Private Electronic Notary Service in Universities and Its Utilization in Education

Nakakuni, Masanori Research Institute For Information Technology, Kyushu University : Associate Professor : Information Science

Ito, Eisuke Research Institute For Information Technology, Kyushu University : Associate Professor : Information Science

Kasahara, Yoshiaki Research Institute For Information Technology, Kyushu University : Assistant Professor : Information Science

Dozono, Hiroshi Faculty of Science and Engineering, Saga University : Engineering

https://hdl.handle.net/2324/15941

出版情報:The 4th WSEAS/IASME International Conference on EDUCATIONAL TECHNOLOGIES (EDUTE '08), 2008-10 バージョン: 権利関係:

Private Electronic Notary Service in Universities and Its Utilization in Education

Masanori NAKAKUNI*, Eisuke ITO*, Yoshiaki KASAHARA* and Hiroshi DOZONO⁺

* Research Institute for Information Technology Kyushu University 6-10-1 Hakozaki, Higashi-ku Fukuoka 812-8581 JAPAN ⁺ Faculty of Science and Engineering Saga University 1-Honjyo Saga 840-8502 JAPAN

{nakakuni, itou}@cc.kyushu-u.ac.jp, kasahara@nc.kyushu-u.ac.jp, hiro@dna.ec.saga-u.ac.jp

Abstract: - A variety of documents are prepared and used in universities and colleges. As the internet becomes widely available in recent years, paper documents are being replaced with electronic data, which are often distributed widely through websites and other electronic resources. Such data are distributed through various routes and means, and prone to the risk of alteration in the process. Data may be protected against alteration, but it is difficult to completely prevent data alteration of data creator and possible alterations by third parties. This method is, however, not valid if the data becomes separated from the electronic signature, making the validation of data creator or data alterations difficult or impossible. In this paper, we describe the invention of a system that, even in cases where data is separated form the electronic signature, enables easy identification of possible data alterations by the electronic signature management. Construction of a prototype system is also described. We also add a review on the utilization method of private electronic notary service in universities.

Key-Words: - Notary Service, Electronic Signature, e-Learning, Digital Data Management, PKI

1 Introduction

As the internet becomes widely available in recent academic educational environment vears. has changed significantly. For example, as e-Learning system becomes more widely used, lecture materials are being switched from papers to electronic media. Recently, some universities are making attempts to distribute educational video data through their websites. In addition, changes are also seen in the receiver side of education. In a conventional system, students at University A were able to take only those lectures given at University A. In these days, introduction of credit transfer system has enabled flexible curriculum that allows students to take lectures of other universities pre-approved in interuniversity exchange program. University alliance, that is to say that the students of University A can take lectures of University B and vice versa, is becoming more common. Moreover, lectures are not limited only to students at pre-approved universities within the interuniversity exchange program, but also available residents neighboring to in the communities.

Lecture materials will be distributed even wider than ever if the lectures are to be taken not only by the university constituents but also by people outside the university. This means that the materials are more prone to alteration in the distribution process. Part of lecture materials may get dropped or miswritten in the process of passing from person to person. The causes are various including accidents and intentions. but the alterations of lecture materials without permission of the creators are likely to be disadvantageous to the creators and the viewers as well. For example, if a lecture material gets altered in a way the content is contradictory to the fact, the creator as an academic staff of the university and the university itself might lose credibility. Therefore, the creator of lecture materials must take measures against such problems if he/she is to distribute the materials in a form of easily-copiable electronic data.

2 Data management

2.1 Conventional data management and its problems

In conventional data management, anti-alteration protection was the main focus in the preventive measures against data alteration. However, prevention of data alteration is quite difficult. Even a non-editable ODF file may be forged into a closely-resembled PDF file, which is almost as same as alteration. Video data, created with non-editable setting similar to PDF, may also be converted to an editable format by using video capturing software [1, 2]. That is, even those data with highly-protective functions can be easily altered by counterfeiting because the contents are always displayed to the viewers.

2.2 Data management method in universities

In educational institutions including universities, strict management is often necessary in order to prevent alteration of data distributed by themselves. It calls for a system that ensures that the data was created by faculties or staff of the university, and that the data has not been altered. One way to do this is to utilize an assurance system similar to notary service [3, 4, 5]. In this case though, strict assurance by third party is not required and the university itself will give the assurance. Then the cost can be cut down through self-management of the notary service by the university, eliminating external commission expense. Also, all that is required is to provide a method which allows the viewers to check the possible presence of data alteration. A private electronic notary system as simple as this can be constructed and operated at low cost. Our proposed system was named PENS from the initials of "Private Electronic Notary System".

3 Data management by electronic signatures

3.1 Advantages of electronic signatures

The above-described requirements can be satisfied by the attachment of electronic signature [6] to data. A brief summary is as follows.

- Validation of data creator
 - Data creator can be identified.
 - Verification of data alteration
 - Possible presence of data alteration can be checked.

3.2 Common electronic signature methods

One of the common electronic signature methods is to embed an electronic signature in the data itself. In this case, the software that handles data must support electronic signature embedding. Software may be self-tailored to support the signature embedding, but it is often difficult in cases where the technical specifications for the software are not open. Even in cases where the technical specifications are open, the specifications may undergo changes through version upgrades, which may necessitate changes of electronic signature method and complicate the adjustment process for the continuous support of new specifications.

Another method of electronic signature is PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) [7, 8, 9]. PKI uses secret key for the attachment of electronic signature, and public key for the verification of electronic signature. In this method, electronic signature is attached in a separate form without being embedded in the data, thereby giving an advantage that the electronic signature can be applied to any formats of data. However, if data gets distributed separately, data verification or assurance is no longer possible. In order to prevent such events, electronic signature method has to be evaluated based on the premise of separate distributions of data and electronic signature.

3.3 PENS Electronic signature method

In the PENS electronic signature method, the data creator generates a message digest from the data by using hash function [10], and then register the message digest and the related information into the PENS database. PENS is therefore similar to PKI, in the way that data and the corresponding electronic signature are separated, giving an advantage that the electronic signature can be easily applied to any formats of data. The PENS database will be managed by the university. And the message digests and the related information registered in the database will be released to the viewers. The viewers will, in accordance with prescribed procedures, compare and verify the message digest of the obtained data with that registered in the database, and thereby obtain information on the data creators and possible alterations.

3.4 Manipulations of PENS electronic signatures

There are three kinds of manipulations for PENS electronic signatures; "Attachment of electronic

signature", "Invalidation of electronic signature" and "Verification of electronic signature".

Procedures for the attachment of electronic signature is shown in Figure 1. In order to attach an electronic signature, the data creator will access PENS through a web browser. The user will be prompted to enter his/her user ID and password for PENS electronic signature attachment, and the user must be pre-approved for the signature attachment. User ID will be provided to faculties, staff, and others that were approved by the university. First, the user will enter his/her PENS user ID and password to login. Next, the user will upload data to which an electronic signature is to be attached. Finally, comments may be added as needed. Attachment of electronic signature is completed through the procedures above.

Procedures for the invalidation of electronic signature is shown in Figure 2. Invalidation of previous electronic signature is necessary upon data revision. In the process of invalidation, the previous signature attachment history is kept in record while the signature invalidation history is added. Procedures are similar to those for electronic signature attachment. The user will login to PENS, upload data of which the electronic signature is to be invalidated. and add comments as needed. Invalidation of electronic signature is completed through the procedures above.

Procedures for the verification of electronic signature is shown in Figure 3. User ID and password are not required for the verification of PENS electronics signature. That is, anyone can use the verification function. The user is only required to upload data which is to be verified. If the data has a PENS electronic signature attached, information of the creator's name, etc. will be displayed on the web browser, which allows verification of the data creator and possible alterations. In case data is too large to upload to PENS, a local computer may be used to generate a message digest of the data, and only the message digest is entered on the PENS verification screen for the data verification.

3.5 Information registered in PENS database

The following information concerning signature-attached data are registered in the PENS database.

- Message digest
- Registered date in PENS
- Name of the data creator

- Department/division to which the creator belongs
- E-mail address of the creator

In addition to the information above, other information may be added as needed. Data itself is not saved in the PENS database.



Figure 1 Procedures for the attachment of electronic signature



Figure 2 Procedures for the invalidation of electronic signature

4 Construction of a prototype PENS 4.1 System construction

System architecture of the prototype is shown in Table 1. The system architecture is also shown in Figure 4.

4.2 PENS operation screens

PENS operation screens are depicted below. Figure 5 shows the PENS login screen. Figure 6 shows the screen for the attachment of electronic signature. Figure 7 shows the screen for the invalidation of electronic signature. Figure 8 shows the screen for the verification of electronic signature.



Figure 3 Procedures for the verification of electronic signature

Hardware	
CPU	Intel Xeon
Memory	2GByte
HDD	250GByte
Software	
OS	CentOS 5.1
Web Server	Apache 2.2.3
DB	MySQL 5.0
Development Language	Perl 5.8.8
Hash Function	MD5

 Table 1
 System architecture of the prototype



Figure 4 The system architecture of PENS

4.2 PENS operation screens

PENS operation screens are depicted below. Figure 5 shows the PENS login screen. Figure 6 shows the screen for the attachment of electronic signature. Figure 7 shows the screen for the invalidation of electronic signature. Figure 8 shows the screen for the verification of electronic signature. Figure 9 shows the screen for the result of verification.

4.3 Technical advantages and disadvantages in PENS

Advantages and disadvantages in the technical aspect of PENS are listed below.

- Advantages
 - Electronic signature can be applied to any formats of data.
 - Data can be easily verified and assured even in cases where data becomes separated from the electronic signature.
 - Simple and compact system enables easy operation.
 - Simple architecture enables easy manipulation of the system.
 - Costs of system introduction and operation are low.
- Disadvantage
 - > Data alterations cannot be prevented.

Private Electric Notary Service - Windows Internet Explorer
😭 🏟 🍘 Private Electric Notary Service
Private Electric Notary Service for Kyushu University
Please login to PENS.
Login ID: Password: Login Clear
Figure 5 The PENS login screen
Figure 5 The PENS login screen
Figure 5 The PENS login screen
Figure 5 The PENS login screen Private Electric Notary Service - Windows Internet Explorer Private Electric Notary Service Private Electric Notary Service for Kyushu University
Figure 5 The PENS login screen Private Electric Notary Service - Windows Internet Explorer Private Electric Notary Service Private Electric Notary Service for Kyushu University Login ID: nakakuni Department: Research Institute for Information Techno

Figure 6 The screen for the attachment

Submit

参照...

Please select target file.



Figure 7 The screen for the invalidation



🔗 Private Electric Notary Service - Windows Internet Explorer 🏠 🏠 🏉 Private Electric Notary Service Private Electric Notary Service for Kvushu Universitv Result of verification Operation: Result: Match! Message digest: 40efdbbb4fc9f0005039794989d1654b Registered date: 09/02/2008 Creator: Ichiro TANAKA Research Institute for IT Department: e-mail: ichiro@xxx.kvushu=u.ac.jp Figure 9 The screen for the result of verification

5 Example of PENS usage

Recently, it is becoming common that universities create video data to put on their websites for public access. In some cases, electronic signature is attached in order to clarify the creator. An increasing number of universities and colleges also distribute video data YouTube [11]. However, video data with on electronic signature is not necessarily compatible with YouTube. The reason is as follows. Data is automatically and compulsorily converted to FLV format [12] in the uploading process of YouTube. At this step, some video data in a particular format with electronic signature attachment may not be converted to FLV. Or the video data may be converted but the electronic signature is erased. For example, in case an electronic watermark is embedded in the video data, the watermark may become invalid by quality degradation due to the conversion to FLV format.

Therefore, video data distributed through YouTube may not contain electronic signature. On the other hand, PENS can solve the problem. First, video data will be uploaded to YouTube. Then the video data in FLV format will be downloaded from YouTube and saved to a local computer. Electronic signature can then be attached to the downloaded video data using PENS.

6 Conclusions

In this paper, we presented the invention of an electronic signature system PENS, which was based on the premise of separate distributions of data and electronic signatures. Construction of a prototype system was also described. PENS has features that enable the data creators to easily attach electronic signatures to their data and the viewers to easily verify the data creators and possible alterations, although data alterations themselves cannot be prevented. When distributing electronic documents including lecture materials, the university will provide to the viewers information on the data creators and alterations, but no other advanced functions are necessary. In this way, PENS has a simple architecture and simple functions, and still capable of contributing to the maintenance of the university's credibility. However, there is one prerequisite that none of the PENS users operates with malicious intention. Although it is difficult to eliminate all malicious users, the first measure will be to prevent unauthorized use by masquerading users who stole user IDs and passwords. Current PENS uses only user IDs and passwords for the user authentification, which does not provide a robust security. In order to improve the situation, it is necessary to incorporate other authentification methods such as biometric identification [13, 14, 15, 16, 17] and IC card identification. From the reason described above, reinforcement of the user authentification function is our main focus in the future.

References:

- [1] RipTiger.com, RipTiger,
 - http://www.riptiger.com/.
- [2] dvdshrink & ATyC Group, DVD Shrink, http://www.dvdshrink.org/.
- [3] Yoshida, A., Security of electronic patient recording system (EPRS) in a clinic, *Japan*

Journal of Medical Informatics, Volume 17, Issue 3 SUPPL., 1997, pp.317-318.

- [4] Ruotsalainen, P., Manning, B., A notary archive model for secure preservation and distribution of electrically signed patient documents, *International Journal of Medical Informatics*, Volume 76, Issue 5-6, 2007, pp.449-453.
- [5] Ota, H., Watanabe, Y., Nakao, K., Sugaya, F., Proposal and evaluation of a digital document protection scheme to specify whether the malicious entity is the sender or receiver, *Electronics & communications in Japan. Part 3, Fundamental electronic science*, Volume 88, Issue 8, 2005, pp.18-27.
- [6] TechTarget, What is digital signature?, http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0, ,sid14_gci211953,00.html.
- [7] TechTarget, What is PKI?, http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0, sid14 gci214299,00.html.
- [8] mozilla.org, Open Source PKI Projects, http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/pki/.
- [9] Stefan Kelm, The PKI page, http://www.pki-page.org/.
- [10] TechTarget, What is hashing?, http://searchsqlserver.techtarget.com/sDefinition/ 0,,sid87_gci212230,00.html.
- [11]YouTube, LLC, YouTube Broadcast Yourself., http://jp.youtube.com/.
- [12] Adobe, FLV/F4V Technology Center, http://www.adobe.com/devnet/flv/.
- [13] Hiroshi Dozono and Masanori Nakakuni et.al, The Analysis of Pen Inputs of Handwritten Symbols using Self Organizing Maps and its Application to User Authentication, *Proceedings* of the 2006 International Joint Conference on Neural Networks (IJCNN 2006), 2006, pp.4884-4889.
- [14] Hiroshi Dozono and Masanori Nakakuni et.al, The Analysis of Key Stroke Timings using Self Organizing Maps and its Application to Authentication, Proceedings of the 2006 International Conference on Security and Management (SAM'06), 2006, pp.100-105.
- [15] Masanori Nakakuni, Hiroshi Dozono, et.al, Application of Self Organizing Maps for the Integrated Authentication using Keystroke Timings and Handwritten Symbols, WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on INFORMATIONSCIENCE & APPLICATIONS, 2-4, 2006, pp.413-420.

- [16] Hiroshi Dozono, Masanori Nakakuni, et.al, An Integration Method of Multi-Modal Biometrics Using Supervised Pareto Learning Self Organizing Maps, Proceedings of the 2008 International Joint Conference on Neural Networks (IJCNN 2008), 2008, CD-ROM.
- [17] Masanori Nakakuni, Hiroshi Dozono, Ito Eisuke and Yoshiaki Kasahara, A Method of Automatic User Authentication by Fulltime Monitoringof Keystroke Timings, Proceedings of the 2008 International Conference on Security and Management (SAM'08), 2007, CD-ROM.