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We incorporate matching schemes into a model of transboundary environmental agreements and investigate their effectiveness using three-stage game model. In the first stage, each country decides whethe...r or not to accede to the agreement. In the second stage, the signatories collectively choose a common matching rate. Finally, in the third stage, each signatory and non-signatory determines its unconditional flat abatement noncooperatively, taking the value of the matching rate as given. Each signatory is imposed an additional abatement obtained by multiplying the total of all the other countries' flat abatements by the matching rate. The analysis of a matching agreement game with symmetric countries as players suggests the existence of a self-enforcing agreement leading to an efficient and equitable outcome, and thus shows that matching schemes are effective.続きを見る
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