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The purpose of this article is to strengthen the normative basis of proportional representation with a limited majority bonus (PR-LMB) by comparing it with one of its strongest rivals: proportional re...presentation with a limited transferable vote(PR-LTV). PR-LTV distributes seats in parliament proportionally, but it uses the transfer mechanism of the contingent vote (CV) to ensure voters are able to choose a government. In this sense, both PR-LMB and PR-LTV try to reconcile two ideals: the proportionality of PR and the identifiability/accountability of single-member districts (SMD). However, PR-LTV has a crucial weakness in terms ofidentifiability/accountability. Thus, the article concludes that PR-LMB is better than PR-LTV.続きを見る
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