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<図書>
Frege's puzzle

責任表示 by Nathan Salmon
データ種別 図書
出版情報 Atascadero, Cal. : Ridgeview , c1991
本文言語 英語
大きさ xiv, 194 p. ; 23 cm
概要 The nature of the information content of declarative sentences is a central topic in the philosophy of language. The natural view that a sentence like "John loves Mary" contains information in which t...o individuals occur as constituents is termed the naive theory, and is one that has been abandoned by most contemporary scholars. This theory was refuted originally by philosopher Gottlob Frege. His argument that the naive theory did not work is termed Frege's puzzle, and his rival account of information content is termed the orthodox theory. In this detailed study, Nathan Salmon defends a version of the naive theory and presents a proposal for its extension that provides a better picture of information content than the orthodox theory gives. He argues that a great deal of what has generally been taken for granted in the philosophy of language over the past few decades is either mistaken or unsupported, and consequently, much current research is focused on the wrong set of questions. Salmon dissolves Frege's puzzle as it is usually formulated and demonstrates how it can be reconstructed and strengthened to yield a more powerful objection to the naive theory. He then defends the naive theory against the new Frege puzzle by presenting an idea that yields both a surprisingly rich and powerful extension of the naive theory and a better picture of information content than that of the original orthodox theory. Nathan Salmon is Professor of Philosophy, University of California at Santa Barbara. A Bradford Book.
The nature of the information content of declarative sentences is a central topic in the philosophy of language. The natural view that a sentence like "John loves Mary" contains information in which two individuals occur as constituents is termed the naive theory, and is one that has been abandoned by most contemporary scholars. This theory was refuted originally by philosopher Gottlob Frege. His argument that the naive theory did not work is termed Frege's puzzle, and his rival account of information content is termed the orthodox theory. In this detailed study, Nathan Salmon defends a version of the naive theory and presents a proposal for its extension that provides a better picture of information content than the orthodox theory gives. He argues that a great deal of what has generally been taken for granted in the philosophy of language over the past few decades is either mistaken or unsupported, and consequently, much current research is focused on the wrong set of questions. Salmon dissolves Frege's puzzle as it is usually formulated and demonstrates how it can be reconstructed and strengthened to yield a more powerful objection to the naive theory. He then defends the naive theory against the new Frege puzzle by presenting an idea that yields both a surprisingly rich and powerful extension of the naive theory and a better picture of information content than that of the original orthodox theory. Nathan Salmon is Professor of Philosophy, University of California at Santa Barbara. A Bradford Book.
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所蔵情報


: paper 中央図 自動書庫 116.3/Sa 55/50990425 1991
050211999004251

書誌詳細

一般注記 "Errata and alterations" -- p. [xiii]-xiv
Bibliography: p. [181]-186
Includes indexes
著者標目 *Salmon, Nathan U., 1951-
件 名 LCSH:Frege, Gottlob, 1848-1925 -- Contributions in semantics  全ての件名で検索
LCSH:Semantics (Philosophy) -- History -- 20th century  全ての件名で検索
分 類 NDLC:H151
LCC:B3245.F24
DC19:149/.946
書誌ID 1000176605
ISBN 0924922052
NCID BA43697140
巻冊次 : paper ; ISBN:0924922052
: cloth (lib. ed.) ; ISBN:0924922559
登録日 2009.09.11
更新日 2009.09.11