このページのリンク

引用にはこちらのURLをご利用ください

利用統計

  • このページへのアクセス:11回

  • 貸出数:0回
    (1年以内の貸出数:0回)

<図書>
Decision theory as philosophy

責任表示 Mark Kaplan
データ種別 図書
出版情報 Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 1998, c1996
本文言語 英語
大きさ xv, 227 p. ; 23 cm
概要 It has been over sixty years since Ramsey first argued for the significance of decision theory to epistemology. Yet many philosophers remain unconvinced. The familiar probabilistic constraints decisio... theory imposes on opinion and confirmation seem too demanding, too prudential in nature and too tangential to our concern with the propriety of categorical belief and knowledge. How important are these concerns? Mark Kaplan argues that they are very important - but that a properly modified and interpreted Bayesian decision theory can meet them. His brief is that, suitably formulated, Bayesian decision theory is of the most profound philosophical consequence to the way we are accustomed to think about inquiry, criticism and rational belief. Kaplan makes his case in a clear and compelling way, and with a minimum of technical detail. The modest variant of Bayesian decision theory to which he appeals is new, well-motivated and easy to follow. Most proofs are relegated to an appendix. A brief primer on probability,is also provided. This book is not just an original contribution to Bayesian epistemology. It is also the most accessible treatment available of the relation Bayesian epistemology bears to the rest of the field.
It has been over sixty years since Ramsey first argued for the significance of decision theory to epistemology. Yet many philosophers remain unconvinced. The familiar probabilistic constraints decision theory imposes on opinion and confirmation seem too demanding, too prudential in nature and too tangential to our concern with the propriety of categorical belief and knowledge. How important are these concerns? Mark Kaplan argues that they are very important - but that a properly modified and interpreted Bayesian decision theory can meet them. His brief is that, suitably formulated, Bayesian decision theory is of the most profound philosophical consequence to the way we are accustomed to think about inquiry, criticism and rational belief. Kaplan makes his case in a clear and compelling way, and with a minimum of technical detail. The modest variant of Bayesian decision theory to which he appeals is new, well-motivated and easy to follow. Most proofs are relegated to an appendix. A brief primer on probability,is also provided. This book is not just an original contribution to Bayesian epistemology. It is also the most accessible treatment available of the relation Bayesian epistemology bears to the rest of the field.
続きを見る

所蔵情報


: pbk 中央図 自動書庫 井上文庫/Z 00/K-1 1996 井上文庫 024212012503304

書誌詳細

一般注記 Originally published(hardback): 1996
Bibliography: p. 215-221
Includes index
著者標目 *Kaplan, Mark, 1951-
件 名 LCSH:Decision-making
LCSH:Knowledge, Theory of.
LCSH:Science -- Philosophy  全ての件名で検索
LCSH:Bayesian statistical decision theory
分 類 LCC:BD184
DC20:121/.6
DC21:101
書誌ID 1001488792
ISBN 0521475058
NCID BA36093856
巻冊次 : hbk ; ISBN:0521475058
: pbk ; ISBN:0521624967 ; PRICE:£13.95
NBN B97W0142
登録日 2012.10.23
更新日 2012.10.23