Mendeley出力
＜図書＞
Justificatory liberalism : an essay on epistemology and political theory
| 責任表示 | Gerald F. Gaus |
|---|---|
| シリーズ | Oxford political theory |
| データ種別 | 図書 |
| 出版情報 | New York : Oxford University Press , 1996 |
| 本文言語 | 英語 |
| 大きさ | xiv, 374 p. ; 23 cm |
| 概要 | Gerald Gaus draws on current work in epistemology and cognitive psychology to defend a modest version of cognitive relativism. Building on this theory of personal justification, he asks, "How do we j...stify moral and political principles to others?" Here, the "populist" proposal put forward by "political liberals"--that the assent of all reasonable citizens must be obtained--is considered and rejected. Because reasonable people often ignore excellent reasons, moral and political principles can be considered conclusively justified, even in the face of some reasonable dissent. Conclusive justification, however, is difficult to achieve, and Gaus acknowledges that most of our public justifications are inconclusive. He then addresses the question of how citizens can adjudicate their inconclusive public justifications. The rule of law, liberal democracy and limited judicial review are defended as elements of a publicly justified umpiring procedure. Gerald Gaus draws on current work in epistemology and cognitive psychology to defend a modest version of cognitive relativism. Building on this theory of personal justification, he asks, "How do we justify moral and political principles to others?" Here, the "populist" proposal put forward by "political liberals"--that the assent of all reasonable citizens must be obtained--is considered and rejected. Because reasonable people often ignore excellent reasons, moral and political principles can be considered conclusively justified, even in the face of some reasonable dissent. Conclusive justification, however, is difficult to achieve, and Gaus acknowledges that most of our public justifications are inconclusive. He then addresses the question of how citizens can adjudicate their inconclusive public justifications. The rule of law, liberal democracy and limited judicial review are defended as elements of a publicly justified umpiring procedure. 続きを見る |
所蔵情報
| 状態 | 巻次 | 所蔵場所 | 請求記号 | 刷年 | 文庫名称 | 資料番号 | コメント | 予約・取寄 | 複写申込 | 自動書庫 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
|
中央図 4C_1‐135 [法] | J 00/G/54 | 1996 |
|
015211996019333 |
|
書誌詳細
| 一般注記 | Bibliography: p. [340]-362 Includes index |
|---|---|
| 著者標目 | *Gaus, Gerald F. |
| 件 名 | LCSH:Liberalism LCSH:Social contract LCSH:Justification (Theory of knowledge) |
| 分 類 | NDC9:311.7 LCC:JC574 DC20:320.5/13 |
| 書誌ID | 1000217731 |
| ISBN | 0195094395 |
| NCID | BA27096048 |
| 巻冊次 | : hbk ; ISBN:0195094395 : pbk ; ISBN:0195094409 |
| 登録日 | 2009.09.11 |
| 更新日 | 2009.09.11 |