| 概要 |
The purpose of this article is to provide an institutional design for proportional representation with a limited majority bonus (PR-LMB), which I have proposed and defended in two of my earlier articl...es (Okazaki 2019a; Okazaki 2021). Japanese proponents of PR have generally argued for open-list PR with prefectural or regional constituencies or mixed-member proportional (MMP) systems, which are alleged to enable voters to choose a candidate on a list or in a constituency. Applied to the PR-LMB, these electoral systems make it difficult for voters to substantially choose a candidate. In addition, they make it difficult for parties to organize a well-balanced and well-communicated team. To avoid these serious problems, I propose a complex closed-list system with a nationwide constituency, in which lists are divided along policy lines. Furthermore, I propose an inversely proportional distribution of party subsidies for making the complex closed-list system work: 45 percent of the subsidies are distributed to the governing coalition or party, and 55 percent are distributed to opposition parties.続きを見る
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Mendeley出力
