Central bank independence, targets and credibility : political and economic aspects of delegation arrangements for monetary policy

＜図書＞
Central bank independence, targets and credibility : political and economic aspects of delegation arrangements for monetary policy

責任表示	Francesco Lippi
データ種別	図書
出版情報	Cheltenham : Edward Elgar , c1999
本文言語	英語
大きさ	viii, 162 p. ; 24 cm
概要	Provides a welfare analysis of central banking, addressing such topics as imperfect monetary control, rational voters, distributional issues, and uncertainty about future policy objectives. The role ...layed by the different institutional elements that contribute to the making of an independent central bank is assessed, as well as the distinction between central bank independence and targets. The final essay analyzes the links between central bank independence, policy strategies, and economic outcomes in a cross-section of 49 countries. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR続きを見る

状態	巻次	所蔵場所	請求記号	刷年	文庫名称	資料番号	コメント	予約・取寄	複写申込	自動書庫
		中央図 3B	338.43/L 67/20000431	1999		017212000004314		予約・取寄			予約・取寄

一般注記	Includes bibliographical references (p. 149-156) and index
著者標目	*Lippi, Francesco
件　名	LCSH:Banks and banking, Central -- European Union countries 全ての件名で検索 LCSH:Monetary policy -- European Union countries 全ての件名で検索
分　類	LCC:HG925 DC21:332.1/1 NDC9:338.43
書誌ID	1000801352
ISBN	1858989159
NCID	BA40101481
巻冊次	ISBN:1858989159
登録日	2009.09.15
更新日	2009.09.15