Mendeley出力
＜紀要論文＞
An Analysis of Transaction-Specific Investment and Duopolistic Group Competition
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| 概要 | We consider the influence of the existence of a transaction-specific investment on a transaction relationship under a duopoly market. In a buyer-supplier paradigm a supplier often tries to make an inv...estment to raise the trade profit. The investment may be transaction-specific. This implies that the supplier cannot appropriate all the increase of the trade profit due to the investment. As a result, the level of the supplier's investment may be inefficient. We investigate the optimal level of the transaction-specific investment under a duopoly market. Since the transaction-specific investment problem under a duopoly market has so far hardly been considered, it is interesting to investigate the issue. We show that the specific investment may be less than in a competitive market.続きを見る |
| 目次 | ABSTRACT Introduction 1 A Basic Model 2 Reservation Profit 3 Symmetric Equilibrium Probability of Group Cancelling 4 Optimal Specific Investment 5 A Competitive Market and Specific Investment |
本文ファイル
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570506_p121
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467 KB | 157 |
詳細
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| 登録日 | 2021.10.07 |
| 更新日 | 2022.02.18 |