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<図書>
The nature of psychological explanation

責任表示 Robert Cummins
シリーズ Bradford book
データ種別 図書
出版情報 Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press , c1983
本文言語 英語
大きさ x, 219 p. : ill. ; 24 cm
概要 In exploring the nature of psychological explanation, this book looks at how psychologists theorize about the human ability to calculate, to speak a language and the like. It shows how good theorizing...explains or tries to explain such abilities as perception and cognition. It recasts the familiar explanations of "intelligence" and "cognitive capacity" as put forward by philosophers such as Fodor, Dennett, and others in terms of a theory of explanation that makes established doctrine more intelligible to professionals and their students. In particular, the book shows that vestigial adherence to the positivists' D-N model has distorted the view of philosophers of science about what psychologists (and biologists) do and has masked the real nature of explanation. Major sections in the book cover Analysis and Subsumption; Functional Analysis; Understanding Cognitive Capacities; and Historical Reflections. Robert Cummins is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Illinois, Chicago Circle. A Bradford Book. 続きを見る

所蔵情報



中央図 2A 140.1/C 95/1 1983
068582183013693

書誌詳細

一般注記 Bibliography: p. [211]-215
Includes index
著者標目 *Cummins, Robert
件 名 LCSH:Psychology -- Philosophy  全ての件名で検索
LCSH:Hermeneutics
LCSH:Cognition
MESH:Psychology
分 類 LCC:BF38.5
DC19:150/.1
書誌ID 1000130444
ISBN 0262030942
NCID BA04983423
巻冊次 ISBN:0262030942
登録日 2009.09.10
更新日 2009.09.10

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