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JAPANESE FEMINISTS AFTER VERSAILLES

BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE ETHNIC NATION

Andrea Germer
One of the striking effects of the end of WWI and the Paris Peace Conference on Japanese society was the renewed impetus it gave to women's rights discourses and feminist organizing in the 1920s. These events spurred a new consciousness and assertive attitude of women who began to frame themselves as full members of the nation-state. They also fuelled developments in cultural feminist theories that called for an ethnic awakening to womanhood. In this article, I introduce various feminist stances towards the Japanese state, the family, and by extension the ethno-cultural nation at the end of World War I and argue that these help explain Japanese feminists' varied reactions towards the League of Nations and eventually towards Japan's withdrawal from the international system founded in Versailles.

“We Japanese women received an unprecedented stimulus in 1919. We have been touched by the world, and at the same time by the future. We, who for long have been functional beings bound by the constraints of the family and convention, have made one leap forward, encountered the life of the world, and have even come to have a say in what the ideal of life in the future is—a drastic and amazing change indeed.”—Yosano Akiko, 1920

In the aftermath of World War I and the Paris Peace Conference, Japanese society experienced a “shock wave” of women's rights discourses that were set off by these events. As the poet and feminist Yosano Akiko (1878–1942) proclaimed in 1920, this meant an “unprecedented stimulus” for the emergence of new movements that were underpinned by a new consciousness and understanding of women's rights, as well as an assertive attitude on the part of women who began framing themselves as full members of the nation-state, and as participants with voices that would reach an international audience. The historian Barbara Molony explains lucidly that Japanese feminists' previous campaigns for civil rights since the Meiji period (1868–1912), including education for women, had transformed into campaigns for political rights by the beginning of the 1920s—due in part to inspiration from women's movements outside of Japan.

In this article, I consider feminist positions as they developed after World War I, the Paris Peace Conference and the League of Nations—together known as the “Versailles order” in Japan—within the context of
the domestic women's movements of early twentieth-century Japan. My questions include the following: How did feminists in Japan connect their agendas to the frameworks of the state (kokka) or the ethnic nation (minzoku)? How did they perceive themselves as citizens (kokumin) or subjects (shinmin) within the Japanese monarchy? And finally, how did they eventually relate to the international level within the framework of the Versailles order, which opened up a liberal space within which to pursue the struggle for equal rights at the same time as it produced winners and losers and re-confirmed ideologies of racial inequality?

The Secretary of the International Committee of Women for Permanent Peace called upon Japanese women in 1915 and 1916 to join the Second International Women's Conference. It was only in 1919, however—the same year the Paris Peace Conference began—that the Study Group on International Problems was formed. The group was initiated by Nitobe Inazo (1862–1933), a government bureaucrat and soon to become Under Secretary General of the League of Nations upon its establishment in 1920. Out of this group subsequently evolved the Women's Peace Association (Fujin Heiwa Kyokai), in 1921. Nitobe's call on Japanese women to participate in peace activities of the League of Nations in 1924 was answered by the students of the Japan Women's University, who finally established the Students' Branch of the League of Nations within their university in 1927. The Japan Women's Committee for International Relations was formed only in 1929, primarily to facilitate appointments of women for projects linked to the League of Nations. As the historian Leila Rupp observed in her seminal work on feminist internationalism, activists “found that their concrete work led inexorably to the League of Nations,” and the historian Angela Woollacott noted that the internationalist zeal spawned during the war by Wilson’s Fourteen Point Plan contributed to women’s identification as political actors. In Japan as well, where women would not be enfranchised until 1946, such developments stimulated local, national, and regional feminist organizing, although to a much lesser degree at the international level.

From its beginning in the late eighteenth century, the international women’s movement was predominantly bourgeois and dominated by European women. It was only after World War I and the establishment of the League of Nations and its affiliated organizations such as the International Labour Organisation (ILO) that Japanese women began to join the international women’s movement in 1923 (International Alliance of Women, IAW) and in 1924 (Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, WILPF). Japanese activists had clearly joined late in the game, and it was only toward the end of the 1920s—at regional meetings such as the First Pan-Pacific Women’s Conference in Honolulu of 1928 and the All Asian Women’s Conference of 1931 in India—that they began appearing as
speakers. Even then, however, Japanese women remained on the margins organizationally.

Rather than exploring the contributions of Japanese activists to internationalist networks, this article seeks to differentiate the ways within which Japanese feminists have positioned themselves regarding the institutions of the state, the family, and the cultural nation in Japan; and to relate the development of their statist, state-critical, or ethno-cultural positions within domestic debates to their stances vis-à-vis the post-World War I international order as framed by the League of Nations.

Japanese Women Since the Late Nineteenth Century

Despite Japanese women's relative "muteness" in the international arena, the impact of international women's activism on the domestic struggle since the late nineteenth century has been significant. Mrs. Mary Leavitt, the "travelling envoy of the Women's Christian Temperance Movement," visited Japan in 1886, leaving the Tokyo WCTU in her wake. In 1893 this became the Japan WCTU, which mainly advocated monogamous marriage and the abolition of government-licensed prostitution. Between 1904 and 1909, socialist feminists formed a short-lived and unsuccessful movement to petition against Article Five of the Public Peace Police Law of 1900, which severely restricted public political actions by women. Since the 1890s, the ideal of the "Good wife, wise mother" (ryōsai kenbo) had taken root in the Japanese state's educational programs for women. At the same time as this development ideologically confined women to the family, it also framed them as servants to the nation-state through public campaigns advocating pursuits such as savings and frugality. By the beginning of the Taishō period (1912—1926), women's higher education since the turn of the century had also led to the emergence of a new group of educated women. Some of them launched the first feminist literary journal Seito (Bluestocking) in 1911, where they published and discussed works of Western feminisms including texts by Ellen Key, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, J.S. Mill, and literary works, particularly Henrik Ibsen's play Nora. While Western feminist internationalists rallied for peace in 1915, Japanese women—for whom, with the exception of petitioning, political activity was altogether illegal—were grappling with the norms of the "Good Wife, wise mother" (ryōsai kenbo). They were also seeking ways of individual self-expression, including sexuality, while re-defining their place as "New Women" within the increasingly liberal cultural sphere of metropolitan Tokyo during the so-called Taishō democracy. Consumerism held sway, and was part of what constituted the image of the urban "Modern Girl." By the mid-Taishō period, a number of
intellectual journals and progressive print media targeting women provided forums for feminist debate. One such major discussion among feminist intellectuals concerning the relationship between women/mothers and the state in 1918–1919 coincided with the end of World War I.\textsuperscript{16}

**Women and the Nation-State: The Motherhood Protection Debate**

The so-called Motherhood Protection Debate (bosei hogo ronsō) was an important public discussion occurring within the Japanese women’s movement with regard to political conditions and the state’s responsibilities for protecting mothers and children.\textsuperscript{17} The various standpoints of this debate have been identified within the existing research as socialist, liberal, maternalist, and equal rights feminisms.\textsuperscript{18} Viewed from a different angle, I examine a structural dimension of the debate by focusing on how the participants referred their arguments to the institutions and concepts of the state, nation, and family.\textsuperscript{19} In doing so, I make reference to postcolonial historian Partha Chatterjee’s distinction of the cultural national domain, and the domain of the state as an inherently Western structure.\textsuperscript{20} I also refer to the terms used by the historian Kevin Doak, who has shown how different concepts of an integrative political state and genealogical ethnic nation competed in Japan since the Meiji period (1868–1912). Concepts of cultural and ethnic nationalism (minzokushugi) initially served as both criticism and populist attack against the political state in modern Japan. By the 1920s, however, such concepts were also utilized by the state to identify with and justify the project of imperial Japan.\textsuperscript{21}

The Motherhood Protection Debate began in January 1918 with the poet Yosano Akiko judging Western feminisms’ expectation of support for young mothers from the state, as well as from men, to be “parasitic” (kiseiteki).\textsuperscript{22} In her view, only economically independent women should give birth and become mothers.\textsuperscript{23} In asserting that children “are not the property of the state,” she explicitly denied the legitimacy of the state’s interest in children.\textsuperscript{24} Yosano did not directly refer to the state as an inherently Western structure. However, her critique of the state was mediated through her rejection of Western feminisms’ conceptions of the state, and thus implicitly turned against Western notions of the institution. Yosano voiced her anti-state position both before and after the Motherhood Protection Debate, wherein she articulated the need for separation between the individual and the state. She is famous for her anti-war poem during the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5), *Kimi shini tamō koto nakare*, where she admonished her brother not to serve and risk his life: “Oh, my Brother, I weep for you. Do not give your life. . . . / For you, what does it matter/ Whether Port Arthur Fortress falls or
not?"

The poem stressed the priority of family bonds; and when Yosano repudiated any state intervention, she did so as much on the grounds of individualism as on the grounds of emotional and family connections.

The other major proponent in this debate was Hiratsuka Raichō (1886–1971), who had been the chief editor of Seiitō, and who responded by justifying demands for state protection of pregnant women and mothers. Hiratsuka was influenced by Swedish social reformer Ellen Key, as well as by discussions of human rights and national self-determination after the end of World War I. Beginning in 1919, she explicitly stressed the idea of human rights for women and children. She connected her statist position with demands of feminists from other countries, and her voice may be seen as part of a broader international political discourse within which motherhood was gradually transformed from a private affair into a social and public responsibility. Her acceptance of the state as an inherently Western structure was mediated through an appraisal of Western feminists’ demands for a welfare state.

The socialist feminist contributor to the debate, Yamakawa Kikue (1890–1980), admonished both Hiratsuka’s and Yosano’s approaches for their lack of a basic critique of capitalism. She insisted, instead, that true protection and the right to exist would only be guaranteed in a society where the conditions of life and work had been transformed, for example, through socialism. In this, Yamakawa, a translator of August Bebel’s Women under Socialism, was similar to German Socialist women who denounced bourgeois feminism and maintained that the emancipation of women could not be achieved without radically transforming the class system. In line with international movements of “women workers in Europe and the United States,” Yamakawa rejected the notion that motherhood protection was “parasitic.” Rather, she called it a scientifically proven need, and advocated the unionization of housewives in the same way as the representation of workers. Thus Yamakawa’s position was critical of the state not as a Western structure, but rather in terms of its capitalist and bourgeois nature.

A fourth famous participant, Yamada Waka (1879–1957), demanded (in close resemblance to Ellen Key) legal protection for mothers, while also arguing for higher respect toward married women. She held that motherhood and housewifery characterized the true calling (tenshoku) of every woman, which the state was obliged to support. Yamada basically expounded the Japanese state’s educational ideal of the “Good wife, wise mother” in her contributions to this debate and in her numerous later writings. She formed a major link between the feminist circles of the Taishō period and the organized state-sponsored mass associations of women such as the Patriotic Women’s Association (Aikoku Fujinkai), to whose publications she regularly contributed articles beginning in 1921. In this respect, she
continuously argued for the elevation of women’s status in the home to their role as servants of the Japanese state. Despite borrowing from Key’s writings, Yamada criticized contemporary feminists who supported their arguments with examples from Europe and the United States. Instead, she stressed the uniqueness of Japan and the Japanese gender model. Yamada’s “statism” went well beyond that of others by arguing for the feminist elevation of the Japanese state’s *ryōsai kenbo* ideology. She implicitly rejected the idea of the state as an inherently Western structure when she claimed an essentially “Japanese” version of both the state and of “womanhood.” Her ethno-cultural and simultaneously statist position was clear from around 1919, and she would continue to articulate this stance through the 1930s.

Another anti-state position in Yosano’s vein was developed by maternalist Takamure Itsue (1894–1964) beginning in the 1920s. Although not directly involved in the Motherhood Protection Debate, Takamure was deeply influenced by the issues raised within this major discussion. Arguing against any co-optation or intervention by the state in her 1926 book *Genesis of Love* (*Ren’ai sōsei*), she developed her concept of motherly love (*boseiai*), which she held to be an instinct naturally opposed to eugenic and racial discrimination. At a time when eugenicist and racial considerations underlay debates over birth policies in European and American pronatalism, Takamure sharply criticized the racism in Key’s eugenic theories that also strongly connected motherhood to the state. In this way, her stance combined an anti-racist, anti-eugenicist critique of contemporary Western feminisms with an institutional critique of the state.

Maternalists challenged the boundaries between state and civil society, as the historians Seth Koven and Sonya Michel noted, and Japanese maternalists—as well as other feminists—accomplished this through greatly varying means. The Motherhood Protection Debate and its discursive after waves clarified the major Japanese feminists’ positions either as “statist,” “anti-state,” or ethno-cultural. In keeping with this distinction, I will outline the ways that these and other feminists positioned themselves with respect to the Versailles order in the aftermath of World War I.

**Feminist Developments after World War I**

In 1921, noting that article eight of the Covenant of the League of Nations on arms reduction had largely been ignored, statist feminist Hiratsuka wondered why it was so hard to realize the goal of peace that was ostensibly shared by all of humanity. During the Washington Naval Conference, she called on the Japanese state regarding its commitment to disarmament and cooperation. At the same time, she and other prominent feminists became active promoters of a new movement for the political organization of women
that manifested itself in the proliferation of a diverse range of women's associations. The most important organizations founded in Japan around the first half of the 1920s alone were the regional All-Kansai Federation of Women's Organizations (1919, *Zenkansai Fujin Rengōkai*); organizations for women's political rights such as the New Women's Association (1920, *Shin Fujin Kyōkai*) and its successor, the Women's League (1922, *Fujin Renmei*); and peace organizations such as the previously mentioned Women's Association for Peace (1921). Socialist women's organizations were also newly established with the Red Wave Society (1921, *Sekirankai*), the Eighth Day Society (1923, *Yōkakai*), and the Working Women's Society (1923, *Hairaku Fujin no Kai*). While labor unions were illegal, women's divisions in fraternal labor organizations had been established since 1916, although a serious platform for working women only developed under the influence of ILO debates beginning in 1919. Early suffrage organizations were the (Christian) Woman's Suffrage Association (1922, *Nihon Fujin Sanseiken Kyōkai*), which was established to become a member of the IAW in 1923; the Alliance for Women's Political Participation (1922, *Fujin Sansei Dōmei*); and the League for the Attainment of Women's Political Rights (1924, *Fujin Sanseiken Kakutoku Kisei Dōmeikai*), which was renamed the Women's Suffrage League (Fusen Kakutoku Dōmei) in 1925.

However divided in political terms (liberal or socialist), these associations signified a new assertive attitude towards demands for political rights among women in the aftermath of the war, and cannot be sufficiently understood without considering the larger discourse on political rights and ethnic self-determination in the context of the establishment of the League of Nations. Contrasting the new atmosphere to the situation in 1911, when she had launched the literary magazine *Seito*, Hiratsuka made it clear that the right time for "a large-scale organized movement for women's liberation" had come with the end of World War I. Together with Ichikawa Fusae (1893–1981) and Oku Munem (1895–1997), she launched the abovementioned New Women's Association (NWA) that rallied for human rights, state support for motherhood, and state regulation for men with venereal disease, while also espousing Western feminisms and calling on women to unite for political and social goals. In recognition of earlier socialist feminists' attempts in this regard, they again launched a campaign for the revision of Article Five of the Public Peace Police Law (1900), framing women's rights to political participation as a "result of the World War" and as "recognized throughout the world" in the petition calling for revision. The British government's appraisal of English women's contribution toward the victory in World War I was widely known among Japanese feminists as an argument for the extension of political rights and enfranchisement.
The tide that had been set in motion by international developments in the aftermath of WWI could not be stopped. As early as 1920, members of the Japan WCTU attended the Congress of the International Women’s Suffrage Alliance in Geneva, effectively establishing its Japanese branch, the (Japanese) Woman’s Suffrage Association, in January 1922. Thus, at least on a formal level, the Meiji Christian organizations were also precursors to the 1920s suffragist movement, using their international ties to promote women’s political rights on a national scale after WWI. Joining with the successors of the NWA, the Women’s League and the Alliance for Women’s Political Participation in 1924, they became part of the united domestic suffrage organization League for the Attainment of Women’s Political Rights (Fujin Sanseiken Kakutoku Kisei Dōmeikai).

Japanese suffragists stressed the idea of “natural” rights for women as human beings and citizens. In the 1925 Manifesto of the suffrage organization that had now changed its name to the Women’s Suffrage League (Fusen Kakutoku Dōmei), they proclaimed: “We women feel ourselves no longer compelled to explain the reasons why it is at once natural and necessary for us, who are both human beings and citizens, to participate in the administration of our country.”

After World War I, Japanese statist feminists had drawn the connections between their domestic struggles and new international frameworks, gaining political and organizational incentive from the latter. The expectations for world peace, disarmament, and demilitarization that Hiratsuka had voiced with regard to the League of Nations and the Washington Naval Treaty in 1921 were in line with her expectations toward the Japanese state. Incidentally, both of these institutional structures were based on concepts of rights and duties within which the struggle for participation and equality formed the main agenda. In the same year, the Women’s Association for Peace explicitly connected its objectives of elevating women’s status in the Japanese domestic realm and forging ties on the international level—thereby aiming to promote and ensure peace as a twofold goal.

The suffrage organization, however, did not present a challenge in terms of offering an essential critique of the Emperor system, the Japanese nation-state, or its colonialist policies. In Korea, the Covenant article on the mandate provisions that appeared to envision the eventual independence for the colonies of the defeated nations had spurred anticlonial nationalism, and led to the Korean uprising against Japanese colonial rule in 1919. In Japan, the members of the most international of all Japanese women’s organizations—the Japan WCTU and its Woman’s Suffrage Association—defended the state’s colonizing project in Korea as a civilizing and educational mission at the same time that they petitioned against licensed
prostitution and promoted women's suffrage in Japan and the occupied territories.\textsuperscript{53} The inability to fundamentally question Japanese colonialism also extended to socialist feminist Yamakawa Kikue, who—despite earlier contact with anti-colonial Korean activists—merely argued in 1924 that similar political strategies should be utilized for both colonized workers and (Japanese) women workers—namely, education and equal pay.\textsuperscript{54}

In view of statist feminists' reformatory stance and their active or passive compliance with the Japanese state's imperialist policies, how did anti-state feminists react to the aftermath of World War I and the Paris Peace Conference? As early as January 1919, Yosano noted her sympathies for Woodrow Wilson, to whom she paid respect for the democratic ideals that he had declared in Paris; yet she was quick to add that to her mind, Wilson was singled out and revered too much.\textsuperscript{55} Her comments were paired with fundamental criticism, as she noted in the same article the "great contradiction" that despite the goal of disarmament in each country, the U.S. Navy was proclaiming major increases.\textsuperscript{56} Four months later, she voiced her great disappointment in the harsh sanctions that the Peace Treaty had imposed on Germany, which in her opinion betrayed all hopes for a humanistic settlement.\textsuperscript{57}

Most outspokenly, Yosano connected the "international" to the "personal" in an article entitled "Women too demand the right to political participation" published in March 1919, at the height of the Paris Peace Conference.\textsuperscript{58} Disassociating herself from those whom she alleged were simply following international trends in asking for universal suffrage, however, her argument for women's political rights forged a direct connection between the international and the individual—at the same time as she consciously and adamantly rejected this connection by placing absolute emphasis on the individual:

In the same way as currently at the Paris Peace Conference an "International League" is debated, the realm of an individual's moral life is enhanced into the whole of preserving and including various ethnicities and various states, that is, even into the peace of "global humanity." The problems of the world are before long the problems of the individual, and the center of this global humanity is always the individual. Thus, as long as the demands that spring from an individual's own accord are not met, we cannot take things on superstitiously and subserviently without critically evaluating if it is a good or a bad thing, just because it is the way the system of the world works.\textsuperscript{59}

Just as Yosano rejected the state, her argument for women's political rights objected to prioritizing the international level or elevating it into a
model. In this sense, she placed the individual as the ultimate reference point. The “individual” in this context, incidentally, also meant “Japanese individual,” and when she admonished that “we cannot take things on superstitiously and blindly [emphasis mine],” it, in fact, extended to “Japan.” The remainder of her argument elaborately situated her demand for equal political rights within a national context, arguing that citizens of the Japanese nation and the Japanese state were “equal in terms of patriotism (aikokushin) and in terms of fulfilling the duties of citizens (kokuminteki gimu).” From her decidedly nation-centered argument for equality, I argue, it was only one step to acknowledging the one Japanese institution that was stylized as the ultimate equalizer of the Japanese nation—the Emperor—and one further step to expressing love and reverence for him as the ultimate cultural, political, and social unifier who could underwrite demands for equal rights. In her 1927 New Year’s Day poem in honor of Emperor Showa’s ascendance to the throne in 1926, she called upon the Japanese people to “unite as one” under the leadership of the new Emperor, who “knows best how the world should move and what his people (kunitami) hope for.” At this point, the citizenship that she had earlier tried to establish on the grounds of equality “in terms of patriotism and in terms of fulfilling the duties of citizens” had in effect colluded with the concept of “the subject” (shinmin) under the great equalizer, the Japanese Emperor. Her turn to monarchy also had an ethno-cultural tinge, as she repeatedly referred to the uniqueness of Japan and the “luck of being born in the East.” Likewise, from her previous focus on family and emotional bonds, it was one step to accepting the widely propagated image of the Emperor as a parental figure; a step she took when in the same poem she declared “We are His Majesty’s Nurselings.”

The rejection of the Japanese proposal for the racial equality of Japanese and Western powers, and the failure of the League to control the arms race, can be said to have left its most immediate and theorized mark in the activist writings of Takamura. She espoused an anarchist feminism whose reference point was the egalitarian farming community, which she then transferred in her later writings onto the ethno-cultural nation. In the preface to her more than one-hundred-page political poem, “Tokyo has caught fever,” which she began in 1922 and published in 1925, she predicted the failure of the League’s mission and a Second World War: “I have the certain feeling that the endpoint of selfish nationalisms (rikokokakushugi) is right before our eyes. I keep thinking that defense preparations (bobi防備) are preparations for violence (bobi暴備), preparations for death (bobi亡備). Wasn’t this clearly proven by the World War that has just ended? Despite this, preparations for a Second War are already well under way.”

However pointed her linguistic use of the triple homphones bobi that change meanings only through the different Chinese characters applied,
and however clear-sighted her analysis and warnings of World War II, she misunderstood and failed to predict the imperialistic ambitions of the Japanese Imperial Army, which she simply called "illusions of the military clique." Instead, she turned toward a fundamental critique of "the West," delivering a thorough critique of Western philosophy and its misogynist aspects in her 1926 monograph *Genesis of Love*, alongside a critique of Western feminisms, modernity, the city, and capitalism. In this book, we also find an assertion of Japanese ethno-cultural values, and a theory of liberation that propagates a new, woman-centered, and genuinely Japanese feminism that sought its roots in mythical and prehistoric times (for example, the sun goddess Amaterasu at the center of the nation’s mythology). Takamure’s ethno-cultural awakening to womanhood was influenced, nevertheless, by Western theories such as that of American sociologist Lester Frank Ward who asserted the biological hierarchy of the female as the primary sex in a chapter of his *Pure Sociology* (1914). While Takamure referred to Ward claiming that her ideas differed from his biological approach, her conceptualization of the leading role of women in the evolution of consciousness was framed in a similar conceptual way that translated the evolutionary concept onto a spiritual and ethno-cultural level.

**Under Increasing Pressures: Japanese Feminists after the Invasion of Manchuria**

When the world economy descended into depression, Japan’s politics turned increasingly to the right while state repression of diverging political movements intensified. Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933 indicated the growth of ultra-nationalist militarism, as well as the end of what had been termed the Taishō democracy. Domestic and foreign policies in 1930s and 1940s Japan were marked by the international isolation that ensued from withdrawal from the League, as well as the rhetorical inclusion of subjects in Japan and in the colonies under the concept of a family state that also bridged ethnic differences. The invasion of Manchuria marked the beginning of the so-called Fifteen Year War, which comprised a series of conflicts in different theaters until 1945.

While the campaign of the NWA had achieved permission for women to organize politically in 1922, the ensuing suffrage movement was less successful, and the Taishō period ended merely with the 1925 introduction of universal male suffrage. In the beginning of the following Shōwa period (1926–1989), the House of Representatives passed bills for women’s suffrage on the local level twice, only to be defeated both times in the politically more powerful House of Peers. The fifth annual convention of the Women’s
Suffrage League in 1934 adopted demands for the welfare of mothers and children for the first time. While additional calls for cuts in military spending went unanswered, the Protective Law for Mothers and Children in Need (Boshi hogo hō) passed in the Diet in 1937. As in Western countries, women activists in Japan were compelled to rely on male politicians—and had to wait until a national crisis such as war created an opening for the realization of their initiatives. The national eugenic law (Kokumin yūsei hō) came into effect in 1941, expressing the pronatalist and eugenic policy of the wartime regime. Altogether, however, the organized struggle of feminists who gradually accommodated their strategies to the pressures of the wartime regime was no match for the increasing organization of women by the state itself during the 1930s. While membership in the Women’s Suffrage League remained below 2,000 in the 1930s, the Patriotic Women’s Association (established in 1901) and the Women’s National Defense Association (established in 1932) had respective memberships of 2.5 million and 2.2 million by the end of 1935, with numbers continuing to rise.

Against this backdrop, the reactions of state feminists to the invasion of Manchuria were at first divided, but gradually converged during the 1930s. While the Women’s Suffrage League in 1932 opposed the Japanese invasion, and the Japanese section of WILPF apologized to their Chinese counterparts, the Japan WCTU as an affiliated group of the Women’s Suffrage League displayed the same colonialist attitude as the Japanese government in defending the invasion against the Chinese Women’s League’s protests. A number of studies on women’s (and men’s) Christian organizations, as well as on suffragism since Meiji Japan, have shown that acting in the national and imperial interest has been a strong and persistent factor in the political strategies of these groups. Historical evaluations of this phenomenon range from empowerment and transnationalism, to feminist complicity in the imperial politics of Japan. These assessments speak to the general observation that “alternative histories” are necessarily imbricated in “a world-wide social formation fashioned by imperialism and colonialism,” but they also point to the need to interrogate the degree to which these histories indeed present alternative visions.

In the face of the Manchurian crisis, and considering that Japanese delegates to the League of Nations were all male, Ichikawa Fusae—leader of the suffrage movement since 1924—wrote an article entitled “International peace and women’s suffrage” arguing that violence cannot be the solution in international conflict. She also described her keenly felt need to extend suffrage to women: “The League of Nations today has been set up as an institution [for arms reduction and for disarmament], and has contributed not little to that end so far. However, seen from what we think would be ideal, there is still more need to have the League sufficiently fulfill its functions.
and to let it become a powerful institution. . . . However, it is impossible to expect this to be done by governments, let alone of course by the military. To accomplish this we do need the women. I believe that only when women actively engage with this in every country, and furthermore join hands on the international level, will it be possible to realize these goals.\(^8\)

Even after Japan's withdrawal from the League in 1933, Ichikawa suggested that the ensuing international isolation could and should be remedied by increasing women's international activities in place of their governments. At the same time, she conceded that Japanese women may not be able to lead the international women's movement, and called upon them to at least do their part as Japanese women to realize an ideal society.\(^8\) Thus Ichikawa and other feminist activists were prepared to let go of the dream of playing a role as international leaders, and instead fulfill their role as members of the Japanese nation-state in the years to come. Suffragist Ichikawa, internationalist Inoue Hideko (co-founder of the Women's Peace Association in 1921), and other statist feminists continued, or began, to actively cooperate with the government after Japan had left the League of Nations. A notable exception was maternalist Hiratsuka Raichō, who had retreated from active political lobbying at the beginning of the 1930s. However, until then her activities in anti V.D. marriage restriction campaigns helped to popularize the ideology of negative eugenics on which the state based its respective policies around the turn to the 1940s.\(^8\)

Under the government's "National Spiritual Mobilization Movement" for total war effort since 1937, the Federation of Japanese Women's Associations (Nippon Fujin Dantai Renmei), established in the same year as the successor to the Suffrage League, rallied for the mobilization of women via such slogans as "no construction without women!"\(^8\) While the struggle for women's suffrage was deliberately dropped, appeals continued toward the state and for the fight to participate in political decision-making. In a most pragmatic way, feminists who had directed their demands toward the state cooperated when called to serve on state-sponsored committees.\(^8\) With the establishment of the "Imperial Rule Assistance Association" in 1940, hundreds of women served in committees related to mobilization in various ministries, gaining unprecedented public visibility.\(^8\)

What about the feminists who had been critical of the state in the beginning of the 1920s? In 1928, Yosano Akiko and her husband travelled to Manchuria and Mongolia at the invitation of the Japanese-owned South Manchurian Railway Company. In the same year and in 1932, Yosano wrote poems about the Mukden Incident and the Shanghai Incident respectively, taking the side of the Japanese Imperial Army in China therein.\(^8\) In 1932, she also published the poem "People of the Japanese Nation, A Morning Song," wherein she lauded the "human bomb" incident, which had been
reported as a consenting suicide mission carried out by three Japanese soldiers near Shanghai, although having been involuntary. Her poem ends with the following stanza:

Ah, the augustness of His Majesty’s Reign
That inspires people’s hearts!
It is a time that ignites our sense of duty,
A time to unify in loyalty. 87

"The augustness of His Majesty’s Reign" had risen above any legal framework that would ensure duties and rights of citizens and had come to justify the expansionist policies of the Japanese nation-state. Yosano supported the invasion of Manchuria from a pan-Asianist perspective, affirming the wartime government’s politics from 1932 onward, and reinforcing the major ideological signifiers of Japan as the leader of East Asia. 88 As the literary scholar Steve Rabson writes, “one cannot fail to be impressed with the distance Akiko had travelled” since her anti-war poem of 1904. 89 As shown above, her fundamentally critical and distanced view of the international undertakings at Versailles can already be discerned in January and March 1919, at a time when she still voiced her sympathies for Woodrow Wilson. 90 After the mid-1920s, however, she had fully turned to support the Japanese Emperor system. I suggest that the main link in this “remarkable journey” is on the one hand Yosano’s critical stance toward the state and superstructures such as the League of Nations, and on the other, her view regarding the priority of family bonds, which eventually evolved into reverence for the Emperor. 91 Whereas the literary scholar Noriko Horiguchi’s study of Yosano’s literature identifies the female body as the site of connecting women with empire, I argue that it is ultimately the emotional and family bonds that are epitomized in the benevolent parental (maternal and paternal) figure of the Emperor. 92

Feminist anarchist Takamure’s critique of the state, modernity, and culture in the 1920s was coupled with a critique of the West, and with her conviction that “the dawn of our ‘new Asianism’ will necessarily emerge from the land of our ancestors.” 93 In 1934, she justified the invasion of Manchuria (1931) with the much used rhetoric of protecting Japan’s “lifeline,” and as an act of defiance against an international order that had been forcibly established by the advanced Western nations during the nineteenth century, and was to be kept in place during the twentieth century by the League of Nations: “However, when we look [at the Manchurian Incident] from the level of behavior and even try to imagine, as the League of Nations pointed out, that it perhaps included some sort of invasive action, [one could say that] if workers were to assert the same right to survive (seizonken) and thereby threatened the capitalists and by extension the whole of the
established power structure, they would bring about the reform of society. If the same invasive action is undertaken belatedly [by Japan], and is in addition accompanied by the problem of Japan’s lifeline (seimeisen), it will of course in effect threaten the League of Nations’ principle of preserving the status quo."

Takamure’s view reflects the stance of the anti-League group of officials and Army leaders who decried the League as an Anglo-American scheme to limit the power of other nations. Her argument was coached, however, in the terminology of anti-capitalist class struggle and ethno-cultural resistance: she also spoke of the “national spirit of Japan” and its destiny in Asia, pointing to the ideologies of Nipponism and Asianism—the central ideological elements of what was to become the politics of the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” In the 1940s, she contributed cultural nationalist essays to various women’s magazines, eventually developing a concept of patriotism based on the idea of a mother’s love for her blood-related kin.

From well before the turn of the 1930s, we thus find clear expressions of ethno-cultural nationalism on the part of the anti-state feminists who explicitly rejected the international level of the League of Nations. These anti-state feminists’ conversions to supporting the nation-state were accomplished by embracing the Emperor system, with the Emperor functioning as the symbol for the ethno-cultural and emotional affirmation of the “nation”—and correspondingly via the imagination of the “people” as a family with the natural bonds of a kinship group. The rejection of the international level was modified correspondingly, which meant rejecting Versailles—the League of Nations—in favor of “ethnic” Asia, the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” The ethnic awakening to a Japanese womanhood that was best exemplified, theorized, and spelled out by Takamure, but was equally performed by those feminists who turned their reverence to the Emperor, extended into the ethnic awakening to Asia under Japanese leadership.

Conclusion

Even though the scope of the Motherhood Protection Debate in 1918—19 remained rather domestic, we can understand it as a first stage wherein major feminist actors set the scene for redefining women’s position in society and in the nation-state during the years to come. Feminists discussed their relation to the state while also taking inspiration from international organizations in their own organization-building. The impetus this provided cannot be overestimated, as their activities for political rights for women reached an unprecedented scale in the 1920s, even if their role in international bodies remained marginal.
State-critics Takamure and Yosano juxtaposed kinship related concepts of family or motherhood and community against an anonymous super-structure such as the state, while clearly favoring the former. As critical as they were of the state, they were also critical regarding the premises of Versailles, pointing out from the very outset the contradictions that were at the very core of the Peace Conference and the Peace Treaty. While Yosano’s turn toward the political nation in her reverence for the Emperor and her support for the expansive imperial state did not develop into an argument for ethnic feminism, Takamure developed a feminism that was at the same time critical of the state and the “West,” as well as productive in imagining an ethnic grounding of her feminist liberation theory. The gradual development of an ethnic ideology can be said to have its reference point in the legitimacy that Versailles lent to ethnic ideas and ethnic nationalisms, but at the same time in its contradictory failure to acknowledge racial equality.

On the other hand, the feminists who appealed to the state in the Motherhood Protection Debate placed their hopes in Versailles, and in the international superstructure that it represented until after Japan left the League of Nations. Although they too were let down by the developments that did not fulfill the hopes for disarmament, peace, and equality, they continued to appeal to the state in their quest for participation—and served in political offices when given the opportunity. As adamant as someone like Ichikawa was in her reasoning for women’s suffrage, stating that there could be no international peace without women, she later became active in the successor organization of the Suffrage League, which asserted that there was “no construction”—i.e. no war—without women either.

Of course, the basic conceptual division between statist and anti-state feminists is not categorical or absolute, as areas of overlap existed regarding the ways feminists presented their arguments using the rhetoric of the state (kokka) and the ethnic nation (minzoku). Hiratsuka, for example, together with Ichikawa, fought within the NWA in 1920 on behalf of women’s political rights and state regulation of venereal disease. Her justification for the petition on venereal disease included eugenic aspects, however, and warned of “the great damage done to the Japanese ethnic nation (Yamato minzoku)” before urging “the protection of wives and children and the betterment of the Japanese people who are the foundation of the state (kokka).” During wartime, she too would eventually voice her reverence for the Emperor as arahitogami, a living god. Yosano—who rejected any appeals to the state—equally supported the women’s suffrage movement led by Ichikawa since the mid-1920s. Takamure espoused the culture of the Japanese farming community, although her ethnic nationalism was not xenophobic, and later developed into a theory of multi-ethnic origins of the Japanese people.
While state feminists voiced formal critiques or disappointment in the League of Nations, state-critical and ethno-cultural feminists raised fundamental critiques and instead espoused the family and nation as reference points for liberation. However, the ethno-cultural critique was able to maintain an oppositional (anti-eugenic, anti-capitalist, and anti-war) stance vis-à-vis the state only as long as the family and ethnic nation was not utilized by, and synonymous with, the expansive political state. Statist feminisms, however, were on lost ground all the while, insofar as the Japanese state and the world order as represented in the League were gender-biased, racist, and imperialistic at their core, allowing feminism to merely become “the maidservant to nationalism” within an international order that violently rejected any attempts to realize racial equality.101

Notes

1Except when otherwise stated, all translations in this article from Japanese sources are my own. Japanese names are noted in the Asian order, with surnames followed by given names, except for bibliographical references. Akiko Yosano, "Fujin shidōsha e no kōgi" [1920], in Yosano Akiko hyōronshū (from here on YAH), ed. Masanao Kano and Nobuko Kōuchi (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1992), 301–312, here 301.

2This term was used by Mark Metzler in his paper "The Correlation of Crises, 1918–1920," presented at the conference "Asia after Versailles" (Munich, 18–20 June 2009), where he spoke of several shocks that set the course of history in Japan and around the world following World War I.


8Rupp, Worlds of Women, 5.

9Rupp, Worlds of Women, 5, 16–18. Among the officers of the international women’s organizations until 1939, one may find women from Uruguay, Egypt, and India—among other nations—but not a single one of Japanese nationality; ibid., 63–69. The Japanese official delegates to the League of Nations were all men. A mere three women joined as advisors to the six ILO conferences until 1924. See also Dorothea M. Northcroft, Women at Work in the League of Nations (London: Page & Pratt, 1924).

10At this conference, Gauntlett Tsune (1873–1953) of the Japan Women’s Christian Temperance Union (Nihon Fujin Kyōfūkai) addressed the Assembly. In her words, the dilemma of many Japanese women in an international environment where the hegemonic colonial language of English was a precondition for meaningful participation becomes clear: “We have come here to learn something. We have with us six school teachers, who came with the great handicap of speaking no English, because they wanted to see the world and learn as much as possible”; Pan Pacific Union, Women of the Pacific (Honolulu: Pan Pacific Union, 1928), 15–16.


16There had been discussion about the problem of war widows that also touched on the relation between women/mothers and the state at the time of the Russo-Japanese War (1904–05) and by the end of World War I; Vera Mackie, Feminism in Modern Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 31–32, 55.


Akiko Yosano, “Joshi no shokugyōteki dokuritsu o gensoku to seyo” [1918], in Kōuchi ed., Bosei, 81–84, here 83.


Akiko Yosano, “Hiratsuka, Yamakawa, Yamada san joshi ni kotau” [1918], in Kōuchi ed., Bosei, 176–192, here 188.

The publication of this poem in the journal Myōjō (Morning Star) led to the issue (Sept. 1904) being banned by the authorities. For references to its other full or partial translations and the full text in the original see Steve Rabson, “Yosano Akiko on War: To Give One’s life or Not: A Question of which War,” The Journal of the Association of Teachers of Japanese 25, no. 1 (1991): 45–74, here 67–68.


32 Waka Yamada, “Kongo no fujin mondai o teishō su” [1918], in Kōuchi ed., *Bosei*, 91–95, here 95.


34 Meiji period feminists had also advocated a reform of the family system and the education of women to enable them to take on a politically responsible role in society; see Sharon Sievers, *Flowers in Salt. The Beginnings of Feminist Consciousness in Modern Japan* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1983), 33–48; Molony, “Women’s Rights,” 51–53; Mackie, *Feminism*, 20. Yamada’s position, however, stressed women’s biological as well as cultural role as mothers.


42 The Woman’s Suffrage Association was later renamed the Japan Christian Association for Women’s Political Rights (Nihon Kirisutokyō Fujin Sanseiken Kyōkai).


46For the manifesto and regulations, see Ochimi Kubushiro, “Nihon Fujin Sanseiken Kyōkai” [1922], in NJUSS, vol. 1, 607–611. For newspaper accounts in the Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun and the Yomiuri Shinbun in 1921, see NJUSS, vol. 1, 606.

47According to Hiratsuka, the Christian suffrage organization emerged due to the influence and politics of the NWA. The Japan WCTU had repeatedly declined the offer of the American Alliance for Women’s Suffrage to join them, arguing that it was too early for Japan. Only when the NWA started their parliamentary petition movement did the Japan WCTU accept and send Gauntlett Tsune as the Japanese representative to the Congress of the International Women’s Suffrage Alliance to Geneva. Hearing there that the first organization to apply for membership would come to represent the respective country, Gauntlett hastened to send the telegram to apply for membership upon her return to Japan. See Hiratsuka, Genshi, 197–198.

48This organization united the various groups that had women’s political rights on their agenda. See “Fusen o dankō suru nara fujin sansei mo sokkō seyo” [1923], in NJUSS, vol 1, 653. In November 1924, Kubushiro Ochimi and Gauntlett Tsune proclaimed their participation in the movement; see Nihon Fujin Sanseiken Kyōkai, “Fujin sanseiken tai gikai undō kondankai e no yobikake” [1924], in NJUSS vol. 1, 731–732, here 732. They joined the Inaugural Committee of the League for the Attainment of Women’s Political Rights one month later; Fujin Sanseiken Kikutoku Kisei Domeikai Soritsu Iin, “Soritsu taikai annai” [1924], in NJUSS vol. 1, 732–734, here 734.


51“Fujin Heiwa Kyōkai sōritsukai” [1921], in NJUSS, vol 1, 630.

52Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Movement: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 61. In the 1920s, however, Korean anticolonial nationalism and Japanese colonial officials in Korea, despite their antagonism, in fact worked together in the suppression of Korean feminists who criticized the patriarchal order and challenged demands on female chastity. Korean women who had studied in metropolitan Tokyo in the 1910s and became the “New Women” in Korea in the 1920s suffered from the attacks of Korean anticolonialists in addition to imperial Japan’s colonial practices; see Insook Kwon, “‘The New Women’s Movement’ in 1920s Korea: Rethinking the Relationship Between Imperialism and Women,” in Sinha et al. ed., Feminisms, 37–61, here 49. Other than Kwoon, who stresses the liberating aspects of Christianity for Korean women, I would argue that Christianity at once carried both liberating and oppressive aspects. As chastity was a crucial element in Christian thought as well,
the Korean New Women were “crushed” not only by the demands for chastity in traditional Korean Confucianism, but by the interlocking and overlapping pressures of two patriarchal ideologies.


54Mackie, Feminism, 88.


56Ibid.


58Akiko Yosano, “Fujin mo sanseiken o yōkyū su” [1919], in YAH, 253–261.

59Ibid., 253–254.

60Ibid., 257.


64Ibid.


68Ibid.

Chapter 24 outlining his gynaecocentric theory had already been translated into Japanese by 1916. Takamure refers to Ward in “Ren’ai sōsei,” 137; and “Ren’ai to seiyoku,” Fujin Sensen 2, no.5 (1931): 18-23, here 20.


Matsukawa and Tachi, “Women’s Suffrage,” 181.


Despite Yosano’s membership in the Catholic Church, her allegiance to the Emperor system and the Japanese nation-state would override her Christian affiliation. This is, however, in line with the general tendency of Christians and the Japanese state, which had been one of amicable collaboration for nearly three decades (1899–1927); see Noble, “Christians,” 69.

Cited from the translation by Steve Rabson, “Yosano,” 60. Rabson, however, translated the title of the poem as “Citizens of Japan, A Morning Song.”


Rabson, “Yosano,” 63.


Rabson, “Yosano,” 63.

Noriko Horiguchi, Women Adrift: The Literature of Japan’s Imperial Body (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012), 78.


Takamure, “Nihon,” 208.

Itsue Takamure, “Kamigokoro” [1944], in TIR, 253–257, here 255; see also Oguma, Genealogy, 156–171.


