<図書>
Repeated games with incomplete information
責任表示 | Robert J. Aumann and Michael B. Maschler ; with the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns |
---|---|
データ種別 | 図書 |
出版情報 | Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press , c1995 |
本文言語 | 英語 |
大きさ | xvii, 342 p. : ill. ; 24 cm |
概要 | The first four chapters of the book treat the competitive zero-sum side of the theory of repeated games. Chapter five takes up cooperative phenomena where one player may want to signal information to...another. An extensive bibliography covers all items mentioned in the main text, in the postscripts, and in the introduction. The bibliography also includes a compilation of published papers and books that refer to the original reports. 続きを見る |
所蔵情報
状態 | 巻次 | 所蔵場所 | 請求記号 | 刷年 | 文庫名称 | 資料番号 | コメント | 予約・取寄 | 複写申込 | 自動書庫 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
中央図 自動書庫 | 393.1/A 96/1 | 1995 |
|
068172195012175 |
|
書誌詳細
一般注記 | Bibliography: p. [323]-333 Includes index |
---|---|
著者標目 | *Aumann, Robert J., 1930- Maschler, Michael, 1927- Stearns, Richard E. |
件 名 | LCSH:Arms control -- Simulation methods
全ての件名で検索
LCSH:Disarmament -- Simulation methods 全ての件名で検索 LCSH:Game theory |
分 類 | LCC:JX1974 DC20:327.1/74/015193 NDC8:393.1 |
書誌ID | 1000226385 |
ISBN | 0262011476 |
NCID | BA25117293 |
巻冊次 | ISBN:0262011476 |
登録日 | 2009.09.11 |
更新日 | 2009.09.11 |