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This paper examines the cases where complement clauses with the verb know have you as their subject. With the verb know, which is one of the factive predicates, truth of complements is generally presu...pposed and therefore even when the main clauses are negated the complements are not (Kiparsky and Kiparsky 1970). However, with cases where the subject is you, we claim that two clearly distinct types are observed: the one in which the factivity is kept intact as in (1), and the other in which the factivity has been completely lost as in (2). (1) You don't know that I spend large amounts of my free time working on costumes for various conventions.... (2) ...Thus, you cannot be a "strong" atheist - you don't know that God doesn't exist. In this paper, calling the former "type A" and the latter "type B", we explicate each type based on Verhagen's theory of intersubjectivity (2005, 2007) and the construal configuration. That is, we claim that type A is the cases where the expressions are maximally "objective"; type B, on the other hand, is the cases that profile the coordination relation between the speaker and the hearer, with respect to the same object of conceptualization.続きを見る
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0. はじめに 1. Langacker(2002, 2009) 2. Verhagen(2005, 2007) 3. Verhagenの把握構図と「you don't know that＋命題」 4. まとめ
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