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＜departmental bulletin paper＞
The Constitutionality of Proportional Representation with a Limited Majority Bonus
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| Abstract | This study examines the constitutionality of proportional representation with a limited majority bonus (PR-LMB). While PR-LMB is a proportional representation system, there is an exception of LMB: the... winning coalition or independent party is awarded 55 percent of the total seats and the other parties are given 45 percent. In addition, PR-LMB has a legal threshold of 2 percent. It is natural that constitutional scholars are concerned that PR-LMB violates some basic principles of the Constitution of Japan: the equality under the law (Article 14 paragraph (1)) and the (equal) representation of all people (Article 43 paragraph (1)). However, the LMB does not violate the basic principles. First, the Supreme Court has judged the huge disproportionality of the existing mixed-member parallel system to be constitutional. Given this tolerant judgement, the LMB will also be judged as constitutional. Second, the LMB will pass the proportionality tests. The aim of LMB is legitimate because it seeks to reconcile two shared ideals: identifiability/accountability and proportionality. The LMB is a means is suitable for achieving this aim (Okazaki 2019). It is necessary because it is superior to the most powerful rival, that is, proportional representation with a limited transferable vote (Okazaki 2021). It is also balancing because the majority bonus is limited and compensated by the minority bonus. Further, the legal threshold of 2 percent does not violate the basic principles. First, even the legal threshold of 3 percent proposed by the Hosokawa Cabinet was authorized as constitutional by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau. Second, the legal threshold of 2 percent will pass the proportionality tests. The legal threshold has a legitimate aim to avoid party fragmentation and to promote governmental stability. As many cases demonstrate, it is suitable for achieving this aim. It is necessary because it is superior to the most powerful rival, that is, lowering of district magnitude. It is also balancing because the legal threshold is lowered to a minimum level. Thus, both the LMB and the legal threshold proposed herein can be considered to be constitutional under the Constitution of Japan.show more |
| Table of Contents | 第一節 序論 第二節 多数派限定優遇の合憲性 一 多数派限定優遇の合憲性問題 二 二段階審査 三 多数派限定優遇の制度設計 第三節 阻止条項の合憲性 一 阻止条項の合憲性問題 二 二段階審査 三 阻止条項の制度設計 第四節 結論 |
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| Created Date | 2023.03.29 |
| Modified Date | 2024.04.11 |