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<図書>
Evolutionary games and population dynamics

責任表示 Josef Hofbauer, Karl Sigmund
データ種別 図書
出版者 Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
出版年 1998
本文言語 英語
大きさ xxvii, 323 p. : ill. ; 25 cm
概要 Every form of behavior is shaped by trial and error. Such stepwise adaptation can occur through individual learning or through natural selection, the basis of evolution. Since the work of Maynard Smit... and others, it has been realized how game theory can model this process. Evolutionary game theory replaces the static solutions of classical game theory by a dynamical approach centered not on the concept of rational players but on the population dynamics of behavioral programs. In this book the authors investigate the nonlinear dynamics of the self-regulation of social and economic behavior, and of the closely related interactions among species in ecological communities. Replicator equations describe how successful strategies spread and thereby create new conditions that can alter the basis of their success, i.e., to enable us to understand the strategic and genetic foundations of the endless chronicle of invasions and extinctions that punctuate evolution. In short, evolutionary game theory describes when to escalate a conflict, how to elicit cooperation, why to expect a balance of the sexes, and how to understand natural selection in mathematical terms.
Every form of behavior is shaped by trial and error. Such stepwise adaptation can occur through individual learning or through natural selection, the basis of evolution. Since the work of Maynard Smith and others, it has been realized how game theory can model this process. Evolutionary game theory replaces the static solutions of classical game theory by a dynamical approach centered not on the concept of rational players but on the population dynamics of behavioral programs. In this book the authors investigate the nonlinear dynamics of the self-regulation of social and economic behavior, and of the closely related interactions among species in ecological communities. Replicator equations describe how successful strategies spread and thereby create new conditions that can alter the basis of their success, i.e., to enable us to understand the strategic and genetic foundations of the endless chronicle of invasions and extinctions that punctuate evolution. In short, evolutionary game theory describes when to escalate a conflict, how to elicit cooperation, why to expect a balance of the sexes, and how to understand natural selection in mathematical terms.
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所蔵情報

: pbk 理系図3F 数理独自 023211998006402 HOFB/10/2 1998

書誌詳細

別書名 表紙タイトル:Evolutionary games and replicator dynamics
一般注記 Includes bibliographical references (p. 301-320) and index
Cover title of hbk.: Evolutionary games and replicator dynamics
著者標目 *Hofbauer, Josef, 1956-
Sigmund, Karl, 1945-
件 名 LCSH:Evolution (Biology) -- Mathematical models  全ての件名で検索
LCSH:Population biology -- Mathematical models  全ての件名で検索
LCSH:Game theory
LCSH:Volterra equations
分 類 DC21:576.8015193
書誌ID 1000302944
ISBN 0521623650
NCID BA36609405
巻冊次 : hbk ; ISBN:0521623650
: pbk ; ISBN:052162570X
NBN B9838275
登録日 2009.09.11
更新日 2009.11.02

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