| 作成者 |
|
| 本文言語 |
|
| 出版者 |
|
| 発行日 |
|
| 開始ページ |
|
| 終了ページ |
|
| 出版タイプ |
|
| アクセス権 |
|
| 権利関係 |
|
| 権利関係 |
|
| 関連DOI |
|
| 関連DOI |
|
|
|
|
|
| 関連URI |
|
| 関連HDL |
|
| 関連ISBN |
|
|
|
|
|
| 関連HDL |
|
|
|
|
|
| 関連情報 |
|
| 概要 |
This chapter argues that Japan's corporate governance may be experiencing a paradox. This paradox relates to the transformation of Japan's corporate governance from the keiretsu system, whereby groups... of non-competing firms were formed through cross-holding shares in each other, to a model based on the presence of institutional investors. This shift was considered necessary to encourage more competitive strategies by freeing Japanese managers from acting in the interests of the cross-shareholders. Emerging scholarship is, however, holding that a similar outcome may be reached if several institutional investors hold a substantial but not necessarily controlling stake in competing firms. This so-called common ownership is gradually developing in Japan. Even though some of the characteristics linked to the negative connotations of common ownership are also emerging in Japan, further empirical research is required to definitively determine whether the paradox has emerged.続きを見る
|
Mendeley出力
