Mendeley出力
＜図書＞
Managerial dilemmas : the political economy of hierarchy
| 責任表示 | Gary J. Miller |
|---|---|
| シリーズ | Political economy of institutions and decisions |
| データ種別 | 図書 |
| 出版情報 | Cambridge [England] ; New York : Cambridge University Press , 1992 |
| 本文言語 | 英語 |
| 大きさ | xv, 254 p. ; 24 cm |
| 概要 | In organization theory a schism has developed between the traditional organizational behavior literature, based in psychology, sociology and political science, and the more analytically rigorous field...of organizational economics. The former stresses the importance of managerial leadership and cooperation among employees, while the latter focuses on the engineering of incentive systems that will induce efficiency, and profitability, by rewarding worker self-interest. In this innovative book, Gary Miller bridges the gap between these literatures. He demonstrates that it is impossible to design an incentive system based on self-interest that will effectively discipline all subordinates and superiors and obviate or overcome the roles of political conflict, collective action, and leadership in an organization. Applying game theory to the analysis of the roles of cooperation and political leadership in organizational hierarchies, he concludes that the organization whose managers can inspire cooperation and the transcendence of short-term interest in its employees enjoys a competitive advantage. In organization theory a schism has developed between the traditional organizational behavior literature, based in psychology, sociology and political science, and the more analytically rigorous field of organizational economics. The former stresses the importance of managerial leadership and cooperation among employees, while the latter focuses on the engineering of incentive systems that will induce efficiency, and profitability, by rewarding worker self-interest. In this innovative book, Gary Miller bridges the gap between these literatures. He demonstrates that it is impossible to design an incentive system based on self-interest that will effectively discipline all subordinates and superiors and obviate or overcome the roles of political conflict, collective action, and leadership in an organization. Applying game theory to the analysis of the roles of cooperation and political leadership in organizational hierarchies, he concludes that the organization whose managers can inspire cooperation and the transcendence of short-term interest in its employees enjoys a competitive advantage. 続きを見る |
所蔵情報
| 状態 | 巻次 | 所蔵場所 | 請求記号 | 刷年 | 文庫名称 | 資料番号 | コメント | 予約・取寄 | 複写申込 | 自動書庫 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
|
中央図 3B | 336.3/Mi 27-4/1 | 1992 |
|
068172193019698 |
|
書誌詳細
| 一般注記 | Includes bibliographical references (p. 239-245) and indexes |
|---|---|
| 著者標目 | *Miller, Gary J. |
| 件 名 | LCSH:Industrial management LCSH:Organizational behavior LCSH:Psychology, Industrial LCSH:Employee motivation LCSH:Incentives in industry |
| 分 類 | LCC:HD31 DC20:658.4/02 |
| 書誌ID | 1000125212 |
| ISBN | 052137281X |
| NCID | BA14197971 |
| 巻冊次 | : hard ; ISBN:052137281X : pbk ; ISBN:0521457696 |
| 登録日 | 2009.09.10 |
| 更新日 | 2009.09.10 |