Mendeley出力
＜図書＞
Cooperation and discord in U.S.-Soviet arms control
| 責任表示 | Steve Weber |
|---|---|
| データ種別 | 図書 |
| 出版情報 | Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press , c1991 |
| 本文言語 | 英語 |
| 大きさ | x, 331 p. ; 25 cm |
| 概要 | If international cooperation was difficult to achieve and to sustain during the Cold War, why then were two rival superpowers able to cooperate in placing limits on their central strategic weapons sys...ems? Extending an empirical approach to game theory--particularly that developed by Robert Axelrod--Steve Weber argues that although nations employ many different types of strategies broadly consistent with game theory's tit for tat, only strategies based on an ideal type of enhanced contingent restraint promoted cooperation in U.S.-Soviet arms control. As a theoretical analysis of the basic security behaviors of states, the book has implications that go beyond the three bilateral arms control cases Weber discusses--implications that remain important despite the end of superpower rivalry. An important theoretical analysis of cooperation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the area of arms control.... An excellent work on a subject that has received very little attention.--Choice 続きを見る |
所蔵情報
| 状態 | 巻次 | 所蔵場所 | 請求記号 | 刷年 | 文庫名称 | 資料番号 | コメント | 予約・取寄 | 複写申込 | 自動書庫 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
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中央図 3E | 391.1/W 51/1 | 1991 |
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068582194014825 |
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書誌詳細
| 一般注記 | Bibliography: p. [313]-325 Includes index |
|---|---|
| 著者標目 | *Weber, Steve, 1961- |
| 件 名 | LCSH:Nuclear arms control -- United States
全ての件名で検索
LCSH:Nuclear arms control -- Soviet Union 全ての件名で検索 LCSH:Strategic forces -- United States 全ての件名で検索 LCSH:Strategic forces -- Soviet Union 全ての件名で検索 LCSH:Game theory |
| 分 類 | LCC:JX1974.7 DC20:327.1/74 |
| 書誌ID | 1000130095 |
| ISBN | 0691078378 |
| NCID | BA12949249 |
| 巻冊次 | ISBN:0691078378 |
| 登録日 | 2009.09.10 |
| 更新日 | 2009.09.10 |