

The Early Comintern in Amsterdam, New York and Mexico City

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1. Introduction

After the collapse of the communist regimes in Russia and Eastern Europe, most of the historical documents of the Comintern (1919-1943) were finally publicly released. As a result, new and comprehensive studies on the Comintern have been commenced on a global scale and, as a first step, documents concerning relations between the Comintern and the communist party in each country have been compiled, edited and published. In the case of Japan, a collection of historical documents entitled *VKP(b), the Comintern and Japan* was published in 2001, but this collection consists of one volume and that is only available in Russian⁽¹⁾. In addition, historical documents concerning the early Comintern remain largely uncompiled.

My second book, *The Early Comintern and Japanese Socialists Residing Abroad: A Transnational Network* in Japanese with the English summary

is to be published in November 2009 [which has been published as scheduled]. Its study seeks to understand the early Japanese communist movement in an international context, to be exact, in the context of “the international history of socialism” (G. Haupt’s term)⁽²⁾. This research, through the use of documents collected independently in Russia, the USA, and Western nations, aims to elucidate how the newly established Comintern tried to make contact with Japanese socialists by establishing a transnational network through two routes: “a western route” (Amsterdam – New York – Mexico City) and “an eastern route” (Siberia – Shanghai) beginning from Moscow. This book details the movements by “the western route” in the first half and those by “the eastern route” in the latter half, each of which is focused, in order, on the top and the rank-and-file of the movements. This research seeks to provide a full understanding of the organizational structure leading from Comintern headquarters in Moscow to lower branches, with a special emphasis on the important role played by Japanese socialists residing abroad and, in particular, Sen Katayama’s leadership.

This article is an abridged version in English of the article in Japanese which was planned and written as Chapter 1 of my second book⁽³⁾ and, for reasons of space, its attention is focused more on the matters concerned with an evaluation than on a detailed explanation of all the facts.

The above-mentioned “western route” was opened up by taking advantage of a comradely relationship between Sen Katayama and S.J. Rutgers since the end of 1916 (L.C. Fraina was added to it soon). The Amsterdam Sub-Bureau of the Comintern was in existence in Amsterdam during the period from November 1919 till May 1920 on the one hand. Rutgers was given full authority to its activities by the

Comintern headquarters, the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI), and worked as its secretary. At that time he established contact with Katayama in the USA and Shozo Sugiyama in Yokohama. On the other hand, the Pan-American Agency of the Comintern was organized in New York in the first half of January 1921 and Katayama was appointed as its chairman. Katayama arrived at Mexico City on 31 March 1921 and started its activities (Fraina joined again with Katayama at the beginning of July). While Katayama kept contact with the members of the Japanese Socialist Group remaining in New York, Taro Yoshihara and Unzo Taguchi who had left for Russia, and Eizo Kondo and others who had gone home, he was also carrying out the preparation of other members for going to Japan or Russia. Finally, at the end of October 1921 Katayama himself left for Russia for a new mission, that is, the preparation for calling the Congress of the Peoples of the Far East, in the midst of the secret plan of the ECCI to dissolve the Pan-American Agency.

It was through its two Foreign Bureaus, that is, the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau and the Pan-American Agency, that the early Comintern made the initial contact through the “western route” with the Japanese socialists. I have already completed my basic research on both Bureaus, primarily based on key documents I have personally compiled and edited⁽⁴⁾. This article aims to make the best use of archival materials available.

2. Planning and Establishing the Foreign Bureaus of the Comintern

Plans drawn up in the early autumn of 1919 by G.E. Zinoviev, the chairman of the ECCI, established the Foreign Bureaus of the West as the initial base from which the newly founded Comintern would

attempt to coordinate and achieve the so-called “World Revolution.” The Bureaus were expected to function as a means to come into contact with the external world under difficult circumstances of the military interventions inside, and the absence of the Communist Parties outside, Soviet Russia. The following is extracts from the German translation by A. Kan of the plan which was written down in the undated draft⁽⁵⁾.

“ I. Zur Entwicklung der kommunistischen Bewegung in Westeuropa und Amerika und besonders zwecks der Koordinierung der praktischen Arbeit verschiedener nationaler Komparteien beschloß das EKKI folgende Büros im Westen zu schaffen:

In Stockholm / In Berlin (Westeuropäisches Sekretariat) / In Holland / In Wien / In Sofia

II. Die ausländischen Büros sind Hilfsorgane des EKKI und erfüllen eine Vermittlerrolle in den Beziehungen zwischen den einzelnen Parteien und des EKKI.

III. Den ausländischen Büros des EKKI werden folgende Aufgaben auferlegt:

..... [2] Beseitigung der Meinungsverschiedenheiten und Konflikte zwischen den verschiedenen Strömungen innerhalb einzelner KP, [4] Vereinbarung einzelner Aktionen des Klassenkampfes, Vorbereitung und Organisierung des gemeinsamen Auftretens des Proletariats der verschiedenen Länder, zu diesen Zwecken Einberufung besonderer Beratungen und Konferenzen von Vertretern der entsprechenden KP - gemäß der Übereinkünfte mit den ZK der Parteien dieser Länder, [6] Aufbewahrung und Verteilung der Geldmittel, [8]

IV. Im weiteren wird das EKKI den kommunistischen Organisationen verschiedener Länder materielle Hilfe lediglich durch seine ausländischen Büros leisten. Für diesen Zweck wird bei jedem Büro

ein besonderer Fonds gebildet. Ausgehend davon, daß KP sämtlicher Länder das Ziel verfolgen müssen, materielle Unterstützung von außen her zu entbehren, läßt das EKKI seine Vertreter - die ausländischen Büros - am Anfang für folgende Bedürfnisse Geldhilfe erweisen:

..... [2]) für die Subventionierung illegaler Parteizeitungen, Zeitschriften und Broschüren; [3]) für die Gründung von neuen legalen Organen, insoweit ihre Notwendigkeit vom entsprechenden ausländischen Büro anerkannt wird; [6])

Die ausländischen Büros des EKKI sind verpflichtet, eine möglichst enge gegenseitige Verbindung untereinander und mit dem EKKI zu unterhalten, regelmäßig, mindestens einmal im Monat, ausführliche Rechenschaftsberichte über ihre Wirksamkeit und Vorträge samt allen Materialien bezüglich der Entwicklung der Arbeiterbewegung und der kommunistischen Arbeit in verschiedenen Ländern an das EKKI zu senden.”

The plan of the Foreign Bureaus was elaborated exhaustively in that draft. To take an example of the issue of financial support from the outside (the ECCI) which has been debated intensively and almost negatively in a lot of historical studies up to the present, the plan had a convincing argument as follows: “the CP of all countries must pursue the aim of doing without the material support [i.e., funds] from the outside.” The Bureaus, however, did not work as initially planned, and suffered some changes due to both internal and external causes. Although the plan called for, for example, the following: “The Foreign Bureaus of the ECCI are engaged in maintaining a connection as closely and mutually as possible *each other* and with the ECCI” (My *italics*), the “connection as closely and mutually as possible *each other*” was broken in most cases due to not only external hindrance, but also the arbitrary

manipulation of the ECCI. To begin with, the tasks assigned by the ECCI at the establishment of each Bureau were not understood each other. In addition, the unfair discrimination was developed among the Foreign Bureaus according to the strength of the ECCI's backing up and its change. I surveys in the above-mentioned Japanese article how the Foreign Bureaus were established with the approval of the Bureau conference of the ECCI on and after 14 April 1919, discusses those problems, and argues that the Bureaus were planned primarily to tackle the preparations for the "World Revolution." Here I make a short mention of each Foreign Bureau chronologically.

- (1) The Bureau of Hungary: decision on founding on 14 April 1919—the Soviet Republic itself collapsed on 1 August 1919.
- (2) The Bureau of Bavaria: decision on founding on 14 April 1919; the founding unconfirmed—the Soviet Republic itself collapsed on 3 May 1919.
- (3) The Bureau of Kiev (the Southern Department): decision on founding on 14 April 1919—decision on reorganizing on 21 January 1920—decision on liquidating on 11 August 1920.
- (4) The Scandinavian Commission (Bureau): prehistory; decision on founding on 14 April 1919—decision on liquidating on 8 August 1920; but continued by limited powers until August 1921.
- (5) The Vienna Bureau (the Southeastern Bureau): decision on founding in March 1919—founding in January 1920—decision on liquidating on 8 March 1922.
- (6) The West-European Secretariat: decision on founding on 8 September 1919—decision on liquidating on 8 August 1920, but continuance approved for the time being—disorganized in 1925.
- (7) The Balkan Bureau: prehistory; decision on founding on 2

February 1920—continued as the Balkan Communist Federation.

- (8) The Dutch Branch (the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau): decision on founding on 8 September 1919—founding in November 1919—decision on diminishing powers on 2 February 1920—decision on liquidating on 25 April 1920.

3. The Transformation of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau

In this chapter some important documents for the history of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau from its establishment to its liquidation are introduced and the transformation of the Sub-Bureau is grasped. And in the following chapter the tentative evaluation of the Sub-Bureaus is made, though it is limited to the range of material treated in this article. Some important problems with the activities of the Sub-Bureau are taken up there and it is elucidated that they lay more heavily on the side of the ECCI.

The Sub-Bureau was, to be blunt, burdened with impractical expectations. Plenary powers were given to the Sub-Bureau at the outset by the following decision on the third item (“On the organization of the Section [Отделение] of the ECCI in Holland and the directions to it”) on the agenda of the Small Bureau conference of the ECCI on 28 September 1919:

- “1) To organize the Dutch Section out of comrades Rutgers, Roland Holst, Pannekoek, Gorter, Wijnkoop and [Van] Ravesteyn. The reward is determined at their own judgement. Besides, to allocate a specified sum in special funds for comrades Gorter and Pannekoek./
.....
3) To commission the Section to call a conference of the Communist International as soon as possible, in January 1920, and, for that,

to have preliminary relations with the Section of the ECCI in Stockholm./

- 6) To commission [the Section] to establish connections with all the countries.
- 7) To empower the Section in Holland in exceptional cases, without giving time, to come out independently by the name of the Third International.
- 8) To empower comrade Rutgers to be a plenipotentiary representative of the ECCI at the conference of the Communist International in case for the ECCI an opportunity does not arise to dispatch there its own representative./ 9)”⁽⁶⁾

Thus all the Dutch members were nominated directly by the ECCI, which was quite different from the nomination of members of other Foreign Bureaus. Especially, expectations for Gorter and Pannekoek were extravagant and optimistic. Furthermore, the “calling of a conference of the Communist International” was commissioned and, as is clearly shown in Clauses 6, 7 and 8, the plenipotentiary power empowered by the ECCI was predominant.

In the wake of the Comintern policy shifts from the “radical left” to the “right” at the Bureau conferences of the ECCI on 30 January and 1 February 1920 where intense discussions followed the report from K. Radek who had been just released and returned from German prison⁽⁷⁾, its powers were weakened one-sidedly by the following decision on the second item (“On the organization of the foreign Bureaus of the ECCI. Heard letters of comrades Rutgers and [A.E.] Abramovich and a report of comrade Radek”) on the agenda of the ECCI conference on 2 February 1920: “3) The Dutch Bureau must serve Holland, England and America. To oblige the Holland Bureau to detach from its own staffs

two or three members, who must devote themselves exclusively to the work of the ECCI⁽⁸⁾

Finally, the weakened Sub-Bureau's complete dissolution was ordered in accord with the following decision made at the ECCI conference on 25 April 1920:

“Das Holländische Bureau hat in einer Anzahl wichtiger Fragen eine Stellung eingenommen (Gewerkschaftsfrage, Parlamentarismus), die gegen die Stellung der Exekutive der 3-ten Komm. Intern. ausläuft. Das Holländische Bureau hat die Exekutive von seiner entgegengesetzten Stellung nicht in Kenntnis gesetzt, bevor es die Intern. Konferenz in Amsterdam einberief. Auf Grund dessen erklärt die executive [*sic*] das Mandat des Holländischen Bureau[s] als erloschen und zieht dieses Mandat zurück.

Die exekutive beauftragt ihren genferes [ihr engeres] Bureau einen ausführlichen Brief darüber den Holländischen Genossen zu senden. Die Funktionen des Holländischen Bureaus werden dem West-Europäischen Sekretariat übertragen, das Skandinavische Bureau in Stockholm wird beauftragt den Rechenschaftsbericht und den Rest des Geldes, wie auch der Wertsachen in Empfang zu nehmen.

Für die Exekutive der Komm. Int. Sekretär/ K. Radek./ Petrograd 25/4-20⁽⁹⁾.

4. The Points at Issue of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau

According to a report of Zinoviev to the Second World Congress of the Comintern, the reason why the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau was liquidated was that it was originally limited as “a technical auxiliary bureau,” but it exceeded its powers and convened at its own initiative the international conference at the beginning of February 1920 which only

served to increase the general confusion⁽¹⁰⁾. That explanation, however, disregards the fact that the ECCI did grant extensive autonomous authority to the Sub-Bureau at the beginning stage.

B. Lazitch and M.M. Drachkovitch devoted 22 pages of their book to the activities outside Russia of the first Comintern emissaries such as Abramovich, N.M. Liubarskii, Ia.S. Reich (Thomas; James Gordon), M.M. Borodin and others. It is in order to try to regard their activities critically as former examples of the Comintern's dominance "from above" that Lazitch and Drachkovitch took a serious view of them. In their interpretation, however, lie the following problems concerned with the so-called "eye of Moscow": 1) the emissaries were in contact with only a small numbers of the country's Communist leaders and always conscious of Moscow; 2) the emissaries had none of direct responsibilities to the communist party in the country concerned and often sent to Moscow the reports whose contents the national leaders were not permitted to know⁽¹¹⁾. In that meaning, emissaries' influence on the spot was temporary and limited.

Lazitch and Drachkovitch were inclined to regard the Foreign Bureaus as those controlled by the centralized Russian organization from the beginning and consequently assumed that the liquidation of the Amsterdam Sub-bureau, which had been out of control, was inevitable.

The beginning of the centralization of powers by Comintern headquarters vis-à-vis the Foreign Branches, however, only occurred with the improvement of the situation involving foreign military intervention inside Russia in 1920. The main, decisive shift occurred in the summer of 1920, after the decision to liquidate the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau had already been made, when most of the remaining Foreign Bureaus were dissolved and replaced by "individual personal agents"

through whom the Comintern could more easily carry out its intentions. The Politburo of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party on 6 August 1920 made a decision, "To abolish all the bureaus. To permit only individual personal agents exclusively for technical purposes"⁽¹²⁾.

Two days later, on 8 August, the matter on the Foreign Bureaus was also discussed at the second conference of the ECCI⁽¹³⁾. Zinoviev first introduced a motion to disband all the Bureaus and organize all the business based on direct, independent relationships with individual agents. Next, H. Maring (H. Sneevliet) made a remark that, taking into consideration Shanghai, Tashkent, etc. as candidate areas, it was imperative for the ECCI to establish such centers both in the Far East and in the Middle East. L.C. Fraina also argued that, taking into account the fact that American imperialism was extending over the Far East, an American Bureau should be established in Mexico.

Following these multiple assertions, Zinoviev drew the conclusion that following the liquidation of the Bureaus in Europe it was imperative to have similar centers in America and the Far East. And he proposed to the ECCI that the following motion should be passed:

"Interests of the Third International demand that in the row of the Executive Committee should not exist other bureaus with political tasks. By this decision the West-European bureau [*sic*] and also other similar bureaus are abolished./ The Small Bureau nominates its own trusted persons and assigns them fully definite tasks with their personal responsibility./ The Small Bureau must further attend to regularly organizing the services of couriers. Couriers are divided into 3 categories: 1) those who hand over literature, etc.; 2) those who hand over and accept various kinds of information as well; 3) those who

execute political tasks”⁽¹⁴⁾.

The proposal was accepted, but as the “executing political tasks” was contained in the third category, the lack of clear distinction between political and non-political tasks was inevitable.

Based on that conclusion, the ECCI decided to liquidate the Bureaus in Europe and, at the same time, to establish new bureaus, with more limited tasks, in America and the Far East. It may safely be said that Fraina’s convincing logic created an opportunity both for establishing the Pan-American Agency and for nominating his sworn friend, Katayama, as its chairman. Nevertheless, the Agency was also regarded as an organ composed of “individual personal agents,” which implied that the ECCI could have easily liquidated it according to circumstance and in accord with its own judgment.

Next, F. Svátek’s evaluation was as follows: “The efforts to stimulate the organizational separation of the revolutionary Left in the Western countries from the Social-democratic parties led the Bolshevik leaders of the Comintern to the foun[d]ation of a number of ‘foreign bureaus’ of ECCI The contacts between Russia and foreign agencies of the Comintern were however weak. This led to the contest between the bureaus and generally to a great confusion in organizational matters./ At that time the organization of the Comintern was still very indefinite, still in the stage of its birth”⁽¹⁵⁾.

The real situation that the Foreign Bureaus did not remain only a technical organ and the point that the Comintern was in the midst of the formative period of organization were well grasped by him. It is needless, however, to say that the elucidation based on primary sources of “a great confusion” had to wait for the disclosure of archival materials in recent years.

In his latest study G. Voerman made the following clear-cut argument: “With the end of Allied siege of Russia, a key *raison d’être* for the network of foreign Comintern bureaus no longer applied”; the ECCI radically changed its course for the Communist Parties in the West because the circumstances had altered for the better around the start of 1920, in stark contrast to the autumn of 1919 when the ECCI had granted a plenary power of attorney to S.J. Rutgers. The ECCI’s decision to liquidate the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau was inevitable on the grounds that the Sub-Bureau had failed to understand and to adapt itself to the ECCI’s policy shifts, due in part to imperfect communication networks⁽¹⁶⁾.

By way of contrast, I emphasize the potentialities of the activities which the Foreign Bureaus initially aimed at developing in the West, which were eliminated too early as a result of the process of the centralization of powers. Lazitch and Drachkovitch argued: “In most of the countries of Central and Western Europe the same leftist ideas surfaced almost simultaneously around the start of 1920”; “In the first half of 1920 left-wing Communism seemed, if not stronger, at least noisier than the Communism of strict Leninist obedience”⁽¹⁷⁾.

Although that interpretation is opposite that of my inclination to evaluate the “left-wing Communism,” it raises a significant question: Why were the left wing forces on the rise and crossing national borders around the start of 1920 [or earlier] ? The following is my attempt to resolve this question with the help of A. Agosti’s views.

The forces that founded the international communist movement immediately after the October Revolution accented the focus on the international nature of the revolutionary process. It is this original international dimension that guarantees the homogeneity, the

consistency of the product of this history of the communist movement. This essentially international vision of the revolutionary process had two roots, of originally equal importance. On the one hand, there was the analysis of imperialism, which despite important differences was common to the entire radical left of the Second International. In opposition to the internationalization of capitalism, the working class was also required to be internationalized beyond nation states which had been obstacles for the socialization process of the productive capacity – proletarian internationalism. On the other, the Bolsheviks – and all the currents within the Comintern – shared the conviction that the Russian revolution was a prologue to a European social revolution and that its only guarantee of safety lay in receiving help from the victorious revolutionary proletariat in some, at least, of the biggest Western capitalist countries⁽¹⁸⁾.

Based on these two roots, as I have already examined in my articles in 1989⁽¹⁹⁾ and 2005⁽²⁰⁾, “Internationalized Bolshevism” (L.D. Trotsky’s term)⁽²¹⁾ was formed on the Western European and American scale among the anti-war socialist left wings. The concentrated and interrelated series of events on Russia’s western borders at the end of 1918 and the beginning of 1919, on the eve of the foundation of the Comintern, should be treated as “an integral whole” (J.D. White’s term)⁽²²⁾. And the very idea of the “World Revolution” underlies the integral whole. It is no mere coincidence that the radical left thought and movement was developed in the West by using the Hungarian and Bavarian Revolutions as a further springboard on the one hand, and that Soviet Russia was unable to render active help to the left due to the circumstances surrounding Civil War and the Intervention on the other, just after the foundation of the Comintern.

This radical thought and movement, however, was in part premised on wishful thinking, carried along as part of the larger anti-imperialistic war and anti-capitalist sentiment of the time. As Agosti has pointed out, the conviction there frequently induced the communist movement to confuse its desire with reality, overestimating the maturity of the potential revolution in the West, whilst underestimating both the solidity of the bourgeois regimes and the specificity of the workers' traditions in Europe and in America. As the developments subsequent to [the latter half of 1920 and] 1921 gave support to an increasingly unconditional confidence concerning the first Socialist State's capability of independent survival, the voluntaristic element which had given life to the conception that the revolutionary process was necessarily an international one gradually faded. The Foreign Bureaus examined in this article were, needless to say, active in the era of a still-unshaken conviction of the international dimension of the revolutionary process, that is, the "World Revolution"⁽²³⁾.

Turning back to the evaluation of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau, as mentioned above, the Sub-Bureau was the most empowered one of the Foreign Bureaus established by the ECCI, at least until a re-decision in the Bureau conference of the ECCI on 2 February 1920. Although the ECCI criticized the six Dutch members nominated by itself for holding an international conference in Amsterdam in February 1920 and adopting some resolutions, it was never "a deviation" from the original task of the Sub-Bureau's calling such a conference on its own judgement.

The ECCI ordered the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau to hand over its powers to the West-European Secretariat in Berlin, but the capability

of the Secretariat was highly questionable. After his attending the international conference in February 1920, Borodin moved to Berlin, where he held talks with the members of the Communist Party of Germany and the West-European Secretariat and others for a month from 3 March. On all such occasions he wrote the records down in his “Diary” and sent them to the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau⁽²⁴⁾. In a report probably delivered to Comintern headquarters he wrote from his experience there as follows: “The Secretariat consists of one person – James [Gordon = Reich]. Others only take part in meetings of the Secretariat, but almost no one carries out practical works. The Secretariat, in James’ opinion (and I fully agree with this), is in need of an ideological leaders, a person with an international reputation”⁽²⁵⁾.

The members of the Secretariat, moreover, were largely limited to those from German-speaking regions and the scope of its contact and correspondence was chiefly limited to Central Europe, constraining links with Western Europe.

The very scope of contact and correspondence was the chief advantage of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau, which covered the largest countries and regions among the Foreign Bureaus at that time. To the best of my knowledge, the countries with which the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau had contact and correspondence are listed below: (1) Soviet Russia, (2) Germany, (3) Sweden, (4) Norway, (5) Denmark, (6) Finland, (7) Great Britain, (8) USA, (9) Japan, (10) Mexico, (11) Spain, (12) France, (13) Belgium, (14) Luxemburg, (15) the Netherlands, (16) Switzerland, (17) Austria, (18) Italy, (19) South Africa, (20) Australia, (21) Poland (through Austria), (22) Bulgaria, (23) Dutch India⁽²⁶⁾.

The Amsterdam Sub-Bureau also issued extensively the leaflets in English, German, French and Dutch during the period from January

to May 1920 and that most of them in the style of the Communication (Mitteilung) of the Sub-Bureau. I could check 53 items, 37 of which I reprinted in *Basic Research on the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau of the Comintern*⁽²⁷⁾. They can be broadly classified into three groups: 1) the Sub-Bureau's appeals to the general or several countries; 2) a report on the Communist Young International; 3) reports on eight countries, that is, to use the above-mentioned numbers, (1), (2), (6), (7) (including Ireland), (8), (11), (13) and (16).

The Amsterdam Sub-Bureau also exchanged far away with South Africa. W.H. Andrews, Secretary Organiser of the International Socialist League (South Africa), wrote in a letter to Rutgers on 29 June 1920 that in spite of the ECCI's denial to the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau, "we shall be glad to keep in touch with you and receive any information you may be able to give us from time to time"⁽²⁸⁾. This is enough to give us at least some idea of the important role which the Sub-Bureau fulfilled as communications media. The League came to send, on Rutgers' advice, the Second Congress of the Comintern its application for entry into the Comintern by telegram⁽²⁹⁾.

5. The Pre-history of the Establishment of the Pan-American Agency

At the end of November 1919, when the Mexican Communist Party, led by M.N. Roy, was founded, the Latin American Bureau of the Third International was also established provisionally at the suggestion of Borodin, who had just arrived in Mexico⁽³⁰⁾. Following the Bureau's founding, he immediately set out for home, accompanied by J. Ramírez (R.F. Philips), and at the beginning of January 1920 he reported from Madrid to the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau (Rutgers) about not only the establishment of the Latin American Bureau but also plans to establish

an Information Bureau and Press Service of the Third International (Agencia Verdad, Servicio Internacional de Noticias) in Madrid⁽³¹⁾, both of which were supported by the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau⁽³²⁾. Thus a far-reaching plan was devised to create a transnational network from Moscow to Madrid via Amsterdam and, even further afield, across the Atlantic Ocean by using the cultural and linguistic ties between Spain and Mexico with the rest of the Spanish-speaking Americas⁽³³⁾.

At the above-mentioned international conference in February 1920 decisions were made to establish the American Sub-Bureau of the Comintern for the two Americas and to call the Pan-American Conference of Communist Organizations⁽³⁴⁾. Shortly after that decision, through a go-between, Fraina who had played a active role in that international conference, the Pan-American Bureau was provisionally organized in New York by the Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the Communist Party of America (CPA) on 25 March 1920. J. Andrew(s) [N.I. Hourwich], D. Damon [Ch.E. Ruthenberg] and A. Raphael [A. Bittelman] of the CPA were appointed members of the provisional Bureau and the following decision was added: "There will be added to the membership of the Bureau a representative of the South American parties as soon as connections are established to call a conference at which the permanent bureau will be established"⁽³⁵⁾.

On the other hand, at the beginning of August 1920, the Latin American Bureau in Mexico started the first issue of its organ, *Boletín Comunista*, in which it proclaimed that it had received authority to call the Pan-American Communist Conference in Mexico with the support of the CPA and, moreover, sought to take over the task of making connections with Japan and the Far East. The task in question had, in fact, been inserted in the above-mentioned decision on establishing

the American Sub-Bureau as follows: “To obtain the cooperation of the Japanese companions with the object of extending and connection propaganda in Japan and the Far East”⁽³⁶⁾.

Both Bureaus came to work separately without establishing a close connection with each other. In addition to that, the establishment of the Pan-American Agency of the ECCI was decided in Moscow in August-September 1920. That decision of the ECCI was necessarily superior to that of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau which had been dissolved several months before. Both Bureaus, which were far from calling the Pan-American Communist Conference on account of financial difficulty, were to be superseded by the Pan-American Agency which was amply funded.

6. The Points at Issue of the Pan-American Agency

Following the decision of establishing two new Bureaus in America and the Far East at the above-mentioned conference of the ECCI at the beginning of August 1920, the Small Bureau confirmed the former staffs, that is, “comrades Katayama, Fraina and Janson [Kārlis Jansons]” in “4) On the bureau in Mexico” of the fifth item (“Problems of the American movement”) at the conference of 29 September 1920⁽³⁷⁾.

A comprehensive picture of the Pan-American Agency, from its establishment to its liquidation by way of its activities in New York, and then in Mexico City (excluding those in Canada and South America), is omitted here. I have provided, however, that picture in my article in Japanese⁽³⁸⁾, while some points at issue of the Agency have been revealed. In this final chapter I explore them by tackling each problem separately, presenting further subjects of research concerning them in some cases.

1) The ECCI accepted the proposal to establish the Foreign Bureaus only in America and the Far East as an exceptional matter, having only recently dissolved the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau. Nevertheless, the authority of the Foreign Bureaus was more restricted, and the ambiguity on “executing political tasks” was present from the start. The Pan-American Agency was summarily liquidated by the ECCI in order to resolve the ensuing confusion.

On 28 September 1921 Katayama with Fraina made a report to the Small Bureau of the ECCI: “Rumors have reached us from New York that the Comintern contemplates liquidating the American Agency. We do not know the source of these rumors, or how true they are. But if true, then we suggest that you send to Mexico a competent Communist comrade as your representative, to work here, with support; otherwise the whole movement will go to pieces”⁽³⁹⁾.

Far from accommodating Katayama’s strong request to ensure functional continuity even after that dissolution, the ECCI Secretariat had already, in fact, started planning the establishment of a new, similar organization before ordering the liquidation: “Aufgaben u. Organisationsplan d. Lateinisch-amerikanischen Section im Secretariat d. Komintern” was drafted by “M. Jaroshevski/Leiter d. Section” and accepted on 28 September 1921⁽⁴⁰⁾. According to the plan, Latin American countries were to be classified into three types (Argentina and Mexico whose communist parties had participated in the Comintern; Uruguay and Chile whose communist parties or groups did not yet; Brazil and most countries on the Pacific coast of South America where capitalism was underdeveloped and the labor movement was hardly differentiated) and to be assigned to the task which corresponded to each type. Shortly after that, at the Presidium conference of the

ECCI on 10 October 1921 the following was decided: “Das [Pan-amerikanisches] Bureau [*sic*] wird aufgelöst”⁽⁴¹⁾.

In the end, Katayama and Fraina were never informed of the decision dissolving the Agency directly by the ECCI. Katayama, who had been summoned from Mexico City to Moscow, took up as “a matter of Communist discipline” the problem that only rumors of abolishing the Agency had reached his ears. “I am informed by the returning men, that in the Main Office sentiment prevails, that the Agency will be abolished.’ These rumors reflected in the attitude of the American Communist Party Executives, who treated the Agency with the most insulting tone. To the earnest and sincere requests sent by the Agency to the C.E.C. of C.P.A, were dealt with by them coldest and utterly uncomradely manner.” “It is grave matter of discipline in the Communist Party that it should stop the circulating rumors [including the rumors of suspicions against Fraina] by investigation and proper communication with the responsible authorities”⁽⁴²⁾.

In the background of this problem stayed not only the above-mentioned problem of the Foreign Bureaus’ positioning by the ECCI, but also the problem of two chains of instructions (to be taken below).

2) Although the Foreign Bureaus were in charge of playing the role of mediator between the ECCI and the communist organizations in the countries concerned, there were in fact two chains of instructions from the ECCI, that is, not only through the Pan-American Agency but also through the representatives in Moscow of the CPA and the United Communist Party of America (UCPA).

Soon after the decision of establishing the Agency in Moscow, for example, on 1 November 1920 a representative of the ECCI, “C” [J.

Carr=L.E.Katterfeld] gave instructions on the issues of the trade union and so on to the CEC of the UCPA as follows: “they are to be carried out in conjunction with comrades Katayama and Jansen [Jansons]”⁽⁴³⁾. The instructions were issued on the basis of the existence of the Pan-American Agency and, at that time, the chain of instructions was not yet confused.

But, just after Katayama’s arrival at Mexico City, the second important instruction of the ECCI reached Charles E. Scott [Jansons] in New York and, without consulting Katayama, Scott sent both the CPA and the UCPA the notification requiring the agreement about the conditions for the unification of two parties without giving them any choice⁽⁴⁴⁾. The CPA formed its judgement that “Comrade Scott is overstepping the ultimatum of the Agency itself”⁽⁴⁵⁾, furthermore, “the Am. Agency has overstepped its powers” and sent Comintern headquarters a statement, protesting against the change from proportional representation to equal representation to be based upon the number of delegates to the convention and so on⁽⁴⁶⁾. The CPA’s reply was sent by telegram to Katayama by way of Scott on 26 April 1921: “Received following from main office; *authorized by board of directors* [the ECCI] to state Agency has no authority to press five conditions. Equal basis [signed by] Josef Andrews [Hourwich] and Marshall [M. Bedacht] Co.”⁽⁴⁷⁾

Receiving that reply, Katayama sent Rutgers a letter saying, “Thus you see again Agency dominated by somewhat partisan attitude was fortunately defeated by the second mandate, although it too shows a trace of partisan attitude bias in the hand of Andrews! Yet I am glad that this will shift entirely the responsibility of the coming convention on the shoulders of both parties, while the Agency’s responsibility

is greatly lightened, being taken away the chairman's casting or controlling power"⁽⁴⁸⁾. In fact, the attendance of the chairman of the Agency, Katayama, which had been expected, was not required and on 15-28 May 1921 thirty delegates from each party assembled and held the joint unity convention at Woodstock, New York⁽⁴⁹⁾.

Indeed, the unification was achieved. But that ECCI's instruction was not given directly to the Agency, but first to the CPA (Josef Andrews and Marshall Co.). It meant that the lines of instructions from the ECCI got crossed. In addition, the Agency's authority over the issue of the party unification was weakened. Those facts were to bring further trouble on the future activities of the Agency.

3) The strife between the two parties was bitter and, above all, the CPA led by the Russian Federation, which had not been merged into the UCPA, took a firm stand which left no room for mutual concessions. (When the UCPA was organized at a joint convention of the CPA and the CLPA, held in Bridgman, Michigan on 26-31 May 1920, a fairly large member of the Slavic Federations [Russian, Ukrainian, Lettish, Polish and Lithuanian] did not participate in it and remained in the former CPA⁽⁵⁰⁾.) This ongoing conflict had not only a negative impact on the communist movement in the USA, but also became a major factor that was to make the Agency's attempts to unite the two parties difficult.

It had already been expressed clearly in a document of the President of the ECCI, Zinoviev, to the Committees of the CPA and the CLPA dated 12 January 1920 that "a united party is not only possible but is absolutely necessary" in the USA: "The American Communist Party is principally a foreign party embracing so-called 'national' federations. The American Communist Labour Party chiefly represents

American or English-speaking elements. If the first is more developed theoretically and is more closely connected with the traditions of the revolutionary struggle of the Russian working class, it is on the other hand more isolated from the mass movement and mass organisations of the American workers who are gradually entering the broad path of the struggle between the classes. Thus both parties naturally supplement each other, and only by their unification is it possible to create in America an efficient Communist Party which must take the lead in the mass movement; and in the oncoming communist revolution”⁽⁵¹⁾.

When H. Allen (M. Cohen), who had been expelled from the CPA in January 1921, became a member of the Agency, the Agency was obliged to handle not only the vital issue of unification, but also the so-called Cohen case. Here I drop the explanation of the course of events⁽⁵²⁾, but take up only “an Appeal to the ECCI” which he drafted on 16 January 1921 for his expulsion from the CPA arising out of the problem of the unification of the Communist Parties⁽⁵³⁾. He grasped in it the essence of the issue as follows: “Behind the question of unity lies the fundamental question of the future form of organization which the united party shall take, — i.e., the old question of foreign language federations”; “And, unfortunately, ‘federation control’ is and has been inevitably accompanied by an instinctively ‘left Communist’ policy upon the American movement.”

The harsh critique of the CPA leaders was presented by Katayama just before departing for Mexico: “They are, indeed, a good communist in so far as they understand the literal meaning of the documents given by the Third International. Their understanding and interpretation are often negative and passive and lack positive and active, hence

miserably fail in practical world. The present leaders' mind is stiff somewhat fossilized and so no flexibility at all. Look at the unity question. The C.P. stand is right and logical through and through. so far so good but they forget the spirit of the mandate and entirely ignore the very urgency of the unity itself. The C.P. maintains its integrity and compactness by an extreme centralization, by expulsion and intimidation and by keeping members in dark ignorance. There is no free discussion, development and initiative in thought and action among the rank and file"⁽⁵⁴⁾.

The hardening of the CPA's stance on the issue caused Scott to make the above-mentioned notification dated 4 April 1921. It also led to double-tracking a line of instructions from the ECCI.

4) The strife between the two parties significantly influenced on one member of the Agency, Scott: He was backing up the UCPA to which he belonged.

On 1 March 1921 a meeting of the Pan-American Council of the Red Labor Union International (RLUI) was held and the motion that "\$500.00 be turned over to U.C.P. to be applied for Defense [for comrades in prison]" was carried. But at a meeting of the Pan-American Agency of 5 March that carried motion was withdrawn and it was decided again that "the C.E.C. of the U.C.P.[A.] be called upon immediately to refund the \$500 advanced to it for 'defense.'"

That funding in advance was an idea of Scott and J. Harper (Julius Heiman [Hyman]), who attended the meeting falsely as agent of Thompson (Fraina), in charge of financial affairs. It was criticized as follows in the "Note" which, judging from its contents, had been made and inserted into the new protocol by the chairman, Katayama: "It is

outrageous to have advanced the U.C.P. money. What becomes of our impartiality? It is beyond the imagination of Scott and Harper to realize the use the C.P. will make of this advance when the news leaks out -- as it will leak out? Limit our work but finance the U.C.P. -- that is no policy for the Agency⁽⁵⁵⁾.

Here I add a supplementary explanation of the Pan-American Council. Although the RLUI (Profintern) was founded at the same time of the Third Congress of the Comintern in June-July 1921, its provisional organization, the International Council of Trade and Industrial Unions had already been organized at the same time of the Second Congress of the Comintern in July-August 1920. In parallel with the Comintern's establishing the Pan-American Agency, the RLUI aimed at establishing the Pan-American Council and, furthermore, its subordinate organization, that is, the American Bureau in the USA and the Provisional Mexican Bureau in Mexico, respectively. Although not so many members did not escape holding two posts concurrently and sometimes used a different name for different purposes, as Katayama held each chairman of both the Agency and the Council⁽⁵⁶⁾, the sphere of activity of both organizations was originally different each other and, therefore, on 3 March 1921 the chairman of the Agency appealed in a "confidential" letter to the CEC of the CPA and the UCPA as follows: "It is imperative that no references be made in the Communist organs which you publish linking up the American Bureau of the R.L.U.I. with either of the two Communist Parties in this country, as the Bureau is acting legally. Such references may fall into the hands of the authorities and thus lay the Bureau open to the charge that it is a Communist 'affair'"⁽⁵⁷⁾.

The other members, Fraina and Katayama, however, were not so

sympathetic to the CPA, because they were outside of its mainstream. Moreover, there was the contrast between Katayama and Scott, which can also be related to the difference between their temperaments: one was a thorough correspondent and was disciplined in financial matters, while the other wrote little, let alone provided financial reports; one tended to be optimistic about the outcome of their activities, while the other, who had been in the left position in the centrist group of Latvian socialists in the USA⁽⁵⁸⁾, was more of a realist.

According to the report of Katayama and Fraina, "Jansen has been alone in the United States for 6 months, and during that time he has not rendered us a single financial report (has spent about 60% of our appropriation and made no report.) He has, moreover, during these six months never sent us a real report of his activity"⁽⁵⁹⁾. On the other hand, Scott criticized their activities in Mexico as follows: "Com. [Katayama and Fraina] have issued a call for the formation of a new C.P., the details of which are contained in the enclosed report on Mexico. It seems to me that this report is putting too rosy a complexion on things. There is much talk but nothing will come of it in the end"⁽⁶⁰⁾.

Their antagonism weakened the authority of the Pan-American Agency. After the unification of the American communist parties, above all, the CPA took advantage of it: "Comrade[s] Yavki and Carter [Fraina], speaking in the name of the Pan-American Bureau [*sic*], complain about the poor connections between the Agency and the Party. This comes to us as a surprise. We are in direct and continuous touch with the Agency through its representative in the United States, Comrade Charles E. Scott"⁽⁶¹⁾. Thus the CPA asserted that it continued contact with the Agency through its American member, Scott, while distancing itself from Katayama in Mexico and disavowing any responsibility for

the Agency's malfunctions.

During this period of time, Fraina was no longer a vital figure as when he had played an active role in the American Left Wing movement⁽⁶²⁾. At the beginning of his activities in the Agency, his two stays in Berlin (mid-October 1920–18 January 1921 [90 days]; 1 April –5 June 1921⁽⁶³⁾) as a courier of financial resources were considered to have been exceedingly long. Even Katayama felt uneasy for a moment about when Fraina would come to Mexico: “I can't understand the movement of our Littlebit [Fraina]. What has [*sic*] he doing all those three months? I wonder!”⁽⁶⁴⁾

On 2 January 1922 Fraina, who had become deputy to the chairman of the Agency, sent a report, “supplementing previous reports, and as a final report on Mexico” to the Small Bureau of the ECCI. His and Katayama's self-examination was made in it as follows: “I suggest that you send a Russian comrade as your representative to Mexico, one capable of giving direction to the work and program of the party, since the party will need that. I do not know what is your present policy on finances, but if support is still to be given, I suggest that it be limited in the case of Mexico. Comrade Katayama and I somewhat misjudged the situation, imagining that the movement was larger or capable of being made larger than it is, and accordingly our plans were bigger than could be carried through, and expenses were according”⁽⁶⁵⁾.

Fraina made the following mention at that end: “In accordance with instructions left by Katayama I am proceeding to South America. I am first going to Argentina, to act with the party there in relation to the rest of South America.” And he was, at the very end, suspected of misappropriation of the remaining financial resources of the Agency, combined with the suspicion of spying in the past.

Moreover, it is difficult to find any positive attitudes in his activities after his late arrival in Mexico. He may have begun thinking about leaving the communist movement, or (in accord with my previous analysis) Fraina, who had been a leader of the theoretical radicalization, may have been impractical in reality (n. 62). This point needs further examination.

5) Although the Agency was most concerned about the relations with the two American communist parties, its authority was largely ignored. The only reliance the two parties had on the Agency was, in fact, for its funding abilities. This was due to the decision by the ECCI not to send any financial aid directly to communist organizations in each country but rather to send aid indirectly through the Foreign Bureaus (cf. n. 5).

Financial troubles, moreover, were never stopped either inside or outside the Agency. After Katayama arrived at Moscow probably on 11 December 1921 at midnight, he drew up the lengthy report dated 10 January 1922 to the members of the Small Bureau of the ECCI at free moments during his hasty preparation for calling the Congress of the Peoples of the Far East, in which he summed up his view conclusively as follows: “The very first great difficulty encountered by the Agency was a realization of a situation that the Agency could not get the money left in Berlin”⁽⁶⁶⁾.

Fraina was forced to stay long in Berlin twice for getting the funds. Reich of the West-European Secretariat, who had exercised nearly total control over the funds, was not helpful in the Agency’s getting the funds. Katayama, on his way to Moscow, 23 November 1921, “wanted to see J. [James Gordon = Reich] very much” in order to “find out our financial matter,” but in vain⁽⁶⁷⁾.

As a part of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau's funds had been misappropriated by the West-European Secretariat a year before⁽⁶⁸⁾, so the Secretariat was a factor of its setback in case of the Pan-American Agency, too.

In this respect, the financial troubles should have a decisive impact on the evaluation of the world movement of the Comintern. It is important to make clear the financial conditions of the Agency in order to examine its activities in their entirety. (I will settle the dispute on the above-mentioned suspicion of Fraina's misappropriating funds on the theme of the whole financial affairs of the Agency.)

6) What were the results of the Agency's movements? In the USA, conditions conducive to good results were absent from the very beginning. In Mexico, the Agency attempted to make contacts with the local organizations and published organs, statements, etc. in Spanish. On 21 April 1921 "Chairman of the Pan-American Council of the International Council of the Trade and Industrial Union" (New York) officially nominated J. Rubio (a member of the Executive Committee of the CGT), M. Paley (H.M. Levin(e); the editor of the organ of the Mexican Executive of the IWW), J.C. Valadés (a member of the Mexican Federation of Communist Youth) and F. Leija Paz (a member of Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana [CROM]) as the members of the Provisional Mexican Bureau of the RLUI⁽⁶⁹⁾. On the next day, 22 April, a weekly, *El Trabajador; Organo del Bureau Provisional Mexicano del Consejo Internacional de Sindicatos y Uniones de Trabajadores (Internacional Roja)* was founded⁽⁷⁰⁾.

Concerning the foundation of the Communist Party of Mexico which was an important mission of the Agency, Yavki, judging from

the fact that each leader of both Mexican Communist Parties, L.A.E. Gale and Roy, was outside Mexico together and both Parties were in name only, requested on 25 May 1921 the members of the Mexican Federation of Communist Youth to appoint a convention committee in order to organize a Communist Party of Mexico⁽⁷¹⁾. After Fraina arrived at Mexico City at the beginning of July 1921, Katayama with Fraina issued a Manifesto (n. 75) to the Congress of the Communist Youth to be held early in August and asked the Congress to appoint a Committee which would be an Organization Committee for the Communist Party. In fact, it took much time to call and hold the Congress itself. It was held on 25-30 December 1921⁽⁷²⁾, that is, two months after Katayama's leaving for Moscow. For Katayama and Fraina argued that the call should not be ordered by the Agency, but it should be issued by the Organization Committee⁽⁷³⁾, and took pains not to repeat "the mistake made in Spain, where the Youth Federation automatically transformed itself into a Communist Party"⁽⁷⁴⁾.

Katayama, who had received the introduction from the Executive Committee of the Profintern newly elected at the founding congress of July 1921, that is, that of abolishing all the Bureaus of the Profintern in Germany, England, the USA, Mexico, etc., proposed that the Organization Committee for the Communist Party should take over a part of the tasks of the Provisional Mexican (Labor) Bureau on 19 September 1921 (n. 73).

Such activities of the Agency, however, came to an end due to Katayama's summons to Moscow, and the decision of liquidating the Agency, by the ECCI.

Speaking of the Agency's participation in local activists, for example, the chairman of the Pan-American Agency, Katayama, who

had gone underground in May 1921, kept on sending them messages and proposals from June to August 1921⁽⁷⁵⁾. How much influence did that participation gain over them? Although a comprehensive evaluation should be done only after examining all the historical materials on the Mexican side, these materials seem to be quite limited in number under current circumstances⁽⁷⁶⁾.

In addition, the Agency's influence on the foundation of the Communist Party of Canada, in which Scott was deeply involved⁽⁷⁷⁾, and the results of Mr. & Mrs. Cohen, who were sent to the Latin American countries such as Argentina⁽⁷⁸⁾, remain topics to be further examined.

7) The relations between the two communist parties in the USA and other parties in the American continents were far from well-established, in spite of the Agency's efforts. There were a variety of obstacles to creating a network in both American continents. The communists in the USA, for example, often referred to the Pan-American Agency as the "American" Agency, because they sometimes did not pay attention to the "Pan-American," that is to say, their Central and South American comrades.

To tell the truth, a contempt for Central and South America was within the members of the Agency. In case at the above-mentioned meeting of the American Council on 1 March 1921 Scott and Harper proposed the stop of both trips of Yavki to Mexico and Allen (Cohen) to Argentina (South America) on account of financial difficulty, the following was written in the "Note": "The Proposal of Scott and Harper that Yavki and Allen not [*sic*] start on their trip shows a complete misunderstanding of the work of the Agency. Our work is Pan-American and only incidentally U.S.A."⁽⁷⁹⁾

On 24 September 1921 in a letter to Zinoviev, Katayama reexamined the whole activities of the Agency since 8 January 1921 when he had taken the present post, and wrote at the end as follows: "Mexico is, as I have been experiencing past six months, a very inconvenient place, especially looked from a practical standpoint, Because the commercial relations between North and South Americas are well established, the New York as a centre./ But South American proletariat is not so willing to listen to the American talk, owing to *a certain prejudice* that exists to-day between two continents. And then American (USA) comrades are accustomed to look down on the Latin American workers. Personally I think that the choice of the seat of the Agency is wise one in the long run"⁽⁸⁰⁾.

A similar indication was shown in a reply letter of A. Stirner (E. Woog) to Katayama, informing the Agency's end from Mexico: "To the C.P. people in U.S.A. we have written several times with regard to closer collaboration, publishing in com[m]on of manifestoes etc. but never got any answer. *The people there look on Mexico as an absolute quantity negligible [negligible]*; surely Mexico plays no first role in world-politics, but the comrades of the USA should, with a view on the international work, care more for the countries of Central and South America"⁽⁸¹⁾.

Prejudices such as the sense of superiority of the CPA, were they to have gained more ground, would have aggravated the difficulties in setting up a network.

The importance of Central and South America was underlined by Katayama in the above-mentioned report dated 10 January 1922 (n. 66): "I think that the Communist movement of two Americas should be aimed at the first overthrow of American imperialism and its capitalism

of America. Without a [sic] strong Communist Parties in Mexico and South American countries the American Communist movement even led by the powerful Communist Party of America will not be able to strike hard blow at the American capitalism because its capitalism and imperialism have been laying their foundation widely along those countries. Mexico is the key to Central and South America and she is the connecting link of two Americas. The Communist International needs a strong Communist Party of Mexico and make it the connecting link of American Communist International with which united front will strike at the American capitalist imperialism a death blow.”

These various problems provide ample reason to anticipate the difficulties present in the Comintern’s direction of transnational activities such as the Pan-American Agency. This could also provide a frame of reference for examining how the Japanese Communist Party had contact with the Foreign Bureaus of the Comintern. Further investigations into the causes of those problems, including the heretofore unexamined financial situation, are the next task of this research project.

Notes

- (1) ВКП(б), *Коминтерн и Япония. 1917-1941 гг.* (Москва, 2001).
- (2) Cf. G. Haupt, “Histoire de l’Internationale socialiste ou Histoire internationale du Socialisme? Sur quelques controverses à propos de problèmes de recherche et de méthode,” *Le Mouvement social*, No.41, X.-XII.1962, 13-34.
- (3) A. Yamanouchi, “The Early Comintern in Amsterdam, New York and Mexico City (The First Part)/(The Latter Part)” [in Japanese], *The Shien or the Journal of History* (Faculty of Humanities, Kyushu University), No.145, III.2008, 1-55; No.146, III.2009, 91-151.
- (4) A. Yamanouchi, *Basic Research on the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau of the Comintern.*

Publication of Scientific Research Results promoted through the Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)(2) of the Ministry of Education, Science, Sports and Culture in the Fiscal Years 1999 and 2000 (Miyazaki, 2001), xi, 235 p.; id., *Basic Research on the Pan-American Agency of the Comintern*. Publication of Scientific Research Results promoted through the Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C) of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science in the Fiscal Years 2004 and 2006 (Fukuoka, 2007), xvi, 183 p.

- (5) Российский государственный архив социально-политической истории, ф. 495, оп. 18, д. 33, лл. 20-21, Moscow (hereafter cited as follows: РГАСПИ, 495/18/33/20-21); German translation in: A. Kan, "Die Skandinavische Kommission der Komintern 1919-1921," *Jahrbuch für Forschungen zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung*, 2004/III, IX.2004, 68-69.
- (6) РГАСПИ, 495/1/1/78.
- (7) РГАСПИ, 495/1/6/17, 19.
- (8) РГАСПИ, 495/1/6/21.
- (9) РГАСПИ, 497/1/9/2; 581/1/95/18.
- (10) G. Zinoviev, *Report of the Executive Committee of the Communist International to the Second World Congress of the Communist International* (Petrograd, 1920), 19-20.
- (11) B. Lazitch/M.M. Drachkovitch, *Lenin and the Comintern*, Vol.1 (Stanford, 1972), 143-164.
- (12) РГАСПИ, 17/3/100/1; cf. Г.М. Адиебеков/Э.Н. Шахназарова/К.К. Шириня, *Организационная структура Коминтерна. 1919-1943* (Москва, 1997), 34.
- (13) РГАСПИ, 495/1/8/64-65.
- (14) РГАСПИ, 495/1/8/65.
- (15) F. Svátek, "The Governing Organs of the Communist International: their growth and composition, 1919-1943," *History of Socialism. Year Book 1968* (Prague, 1969), 185.
- (16) G. Voerman, "Proletarian Competition. The Amsterdam Bureau and its German Counterpart, 1919-1920," *Jahrbuch für Historische Kommunismusforschung 2007* (Berlin, 2007), 218; cf. G. Voerman, *De meridiaan van Moskou. De CPN en de Communistische Internationale, 1919-1930* (Amsterdam/Antwerpen, 2001), 90-92, 95-97.
- (17) Lazitch/Drachkovitch, 253, 256.
- (18) A. Agosti, "The Concept of World Revolution and the 'World Party for the Revolution' (1919-1943)," *The International Newsletter of Historical Studies on Comintern, Communism and Stalinism*, No.9-13, 1997/98, 73-75.
- (19) A. Yamanouchi, "'Internationalized Bolshevism': The Bolsheviks and the

- International, 1914-1917," *Acta Slavica Iaponica. A Journal of Soviet and East European Studies* (Sapporo), Vol.7, III.1989, 17-32; cf. id., *S.J. Rutgers and a Case Study of the International History of Socialism: Association with Sen Katayama, the Bolsheviks and the American Left Wing* [in Japanese], (Kyoto, 1996), 117-133.
- (20) A. Yamanouchi, "The Latvian Soviet Power and the 'World Revolution' from the Autumn of 1918 through the Spring of 1919: S.J. Rutgers and the International (One of the Second Series)" [in Japanese], *The Shien or the Journal of History*, No.142, III.2005, 122.
- (21) *Ленинский сборник*, IV (Москва/Ленинград, 1925), 303.
- (22) J.D. White, "National Communism and World Revolution: The Political Consequences of German Military Withdrawal from the Baltic Area in 1918-19," *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol.46, No.8, 1994, 1367-1368.
- (23) Agosti, 75.
- (24) "Diary from March 3rd, 1920," "Interview with Paul L[evi]. – April 1," etc., РГАСПИ, 497/2/7/1-92.
- (25) [Бородин-Грузенберг,] "Западный Европейский Секретариат," n.d., РГАСПИ, 499/1/3/93-96.
- (26) In the following lists the letters and the material from/to the Sub-Bureau are classified into 13 countries and regions. "Liste von Materialien von Rutgers [Rutgers]," РГАСПИ, 497/2/8/13-18.
- (27) Yamanouchi, *Basic Research on the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau*, 55-186.
- (28) W.H. Andrews (Johannesburg) to Rutgers, 29.VI.1920, РГАСПИ, 497/2/2/214.
- (29) *Der zweite Kongreß der Kommunistischen Internationale. Protokoll der Verhandlungen vom 19. Juli in Petrograd und vom 23. Juli bis 7. August 1920 in Moskau* (Hamburg, 1921), 102.
- (30) L. Kheyfetz/V. Kheyfetz, "Michael Borodin. The First Comintern-emissary to Latin America (Part One)," *The International Newsletter of Historical Studies on Comintern, Communism and Stalinism*, Vol.2, No.5/6, 1994/95, 148.
- (31) M. Borodin (Madrid) to [Rutgers], 4.I.1919[1920], РГАСПИ, 497/2/1/1-4; cf. 495/120/250/5-6.
- (32) G.L. Trotter [=] S.J.R[utgers]. (Amsterdam) to Borodin, 15.II.1920, РГАСПИ, 497/2/1/12-12 об.
- (33) Cf. Л.С. Хейфец, *Коминтерн в Латинской Америке: формирование и эволюция организационных связей III Интернационала и его национальных секций (от зарождения коммунистического движения до создания Южноамериканского*

- секретариата ИККИ* (Санкт-Петербург, 2004), 35.
- (34) *Bulletin of the Sub-Bureau in Amsterdam of the Communist International* (Amsterdam), No.2, III.1920, 8-9.
- (35) "American Bureau of the International," *The Communist. Official Organ of the Communist Party of America* (Chicago), Vol.2, No.3, 5.IV.1920, 1.
- (36) "La Conferencia Comunista Pan-Americana," *Boletín Comunista. Organo del Bureau Latino Americano de la Tercera Internacional* (México), Año 1, No.1, 8.VIII.1920, 7.
- (37) РГАСПИ, 495/2/1/99-99 об.; 495/2/3/97-97 об.; cf. Адиебеков/Шахназарова/Ширина, 30.
- (38) Cf. Yamanouchi, "The Early Comintern in Amsterdam, New York and Mexico City (The Latter Part)," 100-138.
- (39) Kata[yama]/Fra[ina] to the Small Bureau, Comintern, 28.IX.1921, РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/42-46; cf. 495/18/66/327-331.
- (40) РГАСПИ, 495/79/1/1-2; *Коминтерн и Латинская Америка. Сборник документов* (Москва, 1998), 30-31.
- (41) *Die Tätigkeit der Exekutive und des Präsidium des E.K. der Kommunistischen Internationale vom 13. Juli 1921 bis 1. Februar 1922* (Petrograd, 1922), 240; cf. Л.С. Хейфец, *Коминтерн в Латинской Америке*, 60-61.
- (42) Katayama (Moscow) to the Members of the Small Bureau [of the ECCI], 10.I.1922, РГАСПИ, 5/3/145/2-5; 495/18/66/211-214.
- (43) C. [J. Carr = L.E.Katterfeld] [Moscow] to the C.E.C. of the C.P. and U.C.P., 1.XI.1920 [Received about 15 December 1920], РГАСПИ, 495/18/65/2; 515/1/20/44; Another document confiscated by the USA government on 29 April 1921: Records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation [1908-1922], RG 65 [hereafter cited as Records of FBI], BS202600-1775-368, National Archives and Records Administration [NARA], Washington, D.C.
- (44) Notification signed by Ch.E. Scott to the CPA and the UCPA, 4.IV.1921, in: *The Communist. Official Organ of the United Communist Party*, No.16, IV.1921; Reprinted in the corporate report of J. Spolansky, an agent of the Federal Bureau of the Department of Justice, Records of FBI, BS202600-1644-1.
- (45) The CEC of the CPA to the American Agency of the C.I., 16.IV.1921, РГАСПИ, 515/1/45/24.
- (46) C.P. Appeal and Protest to the C.I. on the Unity Ultimatum of the American Agency as Presented by Comrade Scott, РГАСПИ, 515/1/45/25; cf. 515/1/46/29-29a.

- (47) Katayama (Mexico City) to Comrades, Third International, Moscow, 25[-26]. IV.1921, РГАСПИ, 495/108/11/20-21; 495/18/65/150-151 (*My italics*).
- (48) Katayama (Yavki) to R[utgers]., 28.IV.1921, РГАСПИ, 495/108/11/22-23; cf. 495/108/11/5-10; 495/18/65/100-105.
- (49) *Official Bulletin of the Communist Party of America (Section of the Communist International) formed at the Joint Unity Convention of the UCP and CP* (n.p.), No.1, V.1921, 1-4; cf. Correspondence of the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department General Staff, 1917-1941, RG 165, 10110-1581-103, NARA.
- (50) Cf. Greetings to the Communist International/ Comrades of the ECCI, РГАСПИ, 515/1/25/1-2; 497/2/2/190-191. This document, which had been adopted at the joint convention, with a letter signed by I.E. Ferguson reached Rutgers on 3 July 1920 after the dissolution of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau and was forwarded to M[oscow]. by Rutgers.
- (51) РГАСПИ, 515/1/17/1-3; cf. *Коммунистический Интернационал* (Москва/Петроград), No.11, n.d.[1920], 1887-1892.
- (52) Cf. РГАСПИ, 515/1/45/1-4.
- (53) РГАСПИ, 515/1/61/18-20; 515/1/61/21-23.
- (54) Yavki (New York) to Comrades [in the Comintern, Moscow], 10.III.1921, РГАСПИ, 495/18/65/70-73; 495/18/65/74-76. By the way, Katayama's evaluation of the UCPA was more critical: "As to the U.C.P. I have very little to say./ The U.C.P. needs the strong leadership in men of principle and integrity to check and safeguard the party from going to [be] opportunistic."
- (55) Decisions of the Agency, 5.III.[1921], РГАСПИ, 495/18/65/41-44; 495/18/65/62-65; cf. 495/18/65/39.
- (56) Cf. The Chairman of the American Agency to [Mexican] Comrades, 15.VI.1921, РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/16-17.
- (57) The Chairman of the American Agency to the CEC of the CPA and the UCPA, 3.III.1921, РГАСПИ, 495/18/65/45.
- (58) Cf. Yamanouchi, *S.J. Rutgers and a Case Study of the International History of Socialism*, 138-139; *The New York Call*, Vol.10, No.105, Section II, 15.IV.1917, 4; Records of FBI, OG343419.
- (59) Kata[yama]/Fra[ina], American Agency to the Small Bureau, Comintern, 10.X.1921, РГАСПИ, 495/108/11/47-50; 495/18/66/156-159; 495/18/66/237-240.
- (60) [Scott's] "Report on the situation in the United States; the work of the Pan-American agency among the trade-unions of the U.S.; the situation in Canada, the

- Pan-American agency and Scott's proposition" to Zinoviev, 15.X.1921, PГАСПИ, 495/18/66/171-181; cf. 495/18/66/245-246.
- (61) Carr, Executive Secretary, CPA to Scott (Forwarded to Yavki by A. Bray [Scott], 8.IX.1921), PГАСПИ, 495/18/66/109-110.
- (62) Cf. Yamanouchi, *S.J. Rutgers and a Case Study of the International History of Socialism*, 237-238; B.D. Wolfe, *A Life in Two Centuries. An Autobiography* (New York, 1981), 230; Th. Draper, "Communists and Their History," *Political Affairs*, 1959, No.5, 58-61.
- (63) Accounts by T[hompson = Fraina], 11.VIII.1921, PГАСПИ, 495/18/66/71-73.
- (64) [Katayama] to Bray, 19.VI.1921, PГАСПИ, 495/18/66/21-22.
- (65) Fraina to the Small Bureau [of the ECCI], 2.I.1922, PГАСПИ, 495/108/22/1-4; 495/18/66/241-244.
- (66) Katayama (Moscow) to the Members of Small Bureau, 10.I.1921, PГАСПИ, 5/3/145/2-5.
- (67) [Katayama] (Riga) to Thompson, 9.[XII.]1921, PГАСПИ, 495/18/66/154.
- (68) Cf. Trotter to Winter [J. Berziņš], 9.III.1920, PГАСПИ, 497/2/8/1-7; 581/1/95/33-39; [Rutgers] to Fritz [F. Ström], 14.V.1920, PГАСПИ, 497/2/5/24; Voerman, *De meridiaan van Moskou*, 77, 494.
- (69) [Katayama] to J.C. Valadés, J. Rubio, M. Paley and F. Leija Paz, 21.IV.1921, PГАСПИ, 495/18/65/133; cf. 495/18/65/86.
- (70) Cf. PГАСПИ, 495/18/66/337-338.
- (71) Yavki to Members of the Federation of Communist Youths, 25.V.1921, PГАСПИ, 495/108/10/1-3.
- (72) Cf. Fraina to the Small Bureau, 2.I.1922, PГАСПИ, 495/108/22/1-4; 495/18/66/241-244.
- (73) [Katayama] to the Organization Committee of the Mexican Communist Party, 19.IX.[1921], PГАСПИ, 495/18/66/119-120; cf. 495/18/66/113.
- (74) Cf. Report of American Agency. Kata[yama] and Fra[ina] to the Small Bureau of the ECCI, 5.IX.1921, PГАСПИ, 495/108/11/36-41; 495/18/66/98-103; 495/108/10/24-29. Borodin left Spain early in 1920 and Rmirez was left alone. One of the lines of action about which Rmirez came to an agreement with the local comrades was "the transformation of the Executive Committee of the 'Federación de Juventudes Socialistas' into the Provisional Executive Committee of the 'Partido Comunista Espanol'" without calling the founding congress of the Communist Party. Conversation [among Ugarte, Andrade, Geers and Ramirez] (Madrid), 5.III.1920,

РГАСПИ, 495/120/250/53-56.

- (75) On 5 June: To Congreso de la Confederacion Sindicalista del Estado de Puebla (РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/2-4); On 17 June: To the Communist Youths of Mexico (РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/19); On 23 June: To the Congress of the Mexican Federation of Labor [CROM], Orizaba (РГАСПИ, 521/1/17/54-58; 495/18/66/25-29); On 18 July: To the I.W.W. of Mexico (РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/39); To the Congress of the Mexican Federation of Communist Youth (РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/41-42; 495/108/10/12-13); On 27 July: Manifest to the Tampico Oil Field Workers (РГАСПИ, 521/1/17/112-115); To the General Confederation of Workers [CGT] (РГАСПИ, 521/1/17/87; 495/18/66/53); On 1 August: To the Congress of Socialist Party of Southeast of Mexico, Izamal, Yucatan (РГАСПИ, 521/1/17/91-92; 495/18/66/57-58); [In the latter half of August]: To the Federation General and the I.W.W. (РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/83). Cf. [Katayama] to the ECCI, 24.VIII.1921, РГАСПИ, 521/1/17/96-101.
- (76) At present Kheifets and his son (Л.С. & В.Л. Хейфетс), D. Spenser and others are tackling this documentation energetically and the following is the latest result: D. Spenser, *Los primeros tropiezos de la Internacional Comunista en México* (México, 2009).
- (77) The mention of Scott has been made of intermittently in memoirs and studies: e.g., T. Buck, *Canada and the Russian Revolution. The impact of the world's first socialist revolution on labor and politics in Canada* (Toronto, 1967), 88-89; W. Rodney, *Soldiers of the International. A History of the Communist Party of Canada 1919-1929* (Toronto, 1968), 35-39, 42-44, 48, 51-52. The material concerned, which was purchased in the 1990s from the Comintern Archive in РГАСПИ and other archives, is available within the conditions in the Library and Archives Canada. Recently a part of the reports of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (e.g., secret agents' reports on Scott) held by the National Archives in London was introduced in public. The environment for research on the Agency is also being created on the side of Canada. Cf. G. Bolotenko, "The National Archives and Left-Wing Sources from Russia: Records of the Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion, the Communist Party of Canada and Left-Wing Internationals," *Labour/Le Travail*, Vol.37, Spring 1996, 179-203; G.S. Kealey, "The RCMP, the Special Branch, and the Early Days of the Communist Party of Canada: A Documentary Article," *ibid.*, Vol.30, Fall 1992, 169-204.
- (78) Cf. "The Situation in South-America. Report of HENRY ALLEN, South-American Representative of the Pan-Americ. Agency of Comintern," 12.X.1921, РГАС-

ПИ, 495/79/2/5-11; 495/18/66/324-326; *Коминтерн и Латинская Америка*, 31-35 (Russian translation); В.Л. Хейфец, "Панамериканское бюро Коммунистического Интернационала и Южная Америка. Миссия Генри Аллена," *Латиноамериканский исторический альманах* (Москва), 2002, No.3, 137-150.

- (79) РГАСПИ, 495/18/65/41-44; 495/18/65/62-65; cf. "A Memorandum Prepared in Conjunction with Comrade Allen," 9.III.1921, РГАСПИ, 495/18/65/57-58; 495/18/65/54-56.
- (80) [Katayama] to Zinoviev, 24.IX.1921, РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/122-124 (My *italics*).
- (81) A. Stirner [E. Woog] (Mexico City) to Yavky [*sic*], 14.VII.1922, РГАСПИ, 521/1/74/2-3 (My *italics*).