このページのリンク

利用統計

  • このページへのアクセス:316回

  • 貸出数:3回
    (1年以内の貸出数:0回)

<図書>
The theory of learning in games

責任表示 Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine
シリーズ MIT Press series on economic learning and social evolution ; 2
データ種別 図書
出版者 Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press
出版年 c1998
本文言語 英語
大きさ xiv, 276 p. : ill. ; 24 cm
概要 In economics, most noncooperative game theory has focused on equilibriumin games, especially Nash equilibrium and its refinements. The traditionalexplanation for when and why equilibrium arises is th...t it results from analysis andintrospection by the players in a situation where the rules of the game, therationality of the players, and the players' payoff functions are all commonknowledge. Both conceptually and empirically, this theory has many problems.In TheTheory of Learning in Games Drew Fudenberg and David Levine develop an alternativeexplanation that equilibrium arises as the long-run outcome of a process in whichless than fully rational players grope for optimality over time. The models theyexplore provide a foundation for equilibrium theory and suggest useful ways foreconomists to evaluate and modify traditional equilibrium concepts. 続きを見る

所蔵情報


中央図 自動書庫 017212003003797 417.2/F 52/20030379 1999

書誌詳細

一般注記 Includes bibliographical references and index
著者標目 *Fudenberg, Drew
Levine, David K.
件 名 LCSH:Game theory
分 類 NDC9:417.2
LCC:QA269
DC21:519.3
書誌ID 1000018540
ISBN 0262061945
NCID BA36660821
巻冊次 : cloth ; ISBN:0262061945
登録日 2003.12.11
更新日 2003.12.11

類似資料

この資料を見た人はこんな資料も見ています

この資料を借りた人はこんな資料も借りています