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This study reviews existing research using repeated games to analyze long-term international environmental agreements (IEAs), focusing on the issue of deviations. Several studies have examined the eff...ectiveness of IEAs and the conditions of a stable agreement. Models of cooperation for climate control can be divided roughly into two groups: reduced-stage game models, and repeated game models. A considerable number of studies address the formation of stable IEAs in reduced-stage game models. Few studies examine the formation of agreements in repeated game models, which should be paid more attention. Therefore, this study reviews the literature on IEAs, focusing on repeated games, and describes the equilibrium concept and strategies of repeated game models.続きを見る
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1.International environmental agreement 2.Theoretical analyses of IEAs in game theory 3.The basic strategy 4.The strategy with n players 5.Summary and discussion
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