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This study investigates the conditions under which welfare fraud and incomplete take-up emerge simultaneously and persist for a long time, which has been observed in many countries, particularly Japan... and Germany. To do this, we extend models of statistical discrimination and taxpayers’ resentment to simple models of population dynamics. We find two stable boundary equilibria in the first model. One of these equilibria entails low welfare fraud and 100% incomplete take-up, and the other entails high welfare fraud and 100% take-up. In contrast, we find a unique stable equilibrium in the tax resentment model, which is interior and thus allows for the coexistence of welfare fraud and incomplete take-up in a long run. Hence, we conclude that this unique long-run equilibrium of the dynamic taxpayers’ resentment model provides a better explanation for the observation of simultaneous and persistent presence of welfare fraud and incomplete take-up in actual economies.続きを見る
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