

アジア市民社会公開シンポジウム

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Asian Civil Society and Regional Solidarity Movements: A Theoretical Sketch

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Introduction

Asian civil society¹ has traditionally been a puzzling issue. It is not easy to define and conceptualise the so-called Asian civil society. Although civil society may exist in Asia, it is very different from its Western counterparts. Moreover, civil societies in Asia have been mostly mobilised at the national and local communities' levels, rather than at regional levels. Since the mobilisation of civil society has been relatively weak and underdeveloped in Asia (at least in the Western sense of civil society), it has been argued that there is no likelihood that civil society will develop in Asia. This cliché is hard to refute. For many decades, "civil society" has been an abstract concept that exists on paper and that does not possess any substantial realities.

Not surprisingly, civil society sometimes sounds mysterious in Asia. Politically speaking, there is no equivalent to the western words "citizen" or "citizenship" in Asia. If Asian people speak about their citizens, it just means that they are speaking about people living there; it does not necessarily mean that they are inferring civic culture and civic duties. "Asian Civil Society", in a sense, seems to be a self-contradiction: it has been argued that there is no civil society in Asia. For these

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¹ Needless to mention, *Asian civil society* is a rather challenging notion. This paper sharply distinguishes "Asian civil society" from merely "civil societies" in Asia as follows: although civil societies in Asia might signify national and/or local levels of NGOs, CSOs, business communities and so on, Asian civil society stresses regional frameworks, and especially "networks"; these networks consists of region-wide movements and linkages with national and local levels of civil society activities.

reasons, for students of Asian regionalism, Asian civil society has been difficult to cope with.

However, the situation has changed drastically, in particular within the last five years. Region-based non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) have been substantively developed and mobilised. They have engaged region-wide solidarity movements, which we call regional solidarity movements. In this paper's terminology then, there has been a move from "open regionalism" to "participatory regionalism".

The aim of this paper is to assess the prospects, if any, of an Asian civil society by analysing the emerging region-wide civil society movements in Asia. Not least, the paper employs a theoretically driven, rather than case-driven, method and seeks the theoretical and systematic implications of Asian civil society. Thus, the chief questions of this paper are the impacts of the emerging regional solidarity movements and the prospect for evolution of an Asian civil society based on a construction of regionalism; and how they can be evaluated theoretically. This paper theoretically uncovers — as democratisation movements and regional solidarity movements in Southeast Asia heat up — how *civil society* has influenced and participated in Asian regionalism. Not least, this paper goes further to examine the prospect of an Asian civil society, and a "regionalism from below", to be constructed, while evaluating the ways in which numerous think tanks, NGOs and CSOs have influenced the expansion and deepening of "regionalism from below". What, if any, are the differences between "regionalism from above" (inter-governments based) and "regionalism from below" (civil based)? What are the political meanings of the transformation of the former to the latter? To answer these questions, this paper focuses on the region-wide and rapidly mobilised civil society activities, which we call "regional solidarity movements".

This paper covers the following organisations as the regional solidarity movements that are a basis for Asian civil society building: ASEAN Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS), ASEAN People's Assembly (APA), South East Asian Committee for Advocacy (SEACA), Solidarity for Asian People's Advocacy (SAPA), and ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus (AIPMC). By

examining these regional solidarity movements, this paper attempts to develop the theoretical implication of these movements in a realm of Asian civil society. The paper consists of three parts. The first part develops theoretical implications of regionalism, including the impact that civil society movements have posed to the reality of regionalism. The second part examines the cases of regional solidarity movements. The third part of this paper theoretically evaluates regional solidarity movements on Asian regionalism.

1 . Theoretical Implications of Regionalism: from Open Regionalism toward

Participatory Regionalism

This part examines the theoretical implications of regionalism: how Asian regionalism has changed in recent decades and the impact of the civil society movement in regionalism. To provide some context, this paper briefly summarises the history of Asian regionalism, especially a short history of the government-based “open regionalism”, and then focuses on “participatory regionalism” as a civil society aspect of regionalism.

A Short History of “Open Regionalism”

Asian regionalism has historically consisted of government-based elitist coalitions, without reference to civil society; the APEC and ASEAN were the best example of state-centric regionalism. One typical model of regionalism is called “open regionalism”, which was articulated in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in the 1990s.²

In brief, the political meaning of “open regionalism” signifies that regionalism has to be open to the outside world, a concept which is connected with liberalisation

² Although similar attempts existed before the 1990s, APEC has been the first inter-governmental arrangement to institutionalise and advocate “open regionalism”. For discourses on “open regionalism”, see Toru Oga, “Re-discovering Asianness — the role of institutional discourses in APEC 1989–1997” *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, vol. 4-2, 2004.

programmes for globalisation. “Open regionalism”, has to be “open”, in a way it has never been (at least in principle) to outsiders willing to join. On the other hand, “open regionalism” is still “regionalism”: numerous economic cooperation and inter-governmental arrangements run within the APEC. In other words, “open regionalism” signifies an inclusive and non-discriminatory application of open trade principles to all other regions; APEC involved “plurilateral agreements that are non-exclusive and open to new members to join it”.

However, the APEC version of “open regionalism” did not stand on neutral ground: it was strongly associated with the global free trade agenda as embodied in agreements such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Like any other political principle, there were a number of exceptions to “open regionalism”: APEC was *not* absolutely open to newcomers. Colombia and Ecuador were denied their membership. Additionally, numerous island nations of the Pacific (with the exception of Papua New Guinea), and Cambodia and Laos remained as non-APEC members in the Asia-Pacific region.

One of the primary motivations for its establishment was a desire to counter the discriminatory and protectionist tide in Western Europe and North America. “Open regionalism” thus entails minimising external trade barriers according to GATT principles, pursuing liberalisation and free trade (even with non-members), and encouraging non-members to join, notwithstanding the fact that these principles did not function in some instances. “Open regionalism” implied that APEC was not an exclusionary economic bloc like the European Union (EU) and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), but rather, was concerned with the liberalisation of global free trade.

“Open regionalism” has informally also been the basic principle of ASEAN regionalism. What then, if any, are the differences between the two versions of open regionalism — the APEC and ASEAN versions? On the one hand, both APEC and ASEAN (including the ARF) adopt expansionism that promotes gradually inclusion of non-member countries willing to join. On the other hand, “open regionalism” signifies informal and flexible regional governance, with an emphasis on regional solidarity, under a loose consensus of principles for non-interference policies.

“Open regionalism” has been compatible with the East Asian version of a transnational elite coalition by reflecting the domestic political situation in Asian and ASEAN member countries.³ It is evident that Asian regionalism tends to be regionalised in economic integration bases. Although the institutional discourse of “open regionalism” first appeared in the APEC, its ideals have been followed in the ASEAN-typed regionalism which reflects on the political realities that led to intra-regional government-based cooperation while receiving the risk and dilemma of globalisation.

Civil Society and “Participatory Regionalism”

As I mentioned above, “open regionalism” has been harmonised with Asian elitist government-initiated regionalism. However, the traditional form of “open regionalism” has been threatened and criticised by a rise of civil society activities in Southeast Asia. How has this rise of civil society been theoretically explained ?

Civil society-led regionalism can be seen as a participatory form of regionalism. Participatory regionalism is conceptualised by Amitav Acharya; accordingly, there are two conceptual definitions of participatory regionalism. On the one hand, “participatory regionalism” is defined by non-state actors, such as NGOs and CSOs, participating in the decision-making procedures of regionalism. On the other hand, by so doing, the dialogues and cooperation between the government actors and the non-governmental actors (NGOs, CSOs and citizens) deepens.

The demands and influences on democratisation movements in the region, especially Southeast Asia, provide a background to the arguments. From the 1980s to 1990s, there had been an increasing number of democratisation movements, including those in the Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia, and Indonesia. These movements tended to mobilise the newly constructed civil society from an elite-led regionalism to “really opened” “open regionalism”.⁴ In other words, democratisation move-

³ For a description of the relationship between “open regionalism” and domestic political accommodation in East Asian countries, see Kanishka Jayasuriya, “Embedded mercantilism and open regionalism”, in id. (ed.) *Asian Regional Governance*, London: Routledge, 2004, pp. 21- 38. Furthermore, Aihwa Ong provides interesting and detailed arguments about the transnational elite in East Asia. See Aihwa Ong, *Neoliberalism as exception : mutations in citizenship and sovereignty*, Durham : Duke U.P., 2006.

ments, especially in Southeast Asia, can be seen as a departure from traditional ASEAN. Deepening and expanding democratisation changes and improves the elite-led domestic situations, and urges changes to an ASEAN-type institutional culture: principles for non-interference of domestic affairs, and the decision-making procedure which is based on consultation and consensus, generally called the “ASEAN way”.

Not least, region-level NGOs, such as Forum Asia, Global South, and The Third World Network, as well as their campaign activities, make full use of a broad range of networks that tend to urgently claim the improvement of institutional accountability and quality of democratisation toward the ASEAN. These NGOs gradually and consistently tend to be regional NGOs that make claims, and resist changes, based on “East Asia” rather than on particular communities and interest groups.⁵

These arguments stress the changing nature of discourses on regionalism that had been articulated in inter-governmental cooperation (including “open regionalism” and the ASEAN way) and have gone further to be shared in civil society; they regard regionalism *not* as institutional discourses in merely government-level cooperation, *but* rather, look at the dynamics of regionalism as concepts focusing on the broad field of civil societies and on regional society as a whole.

However, Acharya’s “participatory regionalism” is not free from criticism. There have been limits on his analysis. Why does the concept of “participatory regionalism” articulate a civil society based on “regionalism”? Also, what are the difference(s) between global civil society and Asian civil society, if any? In the next part, this paper focuses on the dynamics of numerous regional solidarity movements as the best examples for Asian civil society.

⁴ Amitav Acharya, “Democratization and the prospects for participatory regionalism in Southeast Asia” in Jayasuriya, *op.cit.*, p.128.

⁵ Nick Thomas, “Toward an East Asian Community”, in Jayasuriya, *op.cit.*, p.201.

2 . A Prospect for Asian Civil Society: from Regionalism to Regional Solidarity Movements

The previous part of this paper reviewed the history of Asian regionalism that “open regionalism” centred on, and considered the theoretical framework of the prospect of an Asian civil society, evolving from “open regionalism” toward “participatory regionalism”. This part of the paper observes actual cases of regional solidarity movements and examines the changing nature of ASEAN’s official discourses: how their policies and perspectives on civil society have been changed. This section then describes the way in which civil societies’ responded to the ASEAN and constructed regional solidarity movements.

The Changing Nature of the ASEAN Official Discourses

From the late 1990s, the ASEAN’s attitude towards civil society has indeed changed. The official documents continuously include the key words “caring community” and repeatedly pose “people-centred” and/or “people-oriented” ASEAN.

To begin with, the “ASEAN Vision 2020” adopted in 1997 emphasises a respect for “justice and the rule of law”⁶ of the region. Also it stresses “[a] community of *caring* society”. According to the Vision, the ASEAN community is constructed with a common ground of history and culture: it notes “an ASEAN community conscious of its ties of history, aware of its cultural heritage and bound by a common regional identity”.⁷

Furthermore, the Bali Concord II of 2003, on the one hand, appraises the fundamental significance of the TAC (the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia) as being reconfirmed and adhering to “the principle of non-interference and consensus in ASEAN cooperation”.⁸ On the other hand, it also stresses that the TAC “foster a community of caring societies and promote a common regional identity”.⁹

⁶ “ASEAN Vision 2020”, Kuala Lumpur, December 15, 1997. *Handbook of Selected ASEAN Political Documents*, Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, the third edition, 2006, p.92.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p.96. My emphasis.

⁸ “Declaration of ASEAN Concord II(Bali Concord II)”, Bali, October 7, 2003. *ASEAN Political Documents*, op. cit., p.140.

In the following year, the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Plan of Action refers to the ASEAN citizens' interactions and emphasises that civil society should be "engaged in providing inputs for policy choices".¹⁰ This Plan of Action also defines the "caring society" as including policy areas relating to poverty, equity and a human development arena. The Plan of Action has stressed "[b]uilding a community of caring societies to address issues of poverty, equity and human development".¹¹ Furthermore, the ASEAN and the United States reached an agreement for the Plan of Action to implement the ASEAN-US Enhanced Partnership in 2006. This partnership agreement also offers to "support efforts to engage civil society in developing a people-centered ASEAN Community".¹²

In 2007, the Chairman's statement of the ASEAN Summit argues that "a community of peoples caring for and sharing their human, natural and cultural resources and strengths for their common good and mutual benefit".¹³ Similar statements are repeated in the Cebu Declaration.¹⁴

The most dynamic cornerstone of these changes was the ASEAN Charter in 2007. The ASEAN Charter was ratified among the ASEAN member countries in Singapore on November 20, 2007, and the Charter was published in early in the next year.¹⁵ The fundamental tone of the Charter is to enhance regional cooperation with an emphasis on the construction of a regional identity. The Charter has repeatedly stressed "[o]ne vision, one identity and one caring and sharing community".¹⁶ Furthermore, Article 35 of the Charter proposes the significance of a common ASEAN identity. The ASEAN identity promotes, according to the Charter, "a sense of belonging among its peoples in order to achieve its shared destiny, goals and

⁹ Ibid., p.143.

¹⁰ "The ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Plan of Action", Vientiane, November 29, 2004., *ASEAN Political Documents*, op. cit., p.182.

¹¹ Ibid., p.183.

¹² "Plan of Action to Implement the ASEAN-US Enhanced Partnership", Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, July 27, 2006, para. 3, 7.3. *ASEAN Documents Series*, p.148.

¹³ "One Caring and Sharing Community", Chairperson's Statement of the 12th ASEAN Summit H.E. the President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Cebu, Philippines, January 13, 2007, para. 3. *ASEAN Documents Series 2006*, Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2007, p.1.

¹⁴ "Cebu Declaration towards One Caring and Sharing Community", Cebu, Philippines, January 13, 2007.

¹⁵ *The ASEAN Charter*, Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, January 2008.

¹⁶ Ibid., p.2, 29: it would be the ASEAN motto (see also Article 36).

values”.¹⁷

Although the charter maintains the traditional emphasis on principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference, it also adheres to the democratic principles, and the rule of law and good governance, including respect for, and protection of, human rights and fundamental freedoms.¹⁸ Likewise and more clearly, Article 1 of the Charter contends that it should “strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and the rule of law, and to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms”.¹⁹ At the same time, the Charter proposes also “to promote a *people-oriented* ASEAN in which all sectors of society are encouraged to participate in, and benefit from, the process of ASEAN integration and community building”.²⁰ Related to this point, the Charter has still maintained the traditional decision-making procedure, namely “consultation and consensus”.²¹

Overall, despite its significant departure in pursuing values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and notably the concept of a “people-oriented ASEAN”, the Charter still possessed a state-centric tenor and maintained a non-interference principle. In this sense, the Chapter itself is, in many respects, “old wine in a new bottle”.

ASEAN-ISIS and APA

There have been numerous mobilisations of civil society in the region. ASEAN-ISIS was organised in 1984 as a discussion forum among think-tanks in the ASEAN member countries. The original members of the think-tanks were from Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia; the secretariat is the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Indonesia. The chief objectives of the ASEAN-ISIS are to elevate community awareness and to construct an “epistemic community of sense of regionalism”.²² ASEAN-ISIS has officially provided policy

¹⁷ Ibid., p.29.

¹⁸ Ibid., p.2.

¹⁹ Ibid., p.4.

²⁰ Ibid., p.5. My emphasis.

²¹ See Article 20, *ibid.*, p.22.

²² Interview with Dr. Lay Hwee Yeo, Senior Research Fellow, Singapore Institute of International Affairs, March 6, 2008, Singapore.

recommendations to the ASEAN secretariats, and individual member think-tanks in each country do the same things to member countries' national governments.

Furthermore, ASEAN-ISIS initially organised the ASEAN People's Assembly (APA) in 2001 and also sponsored the APA of 2007 (APA will be discussed further below), and in collaboration with NGOs, ASEAN-ISIS made policy recommendations for an Asian civil society. While think-tanks and NGOs possess different perceptions and approaches, they share the goal of regional solidarity in the region. The ASEAN-ISIS and the APA reached an agreement for the need to re-examine the concept of sovereignty, which is represented by principles of non-interference in domestic affairs.²³

In April 2006, ASEAN-ISIS prepared a memorandum about policy recommendations concerning the ASEAN Charter. According to the memorandum,²⁴ the ASEAN Charter should *not* be: (1) merely a codification of existing documents; (2) a justification for making the existing norms, values, principles and objectives unalterable and inflexible; or, (3) state-centric. Instead, the ASEAN charter *should* be: (1) open to new ideas and forward-looking; (2) amenable to adjustments as the situation dictates; (3) based on the formation of an ASEAN Community which already provides a road-map for ASEAN; and, (4) people-oriented.

The concept of "people-oriented" relates to enhancing human security and eradicating poverty, hunger, disease and illiteracy. Moreover, it identifies and defends market-driven integration and "open regionalism" as key factors in regionalism. It also develops and consolidates democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; a community of caring society; and it strengthens a common ASEAN identity.²⁵ Accordingly, the ASEAN should not be "an elitist club or a club limited to government officials".²⁶

While the ASEAN and its member countries protect "the sovereignty and independence of all States",²⁷ decisions-making procedures should be based on consensus,

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ "The ASEAN Charter", Memorandum, No.1/2006, ASEAN-ISIS, Bali, Indonesia, 18 April, 2006, p.4.

²⁵ Ibid., p.5.

²⁶ Ibid., p.10.

²⁷ Ibid., pp.5-6.

except for the following crucial matters: (1) when a government comes to power through unconstitutional means such as a military coup; (2) when a democratically elected party (parties) is unlawfully prevented from constituting a government; (3) when a government is engaged in a gross and sustained violation of human rights; (4) when a Member States fail to make financial contribution and pay their dues to ASEAN; and, (5) any other matter deemed as consistent and deliberate non-compliance of ASEAN's principles.²⁸ Sanctions include: (1) exclusion from participation in ministerial-level meetings; (2) suspension from participation in all ASEAN meetings; (3) limitation of government-to-government contacts and other similar measures; and, (4) any other measures agreed upon by the ASEAN Summit.²⁹

As mentioned above, the ASEAN People's Assembly (APA) was formed by ASEAN-ISIS in 2001 and the first meeting held in Batam in Indonesia. Its objectives were to construct a civil society dialogue among government officials, think-tanks and NGOs. The chief objectives are to bridge the gap between the ASEAN secretariat and civil society, and promote the construction of an ASEAN community "from below".

SEACA, SAPA, and AIPMC

In September 1999, a number of NGOs in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Myanmar, Cambodia and East Timor gathered in Manila and organised the SEACA in order to construct a cooperative relationship among civil societies in Southeast Asia. Since May 2004, twenty-one organisations have joined SEACA. Now the SEACA has prepared for the ASEAN People's Charter by reforming the ASEAN Charter.

The regional solidarity movements that were initiated by NGOs, mentioned above, have not necessarily been critical to the ASEAN. From the perspective of the regional solidarity movement, regionalism should be, and could be, an alternative to globalisation. That is, on the one level regionalism can protect people from the negative; on the other level, regional solidarity movements resisted authoritarian

²⁸ Ibid., p.11.

²⁹ Ibid., p.11.

regimes or the so-called development dictatorship.

The regional solidarity movement has been critical to globalisation, while not merely an anti-globalisation movement. There have been differences in approach between the anti-globalisation movement and regional solidarity movement. The regional solidarity movement has not been extended to anti-globalisation or global civil society mobilisation; rather, it expands beyond anti-globalisation. This means that the regional solidarity movement has also developed based on local communities: the scope of the activities is at a regional level rather than at a global level.

As for non-interference policy, the regional solidarity movement may also be harmonised with a notion of “flexible engagement”. First proposed by the Thai government in the late 1990s, this notion allows intervention in domestic affairs if it is in the interest of the people (e.g., as in the case of Myanmar). Further, Solidarity for Asian People’s Advocacy is a network NGOs formed in Bangkok in February 2006. At the first convention, over thirty NGOs, including the SEACA, Forum Asia, Global South and the Third World Network joined and its participants have increased since then to more than hundred organisations.

AIPMC was organised in 2004 and was mainly based on members of parliament of the ASEAN member countries. AIPMC developed a wide range of transnational activities for democratisation of Myanmar. AIPMC has branches in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, and Cambodia and has significantly mobilised their activities since 2006.

The AIPMC radically criticises the ASEAN’s inclusion of Myanmar, since it was a failed policy in terms of democratic promotion in Myanmar. The organization strongly emphasises that the military regime in Myanmar has been the greatest threat to regional solidarity.³⁰ From a perspective of regional solidarity, AIPMC claims that the ASEAN performs “constructive dialogue” with Myanmar to stabilise the region.³¹ In June 2006, the AIPMC submitted a note of protest to the Secretary General of United Nations, decrying the release of political prisoners in Myanmar

³⁰ AIPMC, “Solidarity Statement at event of Aung San Suu Kyi’s 62nd Birthday and Women of Burma Day, Bangkok”, June 19, 2007, id., “AIPMC: Global Arms Embargo on Myanmar necessary”, October 16, 2007.

³¹ AIPMC, “Solidarity on Democracy Struggle in Myanmar”, Jakarta, September 25, 2007.

including Aung San Suu Kyi.³² It raised its concern that the exodus of refugees and economic instability in Myanmar threatened regional security. The AIPMC has traditionally been critical to the humanitarian violations and non-democratic reforms in Myanmar.³³ They are extremely critical of the non-interference policy that invited the political crisis, humanitarian crisis and economic crisis that the people suffered from.³⁴

3 . Theoretical Explanations of Regional Solidarity Movements

The previous section of this paper examines the key actors constructing regional solidarity movements. This part theoretically evaluates their impact on Asian regionalism.

There have been several key features in regional solidarity movements. First, regional solidarity movements and region-wide democratisation movements strengthen the legitimacy of regionalism and inclusion of civil society. This has been demonstrated by the government-centred regionalism (“regionalism from above”) toward people-centred regionalism (“regionalism from below”). As a logical connotation, the movements claim that the non-interference principle should be reconsidered. Needless to mention, it is somewhat too early to assess how the form of “open regionalism” (with the non-interference principle) has been challenged by the “participatory regionalism” of civil society movements. However, regional solidarity movements propose, to a certain extent, to change the official and elitist tenor of Asian regionalism. The participatory regionalism of regional solidarity movements may change the traditional nature of Asian regionalism while it is still in process.

A second important feature is that regional solidarity movements still belong to “regionalism”. The border and sphere of regionalism (where “region” is defined as

³² From ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus to United Nations Secretary-General, June 27, 2006.

³³ AIPMC, “ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus Conference on Good Governance, Democracy and ASEAN”, Kuala Lumpur, December 2-3, 2005.

³⁴ Thai Parliamentary Caucus on Democracy in Myanmar, “Thai Parliamentary Caucus on Democracy in Myanmar”, March 2, 2005.

Asia) has been harmoniously agreed upon by ASEAN and the regional solidarity movements. On the basis that membership should comprise the ASEAN member countries, participating actors of regionalism have been transformed from government-centred toward people-centred. While Asian regionalism has long been an inter-governmental suite of elitist coalitions, civil society movements have also possessed a regionalist form. Asian civil society or regional solidarity movements, in this sense, do not join with, or extend to, a global civil society, since Asian civil society is based on a logic of regional solidarity rather than notions such as global ethics and global justice. It does not overcome, but rather extends, the border of regionalism.

Conclusion

This paper theoretically reviews and evaluates the impact of regional solidarity movements on Asian regionalism. On the one hand, inclusion of a civil society in the policy making processes of the ASEAN may ensure the legitimacy of regionalism. On the other hand, those civil society movements construct Asian civil society, rather than unify it into global civil society. In other words, regional solidarity movements have accelerated a regionalist tenor. A future research agenda of regional solidarity movements might therefore be to examine how Asian civil society movements differ from global civil society movements and why and how they are maintaining the regionalist terrain as being Asian.