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＜departmental bulletin paper＞
Administered protection and vertical integration
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| Abstract | Previous literature on antidumping petitions fails to explain the relative frequency of petitioning party's proceeding decision. This paper presents a positive theory of antidumping procedure. Unlike ...previous literature, the domestic firm's decision of withdraw depends on the common winning expectation. When the winning probability is high, the petitioning firm has the nice threat point and tends to settle. When the winning probability is low, the petitioning party had better enjoy the domestic vertically integrated profit and consequently, it tends to proceed the petition. So this model predicts frivolous suit is common in the antidumping petitions.show more |
| Table of Contents | 1 Introduction 2 A vertical structure model of antidumping petition 3 Bargaining over market structure 4 Discussions 5 Concluding remarks |
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| Created Date | 2021.02.15 |
| Modified Date | 2022.02.18 |