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自治産業コロニー「クズバス」とリュトヘルス(7) : 清算後とその総括に向けて
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| 概要 | Previous researches have only touched on the reorganization of “Kuzbassugol” and the downfall of K.N. Korobkin after the liquidation of the Autonomous Industrial Colony “Kuzbas” (AIC-K), but this art...icle has newly revealed that even after its liquidation S.J. Rutgers, with the aid of Begemann, attempted to retain foreign engineers leaving and promote the next plan “Tel’bess,” hoping for a glimmer of hope. In the end, Rutgers’ efforts did not bear fruit. The possible reasons are as follows: (1) The successor manager, Kotin, did not oppose the plan “Tel’bess” from the outset, but he constantly interfered in technical issues and did not get along well with Begemann; (2) Top engineers had left Kemerovo, making it difficult to proceed with the plan; (3) It was difficult for Begemann to take over negotiations in Moscow in place of Rutgers. Next, the aftermath of the leading staff who worked for the AIC-K until the end was briefly described. Many of them continued to work in undertakings similar to Project Kuzbas in Soviet Russia, or returned to their home countries and found new jobs, but they still believed in and had high hopes for “a new Kuzbas.” Here, a supplementary explanation was given about the Dutch engineers. N. Sparks, who participated in the first half of the AIC-K, recalled the role played by them as follows: “Besides the Americans, Rutgers had brought out half a dozen Dutch engineers [in the end, there were about two dozen]. The Americans were somewhat taken aback to find some of the Hollanders contemptuous not only of the Russians but of the Americans also, and convinced of their own superiority. But while all these attitudes muddies the waters slightly, they never seriously hindered the work. Then, too, certain individuals stood out in their efforts and ability at smoothing relations between Russians and Americans, Americans and Dutch, Communists and non-Communists.” This role probably continued in the second half of the AIC-K. It should be noted that among the Dutch engineers, Rutgers, A. Baars, A.G. Struik, D. Schermerhorn and others were graduates of Polytechnic School of Delft (Technical College of Delft from 1905). At the turn of the century in the Netherlands, especially in Delft, it was not uncommon for graduates of the Technical School to be connected to the social reform movement and even socialism. The student movement in the period of the so-called “Red Delft” became one of the origins of socialism in the Netherlands. In the final chapter, a summary has been made toward the conclusion. However, I would like to point out that in this series, each Part is summarized briefly, and in summarizing it here (although it has been newly re-edited), those summaries are repeated to a certain extent. 1 A new interpretation on its foundation The main reason why the deliberations for the foundation were prolonged for nearly half a year was not the merits or demerits of the enormous financial support from the Soviet Government, as researchers have emphasized so far, but the disagreement over who should have jurisdiction over the Colony and who should better guarantee its “autonomy” that Rutgers stressed the importance of sticking to during the deliberations. One side was the Soviet of Labor and Defense (STO), an upper organ which was presided over by V.I. Lenin and legally authorized as commission of the Soviet of People’s Commissars, and the other was the Supreme Soviet of National Economy (VSNKh), a lower organ which promoted the provision of concessions to foreign capitalists and insisted the Colony should also be operated on a commercial basis. In the end, it was decided that the Colony would be founded under the jurisdiction of the STO. But the STO had entrusted preliminary consideration to the VSNKh, a specialized committee specifically involved in the foundation and management of the Colony, and for that very reason, attempts by the VSNKh to “intervene” in the Colony would be unavoidable even after its foundation. It has ultimately been foreseen that the disagreement between the two sides over its jurisdiction would continue. 2 Problems with periodization The Division of the AIC-K into Periods (See The Table printed in page 22) The division of the AIC-K into Periods is presented by Galkina. I have listed it in the left column of the table above, and my own division in the right column (my division basically follows the subtitles of each Part in this series, so no further explanation is necessary). Galkina only adds short annotations for each period (characteristic excerpts are quoted in the table). Looking at these, Galkina’s main interest is not in the development of the AIC-K’s enterprise itself, but is rather partisan and focused too much on the conflict between the Wobblies and the Communists. It is difficult to grasp how the AIC-K actually developed its enterprise from Galkina’s division of periods and the annotations. 3 Problems with the interpretation of the IWW tendency (1) Mass meeting versus technical “efficiency” There were problems with the “mass meeting,” which was taken seriously by pro-IWW colonists as a system that guaranteed “freedom of criticism from below.” Soon after Rutgers arrived at Kemerovo, he posed the problem with the mass meeting (for example, inefficiency that even the technical details had been discussed and resolved there) and tried to improve the deficiencies of mass meeting by introducing “a certain discipline.” Although this attempt drew resistance from IWW supporters, what Rutgers was concerned with was the issue of technical “efficiency” in production, in other words, the inevitability of industrial management by specialized technicians. This was supported by the argument in the article “Workers’ Control,” which was published in a local organ of the IWW, Industrial Worker and reprinted in Kuzbass, saying that “Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as ‘Democratic Control of Industry,’ at least not in the sense of ‘Democratic Management’”; “It might, it is possible to imagine, result in some sort of dictatorship of the technician, rather than a dictatorship of the proletariat, as far as production is concerned.” Rutgers’ critical response to the mass meeting and emphasis on technological “efficiency” in production provided a valid criticism of IWW-style Colony management. (2) Dreams and reality of the Wobblies group In the Colony a group of the leading Wobblies (W.D. Haywood, T. Barker, S. Berg, J. Masukevich and others) who kept on adhering to the original “Kuzbas idea” was being formed. The only time this group fought entirely with the Managing Board was over whether the AIC-K should adapt itself to the NEP system and make some institutional changes. Indeed, their argument was not persuasive in heated discussions when faced with the real issue of how they could contribute to the economic reconstruction of Soviet Russia. Because they were so attached to the “Kuzbas idea,” they could not propose anything other than maintaining the status quo. But they still left something like a hope for this international social “experiments they could not attempt under the profit-system.” They did not fight with the Managing Board on the level of being in conflict with the “Communists” that Galkina and others emphasized. Most members of the group never broke off relations with the AIC-K until its liquidation. (3) The Wobblies as the “counterpart” of Communists Why is it that not only American researchers W.Th. Smith and Morray, but also Russian researchers such as Galkina tend to be too fixated on the binary oppositional interpretation of “Communists vs. Wobblies”? The most important conflict at the time was between governmental organs (VSNKh, Gosplan, etc.) and the AIC-K. However, these were “opponents in argument” and disputes were inevitable under the difficult economic and financial situation at the time. In fact, there was another serious conflict, which was caused by hostile acts of Russian “spetsy” (specialists). N.P. Rastopchin, the chairman of the STO [investigative] committee that investigated this conflict, wrote the following in his memoirs, published years later: The “spetsy” of the competent authorities, who became members of the STO committee, openly opposed its [investigative] report and revealed a tendency to obscure Kuzbass Trust’s management and operation system, which did not actually justify itself, and to underestimate and conceal the achievements of the AIC-K enterprise. The “struggle with ‘spetsy’” was such a serious issue for Rutgers that “their slander or false allegations against the AIC-K were considered political crimes.” Russian researchers have sometimes made do with vague descriptions of the former conflict/controversy, and have not directly addressed the latter conflict/struggle, so no description comparable to the above-mentioned recollection by Rastopchin can be found among them. It is likely that Russian researchers have not placed importance on these two conflicts, and in order to divert attention from them, they have placed more importance on the Wobblies as the “counterpart/villain” than the historical fact dictates, and emphasized the conflict with the Communists. 4 “Autonomy” and the retention of the “special features” Originally, in the first “plan for Industrial Labor Colonial of foreign Workers” addressed to Lenin the following was stated clearly: “It will be absolutely essential that the labor colony gets a free hand to manage its own affairs and to stimulate what energy can be put to further the development.” Rutgers also stated the following in the opening article of the inaugural issue of Kuzbas: “‘Autonomous’ colony means that the Soviet authorities have guaranteed a sufficiently free hand to manage their own interior affairs in order to make possible the highest degree of efficiency. No more.” In order to contribute to the reconstruction and development of the Soviet Russian economy, which was the just cause of the AIC-K, it was essential to improve “efficiency” both technically and socially. To achieve this, the AIC-K also needed to be guaranteed “a free hand,” in other words, “autonomy.” Having started on such established principles, the AIC-K gradually developed despite encountering various difficulties due to it being an unprecedented project. In order to further develop to realize the just cause, the AIC-K needed to obtain any positive support from Soviet governing bodies. However, in reality, since it became difficult to obtain such support, the AIC-K had no choice but to make some institutional changes in line with the economic development under the NEP, and in fact, that would be the only option for the AIC-K. Rutgers’ original dream of forming a new Labor State was gone and all that remained was how to aim at accelerating its economic development by increasing the technical “efficiency” in production as much as possible, on the basis of “autonomy” within the AIC-K organization. First of all, AIC-K’s headquarters was to be located in Moscow as the center of trade. This also required a clear definition of what was meant by the term “autonomy.” Many colonists, including Haywood, Berg, Masukevich, Barker, interpreted “autonomy” as individual authorization and freedom of action in their conduct within the industry, rather than as autonomy of an organization within the framework of Russian institutions. As a result of this interpretation, efforts were made to settle AIC-K’s operational and technical issues through mass meetings. Their interpretations and arguments, which sought to maintain the founding principles, were not persuasive in the heated debate that led to the AIC-K accepting institutional changes mentioned above. At the time, Rutgers (with Th. Reese) sent a letter to the STO, saying that “within the present Managing Board there are various differences of opinion which will put a brake on the preparatory work for actual production.” In other words, Rutgres was afraid that the internal conflict would affect the “efficiency” in production and ultimately hinder the just cause of contributing to the reconstruction of the Soviet Russian economy. This trend referred to a transition from an autonomous management system with special concessions to a centralized management and control system, and was referred to among those concerned as the “Russification of the colony.” For Galkina, this “Russification” was taken for granted, and she could see it as simply the start of full-scale operations, with the AIC-K being transformed into a normal Russian “commercial trust,” in other words, being incorporated into Russia’s overall economic system (which means that the AIC-K will be placed under the jurisdiction of the VSNKh rather than the STO). For Rutgers, the “Isolation” of the AIC-K was a dangerous experiment and the trend toward strengthening the “Russification” was unavoidable, but the prerequisite was that the “autonomy” which was gradually being weakened be retained in the form of the “special features.” To be specific, these conditions were “all the progressive and rational things that the colonists had been adhering to,” “high efficiency of instruction with a minimal amount of administrative personnel [foreign staff],” “combining our statistics and management system with the introduction of the latest production methods,” and the right of appeal to the STO. In the end, these conditions were not accepted either, and these issues were resolved with the liquidation and reorganization of the AIC-K, which was the worst possible outcome. The importance of Rutgers’ insistence to the end on preserving the “special features” that were the last bastion of “autonomy” and on retaining the foreign staff who guaranteed it, has never been recognized by any AIC-K researchers until now. I would like to ask why they did not recognize the importance of this. This is because they did not thoroughly examine the documents written by Rutgers, who was the person most directly involved. The only documents they used in their work from Rutgers were the memoirs “Encounters with Lenin” published in 1935 and articles, reports, etc. printed in Kuzbas. The Rutgers documents were donated by Rutgers’ daughter, G.C. Trincher Rutgers, to the Institute of Marxism-Leninism (now RGASPI) on 31 January 1983. While G.Ia. Tarle and others may not have been able to view them, current researchers such as Galkina can view them, and in fact I have used them as the main sources for this series. Of course, the Rutgers documents I have used still need to be verified again by using meeting minutes of the STO and other organizations and reports submitted by Rutgers on each occasion, and I would like to leave this to future researchers. 5 Over the evaluation of Rutgers The on-the-spot report that the colonists, secretary Hellen C. Wilson and doctor Elsie R. Mitchell, contributed shortly after returning to the United States after the liquidation of the AIC-K, was specific and detailed. However, it was based only on what they had seen, heard, and learned, and they consistently criticized Rutgers as a “dictator,” stating, “It seemed a pity that the man on whom the dictatorship fell was a Hollander. His brief residence in the United States had resulted in a dislike and distrust of everything American － especially democracy.” Smith continued this evaluation of Rutgers as a “dictator.” In response, Sparks, an engineer who was a colonist in the first half of the AIC-K, evaluated Rutgers as follows: “He was the only one of the management board that commanded, if not agreement, at least a necessary modicum of respect from all sides at the enterprise.” It should be noted here that, although highly appreciated, there is a reservation “if not agreement.” This reservation is due to the “bureaucratic” or “centralized” management characteristics that have often been pointed out in evaluations of Rutgers, and is often treated critically. However, for Rutgers, “top-down” management and instruction were sometimes unavoidable, such as the introduction of “a certain discipline” to make up for shortcomings in mass meetings and the unavoidable response of “some sort of dictatorship of the technician” to improve the technical “efficiency” in production. In this regard, Paula Garb expands on Sparks’ evaluation by summarizing it as follows, which was probably valid at least in 1923-24: “[Rutgers] put a stop to the endless meetings and bickering over petty daily problems. To the displeasure of many of the workers, who believed every single matter should be decided by the collective, Rutgers began making decisions himself and insisted that they be followed without question. Fortunately for the Colony, he made the right decisions. He became so well respected that by the time he asked to leave in 1925 no one wanted to see him go. He was strict but fair and, most importantly, an excellent manager.” 6 The evaluation from the perspective of post-liquidation development Regarding the evaluation from the perspective of economic development after the liquidation of the AIC-K, the evaluations of all researchers are almost unanimous. Here are two examples from shortly after its liquidation. Ruth Kennell says: “Taken as a colonization scheme or a social experiment, Kuzbas was a failure. But as an industrial undertaking it succeeded and its work lives on.” Wilson and Mitchell make this evaluation: “The specific task of completing the chemical plant and modernizing the Kemerovo mines had been accomplished; both were producing and profitable. Our coke was being used in the steel-mills in the Urals..... Some of our successes were not lasting, but the completed, producing plant remains as a substantial contribution to the industrial system of Russia.” Its contributions increased further during World War II. “When the Germans overran Donbas, the Soviet Union lost over 60 per cent of her coal output. But in 1943 Kemerovo produced 25 million tons of coal. The chemical plant was the only coke plant still in the Soviet hands during the Nazi occupation. It supplied 2,000 enterprises with coke.” The fact that the AIC-K had already achieved the economic development required to make such a contribution was likely due to the following proactive attitude toward expanding the scale of its operations: (1) The AIC-K had been merging enterprises in the surrounding areas from an early stage, and had consistently aimed to integrate the management of the entire Kuznetsk Basin coalfield until the Tel’bess plan. (2) The AIC-K was originally conceived as an industrial workers’ colony in Kuzbas and the Northern Urals (Nadezhdinsk plants), but in the fall of 1922, when approval of this plan was in doubt, Rutgers pioneered the so-called “Ural-Kuznetsk Combinat” plan at the Presidium conference of the Gosplan (this was to be realized after the first Five-Year Plan). If the AIC-K had not built the foundations for economic development in just five years (in extremely cold and other adverse conditions, although the country was finally emerging from the chaos of the Civil War), it is doubtful whether the complex would have been able to support the country’s economy to the extent that it was during World War II. In the sense that it made this possible, AIC-K’s reputation as something that started as the “Little International in Siberia” and created a major industrial enterprise is unshakable. 7 Was it a failure of idealism? As we conclude this series, let us answer the question posed at the beginning of the series: “Was this great project based on international workers’ solidarity really a failure of idealism? If so, what were the problems?” The AIC-K was started with the aim of (a) contributing to the economic reconstruction of Soviet Russia and (b) realizing social experiments and creation based on international solidarity and the principle of “autonomy.” However, since the pursuit of (a) was the just cause, if (a) was in jeopardy, the pursuit of (b) had to take a back seat, and the AIC-K was faced with a dilemma in which both goals were difficult to achieve. Although there were fundamental problems, i.e., difficulties, the two main elements that motivated the colonists to participate in the Kuzbas project at the time were: “The first is the enthusiasm among workers and technicians in capitalist countries for the social experiment to overthrow capitalism and to build socialism. The second may be found in an overestimating of the all-powerfulness of modern technique, when liberated from the restraints in the capitalist world. Together they explain as well the difficulties and the disappointments, as the successes and the final results” (Rutgers’ reconsideration in the 1950s). In short, it was especially the “enthusiasm for the social experiment” of (b) hat enabled the proactive attitude toward expanding the scale of operations mentioned above to be maintained, and the contribution to (a) to be more solid. On the other hand, the Soviet Government had high hopes for the AIC-K and provided financial support for (a), and as the NEP system was established, it came to believe that (a) could be achieved by the Government itself, that is, by “russifying” the AIC-K. Then another problem appeared. In the wake of Rutgers’ prolonged medical treatment and the issue of his deputy selection, the “Russification” progressed so rapidly that the pursuit of (b) was ultimately driven to failure. The AIC-K was unable to achieve (b), and in that sense it is difficult to overturn the assessment that it was a “a failure of idealism.” Although the AIC-K had internal problems such as a shortage of senior staff, internal conflicts due to differences in ideas and perceptions of the “idealism” that was sought, and the death of Bronka Kornblitt and Rutgers’ medical treatment, it continued to demonstrate high productivity, as Galkina summarized: “It is evident that the colony was much more efficient when operated by its own management than it was under the command of the Soviet director.” In order for such AIC-K to achieve further economic development (for example, expanding the sales channels for coal, coke, and other chemical products), it had no choice but to enter the economic system of Russia as a whole, which was seen by the Soviet Government as a favorable condition for promoting the “Russification” of the AIC-K. Not a few colonists opposed the “Russification” and advocated the “Isolation” for the sake of (b). But Rutgers recognized that refusing the “Russification” would make (a) more difficult and that the “Russification” was already unavoidable. However, he made the final condition that the foreign staff be retained, as they would maintain the “special features” essential to (b). In the end, the fact that even this condition was overlooked by the Soviet side suggests that there was a fundamental problem on the Soviet side, in that they did not accept even the last condition, which had its roots in “idealism.” Finally, it is recalled that not only among Russian “spetsy” but also among governmental organs, sentiments contrary to “international workers’ solidarity” were sometimes expressed, such as that they could manage on their own without help from foreigners. How far Rutgers and his colleagues have come since Lenin said at the turbulent conference of the STO on 30 September 1921: “Dear Comrade Rutgers, don’t get too excited, I promise you not only some freedom, but complete freedom [within the organization]”!続きを見る |
| 目次 | はじめに 第1章 再編とコロプキン失脚時の最後の試み 第2章 外国人入植者のその後 終 章 総括に向けて 1 その創設に関する新解釈 2 時期区分の問題 3 IWW 的傾向という解釈の問題点 4 「自治」と「特性」の保持 5 リュトヘルスの評価をめぐって 6 清算後の発展から見た評価 7 理想主義の看板倒れであったか？続きを見る |
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| 登録日 | 2025.08.04 |
| 更新日 | 2025.08.04 |