| 概要 |
The aim of this paper is to clarify the meaning of good and desire in Russell's ethical theory (1910-1935). First, at the turn of the century, Russell thought that the subject-matter of ethics is good... and bad, and agreed with G. E. Moore in believing in the objectivity of them. In particular, Russell followed Moore in treating good as an indefinable non-natural quality, but Santayana's criticism, in a book called Winds of Doctrine, caused Russell to abandon this view. "From this correct [good is indifinable] , if somewhat trifling, observation, however, Mr. Russell, like Mr. Moore before him, evokes a portentous dogma. Not being able to define good, he hypostasises it". "That the quality 'good' is indefinable is one assertion, and obvious ; but that the presence of this quality is unconditioned is another, and astonishing" "An ultimate good is chosen, found, or aimed at, it is not opined. The ultimate intuitions on which ethics rests are not debatable, for they are not opinions we hazard but prefernces we feel." (Winds of Doctirine, pp. 141-144). By Santayana's theory Russell advocates a form of the doctrine which is called the subjectivity of values and thinks that the good is derivative from desire. According to Russell, the wish, as an occurrence, is personal, but what it desires is universal, and therefore, ethics consists of desires of a certain general kind, namely such as are concerned with the desires of mankind in general. The business of ethics is to give universal importance to our desires.続きを見る
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Mendeley出力
KJ00000075170-00001