

# Theoretical Essays on the Political Economy of Cultural Industry and edia

罗, 小艺

<https://doi.org/10.15017/1500491>

---

出版情報 : Kyushu University, 2014, 博士 (経済学), 課程博士  
バージョン :  
権利関係 : Fulltext available.

氏 名 : 羅 小芸 (Luo Xiaoyi)

論 文 名 : Theoretical Essays on the Political Economy of Cultural Industry and Media  
(文化財産業とメディアの政治経済学：理論的分析)

区 分 : 甲

### 論 文 内 容 の 要 旨

Taking into account the contribution of cultural and creative sectors including the media to global production, the sound development of such industries should be paid more attention even in developing countries. The dissertation theoretically analyzes issues related to the development of cultural and media industries from the perspective of political economics.

Chapter 1 presents the overall structure of the dissertation and provides background information on the topics discussed in the subsequent chapters.

Chapter 2 reviews the existing literature on cultural economics and discusses the theoretical and empirical contributions to demand for cultural goods, including social factors (superstar theory, fashion and fads), consumption experience (cultivation of taste, rational addiction, learning-by-consuming, habit formation), and cultural transmission.

Chapter 3 proposes a simple dynamic monopolistic competition model to describe the protection of domestic cultural goods industries. A significant feature of cultural goods is the ambiguous distinction between producers and consumers. In particular, experience of quality when consuming various types of goods of different origins in young age produces prominent future creators. In the model, in a certain category of cultural goods, the amount of international variety consumed within a country in the current period determines the quality of the domestic creators in the next period of that country. Before globalization, the limited capacity of the domestic market meant that small countries could not consume as many international varieties as large countries, leading to lower-quality domestic creators. By contrast, globalization, which is considered to have caused a substantial decline of the costs of introducing foreign products and services, has increased the variety that consumers can consume, threatening domestic creators that are less competitive. The presented model shows that by implementing a moderate protection policy, a small country can gradually improve the quality of its domestic creators, sustaining their long-run survival and finally allowing them to stand on their own. In such a case, globalization can prove a greater boon to smaller countries. The heavy protection of domestic providers, however, which may result from a powerful political power, can hinder the long-run development of domestic cultural goods as well as harm consumer welfare. Indeed, it may even destroy the industry if an IT revolution takes place that makes the protection by the government completely void.

Chapters 4 and 5 focus on the media industry, especially the problems associated with its political independence, and argue that enhancing media independence cannot be understood as

an easy agenda for developing countries.

Chapter 4 develops a theoretical model in which the mass media may be captured by a specific stratum of society, forcing them to manipulate public opinion in favor of the interests of this specific group. In the model, the specific group decides whether to capture the media by comparing the costs and benefits of doing so. To capture a media outlet, it must compensate for the loss of reputation that the media outlet suffers by not publishing the type of hard information high-quality media are more likely to find. Reputation is modeled as the posterior public belief about the quality of that media outlet, which is affected by a rational prior expectation of the public about the probability of media capture. If the public expects a higher prior probability of media capture, the reputation loss for a media outlet by holding hard information is lower, since the public expects even quality media to act in this way. In turn, this fact implies that the necessary compensation to capture the media is lower. On the contrary, if the public expects a lower probability of media capture, presenting no hard information is more associated with lower quality and thereby the reputation loss and cost of capture are large. The model shows the possibility of multiple equilibria: one in which the media are trusted and the other in which media capture is stuck in a vicious cycle. In other words, both trusted and untrusted media should be understood as social phenomena with a self-fulfilling prophecy, not only the result of institutional and regulatory arrangements.

Chapter 5 presents a political agency model in which the policy choice by the incumbent policymaker can be distorted by the incentives to pander and discusses the influence of media independence. The incentive to pander to the electorate, namely to choose a policy popular among voters even though the policymaker knows that such a decision would be the wrong choice for the electorate, is considered to be weakened when independent media provide correct information about the consequences of the incumbent's policy choice prior to the election. Firstly, the model shows that this is true when the electorate rationally form beliefs about the type of incumbent and about their level of excellence. However, if the electorate have a strong motive to believe themselves to be excellent and resolve cognitive dissonance by distorting prior beliefs on some state variables in the process of Bayesian belief updating, greater media independence could worsen the situation.

Chapter 6 summarizes and concludes this dissertation and suggests future directions for related research.