the social services.

E. General Strategies and Electoral Politics to Bring the Brotherhood's candidate to Power in 2012

No scholar on Middle East studies claims that the EMB won the 2012 presidential elections because of short-term planning and action. The consensus among scholars is that more than 80 years of political experience was more than enough for the organization to gain rule of the country. Therefore, the fundamental question for scholars was: When would Egypt organize fair democratic elections so that the EMB could win such elections? However, after the success of the Egyptian uprising in removing the authoritarian regime from power, all Egyptian political actors agreed to implement a grassroots plan for organizing democratic elections. As one of the main players of Egyptian politics, the EMB benefited from its organizational structure and its mobilization skills during this crucial period to bring Muhammad Morsi to power in 2012. Nevertheless, the pre-and post-uprising periods provided a political opportunity, not only for the EMB but also for all Egyptian opposition parties, to identify their real popularity.

F. Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's Regime from 2012 to 2013

The Muslim Brotherhood's regime that ran from 30 June, 2012, to 3 July, 2013, was widely criticized. The newly elected president became increasingly authoritarian, according to his opponents. He was also blamed for failing to revive Egypt's economy, which was one of the causes of the 2011 uprising against the long-time strongman Hosni Mubarak (Spark 2013). Among the causes for complaint were lack of security, rising food prices, long fuel lines, and frequent electricity cuts during the scorching Egyptian summer (Trager 2013). The Brotherhood, however, denies this completely. Brotherhood leaders and members contend that Morsi had been a mostly successful president. To explain the economic situation in Egypt, Ashour (2013) claims that, although the country's deficit had fallen and tourism revenue had slightly improved over the previous year, the effects were not being felt by the man and woman on the street (Spark 2013).

In his assessment, Hamid (2013), director of research for the Brookings Doha Center, said that a long list of mistakes had added to Morsi's unpopularity, for example, he did not do enough to build consensus among Egypt's very fractious forces, and he had a style of government that was not inclusive. But, Hamid also highlighted, the main problem was that,

in August, the president moved against the military leadership, sending into retirement Field Marshal Mohammed Hussein Tantawi, who, as chairman of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, had acted as the country's de facto ruler in the wake of Mubarak's ouster and prior to Morsi's election (Hamid 2013). A few months later, Morsi issued an edict declaring his decisions immune from judicial review until the holding of the constitutional referendum. He also sacked the head of the judiciary, many of whose members had remained loyal to Mubarak (Abdelaziz 2012).

The opposition saw the moves as a grab for dictatorial powers and poured into the streets. Consequently, Tahrir Square in central Cairo became again the centre of public discontent, as it had been during the uprising that brought down Mubarak. In response, Morsi dropped his decree, but the situation remained tense (Spark 2013). His supporters were accused of beating and detaining opposition protesters during deadly clashes near the presidential palace in Cairo. After a referendum, in which more than 60% approved the new constitution, Morsi signed it into law in late December 2013 (Spark 2013). Critics argued that it was passed too quickly. Liberals, Christians and other minority opposition groups claimed that they felt excluded from the Constituent Assembly that drafted it (Abdelaziz 2012).

Nevertheless, analysing the Egyptian political situation, liberals and minority Christians might not have trusted the EMB to rule the country because of its religious ideology agenda. In less than one year, together with all secular parties and minority Copt organizations, the military overthrew the president on July 3rd 2013, with the chief of the army becoming the president. This political crisis created a severe and a suppressive crackdown against mainly the Brotherhood. The most and horrible crackdown was in a famous area called Rabia. Along with these horrible confrontations between the authority and the opposition led by the Brotherhood, many Egyptians were victims of the conflict. According to the same sources, Badie's oldest son, computer engineer Ammar, 40, was killed by the Egyptian army in Ramses Square during the anti-coup protest of 2014. More than 100 other Egyptians were also killed by the army and thugs on that day (Middle East Monitor 2014)

During the catastrophic confrontation between the army and crowds consisting mainly of the Brotherhood in several public places around the country, Huwaidi (2013) states, the victims following the coup reached at least 40,000; with at least 2700 killed; 16,000 injured; 21,000 in jail (including 200 females). The majority of the above-mentioned casualties came from the EMB's members and sympathizers.⁴⁵ "The Brotherhood described the action which brought international condemnation as a massacre" (Middle East 2013). Consequently, the organization is currently disappeared from the Egyptian political scene because of the continuing suppression by the state security. Nevertheless, with its

⁴⁵ There were and still new development after the end of the EMB's regime, however, this study does not go beyond the end of Morsi's removal from power.

well-established organizational structure and its underground work experience, it is probable that the organization is working to return to the Egyptian political sphere, although how and when this will happen will likely depend on evolving political events.

In sum, the scholarly literature highlighted in this chapter shows that the Egyptian society like other societies who were under the Ottoman Empire until 1923, suffered from colonialism. The struggle to independence and the emergence of the secularism model initiated by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's revolution and the establishment of modern Turkey in 1923 created a political turmoil. Consequently, Islam as the solution was raised and interpreted comprehensively for many Muslims in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab and the Muslim world. This interpretation was propagated by the prominent Muslim reformist scholars who are al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Reda. These scholars attempted to call for Islamism as modernism in the late of the 19th century.

Hassan al-Banna, in his turn, tried to interpret Islam in the 1930s as a comprehensive way of life that covers every single state of life. Moreover, after the end of the World war, the Brotherhood grew due to the political opportunity generated by the international social and political turmoil. Returning to Islam as a practical religion was emphasized by the EMB's founder, especially after the defeat of the Arabs by Israel in 1948, 1967 and 1973 was followed by suppressive tactics used by the successive Egyptian governments against Islamist movements.

The chapter, however, emphasized on the EMB's founder's interpretation of Islam and its impact on the EMB's ideological transformation after al-Banna's death in 1949. As he emphasized on the gradual approach, al-Banna's long term strategy is based on peaceful political approach in the 1930s and 1940s. This method has been examined and developed by the EMB's following supreme guides in a way that the organization could mobilize sympathizers and supporters through studying the successive Egyptian socio-political situations. 'Islam is the solution' slogan adopted by the EMB's founder tried to respond the Egyptian economic, social, political and educational needs *vis-à-vis* the influence of the western industrialization. Accordingly, the EMB's founder used well-known terminologies used to defend the western modernization philosophy such as 'comprehensiveness' and 'civilization' within the EMB's Islamic ideology framework. This ideology helps the organization to continuously recruit sympathizers and members within the Egyptian society through its organizational structure, its economic and social services and its established media.

During the period of the second supreme guide of the Brotherhood in 1950s and 1960s, al-Hudaibi, the organization has been already accused of assassination against the Prime Minister Nuqrashi, the death of judge Khazindar and the 'Jeep Case' terrorist attack. In accordance with this violent atmosphere between the state and the EMB, al-Hudaibi demanded the dissolution of the Secret Apparatus that involved in carrying out the

assassination and other violent acts. Under such circumstances, al-Hudaibi worked harder to present the organization as a peaceful social organization and to cooperate with the Egyptian government as al-Banna used to do. However, al-Hudaibi was accused of turning the Brotherhood into a movement of words not action by many several active members. Thus, membership began to decline and disagreement among members increased. This situation created the emergence of Qutb's ideology that called for a complete disconnection with the Egyptian government. According to Qutb, the Egyptian government was not Islamic and should be fought and replaced by an Islamic state.

The term of the third supreme guide al-Tilmisani is considered as the most influential period in terms of recruitment due to its successful reform within the Brotherhood's inner circle and his ability to present the organization as a definite peaceful organization. During this period, the EMB's mobilization process openly used various ways such as preaching the ideology in their seminars, mosques or through their social activities due to the new Sadat and Moubrak' regimes' policies in the 1970s and 1980s respectively.

Al-Tilmisani's political strategy is similar to all other following EMB's supreme guides except that the breakdown of fear tactics used by all precedent regimes opened the door to the EMB's candidate to win the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2012 via using its political mobilization experiences based on employing its ideology, its organizational structure, its economic and social services and its media involvement.

Chapter IV

Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's Organization Sources and Activities

4.1. Introduction

The EMB is continuously raising its popularity since 1930 to date through its organizational structure, presenting itself as the alternative political power to successive regimes. Within the framework of its organizational sources, the social services and the propagation of its political agenda emerged in Egyptian society side-by-side with other political and social movements, the organization considers its organizational structure as one of the most important factors behind its political mobilization. Therefore, this chapter highlights the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's organizational structure and its related activities. As there have been no major changes to the organizational structure since its formation in 1928 (Al-Anani 2007, 95), the chapter mainly covers the period of 1935 until 2014. The chapter begins with an explanation of the role of the organization's structure and its General Headquarters, with its two main branches. In addition, the peripheral divisions in Egypt, known as administrative offices, districts, branches and family sections, have also been examined to identify the mechanisms that supported the survival of the organization despite several attempts to dissolve it. In addition, highlighting the different sections within the EMB's organizational structure aim to demonstrate the different generations working in these sections. The existence of several generations within the organization provides a larger-scale of the recruiting process as the Egyptian society is diverse in terms of Islamic ideology interpretations. Therefore, the study highlighted in the end of this chapter the different groups within the organization along with their respective political mobilization view.

4.2. The Role of the Organizational Sources

To reach Egyptian society, the Brotherhood used the organizational structure as channels of consolidating and recruiting members and sympathizers, especially in the lower and the middle classes. This structure allowed the organization to maintain its structure and activities at the same time, even when it was formally dissolved by the state and subject to continuous police surveillance and efforts to destroy it in 1948, 1954 and so forth. While some scholars believed that much of the organization was destroyed by the raids and arrests of certain periods, Munson explains that "data contains considerable evidence that the Muslim Brotherhood was relatively successful in surviving repressive efforts by the Egyptian

authorities. As an example, the government dissolved the Society in 1948, but the U.S. State Department received reports of secret mass meetings, Society organizing in mosques, and pamphleteering throughout Egypt during this time” (Munson 2001, 499). Based on the U.S. Department Document, “[T]he group was still sufficiently organized after three years of formal dissolution, to produce a demonstration of over three thousand members on less than a day’s notice in early 1951, and to carry out well organized rallies at every branch office in Egypt. The day after the ban on the organization was lifted on May 1, 1951” (USDS 1954, 2439).⁴⁶ Munson provides another example of the powerful role of the organizational aspect of the Brotherhood. He says,

In 1954, the Society (EMB) was operating again within ten days of the major wave of arrests following Nasser’s 1954 dissolution of it and imprisonment of its leadership and thousands of its members. By June, there were reports of a public resurgence of the Society’s activities. The Muslim Brotherhood was clearly not dismantled by government efforts. Its organizational structure was a key to its ability to resist state attempts to eliminate it. The organizational structure of the Brotherhood not only provided advantages to the group in the traditional ways described by a basic resource mobilization model, but it also provided an important avenue through which the ideology of the organization could contribute to the group’s success. The Muslim Brotherhood, like any other social movements, faced the task of mobilizing the support and resources of individuals with a variety of different beliefs and levels of motivation for collective action. (Munson 2001, 499)

Comparatively, in Egypt, Communist groups were organized in a strictly hierarchical fashion, without independent branches or federated offices. Consequently, this inadequate structure led to constant factionalism and limited the national presence of the communists in the country. “Several studies of the Egyptian communist party suggest that the movement was also decimated by government crackdowns on several occasions” (Goldberg 1986; Botman 1988; Ismael and El-Sa’id 1990). Munson notes that both Beinun and Lockman (1987) mentions the fact that “communist organizations were concentrated and one-dimensional only. Once infiltrated, they had little defense against the security agencies of the state. Unlike the Muslim Brotherhood, the communist presence in Egypt was virtually eliminated in the 1920s and 1930s as a result of state repression” (Munson 2001, 500).

In contrast to the Muslim Brotherhood’s four-tiered membership,⁴⁷ communist organizations seldom made institutionalized distinctions between members and their levels

⁴⁶ U.S. Department of State (USDS) (1949). *Confidential Central Files*. Egypt: 1945-1949. Washington, DC.

⁴⁷ The three-tier memberships are: (a) ‘assistant’ (*musa`id*); (b) ‘related’ (*muntasib*); (c) and ‘active’

of commitment. *Tasht*, one of the most influential communist groups in Egypt during the 1940s, had a 'nomination' process for new recruits that could last as long as two years, during which time the individual was continually investigated and tested. A communist leader who was critical of this system equated the process to entering the priesthood. (Ismael and El-Sa'id 1990, 45)

Munson (2001) argues that there were severe ideological blockades to entry into the communist membership, and the structure made no place for members with varying stages of promise; the movement accepted only the most devoted and dedicated individuals. In contrast to the gradual way in which the Muslim Brotherhood's structure brought its ideas to members, the beliefs of potential communist recruits had to be entirely transformed before they were given any access to the movement. Thus, the communist groups made it extremely difficult for potential recruits to move from their ordinary lives to active participation in the movement (Munson 2001, 501).

During the confrontation with the royal power backed by colonialism, the EMB used similar political techniques to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) during the pre-Soviet Union Revolution in 1917. The recruiting strategies and mechanisms of both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Communist Party were mainly similar for the purpose of avoiding the brutal suppression from the state. However, the most important common recruiting strategies of both are: 1) the centralized and the organizational patterns and 2) understanding political tactics. There are several organizational aspects both the Communist Party and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood share for the purpose of recruitment and avoiding state security as it has been highlighted and analyzed by Hosking (1985), Rigby (1968), Mitchell (1969) and (Al-Anani 2007).

With regard to centralized and the organizational patterns, Lenin stated, "If the autocracy was to be overthrown and a socialist order ultimately created, the party must be a highly centralized and disciplined organization, functioning conspiratorially where necessary, and directing and coordinating the trade unions and all other 'mass' organizations of the workers in a unified struggle consistently guided by Marxist theory" (Rigby 1968, 4). For the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Munson (2001) states that "the successful mobilization of the Muslim Brotherhood was possible because of the way in which its Islamic message was tied to its organizational structure, activities, and strategies and the everyday lives of Egyptians" (Munson 2001,487).

In regard to the second common recruiting strategy, underground political tactics were and often used by both movements. In the case of the Communist Party, Rigby (1968) states that the tricky aspect of the Communist membership structure system is the fact that the party apparatus (highest) is not visible in the political scene rather than the second category,

which is holding no formal party offices in the organizational structure (Rigby 1968, 8). Identically, the Brotherhood was known for its Secret Apparatus which was abolished in the period of the EMB's second leader, Hasan Isma'il al-Hudaibi, who held the position from 1949 to 1972. In this regard, Mitchell (1969) states,

The Secret Apparatus by this time appears to have become fully structured, with appropriate rules delineating functions, commands, authority, and responsibilities, and appropriate symbols, oaths, and an equipment. Its numbers, never very large, were qualitatively increased by recruits from among army officers, probably including some of those who later participated in the revolution of 1952. Al-Banna's relationship to the group was technically that of Supreme Leader, but he kept in touch with it through selected representatives. (Mitchell 1969, 54-5)

In comparing the two organizations, the study arrived at the tentative conclusion that the Communist Party moved very carefully and more strategically than the Brotherhood, since it sought power from the very beginning, while the EMB did not, while the EMB became involved in political activity only after being accused of being a political threat by the state during the Israeli-Palestinian crisis.

This chapter only examines the existing organizational structure of the EMB, and its functions. The chart in [Figure 3] summarizes the organizational structure, from the General Headquarter to the family section. The General Headquarters in Cairo represents the center of the entire organization, both in terms of structure and activity. The family section in turn, represents the first step in structure and activity. From the Headquarters to the family section, a detailed explanation is provided.

4.3. General Headquarters

The General Headquarters is the main office located in Cairo, in "*Hilmiyyat al-Jadidah.*" There are three main divisions in the Headquarters office: the office of the General Guide, the Consultative Assembly and the General Guidance Council. The office of the General Guide is simple and has no complicated task, as all the technical activities of the organization are prepared in the General Guidance Council and others in the General Consultative Assembly. The Consultative Assembly serves as the source to elect or select the appropriate officers to join the General Guidance Council. In other words, all members from the Guidance Council come from the Consultative Assembly. Thus, all members from the Consultative Assembly do not necessarily belong to the General Guidance Council. The Consultative Assembly plays the role of uniting the most important members of the entire organization from the Egyptian prefectures.

The members working in the General Guidance Council are likely to be technically skillful because they are responsible for all administrative and technical activities of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood from the highest to the lowest levels. On the other hand, the Consultative Assembly has, among other duties, the obligation to elect the Muslim Brotherhood's leader; the leader is known as the General Guide of the Organization: '*Murshid.*' In practice, both the General Guidance Council and the General Consultative Assembly supervise the leader of the Brotherhood (Mitchell 1969; Al-Anani 2007). The next sections provide details about the General Guide Office, the General Consultative Assembly and the General Guidance Council.

4.4. The Leader's Office (General Guide Office)

In this office, the leader chooses one deputy or more, depending on his own need, and a secretariat accompanied by the secretary general of the organization. The General Guide Council manages the process to select the deputies, the secretariat and the Secretary General (Al-Anani 2007, 107). However, Mitchell (1969) says, "[T]he Assembly, in a secret ballot supervised by the vote-counting committee, would select from among the nine Cairo members of the Guidance Council a deputy, the secretary-general, and the treasurer" (Mitchell 1969,166). Both Al-Anani and Mitchell mentioned that the selection is in the General Guidance Council, but Mitchell (1969) said that the latter gets orders from the General Consultative Assembly. Overall, in practice, both the General Guidance Council and the General Consultative Assembly simultaneously share the responsibilities of the organization. In terms of the merits and the role of the Muslim Brotherhood's leader, there are no major differences in the General Guide's qualifications from the 1960s until today. According to Mitchell (1969), "[T]he qualifications of a candidate for this post were described as follows: a member of the General Consultative Assembly for five years; at least thirty years old of age: possessing the attributes of learning, morality, and practicality" (Mitchell 1969, 165).

Nevertheless, Mitchell's suggestion is not supported by the newly updated information about the organization. According to Al-Anani (2007), who researched the more recent Muslim Brotherhood documents, said that the candidate should be an active and practical Brother for at least 15 years). In the light of his active participation, Mitchell mentioned that the candidate should be a member of the General Consultative Assembly (Mitchell 1969, 105), however, the new research engaged in by Al-Anani (2007) did not specify the section a leader should be devoted to within the organization. Another contradiction is the question of the age. The existing document shows that the candidate should not be less than 40 years old (Al-Anani 2007, 105). In fact, in the 1960s, the candidate should not have been less than 30 years. Comparatively, the age of 30 in 1960s and the age of

40 in 2014 are understandable because in the past the majority of the active members were recruited at a very early age.

Remarkably, it seems that the idea of emphasizing the age of 40 came from the fact that the Prophet Muhammad got the prophecy by the age of 40. Two elements are interesting for the Brotherhood's leader: 1) first, he is not allowed to execute any kind of business after being elected; whether a private business or associated to the organization. This is to protect his personality from accusations and to spend all his time and efforts for the organization. His activities would be academic research, mainly connected to further the development of the organization (Al-Anani 2007, 106). The second element is that the organization assumes responsibility for his expenses according to the financial regulations associated to the General Guide. As the latter should be elected in the General Consultative Assembly, the characteristics of the General Consultative Assembly are explained in the following section.

4.5. The General Consultative Assembly

The General Consultative Assembly plays the role of supervising “the progress of the Society, the election of the General Guidance Council and an auditor” (Mitchell 1969, 168). This explanation by Mitchell seems to be limited because, not only are the three-abovementioned positions decided in the Assembly, but there are other major duties elaborated by the Assembly, including the election of the General Guide. In this division, there are the elites of the organization from all districts. Based on proportional representation, each district possesses a number of representatives in the Assembly based on the size of the district. Al-Anani (2007) summarizes the role of the Assembly based on Article number 33 of the organization's constitution as follows:

- a) To elect the General Guide and members of the General Guidance Council according to article 11 and article 19; to endorse the objectives and policies of the organization; and also to determine the position of the organization in all aspects,
- b) To approve the general guidelines and necessary networks,
- c) To approve the general plan and identify the way to execute the decided plan,
- d) To discuss the annual report in general and the financial report in particular, and their approvals and the adoption of the budget of the New Year,
- e) To elect the members of the Brotherhood's supreme court, which is in charge to examine cases coming from the General Guide, from the General Guidance Office or from the General Consultative Assembly, whether the cases are for individual members or groups; and also to accept the resignation from members based on the absolute majority of members,

f) To exempt the General Guide and accept his resignation in accordance with Article 16 of the relative regulation,⁴⁸

g) To regulate any proposed amendments from the General Guide, the General Guidance Council or any proposals from eight members from the General Consultative Assembly. (Al-Anani 2007, 99)

The Assembly has had 90 members since the 1990s (Al-Anani 2007, 98), but during al-Banna's period, the number was between 100 and 150 (Mitchell 1969, 168). Members represent all the Brotherhood's recognized affiliations. As each district has a Brotherhood's affiliation, each group chooses its representatives to join the Assembly of the Headquarters. Three members from the Council can be selected to join the Assembly in Cairo. The new development of the Assembly in terms of its multiple divisions is the political section. This section has been introduced as result of the political development before and after the Egyptian parliamentary election in 2005, in which the Brotherhood secured 20% of the national parliament members. Any member of the Brotherhood may join the General Consultative Assembly if he holds the following qualifications: a) active membership within his district's Council or Assembly; b) he should not be less than 30 years old; c) he worked for the Brotherhood for no less than five years; d) he should be qualified with an endowment of morality, culture, and practicality; e) he should not have been previously isolated due to poor leadership in his district five years before his candidacy (Al-Anani 2007, 98-99).

The Assembly meeting in Cairo should be held every six months; a meeting might be held based on the General Guide's demand or his deputy, or a demand from the General Council or from three members of the General Assembly. A meeting cannot be considered as legitimate unless an absolute majority attends it (Mitchell 1969; Al-Anani 2007). "A committee of seven, preferably non-Cairenes, with training in legal and canonical doctrine, was to be elected by the General Assembly to supervise members' behavior and to meet out appropriate penalties" (Mitchell 1969, 168-169). In addition, "its committee elected its own chairman and secretary and kept its own records; its meetings were constitutional with five present members including the chairman. The members of the General Council were exempt from working in the committee because of their own disciplinary procedures. The General Guide might, on his own authority, suspend any member, on condition that his order was submitted to the committee of the Assembly for review" (Mitchell 1969, 169).

One incident explaining the importance and the dynamism of General Consultative Assembly was in 1995. During that period, the regime exploited to repress the Brotherhood occurred when the *Shura* Council convened in January to select the sixteen members of the Guidance Bureau. This was the first time since the 1950s, the *Shura* Council would select the

⁴⁸ Article no. 16 constitutes of three amendments: 1) if the Guide neglects his responsibility or lost his credibility, the Assembly should study his case.

Guidance Bureau. But the regime arrested dozens of the Brotherhood's members and accused them of attempting to overthrow the government. These members were subsequently sent to military trials for the first time since Nasser era (Al-Anani 2016, 149).

4.6. The General Guidance Council

The General Guidance Council chairs the ideological and political activities of the society, manages its administration, and forms and executes its strategy within or outside Egypt. Furthermore, the meetings in this office are chaired by the General Guide, by the deputy in his absence, or by the oldest member in the absence of the other two; however, the Secretary General is considered as the representative of this division for all issues. The General Guidance Council has the authority to create whatever necessary "committees, sections, and divisions to achieve the objectives of the organization" (Mitchell 1969, 167). In sum, this office is known as the highest administrative and executive section in the organization. In order to be qualified for the Council's membership, the candidate should be a member of the Consultative Assembly and should not be less than 30 years old. The term is for four years, and is renewable if the member is reelected. As one of his obligations, the member must follow strictly the rules and regulations of the organization; otherwise, he is to be disciplined depending on the level of his negligence (Mitchell 1969; Al-Anani 2007).

According to the internal regulations of the organization, the membership under this section and their main duties are summarized based on the following fundamentals: a) The General Guidance Council is the highest executive and administrative unit of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood; b) It has 13 members, excluding the General Guide (Al-Anani 2007, 101). This number is the newly updated one in 2007, because in the 1940s, the office accounted of only 12 members (Mitchell 1969, 166). Eight members are elected by the General Assembly and should come from the same region where the General Guide lives; and the other five members, who are necessarily from the General Assembly, should be elected based on regional diversity; c) The leader selects a Secretary General and a Treasurer; d) The General Guidance Council draws guides and supervises the guidelines of the ideology of the organization; e) It prepares the annual report of the leadership's acts, the status and the financial situation of the organization in order to be reported to the General Consultative Assembly (Al-Anani 2007, 101,102,103).

In general, members in the General Consultative Assembly and in the General Guidance Council come from all over Egypt. The following sections examine the organizational structures of the General Assembly and the General Council. These sections imitated the organizational structure and the mechanisms practiced of both the General Consultative Assembly and the General Guidance Council, with slightly differences. Those sub-sections are classified from the lowest level to the General Guidance Council in Cairo, as

members of the Council are more organizationally and technically oriented. Nevertheless, this does not mean that no connections exist at all between the districts and the General Consultative Assembly. There are connections, but those connections are managed and organized by the General Guidance Council. The lowest institutionalized level of the recruiting unit is the ‘family section’ (*al-usrah*), followed by the ‘branch’ (*al-shubah*), then the ‘district’ (*al-mantiqah*), and finally the ‘administrative office’ (*al-maktab al-idari*). These units are located throughout Egypt.⁴⁹

4.7. Administrative Office

This division is very important, as it constitutes a council composed of a chairperson, a deputy, a secretary, and a treasurer. “These held office either because they held the same position in the leading branch of the area encompassed by the council or because they were leading or active members of either a district or some other important groups in the Society” (Mitchell 1969, 176). The Brotherhood’s pyramidal system is based on good performance from the lowest level to the highest. Therefore, in this Administrative Office, the leading figures should be known in their records as the most active members in their perspective families, branches and districts. Mitchell says, “They are appointed by the Guidance Council” (Mitchell 1969, 176). Furthermore, besides the four members already mentioned previously, there is a fifth member who is a direct representative of the Guidance Council whose opinions are ‘advisory’ and who has no right to vote (Mitchell 1969, 176).

4.8. District

This section is the geographic representation for a set number of branches. According to al-Anani, three or four branches form a district (Al-Anani 2007, 97). The district follows the directives of the Administrative office of the area. The main role of a district is to structure their organizational efforts based on the geographic perceptions of members in that district. The number of districts differs from one area to another. (Al-Anani 2007, 97). Furthermore, it is possible for more than one district to form an entire region in order to efficiently strengthen the communication among members and perform administrative duties. According to Mitchell (1969), “the district office was administered by a council composed as follows: a chairman, who was the chairman of its leading branch or a member appointed by the General Guidance Council; the heads of all of the branches in the district; visitors from the branches and the administrative offices, who had no vote; and representatives of the district’s most

⁴⁹ The number of units in each district depends on its size.

important activities. A secretary or treasurer or both for the district might be selected by the heads of its constituent branches” (Mitchell 1969, 176).

4.9. Branch

The ‘branch section’ is the second unit of the Brotherhood, after the ‘family section’ which ranks below. This section unites several families together in order to form a bigger circle compared to the ‘family circle.’ The branch section has been well defined as the basic unit of administration by both Mitchell and Al-Anani (1969, 176 et. 2007, 97). To avoid confusion, the family section is the first organizational unit for the EMB, while the branch represents the first administrative unit. The branch gathers five to six families in an allocated area. The number of members varies based on how many families exist in a given region. The main job of the branch section is to take action in preaching and in the organizational needs in a particular region. Unlike both the Assembly and the Council of the Headquarters, the branch is led by an elected leader. If the leader is absent, he is replaced by his deputy or otherwise the oldest among all the members (Mitchell, 1969).

The function and the mechanism of the branch are similar to the General Guidance Council. The latter intervenes if “a branch’s complaint concerned either of its highest authorities; it might go directly to the Guidance Council if neither the district office nor the administrative council reported the complaint” (Mitchell 1969, 179). Similar to the General Headquarters, the branch may have “a section for propaganda of the message, a section for rovers depending on the local of the branch, a section for students, or workers, or professions, or peasants, singly or in combination. Each was requested to have a ‘library’ or at least a reading room to encourage and assist the local educational programs. Similarly, in the larger branches, some medical or clinical facilities either permanently existed or were provided periodically” (Mitchell 1969, 179).

The idea of the branch is to spread the activities of the Brotherhood to as many areas as possible. Therefore, members from one branch have authority to open a new branch under the supervision of the administrative council unit of this particular branch. Mitchell (1969) mentioned that there are other branches called academic branches. These branches are different from the ordinary branches explained in this section (Mitchell 1969, 180). Members of these branches are university students who are members of the Brotherhood. Students’ activities are mostly similar to the ordinary branch ones; however, the difference is that with the latter, the branch structures itself to what might be suitable to the universities’ environment. Similar to other countries, students play an important role in social movements.

Accordingly, students belonging to the Brotherhood are influential in academic institutions and play a significant role in the recruiting process. However, due to immaturity, they can cause a conflict between the government and the General Headquarters of the

organization. In one of the most famous incidents caused by the students, Al-Anani (2007) reports, on a December morning in 2007, 27 students from Azhar University, also members of the Brotherhood, had a culture show about displaying some fighting skills. The incident became controversial in Egypt. The government accused the Brotherhood of military training against the government. The mainstream Egyptian media ran stories suspecting the Brotherhood of hiding a military agenda against the government (Al-Anani 2007, 154). Because of the tension, the Brotherhood decided to institutionalize its political bases more in order to build awareness among young members and also to prevent their popularity from being undermined. In this regard, the Brotherhood introduced elections in the branch section. In these elections, a leader and his deputy are elected by the members. These elections first started in 2005, just after the Brotherhood won 88 seats in the Egyptian parliament. Both candidates (the leader and his deputy) must be active Brotherhood members. The elected members can renew their term once, and each term covers four years. These elected members will play a major role in the district section, as they will have already been evaluated in the family section (Al-Anani 2007, 97).

4.10. The Family Section

The family section started during the period of the Brotherhood's highest spirit and their most intensive activities. Mitchell notes that "in September 1943 the 'family section system' was established. First, officially called (1969) 'the co-operative system' (*nizam al-ta'awun*), it was soon popularly referred to as 'the family co-operative system' (*nizam al-usra al-ta'awuni*), and finally, popularly and officially, the 'family system' (*nizam al-usra*)" (Mitchell 1969, 197). Scholars of Middle East studies agree that the family section represents the first step for membership in the Muslim Brotherhood organization. According to Mitchell (1969), "the system of 'families' was regarded by the Society as 'the active fulfillment of the meaning of Islam among the Brothers', and the most fundamental of its 'educational' (*tarbiyah*) instruments" (Mitchell (1969, 195). Interestingly, the name and the function of the family section are very popular in many Muslim countries. In East Asia, many Muslims from Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand use the term and the function of the family section in their religious activities. The reason for the family section's popularity might be connected to the very educational and spiritual approach of this section, and also the content of the study curricula used by the family section. In addition, the success of the Brotherhood in imposing itself within the Egyptian socio-political sphere impressed many Muslims around the world to imitate the organizational structure and recruiting strategies.

The family section is composed of five to seven Brothers in one 'family.'⁵⁰ This section is also called a 'cell' by some people in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab World, such

⁵⁰ Women have similar organizations supervised by the sisters' section.

as in Iraq. One of the members is elected as a chief, called '*Naqib*.' The organizational structure and the activities of the family section are fundamentally managed by the family section of the General Headquarters in Cairo. [Figure 3] shows that the family section belonging to the General Guidance Council is in charge of dealing with all family sections within Egypt. Mitchell states that "the high command of the family system was located in the General Headquarters in the family section. From it, issued a special set of regulations governing the internal operation of the families" (Mitchell 1969, 198). In the beginning, the number of Brothers in one 'family' was ten, but due to the experience of the family section's performance, the Headquarters decided to reduce the number from ten to a maximum of seven.

The role of the family section was defined in three words: 'action, obedience, and silence.' The term 'action' refers to how practical the member would be in terms of practicing the Islamic rules and regulations based on the EMB's interpretation of Islam and how effective the member might be in performing what might be prescribed and ordered by the EMB's leadership. The 'obedience' means binding on the command that well-ordered by the Brotherhood's leadership on time and in quality. The term 'silence' refers to how firm and responsible the member should be during his entire life. The recitation of the ritual at night is a good practice for the term 'silence' and it was knowingly patterned after the Prophetic Practice recording that the Prophet took pleasure in such activity (Mitchell 1969, 196). Meeting weekly with his 'family,' the adherent had prescribed duties defined as 'personal, 'social, and financial.' Personal duties including the sincere and diligent practices of the rituals of the faith; the avoidance of the known evils: (gambling, drinking, moneylending, and adultery); continuous determination towards the Islamization of the member's family; and the constant reaffirmation of fidelity and devotion to the organization, its principles, and its leaders (Mitchell 1969, 198). Socially, the EMB members were instructed to make the most of the 'Brotherly relationships of the family,' i.e., to join the weekly meetings at the branch headquarters. Mitchell states that

if possible at members' homes in a rotation system, to spend at least one night of the month together, sleeping and participating of common meals, and to pray together the Friday prayer and if possible, the morning and night prayers. Financially, members of the family were made 'mutually responsible' for each other, sharing each other's burdens, needs, and gains. A 'co-operative treasury' was to be established to which each Brother contributed a part of his income. One-fifth of the treasury was to be sent to a general fund in the Headquarters to be invested in the Society for Islamic Social Insurance. (Mitchell 1969, 198)

The whole idea that reinforced the system was summed up in three words which al-Banna called 'the pillars' - 'familiarity' (*ta'aruf*); 'understanding' (*tafahum*); and 'responsibility'

(*takaful*). All three are understood in the form of the verb indicating mutuality. ‘Familiarity’ means ‘the strengthening of brotherhood among the Brothers;’ the notion derived from the Quranic verse which reads, “And hold fast, all of you together, to the cable of Allah, and do not separate” (Quran 3:103); and from the Prophetic Tradition which says “The believer to the believer is like the building (held together) one part with another” (Prophet authentic tradition). ‘Understanding’ means the true understanding of Islam and willingness to abide by its teachings and be personally responsible before one’s fellows. ‘Responsibility’ is defined as ‘the core of brotherhood’ and the meaning of Islam as revealed by the Prophet’s words, “It is better that ye pursue the needs of your brother than to isolate yourself in my mosque for a month, and whoso brings happiness to the house of a Muslim, God will reward with no less than Paradise” (Prophet’s authentic tradition: Mitchell 1969, 199).

For the reading and studying materials for the family, it has been reported that it was limited in the period of the founder. The book ‘*Rasail*’ that he had compiled for the battalions and other general literature of Islam were mainly served in the family section. The curriculum is based on the regular Islamic teachings such as the Quran and its interpretation, the life and the advice of the prophet, the Islamic ideology and a selection of books mainly authored by the Brotherhood’ scholars including the founder’s books (al-Banna) and Said Qutb’s. According to Al-Anani (2007), a new subject was introduced a few years ago into the family section: the political awareness on the national and international levels. This new idea has been reinforced by the Brotherhood’s political success in the Egyptian society, especially from 2004 to 2005, before and after the Brotherhood’ success in winning 88 seats in the parliament (Al-Anani 2007, 96).

The idea of introducing political studies in the family section’s curriculum is due to the deficit in political understanding for the young of Egyptian society in general and the youth of the Brotherhood in particular. Since the confrontation between the Brotherhood and the state began, the interest to study political science or other relative social science subjects decreased dramatically over the last 60 years. The fear of being suspected as anti-government led many Brothers to focus on entering into scientific fields, such as medicine, engineering, and so forth. Therefore, it is remarkable to see many medical doctors and engineers in the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood while few of them graduated from social science programs, especially political science and political economy. In sum, the family section represents the first step to start involving members in the Muslim Brotherhood’s activities. If the member successfully follows the rules and regulations of this particular section, he can gradually move to the upper levels.

Overall, the EMB’s organizational structure differs from that of other Islamist organizations by virtue of its strict and consolidated linkages among the hierarchical sections. Accordingly, Mitchell states, “Control of the position was one of the most certain assurances of mobility to the highest ranks in the Society” (Mitchell 1969, 180). The figure below

explains how an ordinary Egyptian citizen can be attracted to the organization through a basic but fundamental section called the family section. The ordinary Egyptian citizen in particular could be invited by an active member of the EMB to join the organization from any ‘general working environment such as working places’, ‘general encircled network’ such as a soccer club or a private call such as a friendship or family relationship. On the way to become a member of the family section, the ordinary citizen has already become ‘an attached member’. From the level of the ‘family section to higher sections (active member), a member is under strict evaluation that allows him to be active and influential in the mobilization process.




Figure 3. The different stages from non-member to the Brotherhood membership

This chart presents the different environments from which the ordinary Egyptian citizen gradually moves from non-membership status to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood regular membership (family section).

‘The base of general working environment’, ‘the general encircled network’ and ‘private call’ constitute of the ordinary spots where people meet for their ordinary daily life activities. Having discussions through the Islamic greeting: *As-salāmu ‘alaykum* (Peace be upon you) with ordinary citizens, some of them have been already influenced by the ideology of the Brotherhood through the economic and social activities, the media of the organization or others. The next step is to be an attached member in the way to join his respective family section nearby through an active member of the organization.

The Organization Sources and their activities




Figure 4. Connections from Headquarters to the families

Figure 4 represents a simple figure of the organization's sources of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. However, this particular study only covers the main sources of the Brotherhood's activities (light green color). The functions under these divisions are decided and supervised by the headquarters in Cairo.

In sum, within chapter 4, the study highlights the connections between the General Headquarters and the General Guidance council to the Administrative machinery.

This Administrative Machinery connects with all family sections through their respective administration office. With this framework, the propagation of the ideology and the social services are systematically projected to Egyptian society covering almost the peripheral divisions in Egypt. The chapter highlights that the idea of the branch is to spread the activities of the Brotherhood as many areas as possible once new members join the organization. In fact, branches are responsible to recruit university students through organizing students' activities. In general, the organizational structure supported the survival of the organization despite several attempts to dissolve the organization. During suppressive periods, the Brotherhood employed this organizational structure as channels of consolidating and recruiting members and sympathizers, especially in the lower and the middle classes. More importantly, this structure maintains the EMB's activities when it is under authorities' surveillance as Wickham states, [I]n the 1970s, "the overwhelming majority of the organization's members remained loyal to its senior leadership, due in part to the fact that Hudaibi and other members of the Guidance Bureau had managed to fill strategic

administrative posts in the group's regional and local branches during suppressive periods with individuals beholden to them and vested in their conception of the group's mission" (Wickham 2013, 93).

Another aspect underlined in this chapter is the relationship between the active participation of the EMB's member and its promotion to a higher position. This strategy played a great role to continue recruiting new members or sympathizers beside the consistent supervision of the progress of the organization in general from the headquarters to the family section by the general guidance council. As it has been highlighted previously, the family section represents the first step for membership and also it represents the closest section to the ordinary citizens. Thus, the EMB's family members, friends and classmates are susceptible to join the organization faster than others or at least to be EMB's sympathizers.

4.11. The Various Groups within the Organization

There are several ideological divisions within the organization, reflecting the generations of activists within it. al-Anani (2007) provides a method to understand the existing divisions among members. This study summarizes and analyses these generations. Each generation has its own characteristics, ideological conviction and symbols due to various internal disputes over the interpretation of Islam towards the most sensitive subjects in the organization, namely: The *Sharia* law, the role of women in society and politics, and the status of the Coptic Egyptians, , elections in choosing the leadership, discussions with the authorities or not, alliance with other secular political parties or not which had been at the forefront of discussions among others between the secular and the Islamist Egyptians in general. Al-Anani beside the analysis provided by the author of this work provides the structure below:

A. The Generation of the 1960s

This generation is defined as the members who witnessed the political challenges and incidents of the 1950s and 1960s between the Egyptian government and the EMB. This group is ideologically and politically conservative such that, as a result, it is treated as close minded by mainly the younger members of the EMB. Members belonging to this group often monopolize the decision-making process inside the organization. The age of these members is approximately between 65 and 80 years old.

B. The Generation of the 1970s

This category witnessed the incidents of the 1970s and assisted in the complete return of the

EMB to the political and social scenes during the Sadat era. The members of this category were active within Egyptian universities. One of their main features is their general overall knowledge of the ideological and political aspects of the movement, and, most importantly, they have attempted to renew clear political, economic and social strategies for the future of the organization. Their strategies are based on reading the current political and social challenges the world is facing today. These members are approximately 50 to 60 years old. Some scholars call this generation as the middle-generation leaders. These members due to their know-how in the professional organisations that catalysed their ideological transformation, “they could sustain interaction with individuals and groups outside the Islamist movement, in the form of intensive deliberation and debates on contentious issues and cooperation in pursuit of common goals. The professional syndicates, which were once deemed marginal enough by regime authorities to function with a minimum of interference, which served as the primary site for such new types of cross-partisan engagement” (Wickham 2013, 74).

Further, it can be argued that as elected public officials in the syndicates and as student unions’ activists, they began reaching out to individuals outside the Brotherhood’s networks in an effort to meet the needs of syndicate members. In fact, many students and syndicate members joined the EMB mainly in the 1970s.

C. The Generation of the 1980s and 1990s

This group was educated by the older 1960s generation, and particularly by their leadership. These are the members who lived during the conflict between the Egyptian authorities and a variety of Egyptian *Jihadist* groups in the 1990s. Subsequently, members of this category are sensitive to and concerned about Egyptian security restrictions against the EMB’s leadership in the event of a conflict between the organization and the authorities. This group is tied to the older generation and currently controls the managerial positions at the administrative offices, districts and branch levels. In general, members of this group are not politically supported by the new generation of the EMB due to their rigid mind-set against any attempt at political reform within the movement to reflect the political developments in Egypt. These members are between 40 and 50 years old.

D. The Generation of 2000s (Bloggers).

The age of this generation is between 20 and 35 years. The main feature of this category is its politically and logically open mind-set. This group is influenced by the continuous domestic, regional and international transformation through intensive reading on the Internet and watching satellite TV. Members of this category are often marginalized and oppressed by the

1980s and 1990s generation. They can be understood, in part, through their media postings (on Facebook, Twitter and so forth). Using social media is one of their communication strategies to express themselves.

E. The Bureaucrats

The members of this group are in charge of the EMB's management. As a result, they maintain distance from getting involved in the political movement and they avoid appearing in media. Members of this group succeeded in training new bureaucrats capable of being mediators between the EMB's various branches and Egyptian society. The assigned section to choose the bureaucrats is mainly the general guidance council.

4.12. Usage of EMB Branches for Electoral Purposes

This section examines the role played by the organizational structure of EMB. Accordingly, as it has been mentioned previously in this chapter, the Brotherhood, with its consolidated network monitored by the headquarters in Cairo, had experience in mobilizing people. For example, when the organization decided to join the protest in Tahrir square during the Egyptian uprising, it did not take very long to ask thousands of the EMB supporters to join the protest. It was mentioned in this chapter that the family sections, which are spread out over the whole country, have their respective leaders. These leaders already have contact with all seven members belonging to each family section. Furthermore, in one prefecture, there are tens, hundreds or thousands of family sections connected to branches. These branches are connected to districts, and districts are supervised by the administrative offices. These administrative offices are directly in touch with the administrative section in the Headquarters in Cairo. This experienced network could easily mobilize the EMB's adherents to bring voters to the EMB's candidate in the 2012 parliamentary and presidential elections, especially as the political atmosphere was unrestricted.

During the elections, the Muslim Brothers proved untiring activists, producing a large number of posters, registering people through the mosques it controlled, and turning out voters for their candidate. All this was accomplished by experienced members who had worked for similar campaigns in the past. As Rubin states in a case happened in the 1980s,

In the 1987 elections, the Brotherhood led an Islamic Alliance including the Liberals and the Socialist Labor parties, whose platform called for economic reforms, building private-sector industry and agriculture, more democracy, less corruption, and applying the *Shariah*. The Muslim Brothers proved indefatigable campaigners, producing a large number of posters, registering people through the mosques it controlled, and turning out voters for their

candidates. The Alliance won 60 seats of which the Brotherhood held 36. An al-Ahram election analysis concluded that the Brothers brought the opposition over 420,000 votes, more than one-third of the Alliance's support and about 8 per cent of the total ballots. (Rubin 1990, 33)

In sum, this chapter presents and analyses the organizational structure and activities of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The aim is to critically highlight the different sections and their roles in order to perceive the consolidation and ties among the organizations' divisions within the structure and outside the circle. The Egyptian authoritarian regimes attempted to destroy the organization in 1948, 1981, 1954 and finally, in 2014, and this study explains the reasons behind the survival of the Brotherhood, despite the continuous brutal suppression from successive Egyptian governments. The examination of the organizational structure and activities also reveals the systematic recruitment strategies and mechanism adopted by the Brotherhood, from non-membership to the family sections, and finally to the Headquarters. The family sections, branches, the districts and the administrative offices of the Brotherhood in the country are monitored by the Headquarters in Cairo. These pyramidal structures, with its connecting channels, is the secret behind the survival of the organization despite governments' suppressive tactics and its internal dispute. As example, members belong to the family, branch, district or administrative offices could establish university branches for recruiting purposes,

The university branch was simply and efficiently organized. Directly responsible to the university leader were the leaders of each of the various faculties; the faculties were in turn divided into groups representing each of the four years of schooling. The heads of each year-group were responsible to the faculty heads for the performance of the members of their group. This breakdown permitted an efficient organization of the university Brothers into units small enough to be rapidly assembled and large enough to be effective in their respective faculties. Liaison between faculties was in the hands of the leader of the university. Perhaps no other facet of the activity of the Brothers in the university so astounded (and infuriated) their opponents there as the ability of the leaders to communicate directions and decisions throughout the ranks of the Brothers with such speed and to have them so perfectly obeyed. (Mitchell 1969, 180)

Furthermore, the ideological and political differences among the EMB's members provide a recruiting strategy within Egyptian society. This is because the newly recruited members can join their preferential category within the organization based on their ideological and political conviction.

The next chapter presented and explained the usage of the EMB's social services. It

was obvious during this particular study that a range of medical, social, and charitable organizations extended its network throughout Egypt and had influenced those who benefited from the services to vote for the Brotherhood's candidate. In this regard, the section of social welfare, with its own records, could convey to its clients the importance of the vote in the favor of the EMB's candidate Mohamed Morsi in 2012.

Chapter V

The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's Recruitment Strategies: Economic Activities and Social Services (1928-2015)

5.1. Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to present and examine the economic, welfare and social assistance provided by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood to the Egyptian society as one of the strategic activities that lies behind the EMB's political influence. In a comparison of influence, the provision of economic, welfare and social assistance remains a key factor in any discussion of the EMB recruitment strategies due to the economic crisis the country has been facing since at least the 1930s. Therefore, the EMB's social activities were chiefly helpful for the regime as it confronted economic difficulties especially in the 1980s as Rubin states,

Egypt's debt had risen from \$3 billion in 1973 to \$18 billion in 1981, \$24 billion in 1985, \$44 billion in 1987, and \$50 billion by 1988, according to World Bank figures. Annual debt service reached \$5.5 billion ... Falling oil prices reduced remittances from Egyptians working in the Arab Oil-producing countries, Suez Canal revenues, and Arab tourism. In 1986, the Egyptian economy reached a low point. These hardships might have been expected to encourage internal instability and an upsurge of radical activity. (Rubin 1990, 26)

To be more specific, this chapter sheds light on this factor by providing detailed answers to the following questions: What do we know about the provision of economic activities, welfare and social services provided by the EMB toward the Egyptian people, known that the organization engaged itself in providing affordable healthcare services through building hospitals and clinics in Egypt? What is the impact of those activities on the EMB's political recruitment strategies and mechanisms since the 1930s? How can we evaluate the political contribution made by the provision of economic, welfare and social services to the overall appeal of the EMB within the Egyptian politics?

First, we need to deepen our knowledge on the different economic activities and social services provided by the Brotherhood and then examine the impact of these provisions on the EMB's political support. Nevertheless, it is difficult for scholars to provide an accurate statistical account of the EMB's economic activities and its social services, since the organization was under severe restrictions imposed by successive governments. However, certain media have estimated that the size of the organization's investment in Egypt reached

seven billion Egyptian Pounds (EGP), equal to 917,648,398.24 USD (Al-Anani 2007, 56).

As far as the political strategies of the Brotherhood is concerned, the social activities such as the social services have been employed to attract Egyptians to support the Brotherhood's ideology. As example, during al-Nasr's term under the National Democratic Party (NDP), the Brotherhood concentrated more on developing and using its social services to increase its popularity. According to Rubin (1990), Mubarak's first years in office were marked by relative social peace. In fact, Mubarak's regime from 1981 until 1996 was characterized by political repression and economic and social stagnation" (Heggy 2011). These political and economic crises gave the Brotherhood a chance to employ more its economic activities and social services in a way that was obvious within Egyptian society.

Al-Anani states, after the parliamentary elections of 2005, al-sharq al-Awsat News reported a case of investigating the reasons behind voting for the EMB's candidate in two separated electoral localities. One poor region in the North of Cairo called 'Shubra' and another high class area in the East of Cairo, called Madinat Nasr. In both areas, the EMB's candidates won the elections. Some of those who have been interviewed said they chose the EMB's candidate Hazem Faruq due to his good manner, as he used to provide welfare support to the poor through a 'Zakat' section belongs to *al-Jamia al-Sharia*. In the case of Madinat Nasr, the candidate himself Isam Mukhtar, the EMB's candidate explained that he was in touch with people through the social services and welfare activities and he was working as a secretary in a 'Zakat' collection and distribution section in one of the mosques. In addition, the latter EMB candidate was working as 'Hajj' agent in Cairo. These social services' positions gave him an opportunity to meet people. These two EMB's candidates against Hosni Mubarak's candidates won the elections in 2005 based on the economic and social services' activities (Al-Anani 2007, 58-59).

The following section presents and examines the EMB's total budget for economic activities and social services. The objective is to examine the contribution of these activities to furthering the EMB's political goals.

5.2. Economic Activities

This study defines 'economic activities' as all financial, commercial, trade, industrial or budgetary activities that involve the use of money. Detailed information about the EMB's economic activities is provided by Richard P. Mitchell, among other scholars.⁵¹ In his book '*The Society of the Muslim Brothers*', Mitchell stated,

⁵¹ According to Mitchell, "The primary source for the life of al-Banna (EMB's founder) and the first few years of the EMB's history was his autobiographical material collected and compiled from the pages of the Society's newspapers and magazines" (Mitchell 1969, 1). The author of this dissertation has a copy of the collection and his memoir but in Arabic language. However, as Mitchell' source is in English, I prefer to deal with his source beside the Arab version for verification purposes.

In 1938, the Society embarked on its first major venture, the founding of the company for Islamic transactions [sharikat al-mu'amalat al-islamiyya]. The original announcement declared the company to be an attempt to provide the means for gain within the framework of Islamic principles. Initial capitalization was to be £E4, 000 divided into 1,000 shares of £E4 each; stock could be purchased in one payment or over a period of time not to exceed forty months at a minimum of period of time (PT) 10 monthly. Management was to be in the hands of a board of directors composed of a chairman, treasurer, and seven other members; members of the board had to have at least five shares in the company, and the chairman and treasurer at least ten. (Mitchell 1969, 275)

Thus, the company is not fully owned by the EMB, but belongs to both the organization and its individual members. This arrangement can be better explained by looking at the division of annual profit. Mitchell (1969) states that the EMB was to take 2.5% of the capital and profit of the company annually for purposes of zakat.⁵² The enterprise was to pursue 'investment activity' when funds became accessible from the sale of stocks at 'wholesale prices' in agreement with the 'requirements of the Brothers' and selling at 'suitable prices.' Profit would be distributed yearly on the following schedule: 10% for the directors' fees, 20% for the reserve fund, and 50% for the shareholders (Mitchell 1969, 275).

The first sale of stock was rapidly completed and the company expanded from its initial capital value of £E4, 000 to £E20, 000 in 1945 (Mitchell 1969, 275-6). Mitchell says,

In 1946, a new issue of stock was advertised which was to increase the capital to £E30, 000. In 1947, the company was combined with another enterprise called the Arabic Company for Mines and Quarries (al-sharikat al - 'Arabiyya li'l-manajim wa' l-mahajir) which had a capital value of £E60, 000. The various activities of the two groups included moving and trucking, automotive repairs, and the production of cement, tiles, and gas cooking equipment. In 1947, the quarrying end of the merger decided to modernize traditional techniques and placed orders in Europe for equipment for cutting and polishing marble. The equipment was sent, but remained on the docks of Alexandria and deteriorated during the crisis of 1948 which brought an end to the economic activity of the Society. After its return to legality in 1950, the Society sued the government for its losses. A larger enterprise, earlier in inspiration but later in fruition, was the Society's 'printing press'. (Mitchell 1969, 275-6)

⁵² Zakat is the 3rd of the five pillars of Islam. If one possesses a certain level of wealth, called Nisab, payment of Zakah becomes obligatory. So, at current rates, if the total of one's assets like cash, gold, silver, shares, etc., is £250, one should pay 2.5% as Zakah on all assets. Islamic Aid uses 100% of Zakah and other donations to help make immediate and long-term improvements to the lives of people affected by poverty, war and disaster by providing people with food and water; healthcare and the skills and means to help start earning a decent living" (Islamic Aid 2012).

Building on their experience in the field of providing social services to Egyptian society, some of the active members became businessmen and pursued commercial, financial, and other service activities inside Egypt. Adly (2014) states that these businessmen also had access to commercial and financing networks outside Egypt when the Brotherhood was banished from Egypt in the fifties and sixties, starting out in the Arab Gulf and extending to other countries, such as Turkey, in the eighties and nineties. With these economic activities, the EMB became famous among many scholars in the domain of its social services for recruiting purposes. The most famous example of a successful Egyptian businessman active in the EMB is Khairat al-Shater. He acted as the Brotherhood's deputy supreme guide and succeeded in accumulating a fortune of 80 million EGP equal to 10,482,720.00 USD. His companies once employed about 1000 people in Egypt (Al-Anani 2007, 57). Hassan Malek, who is known as the EMB's richest millionaire, led the Malek Group, which runs the Egyptian branches of a Turkish furniture company, Istikbal, a clothing brand called Sarar, and other companies. According to Al-Anani, Malek's wealth reached 250 million EGP equal to 32,894,733.79 USD (Al-Anani 2007, 57; Hansen et. al, 2012). Furthermore, Malek used to employ about '500 workers, of whom the majority were the EMB's members' (Al-Anani 2007, 57).

There are other successful EMB businessmen. However, as previously noted, the continuous clash between the authorities and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood meant that the EMB members had to keep a low profile when carrying out their business activities. For example, al-Shater was arrested and sentenced on three occasions in the past, spending two, seven and 10 years, respectively in detention. He is currently serving a fourth sentence, since July 2013, as a result of the military coup led by Marchel Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. Shater is in jail together with other key members of the EMB including the General Guide (leader), Mohamed Badie. These suppressive actions of the government inspired the organization to focus on social services rather than economic activities because the latter is more visible compared to the charitable and social services.

Al-Anani (2007) notes that the EMB's wealth is divided into 3 categories. First, there are the private companies entirely owned by the organization and which directly generate profit for the EMB. Second, there are the private companies owned by members of the Brotherhood but in which the EMB itself does not have shares. Third, there are mixed private companies owned by both the organization and some EMB members (Al-Anani 1969, 56). However, these three categories are considered as EMB-owned companies by many Egyptians. Nevertheless, the EMB entrepreneurs are not limited to people inside the Brotherhood's organization, but also include networks of businessmen known for their Brotherhood leanings or sympathies, such as Abdelrahman al-Seoudi.⁵³ Furthermore, Adly

⁵³ Abdelrahman al-Seoud is considered as one of the most successful businessmen often connected to the Brotherhood; however, he denied several times that he doesn't belong to the Muslim Brotherhood.

(2014) states,

What sets these businessmen apart is that their activities are mostly focused in the commercial, financial, and service sectors, such as the wholesale and retail sales. This may be due to the fact that access to assets such as land or divested public-sector companies needed for activities such as industry, construction, or tourism that have historically been limited to the network of people close to the state during Mubarak's regime. This has left others to focus on less capital-intensive activities and the service sectors' enterprises which also lend themselves to reduce the risk of confiscation or retrieval of these funds in case of a clash with the authorities. While they may remain targets, by not holding wealth in fixed assets like land or concentrated in larger companies, Brotherhood's businessmen may more easily relocate or hide their assets to reduce the risk of seizure. Hidden business provision might be monitored by sympathizers instead of the EMB's members themselves. This explanation suggests that the EMB is not necessarily influenced and supported by the EMB's members, but sympathizers instead. (Adly 2014)

To sum up, the economic activities are served in recruiting members or sympathizers through hiring workers in the EMB's enterprises. In addition, these enterprises are creating commercial networks inside and outside Egypt in order to multiply the EMB's economic activities inside and outside Egypt. As example, the Brotherhood's deputy supreme guide, Khairat Al-Shater employed about 1000 people in Egypt (Al-Anani 2007, 57). Hassan Malik led the Malek Group, which runs the Egyptian branches of a Turkish furniture company employed about 500 Egyptians (Al-Anani 2007, 57; Hansen et. al, 2012).

5.3. Social Services and Welfare

The term 'social services' is defined here as a system that is organized by the local government to help people who have financial or family problems. In the case of 'welfare', it is interpreted as the general health, happiness and safety of a person or any practical of financial help that is provided, often by the government, for people or animals that need it. Combining both terms results in the definition of social services as a means for the achievement of welfare. In this regard, this study examines and analyses the social services provided by the (EMB) to Egyptian society. Abdullah al-Arian notes that the EMB's involvement in social services posed a big challenge to the Egyptian authorities. He says, "The rise of social welfare institutions demonstrates that the Muslim Brotherhood emerged as a direct competitor to the state in the provision of services. Coupled with that, the continued

However, the authority treats him as a member of the Brotherhood.

existence of an insular organizational structure supervised by the Muslim Brotherhood's Guidance Bureau gives the appearance of a non-state entity that seeks to displace the regime and impose its vision of a decidedly Islamic state" (Al-Arian 2014, 8).

The following section presents and examines the most influential social services provided by the EMB - health and education services.

A. Health Services

From the beginning of the EMB's social activities, the founder of the EMB considered health services to be a priority in order to address the health problems in the country. Accordingly, Mitchell states, "In his early reform messages, al-Banna made public health an important part of social reform concentrating especially on the dissemination of information and the increase of facilities and personnel to tackle the vast national health problem" (Mitchell 1969, 289). This problem continued to devastate a large portion of the population who wished to get healthcare from the public hospitals. The Brotherhood intervened through its already established rover units. "The purpose of these units was to provide physical training and athletics to supplement members' spiritual and intellectual training" (Mitchell 1969, 174). Based on this experience, the rovers were the first groups from the organization to become involved in providing healthcare. Mitchell says,

The first societal groups used to disseminate hygienic knowledge and bring medical care to the countryside were the rovers. Local rover units undertook the actual work of cleaning up the streets and alleys of the villages, encouraged villagers to use hospitals and clinics and provided simple first aid. These activities were part of a general 'social programme' established for the rovers in 1943 in revulsion against the filth and the sanitation and health problems of the mass of Egyptians, rural and urban. Although this kind of activity gradually passed to the medical section of the Society, the rovers continued to be a useful medium for dealing with the medical problems of the villages. It will also be recalled that al-Banna offered the services of the rover groups to the ministry of health during the epidemics of 1945 and 1947 to serve in the stricken areas where needed. (Mitchell 1969, 289-290)

Furthermore, the creation of a medical section within the organization facilitated the task alongside the rise of the EMB members majoring in medicine. Mitchell states, "The medical section, although conceived independently, was very rapidly made part of the larger 'welfare and social services section' organized in 1945 to take the place of the former 'social assistance office.' The new section was organized 'independently' of the EMB in order to benefit from government aid. In 1946, the Society registered 102 welfare agency branches with the Ministry of Social Affairs. In 1948, it claimed 500 branches all over Egypt (Mitchell

1969, 290). The EMB's organizational structure shows a section of 'services.' Under this section, there is a sub-medical section, which is still considered among the busiest sections within the organization.

In addition, there was intensive work inside the medical section to increase the number of dispensaries, clinics, hospitals, and so forth. In view of the importance of the medical section, Mitchell notes,

This largely educational programme of the Society was augmented in November 1944 by the establishment of a 'medical section' by the doctors in the organization. Its objectives were defined as the establishment of dispensaries, clinics, and hospitals, the intensification of the programme for 'spreading the message of 'hygiene and the raising of the health level of all classes' by all means available. The first dispensary was opened at that time in the offices of the leading doctor member (Mohamed Ahmad Sulayman), and within a month it was transferred to the Society's headquarters. In 1946, the clinic moved to its own building near the headquarters and added to itself a pharmacy headed by a registered pharmacist. This clinic, which soon professed to be a small hospital, claimed to have treated 21,677 patients in 1945; 29,039 in 1946, and 51,300 in 1947. From the time of its opening, smaller clinics were started wherever possible, and by 1948 the medical section had an annual budget of £E3, 000. While most of the equipment and materials of the clinics and dispensaries was confiscated in 1948, activity was resumed in 1950. In 1953, it was claimed that each province of Egypt had at least one dispensary and sixteen clinics in Cairo had treated over 100,000 patients. (Mitchell 1969, 290)

However, as part of the suppressive tactic against the EMB, in January 1954, the government of the Free Officers' revolution formally took over all the clinics then operating; what happened to them was not clear until the emergence of new political order headed by Anwar Sadat in 1981 (Mitchell 1969, 290). Taking advantage of the greater political openness of Sadat's regime, the Brotherhood tried to reopen its social services. In doing so, it promoted a new generation of leaders. Abdurrahman al-Arian states that "[M]any of the leaders of this movement were students at Cairo University's College of Medicine where, as part of their medical training, they treated patients in a wing of Qasr al-Aini Hospital that housed prisoners seeking medical care. It was during the course of those interactions that young leaders like Abdel Moneim Abul Futuh, Essam al-Erian, and Helmi al-Gazzar would come to meet veterans of the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood for the very first time" (Al-Arian 2014, 8). This new generation helped advance the role of the health services. Since then, scholars started paying attention to the political agenda pursued by Islamist social activities. In this regard, Abdullah al-Arian notes,

By the 1980s, scholars had begun to tackle the question of militant violence and the revolutionary potential of these same movements in the wake of the so-called 'Islamic resurgence.' However, as the Muslim Brotherhood's presence in society became 'normalized' during Anwar Sadat's regime, the authority turned a blind eye toward the group's development of a robust social welfare sector. Consequently, a new wave of scholarly studies focused on the role that these institutions play in the promotion of Islamic activism. (Al-Arian 2014).

The health services provided by the Brotherhood were improved during Hosni Mubarak's regime. Since the new regime was attempting to adopt a democratic façade, it allowed the organization to gain more infrastructural ground and attain physical visibility through their clinics, hospitals and mosques presence. Its members joined professional syndicates, gained ground in universities, and began to expand their social welfare apparatus with more emphasis on the healthcare sector (Abdelrahman 2011, 12). However, by the turn of the 1990s, the EMB's freedom to operate in Egyptian society was again disrupted when Mubarak's regime saw that the Brotherhood had begun to use their achievements for political purposes and to mobilize their lower middle class supporters (or beneficiaries) against the regime's strategic policies (Abdelrahman 2011, 12). According to Abdelrahman (2011), "[T]he strength of the EMB became apparent in 1992 when Brotherhood members were the fastest respondents to the earthquake that killed 378 and injured 3,300" (Abdelrahman 2011, 12).

In the aftermath of the earthquake and subsequent recovery, the EMB came to the attention of people on the ground, as well as to worldwide news agencies. The regime realized that the Brotherhood's organizational capabilities far surpassed those of the government and that their social welfare apparatus was there to stay (Abdelrahman 2011, 12). Consequently, the government clamped down on Mostashfa AlMarkazy in Madinat Nasr. It was a multi-million-dollar charity hospital project that government forces occupied and destroyed. Abdelrahman says, "Mostashfa AlMarkazy gained state permits to build a three-story clinic in 1996 but the government backtracked in 2000, and revoked the permits. The Muslim Brotherhood claimed it was because of election disputes, but the state maintained that it was due to improper documentation. In 2006, the courts granted the Brotherhood permits to begin constructing its seven-story hospital only for the building work to be halted in 2009 and for two already built floors to be destroyed" (Abdelrahman 2011,13).

However, this did not stop the Brotherhood from continuing their social welfare programs or from focusing on building up the group's membership and expanding its presence (Abdelrahman 2011, 13). The EMB's persistence to continue its healthcare activities illustrate the importance of this sector. However, the availability of the EMB's doctors played a significant role in maintaining this particular activity. In 1998, a sympathizer of the EMB

stated to the author of this particular study that about 70% of Egypt's medical doctors were the EMB members or sympathizers. Although, it is difficult to get confirmation of this figure, it seems clear that the EMB's medical doctors make up a large number in Egypt due to the organization's focus on encouraging student members and sympathizers to join medical faculties. In Egypt, the EMB's hospitals have a good reputation due to its good quality treatment and its affordable price as privates. As example, in Gharbia city,

[T]he Muslim Brotherhood runs only one: Tiba Hospital. It's gained a reputable reputation due to its good quality treatment, competent doctors, low prices, and various services. The hospital brochure boasts that its services include: Separate clinics for all specializations every day of the week; an intensive care unit with the newest and most modern equipment; a complete dentistry unit; a complete x-ray unit that detects problems through the computer; a unit that detects heart descres through the latest technology of "echo"; a pediatrics and maternity ward; a surgical wing that contains four fully-equipped rooms; surgical microscope for the eyes, ear, and nose and very delicate and complicated surgeries. These services are enhanced by the fact that prices at the hospital are less than the national hospitals. That is due to the fact that the doctors are volunteers who come from very high positions; many are professors at the local medical school in Tanta. The price difference is vast, for example, Dr. Khalid Issa, a doctor who specializes in bones, usually charges sixty-five pounds in his normal clinic, but for the hospital, he charges a mere twelve pounds. (Abdelrahman 2011, 33)

Nevertheless, during the current regime, Abdul Fattah al-Sisi, who became president after the *coup* of July 3, 2013, has suppressed the EMB. During his presidential campaign, Sisi audaciously pledged that "there will be nothing called the Muslim Brotherhood during my tenure" (Al-Arian 2014). "His strategy to fulfill that promise has centered on breaking the perceived base of Muslim Brotherhood support across Egyptian society. Over the course of the past years, the government has taken unprecedented measures to dismantle the network of all kind of social services institutions run by the Muslim Brotherhood and its sympathizers" (Al-Arian 2014, 7). Accordingly, as public health has always been a crucial focus of contention between the State and the Brotherhood. Sisi's regime is currently suppressing this domain as well as other important sectors, such as the EMB's education services.

B. Education Services

Over its history, Egypt has known several changes in its education system. However, Ottoman Pasha Mohamed Ali (1805-1848) is credited with having created the modern Egyptian dual education system backed by Islamic and secular references. The reason for combining the secular and the Islamic curricular was eventually limited from the European

models of education system. In addition, foreign advisors in the ministry of education played a major role in devising the educational structure. The goal was to develop intelligent, balanced citizens who would support Egyptian growth in all aspects (Larink 2013). However, Ali's plans were seen as a threat to the British economic strategy. The latter colonizers changed the education system to a feeble model. According to Paula Larink, the British educational model in general had a negative impact on the average Egyptian citizens, with a population of seven million to 11 million between 1882 and 1907. The leadership of the day did not invest in the educational domain, neither in quantity nor quality. "Literacy rates plummeted to 5% of the population in 1922, causing an obvious deleterious impact on societal development as a whole" (Larink 2013).

Under this educational shortage, the Brotherhood founded in 1928 had the opportunity to involve itself in the education domain, as supporters of literacy and filling out the gap inherited from a history of neglect. First, the EMB tackled the educational system "by (1) propaganda and agitation for reform of the existing school system, and (2) the founding of supplementary or alternative educational facilities" (Mitchell 1969, 284). Moreover, education in the eyes of the EMB did not only give emphasis to Islamic science, "but also on education to patriotism, love of one's homeland, and love of the entire Muslim nations. This, according to the movement, requires the development of a sense of social responsibility, a desire to fight the ills of society (poverty, ignorance, crime, etc.), and an aspiration to create a model society based on the principles of Islamic justice and brotherhood" (The Meir Amit Intelligence 2011, 19). "The movement heavily emphasizes the issue of education (*tarbiya* in Arabic) and preaching, which, with its welfare activity, comprise the pillars of the preaching ('*Da'awah*' in Arabic) of the Muslim Brotherhood, aimed at changing the Muslim nations" (The Meir Amit Intelligence 2011, 19). Therefore, the movement started to organize its own facilities by inaugurating a mosque in 1931, followed by the establishment of a school for boys and another for girls (Mitchell 1969, 287).

As the Society (Brotherhood) expanded, the establishment of schools has been expanded throughout the country; however, it remained a largely informal and unsystematically organized effort. In May 1946, "[T]he committee for the founding of primary and secondary schools for boys and girls was established; in the following month a committee for cultural care was established to aid the already existing education committee" (Mitchell 1969, 287). These three bodies were primarily responsible for the Society's educational activity. In 1948, al-Banna claimed that each of the 2,000 branches of the EMB in Egypt had one or more types of schools attached to the organization (Mitchell 1969, 284-9). "In 1951, Hassan al-Hudaibi, the second general guide after al-Banna's death in 1949, issued a call to create at least one school for preaching in each Muslim Brotherhood administrative office, and in 1953 the movement established its preaching academy in its Cairo headquarters" (The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center 2011).

The aim of such institutions was to train professional preachers to compete with traditional and government-employed clerics for the hearts of the Egyptian public (The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center 2011). In order to expand its educational institutions, the EMB established its affiliated schools throughout the entire country of Egypt. Accordingly, it has been stated, “The Muslim Brotherhood currently has schools in all of Egypt’s provinces, as well as various other education services (after-school activities, summer camps for adolescents, professional training and evening classes, supplementary lessons for children, and more) that provide an alternative to the official/state controlled education” (The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center 2011).

Nonetheless, the EMB’s involvement in supporting and establishing schools had no significant impact on reducing illiteracy among Egyptians. In fact, during the after 1952 revolution of the Free Officers, nearly 75% of the population over the age of ten were illiterate, 90% of them were female (Larink 2013). For these reasons, many social welfare programs were opened and benefitted many Egyptians due to the new educational policy initiated by Jamal Abdel Nasser’s regime. ‘Free education for all’ was an important constituent ideal of Jamal Abdel Nasser’s governing plan. This system also gave a chance for the Brotherhood to establish many schools in collaboration with Jamal Abdel Nasser’s new regime. “In 1953 a friendly student of the Society surveyed the Cairo-Giza area and found 31 schools, mostly kindergarten and night schools with about 3,500 students” (Mitchell 1969, 289). Nevertheless, during Nasser’s brutal suppression on the EMB’s social services in 1954, followed by the official ban of the organization in the same year, almost all of the EMB’s social activities were ended due to the crackdown or were operated underground until Nasser’s death in 1970.

With a shift in power, Anwar Sadat’s regime from 1970 to 1981 attempted to open up again the political situation and liberalize the economic policies constrained by Nasser’s regime. Sadat’s new program was called, ‘Open Door Policy.’ This policy did away with the guaranteed government employment policy that many college graduates enjoyed, resulting in high levels of unemployment for graduates. Many new educational institutions opened in the 1970s, while professors looked for better wages in other countries. With this open environment, “Political scientists and Middle East scholars have been keenly aware of the more general growth of Islamic groups in Egypt and elsewhere in the region since at least the early 1970s” (Mansun 2001, 490). This Islamist growth was visible in the Egyptian universities, where the rise of the EMB student movements was vibrant (Al-Arian 2014). The EMB “engaged in many educational activities, such as establishing primary and secondary schools for boys and girls, as well as technical schools for workers, and Quranic classes and basic skill classes for the illiterate. Through education, the Brotherhood recruited many members from among its students, who eventually became recruiters for the organization, starting from their families and schools and moving outwards into the society” (Aknur 2013,

14).

In Egypt, student unions play a great role in their affiliated political parties. In this regard, “The EMB’s student leaders demonstrated a strong commitment to popular activism as well as political engagement. They swept student union elections and developed programs that offered students subsidized textbooks, free medical care, safe modes of transportation, and even religious pilgrimage trips” (Al-Arian 2014, 8). By the early 1980s, the same spirit was adopted into the revived Muslim Brotherhood with the admission of thousands of young Egyptians into its ranks under the leadership of General Guide Umar al-Tilmisani (1972-1986). Those efforts continued into the subsequent decades with the Muslim Brotherhood’s entry into professional associations, its development of social welfare institutions, and its increasing political engagement with the state (Al-Arian 2014, 8). This was the case with Hosni Mubarak’s regime, after Sadat’s assassination on October 6, 1981. Hosni Mubarak’s education policies were intended to create advancements in all areas of education, with his plan called ‘The Grand Revival.’ Under Mubarak’s suppressive tactics, until his removal from power on February 12, 2011, the EMB intensified its social welfare activities, including its educational services. In the case of educational services, the current government, under General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, has already closed down 77 EMB schools from 15 Egyptian provinces (Alborsanews 2014).

5.4. Informal Welfare Services

The informal services provided by the Brotherhood include those provided independently by the individual members without following the formal rules and regulations of the organization. Mitchell notes that the Brotherhood is intent on regulating conditions of the homeless people and other striving citizens. Mitchell says,

Besides its medical and educational services, the welfare and social services division was also concerned to help in cash poor families, especially those without breadwinners, the aged, the homeless, and the orphaned. In some of the branches ‘social treasuries’, to which members contributed monthly, sometimes supported these activities; mostly the situation was less formalized, and aid (usually in the form of food, clothing, and soap) was distributed on religious holidays either by the branch or by leading members of the particular community who was ‘influenced’ by the Society. (Mitchell 1969, 290-1)

In sum, this chapter has examined the different circumstances in which economic and social services provided by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood to Egyptian society played a great role to mobilize supporters or members since the 1930s. Furthermore, the political impact of those activities within the Egyptian society in favor of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s

political struggle has been examined. The study divides the result of the analysis into economic activities and social, and welfare services. In the case of economic activities, the study claims that one of the EMB's strategic tactics is engaging its activities, in a hidden technique through its non-membership sympathizers, while the social and welfare services have been visible in the health and the educational sectors.

From the 1930s, the EMB was chiefly helping the Egyptian authorities to confront the economic difficulties the country was facing, especially in the 1980s. With this economic misery, the EMB projected itself as not only a religious organization but also a proactive social organization capable to support ordinary Egyptians to a better life in terms of reducing unemployment by hiring Egyptians to work in their companies in 1938. The strategy used by the organization to establish and run companies was to encourage individual members to cooperate with the organization in establishing new companies like the case of the Arab Company for Mines established in 1946 and 1947, and others. These activities motivated members to become businessmen in order to expand the economic activities within the organization. The well-known as a successful EMB's member businessman is Kharat al-Shater who acted as the Brotherhood's deputy supreme guide. Al-Shater succeeded in accumulating a fortune of 80 million EGP and employed about 1000 people inside Egypt.

To conclude the various EMB's economic activities, al-Anani states three categories: 1) the private companies entirely owned by the organization, 2) the private companies owned by members of the Brotherhood and finally, 3) the mixed private companies owned by both the organization and some members. To avoid the state's surveillance, the EMB focused more on less capital-intensive activities and the service sectors 'enterprises that could be easily relocated or hidden in case of a clash with the authorities.

In the case of its social and welfare services, the Brotherhood focused on the health and education sectors besides the informal welfare services. Accordingly, the EMB disseminated hygienic knowledge and brought medical care to the countryside through its rovers. Local rover units assumed the responsibility of cleaning up the streets and alleys of the villages, encouraged villagers to use affordable hospitals and clinics under the EMB's influence. These activities were part of general social programme established since 1943.

Under the educational shortage in Egypt, the Brotherhood also actively involved in supporting literacy by asking for reforming the existing school system, the founding of supplementary or alternative educational facilities, but most importantly, the organization promoted the Islamic education beside the education to patriotism. As the organization expanded, the EMB established its own schools throughout the country. In 1948, al-Banna claimed that each of the 2,000 branches of the EMB in Egypt had one or more types of schools attached to the organization. In 1951, the second general supreme guide issued a call to create at least one school for establishing its preaching academy in its Cairo headquarters in order to train professional preachers to compete with traditional and government-employed

clerics for the hearts of the Egyptian public. Furthermore, during Sadat's regime in the 1970s, many EMB's educational institutions were opened where the rise of the EMB student unions were vibrant. Due to the open political policy of Sadat, the EMB engaged in many educational activities, such as establishing primary and secondary schools for boys and girls, as well as technical schools for workers, and Quranic classes and basic skill classes for illiterate.

However, during Mubarak's regime in the 1980s, the EMB attempted to maintain the same dynamism, but the government with its stick and carrot tactics reduced the influence echoed by the EMB's educational activities. Mubarak's suppressive tactics did not shut down the EMB's schools, but it could create a fear among the EMB's activists, consequently, there was a remarkable decline of the recruiting activities through Egyptian academic institutions, especially after a culture show in 2007, demonstrated by the EMB's at Azhar University. According to the government's media, the EMB displayed military and fighting skill to warn the state.

In regards to the informal welfare services, the EMB's individuals' members, but also the EMB's organization itself helped in cash poor families, especially those without breadwinners, the aged, the homeless, and the orphaned in the 1940s and beyond. These daily basic needs were contributed by the organization's members monthly in the form of food, clothing, soap and so forth, especially on religious holidays.

Generally speaking, this study does not claim that these economic activities and social services are the only reasons behind the EMB's political success according to the literature examined by this particular work, but there are other potential arguments such as the ideology, and also the organizational structure that may surpass the influence of economic and social services in the case of the EMB's political mobilization, all depend on the scenario of the political situation between the state and the EMB

Chapter VI

Media Involvement and Communication Strategies and Mechanisms of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

6.1. Introduction

In this chapter, through the use of selected secondary sources, this study identifies, categorizes and explains the different communication resources used by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood to recruit Egyptians to adopt the ideology and agenda of the organization. This study indicates that the media involvement and communication strategies and mechanisms used by the organization make use of all available communication means. The goal of the EMB's efforts is to convey the message of the organization to Egyptian society and "to rebut the challenges of the adversaries" (Mitchell 1969, 185). In this regard, besides (1) the publication sections of the EMB, the study identifies what is called (2) the 'vertical communication.' This includes face-to-face meetings, group discussions, cassette recordings and the broadcasting channel that the Brotherhood uses for propagating its ideology and agenda. The next section covers (3) the conventional communications. The conventional communication section highlights the different publications produced by the organization. This category covers periodic publications⁵⁴ and books. The last section explains (4) the use of the Internet and its media for political mobilization.

6.2. The Brotherhood's Publication Sections

Within the organizational structure of the Brotherhood, under the General Guidance Council, there are 10 divisions; two of them are 'the Press and Translation Section' and the 'Propagation of the Message Section.' However, according to Mitchell (1969), the press and translation section became a special committee (Mitchell 1969, 187). In the case of the organizational structure of the Brotherhood, 'committee' differs from 'section,' in that the latter is more important than committee in actual operational dynamism. This is because the section was "so intimately and directly involved in the orientation and training of members" (Mitchell 1969, 171). Mitchell states that, "The press and translation committee concerns itself with (1) the publication of the Brothers' newspapers and magazines; (2) the collection and filing of all materials in all languages which related to the Brothers; and (3) the translation of all necessary materials for the interests of the message from and into Arabic" (Mitchell 1969, 170-1). This chapter assumes that the other reason for the shift of 'the press

⁵⁴ Periodic publications: hard copies used for spreading the EMB's ideas periodically.

and translation' material from 'the section category' to 'the committee category' is the cost of the latter in terms of human resources and money. Therefore, it has been taken out from one of the more dynamic sections of the movement to be placed in the administrative machinery, which is more technical in its function in comparison to the other sections. In the case of the role of the 'Publication Section,' Mitchell says,

The publication sections of the organization are headed by 'the Propagation of the Message section', it is also known as 'the organization of the propaganda of the idea of the Brotherhood' by all means compatible with the spirit of Islam. This meant: (1) missionaries (*duaat*) for speeches and lectures, who were particularly well trained for public meetings (i.e., outside the Society); (2) publications of a scientific, cultural, and athletic nature, none of which might be issued by any individual Brother without the authorization of the section; (3) guidance-spiritual, mental, and physical of each Brother towards an Islamic preparation by means of lectures, publications, and organized athletic activity. The section was responsible for supplying the branches with speakers and lecturers. It was also to provide every provincial division with a unified schedule of study for the missionary school which each of them was to maintain, the successful graduates of which would be elevated to the level of organizational missionaries. (Mitchell 1969, 171-2)

The foregoing suggests four main points: (1) The Brotherhood's inner circle tried to train their assigned members to propagate the mission of the organization. (2) The Brotherhood is strict and a closed organization in a way that members have no right to express themselves about the ideology that they believe without being assigned by special committee. This number second point was interpreted, along with other hypothetical reasons, by the former British Prime Minister, Tony Blair (1997 –2007) in a 2012 article. In the article, Blair indicates that it is completely wrong to consider the EMB as a normal political party. He argued that in America, as a single example, if anybody wants to join the Democratic or Republican Party, they can easily join and be welcomed. Nevertheless, to be a member of the Brotherhood, the candidate must be 'brainwashed' for seven years before being accepted as an ordinary member (Blair 2013). Similarly, even if you are a member, you are not allowed to propagate the ideology of the organization without being assigned by the specialized committee. Regarding the third point, the idea of providing a unified schedule to be distributed to all branches, the organizational structure shows that the organization follows up the content of its preaching from up-down and not the other way around. Regardless of the negative impact of this strict federation system, scholars state that this organizational structure plays a major role in the Brotherhood's communication efficiency. (4) The fourth point is that the organization, rather it only prohibits preaching without being officially authorized by the assigned section or committee.

6.3. Vertical Communication or Indoctrination

One of the most important goals of any political, social or religious movement is to enlarge its membership. In this regard, the Brotherhood's primary goal during its first three years after its inception in March, 1928 was the enlargement of its membership (Mitchell 1969, 9). The process of recruitment could be pursued in several ways, depending on a variety of circumstances related to the cultural, political and sociological aspects in any given country. In the case of Egypt, the face-to-face meeting was a driving force for the mobilization process. As a social and political entity, the Brotherhood has used this strategy. Breuer says, "Alongside its public works, the group relied on a strategy of vertical word of mouth communication" (Breuer 2014, 1). In addition, group discussions, seminars and lectures in mosques, Islamic centres and other places played a major role for the organization to reach many Egyptians. In the case of the custom of using mosques for political and social motives, Islamic organizations prefer to have their own mosques in order to avoid any disturbance from a third party such as the mosque's owner or the authority.⁵⁵ This potential third-party involvement led to consider having its own mosques, centres, schools and so forth. As it has been stated, "the Muslim Brotherhood operates an extensive network consisting of tens of thousands of private mosques built with charity funds" (The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center 2011).

In the beginning, due to its evolution, the Brotherhood possessed its own buildings, composed of a mosque, school for boys, club and school for girls from the 1930s (Mitchell 1969, 9). Nevertheless, through its well-trained preachers, the Brotherhood still had the opportunity to be the preferred preachers in many mosques in Egypt as independent preachers. In Muslim countries, "mosques give the speakers the legitimacy and respectability they needed" (Mitchell 1969, 9). Therefore, the regime often exercises a great deal of authority over the religious establishment as a whole. Of the approximately in the 1980, in 50,000 mosques in Egypt, 7000 were directly controlled by the government and the rest were under its supervision" (Rubin 1990, 24-25). Furthermore, to maintain the support of the religious clerics far away from the Brotherhood, regimes would recruit several well-known Muslim scholars and offered them better salaries, especially those who gave Friday sermon. Mosques were and are still the strategic public institutions useful for mobilization, not only for the Brotherhood, but also for other Islamist organizations. Therefore, Egyptian governments pay attention on the use of mosques for political propaganda since its political confrontation with the EMB until today. Accordingly, the law stipulates that religious oration in mainly mosques and lessons be limited to al-Azhar graduates who hold a permit from the Ministry of

⁵⁵ In Egypt and many other Arab countries, the authority nowadays assigns the preachers, who mainly do the Friday sermons and administer the mosques' affairs. One of the reasons is to ensure that the mosques are under the governing system.

Endowments. Any person violating the law will be imprisoned for up to one year or fined up to 50,000 Egyptian pounds (\$7,000) (Fouad 2013). Furthermore, one of the most effective and successful mechanisms used by the government was the ability to recruit a large number of Muslim scholars to remain supportive of the system and preach differently from the EMB's ideology and agenda.

Beside mosques and Islamic centres, the organization pursued its direct communication strategies in private locations. Mitchell notes that direct communication with the people in their homes, at their work, and in their places of leisure added to that legitimacy the quality of sincerity and the personal touch. In four years, these direct communication strategies resulted in the establishment of branches along the eastern edge of the Delta in *Isma'iliyya, Port Sa'id, Suez, and abu-Suwayr*, and on the western edge as far as *Subra Khit*; there was also minor contact with Cairo (Mitchell 1969, 9).

During the Monarchy era under British control as example, the Brotherhood's preachers recorded and distributed cassette recordings throughout Egypt. The cassette recordings, with very selective and touching topics were mainly distributed in the countryside and distant areas, even beyond Egypt. This strategy of using cassette recordings continued to play an important role until the early 1970s. One of the famous preachers whose sermons were recorded for many of the cassette recordings was a blind Sheik named Abdel Hamid Kishk (1933-1996). The Islamic Encyclopaedia states, "In a few years, Kishk was the most popular preacher in the Arab world. For Friday sermons, attendance at his Mosque reached 10,000 by the early 1980s. Due to his fearless criticism of the ruling class, he was again arrested in 1981 as part of a crackdown on political opponents, but was released in 1982"⁵⁶ (Islamic Encyclopaedia 1986). During Jamal Abdel Nasser's regime also, "the mosque constituted the group's most important resource for members' recruitment and communication. Except for sport events, mosques were the only place where the public assembly of a large number of people was tolerated by the government. Specifically, Islamic message was thus crucial for the group's ability to use the mosque in order to disseminate an ideology that was critical of the regime" (Breuer 2014, 3). The preacher Kishk was in prison during Anwar Sadat's regime. It is stated in the same article that his tapes on over 2000 topics were sold all over the Arab world in the hundreds of thousands (Islamic Encyclopaedia 1986).

Regarding the use of TV broadcasting, no literature shows any practical activity of this strategy during the Brotherhood's history until the new emergence of the Doha-based broadcaster: *Aljazeera*. The satellite channel started broadcasting on November 1, 1996, founded by the new Qatari leader Hamad Bin Khalifa al-Thani, who took power in June, 1995 (Bahry 2001). According to Mohammed El-Nawawy, "*Aljazeera's* programming makes

⁵⁶ Kishk's sermons were most of the time criticizing all Arab leaders in his time, including Jamal Abdel Nasser, Sadat, Kdhafi, Hafidh Al-Asad, but also, the Western interference in the Arab world affairs. Arab youth liked such topics and often considered a preacher like Kishk as a brave man.

more sense to the Arab communities than any Western network” (El-nawawy; Iskandar; 2002, 45). *Aljazeera* media network includes *Jazeera* satellite channel, several outlets, including the Internet, and especially TV channels in multiple languages. The channel is accessible in several world regions. In 2005, Myers, co-author of a book titled *Aljazeera*, claimed that the latter channel accounted for a global audience of 35 million Arabic-speaking viewers (El-Nawawy & Iskandar 2002, 34). As a controversial channel for many observers, *Aljazeera* became the most influential and effective broadcaster for the Brotherhood’s active members and sympathizers to spread their political ideology and agenda to the Arab World. The Brotherhood’s approach toward *Aljazeera* broadcasting varies according to the given opportunity for broadcasting their ideas in debates, lectures and presentations about domestic and regional themes.

A programme called *al-Ittijah al-Muakis*⁵⁷ [The Opposite Direction], “similar to the CNN Crossfire, is known as the most popular and controversial ‘talk show’ in the Middle East” (El-nawawy; Iskandar 2002, 45). Brotherhood members and sympathizers used to be given opportunity to attack the Hosni Mubarak regime’s authority, and that of the current president, Abdel al-Fattah al-Sisi. The latter regime, which suspected the satellite channel of presenting propaganda on behalf of the Brotherhood, imprisoned three journalists working for the English *Al-jazeera* channel, but released all of them in February, 2015, after they spent about 400 days in prison (Aljazeera 2015). Another programme, called *Bila Hudud* (Without Borders), has mainly regional political personages interviewed by journalist Ahmed Mansur. This programme gives an opportunity to interviewees to highlight their political or social role in the past or current issues. The journalist, who is apparently a Brotherhood’ sympathizer, “has been sentenced in absentia to fifteen years’ imprisonment by Cairo’s criminal court on the charge of torturing a lawyer in *Tahrir* Square during the January 25 Uprising in 2011. *Al-Jazeera* denies the charge against Mansour, which follows the sentencing of other *al-Jazeera* journalists, including Baher Mohamed, Peter Greste and Mohamed Fahmy, in June 2014” (FreeAJStaff 2014).

The conflict with Al-Jazeera, involving almost all Middle Eastern authorities, as well as Hosni Mubarak’s and Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s regimes in particular, is primarily because of its sympathetic coverage in favour of the Brotherhood. Overall, the most influential figure using *Al-Jazeera* against the Egyptian authorities is Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a former member of the Brotherhood in exile for 30 years until 2011. This unofficial Brotherhood member, who currently serves as the chief religious scholar of a website called “Islam Online,” gave weekly lectures on *Al-Jazeera* called ‘*al-Sharī’a wa al-Ḥayāh*’ [*Shariah* and Life] since November, 1996. Qaradawi is also one of the most famous Muslim scholars among those who openly support the organization’s ideology and political agenda through his more than

⁵⁷ The author watched this broadcasting programme several times. However, it often ended up in personal attacks from which one or both antagonistic debaters angrily left the hall.

120 books and articles published since the mid-1950s (Tamam 2011).

6.4. Conventional Communication Mechanisms of the Brotherhood (Publications)

This section presents and examines the newsletters, newspapers, journals, magazines and books used by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood to support its social and political activities. According to Munson (2001), “In 1932, the Brotherhood moved its centre from Ismailia to Cairo: it began publishing its first weekly newsletter by 1938; it had three hundred offices throughout the country and an estimated membership between 50,000 and 150,000” (Munson 2001, 488). The reason behind initiating the publication strategies may have been the rigorous use of the same strategies by the secular political and social movements in Egypt. In that period, the anti-religious movement in the social, academic and government institutions was strong among the Egyptian political elite. Mitchell states, “[S]ecularist and libertarian literary and social salons, societies, and parties; and the books, newspapers, and magazines which propagated those ideas whose sole goal was the weakening of the influence of religion”⁵⁸ (Mitchell 1969, 4). In that period, Egypt was influenced by the Turkish Kamalist Revolution of 1924. As an anti-Kamalist movement, the Brotherhood counterattacked this secularism through its traditional face-to-face communication strategies, but they failed to make gains in an Egyptian society already influenced by the British lifestyle. Nevertheless, the organization increased its publication activities both in quality and quantity. In this regard, Munson (2001) states, “At the same time, its newsletters became highly critical of the existing political regime in Egypt, especially the quasi-colonial British control of the country. The society produced several new publications over the next two years and increased the frequency of its public rallies” (Munson 2001, 488- 9).

In accordance with the use of conventional communication techniques, Mitchell, quoting from *Al-Dawat Waddaiyat*, states that in the 1950s, “the unofficial but authoritative journal *Majallat al-Da’wa* (1951-1956) is useful” (Mitchell 1969, 1). Among all Egyptian authorities, the ban or the tolerance of the Brotherhood’s publications depended on the degree of criticism the organization engaged in against the respective governing authorities. During Sadat’s regime, “In 1976, the group was allowed to publish its monthly magazine, *al-Dawa* whose circulation is estimated to have reached 100,000” (Kepel 1984; Wickham 2002). The reason is that the Brotherhood avoided openly criticizing the government. Nevertheless, criticism was directed against Israel and supported the Palestinian resistance at the same time. Breuer (2014) mentions that writers of the magazine decidedly rejected Israel as a state, both on political and religious grounds (Breuer 2014, 3). Consequently, when Sadat signed the

⁵⁸ The content of this quotation was the main source of the EMB’s founder’s determination towards the organization’s struggle for Islamizing the society. Seen as contributing to the decline of religious influence and the evolution of secularism, the secular movement was strongly resisted by Hassan al-Banna.

peace accords with Israel at Camp David in 1979, the Brotherhood's relations with the regime quickly deteriorated and the magazine was prohibited again in 1981⁵⁹ (Breuer 2014, 3). As an experienced organization, whenever the government blocked a particular activity, as with the prohibition of *al-Dawa* magazine, the Brotherhood often found an alternative. "During this period, books of prominent Ikhwan' (Brotherhood) scholars were available in many bookstores, and surprisingly, the Brotherhood could publish three monthly magazines: *al-Mukhtar*, *al- Itisam*, and *Liwa' al-islam*" (Breuer 2014, 4).

"The latter *Liwa' al-islam*, which has often been described as the successor to the popular Brotherhood magazine *al-Da'wa*, reached its height of circulation in 1987 with 95,000 copies out of which a roughly 55,000 were sold inside Egypt" (Breuer 2014, 3). "In fact, the EMB's actual communications outreach may have been substantially bigger" (Wickham 2002). According to Manar Hassan, the reason behind *al-Da'wa* and *al-Itisam's* popularity was the transformation of the political language used by its writers and editors. He says, "The growth of their political language came in their two most widely read publications, *al-Da'wa* and *al- Itisam*, when the Brothers fought for a freedom of expression on the basis of "a birth-right stipulated by Islam, exercised and guarded by the community of believers and not by a grant bestowed by the ruler" (Hassan 2006, 7). As far as customers are concerned, contrary to what might be understood, since buying magazines or books was often unaffordable to even the middle class, these publications were often copied and distributed to a much larger number by the assigned publication sections of the Brotherhood (Breuer 2014, 4). After Sadat's regime, Mubarak's regime could politically suppress the group in the beginning; however, with the emergence of the Internet, the organization efficiently used this new technological mechanism for its political mobilization.

6.5. The Use of the Internet

The intensive use of the Internet in Egypt started largely in 2000. Since then, the Internet has particularly attracted the Brotherhood's youth to master the different technical skills needed to effectively use this information communication technology. Based on statistical data, "One reason why the group could effectively use digital technology is Egypt's relatively young and technically versed population. The median age in Egypt is 24 and 33 represents 65 % of the population. Cell phone use is wide spread with 67 mobile phone subscribers for every 100 inhabitants. About 10% of the population has used the Internet at least once" (Howard et al. 2011). "Internet use is the highest among the country's young urbanites. Like other opposition forces, the Brotherhood benefited from the fact that Cairo and Alexandria are not

⁵⁹ In another published paper, the author of this paper mentions that the 1979 Camp David agreement was behind Sadat's assassination by an Islamist militant often connected to the Brotherhood by the organization's opponents. The Brotherhood denied the allegation.

only centres of cultural activities but also had reasonably well developed Internet infrastructures from 2000 onwards, thus enabling the cities' politically disaffected youth to create a dynamic public sphere online" (Breuer 2014, 4). Mastering the different techniques of using the Internet was not a major challenge because "Egypt has long had an active online public sphere. Many of Egypt's political parties maintain websites and publish online newspapers. Even though the EMB was banned under Mubarak's regime, its website presence rivals its opponents if not superior to that of many legally permitted opposition parties"⁶⁰ (Howard et al. 2011).

This usage of the Internet had been initiated by the Egyptian secular political entity. In Mubarak's era, a nationalist party, *Kifaya* was the main political actor in the period 2004-2005. *Kifaya*'s leader, Ayman Nour, was the first man to ever compete against former President Hosni Mubarak for the presidency of Egypt in 2005. Through the success of his party's supporter mobilization, including the use of the Internet, he could mobilize many young Egyptians to support his nationalist movement. The majority of his supporters were activist blogging citizens. In this regard, *Al-Malky* (2007), says, "Activist blogging in Egypt had thus far been closely tied to the leftist *Kifaya*, 'National Movement for Change', a grassroots movement agitating for civil rights and political reform since 2004" (Al-Malky 2007). As the EMB's members tended to support *Kifaya* as independent supporters, "Now, the EMB bloggers sought to import the experience of secular bloggers into the Islamist camp and employ it to serve the Islamist movement (Al-Anani 2008). This suggests that the EMB's motivation to use the Internet was not mainly about challenging Mubarak's authoritarian regime in the beginning; rather it was to compete with *Kifaya* and other social and political movements. Khalil al-Anani, a field researcher, states, "The first phase of Brotherhood blogging can best be characterized as an attempt to challenge the secular domination of the Egyptian blogosphere" (Al-Anani 2008).

The starting point for the Brotherhood's use of the Internet was the creation of an organizational website in 2000. Khaled Hamza says, "The year 2000 witnessed the Brotherhood's first serious web presence with the launch of several Arabic websites"⁶¹ (Hamza 2009). However, Howard states, "Initially, the EMB relied on bloggers who maintained servers located outside of the country and thereby couldn't be taken offline by the government" (Howard 2011). Hence, this study assumes that the moderators of the EMB's online activities are outside Egypt. The reason is that during Mubarak's and Sisi's regimes, members of the Brotherhood were and are still aware of how easily their online activities

⁶⁰ Even though the EMB was and is still banned by the authorities, through experience and having active members outside the country, it is hard for the authorities to effectively block its activities.

⁶¹ Based on the author's investigation, the following Arabic website is the result of the combination of many others. This website is very rich in terms of information about the History of the Brotherhood and the updated information. <http://www.ikhwanonline.com/>

could and can be monitored and shut down by domestic secret security service agents. The presence of active members outside of the country helps the organization to arrange, analyse and propose new ideas in favour of the political ideology of the Brotherhood. In this respect, Breuer says, “In essence, the analysis of web-features on ikhwanweb.com, the official English website of the Muslim Brotherhood, and fjponline.com,⁶² the English website of the Brotherhood’s political arm, the Freedom and Justice Party, reveals that these web presences mainly serve the functions of providing information and of fostering interaction and dialogue with users” (Breuer 2014, 5).

As the organization started to seriously consider the international community’s role especially that of the U.S., toward pressuring Mubarak’s regime in 2005, it decided that focusing on western opinion through its English website was necessary. Accordingly, Khaled Hamza, the English website’s chief editor, describes its mission as follows:

Ikhwanweb’s basic mission is to bridge the knowledge gap between the MB and Western intellectuals so that they get to know its ideology without distortion, and understand our political, cultural, and moderate religious message ... Ikhwanweb was not concerned with spreading Islam ... We are rather adopting a political, cultural and intellectual discourse ... Ikhwanweb’s news coverage avoided any direct religious discourse ... We worked hard to make the editing mainly based on press professionalism, objectivity and neutrality. We focused on issues of democracy, reform, political repression, torture and tyranny. (Hamza 2009)

Similar to its ambition to open up to westerners, The Brotherhood also started to expose its ideology and history to all through their websites. “In 2010 the MB launched Ikhwanwiki4:⁶³ a mini library of about 1,700 articles that offers the Brotherhood’s perspective of their own history and ideology” (Amer 2010). As Morozov (2010) points out, Wikis, with their open-editing philosophy pose a high risk of revealing intra-organizational tensions.⁶⁴ In case of the EMB, “the Ikhwanwiki experiment may well backfire by making ideological splits between the movement’s old guard and its younger Internet-savvy elements visible to the public” (Breuer 2014, 5). In chapter 4, I highlighted the different generations within the Brotherhood and their philosophical differences. Among these generations, there are ‘the bloggers.’ This group is 25 to 35 years old and are the most opened minded members, compared to all other generations, due to the influences from outside Egypt. Consequently, this generation is politically marginalized inside the organization by the 1980s and 1990s

⁶² <http://ikhwanweb.com>; fjponline.com.

⁶³ The author found the web without “4” as it has been mentioned by Amer (2010).
<http://www.ikhwanwiki.com/>

⁶⁴ Evgeny Morozov’s statement shows that the EMB has, in fact, many other wikis; however, the mentioned wiki website in this footnote is the main one.

generations. In order to discuss their opinions, the bloggers use Twitter,⁶⁵ Facebook⁶⁶ and other popular social media outlets.

In the case of Facebook, “Digital content produced by the EMB has also come to dominate Facebook which is one of the most central nodes in the Egyptian online network of political information” (Breuer 2014, 6). This use of Facebook was well described by many Middle East studies’ scholars as one of the influential factors behind the mass protests that helped bring to an end the regime of Hosni Mubarak on January 25, 2011 (Ramadan 2011). Since then, the Brotherhood supporters using Facebook keep gradually increasing in number due to the brutality executed by the Egyptian authority that has caused many active members to flee the country.

6.6. The Use of the Local and International Media for the last Brotherhood’s presidential Elections

The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood made extensive use of the information section in propagating its ideology and agenda during the 2012 Parliamentary and Presidential elections. Thus, after the Egyptian uprising in 2011, and during both the parliamentary and presidential elections, with official restrictions removed, the Local and International Media appear to have been active.

The “Propagation of the Message” section worked diligently to reach the public. However, the use of ‘the vertical communication’ strategy has been replaced by the use of the Internet. The use of Twitter is common in Egypt nowadays. As has been stated previously in this chapter, Egypt’s relatively young and technically well-versed population make extensive use of the Internet, especially in Cairo and Alexandria (Breuer 2014, 4). Mastering the different techniques of using the Internet encouraged all political actors, including the Brotherhood, to rely on the Internet more than on other means, such as the periodic newspapers or magazines. Almost all of Egypt’s political parties maintain websites and publish online newspapers (Howard et al. 2011).

The EMB’s websites and several Arabic websites have been used for electoral campaigns (Hamza 2009). Strategically speaking, bloggers who maintained servers outside the country carried out a strong campaign against the candidate supported by the regime and provided support for the EMB’s candidate (Howard 2011). The presence of active members outside of the country helped the organization to keep updating the websites and publish new messages. “In essence, the analysis of web-features on ikhwanweb.com, the official English website of the Muslim Brotherhood, and fjponline.com, the English website of the

⁶⁵ The EMB’s twitter account is used mainly by the youth: <https://twitter.com/Ikhanweb>

⁶⁶ Facebook is also mainly used by MB’s youth: <https://www.facebook.com/ElShaheed>

Brotherhood's political arm the Freedom and Justice Party, reveals that these web presences mainly serve the functions of providing new information and of fostering interaction and dialogue with users" (Breuer 2014, 5). Thus, in the election periods, Morsi's biography and other articles presented him as the appropriate candidate even though they were somewhat exaggerated. An additional factor in the campaign in favor of the Brotherhood was the broadcasting channel Al-Jazeera. This channel often invited the EMB's leaders to appear on a variety of programs, such as 'Without Borders.' Overall, this channel played an important role campaigning in favor of the Brotherhood's candidate.

To summarize, this chapter presents and highlights the different communication strategies and mechanisms used by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood to influence and recruit the Egyptian people to support the organization. The findings of this section are divided into four categories: First is the publications section of the EMB. This category was further divided into two sections, the 'Translation and Press' section and the 'Propagation of the Message' section. However, based on the evolution of the organization, the 'Translation and Press' section was separated from the second category and became a special committee due to its challenging and costly demands.

The 'Propagation of the Message' section took over the dynamism of the publication section in 1930 and beyond. Second is the use of 'vertical communication.' This section includes face-to-face meetings, group discussions, cassette recordings and the broadcasting channels that the Brotherhood could use for propagating its agenda. Third is the use of 'conventional communication.' The conventional communication available included the different publications (hardcopies) produced by the organization. This category covers periodic publications and books. Fourth is the use of information and communication technology. Lastly, this chapter shows that during the 2012 parliamentary and presidential elections, the Brotherhood has intensively employed the social media (Internet) by mainly the EMB's supporters staying outside Egypt.

For the purpose of recruiting members or sympathizers, the publication section within the general guidance of council provides training to the EMB's preachers. This training aims to continue improving the assigned members' eloquence in debating and in delivering speech. The impact of this professionalism can be acknowledged through the EMB's leaders' speech and debates through Aljazeera channel and others. Al-Ariyan and Khairat al-Shater among many others are potential in debating and in delivering speech in the local and the international media. This media performance played a crucial role to attract mainly the youth to accept the EMB's political and economic program during the 2012 parliamentary and presidential elections. The public section is in charge to identify the best speakers who would be given the priority to lead seminars, Friday' sermons and face the media whenever it would be necessary. In Egypt, like in other Middle East countries and beyond, good speakers have the privilege to be invited for seminars. Accordingly, the EMB's

supreme guides and other key members are well-known through their speeches and lectures inside and outside Egypt. In fact, these lectures played a great role in recruiting many Egyptians to the organization.

In this chapter, the study shows that in Egypt as well as in other Middle East countries, face to face meetings is a driving force for individual, social and political interactions. This strategy of vertical word of mouth communication through discussions in seminars, Islamic centers, and in mosques plays a major role for the organization to reach many Egyptians. In the case of the custom of using mosques, Islamic organizations prefer to have their own mosques in order to avoid disturbance from a third party. In this regard, the Brotherhood operates an extensive network consisting of tens of thousands of private mosques built with charity funds since the 1930s to date. Enjoying a huge audience, the well-known speakers are capable to convey the EMB's Ideology to the Egyptian ordinary Muslims. Sheck Kishk was the most popular preacher in the Arab world from the 1970s until his death in 1996. For Friday sermons, attendance at his mosque reached 10,000 by the early 1980s. His Friday sermons were an opportunity to present the EMB's philosophy in the domain of its social, political and economic views.

The use of newsletters, newspapers, magazines and books is a common social and political mobilization for social movements including secular and religious organizations mostly in the 1950s. Subsequently, the EMB used the same tools qualitatively as well as quantitatively to counterattack the secular political organizations' media. The latter organizations accused the Brotherhood for projecting a backward political system. The EMB's famous magazine was *Majallat al-Da'wat Waddaiyat*. Through this magazine, the Brotherhood published several articles directed against Israel and supported the Palestinian militants. This strategy is an effective one in the Arab world in general where anti-Israel is considered as a truly nationalist issue. When Sadat signed the peace accords with Israel at Camp David in 1979, the Brotherhood used the case to criticize Sadat and presented itself as the alternative political power capable to secure the Arab's pride. This approach opened the door for the organization to recruit many Egyptians to the movement. During Moubarak's regime, *Liwa' al-Islam* which has often described as the successor to the popular *al-Dawa* of the 1950s, reached its height of circulation in 1987 with 95, 000 copies out of which roughly 55, 000 were sold inside Egypt. The mission of this journal was to address the audience with a new political language against Moubarak's regime in the 1980s. The content of the publication emphasized on freedom of expression, the right of political pluralism and so forth.

With the emergence of the Internet in 2000, the Brotherhood prepared the Brotherhood's youth to master the different technical skills needed to effectively use this information technology. The use of the Internet to the EMB's political mobilization was effective because the average age of the Egyptian population between 24 to 35 represents

65 %. This indicates that the Egyptian population is dominated by the youth contrary to the Japanese population and other countries. Further, the use of cell phone is wide spread with 67 mobile phone subscribers for every 100 inhabitants. About 10% of the population has used the Internet at least once. This active online public sphere including websites, Facebooks, Twitters and others was used professionally by the EMB's technique staff to project its ideology and its practical social and economic activities for recruiting purposes. In fact, the organization is currently active in using the Internet through its active members who are often online. The use of the Internet seems to be nowadays the most accessible tool to counterattack the current Egyptian authority which continues suppress the organization.

Chapter VII

Conclusion

As previously mentioned, this study was conducted to present, examine and analyze the main strategies and mechanisms behind the EMB's huge support in Egypt. This chapter summarizes the general findings of the research to provide a clear understanding of 'how the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood employed ideology, organizational structure, economic and social services, and media for the purpose of political mobilization'. The secondary question of this dissertation is, 'what methods did the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood use to mobilize support for the movement, leading to parliamentary wins of 25% and 47% in 2005 and 2012 respectively, and a win of 51.7% in the 2012 presidential election'.

To answer these two questions, the study found that the EMB has effectively employed its ideology, the organizational structure, the economic and social services and the media, to recruit members and sympathizers within Egyptian society. The study presented and analyzed the literature explaining these factors for the purpose of finding out how the organization strategically and systematically used the ideology, the organizational structure, the economic and social services and the media for its political mobilization. In the 1930s and 1940s, the organization focused more on preaching the ideology using the existing methods such as mosques, as well as the use of the economic and social services for its political mobilization due to the miserable economic life during the Egyptian monarchy. In the end of the 1940s, there was a spread of extremism that generated tension between the authority and Islamists including the Brotherhood. Subsequently, the EMB had to resist the high tension that influenced the political atmosphere in the country. Thus, the Brotherhood attempted to identify and improve its mobilization strategies and mechanisms.

In the 1950s through the 1970s, the organization clearly became a political threat in the eyes of the Egyptian governments. Consequently, the organizational structure and the use of the media, beside the use of mosques and economic and social services played a great role in the beginning of the 1950s. However, there was a crash between Jamal Abdel Nasser 's regime and the Brotherhood followed by the continuous suppressive campaigns against the organization. This period was largely documented by the Middle East scholars as it represents a remarkable period due to the dissolution of the Brotherhood and the destruction of its headquarters and its affiliates in the whole Egypt. The Brotherhood resisted the brutal suppression due to mainly its organizational consolidation and others.

In the 1980s to date, there were continuous checks and balances with no significant changes of how to preach the ideology, to shape the roles played by the different divisions within the organizational structure, to evaluate the use of the economic and social services and finally to adapt the newly adopted social media and international broadcasts such as

Al-jazeera to propagate the political agenda of the organization. In this period, the organization increased its number among the Egyptian educated people, and subsequently, there was an improvement on how to preach its ideology. In addition, its organizational structure and its relative activities were updated in order to adapt the social, political but also the international political developments. During this period, the EMB continued working on its economic and social services as the most reliable strategies *vis-à-vis* the suppressive Mubarak's regime. Finally, the emergence of the Internet and Aljazeera gave the Brotherhood a door to effectively propagate its political and social agenda among Egyptians inside and outside the country.

In chapter 2, the study provided short definitions and explanations of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. In this regard, the Brotherhood is an Islamic group established in 1928 by a 22-year-old elementary school teacher. The organization occasionally increased its members under authoritarian regimes from the 1930s until today. Reading from the Egyptian political and social history, this chapter presents and highlights an overview of the Egyptian history in the context of the EMB's political and social positions within Egyptian society from the era of the Egyptian monarchy to the end of Mubarak's regime in 2011. During the Egyptian Monarchy backed by the French and the British political influences, the EMB's founder involved in the labour right movement against the policy of the imperialist companies. Fighting against the western culture's influence after the First World War, the EMB's founder used the growing discontent of the population to establish the EMB in 1928. In the 1930s and 1940s, the Egyptian social and political situations were anti-colonialism. Consequently, the Egyptian political movements in general participated in fighting for the country's independence. Furthermore, the Palestinian and Israeli crisis provided to the Brotherhood a better political ground as the Pan-Arabism was defeated by the Israeli army in 1948. This regional crisis had inspired the Brotherhood to be more dynamic for the purpose of participating in the war against Israel. Thus, the Brotherhood used the Palestinian crisis as the principal argument of its military activities. However, the Egyptian authority accused the Brotherhood of trying to challenge the state order by violence, especially after the assassination of the Prime Minister Nuqrashi Pasha in 1948, followed by the dissolution of the organization. In brief, during the monarchy era, the EMB's political mobilization mainly depended on an anti-colonialism ideology and the renaissance of powerful institutional Muslim bloc. Therefore, the organization preached both nationalism and Islamism in mosques under a consolidated organizational structure, especially after its dissolution in 1948 few years back before the Egyptian revolution in 1954.

In the period of Jamal Abdel Nasser, the figure of the Pan-Arabism in the 1950s, the EMB enjoyed political opportunity as a political partner with the Free Officers, headed by Nasser against the monarchy, backed by Britain. This period corresponded the height of the Cold War between the two polarized powers of the world. Subsequently, Nasser announced

an aggressive development program in 1950s, for which he was lobbying for funds from around the world. However, due to the nationalization of the Suez Canal, the French and the British stockholders arranged a military attack against Egypt and made the initial invasion for Israel to occupy the side of the Suez Canal in late 1956. After the war, there was a nationalistic sentiment in Egypt until the second round war led by Nasser in 1967. In this war, the Pan-Arabism was defeated and there was an increasing in the Islamist mobilization as they were appealed as the only alternative after the defeat of the Pan-Arabism. In the middle and the end of Nasser's regime, a deadly confrontation between the government authority and the Brotherhood reduced the EMB's political influence and many Brothers left the country to live in gulf countries and in Europe.

The EMB, through Sadat's 'de-Nasserization', enjoyed freedom of activities after a large number of its members were freed from jails due to the open door economy and democratization policies. During this regime, political entities enjoyed the new political system. Therefore, the organization concentrated more on promoting democracy and political pluralism, along with its political strategies and mechanisms: preaching its ideology, consolidating its organization, providing social services and using media to recruit as many Egyptians as possible. In the last part of Sadat's regime, there was appearance of the old bourgeoisie that had lost much of its wealth to nationalization and socialism under Nasser. Consequently, the gap between the rich and poor was getting larger. This situation gave the organization an occasion to the Brotherhood to attack the regime, claiming that Sadat's economy policy was devoted to luxury items and was used for embezzlement rather than productive enterprises for the masses. Additionally, after Sadat's conciliation with Israel known as Oslo Peace agreement in 1979, the Brotherhood intensified its criticism against Sadat until his death 3 years after the peace agreement. Consequently, the Brotherhood was accused of Sadat's assassination in 1981 mainly by the latter's family.

During Mubarak's regime from 1981 to 2011, the Brotherhood got the political opportunity to raise again its popularity through its organizational structure, presenting itself as the alternative political power. This political stability started three years after Sadat's assassination, as Mubarak decided to gradually increase political participation. Within the framework of the organization, the social services and the propagation of its political agenda emerged. These activities helped the Brotherhood to enter in parliament in May 1984 as an organized force for the first time since the 1940s. The organization entered into tactical alliance with the secular nationalist *Wafd* party. In the parliamentary elections in April 1987, the EMB joined with the Social Labour Party to form the Islamic Alliance under the banner, 'Islam is the solution'. During the campaign period, there was a perception of the highest public displays of pro-Islamist sentiment in the history of Egyptian parliamentary elections. The Alliance won fifty-six seats, of which thirty-six went to the Brotherhood. Under the opposition rhetoric led by the Brotherhood, Mubarak's regime engaged a sort of autocratic

doctrine known as ‘the Emergency Laws that provided the authority the right to arrest, detain, and interrogate Egyptian citizens suspected of terrorism-related crimes for prolonged periods of time. Accordingly, This Law increased the tension between Mubarak’s regime and the Brotherhood, especially after the Brotherhood won about 25% of the Egyptian parliamentary elections in 2005, and Hamas routed secular Fatah in Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006. In the case of the Egyptian economy, the Egyptian society suffered greatly from 2004 to 2011. In this period, the country was about to experience a complete collapse caused by corruption, especially with the crime of bribery. This situation increased societal and political tensions that reached the international level due to the regime’s strong executive body, supported by the legislative hegemony, a judiciary pro government, Egyptian police force, the intelligence apparatus, the National Democratic Party (NDP) and the Egyptian military. All these actors could resist the domestic and international pressures. However, the emergence of the social media and international broadcasts, such as *Al-Jazeera* channel, facilitated the organization’s leaders to increase its anti-government campaign side-by-side with other political entities, until Mubarak resigned from power on February 11, 2011 after a huge mobilization against the regime.

The Egyptian Uprising in 2011 was inspired by the Tunisian Spring in 2010. In Egypt, the anger against the regime was amplified after the issue of heredity succession from Mubarak to his son Jamal, a move that was widely condemned by the domestic political actors. There were other factors behind the Uprising such as the results of the 2010 parliamentary elections that are highlighted in the end of chapter 3 with beside further information explaining how the Brotherhood could win the parliamentary and presidential elections in 2012.

In chapter 3, the study shows that the EMB’s political mobilization has mainly depended on an anti-colonialism stance, dynamiting the Islamic renaissance ideology and the struggle to form a Muslim bloc under its leadership. The interpretation of the Islamic texts has interwoven with and supported the EMB’s organizational structure, its social and service activities and its media coverage since its inception in 1928. By framing the broad and strategic objectives of the organization by the EMB’s founder, the Islamic interpretation of the EMB was capable of maintaining its legacy among the EMB’s later generations. Significantly, the majority of the EMB’s active members, especially the supreme guides are highly educated. Subsequently, due to the continuous debates among the leaders, they are well informed of the rapid continuous changes occurring in the 21st Century. The checks and balances of the EMB’s political strategies and mechanisms adopted by the organization boost the organization to abandon using violence from Hassan al-Hudaibi’s term, but could be much visible during al-Tilmisani’s leadership due to the political opportunity provided by Sadat’s regime in the 1970s. However, the debates in the inner circle often generate conflicts among leaders. Further, this chapter examined the leadership of the Brotherhood from its

founder, Hassan al-Banna to the last supreme guide, Mohamed Badie who is still in jail until today. However, the various ups and downs within the EMB' organization's political strategies *vis-à-vis* the various suppressive tactics used by the successive Egyptian authorities did not stop the organization from recruiting members and sympathizers in employing more or less the ideology, the organizational structure, the economic activities and social services or the media.

In sum, chapter 3 shows that 'Islam is the solution' is interpreted comprehensively by Muslim reformist scholars and by the EMB's founder, Hassan al-Banna. Beside his comprehensive and practical approach, the EMB's founder used nationalistic rhetoric to mobilize many Egyptians to support the EMB's ideology. The defeat of the Arabs by Israel in 1948, 1967 and 1973 wars followed by suppressive tactics used by the successive Egyptian governments against the organization helped the organization to raise its popularity. During the period of the second supreme guide to the last one, Mohamed Badie, the EMB's leadership worked harder to present itself as a peaceful movement, but it failed to reach its goal, especially during Mubarak's regime. This failure generated a decline of its popularity and disagreement among members. Consequently, Qutb's ideology that called for a complete disconnection with the Egyptian government emerged in the 1950s and 1960s, but was quickly dismissed by the third supreme guide al-Tilmisani in the 1970s and 1980s. Since then, the Brotherhood continued its political mobilization using its ideology and its organizational structure and other factors.

In chapter 4, the organizational structure and activities of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood are presented and analyzed to critically highlight the different sections and their respective roles so as to perceive the consolidation and ties among the divisions of the organizational structure. Although the Egyptian regimes attempted to destroy the organization in 1948, 1981, 1954 and finally 2014, this chapter explains that the organizational structure is one of the fundamental reasons behind the EMB' survival until today, despite the continuous brutal suppressions from successive Egyptian governments. The study of the organizational structure and their activities also explains the recruitment strategies and mechanisms adopted by the Brotherhood, from non-membership status through the family sections to the Headquarters. The decentralization of the organizational structure started from the family sections, branches, the districts to the administrative offices of the Brotherhood in the country is monitored by the Headquarters in Cairo. This pyramidal structure, with its related branches, is also another factor contributing to the recruiting mechanisms and strategies of the organization. The use of this organizational framework facilitates the propagation of the ideology, the economic and social services, and the media involvement. As an example, the chapter shows that the branches are responsible to recruit university students through organizing students' activities. Another aspect underlined in this chapter is the relationship between the active participation of the EMB's member and its promotion to a higher position.

This strategy plays a great role to continue recruiting new members or sympathizers beside the consistent supervision of the progress of the organization in general. Furthermore, the ideological and political differences among the EMB's members provide a recruiting strategy within the Egyptian society. This is because the newly recruited members can join their preferential category based on their ideological conviction.

Chapter 5 presents and highlights the economic and social services provided by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood to Egyptian society since the 1930s. Further, the study examines the political impact of those activities within Egyptian society in favor of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's political struggle. The results of the analysis are divided into economic activities and social and welfare services. In the case of economic activities, this study claims that the EMB engaged in hidden political activities through its non-member sympathizers, while the social and welfare services are visible in the health and educational sectors. To answer questions about the political involvement of these activities, it was found that the economic and social services played a significant role in attracting many Egyptians to support the organization, especially the lower income class since the 1930s to date. However, in the 1930s under the Egyptian monarchy and during Moubarak's regime in the 1980s and beyond under a severe poor economic performance, these activities were respectively much visible in the country. That is to say, other factors, namely the ideology, the organizational structure and media involvement also play a significant role in mobilizing many Egyptians to support the organization. The recruiting strategies are executed through employing Egyptians in the EMB's companies as it is the case of the 1000 people who worked under al-Shater's company and the 500 people who worked under Malik' furniture company. Through providing welfare services to the breadwinners, the aged, the homeless, and the orphaned youth, the Brotherhood got the sympathy of the citizens. Thus, the EMB could get a better recruitment ground.

Chapter 6 presents and highlights the different communication strategies and mechanisms used by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood to recruit Egyptian people to the organization. The findings of the study were divided into four categories. First is the publications section of the EMB. This category was divided into two: Translation and Press section and 'Propagation of the Message' section. Based on the evolution of the organization, the 'Translation and Press' section was separated from the second category and became a special committee, due to its challenging and costly demands. The Propagation of the Message section took over the dynamism of the publication section. Second is the vertical communication of the EMB. This section included face-to-face meetings, group discussions, cassette recordings and the Aljazeera channel that the Brotherhood could use for propagating its agenda. Third is the conventional communication of the EMB. The conventional communication section presented the different publications (hardcopies) produced by the organization. This category covers periodic publications and books. Fourth is the use of

information and communication technology by the EMB.

For the recruiting process, the publication section within the general guidance of council provides professional training to the EMB's preachers. This training aims to improve the EMB's debating and lecturing skills. The impact of this professionalism can be acknowledged via the EMB's leaders' speech and debates through Aljazeera or other international channels. In addition, the Brotherhood distributed thousands of copies of its magazines. The content of its articles were mostly emphasizing on political freedom, human rights and political pluralism. With the emergence of the Internet, the Brotherhood effectively used it through its professional members who master the various techniques of the Internet usage. In this regard, the organization could be influential not only on the domestic level but also on the international arena. For future studies, we will need to focus more about the challenges and obstacles from the EMB's media involvement's perspective *vis-à-vis* the suppressive tactics currently used by the Egyptian authority since the overthrow of the EMB's elected president from power on July 3, 2013.

Generally, this study suggests a precise and clear explanation for the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's political growth. In order to reach this primary goal, the study set five intermediate goals. The first intermediate goal was to reveal through historical explanations and analyses more about the socio-politico-economic conditions in which the Brotherhood could recruit members and sympathizers to support the organization. The second was to comprehensively highlight the EMB's ideology as one of the four main factors to explain the reasons behind the EMB's political growth. The third goal was to examine the organizational structure (with its branches and relative activities) and its importance in recruiting Egyptians to support the organization. The fourth goal was to explain the importance of the economic activities and social services engaged by the organization in the political mobilization process. Lastly, the use of the media in propagating the ideas of the organization to as many people as possible inside and outside Egypt. Further, this study highlights the major literature, including the large-scale (Political, social and economic conditions) and small-scale analytical frameworks (analyzing the ideology, the organizational structure, the economic and social activities and the use of media) of the different scholarly sources regarding the recruiting strategies and mechanisms used by the EMB. The ultimate goal of the entire study was to present the four fundamental arguments behind the EMB's political mobilization in comprehensive and analytical approaches.

To start, the study maintains that the detailed explanation through the history of the EMB to date shows that the political mobilization of the EMB is based mainly on understanding its ideology, the organizational structure, the economic activities and social services and, finally, the media involvement. This consideration aims to adapt the different political, social and political circumstances the organization faces since its formation in 1928 until today. Even though scholars of the Middle East studies present and highlight several

factors behind the EMB's political growth, they do not analyze or explain the mobilization aspect of the Brotherhood in framing the strategies and mechanisms into the ideology, the organizational structure, the economic and social activities and the media involvement, based on the social and economic circumstances of Egypt.

In fact, the ideology, the organizational structure, the economic activities and social services have been systematically employed in support of the EMB's political mobilization regardless of the authorities' repressive tactics. However, there may be a greater emphasis on one or another, in the regard of the existing political situation as it was mentioned previously along the results of this study. As example, the repression of the Brotherhood, following the removal of Morsi from power in 2013 pushed the organization to make greater use of the social media, the Aljazeera television facility and the EMB's websites monitored by the organizational structure, rather than using mosques to propagate its ideology where only governments' preachers are currently allowed to deliver the Friday' sermon. This is the primary originality of this study. Furthermore, studying the four variables with several political movements may aid other researchers in their understanding of the phenomenon of social and political movements' mobilization in general. This is the secondary originality of this study.

As to the significance of this study, it has been shown, through the use of an analytical approach started from analyzing in brief the Egyptian socio-political-religious and economic conditions that the ideology, the organizational structure, the economic activities and the social services, and finally, the media involvement are the forces behind the EMB's successful mobilization in Egypt.

As to the limitations of this study, the research has been conducted for the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood only, not for other Muslim Brotherhood organizations in the Arab World. Another boundary of the study is that the research focused on the four main recruiting strategies and mechanisms of the organization according to this particular study and did not study all other factors describing the organization in detail.

The main literature related to the central argument of this study is the work of Mitchell (1969), Lia (1998), Munson (2001), Al-Anani (2007 & 2013), Breuer (2014) and Milton-Edwards (2016) besides other scholarly books. Their works provided to this study valuable suggestions and analyses regarding the EMB's ideology, organizational structure, the economic activities and social services and the media involvement. However, no analyses provided by those scholars that selectively pointed out and highlighted the impact of the ideology, the organizational structure, the economic and social activities on the political mobilization based on the existing socio-political-religious and economic circumstances in Egypt.

Reading from the different interpretations of the EMB's ideology, this study found that the flexible Islamic interpretation and the continuous political adjustment adopted by the

Brotherhood attracts many Egyptians to be at least sympathetic toward the organization, due to the belief that the organization's Islamism is the most suitable to the geo-socio-political situations of the 21st century, compared to other Islamist movements in Egypt.

The overall result of the study is to reduce the arguments behind the EMB's member recruitment to the importance played by the ideology adopted by the organization, the organizational structure, the economic and social services and finally the media. In this study, the ideology is not considered as the only factor explaining the EMB's mobilization, but also the consolidation and supervision of the organizational structure play a crucial role in ensuring and evaluating the performance of the different strategies and mechanisms employed by the Brotherhood. Additionally, the economic activities and social services provided by the organization, mainly in rural areas, are highlighted and considered as additional forces supporting the EMB's political mobilization. Finally, the fourth and last force supporting the Brotherhood's mobilization is their effective use of media, especially the use of social media facilitated by the emergence of the Internet from the 1990s and the emergence of Aljazeera channel.

In sum, the EMB's political mobilization is basically the combination of several strategies and mechanisms, from the monarchy era to date, headed by focusing more on preaching its ideology and providing economic activities and social services during the monarchy era in the 1930s due to the none-burden usage of mosques by the organization and the miserable economic situations the country faced. Moreover, the EMB continued enlarging and consolidating its organizational structure in the 1960s and 1970s, as the organization became national-wide and beyond, and, finally, the organization uses all available media tools provided by the information technology and uses also international broadcasts such as *Al-jazeera* to influence the public and recruit members and sympathizers.

In the 1980s to date, the organization again shaped its ideology through preaching democracy, flexible interpretation of the Islamic *sharia* to fit the democratic and economic dynamisms enhanced by the 21st century. Furthermore, evaluating the roles played by the different sections embodied by the organizational structure has been achieved by the organization in order to preserve its existence from the various suppressive tactics used by Mubarak's regime.

With the break of fear generated by the Egyptian Uprising in January 2011, the EMB used all its political ideology, its organizational structure, its economic and social networks through its social media coverage and the Qatari *Al-Jazeera* channel to win the parliamentary and presidential elections in 2012 as it is mentioned in the end of chapter 3.

It is currently obvious that the Brotherhood, now legally disbanded, but spiritually intact in the minds of many Egyptians, is likely to continue surviving and evolve due to its continuous revision of its spiritual and political ideology. Even though it underwent during mainly a period of brutal suppression under Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the organization might be

able to constantly adjust its political tactics in order to try to come back as it did after Jamal Abdel Nasser's brutal suppression in the 1950 and 60s.

This study recommends other researchers to additional field research, in order to be able to evaluate more deeply the role played by the four above-mentioned factors in order to rank them in importance. However, such field research necessarily needs to be conducted both qualitatively and quantitatively. As it has been noted previously that the political and social environment of Egypt did not allow the conduct field research, it would be useful to extend the knowledge and findings of this study once there would be a political stability in Egypt.

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