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<図書>
The non-reality of free will

責任表示 Richard Double
データ種別 図書
出版者 New York : Oxford University Press
出版年 1991
本文言語 英語
大きさ xi, 247 p. ; 22 cm
概要 The traditional disputants in the free will discussion--the libertarian, soft determinist, and hard determinist--agree that free will is a coherent concept, while disagreeing on how the concept might...be satisfied and whether it can, in fact, be satisfied. In this innovative analysis, Richard Double offers a bold new argument, rejecting all of the traditional theories and proposing that the concept of free will cannot be satisfied, no matter what the nature of reality. Arguing that there is unavoidable conflict within our understanding of moral responsibility and free choice, Double seeks to prove that when we ascribe responsibility, blame, or freedom, we merely express attitudes, rather than state anything capable of truth or falsity. Free will, he concludes, is essentially an incoherent notion. 続きを見る

所蔵情報


中央図 4C_1‐135 [法] 068152191001504 B 20/D/44 1991

書誌詳細

一般注記 Includes index
Bibliography: p. 235-241
著者標目 *Double, Richard
件 名 LCSH:Free will and determinism
分 類 LCC:BJ1461
DC20:123/.5
書誌ID 1000111362
ISBN 0195064976
NCID BA11506581
巻冊次 ISBN:0195064976
登録日 2009.09.10
更新日 2009.09.10

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