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Modulation as a Procedural Constraint: A Relevance-theoretic Account of *After All* and *Datte**

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Abstract:

This paper proposes a relevance-theoretic procedural account of discourse connectives *after all* and *datte* — commonly recognized as the Japanese counterpart of *after all*. Relevance Theory has been consistently viewing *after all* as encoding a procedural constraint of confirming an existing assumption. This is based on the framework that the procedure it encodes is activated in dichotomous or two-term representations, consisting of conclusion and evidence. Similarly, the *datte*-clause has been generally claimed to connect the preceding clause with a justificatory relation. In contrast, this paper aims to claim *after all* and *datte* contribute to the modulation of two assumptions, i.e. the speaker's and the addressee's, and place them as a modulation marker in the relevance-theoretic framework. This view will also demonstrate that the procedure of modulation illuminates the little investigated puzzle that a single linguistic expression occurs in different contexts.

Key Words: *procedural constraint, modulation, Relevance Theory, after all, datte*

1. Revised Description of the Meaning of *After All*

1.1. Current Dichotomous Accounts

This section presents the quick overview of the current dichotomous approaches of *after all*. Let us first consider two typical uses of *after all*, which are, for the sake of explanation here, called 'concessive' and 'justificatory', as illustrated in (1a, b) respectively:

(1) a. Rang up Doreen and told her I cannot come **after all**. (BNC: H9G)
b. A: Not long ago some highly placed career men resigned their jobs because, they said, they wanted to spend more time with their families.
B: We've all heard of women giving up work for their children, but men?
A: **After all**, the government itself has felt it necessary to set up an agency simply to find fathers who want to spend no time at all with their families. (BNC: FLD)

The concessive use (1a) commonly but not necessarily occurs at the right margin of the conjunct. This use indicates a contrary relation between a previous expectation and the outcome. This relation is termed 'concession' indicating "the unexpected, surprising nature of what is being said in view of what was said before that (Quirk et al. (1972: 674))." For the present discussion, it corresponds to a contrary relation

between what was said just now and what was or was assumed to have been said before by the same person (i.e. the speaker herself). By contrast, the justificatory use (1b) is positioned outside the conjunct and it indicates the reason for what the speaker asserts in the preceding conjunct.

Regarding the analysis of these two uses, several approaches have been taken. In discourse analytic approaches, the crucial role of discourse connectives is in the identification of the particular coherence relation between two textual units (Schourup (1999: 204)). However, these approaches seem unconvincing for cases in which a discourse connective links a linguistically unarticulated constituent or in which it occurs discourse-initially. As a matter of course, these frameworks for the semantics of *after all* draw exclusive attention to the justificatory use with an explicit linking function (cf. Fraser (1990, 1996); Schourup (1999)). Even in the attempts to deal with the multiple uses of this connective, the primary purpose is to give a different functional explanation (cf. Schourup and Waida 1988) or to offer a polysemy account of such a multifunctionality (cf. Traugott (2004); Lewis (2007)). In other words, discourse-based approaches have theoretical difficulties in finding a connection between the multiple uses.

Within the discourse-based account, the concessive use and the justificatory use contribute to a different coherence relation. In the following commonly accepted formulations:

(2) a. concessive use: (*P*) *Q* after all. (*P*: previous expectation / *Q*: argument)
b. justificatory use: *P.* After all *Q.* (*P*: conclusion / *Q*: evidence)

utterances containing both uses are interpreted with regard to two propositions labeled as *P* and *Q*. The concessive use, which very often follows only a single term *Q* overtly expressed, takes effect in the schema (2a), where *P* corresponds to a previous expectation and *Q* is what Traugott (1997) calls an 'argument' expressing the denial of *P*. Thus, this use of the connective guides the addressee to recognize that the proposition expressed by *Q* is coherent as an argument with respect to the previous expectation expressed by *P*. In the justificatory use (2b), on the other hand, *P* is called a 'conclusion', whereas *Q* is a premise or 'evidence' (the latter being a term originally used by Blakemore (1987)) for validating the truth of *P*. Thus, the connective guides the addressee to recognize that the proposition expressed by *Q* is coherent as a premise with respect to the conclusion expressed by *P*. Apparently, in spite of *P* and *Q* used in the two uses, neither of the two terms represents the same property.

In Relevance Theory, on the other hand, discourse connectives serve as indicators that constrain the inferential phase of utterance. In her recent version, Blakemore (2002: 95) points out that discourse connectives "directly encode the type of cognitive effects intended". *After all* imposes a constraint on strengthening an existing assumption and, as Carston (2002: 161) suggests, the addressee is instructed to process the following clause in such a way that it provides evidence for the proposition communicated by the preceding utterance. However, this definition does not seem to unitarily capture the procedural constraint encoded by *after all*. Even the elaborate work of Blakemore does not make any direct reference to the meaning encoded by the concessive use, nor does it mention the connection between the two uses. However, we cannot find any reason to exclude from the same line of argument the concessive use grammatically classified as an adverbial phrase. Discourse connectives do not form a unified grammatical category. Rather, they include a group of non-truth conditional connective expressions which stem from diverse syntactic categories (cf. Fraser (1990: 388-389); Fraser (1999: 943)).

Fretheim (2001) offers an inspiring monosemy account. He adopts the application of a conclusion-premise deduction process into the concessive use. His relevance-theoretic monosemy account is based on the following syntactic formula: [1]

(3) a. concessive use:
Q (not necessarily ostensively communicated). *P* after all.
b. justificatory use:
P. After all, *Q* / *Q*, after all.

He claims that the procedural meaning of *after all* is to instruct the addressee to construe the proposition of the utterance modified by the connective either as a premise or as a conclusion and that the syntactic position (i.e. sentence-final or pre-/post-clausal) of the connective determines either of the two. Furthermore, this connective "activates a context in which some evidence that appears to falsify the conclusion [=*P*] is overridden by some stronger evidence [=*Q*] that support it" (p.86). This argument implicates that there is a contrast between the stronger evidence expressed by *Q* and the other contextual evidence that falsifies *P*. He insists on the dichotomous account, although he observes in other parts of his argumentations, that the concessive use "invariably cues activation of that proposition which is contradictory counterpart of the proposition expressed [=*P*] (p.90). Nevertheless, the contradictory counterpart is not included in the formulation (3a). Rather, I claim that what is contradicted in the interpretation of *after all* is not the proposition *Q* but the proposition *P*, and that a contextual assumption contradictory to *P* should thus be involved in the inferential schema.

1.2. Trichotomous accounts

My point of departure for the trichotomous account is the lexical information of *after all*. Consider examples (4a, b).

(4) a. Maggie chewed at her lip, wondering how to put it to him, but **after all** there was no way but straight out. (BNC: HGK)
b. The swirling greyness shifted again, and the shadows flooded nearer, but **after all** there was nothing to see. (BNC: G10)

The lexical information of *after all* is predictable from the sum of the meanings of the words *after* ('temporal' preposition) and *all* (universal quantifier). Example (4a) concludes that all Maggie could do was to come straight out with the truth after she considered everything about how to say what she wanted to say. In (4b), the speaker eventually concluded that there was nothing around her after considering everything about the circumstances, including what seems to falsify the assumption that there is nothing to be perceived. What both examples have in common is that this use prefaces the statement of a conclusion. The lexical function of prefacing a conclusion in the face of an assumption contrary to it thus supports the trichotomous analysis of this connective.

A monosemous relevance-theoretic account of a linguistic expression is offered on the basis of the conceptual-procedural distinction. Nicolle (1998a, 1998b) demonstrates that a monosemous characterization

of a linguistic expression can be explained by the process of "conceptual retention": conceptual information encoded by a lexical source expression still remains when it is used in certain contexts. The observation of conceptual retention in multiple uses of a linguistic expression indicates that those uses derive from conceptual information encoded by it.

In the case of *after all*, the temporal concept of 'after everything has been considered' or 'after considering everything (to the contrary) conceivable' can be inferentially enriched to give rise to the acceptability of conclusion.[2] If one reaches some conclusion after considering everything (to the contrary) conceivable, any participant has no choice but to accept it as true. Accordingly, the justificatory use invokes the acceptability of conclusion in the sense that the addressee has to accept the adequacy of the speaker's opinion or evaluation. In the concessive use as well, conclusion *P* is worthy of acceptance as an inevitable consequence of circumstances. [3]

With regard to the multifunctionality of *after all*, I therefore propose the following trichotomous formulations of assumptions and that the inferentially enriched meaning is retained in both uses.

(5) Inferential schema:
concessive use: $O\ (\neg P)$ $\underline{P \text{ after all } Q}$
justificatory use: $O\ (\neg P)$ $\underline{P \text{ after all } Q}$
(O: previous assumption / P: conclusion / Q: evidence)

The term of use reflects what part of the schema is explicitly communicated (as highlighted with underlining). What is explicitly communicated is a statement of a conclusion *P* against a previous assumption *O* in concession, and an explanation of *P* by evidence *Q* in justification. In the concessive use, a previous assumption is very rarely linguistically manifest; rather, it is explicitly communicated in the way the addressee retrieves it as being what the speaker must have stated or done. This use does not necessarily precede any constituent serving as evidence. The justificatory use, on the other hand, commonly does not involve an explicit constituent serving as a previous assumption except when it is uttered by another participant in a dialogue.

1.3. Concession/Justification and Cognitive Environments

The trichotomous representation illuminates why *after all* occurs in the context of concession and justification. First of all, consider example (6).

(6) Paul knows Paula well. He is her brother **after all**.

Without punctuation or prosodic cues, (6) is indeterminate between two possible interpretations in terms of a conclusion-evidence relation between two propositions. The concessive interpretation requires that Paul's knowledge of Paula is the evidence for his brotherhood, whereas the justificatory interpretation requires that Paul's brotherhood is the evidence for his knowledge of Paula. Obviously, identification of the interpretation of (6) involves another contextual assumption in addition to an inferential connection of two assumptions (conclusion and evidence). We cannot arrive at a relevant interpretation of it until we recognize how a previous assumption is involved in the interpretation. Concessive interpretation occurs

when the speaker's doubtful assumption about Paul being Paula's brother is made manifest, whereas justificatory interpretation occurs when the addressee's counterview against Paul knowing Paula well is anticipated. These assumptions concerning the doubt and the counterview are attributed to different cognitive environments: i.e. the speaker's and the addressee's cognitive environments. In this respect, the difference between concession and justification in the interpretation of the utterance including the connective stems from a difference in cognitive environments to which a previous assumption is attributed.

Now consider examples (7) and (8) in which the connective occurs in the same sentential position. Underlining indicates evidence.

(7) My thoughts turned to more immediate concerns, and I excused myself. When I returned, a small bouquet of three white carnations and a single red rose lay at my plate. I noticed the flower peddler was smiling. So was my husband. I smiled myself. Maybe Paris isn't so bad, **after all**.
(by Dana McMahan (maybe-pairs-http://www.bootsnall.com/articles/01-09/maybe-paris-isnt-so-bad-after-all-paris-france.html))

(8) Using the Internet at home doesn't make people more depressed and lonely **after all**. A new, longer follow-up from a study that linked Web use to poor mental health—heavily publicized three years ago—shows that most bad effects have disappeared.
(by Marilyn Elias, *USA Today* (http://www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/2001-07-23-web-depression-study.html))

What these two examples have in common is the instruction of the addressee to interpret contrary relations of opinions or evaluations between previous assumption and conclusion. In (7), the contrast between previous assumption and conclusion can be observed between 'Paris is bad' and 'Paris isn't so bad.' In (8), the contrast is found between 'Using the Internet at home often makes people more depressed and lonely' and 'Using the Internet at home doesn't often make people more depressed and lonely.' The most likely interpretation of (7) is concession because 'Paris is bad', which the addressee recognizes as a previous assumption, originally belongs to the speaker's cognitive environment. In order to accept the newly recognized assumption 'Paris isn't so bad', the addressee is then guided in the search for the most accessible evidence in the speaker's recent experiences (underlined part). It accounts for why the speaker's attitude towards the city of Paris has changed from negative to positive.

By contrast, example (8) is essentially indeterminate on its own. Nevertheless, considering the website article title "Net use doesn't increase depression," the more accessible interpretation is justification. News or entertainment articles attempt to present newsworthy topics directly taken from some recent research findings, rather than the writer's newly recognized opinions. Previous assumptions regarding the harmful effect of computers on our mental state are supposed to be in the addressee's cognitive environment. The addressee evokes a general assumption about a negative aspect of the Internet and will process the underlined discourse as evidence for the harmlessness of the Internet. Although the same cognitive process is eventually activated without the use of *after all*, the connective serves as a signal to resolve the contradiction between two contradictory assumptions by indicating that such a contradiction never fails to be resolved in the following discourse.

The procedural constraint imposed by *after all* is to constrain a context of either concession or justification through the interaction of three assumptions. As a precise guidance for determining the nature of context of interpretation, the procedure encoded by the connective can be formulated as construing the utterance containing *after all* in a context in which some evidence settles a contradiction between previous assumption and conclusion. The interaction of the interpretation between concession and justification seems to occur naturally because of the procedural constraint being activated in the inferential schema consisting of three assumptions. The interpretation of the utterance including *after all* seems essentially indeterminate. It cannot be disambiguated by its syntactic position, but rather by the context selection in which those three assumptions are interacted.

2. A Relevance-theoretic Account of *Datte*

2.1. Multifunctionality of *Datte*

Let us then examine the multiple uses of the Japanese discourse connective *datte*, which is commonly regarded as linking two conjuncts with a relation of justification. I would like to re-examine the connection *datte* is in charge of within the procedural framework.

Examples (9)-(13), cited from Japanese corpora of collected office conversations, indicate the multifunctionality of *datte*.

(9) *Hiragana wa nanameyomi ni tekisa-nai ne.*
hiragana character TOP skimming DAT appropriate-NEG PP
'A hiragana character is not appropriate for skimming, isn't it?'
Datte *koo nanameyomi tte taitei*
because in this way skimming TOP usually
kanji no hou de babababa tte iku janai.
Chinese character GEN way INS SSW QT go PP
'Because skimming usually goes more smoothly with a Chinese character in this way.'
(Female 3205; my interpretation)

(10) [A and B are naming their colleague's newborn baby.]
A: *Jaa Besuke tu u no wa doo?*
so (name) QT say NML TOP how
'So how do you like Besuke?'
B: ***Datte*** *onnanoko na-n desho?*
but girl COP (ATT)-SE PP
'But it's a girl, isn't it?' (Female 8845-8846; my interpretation)

(11) A: *Kondominiamu nanka zenzen hiroi shi saa.*
condominium TOP extremely large and PP
'Condominiums are extremely large.'
B: ***Datte*** *chanto beddorumu ga futatu mittu*
well regularly bedroom NOM two or three-CLS

toka aru no mo aru desho.
SOF exist NML also exist PP
'Well, there are also some condominiums which have about two or three bedrooms.'
(Female 638-639; my interpretation)

(12) A: *Aa mou nanka anmashi noriki-ja naku*
INJ SOF very eager-COP NEG
natte-iru-n janai?
get (TE)-ASP (NONPAST)-SE PP
'Damn it, you don't seem very eager, do you?'
B: *Ee sonnakoto nai wa yo, tada ○○-kun ga*
INJ such a thing NEG PP PP but (name)-TL NOM
honto kadouka tte yuu no ga shinpaina dake da kedo.
eager COMP QT say NML NOM afraid just COP but
'What? I'm eager, but I'm just afraid whether Mr. ○○ is eager or not.'
A: *Sonnaa imasara nani?*
INJ after such a long time what
'Oh no, why do you tell me after such a long time?'
B: S*o-ja nai,* ***datte…***
true-COP NEG well…
'No, it's not so, well…' (Female 7104-7107; my interpretation)

(13) A: *○○-chan no kao mi nagara ie-nai.*
(name)-TL GEN face look while say can-NEG
'I cannot say anything while looking face to face at Miss ○○.'
B: *Nandee?*
'Why?'
A: ***Datte datte…***
'Well, well….' (Male 10496-10498; my interpretation)

Example (9) is the monological *datte*. It literally justifies the opinion of the speaker and it is interchangeable with 'because' in English. *Datte* in example (10) is a disagreement use, which occurs at the beginning of the dialogue and objects to the other speaker's opinion. It is interchangeable with 'but' in English. In example (11), *datte* conveys the agreement or sympathy with the other speaker's opinion. In examples (12) and (13), *datte* does not follow any constituent. The so-called one-word utterance of *datte* in (12) does not follow any explanation of reason. In (13), *datte* is repeated twice as '*datte datte*' without adding any explanation of the reason. The purpose of this use is not to convey information but to convey the speaker's emotive attitude. As these examples show, the use of *datte* exhibits a variety of contrasting aspects: monologic or dialogic in context, disagreement or agreement, or logic or emotion. These contrasting aspects seem to complicate the description of the meaning of *datte*. However, we will be able to reveal a monosemy of *datte* if we find a common cognitive ground in which it occurs. Considering the fact that it occurs

utterance-initially and that in most cases it conveys the speaker's emotive attitude, discourse approaches whose aim is to identify the cohesiveness of discourse are also insufficient for the analysis of *datte*.

2.2. What *Datte* Connects

Dichotomous view also seems dominant in the analysis of *datte*. The most intriguing question is what *datte* connects. The leading research on the meaning of *datte* is a conversational approach found in Maynard (1993) and Hasunuma (1995). Maynard (1993) claims the discourse function of *datte* is to self-justify the speaker's own position in order to object to or challenge the other speaker's position. Her polysemy account of *datte* is based on the convergence of two interpretations: 'because' and 'but'. Modifying Maynard's dichotomous account, Hasunuma (1995) attempts a trichotomous account in which *datte* justifies the utterance or action indicating the speaker's position. Utterances containing *datte* are interpreted in the trichotomous schema [O but P because Q]. The focus of her schema is to categorize the uses into four types, rather than to describe the monosemy of *datte*. In the 'protest' and 'challenge' types, the speaker protests against the addressee's challenge. The 'supplementary explanation' type justifies the speaker's own position. The 'compromise' type is a fusion of the 'challenge' and the 'supplementary explanation' types.

In these conversational approaches, the notion of 'position' seems to make the analysis itself ambiguous. Consider (14), taken from Takiura (2003).

(14) *Oi mada ka? **Datte** isogu-n daro?*
INJ not yet Q because hurry up-SE PP
'Did you finish preparation? Because you need to hurry up, don't you?' (Takiura 2003)

Hasunuma's schema would expect example (14) to be interpreted as the protest between the other speaker's position O and the speaker's (*datte*-user's) position P, which is realized as the [O *datte* Q] structure. Takiura points out that example (14) explicates only the speaker's position, and therefore, it should be categorized into the supplementary explanation type: [P *datte* Q] structure.

The ambiguity of whose position is being expressed is also seen in Hasunuma's example (15).

(15) A: *Oryouri no tegiwa ii desu ne.*
cooking (POL) GEN skill good COP (POL) PP
'You're skillful at cooking, aren't you?'
B: ***Datte**, shigoto o motteitara ryouri ni*
because job ACC have (COND) cooking DAT
jikan kakeraremasen kara ne.
time (ACC) spend can (POL)(NEG) because PP
'Because if we have a job, we cannot spend time on cooking.' (Hasunuma 1995)

The natural interpretation of example (15) is that it has the [P *datte* Q] structure as (14) does. Nevertheless, Hasunuma's schema expects example (15) to be mistakenly categorized into the protest type, because

(15A) indicates the other speaker's position or view toward the *datte*-user.

The only way to solve the issues in (14) and (15) is to assume that *datte* connects the speaker's or *datte*-user's assumption that precedes the *datte*-clause, whether it is explicitly communicated or not. In (14), for instance, the *datte*-clause follows the reason for the assumption such as "You should get prepared as soon as possible" represented by the preceding utterance "*Oi madaka*?" Likewise, the *datte*-clause in (15) is assumed to follow the reason for the speaker's unarticulated proposition such as "Cooking should be skillfully done." In addition to the problem of 'position', Maynard's and Hasunuma's frameworks treat the meaning of *datte* as a contrast between opposition and justification, and therefore, those frameworks need a new proposal for the analysis of the agreement use.

There have been some attempts to propose a unitary account. Takiura (2003) reduces the discourse function of *datte* into the justification of the speaker's opinion *P* by *Q*, whether *O* or *P* is explicitly communicated or not, as (16) indicates.

(16) Whether *O* or *P* is stated explicitly or not, "*datte Q*" justifies *P*. (Takiura 2003)

Takiura's unified description, however, does not make any mention of the case of the agreement use and one-word *datte* utterances, in which *Q* is not linguistically articulated. More intriguing is to account for how the self-justification of *P* leads to the agreement of *O* in a cognitively sound way.

Oki's (1996, 2006) unitary account is based on the deletion hypothesis (17):

(17) [situation: N]
A: 「[X]」
B: 「([P]) *datte* [Q]」 (Oki 2006)

In her hypothesis, the monosemy of *datte* is to explain the reason for the bracketed deleted conjunct *P*. Whether *P* shows agreement or disagreement depends upon "situation N" (whether speaker A and B are in an opposition or in an affinity) and speaker A's utterance X. Let us consider how it works in examples (18-19).

(18) A: *Shiken mae dakara benkyo shinasai.*
exam before because study do (IMP)
'Study because the exam is coming so close.'
B: *(Benkyo shi-nai.)* ***Datte*** *tukare-chatta-n da mono.*
study do-NEG because tired-ASP (PAST)-SE COP PP
'(I don't intend to study.) Because I got tired.' (Oki 2006; my interpretation)

(19) A: *Ara Terebi keshi-chatta no?*
INJ television switch off-ASP (PAST) Q
'Did you switch off the television?'
B: *(Keshi-ta yo)* ***datte*** *tumaranai-n da mono.*
(switch off-ASP (PAST) PP) because boring-SE COP PP
'(I switched it off.) Because it is boring.' (Oki 2006; my interpretation)

According to the hostile relation between two speakers and the content X of utterance A, it follows that the *datte*-clause in (18) justifies the deleted conjunct "*Benkyo shinai* (I don't intend to study)." In example (19), the hostile relation between two speakers and the content of X in utterance A tells us what is deleted before the *datte*-clause and that the *datte*-user opposes speaker A.

Examples (20-21) exhibit the *datte*-user's agreement or sympathy toward the other speaker.

(20) A: *Gomen. Okurechatta*.
sorry late
'I'm sorry I'm late.'
B: *(Ii yo.)* ***Datte*** *kyou gakko a-tta mon ne*.
(good PP) because today school exist-ASP (PAST) PP PP
'It's OK. Because you had classes today.' (Oki 2006; my interpretation)

(21) A: *Ashita skii ni iku-n da.*
tomorrow ski DAT go-SE PP
'Tomorrow I'll go skiing.'
B: *(Soo yokatta ne.)* ***Datte*** *hisabisa-no*
(INJ good PP) because after a long time-COP (ATT)
oyasumi da mon ne.
holiday (POL) COP PP PP
'(Really? That's good.) Because tomorrow will be your first holiday in a while.'
(Oki 2006; my interpretation)

In both examples, Oki's deletion hypothesis would predict that the *datte*-user's agreement or sympathy utterances to the other speaker are deleted. This is based on the affinity between two speakers and the content of utterance A.

However, the deletion hypothesis poses some questions. First, the relations between two speakers are not always clear-cut, for instance, in example (19), where the speaker does not necessarily intend to form a hostile relation with the other speaker. In addition, it should be made clear how the deletion hypothesis consistently accounts for the most cases where *P* is explicit and how the proposition that is assumed be deleted can be selected. We further need a comprehensive schema for the account of a one-word utterance and the speaker's emotion it conveys.[4]

2.3. Unitary Accounts

This section claims a unitary account of *datte* within a relevance-theoretic framework. Considering the conceptual-procedural distinction, *datte* encodes a constraint on the type of inference. In my framework, it activates the following inferential schema in which three assumptions O, P and Q are involved:

(22) Inferential schema of *datte*
[O P *datte* Q]
O: addressee's assumption

P: speaker's (*datte* user's) assumption
Q: explanation of the reason for P

There are a few points that differentiate my trichotomous account from Hasunuma's. First, O, P and Q indicate assumptions communicated by utterances or other stimuli, rather than someone's position. Second, the use of *datte* constrains the context selection. This is different from Hasunuma's trichotomy in which multiple functions of *datte* are accounted for by the partial manifestation of three terms such as "O *datte* Q" or "P *datte* Q". Functions exhibited by *datte* — self-justification, opposition, and agreement — are based on the resolution of the cognitive gap between speaker and addressee.

Using this hypothesis, I will develop a unitary account. Let us first re-examine the monologic *datte* in example (9).

(9) *Hiragana wa nanameyomi ni tekisa-nai ne.*
hiragana character TOP skimming DAT appropriate-NEG PP
'A hiragana character is not appropriate for skimming, isn't it?'
Datte *koo nanameyomi tte taitei*
because in this way skimming TOP usually
kanji no hou de bababababa tte iku janai.
Chinese character GEN way INS SSW QT go PP
'Because skimming usually goes more smoothly with a Chinese character in this way.'

This use does not require the addressee's linguistically articulated proposition. But the procedure encoded by *datte* instructs the addressee to access some assumption contrary to the speaker's assumption of claiming the inappropriateness of a hiragana character for skimming. In this interpretation, three assumptions are interacted as in (23).

(23) *Speaker's (datte-user's) assumption*: A hiragara character is not appropriate for skimming.
Addressee's assumption: some assumption that is contrary to the inappropriateness of a hiragana character for skimming.
Explanation of the reason: Skimming usually goes more smoothly with a Chinese character.

The use of *datte* is temporarily instructed to form a cognitive gap between speaker and addressee. The gap will be solved when the addressee processes the *datte*-clause as the explanation for the speaker's opinion of the inappropriateness of a hiragana character for skimming. It operates as interpersonal rhetoric, inducing the addressee to agree with the speaker's opinions. This use is similar to the justificatory use of *after all* in English.

The objection use in example (10) can be reduced to self-justification.

(10) [A and B are naming their colleague's newborn baby.]
A: *Jaa Besuke tu u no wa doo?*
so (name) QT say NML TOP how

'So how do you like Besuke?'
B: ***Datte*** *onnanoko na-n desho?*
but girl COP (ATT)-SE PP
'But it's a girl, isn't it?'

Speaker A (a man) and speaker B (a woman) are talking about naming their colleague's newborn baby. Speaker A names the newborn baby by the classical male name in a jesting manner, but speaker B promptly points out to him that the baby is female. *Datte* in example (10) activates a schema such as (24).

(24) *Addressee's assumption*: *Besuke* is an appropriate name for the newborn baby.
Speaker's (datte-user's) assumption: *Besuke* is not appropriate.
Explanation of the reason: The newborn baby is female.

The appropriateness of a classical male name for a girl baby is communicated by speaker A's suggestion "*Jaa, Besuke tuuno-wa doo?* (So how do you like *Besuke*?)". In response to speaker A, the *datte*-clause does not precede any explicit proposition to justify. Considering the objective nature of speaker B's utterance, however, the addressee accesses some assumption of the speaker that indicates *Besuke* is not appropriate as the baby's name. A cognitive gap the addressee feels is resolved when he interprets the *datte*-clause as the explanation of the *datte* user's assumption. The *datte*-user's intention of self-justification is recognized through the process in which the addressee accepts the *datte*-user's assumption and eliminates his own assumption. This discussion implies that the same inferential schema can be applied to both examples of objection and justification, which have been differentiated in the prior research.

According to Maynard (2000), *datte* conveys the speaker's emotion. It is an emotive attitude coming to the front accompanying the content of a linguistic expression. As far as justification is concerned, logic and emotion cannot be separated. Let us consider the one-word *datte* utterance in example (12).

(12) A: *Aa mou nanka anmashi noriki-ja naku*
INJ SOF very eager-COP NEG
natte-iru-n janai?
get (TE)-ASP (NONPAST)-SE PP
'Damn it, you don't seem very eager, do you?'
B: *Ee sonnakoto nai wa yo, tada ○○-kun ga*
INJ such a thing NEG PP PP but (name)-TL NOM
honto kadouka tte yuu no ga shinpaina dake da kedo.
eager COMP QT say NML NOM afraid just COP but
'What? I'm eager, but I'm just afraid whether Mr. ○○ is eager or not.'
A: *Sonnaa imasara nani?*
INJ after such a long time what
'Oh no, why do you tell me after such a long time?'
B: *So-ja nai,* ***datte...***
true-COP NEG well…

'No, it's not so, well…'

In (12), speaker A is afraid that speaker B is not so eager. Speaker B or the *datte*-user is explaining that actually he is, but he cannot identify any appropriate reason. Even in this use, *datte* constrains the procedure of conforming speaker A's assumption that speaker B is not so eager to the *datte* user's assumption that actually he is, with the reason or explanation followed by *datte*. *Datte* user's emotive attitude such as an urgent desire to justify is conveyed because the addressee has no alternative but to conform his own assumption to the *datte*-user's without appropriate reasons.

The speaker's emotive attitude will be strengthened when *datte* is repeated twice in example (13).

(13) A: *○○-chan no kao mi nagara ie-nai.*
(name)-TL GEN face look while say can-NEG
'I cannot say anything while looking face to face at Miss ○○.'
B: *Nandee?*
'Why?'
A: ***Datte datte…***
'Well, well….'

Datte-datte conveys the speaker's emotive attitude to ask the addressee to recognize some reason that cannot be easily stated or her resignation that it cannot be logically explained anymore. Speaker B has no alternative but to conform, by some unarticulated reason, some assumption communicated by the utterance "*Nandee* (Why?)", for instance, that speaker A should be able to talk face to face to a person named such and such, to speaker A's assumption that he cannot do so. One-word *datte* utterances convey the speaker's emotive attitude rather than the logic of justification. The procedure of conforming the other speaker's assumption to the *datte*-user's assumption without any appropriate reason would raise the *datte*-user's emotive attitude.

Finally, let us consider the use of *datte* in the agreement context.

(11) A: *Kondominiamu nanka zenzen hiroi shi saa.*
condominium TOP extremely large and PP
'Condominiums are extremely large.'
B: ***Datte*** *chanto beddorumu ga futatu mittu*
well regularly bedroom NOM two or three-CLS
toka aru no mo aru desho.
SOF exist NML also exist PP
'Well, there are also some condominiums which have about two or three bedrooms.'

In (11), speaker A shows his view on the size of condominiums and the *datte*-user (speaker B) agrees to it with a *datte*-clause. The use of *datte* here involves three assumptions as (25).

(25) *Addressee's assumption*: Condominiums are extremely large.

Speaker's (datte-user's) assumption: some assumption that agrees on the size of condominiums.
Explanation of the reason: Some condominiums have two or three bedrooms.

In the agreement context, it is assumed that speaker B or *datte*-user has a similar idea to speaker A's. Nevertheless, the identity of ideas between the two is not always guaranteed, so the *datte*-user attempts to conform her idea to the speaker A's. This is realized by a *datte*-clause giving the reason or evidence for agreeing on its size. Compared with a simple agreement response, the *datte*-clause requires more processing effort for the interpretation, but it will meet the appropriate effects to convey the *datte*-user's honest intention to agree and also to indirectly justify the addressee's idea. These effects will not be conveyed by the agreement simply uttered like "*So dane* (Yes, they are)."

The conformity between two assumptions cannot be always successful. Examples (26-27) and the judgment of the two examples are cited from Oki (2006).

(26) A: *Osoji* *shinasai*
cleaning (POL) do (IMP)
'Clean up the room.'
B: ? ***Datte*** *kireini shi-nakyaikenai mono ne.*
because clean do-AUX PP PP
'Because the room must always be kept clean, mustn't it?' (Oki 2006; my interpretation)

(27) A: *Ashita* *skii ni* *ika nai?*
tomorrow ski DAT go Q
'Would you like to go skiing tomorrow?'
B: ? ***Datte*** *oyasumi* *da* *mon ne.*
because holiday (POL) COP PP PP
'Because tomorrow is a holiday.' (Oki 2006; my interpretation)

Two speakers in both examples are in an affinity relation (in the agreement context). Nevertheless, the use of *datte* without preceding utterances is not fully acceptable. Although Oki (2006) merely proposes this question, these examples illuminate that the conformity of assumptions does not succeed. In (26), the agreement with *datte* would be acceptable when the conformity of the *datte*-user's assumption to the speaker A's is motivated on an ordinary basis, such as when speaker B is regularly obliged to clean up his room. In (27), when speaker B attempts to agree with the *datte* clause, there is not an appropriate assumption to which she conforms her assumption. If A's utterance is the one that more clearly represents his desire to go skiing with speaker B, such as "*Ashita Isshoni ski ni iko yo* (Let's go skiing tomorrow)," agreement with the *datte* clause would be more acceptable.

3. Modulation as a procedure

The trichotomous analysis would reveal that the procedural constraint encoded by *datte* lies in the modulation of two assumptions, the speaker's and the addressee's, as (28) indicates.

(28) addressee's assumption → MODULATION ← speaker's (*datte*-user's) assumption

In this hypothesis, the precise description of the meaning of *datte* is to process the following clause in such a way that both assumptions are conformed. That is, the *datte*-clause is processed as the explanation of the reason for the assumption represented by the preceding utterance, whether articulated or not, in such a way that the addressee's assumption is conformed to the *datte*-user's assumption in the case of justification, and the *datte*-user's assumption is conformed to the addressee's assumption in the case of agreement. Thus, the conformity of assumptions indicates the opposite direction between justification and agreement.

By contrast, in the case of *after all*, modulation between two assumptions is unidirectional: i.e. conforming the addressee's assumption to the speaker's. In the context of concession, the addressee, who is confronted with a transition from a previous assumption to a conclusion, is thrown into a temporary state of uncertainty. In typical cases of the concessive use, the addressee is relieved at last of a cognitive state of uncertainty when taken-for-granted assumptions, such as a change of circumstances or a change of mind, are implicated as tentative evidence for the change of events or the speaker's intentions (i.e. why one assumption changed to another).

In the context of justification, on the other hand, a cognitive state that *after all* induces the addressee to get involved in is presumably a logical incompatibility between the speaker's argument and the addressee's counter-argument or general assumption that is inferentially evoked as a previous assumption. The only way to be completely relieved of this cognitive gap is to interpret the proposition following *after all* as strong evidence for the preceding proposition. In other words, as a successful form of justification, it adjusts the addressee's argument to conform to the speaker's conclusion by means of the latter's acceptance. If the addressee's opinion is opposed to that of the speaker, the cognitive effect is further realized in the form of the addressee withdrawing his own opinion and forming the same opinion as that of the speaker. On the other hand, even if the addressee does not have any specific opinion about the conclusion conveyed by the speaker, justification will succeed in the way she leads the addressee to agree with her opinion and influences his attitude without allowing him to have his own perspective in advance.

Procedural accounts are more advantageous than discourse or coherence accounts in the sense that the former can offer a fine-grained description of how each discourse connective makes a different contribution to the interpretation of the utterance in which it is used. Classifications based on coherence relations do not "reflect the (very subtle) distinctions between the meanings of certain connectives" belonging to the same coherence category (cf. Blakemore (2002: 170); Blakemore (2004: 235)). In fact, the category of 'justification' or 'giving a reason' cannot differentiate the meaning between *after all* and *because*, *for* or *since*, and between *datte* and the equivalent counterparts such as *nazenara* and *toiunowa*. Both pairs of discourse connectives induce a similar interpretation except for one crucial respect. *Because* and *nazenara* seem to affect the truth conditions of the utterance including them, whereas *after all* and *datte* do not. The use of *because* and *nazenara* implies that the speaker is asserting the truth of the causal relation between the two propositions, and the addressee is still entitled to his neutrality regarding whether he is able to accept or reject the adequacy of this causal relation. It therefore allows other arguments about the opinion to be presented because they might potentially deserve equal consideration. By contrast, *after all* and *datte* introduce a highly accessible assumption for explaining the preceding clause, and modulation as a

procedural constraint encoded by these two discourse connectives implies that the addressee should have no natural alternative but to accept the adequacy of the speaker's opinion. In this respect, the view of modulation as a procedural constraint corresponds with the rhetorical pattern in which these two discourse connectives are commonly used including the addressee's standpoint.

4. Concluding Remarks

This paper has attempted to place *after all* and the Japanese discourse connective *datte* as a modulation marker within the relevance-theoretic framework. I claim modulation is an inferential process in the sense that the speaker's assumption and the addressee's assumption are modulated to arrive at an intended interpretation of the utterance.

Obviously, my relevance-theoretic analyses of *after all* and *datte* are more complex than those originally proposed. In the framework of modulation, although the procedural constraint encoded by each is different, these two connectives can be regarded as consisting of two instructions: first, accessing the addressee's assumption; and then, minimizing the cognitive gap between the addressee's assumption and the speaker's assumption which is realized by the preceding utterance. Accordingly, it may be concluded that *after all* and *datte* do not directly impose a constraint on cognitive effects as the current relevance-theoretic account defines, but constrains the context selection.

Notes

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1 In order to maintain a consistency with the inferential schema (2b) and further extended schemas in this article, the notation of *P* and *Q* in (3a) and (3b) is an inversion of Fretheim (2001).

2 The present-day common use of *after all* has its roots in the phrase 'after all is said and done' (Blass (1990: 129)) and the OED[2] defines the original meaning as 'after considering everything to the contrary' and explains that this reduced expression appeared for the first time in 1712.

3 Note that the acceptability of conclusion is an inferentially enriched meaning from the lexical information, not an implicature, because it is difficult to cancel; see Nicolle (1998b: 230-231) for further discussion.

4 Kubo (1999) also questions what drives deletion.

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Data References

BNC = The British National Corpus
Female = *Josei no kotoba- shokuba hen* (*Language of Women: Office Edition*), *Gendai nihongo kenkyukai*

(ed.), 1999, Tokyo: Hituji Shobo.
Male = *Dansei no kotoba-shokuba hen (Language of Men: Office Edition)*, *Gendai nihongo kenkyukai* (ed.), 2002, Tokyo: Hituji Shobo.

Abbreviations

ACC: accusative / ASP: aspect / ATT: attributive form / AUX: auxiliary / CLS: classifier / COMP: complementizer / COND: conditional form / COP: copular / DAT: dative / GEN: genitive / IMP: imperative form/ INJ: interjection / INS: instrumental / NEG: negative / NML: nominalizer / NOM: nominative / POL: polite form / PP: pragmatic particle / Q: question marker / QT: quotative / SE: sentence extender / SOF: softener / SSW: sound-symbolic word / TE: *-te* (conjunctive) form / TL: title / TOP: topic